An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy?

White, Wayne E.

An Iraq of Its Regions: Cornerstones of a Federal Democracy? Reidar Vissar and Gareth Stansfield, eds. Columbia University Press, 2008. 274 pages. $27.50.

Amidst the gains of the surge and the Sunni Arab "Awakening" since mid-2007, some readers might tend to be dismissive of the issues discussed in this comprehensive anthology, focused on the dangers of excessive reliance on ethno-sectarian considerations in fashioning an Iraqi federal system. Yet, as noted by co-author Gareth Stansfield, this publication concentrates on perhaps the most "critical" challenge standing in the way of enduring stability in Iraq today.

Of late, these fundamental political and societal concerns have received insufficient attention from many observers and players alike, some even seduced by the vision of a so-called "victory" in Iraq. Such individuals, unlike the authors, usually lack appreciation for the underlying complexities involved in hammering out political compromises related to governance. Indeed, recent military gains on the ground in Iraq might prove transient if not followed up with great care on the political front. Problems related to these very issues could even lead to what Stansfield correctly warns could be a Lebanon-style paradigm among hostile groups who simply recognize they cannot overwhelm their rivals. And, although contributors to this book thoroughly explore regionalism as a factor that might dilute Iraq's profound ethno-sectarian differences (as it has in a few cases elsewhere), they do not offer excessive encouragement in that respect.

Considering how dangerous ethno-sectarian challenges in Iraq already have proven to be, co-editor Reidar Vissar and two other authors assign too much blame to parties such as "Western researchers," Sunni Arab leaders outside Iraq, the United States, Iraqi exiles and even the "international media" for overemphasizing this angle and, implicitly, increasing the overall impact of that divisive dynamic. Iraqi leaders have made similar accusations since 2003, only to revert to being Kurds, Sunni Arabs or Shia (rather than "Iraqis") when tough issues are on the table. Yet, as contributors to this book reiterate, too many non-Iraqis do, in fact, view the practicalities of stabilizing Iraq in one-dimensional and ethno-sectarian context. Also, Vissar points out correctly that the Transitional Administrative Law's approach to representation did magnify the overall ethno-sectarian character of post-war Iraqi politics. Nonetheless, the basic problem has been and remains inherently Iraqi.

Even the once relatively "cosmopolitan" and demographically mixed greater Baghdad area, as Stanfield correctly notes, has taken on a far harsher sectarian character in a mainly Shia drive for greater control. And, while Vissar blames mostly foreign "Sunni Islamists" for initiating the sectarian violence that created such a Baghdad, by late 2005 (when al-Qaeda in Iraq's anti-Shia campaign got into full swing), many experts within the U.S. intelligence community (like myself) had concluded that the majority of al-Qaeda in Iraq's cadres had long been indigenous Sunni Arab militants.

The intense and dangerous ethno-sectarian character of Iraqi internal politics today should have been anticipated in a country ruled for 25 years by a brutal regime that had strayed far from the original Baathist ideal of inclusiveness. Saddam Hussein had relied so heavily on one group and engaged in such ruthless behavior, aimed largely against Iraq's two other major ethno-sectarian communities, that a polarization along ethno-sectarian lines had taken place well before 2003.

Nonetheless, there are those who still view a division consistent with ethno-sectarian divides as a reasonable option for Iraqi governance, along the lines of what was called initially the "Biden Plan." Liam Anderson cautions them in his superb (and sobering) chapter that there is a "high failure rate for ethnic federations" since such a course is so often "an option of last resort." Those who have supported such a basis for governance in Iraq largely concede that it is driven by the desire to find some way to minimize potentially violent ethno-sectarian contact. Yet, as Anderson argues convincingly, failure occurs precisely because some of these ethno-sectarian federative arrangements are "invariably a response to pre-existing ethnic (or sectarian) tensions."

In all too many cases, Anderson observes, "moderate parties tend to disappear in an escalating process of 'ethnic outbidding.'" Consistent with this point, a damaging political and intercommunal phenomenon has manifested itself in the post-2003 Iraqi scene. Maximalist positions have been assumed by the three main ethno-sectarian groupings, which have squared off in a manner that has rendered some important issues effectively zero-sum.

It is to be hoped that the rather limited sampling of Baghdadis upon which Fanar Hadad and Sajjad Rizvi base their contribution will not detract from some important observations. The possibility of progressive "federal chaos" in Iraq is very real, since the current constitution imposes only a one-year waiting period for referenda on the creation of regions after a prior effort has failed. As is also pointed out, large numbers of Iraqis still do not fully understand federalism or its legal underpinnings in current Iraqi law. Yet an Iraqi central government that is somewhat isolated, dysfunctional, corrupt and inclined toward ethno-sectarian agendas will likely generate still further devolution of power to governorates, regions and ethno-sectarian constituencies, regardless of whether it wishes to do so. And, of course, the uneven distribution of natural resources makes this situation all the more difficult to resolve to the satisfaction of all concerned.

Conflict over issues related to Iraq's Kurdish north may already have become the first test of how ethno-sectarian issues are likely to play out. Liam Anderson suggests that an "asymmetric federation" in which regions could negotiate various levels of autonomy vis-a-vis Baghdad might reduce potentially negative consequences stemming from the robust regional powers already assumed by Iraq's Kurds. However, such an approach could prove explosive in a highly traumatized society already hyper-sensitive to territorial and other inequities, especially in the context of the Kurds' aggressive agenda.

To their credit, as Stansfield and Hashem Ahmadzadeh point out, Kurdish leaders like Jalal Talabani have attempted to resist popular Kurdish pressures related to hot-button issues like independence and a tougher stance on Kirkuk. They have even tried to advance the concept of a "Kurdistani" entity with equality for not only Kurds, but other northerners such as Turkmen and Christians. These two authors note, however, that the allure of a thoroughly Kurdish-dominated entity, even a "greater Kurdistan," has proven far more attractive to the broader Kurdish populace and has cost these leaders some popularity. The looming showdown over the status of Kirkuk, already a major source of contention within the past year, is a potential flashpoint in two respects. It is a possible "tripwire" that might lend greater legitimacy to more heavy-handed Turkish intervention, should Turkmen claim mistreatment, as well as a trigger for Kurdish-Arab strife resulting from the intended displacement of significant numbers of Arabs to allow for the settlement of more Kurds.

Although in the Iraq context he uses the inaccurate term "ethnicity" or "ethnic" instead of "ethno-sectarian," Anderson makes a valuable contribution to this anthology. He lays out a number of important warnings and demonstrates how contradictory various potential solutions could turn out to be.

He underscores Irish political scientist John McGarry's contention that, with the sole exception of India, federations in the developing world employing mainly ethnicity to define component polities have an "abysmal track record." He therefore concludes that such a federation would further aggravate already frayed ethno-sectarian relations in Iraq. Although a veto on federal action for weaker groups might be helpful, such a palliative could lead to political paralysis at the center. And where, as in Iraq, there already has been ethno-sectarian strife, separation along ethno-sectarian lines may be the only way to prevent further violence (a method already, of course, employed in Iraq, especially with the unsightly and much-resented walling off of entire neighborhoods in Baghdad). Bearing in mind the difficulties noted above and the large areas of mixed population in Iraq, Anderson posits a somewhat more flexible model mixing both ethno-sectarian and regional considerations for crafting federal sub-divisions. Still, he points out that establishing regional definitions and boundaries could well be a daunting challenge. This is especially the case in light of the ebb and flow of the geography of regional administration in Iraq laid out so well in Richard Schofield's article. Furthermore, dominant groups might well be reluctant to break up their respective power bases in any significant way.

As can readily be seen, these articles serve up more questions, albeit some very good ones, than viable solutions. Nonetheless, Vissar and Stansfield illustrate why those focusing on tactical military successes must look far deeper in search of a balanced formula for federal governance that offers a chance for long-term stability. There is no clear choice that by itself promises to greatly reduce Iraq's ominous and persistent ethno-sectarian and other tensions. Even though representatives of different ethno-sectarian groups in the Baghdad government have been able to work together on certain issues, it is difficult to know whether that tendency can be extended to the broader mass of Iraqis beyond the Green Zone.

Until some of the historical baggage, daunting challenges, potential solutions and contradictions laid out so well in this volume have been explored more thoroughly, observers should continue to heed General David Petraeus's repeated warnings (at least through April 2008) that, despite recent security gains on the ground, the overall situation in Iraq remains "fragile."

Wayne E. White, U.S. Department of State, ret.; adjunct scholar, Middle East Institute