Constitutional and legislative framework for inclusive education in Australia.
Forlin, Chris
IN this article we argue that, despite the complex arrangement of
laws and policies for education in Australia, there is no legal mandate
to ensure that inclusive education occurs. Although the legislative
framework for inclusion appears deficient compared with other western
countries, there are avenues for persons with a disability to seek
redress. The legislative structure for education in Australia is
presented from a constitutional basis. The duties, rights and
responsibilities of teachers, specifically when including children with
disabilities in their regular classrooms, are examined from a legal
perspective. Finally, recent cases which have challenged regular class
placements for children with disabilities are reviewed.
Introduction
As countries have increasingly adopted inclusive approaches to
education, their policies have reflected the need to ensure equitable
educational practices for all children. International legal systems have
formed a model by which educators have viewed the process of inclusion.
Frameworks for determining the rights of a child to education originate
in a number of international declarations and recommendations such as
the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948). Children's rights to education have been
enhanced further in the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the
Child, 1959 (Osmanczyk, 1985) where the initial responsibility for the
education and guidance of the child is bestowed upon the parents. In
Principle 7 of this Declaration, the right to education provides
reference to the need for both `equal' and `full' opportunity
for a child's moral and social development. Equality of education
is promoted in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
UN 1966 (Osmanczyk, 1985). This Covenant includes a generality clause:
`All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law' (Article 26).
The foundations for ensuring the rights of all children to
education were first established by the United Nations (UN). These
rights were then incorporated into national documents which formed the
principles upon which educational policies were developed. Although the
rights of a child to education have been established by international
agreements, it is the interpretation of these rights that is crucial to
the implementation of the fight of all children to access similar
educational opportunities.
Since the early 1960s, the UN has promoted greater awareness of the
educational needs and rights of children with a disability (Convention
against Discrimination in Education, 1960; Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons, 1971; Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
Persons, 1975; International Year of Disabled Persons, 1981; Decade of
Disabled Persons, 1983-1992) (for UN and international agreements, see
Osmanczyk, 1985). These initiatives have been aimed at full
participation for people with a disability by promoting the development
of positive attitudes and by the provision of appropriate physical,
social, economic and educational opportunities for persons with a
disability. The most recent UN framework regarding the fight of a child
to education is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). This has generated formal commitment by over 107 countries and
states, 35 of which are signatories (Alston, Parker, & Seymour,
1992). The Convention imposes a series of duties owed to a child and/or
the child's parents or guardians, and promotes the `best interests
of the child' principle (Poiner, 1996). In addition to the right of
a child to education, the Convention specifies that this should be on
the basis of equal opportunity (Article 28(1)).
An important outcome of the UN recommendations on the protection of
human rights, including the right to education, lies in their influence
on law and practice in the international community (Baehr &
Gordenker, 1992). The UN established that children are considered to
have the right `to education' on the basis of `equal
opportunity' and to the development of their `fullest
potential'. In many instances, this has been interpreted to mean
the inclusion of all students, regardless of disability, in regular
classrooms. The UN has promoted greater commitment to inclusion by
advocating the principle of equity throughout the whole school system.
Inclusive education incorporates the notion of social justice and
considers the education of students with a disability to be an issue of
equity, rather than simply one of placement (Ashman & Elkins, 1994).
Inclusive education also implies a need to reconsider and reform school
curriculum in order to cater for all children.
The UN has provided the stimulus for individual countries and
states to develop their own code of ethics and legislation. The rights
of a child to education, as advocated by the UN, are reflected strongly
in the legislation that has emerged in the United States of America (USA).
Educational provision for students with a disability in the USA
In the USA, the education of children with a disability has been
determined by federal and state law, the civil rights movement and
associated court cases together with changing social and political
beliefs (Friend & Bursuck, 1996). Federal and state laws reflect the
UN principles of ensuring that all children have the right to equitable
educational opportunities. In addition, legislation has been affected
strongly by the outcome of key court cases which directly influenced the
introduction of the first public law to establish federal guidelines for
special education services. In Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S.
483, 1954) it was established that it was inequitable to discriminate by
segregating specific children and denying them access to certain
schools. The Pennsylvania and the Mills cases established the principle
of providing a free public education for all students regardless of
disability.(1)
Together with Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
(1973), which enforced the principles of non-discrimination towards
people with a disability and of equal educational opportunities for
them, these cases were instrumental in promoting the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (PL94-142, USA, 1975). Subsequent
interpretations of the Act conclude that a child should be placed in the
`least restricted environment' (LRE). This Act was reauthorised as
PL101-476 the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). IDEA
reaffirms the major provisions of the earlier legislation but uses the
preferred term of `disability' as opposed to `handicap' and
reflects greater emphasis on inclusive education for children with
severe disabilities. Under this Act, children whose educational
achievements are affected by one or more of the following disabilities
are entitled to receive special education services: mental retardation,
learning disabilities, speech or language impairments, deaf-blindness,
serious emotional disturbance, autism, hearing or visual impairments,
orthopaedic impairments, traumatic brain injury and other health
impairments.
Together with landmark cases, the federal laws provide a basis for
ensuring non-discrimination with respect to children with a disability,
their equal access to appropriate education, and the financial provision
necessary to support them. In the United States, inclusion is considered
to be a right rather than a privilege as defined in IDEA's
requirement to prohibit the placement of a child with a disability
outside a regular class if inclusion, with appropriate support services,
can be achieved satisfactorily. There are also significant legislative
frameworks in the United Kingdom (UK) for inclusive education.
Educational provision for students with a disability in the UK
England and Wales have a key document, the Code of Practice, which
was prepared by the Department for Education (1994), on the
identification and assessment of children with special educational
needs. This document sets out the legal position in respect of children
with special education needs (SEN). Although the document does not
legislate formally for inclusion, it does include the following
presupposition in favour of inclusion:
Children with special education needs, including those children with
statements of special educational needs, should, where appropriate and
taking into account the wishes of their parents, be educated alongside
their peers in mainstream schools (Department of Education, 1994 1:2).(2)
Although the Code has national implications, it is the local
education authorities (LEAs) who have the legal responsibility for SEN
provision. Consequently there is noticeable variation in the degree to
which inclusive education is practiced among LEAs. Some authorities are
highly inclusive whereas others maintain a segregated special school
focus, although most LEAs provide a continuum of services.
Compared with the legislation in the USA (IDEA), whereby
educational provision for children with a disability is seen to be a
right, in the UK the duty to provide education for children with a
disability is prescribed in law and policy.
Inclusive practices in Australia
Many of the arguments applied to educational practices in
.Australia have emanated from other legal systems. In particular, the
move towards inclusive education has been influenced greatly by PL
94-142 and the IDEA in the USA. The outcomes of the recommendations
contained in these two acts have been a major influence on policy
development in Australia for the education of children with a
disability. Specifically the recommendation for an appropriate education
in the `least restricted environment' is reflected in most
Australian policies.
Written formulation for the protection of the interests of all
children in Australia regardless of disability, to equal educational
opportunities, :is located in an array of commonwealth, state and
territory statutes, ordinances, regulations and court decisions.
Statutory provisions are to be found in several acts, including
anti-discrimination and disability services legislation, education acts
and health and safety legislation. Although a child's right to
education is not sated explicitly in any Australian law, these acts
reflect the principles contained in the UN agreements.
The Commonwealth Government, unlike the federal system in the USA,
or the Department for Education in the UK, has no specific legislative
powers in state education, although it does have an influence over
educational policy making via funding arrangements. A lack of national
legislation regarding the education of students with a disability is
seen by some to provide both a strength and a weakness (Friend 87
Bursuck, 1996). It can also be argued that, with the current trend
throughout Australia towards decentralising education and the devolution of management to individual schools, the absence of appropriate federal
legislation may result in inequality of service provision to students
requiring additional support (Forlin 8: Forlin, 1996).
In 1994, a ten-year framework for commonwealth departments and
agencies was produced (Commonwealth Disability Strategy, 1994). This
framework reflects a change in Australia from a welfare perspective to
one which is fights based regarding meeting the needs of people with a
disability. According to the Commonwealth disability strategy report
(1994), `Australia is committed to the principle of equal opportunities
for children, youth and adults with a disability in integrated settings
in primary, secondary and tertiary education' (p.28). Currently, in
most states and territories, education provision for children with a
disability concludes at the age of 18 years when they are deemed to be
no longer eligible under state education acts. Although several cases
have `been brought which challenge this position (e.g. Hashish v. The
Minister for Education of Queensland (1996) EOC 92-806), they have all
been unsuccessful.
Legislative structure for education in Australia
The structure and function of education law in any country emanates
from a constitutional basis. Law provides a framework to permit the
operation of educational systems in Australia from the perspective of
authority, duty, power, responsibility and policy. The High Court of
Australia interprets the Constitution through cases brought before it
and rules on the validity of laws. Education law is, however,
jurisdictionally discrete and the current legislative basis for
education in Australia varies on a state-by-state basis. The Australian
Constitution (1900) confirms that the organisation and governance of
education is a responsibility of the states.
The Commonwealth Government is empowered to override state
provisions by applying its `external affairs' power in Section
51(xxix) of the Constitution. The statutory framework for education in
Australia is complex, but of primary concern are the education acts in
the states and territories. These acts and their updates provide the
structure for education provision and they also define the duties,
rights and responsibilities of participants.
In Australia, many of the federal and state laws that determine the
extent of inclusive education are relatively new. Although none of them
guarantee an unequivocal right to inclusion, their interpretation by the
courts is important. Judicial interpretation of law provides resolution
to educational issues of dispute and establishes precedent for future
decisions.
In schools, there is a weight of tradition which embraces ideas
such as accepted practice, teaching beliefs, professional practice and
community expectations among other issues of tradition. As a result,
there may be conflict between established law and local customs which
may require arbitration. Such was the case in Clayton v. State of
Victoria [1968] VR 562 where the accepted practice of maintaining
chemicals in a non-secure environment was criticised, but no liability
was found as this was deemed to be traditional practice in the school.
In the majority of cases, established law will override local customs.
With respect to inclusive education, though, there is very little
established practice in Australia. Traditions are emerging, however, and
it will be interesting to see how custom law interfaces with established
law in this regard.
Teachers now have to educate students with a broad range of
disabilities in their classes. It is, therefore, important that they are
aware of their duties, rights and responsibilities, particularly those
that pertain to inclusive education.
Teachers -- duties, rights and responsibilities
Many teachers in Australia include children in their regular
classes who have a range of special needs. Of major concern to regular
class teachers, when including a student with a disability in their
classroom, is that the teachers may not perceive that they have the
specific skills or training to perform their duties adequately.
Regardless of training, all teachers owe a legal duty of care to all
their students (Forlin & Forlin, 1998). In order to carry out this
duty, teachers need to understand the special needs of each child so
that reasonable care may be taken to ensure the child's safety. A
lack of specific training for teachers regarding children with special
needs does not justify the provision of less than adequate care. The
duty of care for teachers is premised upon the susceptibility of
children to injury. The more likely an accident, the greater the duty to
guard against it (established in Ricketts v. Erith Borough Council and
Another [1943] 2 All ER. 629). In educational systems, the duty of care
is more onerous where younger children are concerned and where the
activities being undertaken are of a hazardous nature. It is even
greater for children with disabilities.
The standard of care which teachers are expected to show towards
students under their authority is deemed to be that which would be
exercised by a reasonably careful and prudent person in reasonably
foreseeable circumstances (Fleming, 1992). The standard of care required
is measured according to the circumstances. The more serious the likely
outcomes of a course of action, the greater are the precautions required
by law. For example, in Paris v. Stepney .Borough Council [1951] AC 367,
a partially blind person was allowed to work without goggles. His good
eye was seriously injured. Damages were claimed in respect of that
injury on the grounds that the employers were negligent in failing to
demand the wearing of goggles. The case was upheld and the defendants
were found to be negligent.
In schools, some students may be more susceptible than others to
accidents and therefore require extended or more diligent supervision.
In Moore v. Hampshire County Council (1982) 80 LGR. 418, a gift aged 12
had been born with dislocated hips. As a result, she had undergone
numerous operations and walked with a limp. Her mother told the school
that she was not to take part in physical education. While attempting a
handstand, the plaintiff fell and broke her ankle. On appeal, it was
held that the teacher had failed to conform to the standard required of
her towards the child who was in her care. In the final ruling, Watkins
LJ. stated that when the parent of a child who has a physical disability
tells the school the child is not to participate in physical education,
the school is under a duty to give effect to it. The Moore ruling
implies an increased duty of care for teachers who include children with
disabilities in their classrooms. It is of particular note, with respect
to this ruling, that even when a teacher is unaware of a parental
directive, that teacher is still under a duty to comply with it.
Further issues such as school excursions need to be considered
within a framework of inclusive education. The duty of care for teachers
with respect to off-site activities is unclear. What is established is
that such activities require careful planning (Ayoub v. Downs (1982,
SC(NSW) unreported), full authority from school administration (Brown v.
Nelson and Others (1971) LGR. 20), and adequate supervision (Bills v.
State of South Australia (1987) 38 SASR 80).
Teachers have a responsibility to supervise adequately all students
in their care. Supervision that falls below a certain standard may
result in injuries to students and subsequent legal action. The duty to
look after students with appropriate care intensifies when students with
a range of disabilities, including behavioural and emotional problems,
are included in regular classrooms. Teachers are required to refrain
from actions that may cause injury to students as well as take positive
steps towards maintaining their students' safety.
If teachers do not provide an adequate standard of care for their
students they may be in breach of their duty. Breach of duty is the
failure to conform to the standard of conduct required in a given set of
circumstances which results in the cause of harm (Carmarthenshire County
Council v. Lewis [1955] AC 549). For example, in Barnes v. Hampshire
County Council [1969] 1 WL1K 1563, a five-year-old child was run down by
a vehicle following release from school. The authority was held liable
for damages because further issues such as age and disability were
considered as relevant to the capacity of the child to appreciate the
danger. The duty and standard of care, therefore, vary according to the
circumstances. To explain the duty of care for teachers in inclusive
education, it is necessary to determine the standard of care required of
all teachers.
In the majority of cases, the courts have looked to the profession
to define which standard of care and supervision may be applied, noting
that professional standards have changed over time. Decisions made
regarding the standard of care required need to reflect both the
foreseeability of a situation and the determination of what may be
deemed to be reasonable in that situation.
A person cannot be held negligent if the damage was not a
foreseeable consequence of the conduct. An individual is not expected to
avoid injury at all costs, but is expected to act with reason in
particular circumstances. The standard used to define reasonable action
is an objective standard. In Foster v. Houston General Insurance
Company, 407 So.2d 759 (La. App 1981, USA), an elementary school teacher
took a group of 10- and 11-year-old children, who were to varying
degrees intellectually impaired, on a walk to a local park. One boy
suddenly ran onto the road and was hit by a vehicle. He died later. The
Court held that the teacher had breached the duty of care by not
providing appropriate supervision and not acting in a reasonable manner.
The Court held further that the teacher should have chosen a safer route
to the park and should have foreseen the risk. The children in question
had poor attention spans, poor hearing and insufficient experience with
busy roads and highways. The teacher was, therefore, found to be
negligent in providing reasonable care. The Foster v. Houston ruling
implies that a teacher has an increased duty to look after students with
intellectual impairments and, in this particular case, the teacher had
failed to act in a reasonable manner in the circumstances that had
prevailed. The foreseeability and reasonableness of an action,
therefore, is the test for negligence in education and elsewhere
(Glasgow Corporation v. Muir [HL, 1943]).
In Australia, children have a legal right to attend school and
their parents must ensure that this occurs. Although parents have a
legal obligation to enrol their children in school, there is no
reciprocal obligation for education authorities to provide an education
for the child once enrolled. In Queensland, for example, `the
Minister's duties are entirely discretionary and consequently the
Minister has no real obligation to provide your child with an education
once you have enrolled him or her' (Fitzgerald, 1994, p.63).
The promotion of equal educational opportunities for all children,
together
with greater emphasis being placed on the right of children to be
educated in the school of their choice, has led many parents to opt to
enrol their children with disabilities in their local regular school.
This has resulted in some difficulties whereby parents have begun to
challenge the right of their children to attend their local school and,
simultaneously, schools have begun to question the suitability of
regular class placement for all children. With respect to children with
severe disabilities, the situation of placement varies throughout
Australia. In Western Australia, Tasmania, South Australia, Victoria and
the Northern Territory, there are provisions that empower the Minister
to place such students (e.g. Education Act, Tas, 1994, s.21). In the
Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and New South Wales, the laws
are silent on this placement issue. To date there have been only limited
challenges regarding school placement and choice under the various state
anti-discrimination and equal opportunity acts (e.g. Martinovic v.
Ministry of Education (1989) EOC 92-264; Finn v. Minister of Education
(1995) EOC 92-722).
The legislative framework for special education in Australia does
not provide for inclusion rights despite the fact that there are
currently several policies for inclusion and integration.
Notwithstanding the presence of policy :frameworks for inclusion, law
will override policy on an issue, if tested. Although all states and
territories in Australia appear committed to inclusion in principle,
these inclusion policies are not formalised by legal mandates. In this
respect, Australia differs from the USA and the UK. Before such rights
are effected in law in Australia, the various education statutes require
amendment. This has not yet occurred. In Australia, there is a trend
towards anti-discrimination and equal opportunity legislation as a means
of resolving issues such as inclusion. This trend is now reviewed.
Anti-discrimination law as a vehicle for redress
Anti-discrimination legislation in the commonwealth and in the
states and territories is complex and expansive. Commonwealth
anti-discrimination legislation covers the areas of sexual, racial,
political, and disability discrimination.(4) In the states and
territories, the range of issues covered by this type of legislation
varies. These laws are applicable to primary, secondary and tertiary
education systems, together with further education and training sectors
(e.g. Disability Discrimination Act, Clth, 1992, s.4(1);
Anti-Discrimination Act, Qld, 1991, s.,4). In general, comprehensive
anti-discrimination legislation has been enacted in Australia in
response to international approaches to human rights. In the context of
this article and within the debate regarding inclusive education,
disability legislation is of critical importance.
Of particular significance is the meaning of the terms applied.
Definitions of disability are highly relevant when explaining a legal
framework. Although there are definitions for disability(5), issues such
as learning difficulty and learning disability are not adequately
defined. In order to proceed with a case under anti-discrimination
legislation, it is necessary to show that a person possesses a
disability as defined in law. Currently, throughout the various
jurisdictions, broad definitions apply. (e.g. Disability Services Act,
Qld, 1992, s.5; Disability Services Act, WA, 1993, s.3).
In Australia, two approaches are recognised: direct discrimination
(e.g. Anti-Discrimination Act, Qld, 1991, s.9, s.10; Equal Opportunity
Act, Vic, 1995, s.7, s.8) and indirect discrimination (e.g. Equal
Opportunity Act, WA, 1984, 66V(3); Equal Opportunity Act, SA, 1984,
s.29, s.51, s.85). Implicit in direct discrimination is that no student
should receive less acceptable educational treatment because of a
disability than would be received by a person without a disability in
the same educational environment. This principle does not demand
inclusion but mandates educational authorities to provide facilities for
a person or persons with a disability that permit an equal access to
education (Martinovic v. Ministry of Education (1989) EOC 92-264). In
the Martinovic case, brought before the Victorian Equal Opportunity
Board, it was alleged that two children with hearing and intellectual
disabilities were discriminated against by receiving less favourable
treatment. No discrimination was found to have occurred. The Board ruled
that, if the Ministry had provided all the services requested for the
two children with disabilities, this might have constitututed
discrimination against other children in the same educational
environment.
Indirect discrimination may be applicable in circumstances where
there is no intention to discriminate but the practice of persons or the
exercise of certain policies might be deemed discriminatory against
persons with a disability. An example of indirect discrimination is the
requirement that all children wear the same uniform irrespective of religious and/or cultural belie (Mandla v. Lee [1983] 1 All ER 1062).
The issue of services and facilities for children with disabilities
poses particular problems for educational authorities. Authorities are
obliged to provide facilities that offer all students equal access to
education. Should appropriate facilities not be provided for persons
with a disability, then indirect discrimination might be found by a
court. The Victorian Equal Opportunity Board, however, found otherwise
in the Martinovic case. In educational establishments, the provision of
facilities for all students is problematic. This issue encompasses a
wide area including the provision of computers, library facilities,
scientific, and technological equipment and off-site activities such as
excursions and camps. To deny a person with a disability access to any
of these facilities, among others, might be deemed to be discriminatory.
Should a student with a disability have been treated less
favourably than other students, then anti-discrimination laws may
provide a framework for redress. Should an education authority encounter
`unjustifiable hardship', however, in meeting the requirements of
anti-discrimination legislation (Disability Discmination Act, Clth,
1992, s.22(4); Anti-Discrimination Act, Qld, 1991, s.44(2)) then
exemptions under the principle of `reasonable accommodation' may be
applied.(6)
A further issue of potential discrimination during inclusive
education relates to the behaviour of a child with a disability. In New
South Wales, the Equal Opportunity Tribunal (1991) established that a
person could not be discriminated against on the grounds of behaviour if
that behaviour was imputed to the disability (Welsh v. The Commissioner
Soil Conservation Service of New South Wales EOC 92-330). The first
educational case to challenge this issue was heard before the Victorian
Equal Opportunity Tribunal (Lynch v. Sacred Hearst College & Ors,
92-724, 1995). The complainant asserted that she suffered from a
temporary psychological impairment caused by an alleged sexual assault
and it was this impairment that caused the unacceptable behaviour that
she exhibited at the school. The complainant had been given various
detentions and was suspended and advised to transfer to another school.
The Tribunal found that, at the time of the alleged acts, there was
nothing to indicate that the complainant was suffering from an
impairment or that the respondent ought to have been aware of an
impairment. The behaviour problems that caused the school to suspend the
complainant were not found to be directly linked to any impairment;
therefore, in this case, no discrimination had occurred.
The link between behaviour and impairment was also considered in
the case of a seven-year-old child in Queensland brought under the
Anti-Discrimination Act (Qld, 1991). The child exhibited an intellectual
impairment but was expelled from the regular state school that she had
been attending because of her disturbing behaviour (L v. Minister for
Education (1996) EOC 92-787: Welsh v. Commissioner applied as
authority). It was found that `her disruptive behaviours are elemental to her impairment and without them she would not have been suspended
from school' (Holmes J, 1995, p.8). The judgement upheld the claim
that `L' had been discriminated against within the meaning of
s.10(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act, and specifically under s.39 by
an educational authority denying her access to the opportunity of
continuing her instruction at the same school. Although the judgement
acknowledged that `L' had been discriminated against because her
behaviour was a direct result of her impairment, it was also held that
thins discrimination was not unlawful. The Minister for Education argued
that, under s.44 of the Anti-Discrimination Act, `L' required
special services or facilities that would impose unjustifiable hardship
on the educational authority. Holmes J considered unjustifiable hardship
to include not only economic liability but also the human costs and
benefits involved. He ruled that although he was not required to resolve
the debate as to whether full inclusion was the best method for teaching
children with an intellectual disability, there were other relevant
issues that needed consideration. Specifically Holmes J proposed:
The stresses placed on teaching staff at Beta without specialist training
and the disruption entailed to other children are such as to outweigh the
benefits to L and to constitute unjustifiable hardship to the Department
should it be compelled to accept L back into the Beta School (L v. Minister
for Education (1996) EOC 92-787, p.78,821)
Similar findings have occurred in two recent cases in Queensland (K
v. N School, No. H54 of 1996; P v. Director-General, Department of
Education, No. H53 of 1995). In each case, the schools had advised the
parents theft they could no longer continue to enrol their children as
it was causing them unjustifiable hardship to meet their specialised
needs. Both tribunals found that the children had been discriminated
against on the grounds of their impairment. This discrimination was,
however, not ruled to be unlawful as it was deemed that continued
placement at the regular schools required special services or facilities
that would have caused the schools unjustifiable hardship. Both cases
were subsequently dismissed.
It would appear that a precedent has now been set. Although it has
been found to be unlawful to discriminate against a child on the grounds
of behaviour if that behaviour is linked to a disability, it has also
been established that this discrimination is not unlawful if its
avoidance will cause the school unjustifiable hardship. Additional cases
are likely to clarify the breadth of unjustifiable hardship and such
interpretations will be significant for the inclusion movement in
Australia.
It may take a considerable time for cases to go to trial and,
because of the urgency to consider the child's education, interim
decisions often have to be made. The two recent cases in Queensland
brought before the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal required interim
decisions. In both cases, the plaintiffs were applying to be allowed to
continue at their present regular schools while waiting for their cases
to be heard (K v. N School, No Misc. 10 of 1995; P v. Minister for
Education, No Misc.12/95). In both cases the judgements were based upon
the `balance of convenience' and what was in the `best
interest' of the child. Where the child was still at the school (K
v. N School), it was ruled that the child be allowed to continue until
the case was heard. Where the child had already left the school (P v.
Minister for Education), it was ruled that the child should not be
allowed to return until the tribunal had met for a full hearing. The
preservation of the status quo was the underlying principle upon which
both judges appeared to make their decisions.
Should anti-discrimination litigation not offer an appropriate
solution for redress, then a student with a disability might proceed
with a claim for educational negligence and seek compensation in this
way.
Educational negligence
Educational negligence applies to the idea that teachers may be
held accountable for how they teach. Educational negligence poses
further considerations while the normal tests for negligence need to be
met. A duty of care must be owed to the student; there must be
educational carelessness proven as a result of that duty; and because of
carelessness or incompetence, on the part of a teacher or an educational
system, a student must have suffered damage. There is currently no case
law in Australia concerning educational negligence. In the USA, most
courts have decided against extending the duty of care to encompass
educational negligence because of public policy considerations. That is
not to suggest that students in Australia, including students with a
disability, might not proceed with claims of educational negligence
against teachers. A plaintiff will need to show that a duty of care
exists between the teacher and the student with respect to the
educational issues raised. In England and Wales, courts have accepted
the principle that legal claims based on the negligence of school
systems and on educators to respond properly to the learning needs of
students with a disability may be heard. English courts, however, have
not to date held teachers accountable for educating in a careless manner. Nor have they held that educators who give careless advice or
fail to discover a learning disability and fail to implement appropriate
strategies are legally responsible. In X and others (minors) v.
Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 3 All ER 353, it was ruled that
schools assume responsibility for the physical safety and educational
needs of children. Australia, however, is not bound by the rulings in
the House of Lords, but such rulings may exert an influence on
Australian courts.
The law of negligence has been developed so that students in
schools have recourse to financial compensation should foreseeable
physical damage occur during school hours. It may be reasonable to
assume that similar principles might apply should intellectual damage
occur to students as a result of incompetent teaching or educational
carelessness. An appropriate standard of care is, however, difficult to
apply to all students due, in part, to the varying interpretation of
acceptable teaching standards and the unacceptable burden on the courts
should litigation in educational negligence become common.
Conclusion
It has been established that the legislative framework for special
education in Australia does not provide for inclusion rights despite the
fact that there are current policies for inclusion and integration
within the various jurisdictions. Appropriate policy and practice in
Australia are essential components of inclusion; however both are open
to legal challenge and might be found deficient, if tested at law.
Unlike the USA, where people's rights are promoted by constitution,
in Australia, specific laws and policies are required to ensure equality
of opportunity. In the absence of legal provisions for inclusion,
anti-discrimination and equal opportunity law appear to be providing
avenues for redress for persons with a disability. The lack of
legislative frameworks for inclusion in Australian jurisdictions,
promotes the need to develop suitable legal models.
Of major importance is that teachers have a legal responsibility to
offer reasonable care to all children in their classes, regardless of
the child's disability or the adequacy or otherwise of their own
training. Teachers who dc, not provide an adequate standard of care may
be deemed negligent. It is essential that teachers are fully aware of
their obligations to all children in their care, particularly those with
special needs. In cases where a child's
behaviour causes difficulties or where additional resources and
support are required, schools appear reluctant to accommodate these
students. In this regard, schools have been successful in challenging
parents' right to choose a regular school for their child on the
grounds of `unjustifiable hardship'. Even where an action by a
school has been shown to be discriminatory, it has not necessarily been
ruled as illegal. This is likely to form a precendent for future
inclusive practices. Although regular schools are willing to include
students who have reasonable social skills and who require limited
additional support, they are concerned about accepting all children with
special needs. In increasingly devolving education systems, resources
are likely to be allocated more to individual schools and less
externally funded support will be provided for children with
disabilities. Extensive demands on limited resources may not augur well
for increased inclusive practices.
Keywords
constitutional law
disability discrimination
discriminatory legislation
educational discrimination
international law
special needs students
Notes
(1) The Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D.Pa. 1971); 343
F.Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972); and Mills v. Board of Education of District
of Columbia (348 F.Supp.866 (D.D.C. 1972)).
(2) The Code defines explicitly the provision that schools need to
make for children identified as giving their teachers 'cause for
concern'. It also defines these children in terms of identifiable
characteristics. It prescribes the degree of assessment and support that
should be provided at different levels within a school using existing
resources.
(3) Currently the following legislation provides for the placement
of children with disabilities in special education: Education Act, SA,
1972, s.75(a); Education Act, Vic, 1958, ss.64(C)-(H); Education Act,
WA, 1928, ss.20(A)(D)(F); Education Act, NT, 1979, ss.34-35; Education
Act, Tas, 1994, s.21.
(4) Sex Discrimination Act, C1th, 1984; Racial Discrimination Act,
C1th, 1975; and the Disability Discrimination Act, Clth, 1992.
(5) A comprehensive explanation of disability is supplied in the
commonwealth act at Section 4 (Disability Discrimination Act, Clth,
1992).
(6) For variations in interpretation of `unjustifiable
hardship' and `reasonable accommodation', see
Anti-Discrimination Act, NSW, 1977, s.4(4); Anti-Discrimination Act,
Qld, 1991, s.5, s.44; Disability Discrimination Act, Clth, 1992, s.11,
s.22(4).
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Dr Peter Forlin and Dr Chris Forlin are Lecturers in the Faculty of
Education, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Queensland 4350.
Peter Forlin
Chris Forlin
University of Southern Queensland