Policy critique: a response to Navigating Through Turbulence: America and the Middle East in a New Century. Report of the presidential study group (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001).

Hudson, Michael C.

At first glance the reader might be misled into thinking that this report is the product of a study group convened by the president of the United States and might therefore represent a wide range of views and experience. A look at its membership and organizers reveals, however, a vast preponderance of pro-Israel and conservative-hawkish voices. Perhaps it is naive to expect anything better from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), an offspring of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee [AIPAC, the primary lobby for Israel]; nonetheless, it is a shame that such an enterprise could not have been undertaken with more balance and depth. God knows, the new administration could use some good advice on the Middle East. But what has been served up here is a catalogue of pro-Israel exhortations, anodyne pieties, patronizing prescriptions and alarmist declarations, interspersed only occasionally with useful recommendations. What emerges from this tepid think-tank exercise are more of the same cliches and mantras that have guided our politicians into an ever deepening spiral of policy failures in the Middle East.

In their introduction, the co-conveners of the Study Group, their rose-colored glasses firmly in place, assert that progress was made in the 1990s on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Gulf security. But to their seeming puzzlement, there have also been "strategic setbacks" in the "peace process" (which we now realize was all process and no peace) and in the collapse of the Gulf War coalition. They also note "the growth of anti-Americanism." How puzzling! The authors are unable to provide any explanation for this odd development apart from the contrariness of certain Egyptian and Jordanian officials. Fortunately, however, despite the region's becoming "a very inhospitable place for Americans indeed," the U.S. position is "fundamentally strong," owing in part to the fact that "those who are shouting slogans against U.S. policy are clad in Levi's jeans and Nike sneakers."

On the Arab-Israeli situation, it is interesting that the WINEP group, whose alumni were entrusted with (and greatly enamored of) the "peace process," now want to distance themselves from the Oslo framework: "Oslo ... was not an American idea" (p. 13). Little wonder, since those alumni must bear major responsibility for the collapse of the peace process -- surely one of the major U.S. diplomatic failures of the last half-century. However, among the several "lessons of Oslo" one will not find any reference to American failings -- the tragically undisciplined habits of President Bill Clinton, whose scandals diverted him from focusing on the Middle East until the last frantic months of his administration; weak leadership from two secretaries of state; the Middle East peace team's lack of stature, its partisanship, its isolation from State Department input; and the incredible failure to prepare the ground for final-status negotiations. Nor does the Report offer anything in the way of comment, let alone criticism, regarding the Clinton administration's dropping of the ball in the Syria-Israel negotiations in March 2000. To be sure, the collapse of the peace process cannot be laid entirely to any one party. The hapless Barak, the mortally ill Asad and the feeble Palestinian leadership didn't help matters. But it is a pity that this Study Group was unable to evaluate critically the American performance.

The authors of the Report cast the question of regional security in the too-narrow terms of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While it would indeed be good to develop the entire region as a WMD-free zone, the countries to worry about most are Israel, Pakistan and India -- less so Iran or Iraq, the countries on which this chapter in the Report concentrates. Inasmuch as Israel's possession of deliverable nuclear and chemical weapons creates a standing incentive for others in the neighborhood to match them, one searches -- vainly -- for acknowledgement of this problem in the Report.

The Report's focus on "terrorism" in Chapter 3 is analytically deficient inasmuch as it reifies deeper, more complex processes and promotes policing rather than a political approach. Terrorism has roots, and to concentrate one's main focus on putting out fires at the expense of understanding how they start is not a satisfactory way of dealing with a serious problem. Middle East terrorism not only has roots in socioeconomic malaise but also in competing cultural concepts of legitimacy. Actual and potential targets of Middle East terrorism -- mainly Israelis, Americans and pro-American regimes -- need to ask why they risk finding themselves in harm's way. The Report ignores such questions, preferring to offer up exhortations for better intelligence cooperation, police work and punishment.

When it comes to Gulf security, especially policy toward Iraq and Iran, the people who gave us "dual containment" a decade ago -- another failed policy -- are now calling for the United States to promote "profound political change" in both countries. Even the Report's authors admit that this is easier said than done. Apparently forgetting of the law of unintended consequences and the dramatic failed examples of American interventions in the internal affairs of both Iran and Iraq, the Report advocates support for Iraqi opposition groups and "sustained pressure," "to compel change in egregious Iranian policies." Iran gets the more cautious treatment, but against the Iraqi regime the Report recommends the use of "large-scale military force" in the event of its external aggression or use of WMD. But it is hard for them to know exactly where to draw the line: "An especially difficult scenario would be the brutal elimination of the Kurdish autonomous authority in northern Iraq" (p. 40). To their credit, however, the Report's authors seem to recognize that existing policies have been ineffective. Thus they admit that sanctions on Iraq should be reshaped to ease the crushing burdens on ordinary people that have caused such revulsion toward the United States in regional and world opinion. And they obliquely suggest that legislatively mandated sanctions on Iran, which have caused friction with our European allies, might be replaced by "better ways" at least to avoid such friction. Deeper security cooperation with the GCC countries is urged, but scant consideration is given to the level of U.S. military forces in those countries, which has created domestic political problems.

Disappointing as it is, this Report is not totally devoid of sound items. For example, it makes sense to "explore opportunities with Syria," especially at the present critical juncture, as is investing in a freer Lebanon; but to accept the idea that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon is complete, no matter what the United Nations says, will not make achieving those goals any easier. Encouraging international efforts, with the United Nations and the EU, to reduce tensions is certainly welcome advice, although it is weakened by insisting that those efforts not be too vigorous. Similarly, one can certainly endorse the Report's call for redefining "the architecture of U.S. peace-process diplomacy," even though one might hesitate to get behind whatever new design WINEP might come up with. It was to the credit of U.S. intelligence agencies that the Palestinian and Israeli regimes both trusted them enough to play a security-coordination role (more than they trusted U.S. diplomats!), though the Report is right to call for a reduction in that role, perhaps by now a moot point anyway. The authors discover that Israeli settlement expansion is an obstacle to peace. They rightly note that too close a U.S. embrace of the Iranian reformers might boomerang against them. Nor can one complain about the Report's call for expanded outreach programs to Arab and Muslim-majority countries and reaching out to the new generation of leadership in several states. But the fresh thinking that some of these leaders are trying to inject into their domestic situations ought to be matched by some fresh thinking of our own about U.S. Middle East policies.

The most interesting part of this publication is not actually in the Report itself: it is the section of "dissents and clarifications" appended to it. In particular, the comments of Steven Spiegel and Marshall Breger on settlements are helpful, as is War Cluverius's salutary call for a return to the U.N. 242 framework. Robert Hunter's warnings about deploying U.S. forces to Iraq and influencing Iranian behavior are well-taken. Roscoe Suddarth and Shibley Telhami rightly underscore the dangers of moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and Telhami's plea for a tone of "compassionate power" from the new administration is advice that one can only hope George W. Bush will take.

HOW ABOUT REDUCING THE TURBULENCE?

To indulge in a moment of fantasy, suppose that a more representative study group had been assembled by the Washington Institute, including (in more than a token way) those familiar with the concerns of Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, voices articulating European experiences and expertise, and voices attuned to the complex and volatile sociopolitical conditions of the region as a whole. What might such a report recommend? Instead of framing the issues in terms of an axiomatic tilt toward Israel, it might look something like this:

The Arab-Israeli conflict

1. Downsize and normalize the U.S.-Israel relationship. Currently, America's vast and uncritical support for Israel and its provocative behavior in the region is the number one cause of the deteriorating American position in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Terminate economic assistance and suspend military assistance until Israel complies with U.N. resolutions and abandons its militaristic policies.

2. Energize and restructure U.S. diplomacy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by (a) learning the lessons of America's failed Oslo diplomacy (no more last-minute presidential improvisations; no more subcontracting the "peace process" to partisan, mid-level special envoys); (b) engaging in a genuinely multilateral effort involving the United Nations, the European Union and the Arab League; (c) preparing Israeli public opinion for the necessity of Israel's compliance with the land-for-peace parameters of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (including Arab Jerusalem) and with longstanding U.N. General Assembly resolutions on the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

3. Re-engage Syrian-Israeli negotiations by lifting American economic restrictions on Syria and indicating U.S. readiness to participate in a multinational border-monitoring force.

Gulf Security

1. Bring Iraq back into the regional system as a "normal" state -- preferably without, but even with Saddam Hussein in power -- through positive incentives for non-aggressive behavior. Lift the onerous and counterproductive economic sanctions and give Iraqi civil society the freedom it needs to put wiser and more humane leadership in place. Get real about the ineffectiveness of air raids and half-baked domestic interventions involving ersatz opposition groups. The new administration's intention to create "smart sanctions" focusing on WMD is a step in the right direction.

2. Encourage Iran's continuing re-entry as a normal player in the regional system by ending ineffective U.S. sanctions and treating it in a businesslike rather than ideological manner. Re-learn International Relations 101: don't try to abolish the balance of power as the Clintonites did with "dual containment"; take advantage of it. Reasonably stable and strong regimes in Iran and Iraq will balance each other off. Ruling elites in both countries can be encouraged to perceive a stake in regional stability insofar as it contributes to their economic recovery.

3. Work to strengthen the indigenous security capabilities of the GCC while gradually drawing down the U.S. military presence on land and eventually in the Gulf- a presence that is increasingly problematic for Gulf governments.

Anti-Americanism in Arab and Muslim Public Opinion

1. Undertake a serious study of the decline of America's reputation in Middle Eastern public opinion and why it is increasingly threatening legitimate American interests in the region. Analyze the causes of the decline and propose new policies for reversing it. (Such policies might include things as simple as ending Arab and Muslim ethnic profiling in domestic anti-terrorism legislation and ending the humiliating practice of fingerprinting visitors from so-called "rogue" states.)

2. Probe the roots of America's perceived "double standard" in dealing with Israel as compared to other countries in the region.

3. Reconsider the virtues of a more modest U.S. profile in the region. Eschew reckless talk of interfering in these countries' internal affairs; lower the profile of intelligence and covert operations. Refrain from official lecturing about the virtues of American-style democracy; leave such matters to the non-governmental sector. American assistance in matters of development, human rights and governance is not necessarily a bad thing -- indeed, it is sometimes sought by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in emerging Middle Eastern civil societies -- but it should emanate from NGOs, not the U.S. government.

4. Educate American legislators, the news media and the American public about what is at stake.

The Lagging Middle Eastern Economies

1. Assign "high-priority" status to the goal of accelerating economic growth and development, especially in the more heavily populated, non-oil countries of the region. Sluggish economic conditions compounded by still-high population growth have created a climate favorable for political extremism and instability. These domestic conditions are far more threatening to American interests than WMDs or "terrorism." To focus on the latter (as WINEP would have us do) is to commit a fundamental analytical error; instead, we need to understand the context in which these phenomena thrive.

2. Now that the Cold War is over, Israel is well-established, and oil access is secure, American interests in the region can revert to a more traditional focus on encouraging trade, investment, development and cultural exchange. A downsizing of American hegemony in this region would be a win-win game for all concerned.

Compared to what the WINEP "Presidential Study Group" has served up, an agenda like this would not only help us in "navigating through turbulence," it would reduce the turbulence itself.

Michael C. Hudson
Professor of International Relations and Seif Ghobash Professor of Arab
Studies, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies and the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University