Russian-Iranian relations in the Obama era.
Katz, Mark N.
The Obama administration came into office seeking to improve U.S.
relations with both Iran and Russia. However, neither Tehran nor Moscow
has responded favorably toward the new administration's
initiatives. Yet, while Tehran and Moscow continue to distrust
Washington, they also distrust each other.
This paper will focus on how Moscow and Tehran have regarded each
other since the Obama administration took office in January 2009. In
order to do this, though, something first must be said about how Russia
and Iran have reacted toward the Obama administration's overtures,
since this forms an important part of the backdrop of how Moscow and
Tehran have related to each other.
Space does not permit a detailed account of how the Obama
administration sought to improve relations with both Tehran and Moscow.
Suffice it to say that disappointment has been the result in both
instances. Three obstacles have hindered the achievement of the new
president's goals: Iran's reaction, Russia's reaction and
the unforeseen (by the Obama administration) consequences of attempting
to improve U.S. relations with both countries simultaneously.
ADMINISTRATION OVERTURES
The Obama administration signaled early on that it was far more
interested in resolving the nuclear issue with Tehran than in promoting
democratization and human rights in Iran. Its reaction in June 2009 to
protests by the Green Movement over the Islamic government's
announcement that Ahmadinejad had been re-elected by an overwhelming
majority was quite muted.
The Iranian leadership, however, has claimed and may well believe
that the Green Movement has been orchestrated by the United States. (1)
And if Washington can do this without having even a diplomatic presence
in Iran, what could it do if normal relations were re-established? The
Obama administration's efforts to improve relations at the very
moment that opposition to the regime flared up appears highly suspicious
to the hardliners in Tehran.
As for Russia, it has gained enormously from Iranian-American
hostility. The United States has blocked Iran from serving as a corridor
for Caspian Basin oil and gas, and has actively discouraged Europe from
developing and buying gas from Iran. As a result, Russia has benefited
from more Azeri and Central Asian oil and gas flowing through pipelines
into Russia (thus allowing Moscow to both reap transit revenue and
exercise political leverage) than would have occurred had Iranian routes
been available. Further, Russian business interests have been able to
gain opportunities for trade with and investment in Iran that they might
not have obtained had they had to compete with American and other
Western business. These advantages, of course, could be lost if and when
an Iranian-American rapprochement occurs.
In November 2009, the renowned Russian scholar of international
affairs, Georgiy Mirskiy, who believes that Russia and the West have a
common interest in working together to prevent Tehran from obtaining
nuclear weapons, described how Russian suspicion of the United States
vis-a-vis Iran prevented this:
In the first place is the legacy of the
Soviet mentality with its built-in
mechanism that ensures maintaining a
constant level of hostility and suspicion
toward everything Western, and
especially American. "Why should we
try to persuade Iran together with the
Americans? It would be advantageous
for them, and why should we let Washington
lead us by the nose, especially
since the main disputed issues have
not been decided--the CIS (Commonwealth
of Independent States)
and others. To allow the Americans
to score points is not in our interests."
Secondly, strange as it may seem,
these kinds of opinions can also be
heard: "If the United States becomes
reconciled with Iran, it will be bad
for us, and the Americans will push
us out of Iranian economic space. A
nuclear Iran is better for us than a pro-American
one." And, in fact, overall
it appears that many of our politicians
are convinced of one thing: a demonstration
of solidarity with the West will
do nothing for our leadership in terms
of mobilizing the population on the
basis of an upsurge of patriotism.(2)
Finally, the Obama administration's efforts to improve
relations with both Russia and Iran have been unsuccessful, in part,
because they were made simultaneously. Tehran saw U.S. claims of wanting
to improve relations as belied by American efforts to get Russia to
toughen its position to ward Iran on the nuclear issue. Similarly,
Moscow saw the Obama administration's call for Moscow to "help
us" with Iran as highly suspicious. Essentially, Moscow saw
Washington as asking Russia to worsen its relations with Iran over the
nuclear issue to better position the United States to later improve its
own relations with Iran, thereby damaging Russian interests.
Underlying these views of the Obama administration's
"nefarious aims" in both Moscow and Tehran is their deep
suspicion of one another, and their fear that the other might "sell
out" to America at their expense.
RUSSIAN-IRANIAN DIFFERENCES
Iran, as is well known, has had many disputes with and grievances
toward the United States. But Iran's disputes with and grievances
toward Russia are, if anything, much greater and certainly more
longstanding. Historical grievances that Iranians have against Russia
include the loss of territory to the Tsarist Empire in the early
nineteenth century, the division of Iran into spheres of influence by
the Russian and British empires, Tsarist intervention to quell
Iran's constitutional revolution in the first decade of the
twentieth century, Soviet support for secession in northwestern Iran
after both World War I and World War II, the occupation of Iran by the
USSR and United Kingdom during World War II, and Soviet support for Iraq
during the Iran-Iraq War. Russian-Iranian relations improved in the
1990s, but there are still many outstanding differences between them,
including those over Putin's proposals for a joint U.S.-Russian
missile-defense system directed toward Iran, the division of the Caspian
Sea, repeated Russian delays in completing the Bushehr nuclear reactor,
Russian delays in supplying S-300 air-defense missile systems, and
different approaches to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue.
Russian-Iranian differences since the advent of the Obama administration
include the following:
* Putin's ProposedAlternative to the U.S. Deployment of BMD in
Eastern Europe: In May 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated
Putin's proposal that, instead of deploying ballistic-missile
defenses (BMD) to Eastern Europe (which Moscow believes would be aimed
at Russia and not Iran as the Bush administration claimed), the United
States and Russia instead create a joint missile-defense system using
facilities in Armavir, Russia, and Gabala, Azerbaijan. (3) Just as when
Putin first came up with this proposal in June 2007, though, Tehran was
not pleased by Moscow's willingness to cooperate with Washington in
a BMD plan that would be unambiguously aimed at Iran. (4) (U.S.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates responded positively in June 2009, (5)
but--perhaps because of negative Iranian reaction--Moscow seems to have
backed away from this proposal.)
* The Caspian Sea: Iran and Russia (more or less in conjunction
with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) have argued over how to
divide the Caspian Sea (which they all border) ever since the breakup of
the Soviet Union. The history of this dispute is too long and tortured
to describe here. Suffice it to say that Russia, Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan are willing to grant Iran a 13 percent share of the Caspian
(a percentage corresponding to its part of the shoreline), while Iran
demands that each of the five littoral states receive a 20 percent
share. And, of course, there appear to be significant petroleum reserves
in the disputed area. Officials from the five governments have
occasionally met to resolve the dispute but have never been able to do
so. In September 2009, Moscow organized a meeting in Kazakhstan for all
the Caspian littoral countries except Iran. Despite the Russian Foreign
Ministry's insistence to the contrary, this resulted in heightening
Iranian fears that Russia, along with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, were seeking to make decisions about the Caspian without
Iranian participation. (6)
* The Bushehr Nuclear Reactor: After a decade of delays in
completing a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr, the head of Rosatom
(the Russian state atomic-energy corporation) Sergei Kiriyenko, assured
Tehran in February 2009 that the reactor would be "launched"
by the end of 2009. (7) In November 2009, however, the Russian energy
minister announced that, due to "technical reasons," the
reactor could not be completed by the date promised, but that it would
be ready at the beginning of 2010. The Russian foreign minister insisted
that the delay was not linked to the negotiations with Iran over its
nuclear program, but that "strictly technical questions"
needed to be resolved. (8) Rosatom officials later indicated that the
completion of the reactor would not occur at the beginning of 2010, but
"closer to" the Persian New Year in March 2010. (9) The
Iranian press reacted furiously, citing this as yet another instance of
Russian duplicity and unreliability. (10) March 2010 came and went,
though, without the reactor's being started up. In April 2010,
Kiriyenko stated that the launch would occur in August 2010. (11)
* S-300 Air-Defense Systems: Under a contract signed by Moscow and
Tehran, Russia was supposed to deliver S-300 missile-defense systems to
Iran by mid-2009. (12) Russia, citing "technical matters," has
not yet delivered them. (13) With Israeli politicians and officials
openly discussing the possibility of an Israeli attack on Iranian
nuclear facilities in the hope of preventing Tehran from acquiring
nuclear weapons, Tehran has been eager to obtain Russian S300s--to
degrade, and perhaps even deter--such an attack. Tehran, then, has been
frustrated at Russia's delay in delivering the S-300s, especially
since Israel has been urging Moscow not to deliver them.
Indeed, some Iranian observers see the delay as due to Israeli
influence in Moscow. As an unattributed commentary in the strongly
conservative Tehran daily Javan thundered:
[N]othing can calm the uncontrolled
business hunger of Russians. In
Shahirvar of this year [23 August-22
September] Binyamin Netanyahu, the
prime minister of the Zionist regime,
made a trip to Moscow in which he
asked the Russians to refrain from selling
the S-300 defense system to Iran.
Before that, in August, Shimon Peres
also traveled to Russia and asked Dmitriy
Medvedev to refrain from selling
these missiles
to Iran.
After meeting
Medvedev in
the Kremlin,
Peres came
to correspondents
and said,
"The Russian
president has
promised me not to sell S-300 missiles
to Iran." Russian officials have never
denied that statement, but it is said that
the Russian party has sent a message
to the Israelis saying that the Israelis
had to give them the money for them
not to sell the missiles to Iran. (14)
The commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps,
Major General Mohammad Ali Jaafari, claimed the delay in delivery of the
S-300s "is due to the U.S. and Israeli pressure on Moscow."
(15) The deputy coordinator of Iranian air defense, Mohammad Hasan
Mansurian, even warned that Tehran "can complain to international
authorities and sue Russia for failing to carry out its
commitment." (16) It is highly doubtful, needless to say, that such
a course of action would yield much. What these and other statements
reveal, though, is not only that Tehran feels more vulnerable to attack
without the S-300s it expected to have already been delivered, but also
that such an attack is more likely to be effective.
* The Iranian Nuclear File: During the summer of 2009, Russia
worked with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (the
United States, the United Kingdom, France and China) plus Germany (often
referred to as the P5+l) to accommodate the Iranian demand for
medicalgrade (higher than commercial-grade but lower than weapons-grade)
uranium while at the same time reducing the international
community's concerns about Iran's acquisition of weapons-grade
uranium. The plan that the P5+l came up with was for Iran to turn over
most of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium (commercial grade) for
further enrichment to medical grade in Russia, final fabrication in
France and return to Iran. Removing Tehran's low-enriched uranium
from Iran would mean that it could not be further enriched to weapons
grade there. But, while Tehran at first seemed to signal a willingness
to accept this proposal, (17) it later backtracked, insisting on
receiving medical-grade uranium from abroad before giving up any of its
commercial-grade uranium, and only turning over part of its stockpile
for further enrichment while keeping part inside Iran. (18)
Russian delays in completing Bushehr and delivering the S-300s were
cited in the Iranian press as reasons that Tehran should not trust
Moscow to further enrich its low-enriched-uranium stockpile and return
it in a timely manner (if at all) (19) Iran's retaining any
substantial quantity of low-enriched uranium, of course, was exactly
what the P5+l wanted to avoid due to their concern about proliferation.
Both in September and again in November 2009, Russian President Medvedev
indicated that further sanctions against Iran may be implemented. (20)
In late November 2009, the Board of Governors of the Internation al
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed (with Russian and Chinese support) a
resolution censuring Iran for not disclosing that it was building a
uranium-enrichment facility near Qom and calling upon Iran to comply
with the P5+l's proposal. (21) The Iranian press heatedly denounced
both Russia and China for their "betrayal."
Yet, despite Medvedev's statement and Russia's vote in
favor of the IAEA Board of Governors resolution against Iran, Moscow
also took steps to reassure Tehran that any additional Security Council
sanctions against Iran would be limited. Russian Foreign Minister
Lavrov, for example, made several statements about how any new sanctions
should be guided exclusively by the aim of strengthening the
nonproliferation regime "rather than by any other agendas."
(22) Ahmadinejad, though, abruptly changed course in early February
2010, stating that there was "no problem" for Iran to accept
the IAEA deal that he had earlier rejected. (23) Whether Iran actually
accepts it or not, this move allows Moscow and Beijing to credibly argue
that further sanctions are not needed at this time because Tehran is now
cooperating with the IAEA. While some Russian politicians reacted
negatively to Ahmadinejad's surprise announcement later in February
2010 that Iran would further enrich its own commercial-grade uranium to
medical grade, Interfax's recognition that China was still calling
for stepped-up diplomatic efforts suggested that Moscow could talk about
increased sanctions against Iran without having to follow through on
them. (24)
* The Rise of Anti-Russian Sentiment in Iran: Unlike Western
governments, Moscow congratulated Ahmadinejad on his re-election as
president shortly after it was officially declared in June 2009. In
addition to carrying out protests in Iran against what were widely
believed to be falsified election results, the Green Movement frequently
denounced Russia during its demonstrations. (25) While registering its
objection to Moscow's recognizing the re-election of Ahmadinejad as
legitimate, and noting the long history of poor Russian-Iranian
relations, the Green Movement sought to identify Ahmadinejad with a
country that most Iranians regard negatively. Indeed, in November 2009,
the conservative Iranian weekly Siyasat-e Ruz noted that even a Russian
news agency (RIA Novosti) conducted a poll showing that 93.5 percent of
Iranians have a negative opinion of Russia. (26) Moscow sought to
indicate its evenhandedness by calling for the election issue to be
resolved on the basis of Iranian law (thereby slightly distancing Moscow
from Ahmadinejad but calling for a solution highly likely to result in
the validation of his re-election). (27) Senator Mikhail Margelov,
chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation
Council (the upper house of the Russian legislature), made clear that
Moscow feared a "color revolution" in Iran that would bring to
power a pro-American, anti-Russian regime in Tehran. (28) But since the
opposition is anti-Russian, Moscow had little choice but to stick with
the increasingly beleaguered Tehran regime.
Moscow, then, was especially unhappy when, in December 2009,
Ahmadinejad began calling for Russia to pay compensation to Iran for the
Soviet occupation of the northern half of the country during World War
II. (29) Ahmadinejad may have done this because he sensed that he was
perceived in Iran as being too friendly toward Russia and thus wanted to
distance himself from it. This was a subject, though, that Moscow did
not even want to discuss. Moscow does not see itself as owing anyone for
any actions that it took in conjunction with defeating the Nazis, and it
does not want to set a precedent for providing compensation to any other
countries--such as those in the Baltics and Eastern Europe--that the
Soviets occupied for far longer.
* Other: In December 2009, the former head of the Secretariat of
Iran's High Council of Marine Industries complained that Russia had
not built three 63,000-ton ships that Iran had ordered for use in the
Caspian. In addition, he also complained that, despite Russian-Iranian
efforts to construct a North-South transit corridor from Iran through
the Caucasus to Russia (and points beyond), Dagestan (a Russian
autonomous republic in the Northern Caucasus just east of Chechnya) was
not allowing non-CIS trucks to drive across its territory. He attributed
this to a Russian desire "to be the only country that could
demonstrate its power in the region." (30)
In early March 2010, Tehran ordered all Russian commercial pilots
working in Iran to leave the country within two months. Iranian sources
blamed Russian pilots for a number of plane accidents. Others, though,
saw the move as stemming from Iranian frustration with Russian
noncompletion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor and non-delivery of the
S-300s. (31)
CONCLUSION
The Obama administration's efforts to improve relations with
Tehran have so far proven unsuccessful, as have its hopes of getting
Moscow to fully cooperate with Washington on the Iranian nuclear issue.
Russian-Iranian relations, however, remain as fraught with difficulties
as ever. Indeed, although it may have been an unintended consequence,
the Obama administration's effort to improve U.S. relations with
both Russia and Iran has, if anything, served to heighten the distrust
between Moscow and Tehran. Whether or not this was a contributing
factor, however, Russian-Iranian mutual distrust does not seem likely to
dissipate any time soon.
N.B. Unless otherwise noted, all articles were accessed via World
News Connection http://wnc.fedworld.gov/.
(1) See, for example, "Iranian Official Says 'America
Initiated Green Movement in Iran,'" Resalat Online, October 8,
2009.
(2) Georgiy Ilyich Mirskiy, "The Tale of the White Bull,"
Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, November 13, 2009.
(3) Mikhail Zygar, "Russia Is Retargeting Missile
Defense," Kommersant, May 12, 2009, p. 7 (Current Digest of the
Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 61, No. 19, May 11-17, 2009, pp. 15-16).
(4) "Iran Much Sensitive to Putin's Offer to U.S.,"
Fars News Agency, June 21, 2007; and Masud Jafarshoar, "The U.S.
Missile Defense Shield in Europe, from Beginning to End,"
Jomhuri-ye Eslami Online, October 18, 2009.
(5) Vladimir Solovyov, "U.S. Missile Defense Sets Its Sights
on Russia," Kommersant, June 11, 2009, p. 1 (Current Digest of the
Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 61, No. 23, June 8-14, 2009, pp. 17-18).
(6) "Russia FM: Russia Not Trying to Exclude Iran from Caspian
Sea Decisions," Vesti TV, September 17, 2009; Ali Reza Lorak,
"Iran and Russia's Search for Power in the Caspian Sea,"
Mardom Salari, September 15, 2009; and "Experts Study the
Quadrilateral Summit on Caspian Sea: Iran Surrounded by Coveting of
Caspian Neighbors," Siyasat-e Ruz, September 28, 2009.
(7) "Russia Says Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant to Be
Launched on Schedule," ITAR-TASS, February 5, 2009.
(8) "No Political Link between Iran Nuke Issue and Bushehr
NPP--Lavrov," ITAR-TASS, November 17, 2009.
(9) "Russian Energy Minister Leaving for Visit to Iran,"
ITAR-TASS, November 28, 2009.
(10) See, for example, "Russia Official's Remarks on
Bushehr Are Odd," Mehr News Agency, November 16, 2009; "Iran
Radio: 'Russia's Epic Inability to Keep Promise' Delays
Power Plant," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1,
November 16, 2009; and "Iran MP Calls for Russia to Abide by
Commitments on Bushehr N-plant," Iranian Students News Agency,
November 17, 2009.
(11) "Bushehr Plant to Come on Stream in August: Russian
Contractor," Tehran Times, April 17, 2010,
http://www.tehrantimes.com/Index_view.asp?code=217633.
(12) "Russia Six Months Late in Delivering S-300 Missiles to
Iran: General," Mehr News Agency, November 13, 2009.
(13) See, for example, "S-300 Complexes Delivery to Iran
Postponed for Technical Reasons," ITAR-TASS, February 4, 2010.
(14) "Kremlin's Unwound Harmonica for Iran," Javan,
November 20, 2009.
(15) "U.S., Israel Responsible for Delay in S-300 Missile
Delivery by Russia," IRNA, November 25, 2009.
(16) "Air Force Official Urges Iran to 'Sue' Russia
over Delayed S-300 Delivery," E'temad Online, November 28,
2009.
(17) Glenn Kessler, "Iranian Officials Accept Draft Deal on
Uranium Transfer," The Washington Post, October 22, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.corn/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
10/21/AR2009102100636.html.
(18) Andrew Tully, "U.S. Faces Difficult Decisions after Iran
Rejects UN Nuclear Plan," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November
19, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/US_Faces_Difficult_Decisions_After Iran Rejects UN Nuclear Plan /1882001.html.
(19) "Russia's failure to fulfill its commitments in the
Bushehr nuclear power plant project raises serious questions about
whether Iran should send its stockpile of low-enriched uranium it has
accumulated over the years to Russia, because there is no guarantee that
once Russia receives Iran's uranium, it will deliver the 20 percent
enriched uranium," quoted from "Russia Official's Remarks
on Bushehr Are Odd," Mehr News Agency, November 16, 2009.
(20) "Russia's Medvedev Won't Rule Out Iran
Sanctions," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 15, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Russias_Medvedev_Does Not Rule Out
Iran_Sanctions/1823313.html; and "Interview with Der Spiegel,"
President of Russia website, November 7, 2009, http://eng.kremlin.ru/
speeches/2009/11/07/1230_type82916_222598.shtml.
(21) Borzou Daragahi and Greg Miller, "IAEA Board Votes to
Censure Iran," Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.cona/2009/nov/28/world/
la-fg-iran-nuclear28-2009nov28.
(22) "Russian FM Lavrov Comments on Ukraine, START, Iran
Nuclear Issue," Rossiya 24, January 22, 2010.
(23) Thomas Erdbrink and Glenn Kessler, "Ahmadinejad Backs
Deal to Remove Bulk of Enriched Uranium from Iran," The Washington
Post, February 23, 2010,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyrdcontent/article/
2010/02/02/AR2010020200640.html.
(24) "China Advocates Further Talks to Settle Iran's
Nuclear Problem," Interfax, February 8, 2010.
(25) Robin Wright, "Iran's Protesters: Phase 2 of Their
Feisty Campaign," Time, July 27, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/ 0,8599,1912941,00.html.
(26) "Suspicious Opinion Poll by Northern Neighbor,"
Siyasat-e Ruz, November 24, 2009.
(27) "Lavrov for Solutions over Iran's Elections on the
Basis of Iranian Laws," ITAR-TASS, June 25, 2009.
(28) Darya Yuryeva, "Corridor for Ahmadinejad,"
Rossiyskaya Gazeta Online, June 17, 2009.
(29) "Iran's Compensation Claims for Russian, British
Military Presence during WWII Groundless," Interfax/ AVN, December
23, 2009; and "Compensation for 'Countenance,'"
Vedemosti Online, December 24, 2009. See also "Iran to Demand
Compensation for Damage Sustained during World War II," ITAR-TASS,
January 9, 2010.
(30) "Official Says Russia 'Fearful' of Iran's
Strength in Caspian Sea," Mardom- Salari Online, December 18, 2009.
(31) "IranVents Frustration with Moscow, Expels Russian
Pilots," Haaretz.com, March 6, 2010,
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1154429.html.
Dr. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason
University.