One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict.

Gubser, Peter

One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict, by Benny Morris. Yale University Press, 2009. 256 pages. $26.00.

Benny Morris's One State, Two States is deeply disappointing. The author is rightfully known as a pre-eminent leader of Israel's "new historians," who have re-analyzed Israel's early history. In pursuit of this new scholarship, Professor Morris forthrightly laid out in previous works the facts and contours of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the 1940s and 1950s. In his most recent book, actually just a long essay, he drops his focus on history in favor of a political tract. Viewed as such, it is lucid and well argued, but his conclusions leave us with a posited solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict that, in a very fundamental sense, is not viable.

In the heart of One State, Two States, Professor Morris reviews "The History of One-State and Two-State Solutions," that is, the ideas both the Zionists and the Palestinians had and have for the future of Palestine. When he uses his formidable historical skills, especially in his discussion of Zionist thinking in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Professor Morris' contribution is helpful and elucidating. In the sections on Palestinian thinking, though, he falls short. Unlike his presentation on Zionist ideology, where he uses Hebrew sources, he does not cite the many and rich Arabic books and articles on Palestinian thinking from the early twentieth century through the early twenty-first century.

Professor Morris points out that, in parallel fashion, both the Zionist and Palestinian thinkers and political leaders argued for a one-state solution dominated by their respective people. Diverging from this trend, however, in the late 1930s the mainstream Zionists accepted the two-state solution. Adopting a practical and pragmatic approach, they accepted the 1937 Peel Commission Report's recommendation that the land of Palestine be divided between the Jews and the Palestinians. The Zionists recognized, Professor Morris argues, the political realities of the day and accepted the half loaf--or actually less than a half loaf-- that was offered in the Peel Commission Report. In this context, he does point out that some minority Zionist trends, such as Zeev Jabotinsky's Revisionist Movement, rejected this compromise, arguing that the Zionists should settle only for the entirety of Palestine as well as pieces of Jordan and Lebanon. These lines of thinking continue into the twenty-first century. However, he also rightly states that the majority of Israelis were then, and still are willing to accept a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, albeit with reservations.

On the other hand, in Professor Morris' view, the Palestinians have not turned to the pragmatic option and approved the concept of the two-state solution to the conflict. He does recite the various steps Palestinian leaders took in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s by which they adopted a two-state platform, but he contends that they did not and do not truly mean it. Despite numerous statements, documents and agreements accepting the two-state solution, he asserts that, for the most part, the PLO leadership and other Palestinian politicians and thinkers strongly favor the one-state solution, which they think they will be able to dominate over time. I should note that, while Professor Morris is entitled to his view and interpretation, I have had the occasion to talk to hundreds of Palestinians--leaders and ordinary people--over the past 30 years. My observation, quite different from that of Professor Morris, is that the majority of Palestinians would willingly follow their leaders and settle for a state of their own in a two-state context. There are certainly individuals and politicians who prefer one state, but they are not a majority, and many of them would sacrifice their preference for an end to military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state there.

In a concluding chapter called "Where To?" Professor Morris is caught in his earlier contradictory conclusions. He posits that there are five models for a one-state solution: a binational state with parity for the Jewish and Palestinian communities; "a Jewish state encompassing the whole of Palestine, without any Arabs; an Arab state encompassing the whole of Palestine, without any Jews; a Jewish-majority state, with a substantial Arab minority; and an Arab-majority state, with a substantial Jewish minority." (p. 189). He dismisses the first three as unrealistic for political and moral reasons. The latter two, if realized, would be replete "with endless instability, with rebellions, irredentism and foreign intervention the order of the day." (p. 191).

Professor Morris rejects the two-state solution as unstable and a certain breeder of irredentism. In support of this view, he repeats the very argument he makes earlier in the book: "[The] Palestinian Arabs, in the deepest fibers of their being, oppose such an outcome, demanding, as they did since the dawn of their national movement, ali of Palestine as their patrimony" (pp. 193-194). Consequently, in Professor Morris's opinion, it is gravely unwise for the government of Israel to pursue the two-state solution.

This conclusion leads him to the Jordanian option, whereby the West Bank and Gaza would be united with a strong Jordanian state. For Professor Morris, "given current realities, this would seem the only logical--and possible--way forward" (p. 201). In light of the very arguments in the book under review, this is a curious conclusion. Professor Morris rightly recognizes that the Palestinians--leaders and people alike--want their own state. Thus, it would appear that, from a Palestinian perspective, such a forced marriage would be inherently unstable, not the kind of state that Israel would wish to have on its borders. In addition, from a Jordanian perspective, the suggestion is a nonstarter. In 1988, King Hussein took the fundamental step of disengaging Jordan from the West Bank and Gaza. Ceding all authority to the PLO, Jordan abjured political and administrative rights over the Palestinian territories. The Jordanian people have accepted this new reality. Clearly, King Abdullah would not turn his back on his father's national decision and insert Jordan anew into the Israel-Palestine conflict. Professor Morris's "logical solution" thus founders on profound Palestinian and Jordanian political and national realities.

Despite Professor Morris's skepticism about the two-state solution to the IsraelPalestine conflict, only this approach and conclusion will allow both the Israelis and the Palestinians to express their national identities on land they control or might control in the future. President Bush accepted, at least in words, the two-state policy, and President Obama has adopted it with renewed vigor. As a long-time student of the Middle East, I urge him to expend energy and political capital in its pursuit.

Peter Gubser, retired president of American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA); author of Saladin: Empire and Holy War, to be published by Gorgias Press in 2010