Anglo-French Naval Rivalry: 1840-1870.

Neilson, Keith

By C.I. Hamilton. Don Mills, Ontario, Clarendon Press (Oxford University Press), 1993. xiii, 359 pp. $90.00.

The traditional charge levelled against naval history is that it is parochial, often narrowly fixed on technology, and treats its subject as if the navy existed independent of society. That this charge cannot be made against C.I. Hamilton, a lecturer at the University of the Witwatersrand, should come as no surprise to those who have read his perceptive articles published during the last decade. In fact, Hamilton, using the navies of the two countries as his focus, combines traditional diplomatic history, administrative history, the history of technology, and the history of tactics to provide a fascinating account of the long-standing Anglo-French rivalry at sea. The book is based on a wide range of archival material from both sides of the channel, including fifty sets of private papers.

The focus of the book is the French challenge to the supremacy of the Royal Navy (R.N.). After the French humiliation during the Mehemet Ali crisis of 1839-40, a humiliation believed to have occurred largely due to the inferiority of the French navy, there was a determined effort in Paris to make la Royale the equivalent of the R.N. The rise of steam-powered ships in the 1840s allowed the French to engage the R.N. in a naval arms race wherein the new technology made the R.N.'s superiority in existing sailing ships irrelevant. The new ships, independent of wind and tide, also raised great fears of a French invasion force crossing the channel on a "steam bridge." Hamilton is particularly good at showing how each technological change, from sail to paddle wheeler to screw, played into these fears and ensured that relations between the two countries remained tense. Ironically, the two fleets that were designed to fight against one another instead fought as allies against Russia in the Crimean War; however, that conflict underlined the advantages that steam power provided.

After the Crimea, the technological naval race continued unabated, with the French leading the way in the transition to the ironclad. By 1863-64, Hamilton argues, the French had achieved what they had set out to do in 1840: la Royale was a force equivalent to the R.N. Why, then, did relations between the two countries improve? In his long and thoughtful conclusion, Hamilton steps outside the naval mould and outlines the non-maritime factors that led to an Anglo-French detente. Wounded French amour propre had been instrumental in beginning the arms race; the very success (and the tacit British recognition of the fact as demonstrated in the provisions of the Treaty of Paris dealing with laws of the sea) of the French effort to gain equality provided a balm that removed much of the sting of wounded pride. Further, the changing situation on the continent -- the rise of a unified Italy and a powerful Prussia -- required that France concentrate more on terrene matters, depriving la Royale of funds. For the British, this was all to the good, and, besides, the focus of British politics in the 1860s was on parliamentary reform. With the French navy no longer seeming an imminent threat, the R.N. was also given less money, and the Anglo-French naval race diminished.

The above outlines the basic thrust of the book, but there are individual chapters that add richness to the account. In a long comparative account of the nature of the personnel of the two navies, Hamilton shows how the differing natures of the two states affected recruiting. In France, with its tradition of state service, the inscription maritime obliged all those who made their living at sea to be liable to service in the French navy, whereas in Britain, a maritime country lacking in such traditions, the admiralty recruited by voluntary means. The problems in manning engendered by the Crimean War demonstrated the weaknesses of the British policy; the result was the creation of the Royal Navy Reserve (R.N.R.). However, the overarching control was always provided by the dead hand of the treasury, and the R.N.R lived a precarious existence. Above decks, the French officer corps was drawn from a wider social strata than was its British counterpart and enjoyed a significantly better education. This was particularly true of the elite that passed through the French naval school, situated on the Borda.

This advantage to the French also was evident in French naval architecture, although not in dockyards. The reason for the former was simple: the French had a better education system and were more systematic in their development of new designs. The reason for the latter was also straightforward. The British dockyards not only catered to the R.N., but also to the British merchant marine, by far the world's largest, thus creating excess capacity that could be tapped in time of crisis. The size and strength of the British economy generally multiplied this effect. Whatever the R.N. required could generally be found in the private sector, in contrast to the situation in France, where la Royale was largely supplied by state concerns.

Two other important matters are tackled by Hamilton. The first is a comparative examination of the admiralty and the Ministry of the Marine; the second is a consideration of the effect of technological change on naval strategy. Just as was the case with the officer corps, Hamilton gives the clear edge in administrative competence and organization to the French; however, French superiority in this regard did not ensure French naval superiority as long as the R.N. enjoyed firm political support and was backed by Britain's industrial resources. As to the impact of technology on naval warfare, Hamilton points out -- in a chapter that is virtually identical to an article that he published in 1983, a fact that is not acknowledged -- that the French, in particular, attempted to "militarize" naval tactics by applying theories of land warfare to the sea. While this had its vogue, the R.N. largely ignored the French initiative in favour of its own concerns about imperial defence.

This is an exceptional book that propels naval history into the mainstream of historical endeavour. It is well-written, well-organized, and impeccably researched. My disagreements with it are on matters of emphasis. In my view, Hamilton overestimates the centrality of la Royale in British naval planning. As the recent work of Andrew Lambert and John C.K Daly has shown, prior to the Crimean War the R.N. was just as concerned about the Russian as the French fleet. Equally, the R.N.'s worldside responsibilities are not given much prominence by Hamilton, surely a distortion of its global role. But these are simply matters for debate: Anglo-French Naval Rivalry is an instant classic of the new naval history, and required reading for anyone interested in Anglo-French relations in the period.