Reinventing Iraq: the regional impact of U.S. military action.

Yaphe, Judith

Dr. Yaphe, senior research fellow and Middle East specialist at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, the National Defense University at Ft. McNair, wrote this memo at the end of September. Analysis and conclusions expressed are hers and do not reflect the views of the university, the Department of Defense or any other government agency.

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As the United States prepares for a military confrontation with Iraq, several key questions emerge regarding how we build support for that effort and sustain it through the difficult period after Saddam and his regime are "changed." In many ways, this will be more difficult and more important than the military attack. The issues are complicated by the competing national interests of Iraq's neighbors in the composition and character of the successor government and their view of the role they, the United States, and other external powers should and must play in reconstructing Iraq. It will be hard to reconcile their demands for a pacific post-Saddam Iraq with those of Iraqis, who will have their own visions and definitions of life after Saddam and without fear. The national "interests" include conflicting political lifestyles, competing economies based on the same resource or lack thereof --oil--sectarian and tribal enmities, and level of comfort with a prolonged U.S. military presence in the region.

Following are preliminary thoughts on these issues. The thoughts are based on knowledge of Saddam and Iraq's history and modes of behavior as well as the events of the past decade, with Iraq at war and under sanctions.

HOW BEST TO RECONSTRUCT GOVERNMENT?

Whom can We Trust?

Thirty years of Saddam's repressive rule, in addition to wars and sanctions, have virtually emasculated the political will and independent judgments of most Iraqis on by whom and how Iraq should be governed after Saddam, his family and friends, and his Baath party have disappeared from the scene. Most of Iraq's intellectual elite in the party and civil society were murdered or forced into exile, as were any potential political rivals and leaders--military and civilian--who were cultivating or threatening to cultivate a loyal following. Of Iraq's 23 million people, more than 3 million are in exile today, primarily in Jordan, Europe and the United States. Many of them represent the cream of Iraqi society--its scholars, writers, scientists, intellectuals, technicians and craftsmen. The wars and the long years of sanctions have decimated the ranks of Iraq's middle class--the talented, educated doctors, lawyers, professional bureaucrats and civil servants who ran the government, schools, offices and hospitals. Those who remained in Iraq saw their salaries dwindle, lifestyles evaporate, and confidence in their ability to face the future erode. Many belonged to the Baath party, but most were probably members for the perquisites a party credential guaranteed--education, careers and the promise of a secure future, albeit one in a dangerous political environment.

The United States almost certainly will face a critical political decision before the military battle is over. That decision will involve whom to reward with power, authority and responsibility. The Iraqi opposition in exile, led by the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and Ahmad Chalabi, will assume that they deserve the spoils of war; they may be present with U.S. units as they assume control of Iraq. They will promise a broad coalition of the ethnic, political and sectarian elements that comprise Iraq: Sharif Ali, representing the Constitutional Monarchists (he is convinced that Iraqis will choose this path if only they were given the choice); Kurds representing the two major factions, the Barzani-led Kurdish Democratic party and the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; the 65 percent of the population that is Shia, represented by the Iran-based Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim; and trace elements of the Turkoman, Assyrian and Christian communities. The Iraqi National Accord, led by a former general and Baath party refugee, and other once-prominent military and political defectors will demand their share of the pie as well. All will sing a democratic tune, although their own behavior in opposition activities abroad has been self-serving, autocratic and highhanded.

A dilemma could surface, however. Elements in the military, the Baath party, Saddam's inner circle or a trusted tribal leader could decide just before or after we attack Iraq to do the unthinkable but long hoped for: eliminate Saddam. His sons and cousins who dominate the security and intelligence apparat would be gone as well. In return for this act of courage, the general or prominent political or tribal leader would expect a great reward--power. Would he agree to rule with the INC, et al.? Or, more likely, would he turn to his family, friends and tribal-political allies to receive the prize that is Iraq?

One thing seems certain. Most Iraqis will probably abandon Saddam quickly when they see war coming. They are likely to hide at home or some protected location and stay put until the battles are over and the victor certain and secure. It would take a willingness to assume great risk for most "average" Iraqis to come forward and join with the United States before it is clear that Saddam and sons are gone. It will be easier, perhaps, for mid-level military and government bureaucrats if they believe they do not risk arrest as war criminals.

Whom will Iraqis Trust?

Iraqis naturally will regard with deep suspicion all of the above possibilities. Chalabi and the INC are known quantities and extremely unpopular inside Iraq. Those who flee a country--even Saddam's Iraq--tend to be condemned by those who stayed. If a general or political leader is given power, then Iraqis are likely to wonder what has changed in their governance and what the war was about. Moreover, coalitions have an unlucky history here. None have survived long enough to govern, the last being the July 17, 1968, coalition that the militant Baathists and Saddam Hussein replaced two weeks later. Given their mistrust and suspicion of each other as well as their neighbors, many Iraqis may be relieved to have a U.S. military presence (the word is occupation) if only to protect them from their own rapacious potential successors. It is difficult to determine from our vantage point and Iraq's bloody history who the Vaclav Havel or Hamid Karzai may be for Iraq, if one can indeed be found. This will not be a velvet revolution. If history is any guide--and it usually is--Iraq on its own is likely to face a protracted period of chronic instability as coalitions and interests compete for control. It will not be pretty; it could be bloody.

What is Federalism?

Iraq has no democratic tradition--not under the British, not under the king, and certainly not under the authoritarian military- and party-dominated regimes that have ruled Iraq since 1920. It will have to build from scratch political institutions that are democratic, pluralistic, transparent and diverse. At the same time, Iraq's Kurds talk about federalism, and many outside Iraq believe the country can be easily divided among its ethnic and religious communities. It cannot be so easily divided. Kurdish and Arab areas seem reasonably clear-cut until one hears the Kurds' demand for control of oil-rich Kirkuk, claimed also by the Turkmen and controlled by the Arabs. A federal state that simply divides Kurd from Arab may be difficult to sustain. No government in Baghdad, democratic or authoritarian, can afford to concede its authority over Kirkuk or any other region. To do so would show weakness and risk further fragmentation. Turkey, however, is encouraging the Iraqi Turkmen--their "brothers"--to demand the same rights of autonomy that the Kurds demand and over much of the same territory, including Kirkuk and Irbil. Ankara at the same time is reserving the right to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs if the Turkmen are threatened or denied their rights. Iraq's Shia live in central and southern Iraq. For them there is no division between Sunni and Shia areas. Most of Iraq's Shia consider themselves Iraqi and Arab first; they are not Iranian, and many will resent the return of the Shia militants in exile in Iran. Iraq's Sunni Arabs are probably the most concerned about the implications of any democratization, pluralism or federalism. Only 17 percent of the population, they have ruled Iraq since Ottoman times, and many tend to regard the Shia and Kurds as irrelevant.

In this political morass, the U.S. military will face some tough choices, perhaps before the political decisions are made in Washington or Baghdad. The initial reaction of most Iraqis to the U.S. military will probably be elation that Saddam and his family are gone and the dead hand of Saddam and his regime is removed. The welcome may not last, however. By day three, some may be asking, "Why are you still here?" Others, however, may be too frightened to see U.S. forces depart to come forward. We will have to spell out very clearly from day one our vision of the New Iraq, federalism and the role of Iraqis inside and outside the country. Iraq will need the talents and support of its diaspora, but we will also need to nourish the recovery of its own damaged elites in country. Federalism as a state or province-based idea might be better received. This would mean 18 equal states in a federal union (similar to the structure of our government with equal and representative institutions at the national level.) It would not be what the Kurds want, but it may be a viable solution for all of Iraq.

HOW BEST TO RESTORE SECURITY?

Rebuilding Iraq's Military

The goal of the United States and the new Iraqi government will be to create a new Iraqi army that has been shorn of its Baathist, militant Arabist and extreme nationalist ambitions. The trick will be to do so without creating a pan-Arab, anti-U.S. backlash. The military institution in Iraq has a long and proud tradition. It was the first military created in an independent Arab state (1932) and has the dubious distinction of being the first to be used in an ethnic-cleansing operation (against the Assyrians in 1933). Its origins lie in the Ottoman military academies, and its creators returned to Iraq as Iraqi Arab nationalists with King Faisal in 1920. It has played a role in virtually every coup and attempted coup from 1936 to 1968, when the Baathists preempted military leaders and began the long process of purging and reindoctrinating the military.

Under Saddam, the Iraqi Regular Army was stripped of its status, prestige and weapons and subordinated in the 1980s to the Republican Guard, whose members are recruited from especially loyal Sunni Arab tribes, including the al-Ubayd, al-Jabbur, al-Shammar and al-Dulaymi. Virtually untouched by the Gulf War--they were withdrawn from Kuwait to Baghdad--they emerged afterward with whatever was left of military hardware, continued to train, and effectively put down the rebellion in southern Iraq. They were prevented from similar success against the Kurds only by Operation Provide Comfort (now Northern Watch).

In my personal view, elements of the units that comprise the Republican Guard and the Special Republican Guard, which reports to Saddam's second son, Qusay, will remain loyal to Saddam at least in the beginning stages of an attack. Their commanders will believe that they stand to be executed as war criminals and have nothing to lose. That they are guilty of war crimes goes without saying--Saddam implicated all around him in killing fractious Kurds, recalcitrant Shia and disgruntled Sunni Arabs. All have blood on their hands and almost certainly lack the ability to think independently of the regime. If they could, they would not have survived, as Saddam executed or exiled any senior military officer not in full agreement with his military strategies and tactics. Yet it is equally important that in the years since 1991, virtually all of the reported and alleged coup attempts have been made by members of the Republican Guard and Iraq's elite tribes.

Ridding the Iraqi military (regular army and Republican Guard) of its Baathist faith can be done. Ridding it of its pride in its Arabism, militant opposition to Israel, and aspirations to once again be a preeminent power in the region may not be possible. These are deeply ingrained in the Arab Iraqi psyche, especially among the Sunnis who dominate the ranks of the elite units. Many Iraqis, and not just Saddam or his Baathist minions, believe Kuwait should be the nineteenth province someday. They also harbor a deep distrust of Iran.

The trick here will be to turn these negatives into positives. The military as an institution remains respected in Iraq. To reflect the shape of the new government, it will have to be turned into a more diverse institution, once again bringing Kurdish and Shia recruits into all echelons of the military. (Some Kurds are among the senior ranks now, but the number is not known; Shia recruits were nearly 80 percent of the regular army, but few made it to the Republican Guards or senior leadership.) Its loyalty may be gained with new training, equipment and responsibilities for the defense of Iraq's political and territorial integrity. Its officers and recruits may also respond to positive contacts with the U.S. military in a non-threatening, post-Saddam environment. The risk of ethnic and family loyalties taking precedence over national ones is there and almost impossible to estimate.

Denying WMDs, Allowing Conventional Rearmament

If denying Iraq under any government weapons of mass destruction is the primary U.S. goal, it is not a universal fear. Iraq's neighbors feel little threat now from a WMD-armed Iraq, despite the invasion of Kuwait and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel in 1991. They have a much greater fear of Iraq rearmed with conventional arms--new tanks, guns, aircraft, etc. Iraq with a rebuilt conventional force, even if its size remains at its current 400,000-man strength, with new arms, improved training, and scientific and technological skills for its professionals, will reemerge as a force to be reckoned with in Iran, the Gulf, and possibly in configuring a potential threat to Israel.

The U.S. government has made it clear that any successor regime would have to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding WMD research, acquisition and development. It will be difficult to maintain the embargo on conventional weapons, however, especially once the new Iraqi government has control of Iraq's oil revenues. Any government in Baghdad will need to have the means to defend itself--a right acknowledged in international law and the U.N. Charter. And almost any Iraqi government is likely once again to covet WMD capability, especially nuclear. The difficulty for the United States will be to allow conventional arms rebuilding, which could help ensure a pro-U.S. military without raising concerns anew among Iran and Gulf Arab allies. Baghdad will also feel it needs a credible military to maintain territorial and political integrity, for example in the event the Kurds grow restive or tribal warlords emerge to challenge central authority.

Administering Justice, Ensuring Domestic Tranquility

In an eerie way, U.S. forces will find the same problems in maintaining law and order and administering justice as faced Saddam after the Gulf War. Whom can you trust? How do you keep control? His answer was to turn to the traditional tribal chiefs and leaders, especially outside the large cities and in the more isolated south and west. He restored their rights to administer local justice and impose taxes so long as they did not contravene national law and maintained law and order. I assume this means that tribal elements man local police and security posts and that the national police and security organizations man border posts and major transit through-points (the roads to Jordan, Iran and as close to Turkey as allowed by international monitors). Baath party members once patrolled the streets of the cities and helped maintain law and order, but some sources report that since the Gulf War and imposition of sanctions these Iraqis are too busy working two or three jobs to feed their families and too demoralized to care about the larger picture.

Initially, the U.S. military will have to assume this function to a large extent. If not, chaos could emerge as rival political, military and tribal leaders vie for power, status and control of Iraq's remaining arms and WMD. The United States will also have to watch Iraq's borders for signs of Kurdish unrest, Turkish dissatisfaction and Iranian efforts to manipulate or force the return of the nearly one million Iraqi refugees it has hosted since 1991. Finally, it is difficult to gauge the extent of local opposition to the U.S. military, but force protection must be a major concern.

HOW BEST TO PROTECT THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY?

The Interim: How Much, How Long?

As noted above, Iraq has no history of democratic institutions, role or tradition. The custom under the Turkish empire, British mandate, king and republic was authoritarian role by one, several, a committee or a council. Elections, when held, were affairs for the most part arranged to suit the current government. Iraq's political history has been marked by violence, coups, ethnic warfare and bloody retaliation. Saddam Hussein did not invent the "republic of fear"; he refined and improved on its practices.

Iraq will have to build anew political institutions that are democratic, pluralistic, transparent and diverse. In this one connection, Afghanistan may provide some clues. Although Iraq has long been a more complicated and modern society with many of its people educated in Western Europe and the United States, its political straggles and values have been defined by class, family and tribal interests and shaped around ethnic and sectarian differences. Saddam's one positive innovation in this sense was to try to create an Iraqi national identity where one had not really existed. His focus became a cult of personality, but he stressed Iraq's long history as a united homeland (6,000 years), as a law giver (Hammurabi), as the home of the first Islamic caliphs (including the prophet's son-in-law and successor Imam Ali and his son the martyred Husayn), and the capital of the Arab Islamic empire during the flowering of Arab and Islamic art, culture and civilization (during the eighth-thirteenth centuries CE). In the interim, as Iraqis struggle to come to terms with a new form and style of governance and government institutions and practices, they will look to this past for validation and legitimacy. Emphasis on commonalty--we are Arabs and Kurds, we are Muslims and Christians, we were great and will be again--can help deflect the anxiety of the current moment and perhaps help to cement Iraq's diverse groups.

These elements can be used positively to reincorporate Iraq into the region and ease some of the tensions that could make an interim period dangerous for Iraqis and for the U.S. occupation force. U.S. forces will not be able to withdraw quickly from Iraq. Iraqis are bound to reject imposition of diaspora exiles and fear reinstitution of the elites who dominated their lives under Saddam. They will need some outside monitoring while they wend their unsteady way to open elections and political parties, and democratic, transparent and representative government institutions. More important, they need to avoid civil war and may find the presence of a dispassionate U.S. military force far preferable to chaos or to meddling by neighbors.

It is impossible to guess the length of stay that will be required. Given the talents of the Iraqis themselves, they may need a shorter time for foreign reconstruction and development assistance than they will need for security assistance. A stay of 6 to 12 months is probably too short; a stay of 5 years, too long.

Who will Form the New Civil Society and Administration in the Transition?

This is also a difficult question to answer. Some Iraqis have strong ties to traditional families, clans and villages. This is especially tree of the generation that came to power with Saddam; they were village-based and had an almost primitive loyalty to clan and patriarchal systems and values. City-bred Iraqis (be they Arab, Kurd, Sunni or Shia in origin) have long been urban-oriented and have looked with disdain on the citified peasants and the religious communities with their crude customs and arcane loyalties. All, however, are bound by a common fear: whom do you trust, and when will it be safe to emerge from the shadows?

In the first days of transition, I estimate that few Iraqis will feel secure enough to offer their services to the U.S. military command. They will wait to see who gets what--exiles, generals, reconstructed Baathists who are now Arab nationalists and Iraq-firsters again. (1) Like Saddam, the U.S. military will have to turn to the traditional sources of authority in the countryside--tribal shaikhs, prominent individuals and families--to help form local civil administration and encourage civil society organizations to reform.

The whole answer is not in the tribes or clans or prominent families. Once the threat of retribution has passed, the many Iraqis who have been trained as professional educators, scientists, engineers, lawyers, bureaucrats, technicians, etc. will come forth to work again. Some Iraqi specialists do not believe the cadre of talent is there. Others do--and I agree--but Iraq's professional classes will need modern training and experience in living without the government and party dictating every step and determining who gets or does what. Once one of the best-educated populations with the highest literacy rate in the Arab world, many Iraqis have been ill-educated, untrained and isolated from the technological and intellectual advances of the last dozen years. More important, they are unaccustomed to planning and making decisions independently, unfamiliar with ways of creative problem solving, unused to risk-taking. Getting the schools open and running normally will be critical. NGOs can play a role here, as can the apolitical religious institutions in Iraq (such as the Shia Muslim Khoi Foundation). Getting Iraqis to display initiative and independent judgment will be harder.

Is there a Role for Outsiders?

Two kinds of assistance will be necessary: assistance in establishing and maintaining security, and assistance in economic reconstruction and development. External aid will be critical in establishing more than security. It will be needed to handle refugee flows from Turkey, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia; distribute food and humanitarian aid; repair and rebuild housing, schools and clinics; rebuild and repair oil and gas industry infrastructure; and prevent banditry. Some sources are more welcome than others. The United Nations, Islamic NGOs and European Union humanitarian organizations will be welcome, as may some U.S.-based charities, such as Humanitas and the various church groups that have been bringing humanitarian goods to Iraq since the end of the war.

Who will Not be Welcomed?

The neighbors--especially Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the small Arab Gulf states of the Peninsula--will not be welcome. Iraqis will be suspicious of their motivation and intent: Is Ankara secretly encouraging the Turkmen to rebel and scaring the Kurds into passivity? Is Riyadh trying to export its version of Wahhabism (a puritanical and extreme form of Sunni Islam) into Iraq, especially in the central Sunni Arab regions, and thereby subverting the new secular government? Is Tehran trying to manipulate Iraq's Arab Shia into seeking establishment of a clerical-based government? Have Damascus and Amman conceded their claims to Arab or Hashemite hegemony over Iraq? Given these concerns, Iraqis are most likely to turn to the West and Russia for security and development assistance.

Lessons from Afghanistan?

Probably not. No candidate with the acceptance, respect and stature of Hamid Karzai has emerged among the Iraqi opposition, and none is likely to appear. Importation of an unemployed Jordanian Hashemite prince, such as Prince Hassan (brother to the late King Hussein, who on his deathbed dumped him as his successor), or a cousin of the murdered Faisal II, the last king of Iraq (London-based Sharif Ali, who left Iraq in 1958 at the age of two and believes Iraqis would choose a constitutional monarch if given a choice) are not serious or acceptable contenders to most Iraqis. This would replicate the British Mandate, a vision still abhorrent to them. Nor will a general or other senior military officer, Baath party official or ministerial hack be acceptable. This would too closely resemble Saddam's regime in perpetuating his kind of Sunni Arab authoritarianism. Efforts to hold international conferences of Iraqis have failed, overwhelmed by bitter personal rivalries, conflicting ambitions and mistrust. Iraqis at home or abroad do not need more of these efforts. They do need help, however, in organizing themselves with plans for Iraq after Saddam.

HOW BEST TO WIN REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE NEW IRAQ?

Is there a Role for the Neighbors?

There are serious limitations on the roles the neighbors can play in Iraq. It will be important, however, for the neighbors to offer assistance and become invested in the new Iraq, even if it has political institutions and democratic practices whose effects they cannot predict. Turkey, Jordan and Syria have fragile economies that Saddam has made dependent on cheap Iraqi oil, transit fees for oil export and customs duties for exports to Iraq. Tying them to the fate of the new government through trade and construction contracts, for example, could reduce efforts to meddle across borders.

Iran in many ways is a special case. Few Iranians have forgotten or forgiven the devastation of the eight-year war with Iraq, and resentment against hard-liners in the Iranian government who were born in Iraq (they are called "Arabs") is growing. They are less certain today than they were in 1980 of the popularity of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Iraq. In the past several months, Iranian officials abroad have contacted Americans discreetly to pass the message that Iran has no intention of supporting Iraq in a war with the United States and would like Washington to consult it about plans for a post-Saddam government before attacking Iraq. Moreover, these Iranians claim that Tehran would prefer a conservative government in Iraq, one that would be able to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and keep the country from dissolving into civil war. While this is probably short-term thinking, the political gridlock in Iran and continual debate over dialogue with the United States continues to rage, despite official hard-line efforts to damp it. If the United States is to be tied down in peacekeeping and nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq, it can ill-afford to confront a hostile Iran.

Will U.S. Military Action Trigger Regional Instability?

Despite the claims of Arab governments that it will, and despite the hopes in Israel and on the part of some in the United States that it will, direct U.S. military action is unlikely to trigger a chain reaction of regime change in the region. Many of these governments face growing domestic pressures to institute political and economic reforms, broaden popular participation in government, end royal-family perks and greed, create jobs and housing. Thus far, dissent to the regimes has taken the safe forms of opposing U.S. hegemonic designs on the region's energy resources while keeping Iraq and the Arabs weak, urging support for Iraqis suffering under U.S.- (and not U.N.) imposed sanctions, and opposing Israel's brutal suppression of the Palestinian intifada, now entering its third year. There is less public sympathy for suicide bombers in Israel or the victims of September 11 on the streets of some Arab capitals, although it would be a mistake to interpret this as the view of the majority of Arabs and Iranians. Rather, these represent acceptable forms of protest that could translate into regime opposition if the neighboring governments are not more responsive to domestic sources of unrest. In this sense, the U.S. invasion and occupation will trigger anti-American protests outside Iraq and raise the risk of terrorist attacks against our forces, nationals and interests. The reaction will be different inside Iraq, however, because the destructive force of 30 years of Saddam's rule has been great and because Iraqis will feel that, left to their own devices, they will face a bleak future marked by the factional coup attempts and military intervention that have marked most of Iraq's history.

One point is certain, in my view. The neighbors--especially Saudi Arabia, Turkey and perhaps even Iran--will expect the United States to stay to preserve them from the dangers of a collapsing and lawless Iraq, more to protect them than the Iraqis. In their eyes, we will be responsible for the stability and good behavior of the new Iraqi government and state.

How Much Regional Support for U.S. Military Operations/Presence?

Trying to gauge the level of support the United States will be offered or denied in future similar encounters is like trying to hit a moving target. Circumstances, conditions and pressures are changing hourly--U.N. approval of military action because Iraq is in "material breach," public demonstrations to protest assisting the United States, Saddam's real or apparent concessions--all these are factors which are hourly changing the equation of trying to calculate who will give or withhold what under which conditions. Saddam's offer to allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq is likely to weaken today the support for U.N.-U.S. action offered yesterday. Tomorrow could see another reversal, based on the poker play of the day.

(1) Iraq-firsters were the staunch nationalists who emerged in the 1930s with an Iraq-centric and Arab nationalist political agenda. Saddam's uncle and adoptive father, Khayrallah Talfah, was a senior army officer who was an Iraq-firster and joined in an abortive rebellion against the British in Iraq. It failed and he was arrested, but Saddam learned his first lessons in Iraqi and Arab nationalism.