Can feedback from the jumbo CD market improve bank surveillance?
Gilbert, R. Alton ; Meyer, Andrew P. ; Vaughan, Mark D. 等
In recent years, policymakers in the Basel countries have begun
exploring strategies for harnessing financial markets to contain bank
risk. Indeed, the new Accord counts market discipline, along with
supervisory review and capital requirements, as an explicit pillar of
bank supervision. (1) A popular proposal for implementing market
discipline in the United States would require large banks to issue a
standardized form of subordinated debt (Board of Governors 1999; Board
of Governors 2000; Meyer 2001). Advocates of this proposal argue that
high-powered performance incentives in the subordinated debt (sub-debt)
market will produce accurate risk assessments. And, in turn, these
assessments--expressed for risky institutions through rising yields or
difficulties rolling over maturing debt--will pressure bank managers to
maintain safety and soundness (Calomiris 1999; Lang and Robertson 2002).
Even if financial markets apply little direct pressure to curb risk
taking, market data could still enhance supervisory review by improving
off-site surveillance. (2) Off-site surveillance involves the use of
accounting data and anecdotal evidence to monitor the condition of
supervised institutions between scheduled exams. (3) Market assessments
could enhance surveillance in three ways: (1) by flagging banks missed
by conventional off-site tools, (2) by reducing uncertainty about banks
flagged by other tools, or (3) by providing earlier warning about
developing problems in banks flagged by these tools (Flannery 2001).
Such enhancements would reduce failures over time by enabling
supervisors to take action earlier to address safety-and-soundness
problems.
One concern about attempts to incorporate market data into
surveillance is regulatory burden--current proposals would require large
banking organizations to float a standardized issue of sub-debt. That
most large banks currently issue sub-debt does not imply the burden is
negligible. (4) Voluntary issuance varies considerably over time with
market conditions. For example, the number of sub-debt issues by the
top-50 banking organizations rose from 3 in 1988 to 108 in 1995, only to
fall to 42 in 1999 (Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast 2002). Moreover, banks
currently issuing sub-debt may be choosing maturities unlikely to
produce valuable risk signals, so a mandated maturity would still impose
a regulatory burden. Before placing additional burden on the banking
sector, particularly at a time when other sizable regulatory changes
(Basel II) are in the offing, supervisors should first assess the power
of risk signals from existing securities.
One potential source of risk assessments that can be mined without
increasing regulatory burden is the market for jumbo certificates of
deposit (CDs). Jumbo CDs are time deposits with balances exceeding
$100,000. The typical bank relies on a mix of deposits to fund
assets--checkable deposits, passbook savings accounts, retail CDs, and
jumbo CDs. Both retail and jumbo CDs have fixed maturities (as opposed
to checkable deposits which are payable on demand); they differ by
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage. Only the first
$100,000 of deposits is eligible for insurance, so the entire retail CD
(which is less than $100,000) is insured while only the first $100,000
of a jumbo CD is covered. Checkable deposits, passbook savings, and
retail CDs are often collectively referred to as "core
deposits" because balances respond little to changes in bank
condition and market rates. Full FDIC coverage makes these deposits a
stable and cheap source of funding. At year-end 2005, U.S. banks funded
on average 67.1 percent of assets with core deposits and 14.4 percent
with jumbo CDs. The average jumbo CD balance in the fourth quarter of
2005 was $330,886; the average balance in 95 percent of the U.S. banks
exceeded $152,115. The average maturity was just over one year. Jumbo
CDs are considered a "volatile" liability because relatively
large uninsured balances and short maturities force issuing banks to
match yields (risk-free rates plus default premiums) available in the
money market or lose the funding. This pressure to "price" new
conditions quickly makes the jumbo CD market, in theory, an important
source of feedback for off-site surveillance. (5)
Potentially valuable jumbo CD data are currently available for most
commercial banks. In contrast, only very large banking organizations now
issue sub-debt. These organizations may be the most important from a
systemic-risk standpoint, but the focus of off-site surveillance--indeed
of all U.S. prudential supervision--is on the bank, and most banks do
not issue or belong to holding companies that issue sub-debt. Moreover,
a negative risk signal from a holding company claim would not, by
itself, help supervisors identify the troubled subsidiary. Jumbo CDs
constitute a large class of direct claims on both large and small banks.
At year-end 2005, U.S. banks with more than $500 million in assets
funded 14.6 percent of assets with jumbo CDs; for banks with less than
$500 million, the average jumbo-CD-to-total-asset ratio was 14.3
percent. Finally, risk signals in the form of yields and withdrawals can
be cheaply and easily constructed because banks report jumbo CD interest
expense and balances quarterly to their principal supervisor. Also,
nearly 30 years of research--much of which relies on these
interest-expense and account-balance data--has produced robust evidence
of risk pricing in the jumbo CD market.
Data from the jumbo CD market might prove particularly useful in
community bank surveillance. Community banks specialize in making loans
to and taking deposits from small towns or city suburbs. For regulatory
purposes, the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 established an asset
threshold of $500 million--expressed in constant 1999 dollars. At
year-end 2005, nearly 90 percent of U.S. banks operated on this scale.
Not surprisingly, most failures are community banks. They also
frequently operate on extended exam schedules, with up to 18 months
elapsing between full-scope, on-site visits. This schedule diminishes
the quality of quarterly financial statements, thereby reducing the
effectiveness of off-site monitoring. (6) It is possible that holders of
community bank jumbo CDs supplement public financial data with
independent "Peter-Lynch-type" research. (7) Or, inside
information about bank condition could leak from boards of directors,
which typically include prominent local businesspeople. (Community bank
jumbo CDs are often held by such "insiders.") Thus, sudden
changes in yields or withdrawals might signal trouble more quickly or
reliably than surveillance tools based on financial statements.
In short, jumbo CDs fund a large portion of bank assets and furnish a cheap source of market data, yet no study has formally tested the
surveillance value of yields and withdrawals. We do so with an early
warning model and out-of-sample timing conventions designed to mimic
current surveillance practices. Specifically, we generate risk rankings
using jumbo CD default premiums and quarter-over-quarter withdrawals for
banks with satisfactory supervisory ratings. We rank the same banks by
CAMELS-downgrade probability as estimated by an econometric surveillance
model. Finally, out-of-sample performance for all three rankings is
compared over a sequence of two-year windows running from 1992 to 2005,
counterfactually as if supervisors in the fourth quarter of each year
possessed data only up to that point. We find that jumbo CD signals
would not have flagged banks missed by the CAMELS-downgrade model or
would not have reduced uncertainty about banks flagged by the model. We
also find that jumbo CD signals would not have provided earlier warning
about developing problems in banks flagged by the CAMELS-downgrade
model. These results are broadly consistent with other recent work, so
we close by exploring reasons the surveillance value of market data may
have been overestimated.
1. PRIOR LITERATURE
Research on the jumbo CD market since the mid-1970s--mostly with
1980s data--has consistently found evidence of risk pricing (see Table
1). Some 20 articles have been published using a mix of time series and
panel approaches: 18 articles exploited U.S. data, 11 examined only
yields, 4 examined only runoff (i.e., deposit withdrawals), and 5
studied both. Most drew heavily on quarterly financial statements. Only
one article--the first contribution to the literature in 1976--found no
link between bank risk and yields or runoff. In some ways, the
robustness of these results is striking because U.S. samples mostly
predate the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA). Before this Act, the majority of failures were resolved
through purchases and assumptions, whereby the FDIC offered cash to
healthy banks to assume the liabilities of failed ones. So, even though
jumbo CD holders faced default risk in theory, many were shielded from
losses in practice. (8)
Although evidence from prior literature about our out-of-sample
test windows (1992-2005) is thinner, intuition and history make a case
for significant risk sensitivity. The handful of articles looking at
1990s data found risk pricing, but no study examined jumbo CD data for
the post-2000 period. Nonetheless, economic intuition suggests
sensitivity should be strong because of three important institutional
changes in the 1990s. First, as noted, the FDICIA directed the FDIC to
resolve failures in the least costly way, which implies imposing a
greater share of losses on uninsured bank creditors (Benston and Kaufman
1998; Kroszner and Strahan 2001). (9) This change should have increased
expected losses for jumbo CD holders and their incentive to monitor bank
condition. Second, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 required supervisors to disclose serious
enforcement actions (Gilbert and Vaughan 2001). (10) Third, in the late
1990s, the FDIC began putting quarterly financial data for individual
banks on the Web, along with tools for comparing performance with
industry peers. The second and third change should have lowered the cost
to jumbo CD holders of monitoring bank condition. Evidence from U.S.
banking history also implies our sample should feature strong risk
pricing. Gorton (1996), for example, documented a link between discounts
on state bank notes and issuer condition during the free-banking era,
while Calomiris and Mason (1997) observed sizable differences in yields
and runoff for weak and strong Chicago banks prior to the 1932 citywide
panic. Friedman and Schwartz (1960) also noted that public
identification of banks receiving loans from the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation triggered runs in August 1932. More recently, Continental
Illinois began hemorrhaging uninsured deposits when the extent of its
problems became public in May 1984 (Davison 1997). In all these cases,
uninsured claimants monitored and reacted to changes in bank condition,
thereby impounding risk assessments into prices or quantities.
Evidence of risk pricing in the jumbo CD market does not imply that
yield and runoff data would add value in surveillance. First, stable
in-sample estimates of reactions to current bank condition and reliable
out-of-sample forecasts of emerging safety-and-soundness problems are
not the same thing. Evidence from the market efficiency literature, for
example, has demonstrated that trading strategies based on
well-documented pricing anomalies, such as calendar effects, size
effects, and mean revision, do not offer abnormal returns when tested in
real time by fund managers (Roll 1994; Malkiel 2003). Second, just as
assessing the profitability of trading rules requires a benchmark, such
as the return from an index fund, assessing the surveillance value of
market data requires a baseline for current practices. It is not enough
to note that jumbo CD signals flag problem banks because supervisors
already have systems in place for these purposes. The true litmus test is this: Does integration of yields and runoff into actual surveillance
routines consistently and materially improve out-of-sample forecast
accuracy? (11)
Four recent articles have gauged the surveillance value of market
data against a current practices benchmark. Evanoff and Wall (2001)
compared regulatory capital ratios and sub-debt yields as predictors of
supervisory ratings, finding that sub-debt yields modestly outperform capital ratios in one-quarter-ahead tests. Gunther, Levonian, and Moore
(2001), meanwhile, observed in-sample improvement in model fit when
estimated default frequencies (EDFs, as produced by Moody's KMV)
were included in an econometric model designed to predict holding
company supervisory ratings with accounting data. Krainer and Lopez
(2004) also experimented with equity market variables--in this case,
cumulative abnormal stock returns as well as EDFs--in a model of holding
company ratings. Unlike Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001), they
assessed value added in one-quarter-ahead forecasts. Like Evanoff and
Wall (2001), they noted only a modest improvement in out-of-sample
performance. Finally, Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2003) added various
equity signals to an econometric model built to predict
four-quarter-ahead supervisory ratings, again witnessing only a slight
increase in forecast accuracy.
Recent tests against a surveillance benchmark have advanced the
market data literature, to be sure, but the absence of empirical tests
modeled on actual practice mutes the potential impact on supervisory
policy. Evanoff and Wall (2001), for example, proxied supervisor
perceptions of safety and soundness with regulatory capital ratios--a
practice that was problematic because capital is the sole criterion only
when Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) thresholds are violated. Otherwise,
a variety of measures are weighed. (12) In addition, Gunther, Levonian,
and Moore (2001) and Krainer and Lopez (2004) conducted performance
tests with holding company data--a problematic approach because, as
noted, off-site surveillance focuses on individual banks. Indeed, the
Federal Reserve, which has responsibility for holding company
supervision, does not maintain an econometric model estimated on holding
company data. (13) Finally, Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) and
Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2003) relied on tests unlikely to impress
supervisors: the first assessing in-sample performance only and the
second assessing out-of-sample performance with a contemporaneous holdout (rather than a period-ahead sample). Our work improves on this
research by employing an econometric model used in surveillance,
out-of-sample timing conventions patterned on current practices, and
data taken from bank (rather than holding company) financial statements
and supervisor assessments. Even more important, we contribute a
coherent framework for use in future research on the surveillance value
of market data.
2. THE DATA
To test the surveillance value of jumbo CD data, we built a long
panel containing financial data and supervisory assessments for all U.S.
commercial banks. This data set contained income statement and balance
sheet series as well as CAMELS composite and management ratings from
1988:Q1 through 2005:Q4. (14) The accounting data came from the Call
Reports--formally the Reports of Condition and Income--which are
collected under the auspices of the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC). The FFIEC requires all U.S. commercial
banks to submit such data quarterly to their principal supervisor; most
reported items are publicly available. CAMELS ratings were pulled from a
nonpublic portion of the National Information Center database; only
examiners, analysts, and economists involved in supervision at the state
or federal level can access these series. Only one substantive sample
restriction was imposed--exclusion of banks with operating histories of
under five years. Financial ratios for these start-up, or de novo, banks
often take extreme values that do not imply safety-and-soundness
problems (De Young 1999). For instance, de novos often lose money in
their early years, so earnings ratios are poor. Extreme values could
introduce considerable noise into risk rankings, making it more
difficult to assess relative performance. Another reason for dropping de
novos is that supervisors already monitor these banks closely. The
Federal Reserve, for example, examines newly chartered banks every six
months until they earn a composite rating of 1 or 2 in consecutive
exams.
Although our testing framework improves on prior research, our data
still contain measurement error. Only a small number of money center
banks issue negotiable instruments that are actively traded, so true
market yields are not available for a cross section of the industry. It
is possible, however, to construct average yields from the Call Reports
for all U.S. banks by dividing quarterly interest expense by average
balance. Subtracting rates on comparable-maturity Treasuries from these
yields produces something that looks like a default premium series.
Other researchers have successfully tested hypotheses about bank risk
with this approach (for example, James 1988; Keeley 1990; and, more
recently, Martinez-Peria and Schmukler 2001). Still, two related types
of measurement error must be acknowledged; the proxy is an average
rather than marginal measure (and, therefore, somewhat backward
looking), and it is a quarterly accounting rather than real-time
economic measure.
Measurement error in this series does not imply that Jumbo CD data
taken from the Call Report lack surveillance value. Jumbo CD holders may
react to rising risk by withdrawing funds, and changes in account
balances (deposit runoff) can be measured error-free with accounting
data. (15) Moreover, distress models based on financial statements have
been a cornerstone of public- and private-sector surveillance for
decades (Altman and Saunders 1997). Indeed, federal and state
supervisors alike give heavy weight to book-value measures of credit
risk and capital protection in routine surveillance, yet both contain
serious measurement error (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman 1996; Reidhill
and O'Keefe 1997). Finally, and most importantly, the supervisory
return on jumbo CD signals--or any market signal for that
matter--depends not on the value of the signal alone, but rather on that
value net of the cost of extraction. Current surveillance routines are
built around the Call Reports and, as noted, these reports already
contain the data necessary to construct yield and runoff series for
jumbo CDs. Even if the marginal surveillance value of jumbo CD signals
were low relative to pure market signals because of measurement error,
the marginal cost of extracting jumbo CD signals is near zero. The cost
of integrating market signals into off-site surveillance is not as low
because of the regulatory burden associated with any compulsory security
issues and the training burden associated with changes in supervisory
practices. It is possible, therefore, that jumbo CD data add more net
value than pure market signals. In short, the surveillance value of
jumbo CD data is ultimately an empirical issue.
Still, the net contribution of jumbo CD signals to surveillance
cannot be positive if measurement error renders the data hopelessly noisy. So, as a check, we performed a simple test on yields and another
on runoff--both suggested that bank condition is priced. In the first
test, we compared quarterly yields--that is, jumbo CD interest expense
divided by average balance--for the 5 percent of banks most and least at
risk of failure each year from 1992 to 2005 (the period used in
out-of-sample testing). (16) Over this period, yields at high-risk banks
topped yields at low-risk banks by an average of 25 basis points. (By
way of comparison, the average spread between yields on three-month
nonfinancial commercial paper and three-month Treasury bills for 1992 to
2005 was 24 basis points.) Institutional changes in the 1990s appear to
have strengthened risk pricing. Despite declining money market rates,
the mean spread between "risky" and "safe" banks
climbed from 14 basis points for 1992-1997 to 33 for 1998-2005
(difference significant at 1 percent). In the second test, we examined
quarterly jumbo CD growth at the 169 U.S. banks that failed between 1992
and 2005 for two distinct periods in the migration to failure: two to
four years out and zero to two years out. Mean growth two to four years
prior to failing was a healthy 8.4 percent. But in the final two years,
quarterly growth turned sharply negative, averaging -4.0 percent--a
pattern consistent with jumbo CD holders withdrawing funds to avoid
losses.
As a final check, we regressed yields and runoff on failure
probability and suitable controls; the results also attested to risk
pricing. The sample contained observations for all non-de-novo banks
with satisfactory supervisory ratings from 1988:Q1 to 2004:Q4. (17)
(Table 2 contains the results.) Both coefficients of interest were
"correctly" signed and significant at the 1-percent level,
implying a rise in failure risk translated into higher yields and larger
runoff: coefficient magnitudes were economically small, but it is
important to remember that risk sensitivity is a cardinal concept
whereas risk ranking is an ordinal one. Recent back-testing of the Focus
Report highlights the difference. The Focus Report is a
Call-Report-based, Federal Reserve tool for predicting the impact of a
200-basis-point interest rate shock on bank capital. For the 1999-2002
interest rate cycle, Sierra and Yeager (2004) found that estimates of
bank losses were very noisy, but risk rankings based on these losses
were quite accurate. Our criterion for assessing jumbo CD data is
analogous. Surveillance value is measured not by the precision of
estimated sensitivities to bank risk, but rather by the improvement in
risk rankings traceable to jumbo CD yields and runoff. (18)
3. MARKET ASSESSMENTS OF RISK: THE JUMBO CD RANKINGS
The first step in assessing the value of jumbo CD data was
obtaining default premiums for all sample banks with satisfactory
supervisory ratings. We created two measures--a "simple" and a
"complex" default premium--to reduce the likelihood that
performance tests would be biased by one, possibly poor, proxy. At the
root of each measure was average yield--the ratio of jumbo CD interest
expense to average balance, computed with Call Report data for each bank
in each quarter. To convert yields into simple default premiums, we
adjusted for the average maturity of a bank's jumbo CD portfolio.
To obtain a complex premium series, we used regression analysis to
adjust yields for maturity and nonmaturity factors likely to affect
jumbo CD rates. (19) Simple and complex default premiums were highly
correlated, exhibiting an average year-by-year correlation coefficient of 0.88.
The second step was generating a deposit-runoff series for all
banks with satisfactory ratings. When significant transaction or
information frictions are present, jumbo CD holders are apt to withdraw
funds as failure probability rises (Park and Peristiani 1998). Another
reason to examine runoff is that a bank's demand for jumbo CDs
could depend on its condition. Billett, Garfinkel, and O'Neal
(1998) and Jordan (2000) have documented a tendency for risky banking
organizations to substitute insured for uninsured deposits to escape
market discipline. If such substitution is important, escalating risk
would show up in declining jumbo CD balances rather than rising default
premiums. To explore these possibilities, we again computed two measures
of runoff: "simple" and "complex." Simple deposit
runoff was defined for each sample bank as the quarterly percentage
change in jumbo CD balances. (20) The complex series was constructed by
adjusting simple runoff with the same approach used to identify complex
default premiums--that is, regressions of quarterly deposit runoff on
maturity and nonmaturity factors likely to affect jumbo CD demand or
supply. The correlation coefficient for simple and complex runoff was 35
percent, somewhat less than the correlation between simple and complex
default premiums.
4. THE SURVEILLANCE BENCHMARK--DOWNGRADE PROBABILITY RANKINGS
Since the 1980s, econometric models have played an important role
in bank surveillance at all three federal supervisory agencies. (21) We
benchmark the performance of these models with the CAMELS-downgrade
model developed by Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan (2002). (22) This model
is a probit regression estimating the likelihood a bank with a
satisfactory supervisory rating (a CAMELS 1 or 2 composite) will migrate
to an unsatisfactory rating (a 3, 4, or 5 composite) in the coming eight
quarters. Explanatory variables were selected in 2000 based on a survey
of prior research and interviews with safety-and-soundness examiners.
Table 3 describes the independent variables, as well as the expected
relationship between each variable and downgrade risk. Table 5 contains
summary statistics for these variables. Most variables are financial
performance ratios related to leverage risk, credit risk, and liquidity
risk--three risks that have consistently produced financial distress in
commercial banks (Putnam 1983; Cole and Gunther 1998).
We benchmark current surveillance procedures with a
CAMELS-downgrade model. Traditionally, the most popular econometric
surveillance tool has been a failure-prediction model. But failures have
been rare since the early 1990s, preventing re-estimation of these
models. Any resulting "staleness" in coefficients could bias
performance tests by compromising the surveillance benchmark used to
assess jumbo CD data. Unlike failures, migration to unsatisfactory
ratings remains common, so a downgrade model can be updated quarterly.
(Table 4 contains 1992-2005 data on downgrade frequency.) Recent
research confirms that a CAMELS-downgrade model would have improved
slightly over a failure-prediction model in the 1990s (Gilbert, Meyer,
and Vaughan 2002). Even more important, a downgrade model is best suited
to support current supervisory practice. Institutions with
unsatisfactory ratings represent significant failure risks; supervisors
watch them closely and constantly to ensure progress toward safety and
soundness. Most 1- and 2-rated banks, in contrast, are monitored between
exams through quarterly Call Report submissions. As noted, early
supervisory intervention improves chances for arresting financial
deterioration. So a tool that more accurately flags deteriorating banks
with Call Report data would yield the most surveillance value. These
considerations have prompted one Federal Reserve Bank to "beta
test" a CAMELS-downgrade model in routine surveillance and the
Board of Governors to add a downgrade model to the System surveillance
framework in 2006.
The CAMELS-downgrade model relies on six measures of credit risk,
the risk that borrowers will not render promised interest and principal
payments. These measures include the ratio of loans 30 to 89 days past
due to total assets, the ratio of loans over 89 days past due to total
assets, the ratio of loans in nonaccrual status to total assets, the
ratio of other real estate owned to total assets (OREO), the ratio of
commercial and industrial loans to total assets, and the ratio of
residential real estate loans to total assets. High past-due and
nonaccruing loan ratios increase downgrade probability because,
historically, large portions of these loans have been charged off. OREO
consists primarily of collateral seized after loan defaults, so a high
OREO ratio signals poor credit-risk management. Past due loans,
nonaccruing loans, and OREO are backward looking; they register asset
quality problems that have already emerged (Morgan and Stiroh 2001). The
ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total assets is forward
looking because, historically, losses on these loans have been
relatively high. The ratio of residential real estate loans to total
assets also provides a forward-looking dimension because, historically,
the loss rate on mortgages has been relatively low. Other things equal,
an increase in dependence on commercial loans or a decrease in
dependence on mortgage loans should translate into greater downgrade
risk.
The model contains two measures of leverage risk--the risk that
losses will exceed capital. Measures of leverage risk include the ratio
of total equity (minus goodwill) to total assets and the ratio of net
income to average assets (or, return on assets). Return on assets is
part of leverage risk because retained earnings are an important source
of capital for many banks, and higher earnings provide a larger cushion for withstanding adverse economic shocks (Berger 1995). Increases in
capital protection or earnings strength should reduce the probability of
migration to an unsatisfactory rating.
Liquidity risk, the risk that loan commitments cannot be funded or
withdrawal demands cannot be met at a reasonable cost, also figures in
the CAMELS-downgrade model. This risk is captured by two ratios:
investment securities as a percentage of total assets and jumbo CD
balances as a percentage of total assets. A large stock of liquid
assets, such as investment securities, indicates a strong ability to
meet unexpected funding needs and, therefore, should reduce downgrade
probability. Liquidity risk also depends on a bank's reliance on
non-core funding, or "hot money." Non-core funding, which
includes jumbo CDs, can be quite sensitive to changes in money market
rates. Other things equal, greater reliance on jumbo CDs implies greater
likelihood of a funding runoff or an interest expense shock and, hence,
a larger risk of receiving a 3, 4, or 5 rating in a future exam.
Finally, the model uses three control variables to capture
downgrade risks not strictly associated with current financials. These
controls include the natural logarithm of total assets because large
banks are better able to reduce risk by diversifying across product
lines and geographic regions. As Demsetz and Strahan (1997) have noted,
however, such diversification relaxes a constraint, enabling bankers to
assume more risk, so the ex ante relationship between asset size and
downgrade probability is ambiguous. We also add a dummy variable for
2-rated banks because they migrate to unsatisfactory status more often
than 1-rated banks. (See Table 4 for supporting evidence.) The list of
control variables rounds out with a dummy for banks with management
component ratings higher (weaker) than their composite rating. In such
banks, examiners have raised questions about managerial competence, even
though problems have yet to appear in financial statements.
We estimated the CAMELS-downgrade model for 13 overlapping two-year
windows running from 1990-1991 to 2002-2003. (23) Each equation
regressed downgrade incidence (1 = downgraded, 0= not downgraded) in
years t + 1 and t + 2 on accounting and supervisory data for banks with
satisfactory ratings in the fourth quarter of year t. For example, to
produce the first equation (1990-1991 in Table 6), downgrade incidence
in 1990-1991 was regressed on 1989:Q4 data for all 1- and 2-rated banks
that were not de novos. We continued with this timing convention,
estimating equations year by year, through a regression of downgrade
incidence in 2002-2003 on 2001:Q4 data. Observations ranged from 6,367
(2002-2003 equation) to 8,682 (1995-1996 equation); the count varied
because bank mergers and supervisory reassessments altered the number of
satisfactory institutions over the estimation period.
The model fit the data relatively well throughout the estimation
sample. (Table 6 contains the results.) (24) The hypothesis that model
coefficients jointly equaled zero could be rejected at the 1 percent
level for all 13 equations. The pseudo-R2, the approximate proportion of
variance in downgrade/no downgrade status explained by the model, was in
line with numbers in prior early warning studies--ranging from 15.0
percent (1994-1995 equation) to 22.6 percent (1991-1992 equation).
Estimated coefficients for seven explanatory variables--the
jumbo-CD-to-total-asset ratio, the past due and nonaccruing loan ratios,
the net-income-to-total-asset ratio, and the two supervisor rating
dummies--were statistically significant with expected signs in all eight
equations. The coefficient on the logarithm of total assets had a
mixed-sign pattern, which is not surprising given ex ante ambiguity about the relationship between size and risk. The coefficients on the
other six explanatory variables were statistically significant with the
expected sign in at least three equations.
Comparing out-of-sample performance of jumbo CD and downgrade
probability rankings is not as biased as it may first appear. True,
jumbo CD rankings draw on one variable--either default premiums or
deposit runoffs--while the downgrade probability rankings draw on 13
variables. But theory suggests premiums and runoff should summarize overall bank risk, not just one type of exposure such as leverage or
credit risk. Put another way, jumbo CD holders should sift through all
available information about the condition of the issuing bank, note any
changes in expected losses, and react to heightened exposures by
demanding higher yields or withdrawing funds. This process should
impound all relevant information--financial as well as anecdotal--into
default premiums and deposit runoff just as the econometric model
impounds all relevant Call Report data into a CAMELS-downgrade
probability.
5. ASSESSING OUT-OF-SAMPLE PERFORMANCE: POWER CURVE AREAS
We assessed out-of-sample performance using both Type 1 and Type 2
error rates. Both forecast errors are costly. A missed downgrade to
unsatisfactory status--Type 1 error--is costly because accurate
downgrade predictions give supervisors more warning about emerging
problems. A predicted downgrade that does not materialize--Type 2
error--is costly because unwarranted supervisory intervention wastes
scarce examiner resources and disrupts bank operations. A tradeoff
exists between the two errors--supervisors could eliminate
overprediction of downgrades by assuming no banks are at risk of
receiving an unsatisfactory rating in the next two years.
For each risk ranking, it is possible to draw 0a power curve
indicating the minimum achievable Type 1 error rate for any desired Type
2 error rate (Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther 1995). For example, tracing the
curve for simple default premium rankings starts by assuming no sample
bank is a downgrade risk. This assumption implies all subsequent
downgrades are surprises--a 100 percent Type 1 error rate. Because no
banks are incorrectly classified as downgrade risks, the Type 2 error
rate is zero. The next point on the curve is obtained by selecting the
bank with the highest simple default premium (maturity-adjusted spread
over Treasury). If that bank suffers a downgrade in the following eight
quarters, then the Type 1 error rate decreases slightly. The Type 2
error rate remains zero because, again, no institutions are incorrectly
classified as downgrade risks. If the selected bank does not suffer a
downgrade, then the Type 1 error rate remains 100 percent, and the Type
2 error rate increases slightly. Selecting banks from highest to lowest
default premium and recalculating error rates each time produces a power
curve. At the lower right extreme of the curve, all banks are considered
downgrade risks--the Type 1 error rate is 0 percent, and the Type 2
error rate is 100 percent. Figure 1 illustrates with the power curves
for downgrade probability and jumbo CD rankings for the 1992-1993 test
window.
Areas under power curves provide a basis for comparing
out-of-sample performance across risk rankings. The area for each
ranking is expressed as a percentage of the total area of the box. A
smaller percentage implies a lower overall Type 1 and Type 2 error rate
and, hence, a more accurate forecast. The area for a
"random-ranking" power curve offers an example as well as a
yardstick for evaluating the economic significance of differences in
forecast accuracy. Random selection of downgrade candidates, over a
large number of trials, will produce power curves with an average slope
of negative one. Put another way, the area under the random-ranking
power curves, on average, equals 50 percent of the total area of the
box. Power curve areas can be compared--jumbo CD ranking against
downgrade probability rankings or either ranking against a random
ranking--for any error rate. Assessing forecast accuracy this way,
though somewhat atheoretical, makes best use of existing data. A more
appealing approach would minimize a loss function explicitly weighing
the benefits of early warning about financial distress against the costs
of wasted examination resources and unnecessary regulatory burden. Then,
the relative performance of risk rankings could be assessed for the
optimal Type 1 (or Type 2) error rate. The requisite data, however, are
not available.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
A specific example will clarify the mechanics of the "horse
race" we run for risk rankings. To assess the surveillance value of
simple default premiums for 1992-1993, we start by assuming it is early
1992, just after fourth quarter 1991 data became available. In
accordance with standard surveillance procedures, 1990-1991 downgrade
incidences are regressed on 1989:Q4 data for the 13 explanatory
variables in the CAMELS-downgrade model. Model coefficients are then
applied to 1991:Q4 data to estimate the probability that each 1- and
2-rated bank will migrate to an unsatisfactory condition between 1992:Q1
and 1993:Q4. These banks are then ranked from highest to lowest
downgrade probability. At the same time, all banks with satisfactory
supervisory ratings are ranked from highest to lowest simple default
premium (maturity adjusted spread over Treasury), also using 1991:Q4
data, under the assumption that high spreads map into high downgrade
probabilities. After two years, the record of missed and overpredicted
downgrades is compiled to generate power curve areas for each ranking. A
smaller area for the downgrade probability ranking would imply that
simple default premiums added no surveillance value in the 1992-1993
test window.
6. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Downgrade Model Rankings and Jumbo CD Rankings -- Full-Sample
Results
The evidence suggests jumbo CD default premiums would have
contributed nothing to bank surveillance between 1992 and 2005 when used
to forecast downgrades two years out. (Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 7
contain the relevant power curve areas.) Over the 13 test windows, the
average area under the simple default premium power curve (45.63
percent) and the average area under the complex default premium power
curve (49.70 percent) did not differ statistically or economically from
the random-ranking benchmark (50 percent). In contrast, the average area
under the downgrade model power curve (19.66 percent) came to less than
half of that benchmark. Power curve areas for individual two-year test
windows showed the same patterns. Specifically, downgrade model areas
ranged from 15.24 percent (1996-1997) to 22.39 percent (1994-1995);
simple default premium areas ran from 41.56 percent (2003-2004) to 50.57
percent (1994-1995); and complex default premium areas varied from 45.69
percent (1998-1999) to 52.20 percent (1992-1993). The poor performance
of jumbo CD rankings relative to downgrade model rankings suggests
default premiums would not have flagged banks missed by conventional
surveillance. The poor performance relative to the random-selection
benchmark suggests default premiums would not have increased supervisor
confidence about rankings produced by the CAMELS-downgrade model.
Out-of-sample performance of risk rankings based on jumbo CD runoff
was no better. (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 7 contain the relevant power
curve areas.) The average area for simple runoff rankings across all
test windows was 46.12 percent while the average for complex runoff was
50.47 percent--again, statistically and economically indistinguishable
from random selection. And once again, patterns were consistent across
individual two-year test windows. Power curve areas for simple runoff
rankings varied from 43.56 percent (1999-2000) to 49.54 percent
(1992-1993), areas under complex runoff curves from 45.75 percent
(1998-1999) to 53.08 percent (1992-1993). This consistently poor
performance suggests runoff rankings would not have helped spot
downgrade risks two years out between 1992 and 2005.
Changing forecast horizons did not alter the results. Over 13
one-year windows, downgrade model rankings produced an average power
curve area of 17.37 percent (standard deviation across test windows of
2.39 percent). In contrast, simple default premium rankings produced an
average area of 45.38 percent (standard deviation of 2.95 percent) and
complex default premium rankings, an average area of 50.29 percent
(standard deviation of 3.26 percent). Areas for runoff rankings were
even closer to the random-ranking benchmark--46.79 percent on average
for simple runoff (standard deviation across the 13 windows of 2.47
percent) and 50.87 percent for complex runoff (standard deviation of
3.45 percent). Lengthening the forecast horizon to three years yielded
similar numbers. This evidence goes to the timeliness of information in
jumbo CD rankings. As noted, market data could enhance surveillance by
flagging problems before existing tools. But, between 1992 and 2005,
jumbo CD data would not have improved over random selection at any
forecasting horizon, much less current surveillance procedures. Put
another way, feedback from the jumbo CD market would not have provided
supervisors with earlier warning about developing problems.
Jumbo CD rankings constructed from both default premiums and runoff
did not improve over random selection, either. In theory, price and
quantity signals from the jumbo CD market, though weak when used singly,
could jointly capture useful information about future bank condition. If
so, a model relying only on multiple signals could add value--even if
performance relative to the benchmark was poor--by reducing supervisor
uncertainty about banks flagged by conventional surveillance. We
explored this possibility by estimating a downgrade model with (1) only
simple default premiums and runoff as explanatory variables and (2) only
complex default premiums and runoff as explanatory variables.
Out-of-sample performance was then tested over a variety of forecasting
horizons for 1992-2005. Columns 7 and 8 in Table 7 contain the results
for two-year windows; they are representative. Over all 13 tests, the
power curve area for the bivariate "simple" model averaged
45.55 percent (standard deviation across individual windows of 2.49
percent) and 50.05 percent for the bivariate "complex" model
(standard deviation of 2.99 percent). Further perspective can be gained
by comparing these numbers to power curve areas produced by a
"pared down" model including only the dummy variables in the
baseline CAMELS-downgrade model. The average power curve area for this
model across the 13 two-year windows was 30.07 percent. Taken together,
this evidence suggests jumbo CD data would not have reduced supervisory
uncertainty about banks flagged by conventional surveillance tools.
Downgrade Model Rankings and Jumbo CD Rankings -- Sub-Sample
Results
Although jumbo CD risk rankings would not have contributed to
general surveillance of 1- and 2-rated banks, default premiums and
runoff might improve monitoring of specific cohorts such as banks with
short jumbo CD portfolios, large asset portfolios, no foreign deposits,
low capital ratios, or significant "deposits at risk."
The marginal-average problem noted earlier could in part account
for the weak performance of default premium rankings. As an arithmetic
matter, today's average yield will be more representative of
today's risk levels if jumbo CD maturities are short. To explore
this possibility, we replicated all out-of-sample tests described
earlier in Section 6 on a sub-sample of banks with weighted-average
portfolio maturities under six months. The results did not change. At
the two-year horizon, for example, the average area under complex
default premium power curves was 42.97 percent. At the one-year horizon,
the average area was 42.30 percent. Put simply, long jumbo CD maturities
do not account for the poor performance of default premiums.
The jumbo CD market might emit stronger risk signals for large,
complex banking organizations. Jumbo CDs at community banks may be more
like core deposits than money market instruments. And because prices and
quantities of core deposits are known to be sticky (Flannery 1982),
yields and runoff of community bank jumbos could respond sluggishly to
changes in risk no matter how short the maturity of the portfolio.
Another reason large bank signals may be more informative is that
monitoring costs for their uninsured depositors are lower--these
institutions have publicly traded securities and are closely followed by
market analysts. To test for an asset-threshold effect, we reproduced
all out-of-sample tests from Section 6 on a sub-sample of banks holding
more than the median level of assets. Out-of-sample results for this
sub-sample were qualitatively similar to the results from the full
sample. Across the 13 two-year test windows, for example, the area under
the simple default premium power curves averaged 44.90 percent (compared
with 45.63 percent for the full sample). We also tested risk rankings
for banks holding more than $1 billion in assets and for banks with SEC
registrations. Each time, we compared results from the large bank
sub-sample with results from the remaining sub-sample (i.e., banks
holding less than median assets, banks holding less than $1 billion in
assets, and banks with no SEC registration), looking for performance
differences across size cohorts. Size-split evidence was consistent: for
large as well as community banks, the CAMELS-downgrade model proved to
be the far superior surveillance tool, and rankings based on default
premiums and runoff barely improved over random rankings.
Jumbo CD default premiums and runoff might improve off-site
monitoring of banks with no foreign deposits. The National Depositor
Preference Act of 1993 elevated claims of domestic depositors over
claims of foreign depositors, reducing expected losses for jumbo CD
holders (Marino and Bennett 1999). Domestic holders of jumbo CDs issued
by banks with foreign offices may have perceived no default-risk
exposure because of the financial cushion provided by foreign deposits.
To test for a depositor-preference effect, we screened out banks with
foreign deposits and replicated all out-of-sample tests. Again, the
results mirrored the full-sample
results; for example, for the two-year test windows, the average
power curve area under the simple default premium rankings was 45.70
percent, virtually unchanged from the full sample (45.63 percent). Even
for banks with no foreign-deposit cushion, jumbo CD rankings contained
no useful supervisory information.
Finally, the jumbo CD market might yield clues about emerging
problems in banks with high levels of uninsured deposits or low levels
of capital. In theory, jumbo CD holders with more exposure--either
because their uninsured balances are high or bank capital levels are
low--have greater incentive to monitor and discipline risk. So we
produced rankings for the quartile of sample banks with the largest
volume of "deposits at risk" and the quartile with the lowest
ratios of equity-to-assets (adjusted for bank size). Again, default
premium and runoff rankings did not improve over random selection, much
less conventional surveillance. As a final check, we looked at various
intersections of the sub-samples--banks with high deposits at risk and
low capital, banks with no foreign deposits and short jumbo CD
maturities, etc. We generated rankings based on default premiums,
deposit runoff, and both default premiums and deposit runoff. The
results across all tests were consistent--jumbo CD rankings did not
improve materially over random rankings at any forecast horizon.
Default Premiums and Runoff as Regressors in the Downgrade Model
Although default premium and runoff perform poorly as independent
risk signals, they could add value as regressors in the CAMELS-downgrade
model. Indeed, previous research has identified surveillance ratios with
this property (Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan 1999). To pursue this angle,
we estimated an "enhanced" CAMELS-downgrade model, adding both
simple and complex measures of premiums and runoff to the 13 baseline
explanatory variables. As before, out-of-sample performance was gauged
by impact on power curve areas--first when default premiums and runoff
were added to the baseline model and then when these variables were
dropped from the enhanced model. As a further check, we assessed
performance with the quadratic probability score (QPS)--a probit
analogue for root mean square error (Estrella 1998; Estrella and Mishkin
1998). (25) If default premiums and runoff enhance the CAMELS-downgrade
model, removing them from the enhanced model will boost QPS. Columns 9
and 10 in Table 7 contain power curve areas for the simple and complex
enhancements of the downgrade model. Column 2 of panel A in Table 8
notes the impact of the two simple jumbo CD series on power curve areas;
column 2 of panel B in Table 8 shows the impact of the series on QPS.
(Results for complex default premiums and runoff are not reported
because they mirror results for the simple series.) To facilitate
interpretation, we note the impact on QPS and power curve areas of other
variable blocks--such as the leverage-risk variables (equity-to-asset
ratio and return on assets) and control variables (log of total assets,
dummy for composite rating of 2, and dummy for management component
rating weaker than the composite rating)--in columns 3 through 6 of
panels A and B in Table 8. In Table 6, changes in QPS and power curve
areas are expressed in percentage-change terms to permit direct
comparison.
In performance tests for 1992-2005, default premiums and runoff did
not enhance the CAMELS-downgrade model. Adding simple versions of the
series increased (worsened) average power curve area by 4.17 percent
(0.82 percentage points, from 19.66 percent for the baseline model to
20.48 percent). Removing these series from the enhanced downgrade model
improved performance slightly by the power curve metric (reduced average
power curve area by 0.26 percent) and worsened performance even more
slightly by the QPS metric (increased average QPS by 0.06 percent). The
leverage-risk variables provide some perspective on the economic
significance of these changes--dropping both of them increased the power
curve area (worsened performance) by an average of 5.20 percent and
increased the average QPS (worsened performance) by an average of 2.03
percent. These results held up in tests on the various sample cuts and
forecasting horizons described in the previous subsections.
7. DISCUSSION
It is possible that some combination of measurement error and
idiosyncrasies in the jumbo CD market accounts for our results. These
factors may not be important enough to remove all evidence of risk
pricing from jumbo CD data, but they may be important enough to prevent
risk rankings based on the data from imparting valuable surveillance
information.
But data problems and market frictions are unlikely to explain away
the findings. As noted, recent studies using actual debt and equity
market data rather than accounting proxies have found only modest
surveillance value in market signals. Rather, the economic environment
since the early 1990s probably plays an important role. Over this
period, bank profitability and capital ratios soared to record highs.
Some economists attribute these trends to an unprecedented economic boom
that allowed banks to reap the upside of expansions into risky new
markets and product lines (Berger et al. 2000). Others argue that
stakeholders of large complex banking organizations insisted on greater
capital cushions because of increasingly sophisticated risk exposures
(Flannery and Rangan 2002). In such a high-profit, high-capital
environment, jumbo CD signals--no matter how accurately measured or
precisely determined--would convey little information because the
benefits of monitoring are so low. Such an explanation would account for
the successful use of average yields in bank-risk studies on data from
the 1980s--a time when financial distress was fairly common and failures
were sharply rising. Such an explanation would also account for the
evidence in Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001). With a data set and
research strategy similar to ours, they studied the impact of banking
crises on market discipline in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, finding
little discipline before, but significant discipline after, the crises.
8. CONCLUSION
The evidence suggests that feedback from the jumbo CD market would
have added no value in bank surveillance between 1992 and 2005.
Throughout the decade, risk rankings produced by a CAMELS downgrade--a
model chosen to benchmark current surveillance practices--would have
significantly outperformed risk rankings based on default premiums and
runoff. Moreover, jumbo CD rankings would have improved little over
random orderings. Finally, adding jumbo CD signals to the downgrade
model would not have improved its out-of-sample performance. These
results hold up for a variety of sample cuts and forecast horizons.
Taken together, these results imply that the marginal surveillance value
of jumbo CD signals is less than the marginal production cost--even if
that cost is very low.
Our results carry mixed implications for proposals to incorporate
market data more formally into bank supervision. On the one hand, the
evidence suggests available jumbo CD data would do little to enhance
surveillance, thereby clearing the way for experimentation with other,
"purer" market signals. On the other hand, if the "unique
sample period" explanation for our results is true, then it is
likely the surveillance value of signals from the market for bank debt
and equity will vary over time. Other things equal, such time variation
would lower the net benefit of integrating market data into current
surveillance routines. Interpreted in this light, our findings imply
that future policy and research work on market data should focus on
identifying the specific bank claims that yield the most surveillance
value in each state of the business cycle. Put another way, our
findings--when viewed with other recent research--suggest the
supervisory return from reliance on a single market signal through all
states of the world may have been overestimated.
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Critical feedback from a number of sources greatly improved this
work. We would specifically like to thank the examiners and supervisors
(Carl Anderson, John Block, Joan Cronin, Ben Jones, Kim Nelson, and
Donna Thompson) as well as the economists (Gurdip Bakshi, Rosalind
Bennett, Mark Carey, Margarida Duarte, Kathleen McDill, Bill Emmons,
Doug Evanoff, Mark Flannery, John Jordan, John Hall, Jim Harvey, Tom
King, John Krainer, Bill Lang, Jose Lopez, Dan Nuxoll, Evren Ors, Jeremy
Piger, James Thomson, Sherrill Shaffer, Scott Smart, Haluk Unal, Larry
Wall, John Walter, and John Weinberg) who provided helpful comments. We
also profited from exchanges with seminar participants at Baylor
University, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, and Washington University in St. Louis
(Department of Economics and the Olin School of Business), as well as
exchanges at the Federal Reserve Surveillance Conference, the Federal
Reserve Committee on Financial Structure meetings, and the Financial
Management Association meetings, Any remaining errors and omissions are
ours alone. The views expressed do not represent official positions of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, or the Federal Reserve System.
(1) The cornerstone of supervisory review--the most important of
the pillars--is thorough, regularly scheduled, on-site examinations. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA)
requires most U.S. banks to submit to a full-scope examination every 12
months. These examinations focus on six components of safety and
soundness--capital protection (C), asset quality (A), management
competence (M), earnings strength (E), liquidity risk exposure (L), and
market risk sensitivity (S)--CAMELS. At the close of each exam, an
integer ranging from 1 (best) through 5 (worst) is awarded for each
component. Supervisors then use these component ratings to assign a
composite CAMELS rating reflecting overall condition--also on a 1-to-5
scale. In general, banks with composite ratings of 1 or 2 are considered
satisfactory while banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are unsatisfactory
and subject to supervisory sanctions. (Footnote 10 offers more details
about these sanctions.) At year-end 2005, 4.63 percent of U.S. banks
held unsatisfactory ratings.
(2) Bliss and Flannery (2001) found that managers of holding
companies do not respond to market pressure to contain risk, though
Rajan (2001) questioned the ability of their framework to unearth such
evidence.
(3) Examination is the most effective tool for spotting
safety-and-soundness problems, but it is costly and burdensome--costly
because of the examiner resources required and burdensome because of the
intrusion into bank operations. Surveillance reduces the need for
unscheduled visits by prodding bankers to contain risk between scheduled
exams. It also helps supervisors plan exams by highlighting risk
exposures. For example, if pre-exam surveillance reports indicate a bank
has significant exposure to interest rate fluctuations, supervisors will
staff the exam team with additional market risk expertise.
(4) Mandating issuance of a security with specific attributes is
tantamount to a tax on capital structure. Although we know of no direct
evidence about the burden of this tax, heterogeneity in sub-debt
maturities, outstanding volume over time, and the source of issue (bank
vs. bank holding company) suggest it is nontrivial.
(5) Since the early 1990s, financial innovation has offered
households a growing array of substitutes for traditional bank deposits.
As a result, the supply of core deposits has declined secularly, forcing
banks to turn to more volatile funding sources such as jumbo CDs.
Between 1992 and 2005, for example, the average core deposit-to-total
asset ratio for U.S. banks tumbled from 80.1 percent to 67.1 percent,
while average jumbo CD dependence jumped from 7.5 percent to 14.4
percent of assets. Increasing reliance on jumbo CDs implies greater
exposure to liquidity and market risk--a bad outcome from the
perspective of a bank supervisor. At the same time, the $100,000 ceiling
on deposit insurance makes jumbo CD holders savvier about bank risk than
other depositors. So the jumbo CD market could exert pressure on bank
managers to contain risk--either directly through the impact of higher
yields and lower balances on profits or indirectly through supervisory
responses to risk signals conveyed by yields and withdrawals. Such
pressure would complement supervisory review. Hence, another
contribution of this article is to offer insight into the tradeoff by
quantifying the potential contribution of jumbo CD data to off-site
surveillance. See Feldman and Schmidt (1991) for further discussion of
the tradeoff between greater risk exposure and more reliable market data
implied by rising jumbo CD dependence. Our results suggest this rising
dependence makes supervisors on balance worse off.
(6) Verification of financials is an important source of value
created by exams (Berger and Davies 1998; Flannery and Houston 1999).
Indeed, recent research has documented large adjustments in
asset-quality measures following on-site visits, particularly for banks
with emerging problems (Gunther and Moore 2000).
(7) Peter Lynch ran Fidelity's Magellan Fund from 1977 to
1990. During this period, fund value rose over 2,700 percent. Lynch was
famous for looking past financial statements to the real world,
observing consumer and firm behavior in malls, for example. For more
details, see Lynch and Rothchild (2000).
(8) Before 1991, expected losses had three components: (1) the
probability of bank failure, (2) the loss if the failed bank were not
purchased by a healthy one, and (3) the probability the failed bank
would not be purchased. Even if (1) and (2) were positive, expected
losses would still be approximately zero if jumbo CD holders expected
all failures to be resolved with purchase and assumptions. The need to
model FDIC behavior, therefore, complicates estimation of risk
sensitivity for the pre-1991 regime. Suppose, for example, (1) and (2)
fall, reducing expected losses, incentives to monitor risk, and jumbo CD
risk sensitivity. But the FDIC responds by curtailing implicit
coverage--perhaps because of the reduced threat of contagious runs. If
large enough, this offsetting effect could induce a rise in measured
sensitivity to bank condition.
(9) As discussed in footnote 8, expected losses equal zero if jumbo
CD holders anticipate resolution through purchase and assumptions. But
the FDICIA should have changed expectations about FDIC behavior. Between
1988 and 1990, jumbo CD holders suffered losses in only 15 percent of
bank failures. From 1993 to 1995, they lost money 82 percent of the
time.
(10) The term "enforcement action" refers to a broad
range of powers used to address suspect practices of depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties--the supervisory
sanctions mentioned in footnote 1. Typically, these actions are imposed
in response to adverse exam findings, but they can also be triggered by
deficient capital levels under Prompt Corrective Action or by negative
information gathered through off-site surveillance. Usually enforcement
actions are implemented in a graduated manner, with informal preceding
formal actions. An informal action is the most common; it is simply a
private, mutual understanding between a bank and its supervisory agency
about the steps needed to correct problems. Formal actions are far more
serious. Supervisors resort to them only when violations of law or
regulations continue or when unsafe and abusive practices occur. Formal
enforcement actions are legally enforceable and, in most cases, publicly
disclosed.
(11) As discussed in footnote 10, supervisors use enforcement
actions to induce banks to address safety-and-soundness problems. Some
are quite severe, going as far as permanent removal from the banking
industry. The earlier actions are imposed, the more likely problems can
be corrected. But enforcement actions impose significant costs on the
bank, so supervisors prefer to wait for compelling evidence of serious
problems. Hence, jumbo CD signals could add supervisory value by
reinforcing conclusions yielded by other surveillance tools, thereby
facilitating swifter action.
(12) Footnote 1 discusses the CAMELS framework supervisors use to
assess bank condition. In any event, evidence from counterfactual
applications of PCA to late 1980s/early 1990s data (Jones and King 1995;
Peek and Rosengren 1997) suggests the thresholds are too low to affect
supervisor behavior.
(13) Each article estimated a unique holding company model to
benchmark surveillance procedures. Both tested joint hypotheses: (1) the
model approximates the one the Fed would use and (2) equity market
signals enhance the performance of that model.
(14) Two data notes: (1) Explicit assessment of market risk
sensitivity (S) was added in 1997, so pre-1997 composites are CAMEL
ratings, and (2) none of our empirical exercises exploits the entire
dataset (1988:Q1-2005:Q4); each uses a suitable sub-sample. For example,
estimation of the downgrade model ends in 2003 to permit out-of-sample
tests on 2004-2005.
(15) In the literature, "runoff" is used loosely as a
synonym for withdrawals. For this test, we define it as
quarter-over-quarter percentage changes in a bank's total dollar
volume of jumbo CDs. Later, we define "simple" deposit runoff
similarly.
(16) We estimated failure probabilities with the Risk-Rank
model--one of two econometric surveillance models used by the Federal
Reserve. See footnote 18 for more discussion of this model.
(17) We controlled for factors suggested by academic literature,
examiner interviews, and specification tests. These factors included
term-to-maturity, the rate on Treasury securities with comparable
maturities, economic conditions (dummies for quarters and states in the
union), power in local deposit markets (dummy for banks operating in an
MSA), access to parent-company support (dummy for banks in holding
companies), and demand for funding in excess of local supply (dummy for
banks with brokered deposits). The estimation sample included only
satisfactory banks to parallel the performance tests of downgrade
probability and jumbo CD rankings. Confining the analysis to 1- and
2-rated banks may seem odd, akin to testing risk sensitivities of AA or
better corporate debt, but there are theoretical as well as practical
justifications. Managers of nonregulated firms operate with considerable
latitude up to the point of bankruptcy. Bank managers, in contrast, lose
much of their discretion when an unsatisfactory rating is assigned. So
market data for 3-, 4-, and 5-rated banks contain assessments of ongoing
supervisory intervention as well as inherent risk. Excluding
unsatisfactory banks also produces more relevant evidence about the
surveillance value of market feedback. Supervisors continuously monitor
these institutions, so market data are unlikely to yield new
information. But knowledge of deteriorating Is and 2s would be valued
because these banks do not face constant scrutiny between exams.
(18) Besides measurement error, there are several idiosyncratic aspects of the jumbo CD market that might weaken risk pricing. Jumbo CD
holders often receive other bank services--loan commitments and checking
accounts, for example--so the issuer might price the relationship
comprehensively. Another potential explanation is that many jumbo CDs
are held by state or local governments and are, therefore, practically
risk-free. (Most states require banks to "pledge" Treasury or
agency securities against uninsured public deposits, thereby eliminating
all but fraud risk.) Still another possibility is that many banks no
longer fund at the margin with jumbo CDs--these instruments are now
essentially core deposits because of the declining cost of commercial
paper issuance and the increasing availability of Federal Home Loan Bank
advances. A final, related possibility is that posted jumbo CD rates are
sticky, "clustering" around integers and even fractions like
retail CD rates (Kahn, Pennacchi, and Sopranzetti 1999). These market
characteristics may account for modest risk sensitivities in the yield
and runoff regressions. Still, evidence presented in this section
suggests the data contain information about bank condition, thereby
satisfying the necessary condition for jumbo CD risk rankings to add
value in surveillance.
(19) Default premiums were obtained with maturity and nonmaturity
controls from the Call Report. The reporting convention for maturities
changed in the middle of our sample. From 1989 to 1997, the FFIEC
required banks to slot jumbo CDs in one of four buckets: "less than
3 months remaining," "3 months to 1 year remaining,"
"1 to 5 years remaining," and "over 5 years
remaining." In 1997, the two longest maturity buckets became
"1 to 3 years remaining" and "over 3 years
remaining." These maturity measures are crude--jumbo CDs in the
shortest bucket might have been issued years ago--but they offer the
only means of controlling for term structure. We produced simple
premiums by first multiplying each bank's jumbo CD balance for each
maturity bucket by that quarter's yield on Treasuries of comparable
maturity. The sum of the resulting values, divided by average jumbo CD
balances, approximated that bank's risk-free yield. Simple default
premiums for a quarter were then the difference between a bank's
risk-free yield and its average jumbo CD yield that quarter. Complex
premiums controlled for other factors likely to affect jumbo CD demand
or supply. Specifically, average yields were regressed on average jumbo
CD maturity, maturity-weighted Treasury yield (the portion of a sample
bank's CDs in each maturity bucket, multiplied by that
quarter's yield on a comparable-maturity Treasury), and the same
nonmaturity controls used in the data-check equations in Section 3.
Regression residuals served as the complex premium series. Carefully
controlling in this way for maturity and nonmaturity influences on
yields should render the resulting default premium series a cleaner
measure of default risk.
(20) Technically, a positive number implies growth while a negative
number implies runoff. To simplify, we refer to all percentage changes
as runoff. By our nomenclature, a bank can experience positive or
negative jumbo CD runoff.
(21) Since the early 1990s, the Federal Reserve has relied on two
econometric models, collectively known as SEER--the System for
Estimating Examination Ratings. One model, the Risk-Rank model, exploits
quarterly Call Report data to estimate the probability of failure over
the next two years. The other model, the Ratings model, produces
"shadow" CAMELS ratings--that is, the composite that would
have been assigned had an examination been performed using the latest
Call Report submission. Every quarter, analysts at the Board of
Governors feed the data into the SEER models and forward the results to
the Reserve Banks. The surveillance unit at each Bank, in turn, follows
up on flagged institutions. The FDIC and the OCC use similar approaches
in off-site monitoring of the banks they supervise (Reidhill and
O'Keefe 1997).
(22) The model is discussed in detail here because it is possible
in-sample performance has deteriorated since the Gilbert, Meyer, Vaughan
(2002) estimation sample ended in 1996. Such deterioration would bias
performance tests in this research in favor of the jumbo CD rankings.
So, we explain the rationale for the explanatory variables and present
evidence of in-sample fit to make the case that the CAMELS-downgrade
model is still a good benchmark for current surveillance practices.
(23) Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan (2002) estimated the model for six
windows running from 1990-1991 to 1995-1996. We re-estimated the model
for these windows because Call Report data have since been revised,
which implies slight changes in coefficients. We also wanted to use a
consistent approach and consistent data for the entire estimation sample
to insure subsequent out-of-sample tests of jumbo CD data were not
biased against the surveillance benchmark.
(24) This table presents the results of probit regressions of
downgrade status on financial-performance ratios and control variables.
The dependent variable equals "1" for a downgrade and
"0" for no downgrade in calendar years t + 1 and t + 2. Values
for independent variables are taken from the fourth quarter of year t.
Standard errors appear in parentheses below the coefficients. One
asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 10-percent level, two
at the 5-percent level, and three at the 1-percent level. The pseudo-R2
indicates the approximate proportion of variance in downgrade status
explained by the model. Overall, the downgrade-prediction model fit the
data well. For all eight regressions, the hypothesis that all model
coefficients equal zero could be rejected at the 1-percent level of
significance. In addition, eight of the 13 regression variables are
significant with the predicted sign in all eight years, and all
variables were significant in at least some years.
(25) To obtain QPS, we first computed downgrade probability for
each sample bank with the CAMELS-downgrade model. Then, we subtracted
[R.sub.t]--a binary variable equal to one if the bank was downgraded in
the out-of-sample window and zero if not--from the downgrade probability
estimate. Finally, we squared the difference, multiplied the result by
two, and averaged across all sample banks. An ideal model generates
probabilities close to unity for banks with subsequent downgrades and
probabilities close to zero for non-downgrades, so higher QPS figures
imply weaker out-of-sample performance, just as higher power curve areas
imply weaker performance.
Table 1 Do Prior Studies Point to Risk Pricing in the Jumbo CD Market?
Issuer of
Authors Jumbo CD Country Sample Dates
Crane (1979) Bank United States 1974
Goldberg & Lloyd-Davies (1985) Bank United States 1976-1982
Baer & Brewer (1986) Bank United States 1979-1982
Hannan & Hanweck (1988) Bank United States 1985
James (1988) Bank United States 1984-1986
Cargill (1989) Bank United States 1984-1986
James (1990) Bank United States 1986-1987
Keeley (1990) Bank United States 1984-1986
Ellis & Flannery (1992) Bank United States 1982-1988
Cook & Spellman (1994) Thrift United States 1987-1988
Crabbe & Post (1994) Bank United States 1986-1991
Brewer & Mondschean (1994) Thrift United States 1987-1989
Park (1995) Bank United States 1985-1992
Park & Peristiani (1998) Thrift United States 1987-1991
Jordan (2000) Bank United States 1989-1995
Martinez Peria & Schmuckler Bank Argentina, 1981-1997
(2001) Chile, Mexico
Goldberg & Hudgins (2002) Thrift United States 1984-1994
Birchler & Maechler (2002) Bank Switzerland 1987-2001
Maechler & McDill (2003) Bank United States 1987-2000
Hall, King, Meyer, & Vaughan Bank United States 1988-90,
(2005) 1993-95
Authors Yield or Runoff? Risk Pricing?
Crane (1979) Yield Somewhat
Goldberg & Lloyd-Davies (1985) Yield Yes
Baer & Brewer (1986) Yield Yes
Hannan & Hanweck (1988) Yield Yes
James (1988) Yield Yes
Cargill (1989) Yield Yes
James (1990) Yield Yes
Keeley (1990) Yield Yes
Ellis & Flannery (1992) Yield Yes
Cook & Spellman (1994) Yield Yes
Crabbe & Post (1994) Runoff No
Brewer & Mondschean (1994) Yield Yes
Park (1995) Both Yes
Park & Peristiani (1998) Both Yes
Jordan (2000) Both Yes
Martinez Peria & Schmuckler Both Yes
(2001)
Goldberg & Hudgins (2002) Runoff Yes
Birchler & Maechler (2002) Runoff Yes
Maechler & McDill (2003) Runoff Yes
Hall, King, Meyer, & Vaughan Both Yes
(2005)
Notes: This table summarizes the literature on risk pricing by jumbo CD
holders. ("Bank" refers to commercial banks, bank holding companies, and
thrift institutions. "Risk pricing" refers to price or quantity
responses to a change in bank condition.) These studies used both cross-
section and time-series techniques along with a variety of risk proxies
and control variables. The weight of the evidence indicates bank
condition is priced, suggesting that jumbo CD data might add value in
off-site surveillance.
Table 2 Do Jumbo CD Data Contain Evidence of Risk Pricing? Evidence from
Regressions of Yields and Runoff on Failure Probabilities
Sensitivity of Jumbo CD Yields and Runoff of Failure Probability 1988:
Q1-2004:Q4
Dependent Variable: Dependent Variable:
Yields Runoff
Coefficient (Std. Coefficient (Std.
Independent Variable Error) Error)
Failure Probability (Lagged 0.0108*** -0.3309***
One Quarter) (0.0038) (0.0505)
Maturity-Weighted Treasury 0.6878*** 0.5324
Yield (0.0391) (0.5211)
Average Portfolio Maturity 0.0820*** -1.8743***
(0.0209) (0.2785)
Maturity-Treasury Interactive -0.0140*** -0.3408*
(0.0147) (0.1959)
Holding Company Dummy -0.0595 -0.9042***
(0.0136) (0.1808)
Brokered Deposit Dummy 0.1403*** -0.0868
(0.0270) (0.3592)
MSA Dummy 0.1384*** 1.7813
(0.0913) (1.2164)
[R.sup.2] 0.2288 0.0125
F-statistic Control Variables 394.16*** 33.25***
F-statistic Time Dummies 155.69*** 21.88***
F-statistic State Dummies 21.53*** 15.21***
Observations 229,486 229,486
Notes: This table reports results for regressions of jumbo CD yields and
runoff on failure probabilities and various controls. Equations were
estimated on a sub-sample of banks with satisfactory CAMELS ratings.
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 10- (*), 5- (**), and
1- (***) percent levels. A positive and significant failure-probability
coefficient in the yield equation and/or a negative and significant
coefficient in the runoff equation constitute evidence that bank
condition is priced. The results indicate that greater risk of failure
translates, on average, into higher yields and larger runoff, suggesting
that jumbo CD data may have surveillance value in our sample.
Table 3 Which Variables Predict Migration to an Unsatisfactory CAMELS
Rating?
Impact on
Independent Variables Symbol Downgrade Risk
Credit Risk Loans past due 30-89 days PAST DUE 30 +
(% of total assets)
Loans past due over 89 days PAST DUE 90 +
(% of total assets)
Loans in nonaccrual status NONACCRUING +
(% of total assets)
"Other real estate owned" OREO +
(% of total assets)
Commercial & industrial COMMERICAL +
loans (% of total assets)
Residential real estate RESIDENTIAL -
loans (% of total assets)
Leverage Risk Equity capital minus NET WORTH -
goodwill (% of total
assets)
Net income (% of average ROA -
assets)
Liquidity Risk Book value of investments SECURITIES -
(% of total assets)
Time deposits over $100,000 JUMBO CDs +
(% of total assets)
Controls Natural logarithm of total SIZE Ambiguous
assets (thousands of
dollars)
Dummy for banks with CAMELS-2 +
composite CAMELS rating=2
Dummy for banks with MANAGEMENT +
management rating >
composite rating
Notes: This table lists the independent variables in the CAMELS-
downgrade model. Signs note the hypothesized relationship between each
variable and the likelihood of downgrade from a satisfactory (CAMELS 1
or 2 composite) to an unsatisfactory rating (CAMELS 3, 4, or 5
composite). For example, the negative sign on the NET WORTH variable
indicates that, other things equal, higher capital levels reduce the
likelihood of migration to an unsatisfactory rating over the next two
years.
Table 4 How Common Is Migration to Unsatisfactory CAMELS Ratings?
Evidence from 1992-2005
Year of Migration
to 3, 4, or 5 Rating at Banks with Number Migrating to
Rating Beginning of Year 1 & 2 Rating 3, 4, or 5 Rating
1992 1 1,959 22
2 5,275 403
1993 1 2,289 7
2 5,978 175
1994 1 2,919 9
2 5,742 153
1995 1 3,106 8
2 4,905 94
1996 1 3,295 10
2 4,518 117
1997 1 3,250 7
2 3,744 118
1998 1 3,027 19
2 3,101 135
1999 1 3,064 19
2 3,041 179
2000 1 2,843 12
2 3,084 183
2001 1 2,661 12
2 3,153 219
2002 1 2,449 11
2 3,216 219
2003 1 2,283 16
2 3,101 177
2004 1 2,111 10
2 2,950 114
2005 1 2,573 10
2 3,650 85
Year of Migration Percentage Total Downgrades
to 3, 4, or 5 Rating at Migrating to 3, to 3, 4, or 5
Rating Beginning of Year 4, or 5 Rating Rating
1992 1 1.12 425
2 7.64
1993 1 0.31 182
2 2.93
1994 1 0.31 162
2 2.66
1995 1 0.26 102
2 1.92
1996 1 0.30 127
2 2.59
1997 1 0.22 125
2 3.15
1998 1 0.63 154
2 4.35
1999 1 0.62 198
2 5.89
2000 1 0.42 195
2 5.93
2001 1 0.45 231
2 6.95
2002 1 0.45 230
2 6.81
2003 1 0.70 193
2 5.71
2004 1 0.47 124
2 3.86
2005 1 0.39 95
2 2.33
Notes: This table demonstrates that banks with satisfactory composites
ratings (CAMELS 1 or 2) frequently migrate to unsatisfactory ratings (3,
4, or 5), thereby permitting yearly re-estimation of the CAMELS-
downgrade model. The data also show that 2-rated banks are much more
likely to migrate to unsatisfactory ratings than 1-rated banks.
Table 5 Selected Summary Statistics--Jumbo CD Data and Regressors for
the CAMELS-Downgrade Model
Standard
Variable Median Mean Deviation
Credit Risk PAST DUE 30 0.68 0.90 0.84
PAST DUE 90 0.07 0.21 0.39
NONACCRUING 0.19 0.38 0.56
OREO 0.03 0.20 0.46
COMMERICAL 7.65 9.28 6.97
RESIDENTIAL 14.26 15.91 10.68
Leverage Risk NET WORTH 8.84 9.79 4.74
ROA 1.17 1.23 2.05
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES 28.65 30.41 14.87
JUMBO CDs 8.00 9.33 6.56
Controls SIZE 11.07 11.21 1.29
CAMELS-2 1.00 0.61 0.49
MANAGEMENT 0.00 0.18 0.39
"Simple" Default Premium 0.47 0.42 2.83
"Complex" Default Premium NA NA 2.18
"Simple" Deposit Runoff 9.39 19.25 52.02
"Complex" Default Premium NA NA 33.03
Notes: This table contains summary statistics for the independent
variables used in the CAMELS-downgrade prediction model, computed over
all year-end regression observations from 1989 to 2001. Summary
statistics for the default premiums and deposit runoff series used in
jumbo CD risk rankings are also provided for comparison. The "complex"
measures of premium and runoff are regression residuals, so means and
medians are not meaningful, but standard deviations are roughly in line
with their "simple" counterparts. The correlation coefficients between
the "simple" and "complex" measures are 88 percent for default premiums
and 35 percent for the runoff.
Table 6 How Well Does the CMELS-Downgrade Model Fit the Data? Downgrade
Years 1990-2005.
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 1990-1991 1991-1992
Credit Risk Intercept -2.087*** -0.957***
(0.246) (0.264)
PAST DUE 30 0.112** 0.150***
(0.021) (0.022)
PAST DUE 90 0.376*** 0.328***
(0.039) (0.040)
NONACCRUING 0.235*** 0.199***
(0.029) (0.030)
OREO 0.220*** 0.216***
(0.030) (0.032)
COMMERCIAL 0.009*** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003)
RESIDENTIAL -0.005*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.002)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.054*** -0.048***
(0.010) (0.011)
ROA -0.241*** -0.318***
(0.035) (0.039)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.016*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
JUMBO CDs 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
Controls SIZE 0.079 -0.029
(0.017) (0.019)
CAMELS-2 0.633*** 0.517***
(0.062) (0.068)
MANAGEMENT 0.488*** 0.401***
(0.051) (0.054)
Number of Observations 8,494 8,065
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.219 0.226
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 1992-1993 1993-1994
Credit Risk Intercept -0.081 0.048
(0.318) (0.375)
PAST DUE 30 0.136*** 0.174***
(0.026) (0.033)
PAST DUE 90 0.239*** 0.304***
(0.047) (0.060)
NONACCRUING 0.291*** 0.178***
(0.036) (0.045)
OREO 0.145*** 0.167***
(0.031) (0.043)
COMMERCIAL 0.009** 0.002
(0.004) (0.005)
RESIDENTIAL -0.004 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.073*** -0.074***
(0.013) (0.013)
ROA -0.200*** -0.263***
(0.043) (0.051)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.013*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.003)
JUMBO CDs 0.015*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.005)
Controls SIZE -0.125*** -0.147***
(0.024) (0.030)
CAMELS-2 0.509*** 0.432***
(0.087) (0.102)
MANAGEMENT 0.478*** 0.466***
(0.061) (0.069)
Number of Observations 7,837 8,060
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.209 0.161
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 1994-1995 1995-1996
Credit Risk Intercept -0.780* -0.011
(0.402) (0.436)
PAST DUE 30 0.119*** 0.164***
(0.035) (0.035)
PAST DUE 90 0.296*** 0.322***
(0.064) (0.074)
NONACCRUING 0.192*** 0.145***
(0.046) (0.051)
OREO 0.192*** 0.153***
(0.044) (0.052)
COMMERCIAL 0.007 0.013***
(0.005) (0.005)
RESIDENTIAL -0.002 -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.032** -0.034***
(0.014) (0.013)
ROA -0.229*** -0.164***
(0.052) (0.038)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.002 -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
JUMBO CDs 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.005) (0.005)
Controls SIZE -0.150*** -0.202***
(0.033) (0.035)
CAMELS-2 0.594*** 0.589***
(0.104) (0.013)
MANAGEMENT 0.389*** 0.510***
(0.075) (0.078)
Number of Observations 8,665 8,682
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.150 0.188
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 1996-1997 1997-1998
Credit Risk Intercept -0.162 -1.371***
(0.415) (0.388)
PAST DUE 30 0.093*** 0.189***
(0.029) (0.033)
PAST DUE 90 0.347*** 0.399***
(0.057) (0.064)
NONACCRUING 0.187*** 0.157***
(0.044) (0.046)
OREO 0.156** 0.091
(0.067) (0.059)
COMMERCIAL 0.005 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005)
RESIDENTIAL 0.000 -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.020* -0.036***
(0.012) (0.014)
ROA -0.110** -0.393***
(0.044) (0.063)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.011*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.003)
JUMBO CDs 0.019*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.005)
Controls SIZE -0.101*** -0.150***
(0.030) (0.032)
CAMELS-2 0.760*** 0.501***
(0.093) (0.099)
MANAGEMENT 0.535*** 0.406***
(0.081) (0.083)
Number of Observations 8,585 8,314
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.223 0.184
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 1998-1999 1999-2000
Credit Risk Intercept -1.603*** -1.118***
(0.352) (0.360)
PAST DUE 30 0.186*** 0.169***
(0.030) (0.029)
PAST DUE 90 0.182*** 0.217***
(0.058) (0.055)
NONACCRUING 0.163*** 0.227***
(0.044) (0.044)
OREO 0.118 0.117
(0.087) (0.076)
COMMERCIAL 0.015 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
RESIDENTIAL -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.011 -0.044***
(0.010) (0.011)
ROA -0.133 -0.199***
(0.040) (0.046)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.007** -0.002
(0.003) (0.003)
JUMBO CDs 0.008* 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
Controls SIZE -0.071*** -0.099***
(0.027) (0.029)
CAMELS-2 0.716*** 0.780***
(0.078) (0.079)
MANAGEMENT 0.518*** 0.564***
(0.077) (0.080)
Number of Observations 7,818 7,341
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.166 0.190
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 2000-2001 2001-2002
Credit Risk Intercept -1.061*** -1.788***
(0.358) (0.342)
PAST DUE 30 0.184*** 0.170***
(0.032) (0.026)
PAST DUE 90 0.417*** 0.321***
(0.059) (0.059)
NONACCRUING 0.165*** 0.250***
(0.045) (0.042)
OREO 0.157* 0.175*
(0.087) (0.090)
COMMERCIAL 0.013*** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
RESIDENTIAL 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.036*** -0.008
(0.010) (0.009)
ROA -0.254*** -0.135***
(0.043) (0.039)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.005** -0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
JUMBO CDs 0.017*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004)
Controls SIZE -0.106*** -0.069***
(0.028) (0.026)
CAMELS-2 0.799*** 0.878***
(0.081) (0.083)
MANAGEMENT 0.538*** 0.338***
(0.084) (0.092)
Number of Observations 6,968 6,582
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.206 0.210
Period of Downgrade in CAMELS
Rating
Independent Variable 2002-2003
Credit Risk Intercept -1.528***
(0.342)
PAST DUE 30 0.171***
(0.027)
PAST DUE 90 0.147**
(0.061)
NONACCRUING 0.285***
(0.041)
OREO 0.082
(0.073)
COMMERCIAL 0.004
(0.004)
RESIDENTIAL -0.005
(0.003)
Leverage risk NET WORTH -0.025**
(0.010)
ROA -0.134***
(0.037)
Liquidity Risk SECURITIES -0.005*
(0.002)
JUMBO CDs 0.015***
(0.004)
Controls SIZE -0.065**
(0.026)
CAMELS-2 0.797***
(0.083)
MANAGEMENT 0.491***
(0.088)
Number of Observations 6,367
Pseudo-[R.sup.2] 0.184
Note: See footnote 24.
Table 7 Do Jumbo CD Default Premiums or Runoff Add Value in Bank
Surveillance? Full-Sample, Two-Year Horizon
Out-of-Sample CAMELS-Downgrade Simple Default Complex Default Simple
Test Window Model Premiums Premiums Runoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1992-1993 20.20 47.56 52.20 49.54
1993-1994 21.81 47.10 47.48 47.22
1994-1995 22.39 50.57 49.57 45.06
1995-1996 17.51 43.50 46.81 47.42
1996-1997 15.24 46.93 49.01 46.31
1997-1998 19.24 46.34 48.12 45.01
1998-1999 21.39 47.27 45.69 47.20
1999-2000 19.55 45.62 48.83 43.56
2000-2001 18.77 44.31 51.78 46.10
2001-2002 18.92 43.82 51.78 44.93
2002-2003 19.46 45.35 51.61 46.27
2003-2004 20.36 41.56 51.30 46.12
2004-2005 20.76 43.29 51.89 44.85
All Years 19.66 45.63 49.70 46.12
Downgrade Downgrade
Model + Model +
Simple Complex Simple Complex
Out-of-Sample Complex Premium + Premium + Premiums/ Premiums/
Test Window Runoff Runoff Model Runoff Model Runoff Runoff
(1) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1992-1993 53.08 50.51 52.88 21.12 21.67
1993-1994 48.62 48.31 49.30 23.22 21.07
1994-1995 50.90 46.18 49.55 22.67 19.94
1995-1996 48.49 45.52 46.48 18.64 18.87
1996-1997 51.03 46.39 48.79 18.38 16.16
1997-1998 49.33 45.22 48.92 19.72 20.59
1998-1999 45.75 47.24 45.70 21.87 21.45
1999-2000 48.94 43.41 48.64 19.33 19.19
2000-2001 52.03 45.38 52.13 20.11 18.47
2001-2002 51.85 44.40 51.90 19.64 20.23
2002-2003 51.56 44.34 51.45 19.56 19.36
2003-2004 52.54 43.02 52.30 21.18 20.51
2004-2005 52.00 42.18 52.59 20.77 21.14
All Years 50.47 45.55 50.05 20.48 19.95
Notes: This table summarizes evidence about the surveillance value of
jumbo CD data. Each cell in columns 2 through 10 contains the area under
the power curve for a specific risk-ranking produced by a specific
surveillance tool over a specific test window. Smaller areas imply lower
Type 1 and Type 2 error rates and, thus, better performance. Column 2
contains areas for downgrade probability rankings to benchmark current
practices. Columns 3 through 10 contain rankings based on various uses
of jumbo CD default premiums and runoff. The evidence suggests the data
would have added no value in surveillance between 1992 and 2005. Risk
rankings produced by the CAMELS-downgrade model (column 2) performed
considerably better than random rankings (average power curve area of 50
percent). But, rankings based on default premiums or runoff (columns 3
through 6) as well as rankings based on both series (columns 7 and 8)
barely outperformed random rankings. Finally, default premiums and
runoff (columns 9 and 10) did not improve out-of-sample performance of
the CAMELS-downgrade model.
Table 8 Do Jumbo CD Default Premiums or Runoff Enrich the CAMELS-
Downgrade Model?
Panel A: Percentage Change in Power Curve Area
Out-of- Default Leverage
Sample Premiums Risk Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Control
Window and Runoff Variables Variables Variables Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1992-1993 -4.36 8.81 13.92 8.00 4.36
1993-1994 0.64 -1.21 13.24 6.16 12.91
1994-1995 -0.44 3.93 10.48 0.75 19.36
1995-1996 -1.18 4.50 14.36 6.98 27.70
1996-1997 0.13 -0.39 24.65 5.87 16.90
1997-1998 -1.78 1.58 9.62 4.89 22.24
1998-1999 0.19 -0.28 9.93 0.05 16.82
1999-2000 1.98 3.43 16.44 -1.30 20.40
2000-2001 0.43 4.89 18.28 1.12 19.08
2001-2002 -0.94 1.15 18.47 2.73 13.59
2002-2003 0.15 6.52 16.22 1.28 14.12
2003-2004 1.15 5.64 22.18 1.90 12.64
2004-2005 0.63 5.79 17.33 1.36 19.62
Mean -0.26 5.20 15.78 3.06 16.90
Panel B: Percentage Change in QPS
Out-of- Default Leverage
Sample Premiums Risk Credit Risk Liquidity Risk Control
Window and Runoff Variables Variables Variables Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1992-1993 -1.06 3.65 6.25 4.55 -1.70
1993-1994 0.43 6.45 9.31 1.43 -0.72
1994-1995 0.20 3.59 5.39 0.60 1.20
1995-1996 0.00 0.23 3.85 0.68 2.49
1996-1997 -0.20 1.43 3.46 0.61 1.02
1997-1998 -0.17 0.86 2.06 1.03 3.26
1998-1999 0.00 0.40 2.53 0.40 2.39
1999-2000 0.00 0.91 2.62 0.57 2.50
2000-2001 -0.21 0.84 3.45 0.31 2.72
2001-2002 0.66 1.98 5.84 0.85 2.64
2002-2003 -0.38 2.67 2.96 0.29 2.29
2003-2004 0.72 0.96 5.97 -1.55 0.72
2004-2005 0.82 2.45 2.45 0.49 1.96
Mean 0.06 2.03 4.32 0.71 1.60
Notes: This table provides alternative measures of the contribution of
simple default premiums and runoff to the CAMELS-downgrade model. Column
2 of Panel A shows the impact on power curve areas of removing the two
jumbo CD series from the enhanced downgrade model (baseline model plus
premiums and runoff). Column 2 of Panel B notes the impact of removing
these series on quadratic probability score (QPS). Changes in the QPS
and power curve areas are expressed in percentage-change terms to permit
direct comparisons. Positive percentage changes for QPS or power curve
areas imply that removing the variable block weakens model performance.
To facilitate interpretation of changes, columns 3 through 6 show the
impact of removing other variable blocks from the CAMELS-downgrade
model, such as the control variables (asset size, dummy for CAMELS
rating, and dummy for management rating of 2). The evidence suggests
default premiums and runoff add nothing to the CAMELS-downgrade model.