Thinking strategically about Iraq: report from a symposium.
Kahl, Colin H. ; Katulis, Brian ; Lynch, Marc 等
Is America now winning in Iraq? What would "victory"
mean? Over the last several months, optimism over the spread of
local-level security in Iraq and the changed politics of the Iraqi Sunni
community has surged. Analysts from all sides of the political spectrum
have noted the decline in American and Iraqi casualties from their peak
in the preceding year but sharply disagree about how to interpret these
trends. Republican presidential candidates and the conservative media
now routinely trumpet that the United States is winning. American
military and diplomatic officials in Iraq themselves are notably more
circumspect, routinely warning of the fragility of the current progress
and the urgent need for political progress commensurate with recent
security gains. Many Democratic politicians and liberal analysts have in
turn focused upon the political dimension, in particular the failure of
Iraqi politicians to take advantage of the security gains to achieve
national political reconciliation.
Lost in much of the political argument over the success of the
"surge" has been a more fundamental debate over the purpose of
American strategy in Iraq. Much of the public discourse seems to have
degenerated into partisan arguments about body counts, while neglecting
the core political and strategic questions. Suppose that Iraq stabilizes
into a condition of low-level but manageable violence, a "warlord state" composed of a patchwork of local-level deals largely
ignoring a sectarian and irrelevant central state, maintained by a
long-term American presence of some 100,000 troops. What American
strategic interests would be served, and what opportunities forgone,
with such an outcome? Such calculations depend on a whole series of
crucial questions about the sustainability of current trends. Can such a
patchwork lead to a stable peace in the absence of political
reconciliation? Does the devolution to the local level make strategic
sense, even if it reaps short-term tactical gains? Will local security
eventually trickle up to reconciliation at the national level, either by
changing the calculation of national elites or by cultivating an
alternative elite more amenable to compromise? Towards what endpoint are
the tactics leading? Do we want to see a unified Iraq with a sustainable
political accord? If so, are American political and military tactics
encouraging or discouraging such an outcome?
In November 2007, I organized an online symposium about these
strategic questions? Colin Kahl, an assistant professor in the Security
Studies Program at Georgetown University and contributor to the Center
for a New American Security report, "Phased Transition: A
Responsible Way Out of Iraq," and Brian Katulis, a senior fellow at
the Center for American Progress and coauthor of the report,
"Strategic Reset: Reclaiming Control of U.S. Security in the Middle
East," provided extensive posts bookended by my own commentary.
Each extensively revised his contribution to that symposium, taking into
account the others' arguments as well as the extremely productive
comments and arguments the symposium generated across the blogosphere.
Marc Lynch
TURNING POINT OR TACTICAL PAUSE? PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY AND
POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN IRAQ
Colin H. Kahl
It has become a cliche in Washington to say that there are "no
good options" in Iraq. The cliche has taken hold so quickly because
it is true. Although some conservative commentators continue to speak of
an American "victory" in Iraq, (2) such talk is ridiculous. At
this point, if we are lucky, the various warring Iraqi parties may eke
out a basic accommodation that allows them to coexist with a modicum of
stability. There is little hope of real national reconciliation in the
foreseeable future, let alone achievement of President George W.
Bush's grandiose vision of a Jeffersonian democracy on the Tigris.
If everything works out, Iraq may just barely avoid becoming a safe
haven for international terrorism, the site of a major humanitarian
catastrophe, and the focal point for a regional conflagration. This is
not victory; it is simply the mitigation of the self-inflicted wounds
created by the invasion and years of mismanagement of the war.
Yet it would have been difficult to imagine achieving even this
minimalist definition of success a year ago. The "surge" of
additional U.S. forces starting in February 2007 and a series of
critical decisions by Iraqi combatants have opened a narrow window of
opportunity to move Iraq toward stability. But this window could close
quickly. It is not clear whether recent security gains represent a
genuine turning point or a mere tactical pause that will soon give way
to renewed civil war. Much will depend on the actions of the U.S. and
Iraqi governments in coming months.
As the United States adjusts its strategy, it must recognize that
Iraq is moving rapidly in the direction of a highly decentralized state.
(3) It will not be a neat three-way division, as some "soft
partition" proponents envision. (4) Instead, there will be some
relatively homogenous provinces and localities, and others with pockets
of homogenous and mixed communities, all attempting to provide for their
own security and governance. In this emerging context, the best we can
hope for in the near-to-medium term is a stable, decentralized
equilibrium that is sustainable as U.S. forces draw down. This
equilibrium should be rooted in a rough balance of power among
Iraq's Sunni, Shia and Kurdish communities; sufficient security and
economic ties between center and periphery to prevent the country from
flying apart; and a minimalist approach to political accommodation that
empowers provinces and localities and contributes to a "live and
let live" attitude. The United States should foster this
accommodation by setting firm conditions on the continued presence of
U.S. forces in Iraq and by bargaining hard during upcoming negotiations
aimed at creating a long-term U.S.-Iraq agreement.
PROGRESS IN IRAQ?
Although Iraq remains a very dangerous place, there has been
significant and meaningful improvement in the security situation over
the past year. The clearest evidence for this is the declining level of
Iraqi civilian casualties. After the February 2006 bombing of the Golden
Shrine in Samarra tipped the country into sectarian civil war, the
number of Iraqis killed by violence skyrocketed. Based on Iraqi Ministry
of Health and morgue figures, the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq
estimated that approximately 1,800 civilians were killed in January
2006; by June-December 2006, the monthly average nearly doubled to
3,300. According to U.S. military statistics incorporating data from
Iraqi ministries, the number of civilian deaths per month went down
steadily, albeit unevenly, across the period of the surge. The monthly
total declined from approximately 2,800 in January 2007 to 1,600 in June
to around 550 in December. (5) Estimates from independent organizations
are higher but confirm the same general trend. According to Iraq Body
Count, a non-profit organizations that tallies civilian deaths from
media accounts, the number of fatalities declined from approximately
2,600 in January 2007 to 2,100 in June to 900 in December. (6)
Signs of security progress can be seen in other statistics as well.
According to U.S. commanders, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has been crippled
in Baghdad and Anbar and degraded by 60 to 70 percent nationwide since
the beginning of 2007 (although the organization continues to be active
in parts of Diyala, Salah ad Din and Ninewa provinces). (7) The total
number of all types of attacks on U.S. forces, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and Iraqi civilians in October 2007 were down 55 percent from
their levels in June, and, by the end of November, attacks had declined
to a level not seen consistently since mid-2005. (8) Finally, although
2007 was the deadliest year in Iraq for the U.S. military, casualties
came down substantially in the latter part of the year. From a peak
three-month total of 331 killed in April-June, the numbers declined by
70 percent to 98 in October-December, the lowest three-month total of
the entire war. (9)
In contrast to the security trends, the news on the political front
in Iraq is more mixed. There have been a number of high-profile symbolic
engagements between Shia and Sunni leaders, (10) but genuine
cross-sectarian accommodation remains elusive. Indeed, in Baghdad, Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-dominated government is narrower
and more sectarian than ever. The so-called "unity" government
remains dysfunctional, and decision-making authority appears to be
increasingly concentrated in the hands of Maliki and a small clique of
Dawa party advisors who remain reluctant to engage in genuine
accommodation. (11) The Iraqi parliament has recently approved
de-Baathification reform, amnesty legislation for detainees, and a
provincial powers law. (12) This is good news, but the devil will be in
the details--which remain vague--and the implementation. Sunni
politicians fear the ambiguous legislation may actually be used to
further purge their ranks from the ISF. (13) The Bush administration and
the American embassy in Iraq have attempted to frame de facto revenue
sharing, leniency toward former Baathists and insurgents, and local and
provincial empowerment as evidence of political progress. (14) But
movement toward accommodation has been uneven; and in the absence of
legislation formalizing these arrangements, any cooperation may prove
fleeting. (15)
SECURITY AND THE SURGE
Four factors have combined to improve the security situation in
Iraq.
U.S. Operations. The first factor is the surge. The surge married
28,500 additional U.S. forces with better counterinsurgency tactics and
a much-improved "joint campaign plan" designed by General
David Petraeus, the overall commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, and
Ambassador Ryan Crocker. (16) As additional troops began to arrive in
mid-February, the military kicked-off Operation Fardh al-Qanoon
("Law and Order"). U.S. troops fanned out into dozens of joint
security stations and combat outposts and partnered with Iraqi forces in
volatile neighborhoods to provide 24/7 population security. At the same
time, the U.S. military continued to target AQI cadre and began to move
more aggressively against "rogue" elements of the Jaish
al-Mahdi (JAM), Moqtada al-Sadr's Shia militia. Then, in June, as
the final installments of the surge arrived, the U.S. military launched
Operation Phantom Thunder, a series of large-scale clearing offensives
against AQI and Shia militants in the Baghdad "belts"
(including northern Babil, eastern Anbar, and the southern outskirts of
Baghdad) and Diyala province. This was immediately followed up by
Operations Phantom Strike and Phantom Phoenix, large-scale offensives
aimed at pursuing AQI remnants fleeing north and west of Baghdad. As AQI
and extremists have been pushed out, U.S. and Iraqi forces have
attempted to hold these areas to prevent reinfiltration. (17)
The Sunni "Awakening." The second and perhaps most
decisive reason for improved security is the so-called Sunni awakening:
the successful effort to recruit Sunni tribes and former militants to
cooperate with U.S. forces against AQI. The movement began in 2006 in
Anbar province with the formation of the Anbar Salvation Council, a
group of tribal sheiks that revolted against AQI affronts, atrocities,
power grabs and encroachments into (often illicit) tribal economic
activities. The beginning of the movement predated the surge and was, to
a large degree, causally unconnected to it. Nevertheless, nimble U.S.
commanders effectively exploited the growing wedge between Sunni tribes
and AQI to forge cooperative arrangements, and the tribes responded by
providing thousands of men to serve in auxiliary security forces. (18)
The result was a dramatic reduction in violence in Anbar, once the
hotbed of the Sunni insurgency.
In late May, 2007, Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the day-to-day
operational commander in Iraq, announced the U.S. military's intent
to apply the Anbar model elsewhere. Odierno estimated that 80 percent of
Sunni and Shia militants in Iraq were "reconcilable," and U.S.
military commanders were given wide discretion to reach out to these
groups. (19) This spurred a rapid proliferation of ceasefires and
financial arrangements (usually rooted in large cash payments) with
tribal sheiks, former insurgents, and other community leaders to
cooperate with U.S. forces, go after AQI, and recruit auxiliary security
forces to man checkpoints and otherwise secure their own localities. The
effort has now spread to many neighborhoods in greater Baghdad, Diyala,
Salah ad Din and Babil provinces, contributing to the rapid growth of
"Concerned Local Citizens" (CLCs) groups (perhaps the worst
euphemism of the war). (20) Approximately 80,000 individuals currently
participate in CLCs, 80 percent of whom are Sunnis. Most CLC members
receive a monthly stipend from U.S. forces, averaging $300, to man
checkpoints and patrol neighborhoods. (21)
The Sunni awakening has coincided with a dramatic consolidation and
politicization of the Sunni insurgency. Significant portions of the
long-fragmented Sunni resistance are coalescing into three Sunni
insurgency councils: the Reformation and Jihad Front, the Jihad and
Change Front, and the Supreme Council for Jihad and Liberation. (22)
These councils represent loose national-level coalitions that oppose AQI
(and its self-declared Islamic State in Iraq) and seek to protect Sunni
communities against Shia militia groups. Elements of the Reformation and
Jihad Front and the Jihad and Change Front have also created the
Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance, the first attempt by Sunni
insurgents to form a political umbrella organization. (23)
As a consequence of these changes, many segments of the Sunni
insurgency have begun to cooperate with U.S. forces against AQI, either
directly or through intermediaries. Indeed, many of the CLCs simply
represent front organizations for these groups. In conjunction with
tribal realignments, the altered disposition of Sunni militants has
played a huge role in security improvements in many areas. But it is
important to recognize that the decision by Sunni tribes and insurgents
to cooperate with American forces does not necessarily signify a
fundamental change of heart toward the U.S. presence in Iraq. Instead,
it represents efforts by Sunni groups to eliminate the proximate threat
from AQI, reverse their current political marginalization, and position
themselves vis-a-vis the Shia (and their presumed Iranian patrons) in
the event of a U.S. withdrawal. (24) The surge may be exploiting these
dynamics, but it is not the cause.
The Sadr "Freeze." A third factor contributing to
improved security has been the decision by Muqtada al-Sadr to stand down
his militia. When the surge was announced, Sadr instructed his forces
not to directly challenge the Baghdad security plan (although elements
of JAM continued to attack the coalition). (25) Then, on August 28, a
ferocious gun battle erupted between JAM and members of the Badr
Organization, the rival militia associated with the Supreme Islamic
Iraqi Council (SIIC), during a festival in Karbala, killing dozens and
wounding hundreds. The following day, Sadr announced a six-month freeze
on all armed actions by JAM in an attempt to "rehabilitate"
his organization. (26)
The motivations behind the freeze remain unclear. Sadr's
decisions may have been intended in part to improve JAM's image in
the face of growing accusations of criminal behavior. Sadr has also been
facing fierce competition from extremist factions within JAM, and may
have decided to look the other way as U.S. forces targeted these rogue
elements (often referred to as "special groups" or
"secret cells") as a means of consolidating control. (27) It
is also likely that he wanted to avoid the kind of large-scale
confrontation with U.S. troops that substantially degraded his militia
in the summer of 2004. Whatever the precise motivation, General Petraeus
recently credited the Sadr freeze with helping reduce sectarian violence and attacks on coalition forces. (28)
Prior Sectarian Cleansing. Fourth, and finally, the aftereffects of
prior sectarian cleansing help account for lower levels of violence now.
Since the beginning of the war, more than four million Iraqis have fled
the country or become internally displaced. This process accelerated in
2006 and early 2007 as sectarian cleansing exploded. Hundreds of
thousands have been pushed out of Baghdad, and many formerly mixed
Sunni-Shia neighborhoods are now dominated by one sect. Sectarian
cleansing had the perverse effect of driving down subsequent violence by
reducing the pool of potential victims and segregating groups into
defensible enclaves. (29)
TOWARD A STABLE EQUILIBRIUM
The security progress over the past year is real but brittle. In
the coming months, as the surge ends, population security gains may not
survive the transfer of responsibility to ISF units; Sunni CLC members
may get frustrated at the failure of the Maliki government to integrate
them into the Iraqi police and army and decide to turn their sights on
the government; Sadr's freeze may turn out to be a temporary pause
rather than evidence of moderation; and the return of refugees and
internally displaced people may spark new sectarian clashes. The clock
is ticking, and there is precious little time to put Iraq on the path to
sustainable security.
Still, recent improvements in security have at least made it
possible to envision a stable equilibrium emerging within a highly
decentralized Iraq. But this equilibrium will not magically appear on
its own. It will take determined efforts by the U.S. and Iraqi
governments to shape and shove the political and security landscape into
something that is sustainable as U.S. forces inevitably begin to
withdraw.
Focus on Legislation to Make Provinces Viable. A stable outcome in
Iraq does not require a breakthrough on every single contentious issue
or full-scale national reconciliation, but any viable decentralized
system in Iraq still hinges crucially on a handful of difficult
compromises at the center. The first is an oil deal that equitably
distributes revenue to the provinces. The vast majority of Iraq's
oil wealth is located in the south and north of the country, where Shia
Arabs and Kurds are the demographic majorities, respectively. Currently
producing fields are concentrated in Basra and Kirkuk, and there is also
limited production in fields located in the Baghdad, Diyala, Maysan,
Mosul and Salah ad Din provinces. There are some undeveloped fields
scattered throughout most of the country's other provinces, except
Anbar, Babil, Dahuk and Diwaniya. (30) Unless an oil law is crafted to
ensure that Sunni Arabs, who make up about 20 percent of the population
but control land with only about 10 percent of the oil resources,
receive an equal share of revenue, their areas will not be economically
viable, and they will face continued incentives to try to violently
seize the central government. (31)
Fully implementing and, if necessary, clarifying recent provincial
powers legislation is also essential. Delineating the fights and
responsibilities of provincial councils and governors is necessary to
facilitate the provision of essential services and establish mechanisms
to hold local leaders accountable to their constituents. It is also a
prerequisite for provincial elections, now scheduled for October. (32)
Because the Sunnis largely boycotted the 2005 provincial elections, they
are currently underrepresented in many provincial councils. As new local
leaders have begun to emerge, ensuring that these elections occur as
scheduled is vital to form provincial councils with greater legitimacy.
(33)
Carefully Manage CLCs. It is no secret that many of the Sunni
groups now cooperating with U.S. forces are populated with unsavory
characters ("former" insurgents, smugglers, common criminals
and would-be warlords) whose loyalties and motivations may not be
benign. Overall, it remains unclear whether the CLCs are primarily a
"defensive" movement that seeks nothing more than to protect
Sunni localities against AQI and Shia militias, or whether many of these
groups have "offensive" and expansionist aims to exact
revenge, reclaim Sunni neighborhoods lost in 2006-07, and topple the
Iraqi government. (34) Abandoning cooperative efforts with these groups
based on fears of potential "blowback," however, would not
reduce risks of Sunni revanchism. On the contrary, now that these groups
have organized, severing relations with them is more likely to drive
them into open conflict with U.S. forces and the central government, and
it may even push them to once again make common causes with AQI against
the Shia. Instead, a comprehensive strategy that capitalizes on the
clear short-term security benefits CLCs have produced, while managing
the medium- and long-term risks associated with CLC mobilization, must
be developed. The U.S. approach must address the defensive motivations
of these groups by allowing them to ensure security for their
neighborhoods while limiting their ability to carry out offensive
operations. This means tightly restricting their jurisdictions and
movement, and closely monitoring them for compliance, so that they do
not rub up against rival militias. It means calibrating their military
capabilities by preventing them from acquiring heavy weapons or
otherwise outgunning the Iraqi Army. And it means rigorously screening
the CLC recruits and continuing to collect their biometric information
to deter illegal behavior and, if necessary, respond to actions taken
against the government. (35)
But the single most important step in managing the CLCs is
integrating them into the Iraqi police and army or otherwise providing
them gainful employment through ties to the central government. Forging
financial and institutional dependencies will help dissuade CLCs from
reverting to insurgents, and, by giving the Iraqi government leverage,
will help minimize anxieties among the Shia that the CLCs will do so.
The Iraqi government initially welcomed the Sunni awakening in
homogenous Anbar province, but as the movement has spread into mixed
areas, the anxieties of the Maliki government have grown. (36) After
considerable cajoling, the Maliki government has agreed to integrate
about 20 percent of current CLC members into the ISF and provide the
remainder with nonsecurity jobs. But the government has been very slow
in carrying out these pledges and the new de-Baathification reform law
may actually complicate integration efforts by precluding ex-Baathists
from the security services. (37) Given the slow pace of integration, the
U.S. military appears to be hedging its bets by establishing a civilian
jobs corps to absorb the tens of thousands of CLC members that may not
be hired into the ISF. The goal is to transition them into public works and vocational training programs. (38) But this is, at best, a quick
fix. Creating the needed relationships and demonstrating good faith with
Sunni volunteers will require the Iraqi government to carry through on
its promises to integrate CLCs and eventually take over the management
and funding of civil employment programs. As one U.S. Army officer
recently observed, if the Iraqi governments fails to reach out to the
CLCs in this manner, "it's game on--they're back to
attacking again." (39)
Defang JAM. Disarming and demobilizing all militias in Iraq should
remain a long-term objective, but, in the short term, attempts to
marginalize extremist elements and manage their role in providing local
security may be more realistic. This is true of Sunni CLCs, and it is
also probably the case with JAM. Since eliminating JAM or Sadr's
political influence is impossible, the goal should be to create an
incentive structure that draws as much of the movement as possible away
from violence.
In part, this entails working with the Iraqi government to weaken
popular support for extremist and criminal elements within JAM. This
means continuing to hold informal talks with Sadr representatives and
mobilizing elements within Shia communities that are fed up with JAM
factions engaged in criminal extortion. In some Shia-majority
neighborhoods, moderate elements of JAM should be integrated into the
ISF and placed under the same restrictions as Sunni CLCs. For example,
in Baghdad's Rashid district, once a majority Sunni area and now
mostly populated by Shia, U.S. forces have engaged moderate elements of
JAM to guard outdoor markets and pick up trash, and they have even
managed to craft a reconciliation agreement between Sunni and Shia
residents in Rashid's Jihad neighborhood. (40)
Taking other steps to maintain security improvements is also an
indirect way of encouraging Sadr to maintain his freeze and prevent
JAM's resurgence. (41) Sadr could confidently pull his forces back,
in part, because his main constituents, poor Shia, were no longer under
attack by Sunni insurgents. If the U.S. military and ISF are able to
protect Shia civilians from AQI attacks and provide assurances to the
Shia community that other Sunni insurgents have been effectively
co-opted, they may be able to continue chipping away at support for the
most violent elements within JAM. (42) Together with continued efforts
by U.S. and Iraqi forces to target groups that refuse to comply with the
Sadr freeze, this may tilt the playing field in favor of moderate
factions within the movement.
Resettle Refugees and Displaced Persons. Over the past several
months, thousands of refugees have returned to Iraq as a consequence of
growing economic hardship abroad and improved security in Baghdad. Many
have arrived to find families from a rival sect occupying their homes.
The Iraqi government appears to have no plan to provide shelter, food or
other essential services for these people. It also has no mechanism to
settle property disputes or otherwise prevent the influx from sparking a
fresh round of bloodshed. (43)
Returning families should receive compensation for family members
who were killed and property destroyed, as well as assistance in
resettling. However, at least initially, it may be better to encourage
displaced persons attempting to return to fault-line neighborhoods,
especially in Baghdad, to settle elsewhere. This obviously risks
ratifying previous sectarian cleansing, but the alternative is to create
thousands of flashpoints for renewed bloodshed by attempting to
aggressively "reverse engineer" mixed neighborhoods.
Professionalize the ISF. A stable equilibrium in a highly
decentralized Iraq is impossible without a neutral Iraqi Army. The army
must become a national, nonsectarian guardian of the state that can
provide security in mixed neighborhoods and regions and police the seams
between rival groups as U.S. forces withdraw. The operational
effectiveness of the Iraqi Army has improved, but it still requires
substantial support from U.S. forces, and some units remain prone to
sectarian tendencies. (44) As the surge ends, more U.S. military
resources must be shifted to training and advising missions through some
mix of enhanced military "transition teams" and retasked U.S.
brigades from a combat to a support role. (45)
Unlike the Iraqi Army, the National Police appear to be an
unmitigated disaster. The 25,000-man police force is heavily infiltrated
by sectarian agendas and, in the past, has been complicit in gross
human-rights violations. (46) Completely disbanding it is probably not
an option, but National Police counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
missions should be folded into the Iraqi Army. Moreover, the number of
U.S. advisers embedded in the Ministry of Interior and police should be
increased to enhance their ability to detect sectarian tendencies and
human-rights abuses, and all U.S. support should be conditioned on
respect for the rule of law.
Dampen Powder Kegs in the North and South. Central and western
Iraq, the focal points for the Sunni insurgency and sectarian conflict,
remain the most volatile parts of the country. Nevertheless, significant
conflict potential also exists in the north and south.
Up north, the biggest flashpoint for communal violence is the
impending referendum to determine the status of oil-rich Kirkuk. Kurds
have a strong cultural and emotional attachment to Kirkuk and seek to
absorb it into Iraqi Kurdistan. In contrast, Kirkuk's Arab
population, including many who resettled there during Saddam's
rule, generally favor continued governance from Baghdad. The referendum
was supposed to be held in 2007, but it now appears that it will be held
in mid-2008 or later. The decision to postpone it temporarily avoided a
showdown between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen, providing some breathing
space to reach agreement on the process for determining Kirkuk's
fate. The prospect for a peaceful political settlement was given a boost
recently by the decision of the Arab bloc in the province to end a
year-long boycott and return to the provincial council, as well as by a
new round of dialogue between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen initiated by
Kurdish leaders. (47) This may signal that Kurdish politicians recognize
that a consensus-based approach resulting in a shared Kirkuk is
preferable to risking a violent confrontation. At the same time,
relations between the Kurds and the central government appear to be
rapidly deteriorating over oil contract disputes, and a bloc of Iraqi
parliamentarians recently proposed eliminating the referendum altogether
and imposing a decision on Kirkuk's status from Baghdad. (48) In
this volatile context, the United States must continue to push for the
referendum to be held while encouraging local dialogue on the issue.
In southern Iraq, the biggest challenge to stability has been
violent competition between Shia political parties and their affiliated
militias, particularly between the Sadrists/JAM and SIIC/Badr. Clashes
appear to have subsided somewhat as a result of the October 2007
announcement of a ceasefire by Sadr and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of
SIIC. (49) Moreover, as British forces have withdrawn from southern
Iraq, the much-feared intra-Shia bloodbath in Basra province, home to
the country's second largest city and the majority of the
country's oil, has thus far been avoided. Basra remains beset by
widespread criminality, but a crude stability has emerged from a
mafia-like division of turf and spoils by the Sadrists, SIIC and Fadilah
(a smaller Shia party). Iraqi Army units have also been deployed to keep
the residual competition within bounds. (50) The incentive to keep the
oil (and profits) flowing may provide sufficient motivation for the
major parties to maintain the current arrangement. U.S. forces should
assist the Iraqi Army as requested, but, ultimately, the departure of
British forces leaves the United States little influence over the
region.
ENCOURAGING POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION
Given the tenuous nature of current security improvements in Iraq,
there is no prospect for lasting stability without genuine political
accommodation regardless of the number of U.S. forces in the country. At
the moment, the main barrier to political progress is the reluctance of
the Iraqi government or, more specifically, Shia parties that seek to
run the Iraqi state solely on their own terms. Because the Sunnis lost
the battle for Baghdad in 2006-07, the costs of ignoring them declined,
reducing the Maliki government's incentives to compromise. American
outreach to Sunni tribes and former insurgents alarms the regime--but
this very alarm increases pressure on the government to reach out if
they want to avoid further bloodshed. At the same time, the events of
2006-07 have probably convinced most Sunnis that they cannot defeat the
Shia in a civil war. This is also good news; it encourages Sunni groups
to shift from offensive, power-centered goals to predominantly
defensive, security-centered ones. This may increase their willingness
to make a deal and settle for less, as long as doing so does not leave
them completely defenseless against a potential onslaught by Shia
militias or the Shia-dominated ISF. Last but not least, the
consolidation of Sunni groups may increase the odds of reaching and
enforcing a negotiated settlement, which has historically been
complicated by the sheer number of insurgent groups.
The conditions are thus ripe for the United States to push the
Iraqi government to follow through on its promises, fairly implement
existing legislation, and reach deals on oil, CLC integration and
employment, reforming the National Police and Iraqi Army, and other
issues. But this pressure will only work if the Busy administration uses
all of its remaining leverage with the Iraqi government. This requires a
credible threat of U.S. withdrawal but also a credible promise to
provide U.S. support if key steps are taken. The Bush administration has
thus far failed to generate this leverage because its commitment to the
Iraqi government has been effectively open-ended. On the other hand,
many Democratic initiatives that propose a unilateral timetable for
complete withdrawal also provide no leverage, because there is no carrot
held out to the Iraqi government if they accede to U.S. demands and no
ability for the Iraqi government to affect the pace of the withdrawal in
a way that serves their interests.
A new approach is needed. To correct the perception that its
commitment is open-ended, the Bush administration should immediately
make a formal pledge that the United States will not seek, accept or
under any conditions establish permanent military bases in Iraq. The
administration should then announce that, after U.S. forces return to
their pre-surge levels of 15 combat brigades in the summer of 2008, it
intends to draw down further (perhaps to 10-12 brigades) before it
leaves office in January 2009. A down payment on U.S. withdrawal below
pre-surge levels would not only alter the perceptions of the Iraqi
government, it would also signal to groups strongly opposed to the
occupation inside the Iraqi parliament, as well as organizations
representing the Sunni insurgency, that the United States does not
intend to stay forever. This might open up additional avenues for
bringing them into formal and informal negotiations.
The Bush administration must also take advantage of upcoming talks
aimed at shaping a long-term bilateral framework between the U.S. and
Iraqi governments to push the Iraqis toward accommodation. These
negotiations, which the Bush administration hopes to complete by July
2008, are meant to replace the current UN Security Council resolution
authorizing the presence of international forces in Iraq with a
bilateral accord, including a status-of-forces agreement. (51) On
November 26, 2007, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed a
Declaration of Principles outlining the goals of each party. The
document clearly reveals the Iraqi government's desire for U.S.
security assurances against external aggression, protection against
internal terrorist threats to the government, and continued support for
the ISF. In the economic sphere, the Iraqi government wants continued
assistance in renegotiating the country's debt obligations,
encouraging foreign investment and supporting further integration into
international financial organizations. (52) The fact that many of
Iraq's leaders have requested an enduring relationship gives the
United States a rare opportunity. The Bush administration should exploit
these talks to set conditions and deadlines for the Iraqi government
that will affect the pace of further U.S. withdrawals, as well as the
distribution and mission of residual forces.
If the Iraqi government passes key legislation and takes other
steps necessary for genuine political accommodation, the administration
should signal its willingness to sign an agreement that continues U.S.
economic and diplomatic support for Iraq, withdraws U.S. forces
gradually, and maintains a robust residual presence of perhaps
50,000-80,000 troops for several years to support the ISF, conduct
counterterrorism missions, and deter external aggression. However, if
the Iraqi government fails to act, the administration must threaten to
redeploy U.S. forces much more rapidly, leaving the Iraqi government to
face its enemies alone, and shift the U.S. posture toward containment.
(53)
To make this threat credible, the administration should seize on
the impending U.S. presidential election and the prospect that the next
administration may abandon the Iraqi government altogether. Since U.S.
public opinion continues to oppose the war, the U.S. presidential
election represents a crucible of sorts for the Iraqi government. The
presidential candidates from both parties should drive that point home
by publicly endorsing the conditions the Iraqi government must meet in
order to affect the pace of a U.S. withdrawal and gain their
administration's support for leaving a robust residual force in the
country. The candidates should also declare their intention to revise
any bilateral accord that does not hold the Iraqi government
accountable.
END IN SIGHT
Given recent but fragile security gains, it would be a mistake for
the United States to set a firm unilateral timetable now for withdrawal
before one last round of hard bargaining in 2008. At the same time, even
at lower levels of violence and U.S. casualties, a continued American
presence in Iraq entails costs (in terms of lives and money, the ability
to devote more resources to the war in Afghanistan and other
contingencies, strains on the U.S. military, and the continued
perception of occupation). Therefore, U.S. patience with the Iraqi
government should not be unlimited. General Petraeus suggested as much
in an exchange with Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) during his September
11, 2007, testimony before the Senate Armed Services committee:
SEN COLLINS: If, a year from now, the Iraqi government has still
failed to achieve significant political progress, what do we do? ...
GEN. PETRAEUS: Senator, if we arrived at that point a year from
now, that is something I would have to think very, very, very hard
about.... Because, on the one hand, we have very real national interests
that extend beyond Iraq.... On the other hand, there clearly are limits
to the blood and treasure that we can expend in an effort. And I am
keenly aware of that. (54)
If, in the coming year, the major conflict groups in Iraq move
toward genuine accommodation, the United States should gradually
redeploy its troops but leave a robust residual force in the country to
support the Iraqi government. However, if the Iraqi government will not
engage in genuine political compromise, no amount of U.S. military force
will be sufficient to produce long-term stability. Under this scenario,
American national interests would be better served by a more rapid
departure and transition to a containment posture. Either way, 2008
should represent the beginning of the "endgame" in Iraq.
REDEPLOYING FROM IRAQ AND RESETTING U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY IN 2009
Brian Katulis
With the fifth anniversary of the start of the Iraq war rapidly
approaching, the United States is entering a period of transition in its
Iraq policy, driven by three forces: a continued lack of American public
support for the war, a growing U.S. military-readiness crisis, and other
pressing priorities in the fight against global terror networks,
particularly in Afghanistan. As the Bush administration enters its last
year, it has set into motion a series of important policy shifts on the
Iraq front. After temporarily boosting its troop presence in Iraq in
2007, the United States has begun a process of troop withdrawal that
will continue in the coming year.
In 2007, the United States engaged in a series of diplomatic
efforts centered on Iraq, including the launching of an International
Compact for Iraq sponsored by the United Nations, participation in
several regional conferences dedicated to boosting Iraq's security,
and bilateral discussions with Iran in Baghdad. It also supported an
effort by the United Nations to boost its presence after four years of
relatively quiet, yet at times important, involvement in Iraq, with the
goal of using UN assets in an attempt to mediate among Iraq's
leaders and respond to humanitarian challenges resulting from the four
million Iraqis currently displaced.
Although President Bush's lame-duck administration will
maintain an extensive U.S. troop presence in Iraq through the end of its
term, a debate continues in the United States, with strong majorities
supporting troop withdrawals within the next one to two years. Even
after violence declined in late 2007 in Iraq, three quarters (73
percent) of Americans said that two years would be the maximum amount of
time they would be willing to have large numbers of troops in Iraq, with
half of the country saying that they want large numbers of troops in
Iraq for no longer than a year. (55) American public support for the war
has steadily declined since Saddam Hussein's capture in December
2003, slightly increasing after certain isolated events of good news,
and seems to have passed the point of no return. The composition of the
leadership in the 111th Congress and the new administration that will
take office in 2009 will likely reflect this desire for a diminished
troop presence, just as it has in other democracies that had a troop
presence in Iraq, including Great Britain, Australia and Poland. As
Iraqi authorities increasingly look to assert their own sovereignty and
the number of U.S. partners in the so-called coalition of the willing
dwindles to less than one-fifth of its original size, U.S. military
commanders are looking for the best way to manage the eventual drawdown of U.S. forces.
Within the Pentagon, a debate continues, weighing the strategic
costs and risks of maintaining a sizable U.S. troop presence in Iraq
against potential security benefits. One major concern among top
Pentagon officials is the impact on overall U.S. military readiness. The
Army has lowered it recruiting standards to unprecedented levels, and
the United States no longer has a strategic ground reserve as a result
of the extended deployments. Proposals for a prolonged military presence
makes little sense at a time when the Iraq War threatens to break our
all-volunteer military--a crisis so bad that the Army recently raised
potential signing bonuses to $45,000. (56) Of course, the United States
has considerable resources, and it could always reinstitute conscription if we needed to meet these challenges. But the Iraq War's
unpopularity with the American public makes a draft improbable.
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George W. Casey, Jr.,
warned in early December 2007 that the Army was "suffering the
cumulative effects of six years at war" and that its forces were
"deploying at unsustainable rates." (57) In the fall of 2007,
Marine Corps Commandant James T. Conway proposed redeploying Marine
forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. (58) Though Defense Secretary Robert
Gates eventually rejected the proposal, this call is further evidence
that U.S. military commanders are recognizing the need for the United
States to reallocate its military assets to meet continued threats on
other fronts.
The growing concerns about increased instability in Afghanistan and
Pakistan prompted some senior officials in the U.S. government to
conclude that the United States must accelerate a drawdown of U.S.
troops from Iraq in order to increase force levels in Afghanistan.
Military commanders there, concerned about the resurgent Taliban
movement, are seeking additional battalions, where approximately 26,000
U.S. troops are currently joined by 28,000 NATO forces in efforts to
combat the Taliban insurgency, root out al-Qaeda elements, and boost the
capacity of the Afghan government and its security forces. (59) Even
though some analysts have argued for making this shift for several
years, (60) efforts to make a strategic reallocation in U.S. resources
and shift greater focus back to the mission left unaccomplished in
Afghanistan are likely to garner greater support in 2008.
Nearly seven years after the September 11 attacks, the military
actions initiated by the Bush administration have cost the United States
an estimated $1 trillion, the majority of those resources going to the
military and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. As the United States looks
at the broad global landscape and assesses the best way to marshal its
considerable yet not infinite resources to address global security
challenges, more Americans will continue to conclude that it is time to
get out of the weeds in Iraq's multiple internal conflicts, reset
its overall Middle East policy, and shift the focus back to eliminating
al-Qaeda's leadership that planned the September 11 attacks.
Taking Stock at the End of 2007
As 2007 drew to a close, three main features characterized the
complicated state of affairs in Iraq: an improved but still deadly and
tenuous security environment in the central part of the country,
continued deadlock among a divided leadership on fundamental questions
of power-sharing, and growing trends towards decentralization.
A Temporary Lull in Violence? According to Pentagon statistics,
violence in Iraq has declined to 2005 levels. The primary reasons for
this decline include the pragmatic shift by Sunni groups and tribes
against foreign fighters that has roots from as early as 2004, a new set
of tactics introduced by U.S. and Iraqi forces in the central part of
the country involving an increased force presence and the building of
separation barriers between communities, and the impact of sectarian
cleansing campaigns that continued throughout 2007 and left increasingly
homogeneous sectarian neighborhoods in their wake.
This improved but still tenuous security environment in the central
part of the country came to some degree at the expense of security in
the northern areas of Iraq just south of the autonomous Kurdish regions.
(61) The northern city of Mosul has emerged once again as an important
hub for Iraq's insurgency, with local government officials
reportedly collaborating with militants to help boost the
insurgency's finances. (62) In southern Iraq, intra-Shia clashes
continued in the streets of major cities like Basra and Diwaniya. A
battle between two rival Shia militias in late August in the city of
Karbala killed more than 50 people, prompting the militias to take some
steps away from the brink of further violence.
Because much of the violence in Iraq is linked to vicious struggles
for power, and the fundamental disputes over power sharing remain
unresolved, some have concluded that the past few months are little more
than a temporarily lull. "It's more of a ceasefire than a
peace," Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih remarked in
early December 2007, a comment echoed by several Iraqi leaders. (63)
Rather than fundamentally reshaping internal Iraqi political
dynamics to advance a sustainable agreement, the 2007 surge of U.S.
forces may have simply put a temporary lid on the violence and driven
the activities of various militias and insurgent groups underground.
Death squads that still operate in Baghdad have reportedly begun to hide
victims' corpses rather than drop them in the streets, as they had
done before. Robert Lamburne, the director of forensic services at the
British Embassy in Baghdad, said, "There's less killing, but
there's more concealment." (64) Several U.S. military
officials have grown increasingly skeptical about the data compiled by
Iraq's forces. As U.S. forces scale back their presence, they
become more reliant on Iraqi security forces for statistics such as the
number of attacks; serious questions remain about the quality of this
data. (65)
Despite recent purges, the Badr Organization, the militia of the
Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), has extensively infiltrated
the National Police, whose units have perpetrated sectarian violence and
formed death squads against Sunnis. Although the surge of U.S. forces
continued through Baghdad in 2007, Muqtada Sadr's Mehdi militia
still rules underneath the radar of U.S. forces and has continued to
expand and consolidate its control on neighborhoods, turning to a new
generation to fill a vacuum left by arrested and purged Mehdi militia
leaders. (66)
Finally, the much-touted U.S. effort to support
"irregular" forces, termed "Concerned Local
Citizens" (CLCs), is fraught with significant risk. Opposed by the
Shia-led government, this initiative has organized close to 80,000
individuals--80 percent of them Sunnis--and provided most of them with
monthly $300 contracts with the goal of integrating them into
Iraq's national security forces. But top Iraqi leaders in the
central government have harshly criticized this effort; and, as of
December 2007, fewer than 2,000 of the CLCs were "approved"
for jobs. (67) By the end of 2007, some members of Iraq's
government had changed their tone on the effort and indicated an
increased willingness to integrate these forces, but concrete action
towards integration remains to be seen. A considerable risk remains that
this initiative may amount to little more than creating yet another
category of militias outside of the framework of Iraq's formal
security forces. If Iraq's political leaders remain bitterly
divided and incapable of resolving their power-sharing disputes, these
competing armed groups could turn their weapons on each other and make
Iraq's internal conflicts even more deadly.
Continued Deadlock among Iraq's Leaders. The core objective of
President Bush's surge strategy--that Iraq's leaders will make
key decisions to advance their country's political transition and
national reconciliation--has not been achieved. Iraq's leaders are
fundamentally at odds over what Iraq is and should be, how power is and
should be distributed, and who controls and should control the
nation's oil wealth.
Because of sharp divisions, Iraq's national government has
made little progress on the fundamental questions related to
constitutional reform, oil and revenue sharing, and the balance of power
between national and provincial governments. The Iraqi parliament
decided to suspend its session for the rest of the year on December 6,
2007, without achieving any meaningful progress on the core issues. This
recess comes just four months after a month-long recess in August.
Without some sort of emergency political and diplomatic intervention,
Iraq's leaders at the national level will likely spend 2008
debating the same issues they debated in 2004, without achieving
meaningful resolution. Even if the United States and other countries can
motivate Iraq's leaders to peacefully address the unanswered
questions, it is unlikely that these accords would be implemented. On
most issues, what happens de jure in Iraq at the national level will not
matter very much in the next few years; it will be the de facto
practices, actions and institutions that will shape events. For example,
Iraq's national government may at some point take action on
finalizing new oil- and revenue-sharing laws. These laws may even win
the approval of the national parliament. But the greater challenge will
come in implementing the laws' provisions.
Growing Trends towards Decentralization. Because Iraq's
central government is incapable of providing a forum for resolving
disputes over power-sharing, a growing number of political forces have
opted to disengage from the national government. In the past year, two
Shia factions, Fadhila and a bloc led by Muqtada al-Sadr, dropped out of
the coalition created by Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, leaving him
with very slim support in parliament. Sunni leaders abandoned the Maliki
government and suspended their participation in parliament numerous
times throughout 2007.
An increasing number of Iraqi actors are instead focusing their
efforts on extending their influence in individual communities and
provinces, taking their cues from the Kurdish leadership in northern
Iraq, which has carved out its own space and autonomy. If the
long-delayed provincial elections go forward in 2008, it will likely
reinforce this trend towards decentralization. A highly decentralized
state--though not simplistically drawn along three regions as proposed
by some (68)--is a probable outcome in Iraq.
Developing a Multi-Year Process to Resolve Conflicts for Power
The decline in violence in 2007 has not yet resulted in a more
functional process for Iraq's leaders to resolve their disputes
over power sharing, and the institutions of Iraq's central
government, as well as the numerous security forces being built and
supported by the United States, have done little to set Iraq's
leadership on the path towards a sustainable settlement of their
conflicts. Iraqis remain as bitterly divided as they were at the start
of 2007, and the environment of mistrust remains strong. The conflicts
are not religious civil wars or part of a clash of civilizations, as
some have simplistically argued. Rather, they are about influence and
power: which forces control and distribute the country's resources
and jobs and provide the people with basic needs like safety and
security and services such as food, water, electricity and healthcare.
At this stage, the open-ended commitment of U.S. troops to Iraq
serves as a disincentive to Iraq's leaders to resolve their
power-sharing disputes. In essence, unconditionally committing U.S.
troops to an enduring presence in Iraq has fostered a culture of
dependency on the U.S. military among some Iraqi leaders. These leaders
use the imperfect security umbrella provided by U.S. forces to maintain
their grip on power without taking tangible steps forward to reconcile
their differences. To break this continued cycle of dependency, the
United States needs to send a clear signal that it plans to remove its
troops from Iraq, centered on a defined goal with a clear date, and
intensify diplomatic efforts in coordination with Iraq's neighbors
and other international power.
Implementing U.S. Troop Redeployment in 2009. The realization that
the U.S. military's efforts can only lead to a temporary lull in
Iraq's violence without true steps towards political reconciliation
will lead U.S. leaders to conclude that the time has come to implement a
phased redeployment of troops as efficiently as possible in 2009.
The declaration of principles signed by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri
Al-Maliki and President Bush in November 2007 set guidelines for an
enduring security pact between Iraq and the United States. Iraqi Foreign
Minister Hoshyar Zebari indicated that the new agreement would put a
time limit on the presence of American troops. (69) Given the deep
unpopularity of the U.S. military presence among ordinary Iraqis, (70)
it is inevitable that Iraq's leadership will try to limit the role
and tenure of U.S. troops in Iraq.
In order to maximize its leverage over Iraq's divided
leadership, the United States should utilize discussions on this pact as
leverage to motivate Iraq's leaders to settle their power-sharing
disputes. The strains on the U.S. military as well as the growing need
for additional support in Afghanistan will likely require this shift,
and the United States should seek to maximize the political impact that
its redeployment of troops might have on Iraq's leaders. The best
way to motivate Iraq's leaders to jumpstart their political process
is to set a certain date for redeploying all U.S. troops from Iraq
within a 12-18 month time period. In any security-assistance pact that
the United States strikes, it should seek to maintain the capacity to
carry out targeted strikes on select terrorist sites from a robust U.S.
military presence in the region. But the United States should make clear
that it has no intention of maintaining permanent bases in Iraq and that
its commitment of military forces will end in a defined period of time.
Continuing Diplomacy in Iraq and the Middle East. All too often,
discussions on Iraq get mired in the various intra-Iraqi disputes and
details of possible long-term security training and assistance programs
without strong reference to the political dynamics within Iraq and the
broader Middle East. Getting to a stable equilibrium inside Iraq will
mean some degree of accommodation and cooperation with Iraq's
neighbors, which will require a complicated set of initiatives given the
diverse security interests involved. Iran, for example, offers support
to some Shia militia while also maintaining positive official relations
with Iraq's Shia and Kurdish leadership. Elements in Syria and
Saudi Arabia offer financial and logistical support to some Sunni groups
in Iraq. Iraq's internal conflicts have in some ways already become
proxy wars for regional forces, pitting country against country, Shias
against Sunnis, and Arabs against Persians against Kurds against Turks.
Iraq's neighbors have stakes in key aspects of Iraq's internal
conflicts. The consequences of an escalated conflict in Iraq would be
dire for these countries--more refugees, the possible spread of attacks
by global terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and more
criminality and lawlessness. This is why a sustained set of regional
diplomacy initiatives is necessary.
After much delay, the Bush administration finally began the process
of reaching out to Iraq's neighbors by participating in regional
conferences in Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. Regional working groups on
refugees, fuel imports and border security were created. The
administration also began bilateral discussions with Iran on issues of
mutual interest in Iraq in late May 2007. This engagement may have
delivered important results: by the end of 2007, top U.S. commanders in
Iraq noted a significant decrease in attacks linked to Iran. Similar
regional-security and diplomatic initiatives are necessary on several
fronts, including the borders with Turkey, Syria and Iran. These
initiatives should be targeted; securing border outposts and setting up
cross-border communications between different governing authorities
would be a good start on some fronts.
The United Nations, which saw its role in Iraq expanded in an
August 2007 resolution, can play a helpful role in reconciling
Iraq's political factions and addressing the needs of displaced
Iraqis. (71) The new UN special representative to Iraq, Staffan de
Mistura, has already started working to resolve emerging crises such as
the ongoing dispute over Kirkuk. In December, Sunni Arabs ended a
year-long boycott of the provincial governing council, and the deadline
for holding a referendum on the status of the city, due before the end
of 2007, was extended into 2008, in part because of quiet diplomatic
efforts. These moves represent steps in the right direction, but they
are not nearly enough.
For years to come, diplomats from the United States and other major
countries will need to help Iraqis grapple with difficult choices about
their country's future. In some instances, U.S. diplomatic
engagement will not be constructive at all. For example, in southern
Iraq, the United States seems to have little influence on the warring
Shia factions, but it could encourage other interlocutors from the
region or other Muslim-majority countries to play a constructive role.
With the right kind of diplomatic support and approach, the United
States, working with key international powers and countries in the
region, can build on the steps taken in 2007 to stabilize the Middle
East on two key tracks: resolving Iraq's internal conflicts and
restarting international efforts to manage and resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
This increased diplomatic engagement on the Arab-Israeli conflict
is critical for two key reasons. First, resolving the Arab-Israeli
conflict will benefit U.S. national security interests by ending a
conflict that has undermined regional security and been used as a
propaganda tool by global terror groups. Second, people in the region
view the United States more positively when it is working to address
tensions between Israel and its neighbors and seen to be taking an
active role in constructively shaping regional dynamics. The United
States might productively focus more effort on resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict in return for more effort on the part of Middle
East countries to help manage, contain and resolve Iraq's
conflicts.
CONCLUSION
No simple military solutions exist for the many challenges inside
Iraq. Iraq's internal conflicts are struggles for power that
require much more than just a long-term U.S. military training and
assistance effort that aims to strike an internal balance of power. A
narrow focus on continuing the security initiatives introduced by the
Bush administration in 2007 in the hope that it will somehow achieve
equilibrium is far-fetched. New diplomatic efforts to break the logjam among Iraq's leadership are necessary to achieve a sustainable
security pact that stabilizes the country and the region.
Nearly five years after the start of the war, Iraq's leaders
remain incapable of making the tough compromises necessary to stabilize
their country. The U.S. strategy in 2007 recognized this reality and
invested more resources in local security initiatives, but these
initiatives failed to bridge the divides among Iraq's leaders--and
in some ways may have exacerbated tensions and mistrust. The surge,
which the Bush administration argued would create a more stable
environment that would induce Iraq's leaders to strike
power-sharing deals, has not achieved its intended results. Iraq is more
stable, but without a brokered agreement or minimal accommodation among
its leaders; this increased stability is not likely to endure.
In 2007, the Bush administration adopted a more pragmatic approach
to the Middle East, engaging in a series of diplomatic initiatives that
offer some potential for progress but may not end up achieving anything
without serious follow through and continuous efforts. The key question
in 2008 is whether the administration will remain intensely engaged on
the multiple diplomatic fronts. If it continues to take pragmatic steps
forward, engaging all of Iraq's neighbors and trying to achieve
progress on the Arab-Israeli front, it could help revive U.S. power and
position in the Middle East. But without a clear signal that the United
States is leaving Iraq and a clear message that the United States does
not desire long-term military bases in the heart of the Middle East,
leaders in the region will lack the necessary incentives to take greater
responsibility for their own affairs.
U.S. STRATEGY AND THE FAILURES OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION
Colin Kahl and Brian Katulis offer sharply opposed verdicts on the
long-term strategic merits of America's current strategy in Iraq
and on what to make of recent changes in the security situation. It is
worth noting, however, that a general consensus exists on where Iraq is
headed, and the general situation that will confront a new American
president in January 2009. Partition, hard or soft, now seems very
unlikely. Most now expect to see a highly decentralized state, where
governance and security are increasingly devolving to localities and the
central state has limited reach. The original goal of a strong,
centralized democratic state rooted in a general consensus on political
identity and norms, with a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence,
for now seems to be off the table. Most expect that the formal Iraqi
state will remain governed by the existing political rules: no new
elections, no new constitution, no new grand bargain--meaning a
political monopoly of the major Shia parties supported by a deal to
leave the Kurds alone in exchange for their votes. Few expect serious
progress on national-reconciliation legislative benchmarks or on the
large-scale integration of the Sunni "Awakening" militias into
the Iraqi army or police. Most agree that the situation in the Shia
areas is beyond American control and likely to remain violent,
fragmented and unstable. Most expect, though here there is less
consensus, that the general reduction of violence in Sunni areas will
continue. Few think that there will be any national-level political
accommodation. And it seems clear that the American troop presence will
remain at pre-surge levels of about 130,000.
This widespread consensus, while grim, offers a standpoint from
which to begin seriously debating America's strategic options.
Debate should now move to whether such an outcome is acceptable in terms
of American interests, and whether security gains are sustainable in the
absence of national political reconciliation. Optimists suggest that if
local-level peace can be maintained, Iraq may eventually stabilize into
a functioning, decentralized federalism in which each community largely
governs its own affairs. American forces would largely function as a
buffer preventing backsliding into violence. Pessimists see the contours
of an emerging warlord state, with power devolved to local militias,
gangs, tribes and power brokers, in which even minimal stability will
require an active American military presence. Between these federalist hopes and warlord fears lie the fundamental questions about American
interests, the opportunity costs of maintaining a large troop presence,
and the risks of withdrawal. For instance, the military theorist Stephen
Biddle recently returned from Iraq convinced that the prospects for
success had greatly improved over the last year. But in the end, his
optimism was tempered by a sobering policy suggestion: Maintaining a
stable Iraq would require a commitment of some 100,000 American troops
over a 20-30-year period. (72)
I argue that the core question for assessing the strategic future
of Iraq and America's role should be whether the military and
political trends are leading to the consolidation of a sustainable Iraqi
state. In the absence of an effective, nonsectarian state with a
monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, only external
peacekeepers--the United States--would be able to maintain a fragile
mosaic of uneasy local-level truces and ceasefires. I am far less
optimistic than Kahl that the security gains in the second half of 2007
are building towards a sustainable equilibrium. This is primarily
because the trends are working against the consolidation of an
effectively sovereign Iraqi state, devolving power to local levels that
are themselves wracked by infighting and growing political
fragmentation. (73)
Second, I argue that this fragmentation is not one remaining
obstacle to an otherwise successful strategy. Such fragmentation is both
a primary reason for the current patina of success (as the United States
has cut deals with Sunni factions and largely ceded Shia areas to local
power brokers) and the most likely effect, intended or otherwise, of the
Petraeus-Crocker tactics. (74) The United States is empowering local
actors at the expense of the national level, with, at best, the nominal
participation of the Iraqi state. Not coincidentally, both the Sunni and
Shia communities are fragmenting at a remarkable rate. The Sunni side is
increasingly divided by a fierce power struggle among the various
insurgency factions, the elected leadership, the Awakenings (which are
themselves internally divided, with tribes and local leaders bickering
over power and personalities), and a "salafi-jihadist" wing of
the insurgency (the Islamic State of Iraq associated with al-Qaeda) that
has experienced significant setbacks but has hardly disappeared. On the
Shia side, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) has fragmented; Muqtada
al-Sadr has been confronted with internal challenges and
"rogue" militias; Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has lost
influence, and his aides are being murdered at an alarming rate; and
militias are battling it out on the streets for power and control.
This kind of fragmentation might help the United States in its
tactical maneuvers at the local level and buy local stability in the
short term, but it is anathema to any kind of national deal. As Jim
Fearon, one of the leading political scientists working on civil wars,
recently put it, "a power-sharing deal tends to hold only when
every side is relatively cohesive. How can one party expect that another
will live up to its obligations if it has no effective control over its
own members?" (75) American strategy over the last year encourages
the fragmentation of authority within communities and undermines those
groups that might be able to deliver such a lasting bargain. The
fragmentation of the communities at the local level makes a national
bargain more important and less likely. For a deal to stick, it needs to
be negotiated with interlocutors capable of delivering on the bargain.
The Anbar Salvation Council (ASC), for instance, might settle with the
United States and the Shia-dominated government on better terms than
would the insurgency factions. But can they make such a deal stick?
Finally, I return to the core question: Is a fragmented, sectarian,
warlord state held together by a long-term commitment of significant
numbers of American troops an acceptable or desirable destination for
American policy makers? Whether such an outcome, if combined with a
local Sunni power structure hostile to al-Qaeda, would pose a threat to
American national interests is a debate worth having. It would certainly
mean a major climbdown from initial American goals, but a lot has
happened over the last four years, and it is quite clear that the United
States no longer has the power to achieve its original goals. It would
hardly be optimal for Iraqis either, since they would be condemned to
live in a Hobbesian environment, and the refugee crisis would likely
never be resolved. Should Washington simply acknowledge the reality of
the institutional and political environment it has created in Iraq, or
maintain its current radical disconnect between its stated objectives
and what it is actually doing? Finally, would an Americn drawdown or
withdrawal undermine or promote American interests?
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
National reconciliation matters not because of arbitrary
legislative benchmarks or the self-serving demands of Sunni politicians.
It matters because only genuine national reconciliation, in which
mutually acceptable agreements are not only signed but implemented and
manifested within key state institutions, will make possible the
consolidation of a sovereign Iraqi state. When the "surge" was
announced, American officials clearly recognized this, making political
reconciliation the central focus of their efforts. The military
escalation would provide a secure window of opportunity for Iraqi
politicians to finally make desperately needed compromises on the
fundamental issues dividing the country.
Such reconciliation has not happened, as Kahl's essay recounts
in painful detail. Instead SunniShia political tensions at the national
level have escalated while the Iraqi state has become ever more
dysfunctional. In August, the Sunni Accordance Front withdrew its six
ministers from Maliki's cabinet in protest over the lack of
progress on sectarian reconciliation. Since surviving a dizzying flurry
of attempts last summer to topple his government, Maliki has been
content to govern with a rump cabinet of Shia and Kurds and a Sunni-free
"coalition of moderates." Talk of a cabinet reshuffle (a
"national unity" government of technocrats under Maliki)
circulates endlessly, thus far with little to show.
When the Parliament adjourned early in December without passing any
major legislation, it was probably for the best. In the preceding week
it had been the scene of vitriolic disputes between Shia and Sunni
parliamentarians over allegations of the involvement of Adnan
Dulaimi's son and bodyguards in a car-bombing plot. Even when
legislation is passed, its content and implementation can make things
worse. In January, the Parliament finally passed a long-awaited reform
of the de-Baathification law, only to see its ambiguous and potentially
punitive contents generate outrage among Sunnis and a veto threat from
Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, who argued that "We cannot
regard this law as a step in the national reconciliation process
[because] the spirit of revenge is so clear in many articles of the
law." (76)
While the sectarian, insular government of Nouri al-Maliki bears a
considerable share of the responsibility, the blame is not only his, and
a new prime minister or cabinet reshuffle would not likely change the
more fundamental underlying problems. The failure of national
reconciliation is rooted in fundamental divides over core principles
underlying the foundations of the Iraqi state and the exacerbation of
these divides by the institutions designed under American occupation.
The total dysfunction of formal institutions adds to the problem. With
Parliament hopelessly deadlocked, often unable to muster a quorum, even
goodwill would likely fail to achieve legislative progress. With the
Iraqi Police thoroughly controlled by sectarian forces, additional
training or funding would not fix the problems.
American officials frequently air their distress that the Iraqis
are "wasting the opportunity" provided by the improved
security conditions. (77) But there is less recognition of the
possibility that American strategy actually contributes to losing this
opportunity by strengthening localities over the central government and
by creating a dangerous condition of "moral hazard" in which
Iraqi politicians have few real incentives to change their behavior
because of their confidence in continued American military backing.
A new grand bargain over the contentious issues dividing Iraq is
difficult to imagine today, but it is even more difficult to imagine any
form of long-term stability without one. Reforms of the
de-Baathification decrees are widely seen as crucial to entice Sunnis
into the political process but horrify many Shia and Kurds who see
Saddam's ghost lurking in the shadows. Kahl is fight to place the
oil issue at the center of any achievable national reconciliation. But
those oil negotiations are deadlocked, with Kurds in particular taking a
series of steps that have inflamed the issue. There is little reason for
the Shia to believe that funneling more oil revenues to the Sunni areas
will not simply help finance their military capabilities for the coming
civil war. With a wider political settlement, oil revenue sharing
creates positively reinforcing incentives. Without that grand bargain,
oil revenue sharing could cut in either direction. This is one of the
reasons that a deal has been so difficult to strike.
Provincial elections, which feature prominently in recent American
discussions of reconciliation, appear to be a relatively tangential issue for most Sunnis, in contrast to prisoners, amnesty, oil and the
rampant sectarianism in state agencies. Sunnis seem deeply opposed to
anything resembling a move towards federalism or partition and would
probably feel more threatened than reassured by heavily promoted
provincial elections. As discussed below, provincial elections might
also inflame the intra-communal power struggles which increasingly
engulf Iraqi politics. There seems to be more interest in change at the
national level. There seems to be more interest in new elections, with
such demands advanced by Sunni vice president Tareq al-Hashemi, Iyad
Allawi's Iraqi Bloc and the Sadrist movement at various times. Of
course, it is not clear that new national elections under the same
electoral law would solve any problems, but the interest in these
elections demonstrates Iraqi frustration with the performance of
national institutions.
NATIONAL-LOCAL LINKAGES: "BOTTOM-UP" RECONCILIATION?
American and Iraqi officials, recognizing this deadlock at the
national level, have responded by advancing a new theory of
"bottom-up reconciliation." They have turned, however
opportunistically, to a new argument: that local-level reconciliation is
actually more important than national reconciliation. (78) The important
thing, they now argue, is that Sunnis (in particular) have been bought
into the political process, and that, over time, they can be integrated
into the state without waiting for a grand national bargain. Local
security, by this argument, will allow passions to cool and sectarian
trust to build. This, over time, would alleviate the worst problems at
the national level.
Maliki has recently echoed these American arguments, dismissing the
significance of national reconciliation and even mocking those calling
for it as conspirators and opportunists. In a November interview, he
made clear that he had no intention of pursuing moves towards national
reconciliation defined in terms of legislation at the national level or
agreements with Sunni political parties. Instead, Maliki argued that
Iraqi national reconciliation has not only already been achieved, it is
"strong and stable and not fragile." He made clear that he
does not equate national reconciliation with political progress at the
national level: "I think that national reconciliation will come
about not as some understand it, as a reconciliation with this political
party governed by an ideology or a specific mentality." Indeed, he
dismissed the politicians demanding reconciliation as "minor
political parties" whose tiresome complaints now fall on deaf ears
with the people. (79)
Ironically, then, the achievements of the Sunni awakenings have
become an excuse to absolve the national government of any further
responsibility, an important example of how American strategy has been
working against its stated goals. Feeling little political threat,
Maliki chose to take advantage of the space created by a moment of
relative security to further marginalize his Sunni "partners."
The Bush administration, determined to exploit the security improvements
for domestic political advantage, is in no position to object to his
appropriation of the language of "bottom-up reconciliation."
But to the extent that the Sunni suspension of armed insurgency weakens
their bargaining position with the Shia-dominated government, what does
this tell Sunnis about the value of political participation rather than
violent resistance?
A key dimension of the bottom-up-reconciliation argument has been
that the integration of Sunnis into the police forces and military will
give them a stake in the central government while preventing the
emergence of militias. This is not yet happening. The 60,000 reported
CLC members now patrolling their own neighborhoods are paid by the
American military and owe loyalty to General Petraeus, not to Maliki or
to Iraqi national institutions. (80) As of mid-November, only about
1,600 of the volunteers had been integrated into the Iraqi security
forces. Iraqi government officials have recently been signaling a
willingness to take more of these militias on to the official payroll,
but such promises have routinely fallen through, and the details remain
sketchy. Indeed, in December the United States announced plans to
convert some of the CLCs into a public-works program, paid for by the
Americans, because of the Iraqi government's refusal to move
quickly to integrate them into the national security forces. (81) Voices
on all ends of the Sunni spectrum, as well as American officials at all
levels, have called for such integration with increasing urgency--with
some Awakenings commanders publicly warning of a return to the
insurgency in months if they do not receive satisfaction--but to no
avail. American military officials reportedly now do not expect more
than a third to be integrated, suggesting an imminent disaster.
To be fair, there have been some efforts to initiate
reconciliation, largely outside the formal institutions of the state and
all meeting with limited success. At the national level, Sunni Vice
President Tareq al-Hashemi prepared a 26-point National Compact to
overcome the sectarian divide and received support from Sistani, but the
Compact has since gone nowhere. (82) A series of
"reconciliation" conferences held abroad have reportedly
brought in some of the key insurgency factions alongside national
politicians, but these have as yet gone nowhere. (83) On a different
level, the second in command of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
(SIIC), Ammar al-Hakim, took a heavily publicized trip to Ramadi to try
to sell the concept of federalism to the Sunni tribes, and a variety of
SIIC figures have publicly praised the Anbar Salvation Council's
efforts. (84) But as discussed in the next section, the cautious public
detente between the Anbar Salvation Council and SIIC may be something
entirely different from reconciliation: highly controversial moves in
the intra-communal power struggles that increasingly dominate Iraqi
politics.
In short, whatever the logic of bottom-up reconciliation, it has
thus far failed to materialize. Developments at the local level have not
translated into national-level progress and arguably are strengthening
local forces at the expense of national institutions. This does not mean
that it cannot happen, since the provision of security certainly changes
the calculations and expectations of all involved. But this only
underlines the importance of an effectively sovereign state for
overcoming the sectarian security dilemma and allowing Iraqi
institutions to survive the withdrawal of American forces. Unless the
local-level deals are consolidated into a national arrangement, the
security gains will easily be blown away like so much tumbleweed when
the atmosphere goes sour.
FRAGMENTATION AND INTRA-COMMUNAL POWER STRUGGLES
What complicates efforts at striking a national bargain, above and
beyond the blockages at the national level and the devolution of power
to the local level, is the relentless fragmentation of politics within
both the Sunni and Shia communities. The UIA, which brought together the
major Shia parties under a single umbrella, has largely collapsed. SIIC
and the Sadrists, despite occasional uneasy truces, have been fighting
for control of the streets across Shia towns, cities and neighborhoods.
(85) The influence of Sistani and the Hawza seems to have declined
relative to the powerful armed militias controlling the streets. In this
section, I will focus primarily on the Sunni community, however, since
it is there that the great hopes of the current American strategy have
largely been placed. And here, largely unnoticed by those focused upon
American success, a power struggle has been emerging in earnest in
recent months.
The proximate cause of the reshuffling of Sunni politics was the
emergence of the Awakenings, which turned against the al-Qaeda wing of
the insurgency and began negotiating agreements with the American
military. The true origins of the Awakenings remain a mystery, somewhere
between tribal dynamics, insurgency factional tactics, and American
largesse. While Americans had tried in various ways for years to reach
out to the Sunni tribes, the new course began to gain momentum in April
2006 (well before the surge) and crystallized that fall in response to
al-Qaeda's strong-arm tactics following its declaration of the
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). While this is often portrayed as a
"tribal" turn against "the insurgency," the initial
moves against al-Qaeda came from key "nationalist-jihadist"
insurgency factions such as the Islamic Army of Iraq. Those factions
lacked a public political face, however, and risked being outgunned by
the various hard-line factions surrounding the ISI. The Salvation
Councils might then be seen as initially offering an acceptable public
face for the insurgency's battle against al-Qaeda--and as a conduit
for American funds. (86)
Americans, delighted to find large numbers of Sunnis volunteering
to join its battle against al-Qaeda, generally assumed that the fighters
came from insurgency factions but did not ask many questions. The
insurgency factions and the Salvation Councils have been coy about their
relationship. When al-Arabiya TV featured an Awakenings leader who
claimed to be a former leader of the Islamic Army of Iraq, the faction
issued a series of furious denials rather than try to take credit for
his success. Some insurgency spokesmen have argued that they disagree
with the Awakenings but do not wish to fight them, and so have stood
down in those areas while redeploying elsewhere. (87) In a September
interview on al-Jazeera, Islamic Army of Iraqi spokesman Ibrahim
al-Shammari acknowledged that some "sons of the tribes" were
cooperating with the Americans, but insisted that the cooperation was
strictly limited to self-defense and to fighting against al-Qaeda. The
street remains with the resistance, he claimed, and it was absurd to try
to distinguish between the resistance and the tribes. (88)
While its origins therefore lie to some degree within the
insurgency and the prevailing Sunni power structure, the ASC has lately
been attempting to put itself forward as the legitimate representative
of Iraq's Sunni community. Ahmed Abu Risha, who took over as its
leader after the murder of his charismatic brother, has been advancing
the idea of an "Iraqi Awakening." (89) This Iraqi Awakening
would consolidate as a formal political entity, within which the leaders
of the ASC would speak politically on behalf of tribes throughout the
country. This bid for national power has sparked growing political
conflict with other Sunni political forces. (90) The ASC has also been
jockeying for local power with the elected leadership, especially
representatives of the Islamic party.
It would be a serious mistake to assume that the ASC speaks
politically for all of the CLCs--especially those in the Baghdad area,
which seem closer to the insurgency factions than to their nominal
Salvation Council leaders. Where the ASC has warned against an American
withdrawal and been open to ISCI's overtures, a number of prominent
CLC leaders oppose the American occupation and claim to be prepared to
do battle with the Shia and Iran. For example, Abu Azzam, a leader of
the Abu Ghraib Awakening, recently said that "the greatest threat
to the Arab Sunnis is the Iranian occupation, before the American
occupation ... not al-Qaeda as portrayed in the media but Iran and its
agents." (91) Even the demand that the CLCs be incorporated into
the national army and police is often cast as a way of combating Iranian
and Shia power, rather than purely about reconciliation.
Faced with a rapidly changing political and military situation, the
Sunni insurgency factions that led the initial turn against al-Qaeda
began to try to unite and put forward a public political front. (92) As
noted in Kahl's essay, insurgency factions have consolidated into
several larger groupings, including the Reform and Jihad Front, the
Change and Jihad Front, and most recently the Political Council of the
Iraqi Resistance (PCIR). The PCIR was welcomed by Tareq
al-Hashemi's Iraqi Islamic party, which called on all parties to
"deal with the Political Council and to recognize it as an
important representative of a section of Iraqi society," as well as
by Salah al-Mutlaq and other leading Iraqi Sunni politicians. (93) Thus
far it has failed to act effectively, however.
The PCIR's public attitude towards the Awakenings has been
muted, largely avoiding direct criticism but adhering to their
longstanding political platform. These factions have consistently
demanded that the United States leave Iraq, claiming that they would be
willing to participate in the political process on that condition. They
fairly consistently argue that their insurgency defeated the United
States and that they have also defeated al-Qaeda, something the
Americans never could do. They retain their commitment to the
"jihad" and to driving the United States from occupied Iraq.
While they blame their setbacks at the hands of Shia militias partly on
American interference and on Iranian support, one can fred
self-criticism and reflection in their forums and public statements--a
recognition, driven in no small part by the "Battle of
Baghdad," that they could not win the sectarian war.
The political efforts of the factions were partly sparked by a
belief in an impending American departure, which they had long
maintained would make possible their entry into political life. They
also seem to have responded to concern over the political ambitions of
the Awakenings. In early September, a leading Sunni website published an
essay by Abd al-Rahman al-Ruwashdi that complained about (unnamed)
politicians stepping forward to claim the fruits of the
insurgency's victory without having made its sacrifices or paid its
costs. (94) He called on the politically influential leaders of the
insurgency to step forward and reveal themselves, to prevent others from
exploiting their victory and claiming to speak for the Sunni community.
Spokesmen for the insurgency factions consistently repeat that they are
the authentic representatives of the Sunni community, their legitimacy
earned by force of arms and their roots in that community. For example,
in late September, the spokesman for the Reform and Jihad Front, Abd
al-Rahman al-Qissi, claimed that the jihadist factions were the only
legitimate representatives of the (Sunni) Iraqi people, even if they
reject and seek to abort any political process that gives legitimacy to
the occupation or helps it to achieve its goals and reject the
legitimacy of a constitution devised under occupation.
The fragmentation and internal conflict clearly worries some Sunni
leaders, some of whom now openly worry about the Afghanistan experience,
where the victorious jihad was squandered in the subsequent factional
warfare. (95) Others grumble that the Awakenings were foolishly trusting
the United States and that cooperation could only harm Sunni and Iraqi
interests in the long term. The head of the Association of Muslim
Scholars (AMS) of Iraq, Hareth al-Dhari, for instance, attacked the
Awakenings as an American tool to divide and defeat the Resistance. (96)
He later released a scorching open letter to the Iraqi tribes upbraiding
them for falling into an American trap and allowing themselves to be
divided and ruled. (97)
The insurgency factions may be battling al-Qaeda and at times
tactically cooperating with the United States, but that does not mean
that they have forgone an interest in power. It appears likely that the
vast majority of the Concerned Local Citizens are in fact insurgency
factions taking on a new role. It is less clear whether the insurgency
factions retain operational control over these fighters. In November, a
series of representatives of these factions publicly stated that they
had used the lull of the last few months to regroup, rearm and
reorganize, and were prepared to relaunch the insurgency when
strategically appropriate. (98) The steady campaign of assassinations of
Salvation Council members, of which Abu Risha was only the most
prominent, cannot be definitively attributed to al-Qaeda (even if they
are happy to take credit, as always). There are many Sunnis able and
keen to resist the attempt to establish a new elite that is not
themselves--and many others who blame Shia death squads, rather than
al-Qaeda, for the rising carnage against the Sunni Awakenings.
Americans and Iraqi Shia politicans alike have seen the
possibilities created by the Awakenings movement and seem to be
attempting to empower an alternative and more compliant local-level
leadership that might be willing to strike an easier bargain than the
more contentious elected politicians or insurgency factions. (99) Maliki
has repeatedly discussed replacing recalcitrant Accordance Front
deputies with Salvation Council figures. (100) Leaders of SIIC,
including both Ammar Hakim and Abd al-Aziz Hakim, have ostentatiously reached out to the Awakenings--in sharp contrast to their treatment of
other Sunni politicians. Abu Risha recently shocked the Iraqi public by
praising Hakim as a great national leader and agreeing to work with him
on the resettlement of Shia refugees in Anbar. (101) This Shia
enthusiasm for the Sunni Awakenings might plausibly be understood as a
preference for a more compliant Sunni interlocutor rather than as a
signal of national reconciliation, particularly since many Shia clearly
fear both rising Sunni military potential and better Sunni ties to the
American military. (102)
The promotion of alternative elites is always a risky business, as
the Israelis discovered over decades in their attempt to promote local
leaderships over the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza, or South Africans in
their efforts to promote alternatives to the African National Congress in the Apartheid era. The current leaders of the various U.S.-aligned
councils are not democratically elected, nor do they particularly want
to be. Relations with the United States remain deeply controversial,
which makes the standing of alternative elites whose claim to power
rests on their ties to the Americans somewhat tenuous. Abundant evidence
suggests that the power of these new elites derives largely from
American cash. This is not a stable basis for political order. The
Salvation Council spokesmen have recently suggested that Anbar deserves
and needs billions of dollars in compensation for damage done during the
war and in reconstruction assistance. In today's political climate,
massive new reconstruction funds for Iraq are unlikely to materialize.
This means that in the not-distant future, these leaders are going to
face a serious challenge due to their likely failure to deliver a better
life.
Any deal struck by the Salvation Councils on behalf of the Sunnis
might offer terms acceptable to the Shia but would not necessarily
represent the real interests or preferences of the Sunni community.
Bringing the insurgency factions into the process, long a goal of
American policy, would increase the prospect of a deal's holding,
but would make such a deal far more difficult to negotiate and would
challenge the authority of America's current allies. The rise of
the Awakenings, therefore, has sparked political conflict with both
elected Sunni politicians and the insurgency factions. (103) In
November, the Baghdad office of the Association of Muslim Scholars was
closed by the head of the Sunni waqf, who blamed the AMS for helping
al-Qaeda and for preventing the integration of Sunnis into the military.
(104) In late November, Abu Risha accused the Islamic party of
corruption and challenged its electoral legitimacy, while elected Sunni
politicians have been sniping back at the tribal leaders. In February,
ASC leader Hamed al-Hayes threatened to take up arms against the Islamic
party if the local councils it dominated were not dissolved. (105) In
short, the Sunni community is increasingly consumed by internal power
struggles, which make it less, not more, likely to be able to strike
such a bargain.
Finally, it is important to remain cautious about the newfound
Sunni affection for the United States after four years of brutal
insurgency and counterinsurgency. The most recent public-opinion survey,
conducted in August, found that Sunnis were more opposed to the American
presence than ever, do not think the surge has accomplished either its
military or political goals, and have dwindling confidence in the U.S.
forces. (106) Only 11 percent said that security in the country as a
whole has improved in the last six months, and 70 percent said that the
conditions for political dialogue have gotten worse. Only 15 percent
expressed confidence in U.S./UK occupation forces--down from 18 percent
in February--with 58 percent expressing "no confidence at all"
(the highest in any of these surveys dating back to 2003) and 79 percent
opposing the presence of coalition forces in Iraq. Only 1 percent of
Sunnis said that they have confidence in American forces and support the
American presence in Iraq or that security has improved in Iraq as a
whole in the last six months. Seventy-two percent of Sunnis said that
the U.S. forces should leave immediately, and 95 percent said that the
presence of U.S. troops makes security worse; 93 percent still saw
attacks on coalition forces as acceptable. While views may well have
changed as the alliance with the American forces bore some fruit,
skepticism about the latest round of "good-news" reporting
from Anbar seems appropriate. On January 13, Kamal Abu Risha, the vice
president of the Anbar Salvation Council, said that the Awakenings
opposed the American presence and called on the United States to leave
as soon as possible and turn security over to Iraqis--only to be
immediately corrected by Ahmed Abu Risha, who urged the Americans to
stay. (107)
SPOILERS
Beyond these core political problems, a number of potential
spoilers loom. First, Kurdish issues have been growing increasingly
tense. Sharp differences over Kurdish oil deals have provoked serious
political conflicts. Turkish raids directed at PKK fighters alleged to
be based in Iraqi Kurdistan have generated outrage. Aremarkable
coalition of a dozen political parties, including 150 MPs, released a
blunt statement in December calling for the status of Kirkuk to be
negotiated rather than submitted to the referendum mandated by Article
140 of the Constitution. Avoiding this referendum would be a great
relief to most Iraqis and to the United States, but Kurdish leaders do
not seem inclined to give way.
Second, despite recent reports of some refugees returning to Iraq
from Syria (largely due to increasing hardships in the reluctant host
country), virtually nobody expects a serious return of refugees or
displaced persons to their old neighborhoods. Indeed, many fear that
their return could spark intense new fighting. (108) One of the
explanations for the recent reduction of violence is almost certainly
that sectarian cleansing has succeeded in so many formerly mixed areas.
No plan can succeed if it fails to take into account the bitter, angry,
fearful displaced communities both inside and outside of Iraq's
borders. These refugees and internally displaced persons constitute not
simply a humanitarian disaster, but also a constituency for radicalism
and irredentism that will weigh heavily over all local-level politics or
future democratic elections. The narratives and symbolic politics
carried by these communities, to say nothing of their sheer numbers and
material interests, are likely to have a powerful impact on any future
Iraq. I suspect that few of them are going to be easily reconciled to a
"local-level dominant" Iraq in which they are permanent
outsiders and have little hope of gaining satisfaction at the national
level.
A third point has to do with Sunni prisoners. Vice President Tareq
al-Hashemi and many other Sunnis have made a major issue of the large
number of their kin held without charge (over 80 percent of those held
by U.S. forces are currently Sunni). The numbers of detainees is not
clear, with accounts ranging from 20,000 to 60,000. These mostly
military-age men, often rounded up in sweeps during clearing operations,
represent something of a wild card. While Nuri al-Maliki proposed a
general amnesty in late December, it has bogged down in Parliament and
its fate is unclear. Their release would be a major step towards meeting
Sunni grievances, but at the same time would return large numbers of
embittered, military-age young men to the streets.
Fourth, while Iranian responsibility for the violence in Iraq is
often overstated, Iran's calculation of its self-interest will
likely play a significant role in stability or instability in Iraq. The
recent National Intelligence Estimate report, by making the prospects of
an American attack on Iran less likely, could potentially encourage Iran
to rein in its proxies. But this, like other fluctuations in the
security situation, would represent only a tactical rather than a
strategic change. Few Americans seem willing to confront the basic
strategic dilemma that its policies have created: a heavy reliance on an
Iraqi government that is, at its core, fundamentally aligned with and
dependent upon Iran. In mid-December, a group of Iraqi politicians
including Iyad Allawi and Adnan Dulaimi released an open letter to
George Bush calling upon him to stop backing Maliki in the name of
resisting Iranian influence and "religious fascism." Iran
could well provide the common enemy to energize a united Iraqi
nationalism, save that the current government and the most powerful
factions in the coalition are the closest Iranian allies in the country.
Finally, for all the recent setbacks of al-Qaeda in Iraq, it
remains quite resilient and capable of carrying out a wide range of
attacks, and there remains some hope on both sides of reconciliation
with the wider insurgency. Hareth al-Dhari called on Osama bin Laden to
intervene and correct the behavior of his Iraqi allies, later arousing
intense controversy by declaring that al-Qaeda was not beyond the pale.
An unusually direct intervention in Iraqi affairs by Bin Laden in
October received wildly varying interpretations. The insurgency
factions, relying on excerpts broadcast on al-Jazeera, trumpeted his
speech as a rebuke of al-Qaeda in Iraq and immediately called for the
reunification of the ranks. But the full speech was less forthcoming and
seemed to take the side of al-Qaeda by virtue of its adherence to the
sharia, a point emphasized by Ayman al-Zawahiri in a follow-up video
released in mid-December. Attacks on Awakenings members have increased
significantly since ISI leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi released an
audiotape calling for an offensive against it. For all the current bad
blood, should the political process continue to fail and the political
struggle between the factions and the Awakenings escalate, it is not
inconceivable that Sunni fighters could once again realign and resume
armed insurgency.
STRATEGIC VISION AND MORAL HAZARD
What should the United States then do with this situation of
political deadlock and local fragmentation? The last four years have
left me deeply skeptical of any argument requiring either a high degree
of sophisticated American micromanagement or a large number of things
that have to go right. Kahl makes a range of very sensible suggestions
as to what the United States should do, threaten, recommend or promote.
But the United States has little ability to do any of these things, even
were the Bush administration to suddenly develop an interest in them at
this late date. Why would the Iraqi government take seriously the sorts
of demands and threats suggested by Kahl, after ignoring American
entreaties on such matters for years? What would make such threats
credible to an Iraqi observer capable of reading the American political
arena? The Iraqi government has proven quite impervious to American
demands on political reconciliation over the last year, and few actors
take seriously American threats to withdraw military or political
support (at least during this administration). What is more, American
power is a wasting asset. Everyone in Iraq and the region knows that the
United States is running out of time and patience and that U.S. forces
will soon be drawn down, whether by Bush or his successor. Everyone is
gaming that reality, taking what they want from Americans while ignoring
American demands or advice.
As Katulis very effectively outlines, American efforts to advance
the sorts of ideas proposed by Kahl are hamstrung by the moral-hazard
problem that the United States has created, where Iraqi politicians are
shielded from the negative consequences of their risky decisions. Since
the Bush administration cannot credibly threaten to escalate and will
not threaten to withdraw, it has no leverage over any of them while
protecting them from the consequences of their decisions. Even if those
politicians did somehow magically come to agreement, their ability to
deliver on any such agreement declines by the day. As long as Americans
provide his security, Maliki simply has no reason to make concessions to
people he sees as political conspirators and sectarian troublemakers. As
long as Americans protect their interests, the Kurdish parties see no
reason to move away from their unconditional support for Maliki's
government. Finally, many of the Sunni insurgency factions described
above have repeatedly and publicly stated that their participation in
the political process is contingent upon an American commitment to
withdrawal. An impending American withdrawal will change those
calculations in fundamental ways, giving the Shia and the Kurds reason
to make more serious concessions and the Sunni groups the political
cover they need to strike the deal.
Advocates of the current strategy hold out hopes that a political
balance can be achieved by adjusting the sectarian balance of power, for
instance by strengthening Sunni military forces against their Shia
rivals. But the degree of precision necessary to achieve the
"Goldilocks" equilibrium (not too strong, not too weak) is
daunting in an environment in which we hardly seem to know where the
guns are going or who our allies are. In short, the only thing that can
seriously overcome the sectarian security dilemma in the absence of a
heavy American troop presence would be the tight integration of military
capability into an institutionalized, centralized security force--the
monopoly on the legitimate use of violence that is essential to
statehood. But the current policy of devolving authority to the local
level and empowering militias outside of state institutions undermines
rather than increases prospects of achieving such effective state
sovereignty.
This is precisely where the failure of political reconciliation
becomes such a core strategic problem, rather than one issue among many.
Traditionally, the solution to domestic security dilemmas is a state
that enjoys a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence and enforces
the laws in a nonsectarian way. In the absence of meaningful political
reconciliation, the Iraqi state offers neither. The strategy suggested
by this institutional disaster is to start over: convene a new
constitutional assembly under international auspices to achieve a new
grand bargain on the rules of the game among all the politically
significant factions. But while such a "diplomatic surge" is
the best hope for overcoming the strategic dilemma, it is difficult to
imagine the United States accepting its failure, the world mustering the
energy, or the ascendant Shia-Kurdish coalition allowing its gains to be
put on the bargaining table. (109)
Absent such a comprehensive "reboot" of Iraq's
political system, the current approach is clearly a second-best
strategy, substituting American forces for the state that seemingly
cannot be effectively constituted. The best-case scenario then calls for
a long-term American military presence to provide security guarantees
for the distrustful, heavily armed sectarian communities that the Iraqi
state cannot protect. The U.S. military would maintain an unsteady
equilibrium among these forces rather than actually solving problems,
leaving American global strategy hostage to an effectively endless Iraqi
presence. At this point, political reality must intrude. A recent
public-opinion survey found only 13 percent of Americans in favor of
keeping troops in Iraq more than two years. (110) It seems highly
unlikely that the American public will accept the long-term, large-scale
commitment the current strategy's defenders consider necessary.
This seems to make the case for the current strategy untenable, even on
its own terms. With the 'surge' winding down, it is time to
admit that a strategy which cannot succeed without a long-term, massive
American military presence has already failed.
(1) A PDF version of the symposium can be downloaded here:
http://abuaardvark.typepad.com/abuaardvark/ 2007/11/debate-pdf.html.
(2) See, for example, Tony Blankley, "Victory in Iraq,"
The Washington Times, November 14, 2007.
(3) Mowaffek al-Rubaie, "Federalism, Not Partition," The
Washington Post, January 18, 2008.
(4) Edward P. Joseph and Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Case for
Soft Partition in Iraq, Brookings Institution, Saban Center Analysis,
No. 12, June 2007.
(5) The Brooking Institution, Iraq Index, January 28, 2008, p. 5.
(6) Iraq Body Count, "Civilian Deaths from Violence in
2007," http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2007/.
(7) Thomas E. Ricks and Karen DeYoung, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Reported Crippled," The Washington Post, October 15, 2007; Damien
Cave, "Militant Group is Out of Baghdad, U.S. Says," The New
York Times, November 8, 2007; and Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Qais Mizher,
"Bomber Kills Sunni Allies of the U.S.," The New York Times,
January 21, 2008.
(8) Sam Dagher, "How Much Safer is Baghdad Now?"
Christian Science Monitor, November 27, 2007; Ann Scott Tyson,
"Petraeus Says Cleric Helped Curb Violence," The Washington
Post, December 7, 2007.
(9) Based on the monthly tabulations provided by Iraq Coalition
Casualty Count, http://icasualties.org/oif/.
(10) See Joe Klein, "The Ramadi Goat Grab," Time, October
25, 2007; and "Cleric Renews Call For End to Sectarian
Violence," Associated Press, November 28, 2007.
(11) Charles Levinson, "As al-Maliki Gains Strength, Some
Question His Will for Unity," USA Today, January 16, 2008.
(12) Alissa J. Rubin, "Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs
Measures," The New York Times, 2/14/08.
(13) Amit R. Paley and Joshua Partlow, "Iraq's New Law on
Ex-Baathists Could Bring Another Purge," The Washington Post,
January 23, 2008.
(14) White House, Benchmark Assessment Report, September 14, 2007,
p. 6; and Thomas E. Ricks and Karen DeYoung, "For U.S., The Goal Is
Now 'Iraqi Solutions'," The Washington Post, January 10,
2008.
(15) Wayne White, "Can Iraqis Beat the Ticking Clock?"
MEI Commentary, November 27, 2007, http://
www.mideasti.org/commentary/can-iraqis-beat-ticking-clock.
(16) David Kilcullen, "Don't Confuse the
'Surge' with the Strategy," Small Wars Journal Blog,
January 19, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th/; and Ann Scott Tyson, "New Strategy for War
Stresses Iraqi Politics," The Washington Post, May 23, 2007.
(17) Kimberly Kagan, "How They Did It," The Weekly
Standard, November 11, 2007; and Scott Peterson, "Iraq Offensive:
Clear Out Militants-And Stay," Christian Science Monitor, January
14, 2008.
(18) Greg Jaffe, "How Courting Sheiks Slowed Violence In
Iraq," The Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2007; and Dave Kilcullen,
"Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt," Small Wars Journal Blog, August
29, 2007, http:// smallwarsjoumal.com/blog/2007/08/anatomy-of-a-tribal-revolt/.
(19) "DoD Press Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from the
Pentagon," May 31, 2007, http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3973.
(20) Michael R. Gordon, The Former-Insurgent Counterinsurgency, New
York Times Magazine, September 2, 2007; Linda Robinson, "Iraq Trip
Report," Small Wars Journal Blog, September 16, 2007, http://
smallwarsjoumal.com/blog/2007/09/where-do-we-go-from-here/; and Nancy A.
Youssef, "U.S. Finds a Way to Pacify Iraqi Town-By Using
Cash," McClatchy Newspapers, November 13, 2007.
(21) Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in
Iraq, December 2007, p. 17; Sudarsan Raghaven, "New Leaders of
Sunnis Make Gains in Influence," The Washington Post, January 8,
2008; and Solomon Moore and Richard A. Oppel Jr., "Attacks Imperil U.S.-Backed Militias in Iraq," The New York Times, January 24,
2008.
(22) Evan Kohlman, "State of the Sunni Insurgency in
Iraq," The NEFA Foundation, August 2007, pp. 15-22; Muhammad Abu
Rumman, "Iraq: The Politics of Sunni Armed Groups," Arab
Reform Bulletin, Vol. 7, Issue 5, September 2007; and Bill Roggio,
"The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandiyah Order," The Long War
Journal, October 4, 2007,
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/al_douri_forms_natio.php.
(23) "Iraqi Fighters Form Political Group," Al Jazeera,
October 13, 2007, http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/
739E1A85-1F25-41AA-9B5F-EBD595177845.htm.
(24) John F. Burns and Alissa J. Rubin, "U.S. Arming Sunnis in
Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies," The New York Times, June 11,
2007.
(25) Sudarsan Raghaven, "For U.S. and Sadr, Wary
Cooperation," The Washington Post, March 16, 2007.
(26) Carol J. Williams and Saad Fakhrildeen, "Iraq: 1 Million
Evacuated From Shrine in Karbala," Los Angeles Times, 8/28/07;
Joshua Partlow and Saad Sarhan, "Sadr Orders 'Freeze' on
Militia Actions," Washington Post, August 30, 2007; and Dean Yates,
"U.S. Military Encouraged by Sadr Freeze on Militia," Reuters,
9/1/07.
(27) Sam Dagher, "Iraq's Sadr Uses Lull to Rebuild
Army," Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2007.
(28) Tyson, "Petraeus Says Cleric Helped Curb Violence."
(29) Ned Parker, "Iraqi Civilian Deaths Plunge," Los
Angeles Times, November 1, 2007; and Joshua Partlow and Naseer Nouri,
"In Iraq, a Lull or Hopeful Trend," The Washington Post,
November 2, 2007.
(30) Kamil al-Mehaidi, "Geographical Distribution of Iraqi Oil
Fields and Its Relation with the New Constitution," Revenue Watch
Institute (Iraq), May 2006.
(31) Edward P. Joseph and Michael E. O'Hanlon, The Case for
Soft Partition in Iraq, pp. 21-22.
(32) Rubin, "Ending Impasse, Iraq Parliament Backs
Measures," The New York Times, 2/14/08.
(33) Ricks, "Iraqis Wasting Opportunity, U.S. Officials
Say."
(34) Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Meet Abu Abed: The U.S.'s New
Ally Against al-Qaida," The Guardian, November 10, 2007; Jon Lee
Anderson, "Letter from Iraq: Inside the Surge," The New
Yorker, November 19, 2007; and Jonathan Steele, "Iraqi Insurgents
Regrouping, Says Sunni Resistance Leader," The Guardian, December
3, 2007.
(35) The U.S. military claims that the vast majority of CLC
recruits have had their biometric information recorded. Fadel,
"U.S. Sponsorship of Sunni Groups Worries Iraq's
Government."
(36) Christian Berthelsen, "U.S. Commander in Iraq: Sectarian
Bias Limits Police," Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2007; Michael
R. Gordon, "Iraq Hampers U.S. Bid to Widen Sunni Police Role,"
The New York Times, October 28, 2007; and Cara Buckley, "U.S.
Military Plans to Bolster Iraqi Sentry Forces by 10,000," The New
York Times, November 29, 2007.
(37) Hoda Jasim and Rahma al Salem, "The Awakening Council:
Iraq's Anti-al-Qaeda Sunni Militias," Asharq Alawsat, December
29, 2007; Peter Spiegel, "U.S. Shifts Sunni Strategy in Iraq,"
Los Angeles Times, January 14, 2008; and Solomon Moore,
"Ex-Baathists Get a Break. Or Do They?" The New York Times,
January 14, 2008.
(38) Karen DeYoung and Amit R. Paley, "U.S. Plans to Form Job
Corps for Iraqi Security Volunteers.," The Washington Post,
December 7, 2007.
(39) Quoted in Ricks, "Iraqis Wasting an Opportunity, U.S.
Officials Say."
(40) Parker, "Iraqi Civilian Deaths Plunge."
(41) Sadr has recently threatened to end his freeze, but this may
simply be posturing to defend himself against criticisms from more
extreme elements within his movement. See Alissa J. Rubin, "Despite
Deadly Clashes in Iraq, Shiite Pilgrims Spared," The New York
Times, January 19, 2008.
(42) Rubin, "A Calmer Iraq: Fragile, and Possibly
Fleeting."
(43) Michael R. Gordon and Stephen Farrell, "Iraq Lacks Plan
on the Return of Refugees, Military Says," The New York Times,
November 30, 2007; and Cara Buckley, "Refugees Risk Coming Home to
an Unready Iraq," The New York Times, December 20, 2007.
(44) General James L. Jones (Ret.) (Chairman), The Report of the
Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, September 6,
2007, chapter 4.
(45) For a discussion of some of the ways to expand transition
teams, see James N. Miller and Shawn W. Brimley, Phased Transition: A
Responsible Way Forward and Out of Iraq, Center for a New American
Security, June 2007, pp. 43-49.
(46) Jones, The Report of the Independent Commission on the
Security Forces of Iraq, chapter 9.
(47) Lauren Frayer, "Sunni-Kurdish Deal a Try for Iraq
Unity," Associated Press, December 5, 2007; Basil Adas,
"Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds Start Talk on Kirkuk Future,"
GulfNews.com, December 6, 2007, http://
www.gulfnews.com/region/Iraq/10172902.html.
(48) Ned Parker, "Kirkuk Referendum Needed, Kurdish Leader
Says," Los Angeles Times, January 15, 2008; and "Iraqi
Alliances: Shifting Sands," Asharq Alawsat, January 28, 2008.
(49) Andrew E. Kramer, "Two Shiite Leaders in Iraq Reach a
Peace Agreement," The New York Times, October 7, 2007.
(50) Bassem Mroue, "Basra Pullout Will Test Iraqi
Forces," The Washington Post, September 6, 2007; "Shia
Factions Proclaim Truce in Iraq's Basra, Reuters, December 11,
2007; and Peter Spiegel, "British Tout Basra Model," Los
Angeles Times, December 14, 2007.
(51) Tom Vanden, "U.S., Iraq Set Stage for Talks on
Ties," USA Today, November 26, 2007.
(52) "Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship
of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the
United States of America," November 26, 2007,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2007/11/20071126-11.html.
(53) Perhaps along the lines suggested by Brian Katulis, Lawrence
J. Korb, and Peter Juul, Strategic Reset." Reclaiming Control of
U.S. Security in the Middle East, Center for American Progress, June 25,
2007.
(54) Transcript available at:
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/
anaaed_services_cmte_hearing_091107.html.
(55) CBS News/New York Times Poll, December 5-9, 2007.
(56) Aamer Madhani, "$45,000 Is Latest Army Sweetener for
Recruits," Los Angeles Times, October 21, 2007.
(57) General George W. Casey, "Maintaining Quality in the
Force," Briefing at the Brookings Institution on December 4, 2007.
(58) Thom Shanker, "Marines Press to Remove Their Forces from
Iraq," The New York Times, October 11, 2007.
(59) Michael Abramowitz and Peter Baker, "Bush Faces Pressure
to Shift War Priorities," The Washington Post, December 17, 2007.
(60) See Lawrence Korb and Brian Katulis, "Strategic
Redeployment: A Progressive Plan for Iraq and the Struggle against
Violent Extremists," Center for American Progress, September 2005.
(61) Pauline Jelinek, "General Says N. Iraq Most Violent
Region," Associated Press, November 19, 2007.
(62) Michael Gordon, "Pushed Out of Baghdad, Insurgents Move
North," The New York Times, December 6, 2007.
(63) Alissa J. Rubin, "A Calmer Iraq: Fragile, and Possibly
Fleeting," The Washington Post, December 5, 2007.
(64) Babak Dehghanpisheh, "The 'Body
Contractors'," Newsweek, December 24, 2007.
(65) Peter Spiegel, "Iraq's Numbers Don't Add Up,
U.S. Says," Los Angeles Times, November 30, 2007.
(66) Sudarsan Raghavan, "Iraq's Youthful Militiamen Build
Power through Fear," The Washington Post, December 13, 2007.
(67) Karen DeYoung and Amit R. Paley, "U.S. Plans to Form Job
Corps for Iraqi Security Volunteers," The Washington Post, December
7, 2007.
(68) See Senator Joseph Biden, "Plan For Iraq,"
PlanForlraq.com, November 30, 2007.
(69) Zaid Sabah and Ann Scott Tyson, "Security Pact on Iraq
Would Set U.S. Exit," The Washington Post, December 11, 2007.
(70) See ABC News/BBC/NHK Poll, "Iraq: Where Things
Stand," conducted August 17-24, 2007; the poll found that a
majority of Iraqis, 57 percent, thought that attacks on coalition forces
were acceptable, representing a 40-point increase since February 2004.
(71) For a good outline of the roles the United Nations might play,
see Carlos Pascual, "The United Nations In Iraq," Brookings
Institution Policy Paper, Number 3, September 2007.
(72) Stephen Biddle, "Iraq: Can We Guard What We've
Gained?" The Washington Post, December 10, 2007, and remarks to
George Washington University Security Policy Forum, December 2, 2007.
(73) For a similar view, see Rend Rahim Francke, "Political
Progress in Iraq During the Surge," United States Institute of
Peace Special Report 196, December 2007.
(74) Marc Lynch, "Crocker vs Petraeus," Praeger Security
International, August 15, 2007; Ned Parker, "Iraq Calmer, but More
Divided," Los Angeles Times, December 10, 2007.
(75) James D. Fearon, "Iraq's Civil War," Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2007.
(76) As quoted by Waleed Ibrahim, "Iraq VP Says Won't
Ratify Key Baathists Law," Reuters, January 31, 2008.
(77) Thomas Ricks, "Iraqis Wasting an Opportunity, Officers
Say," The Washington Post, November 15, 2007.
(78) Frederick Kagan, "Reconcilable Differences," Weekly
Standard, November 12, 2007; Steven Lee Myers and Alissa Rubin,
"U.S. Scales Back Political Goals for Iraqi Unity," The New
York Times, November 25, 2007.
(79) As reported in al-Zaman, October 29, 2007.
(80) Joshua Patlow and Ann Scott Tyson, "Hurdles Stall Plans
for Iraqi Recruits," The Washington Post, November 11, 2007.
(81) Karen De Young and Amit Paley, "U.S. Plans to Form Job
Corps for Iraqi Security Volunteers," The Washington Post, December
7, 2007.
(82) Aswat al-Iraq, September 26, 2007; Sam Dagher, "The Sunni
in Iraq's Shiite Leadership," Christian Science Monitor,
November 14, 2007.
(83) Richard Murphy, phone interview with author, December 11,
2007.
(84) Al-Hayat, October 16, 2007. Other accounts suggest a more
positive reception for Hakim; for example, see al-Zaman October 14,
2007.
(85) "Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme
Council," International Crisis Group, November 15, 2007; also see
Francke, "Political Progress in Iraq During the Surge."
(86) Sam Dagher, "Will Armloads of US Cash Buy Tribal
Loyalty?" Christian Science Monitor, November 8, 2007; Jon Lee
Anderson, "Inside the Surge," The New Yorker, November 19,
2007.
(87) See Jonathan Steele, "Iraqi Insurgents Regrouping, Says
Sunni Resistance Leader," The Guardian, December 4, 2007; Awni
Qalamji, "Retreat of Iraqi Resistance," Al-Quds al-Arabi,
December 4, 2007.
(88) Shammari on al-Jazeera, September 17, 2007. In an interview
with the Qatari newspaper al-Arab on December 17, 2007, Shammari
categorically denied that the IAI had a relationship with the
Awakenings.
(89) Ahmed Abu Risha, interviewed on al-Arabiya, November 25, 2007.
(90) Trudy Rubin, "A Powerful Awakening Shakes Up Iraqi
Politics," Philadelphia Inquirer, December 12, 2007.
(91) As quoted by Hassan al-Barari, "The Abu Ghurayb
Awakening", Al-Ghad, January 3, 2008; also see Abu Azzam interview
on al-Arabiya, January 18, 2008.
(92) "Out of the Shadows" The Guardian, July 19, 2007.
(93) Mutlaq on al-Jazeera, October 19, 2007; Hashemi open letter
released October 12, 2007. Also see Pepe Escobar, "It's the
Resistance, Stupid," Asia Times October 17, 2007.
(94) Published on al-Haq Agency, September 2 2007. A similar
argument was made by Hareth al-Dhari of the Association of Muslim
Scholars in an open letter, September 1, 2007.
(95) For instance, see Abdullah al-Janabi letter as posted on the
al-Boraq forum, December 3, 2007; and Hareth al-Dhari's open letter
to the Iraqi tribes, December 1, 2007.
(96) Al-Jazeera, November 21, 2007.
(97) Text of the letter can be found at http://www.iraq-amsi.org/
news.php?action=view&id=21040&a9d8b6dd9a138af90fSce277b6e6f337
(98) This argument was recently made by Douglas MacGregor,
"Will Iraq's Great Awakening Lead to a Nightmare?" Mother
Jones, December 11, 2007
(99) See M. Abbas, "Struggle for Political and Religious
Representation," Al-Hayat, November 25, 2007.
(100) Al-Hayat, August 5, 2007; Aswat al-Iraq, August 15, 2007;
Waleed Ibrahim, "Iraq Mps Block Maliki Nominees for Cabinet
Posts," McClatchy, November 29, 2007.
(101) For account of Abd al-Aziz Hakim speech praising the
Awakenings, see al-Zaman, December 4, 2007; on Abu Risha's
reciprocal praise, see Al-Hayat, December 13, 2007.
(102) Leila Fadel, "U.S. Sponsorship of Sunni Groups Worries
Iraq's Government," McClatchy, November 29, 2007; Al-Hayat,
"Warnings That Al-Qaeda Is Penetrating the Security Services and
the Awakenings," November 26, 2007.
(103) Al-Hayat, November 15, 2007 and November 25, 2007.
(104) Aswat al-Iraq, November 17, 2007.
(105) Aswat al-Iraq, February 6, 2008.
(106) BBC/ABC/NHK survey, conducted in all 19 provinces during
August.
(107) Al-Hayat, January 13, 2008.
(108) See Nir Rosen, "No Going Back", Boston Review,
September 2007.
(109) Christopher Kojm, "Here's the Surge Iraq
Needs," Christian Science Monitor, December 13, 2007.
(110) CBS/NY Times poll, December 6-9, 2007. Available at
www.pollingreport.com/iraq.
Dr. Kahl is assistant professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund
A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and a fellow
at the Center for a New American Security. Dr. Katulis is senior fellow
at the Center for American Progress. Dr. Lynch is associate professor of
political science and international affairs at George Washington
University.