Lebanon and Syria: internal and regional dimensions: the following is an edited transcript of the twenty-fifth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on May 23, 2001, in the Dirksen Senate Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., moderating. (Symposium: Lebanon and Syria).

Kessler, Martha Neff ; Irani, George Emile ; Gubser, Peter 等

CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR., president, Middle East Policy Council

Lebanon has been both a participant and a victim of the vortex of politics in the region. With the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the end of occupation there, a whole range of issues now present themselves for discussion. They deserve a public airing, notwithstanding the obsession we all have with events to Lebanon's south. A series of questions needs to be raised in this connection. Ate conditions ripe, now that Israel has withdrawn, for Syria to carry out its commitments under the accords of 1989, brokered by Saudi Arabia in the mountain city of Taif, and to withdraw? If not, what other adjustments toward greater equality in the Lebanese-Syrian relationship might be possible? What role, if any, can the United States play in either inducing such developments or coercing them? Now that the peace process has collapsed and Palestinians and Israelis ate seen as hell-bent on inflicting as much pain as possible on each other, what ate the implications of this for Lebanon, where Palestinian refugees continue to be an important group in Lebanese politics and external relations?

There is the issue of the Shebaa farms and the issue of Hizballah, which, as violence escalates in the occupied territories, ate becoming once again very active factors drawing Lebanon and Syria back into a relationship with Israel that probably none of them would have wished for. Finally, in Lebanese politics themselves, which have a reputation internationally for a distinct pathology, is there now a possibility of reconciliation and a move toward a new internal balance?

MARTHA NEFF KESSLER, former Central Intelligence Agency officer

Two events in the last year -- Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the collapse of the 10-year peace effort begun at the Madrid conference -- have focused attention on the Syrian presence in Lebanon and elevated the hopes of those who want the Syrians out. The Israeli withdrawal from the security zone (with the notable exception of the Shebaa farms area) was thought to remove a pretext for Syrian troops being in Lebanon in the first place. The collapse of the peace process and the violence it has stirred have spurred all parties in the region to prepare for a long period of uncertainty that will involve a constant power struggle among them. Pressing Syria to leave Lebanon now while there is a fresh rationale in the form of the Israeli withdrawal is no doubt the strategy of the Israelis and Lebanese Christians (old allies in the contest with Syria) as they look to their strategy for managing a prolonged period of regional instability. The fear is that the longer Syrian entrenchment goes on, the more likely it is that a Syrian-Lebanese symbiosis will become unalterable in the future in any meaningful sense.

Damascus exercises influence on its neighbor in a variety of ways, most of them independent of its military presence in Lebanon, which could be substantially reduced without altering Syria's special role in Lebanese political life. Syria's decision earlier this summer to redeploy some of its troops stationed in the north Beirut area initially gave some of its opponents brief hope of a draw down, but the move does not appear to be the beginning of an appreciable repositioning of Syrian forces in Lebanon or even a substantial lowering of its profile in the capital. Coming weeks after criticism of Syria's presence in Lebanon by Lebanese Christians had reached a crescendo, the small-scale redeployment does not even seem to be an attempt to silence these most vocal critics. The shift was probably in response to local conditions considerations internal to the Syrian military. Similar withdrawals and movements of Syrian units have taken place in the past and have not heralded important changes in Syrian policies or overall influence in Lebanon.

The issue of Syria's position in Lebanon has received greater scrutiny in regional politics since the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the security zone in southern Lebanon last year. Damascus has been seemingly unmoved by critics inside Lebanon, Israel or elsewhere in the region, but may be somewhat concerned that the international community not become persuaded that Syria has permanent designs on Lebanon. Small episodic troop withdrawals might be aimed at countering such speculation. In my view, there is little likelihood of Damascus capitulating to any probable combination of pressures to withdraw from Lebanon, and, in fact, Syria's rationale for maintaining substantial influence over Lebanon has deepened. The only uncertainty is how effectively the young Asad will manage the relationship with his neighbor and how far Syria's competitors for predominance in Lebanon -- Israel, Iran and Iraq -- ate prepared to go.

The issue of Lebanon is a complex one for Syria and involves virtually every aspect of its national life and national security. I would like to review briefly why Syria entered the Lebanon crisis 25 years ago. Although hard to imagine now, President Hafiz al-Asad was very reluctant to become entangled in Lebanese civil strife and did so only after first trying to use the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) as a stabilizing force; its rapid disintegration once deployed in Lebanon, the worsening conflict between Christian and Muslim militias, and gathering trouble inside Syria itself - stimulated in part by Lebanon's religious tensions -- finally pushed Syria to intervene. Asad sought and received Arab League validation of Syria's move, which ironically was in the first instance to protect Christian communities against Muslim militia attacks. It is important to recall that Damascus was initially a reluctant policeman in Lebanon, acting to protect itself from the destructive confessional forces that eventually tore Lebanon apart for nearly two decades. While Syria's role in Lebanon has changed and been amplified many times over, it still has a major defensive component that for Asad and his father is essential to the safety of the country for the foreseeable future.

There are four primary reasons that Syria (under any leadership) will try to maintain the level of influence it currently exerts over Lebanon. The first and most often overlooked involves the strong sociopolitical influence Syria and Lebanon have on one another as a result of the long history the two countries share.

1. Despite the Taif agreement, Lebanon's confessional communities remain fractious, and its system of governance based on confessional apportionment of political power and position is inherently unstable within what is little more than trappings of democracy. The demographics of Lebanese religious groups are changing in ways not reflected in the country's formal power structure, disadvantaging the fastest growing and most radically inclined segment of the population, the Shia. It is a special irony, in my view, that Syria's presence in Lebanon is likely to have the effect of maintaining Christian political primacy even though Christians are losing the demographic weight to justify their position under the Taif accord and that Christians are working hardest for Syria's ouster. This rickety system and the unhealed injuries of conflict in Lebanon make the close historical and social ties between Lebanon and Syria dangerous transmission belts of political tension from Lebanon to Syria, just as they were in the 1970s. Despite their vastly different political systems, economies and international orientation, these two societies are at their core so similar and share such a long history that their estrangement in the 1950s and '60s is likely to be the anomalous period in their history rather than the present. Even though it has not been obvious in the stable final years of Hafiz al-Asad's rule, Syrian leaders believe they cannot afford a Lebanon left to its own uncertain stewardship, particularly at a time when the Syrian establishment is being tested by generational change, a failed peace process, new leadership, and mounting internal pressure for liberalization.

2. The Palestinian diaspora in the Middle East is arguably the most potentially destabilizing force in the region. Syria and Lebanon together accommodate nearly 1 million displaced Palestinians, many of them well trained in guerrilla tactics, some having served in Lebanese militias and all disillusioned and wanting a political voice and a homeland. Maintaining some control over potentially restive Palestinian communities in Lebanon is thus an important objective for Damascus, particularly since Lebanon on its own proved entirely incapable of shielding itself from the destabilizing effects of Palestinian activism in the run up to its civil strife and collapse. Much has changed in Lebanese and Palestinian politics since the 1970s, but in no respect have these changes made the management of the diaspora easier or less threatening to regional stability -- quite the opposite is, in fact, the case. For this reason alone Syria will want to maintain its policing of Lebanon. The collapse of the peace effort (which I will discuss in a moment) makes this objective doubly important to Damascus as it tries to equip itself for a new round of regional and inter-Arab tensions, which inevitably accompany stalemate with Israel. Syria also needs influence among Palestinians in Syria and Lebanon as a counterweight to what is to Damascus a suspect and erratic Palestinian leadership. Arafat ended the previous intifada with the Oslo accord, an agreement Asad senior condemned and predicted would never hold. His son no doubt fears that this intifada could produce another secret, random agreement that works against Syria's interest and at worst could go even further than Oslo in unhinging the region.

3. Syria's triangular relationship with Iran and Hizballah has the appearance of a collaborative effort against Israel, and, indeed, it is. But it is also Syria's embrace of two powerful regional actors of significant potential danger to Syria itself. The unrealistic notion that Hizballah would somehow fade away once the Israelis withdrew from southern Lebanon is being proved increasingly naive, in part because the prediction ignored the very heart of the group's belief system and relationship to Iran. Both are dedicated to reshaping the entire region to fit their vision of true Islam -- its social, political and religious dimensions. Islam's rightful patrimony was not for Hizballah just about southern Lebanon and occupation. While Israel may top the list of "unacceptable" features of the current landscape, Syria's secularism and Lebanon's Christian predominance are only further down that list. Hafiz al-Asad's initial cultivation of Syria's relationship with Iran corresponded in time to the intensification of Muslim militancy inside Syria in the early 1980s and was a hedge against Tehran seeking to exploit Syria's deepening trouble. Over time Asad turned that necessity into a multi-purpose virtue and has done essentially the same with Iran's cats paw in Lebanon, Hizballah. However, Syrian and Iranian interests in Lebanon, particularly with regard to the future power of Lebanese Shia and Sunni Islamists, are not compatible over the long term, and as those incompatibilities emerge they will seriously test the younger Asad's skills as a regional player. It is important to remember that the first thing Asad's father taught him was the micromanagement of Lebanon and particularly the dynamics of the relationships with Hizballah and Iran. Observers of Lebanon know this is a "close in" game, and Bashar is likely to fiercely resist efforts to weaken his hand or to put any distance in Damascus' hold on Beirut and relationship with Hizballah.

4. The collapse of the peace process has confronted the region with a host of dangers; most immediately, the violence in the West Bank, Gaza, inside Israel itself, and along the Israeli-Lebanese divide. Lebanon is for Syria a buffer, an exploitable front (through Hizballah acting as a Syrian proxy), and -- most important -- a major strategic vulnerability, a route for Israel into Syria via Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. This, of course, has been true since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict; what have changed as a result of the collapse of the Madrid process are perceptions, expectations and fears.

The implosion of the peace effort battered and may have destroyed entirely the Syrian leadership's belief that a negotiated settlement with Israel is possible. Asad senior never thought that Israel would on its own accept Syria's core terms, but he did believe that the United States might be able to broker, cajole, buy, monitor and guarantee Israeli acquiescence to an acceptable treaty -- one in which Israel traded the entire Golan for asymmetric security and diplomatic agreements very favorable to Israel. The effort to achieve this, spanning nearly two decades, was an extraordinary learning process for the Syrians in terms of Israeli and American political systems. While American pundits talk of Asad missing opportunities, the Syrians' take is quite different:

5. With regard to Israel, the Syrians seem to have taken away from the Madrid experience the perception that Israeli leaders are weak and unable to control a deeply divided and dangerously factious population. Asad bridled at the American and Israeli mantra during the negotiations that "he, Asad, needed to help sell peace to the Israeli public" -- a responsibility he felt the Israeli leadership should shoulder and could not. Syrians seem now to believe that while Israel is the unquestioned military power of the region, it is a weak society socially and politically and, therefore, even more dangerous. In their view, the Israeli military is not clearly under the control of the government, and the Knesset is largely out of any control. The peace process did not end with a better understanding between the two sides; Syria watched five Israeli prime ministers struggle with their governments and the Knesset, seek Syrian accommodation of their unique politics, and in the end go down in election defeat or assassination. Through Syria's optic, the exercise of democracy Israeli-style was chaotic, unreliable and ultimately dangerous in that a divided public will could not actor be authoritatively represented. The average Syrian still believes (no matter the details of negotiations) that Israel is at bottom an aggressive, expansionist country with an insatiable appetite for security -- impulses held in check only by its patron, the United States.

Given this, of great alarm to the Syrians is their altered understanding of the United States. Those who were involved in negotiations on the Syrian side believe they now have a clearer grasp of American political parties, the role of Congress, and the limitations of the U.S. presidency -- once regarded as far more powerful than it is now judged to be. Israel and its American Jewish advocates are seen as having undue influence over every aspect of America's Middle East policy, an influence so strong that it can compel Washington to act against its own interests in the Arab world. Most worrisome is the Syrian view of what happened in the final chapter of its negotiations with the United States at the summit meeting in Geneva. Most evidence suggests Asad felt the U.S. president was not seriously negotiating but simply helping the Israeli leadership to set up political circumstances that would facilitate an Israeli exit from Lebanon, a move Israeli Prime Minister Barak was determined to carry out. The strain of that abortive trip to Geneva and the disappointment of what was regarded as a deception by Washington were seen as serious blows to Asad's frail health. America misleading the Syrians is a theme woven through their appreciation of the U.S. role in negotiations going back to disengagement talks in 1974. Whether this amplified distrust and reassessment will result in an alteration of Syrian security policy is uncertain. That policy has had at its core a U.S.-Syrian relationship that would dispose Washington toward restraining Israel from any major aggression against Syria. That required reasonably good working relationships with Washington. With a substantially altered view of America's capability to restrain and direct Israel, U.S. influence with Syria has probably diminished significantly.

What does all this have to do with Lebanon? Failed hopes for a peace agreement and these altered perceptions make Lebanon more important to Syria than it has ever been -- as a buffer, an ally and a proxy combatant. Syria cannot militarily challenge Israel or even come close to constituting a threat similar to the 1973 war. But, with southern Lebanon as a proxy battleground Syria can menace Israel, and with Lebanon as an ally and buffer Damascus can feel reasonably safe from any Israeli efforts to subvert or attack Syria using Lebanese assets or territory. Most important, Damascus wants to be able to thwart any attempt by the United States and Israel to lure Lebanon into a peace arrangement disadvantageous to Syria, such as the Israeli deal with Bashir Jumayil in the 1980s or the Oslo accords in 1993-94.

GEORGE EMILE IRANI, professor, Conflict Analysis and Management, Royal Roads University, Victoria, British Columbia

I've entitled my brief talk "From the French Mandate to the Syrian Protectorate," as Lebanon is still in need of babysitting, then by the French and now the Syrians. Unlike other societies coming out of internal ethnic of communal conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia of Northern Ireland, the concept of a "postwar" society does not apply to Lebanon. The Taif accord did not stop the war in Lebanon. In fact, it was the elimination of General Michel Aoun's rebellion, in October 1990, with the U.S. blessing that marked the end of the war. Syria for the first time used its air force to bomb the presidential palace at Baabda, and Aoun had to seek refuge in the French embassy, before being forced to go to Paris, where he remains to this day. Instead of Taif, what we have now in Lebanon is a Pax Syriana. Nothing happens in Lebanon, from building roads, to the most minute issues, to the major issues, without the blessing of Damascus.

As a result of a total lack of responsibility on the part of Lebanese leaders, several postwar issues were not dealt with and are still not being dealt with. There is the issue of militia absorption. We still have one militia, Hizballah, roaming around. Then there is the issue of war crimes and amnesty. We went from amnesia to amnesty, and the issue of what is in the past was not dealt with. There is the question of the disappeared. In Lebanon today there ate, according to recent data, more than 17,000 Lebanese who have disappeared. No one knows what their late was. The most recent decision by the Hariri government was that the families of the disappeared should put their claims to compensation before the government, but there is no willingness yet to put out a list of all the disappeared, in order to have closure, to use a psychological term.

Another issue is the question of reconstruction. What comes first, stones of human beings? That was a big debate in the 1993-98 period of the first Hariri government. It is still up in the air. Finally, there is the question of the relationship with Syria. This was recently raised by the visit of the Maronite patriarch to the United States and the frustration he faced by not being able to meet anyone in Washington, especially of the higher levels of the administration. By contrast, Prime Minister Hariri two weeks ago had access all over the place. Many people said he was welcomed by Powell, Bush and others because he is a billionaire rather than because he is the prime minister of Lebanon.

Recently there were important documents issued in Lebanon -- the Qornet Shahwan statement and the statement issued by the Democratic Forum. Both documents are calling for the implementation of the Taif accords, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. But all the promoters of these ideas are either Maronite Christians -- Samir Franjieh from north Lebanon, Simon Karam from south Lebanon -- or Druze such as Walid Jumblatt, the head of the Progressive Socialist party. Very few Sunni of Shiite Muslim leaders openly supported it. They all signed the Democratic Forum statement, but no one came out openly supporting it.

Coming back to the question of policing the past, there is a selectivity in terms of putting people on trial. Take the case of Aoun, who is in France, or take the case of the former Maronite warlord Samir Geagea, who is still in jail. Take the case recently of the former South Lebanon Army (SLA) militias, who are now facing all kinds of harassment with their families in south Lebanon. Then there is the case, on the other hand, of Elias Hobeika, allegedly responsible for the infamous massacres of Sabra and Shatila, who was a member of the Lebanese government. And then Tony Franjieh, who also had his own militia and was responsible for all kinds of war crimes. All crimes should be investigated.

Add to that the issue of the morass of the Lebanese economy, which according to recent government figures has a 56.3 percent deficit, compared with the 37 percent target, and $24 billion of public debt, which is huge for a poor country like Lebanon. And then there is the question of the hijacking of the political system in Lebanon. There was a system whereby the president was a Maronite Christian, the prime minister was a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the parliament was a Shiite, basically a kind of troika system for dividing the wealth and power. Last but not least, the intelligence services, both the Lebanese army behind President Emile Lahoud and the Syrian mukhabarat, are pervasive throughout the country.

In a multicultural society emerging from nearly two decades of war and situated in a politically volatile region, the task of policing the past is extremely difficult. Many Lebanese individuals and groups have been calling for a truth and reconciliation commission. A month ago, there was a conference on memory and the future in Lebanon, but unfortunately, it turned out to be an intellectual exercise. Most Lebanese prefer to forget the war's legacy of suffering, victimization and disempowerment. As in other wars, in the Balkans or Rwanda, the memories of violence and victimization ate never fully erased. And the Lebanese tradition of compromise -- no winner and no loser -- does not help in terms of getting to a process of policing the past and assigning blame for the tragic and unjust consequences of the war.

Establishing war crimes tribunals or a Lebanese truth and justice commission would be a difficult, if not impossible, task. Just look at the trial, for instance, of the Maronite warlord Samir Geagea and the current trial of the former SLA members. They were all guilty of several crimes, but they were singled out by the Lebanese state for trial and punishment largely, in the case of Geagea, because he did not play by the rules of the current political status quo. Warlords from other communities who were responsible for equally reprehensible atrocities are today free; some even hold crucial positions in the Lebanese government.

Another significant obstacle to policing the past in Lebanon is the influence of external forces: the presence of Syrian troops, the unresolved issue of Palestinian refugees, and the Iranian involvement. Internal healing must be rooted in the will of the Lebanese people themselves rather than manipulated or imposed by outside actors. Since it is clearly to the advantage of outside powers occupying Lebanon to delay genuine conflict resolution and obstruct national reconciliation through policies based on divide and rule, the removal of all foreign, in this case Syrian, troops should hasten reconciliation.

Last but not least is the U.S. attitude toward Lebanon. The best illustration of it is the vote last week here on the Hill for cutting any economic assistance to Lebanon at this stage: the Lantos bill. Lantos's and other supporters' position is that Lebanon is not a sovereign country, that the Lebanese army should go into south Lebanon and impose state sovereignty. But it is very clear that behind that decision is an AIPAC (American-Israel Public Affairs Committee) move to hit on Syria and Iran because they are not being players in the so-called peace process.

PETER GUBSER, president, American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA)

When you're talking about registered refugees, the numbers may be somewhat different from the total number of Palestinians. I looked up on the UNRWA website yesterday, and it says, as of June 30, 2000, there ate 376,000 registered refugees out a total of 3,700,000 throughout the Middle East. The actual number of registered refugees in Lebanon from reports I see and from experts I talk to is actually smaller.

During the '80s and early '90s, there was an exodus of quite a few registered Palestinian refugees to Europe, some to Australia, some to this country. So the numbers have diminished. The smallest number I have heard, which is probably too small, is 190,000; the highest is 250,000. To go back to UNRWA's figure, there area lot of Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria who ate not registered refugees. Some of them have become citizens of the country over the years, especially a lot of Christian Palestinians, and some are just able to work on the economy as guests in the country.

The Palestinian refugees' situation in Lebanon is extraordinarily different from the situation of refugees in all of the test of the Middle East, from a social, economic and political standpoint. First, they cannot work in the economy. They cannot work outside the refugee camps except in two categories of work, common labor in construction and agriculture. They ate not allowed to do anything else, to be a doctor, lawyer, administrator, whatever. Naturally, a number work illegally. That makes it a very different situation than in Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza.

Second, for the most pro% they are not allowed to own property. Third, they cannot attend public schools. This becomes very important, because UNRWA offers public schooling for refugee children through primary school. They make an exception in Lebanon for the junior high-school level. So there ate some students at that level and I think just a few at the high-school level, but it does not reflect the numbers of young people who want to go to junior high school of high school and ate not being allowed to do so. And this is not true in Jordan, the West Bank of Gaza, or Syria.

Finally, they do not have passports; they ate stateless. This is in contrast to the situation of the Palestinians in Jordan, the vast majority of whom have passports and can travel as Jordanian citizens. In Syria they do not have passports but travel papers, and that is an impediment. In West Bank and Gaza some of them have Jordanian papers, some have Palestinian papers. This is not a good situation. I used to say that the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was absolutely the worst in the Middle East. Given the extended fighting in the West Bank and Gaza, I'm not sure I would say that today.

What is the Lebanese political attitude towards the Palestinians? One reads in the press time and time again that the politicians want them out; they see them as potentially disruptive. How ever, we do not hear much more than rhetoric. We don't hear explanations, just calls for them to leave. Somewhat ironically, among Arab politicians, the Lebanese ate the strongest defenders of the concept of the right of return -- but for negative reasons. Fifteen or 25 years ago, you heard talk in Lebanon that the Sunnis entertained the concept of nationalizing a lot of the Palestinian refugees because they too are Sunni Muslims, in order to augment their numbers. Today you don't hear that at all or read it in the newspapers.

Let's now turn to the relationship between the Palestinians in Lebanon and the PLO. In many ways, the Palestinians of Lebanon made Yasser Arafat. A lot of his support came from there; he was able to organize and get money and get recruits there. After the 1970 events in Jordan, in which the PLO was essentially defeated by the Jordanian government, a lot of Palestinians went to Lebanon, and a state within a state was organized by the Palestinians for a number of years. Even after the defeat in 1982, a lot of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continued to support the PLO.

However, we start seeing a major shift after the Oslo accord in 1993. It was predicted in the press, and it became reality that the Palestinians there would feel abandoned by the PLO. With the PLO having moved to the West Bank and Gaza and not being present in Lebanon anymore, a lot of service providers have left. The Palestine Red Crescent services have diminished very greatly. Many international NGOs that were serving Palestinian refugees in Lebanon directed their attention to the West Bank and Gaza, because that is where the PLO and the Palestine National Authority had gone. A consequence of this, naturally, is that the refugees are relatively disgruntled.

After the Oslo accords, somewhere between 100,000 and 150,000 Palestinians from the Middle East went to the West Bank and Gaza in service of the PLO, individuals as well as families. However, most of them came from Tunisia, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and some perhaps from Syria. Very few came from Lebanon because most of those who were working for the PLO there had already left. So Oslo changed the relationship of the PLO to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

What are the attitudes of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? There are some polls and some observations from people who go there and talk to them, including myself. Some of the polls say that the poorer one is as a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon, the more likely he or she will be to state a desire to return to historical Palestine. You will see this phenomenon especially in the refugee camps, among people who do not have very much hope. Another type of attitude among the more worldly is very anti-Israel, naturally, and, by extension, anti-U.S. Many ate also anti-Arafat, anti-PLO, anti-Fatah because of their feeling abandoned.

Looking at it from a slightly different perspective, some of the more thoughtful Palestinian politicians in Lebanon worry about the nature of a future Palestinian-Israeli Arab agreement that would involve settling the refugee situation. They are fearful that what will be addressed is only the states' interests and not the individual interests of the Palestinian refugees. Because Palestinian refugees feel that their interests are not going to be represented by Lebanon -- that they are going to be pushed out in one direction or the other -- they are even more disgruntled.

Attitudes have changed over time. I remember reading a study done by a professor at the American University of Beirut in the mid-'80s examining the attitudes of the Palestinian refugees in a couple of camps in the south. He asked them what they feared the most. The thing that they feared the most was not the Israeli military; it was the Christian militia coming into the camps. The second thing they feared the most was the Lebanese military. And the third thing they feared was the Israeli aircraft over their heads. It was a very interesting juxtaposition. It would be interesting to know what they fear the most today. Most likely the Lebanese military.

What is going to happen to the Palestinians in Lebanon? One had been hearing rumors over the last year and a half that there were discussions by some Western governments to try to pressure Lebanon through money etc. to settle a large number of the refugees in Lebanon. One is not hearing that as much any more, but I was hearing such discussions from both British and American and some other European circles for a while.

The Palestinian refugees have very little influence over the Palestinian National Authority in the West Bank and Gaza. It is somewhat ironic; the Lebanese Hizballah are having more influence now.

AMB. FREEMAN: I'd like George Irani to address the question of what would happen if the Syrians do withdraw. You alluded to this briefly. Many Lebanese regard the Syrians as very unwelcome in Lebanon, yet they have been participants in Lebanese politics now for a long time. Presumably their departure would leave some sort of a vacuum to be filled by somebody or other.

DR. IRANI: When we talk about Lebanese interests as far as Syria is concerned, we must ask who has an interest in a close connection with the Syrian regime. It's clearly the ruling elites, those who ate manipulating the economy. Out of any business deal that goes ahead in Lebanon, the biggest example being the mobile phone companies, the Syrians take a cut. The same applies for a cement factory in northern Lebanon. There's a very close connection between the ruling elites in Syria and the ruling elites in Lebanon. They both use Lebanon as a cash cow.

From the grass-roots level there is a kind of rebellion, but unfortunately it is a helpless rebellion. The Lebanese like to use Poland as an example of a country that was occupied and later redeemed. But the Polish diaspora played a very important role, because it was helped by Pope John Paul II. Lebanon has a huge diaspora -- more than seven million Lebanese around the world, six million in Brazil alone. But this diaspora has not been harnessed yet by the Lebanese government with any authority.

The pope himself, asked the Christian Lebanese to clean their own house, to nurture new leadership. This did not come about. Lebanon today is in a transition and suffers from lack of leadership. We don't have leaders. We have a billionaire, who is the prime minister, and we have former warlords who have been recycled. The Christian leaders are either in exile in Paris or sitting in Lebanon cowed by the Syrians. Or we have the patriarch, who is trying to use his religious prestige and charisma to try to have some kind of political influence. To no avail because Lebanese internal politics today are hostage to the Syrian-Israeli relationship.

DR. KESSLER: I think it's unclear what would happen if Syria were to suddenly disappear from the scene and not police Lebanon. What would happen to the integrity of the country and its ability to lead itself and deflect outside influences? What situation would occur, should the Syrians not be there? We know the answer that Damascus has arrived at. It's unclear to me where U.S. decision makers come out on this issue. There may be a very unrealistic attitude about what would happen to Lebanon if Syria were not there.

AMB. FREEMAN: Martha, earlier you said that you had some thoughts on U.S.-Syrian relations in the new era. It clearly is a new era in the Middle East, as elsewhere. I wonder if you would take a minute or two to tell us those thoughts.

DR. KESSLER: Syria emerged from a 10-year peace effort with what it thought was greater knowledge of the Israeli political system and a greater fear of it than they had going in. At bottom they still see Israel as quite aggressive, with this insatiable appetite for security, and that it is largely the United States that can keep that in check. That notion, I think, has been a central aspect of Syria's security policy, maintaining a relationship with the United States decent enough so that the United States would prevent any aggressive behavior towards Syria.

What is alarming to the Syrians as a result of their experience over the last 10 years, since the Madrid process, is that they've also emerged with what they think is a new understanding of the United States. They think they have a clearer grasp of our political parties, the role of Congress and, most important, the limitations of the U.S. presidency, which they once regarded as much more powerful than they do now. I think they still make clear distinctions between the individual and the role, but I think they have come to see the U.S. presidency as much weaker than they had thought. They believe Israel and its Jewish advocates in the United States have undue influence on our policy and are able to get any administration to act against Washington's interests in the Middle East.

One of the stories that I think the media in this country really failed to tell as it probably should have been told was the final chapter for Syria. The Geneva summit with President Clinton was regarded by the Syrians as a deception. The terms presented were not in any way acceptable to them. It ended abruptly, after an intentional effort to set up the circumstances for the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, no more, no less. This experience has had the impact of reinforcing in the Syrian mindset deceptions that have been perpetrated on them from the beginning of the negotiations, beginning not in 1991, but in 1974. And it has raised long-held fears about being manipulated in order to advance another track, in this case the Palestinian.

It's unclear to me what this altered view of the United States is going to mean in terms of Syrian security policy. They don't have good choices; Asad, Sr. understood that. I assume his son also does. It just isn't clear, but I think the failed hopes for a peace agreement and this altered perception of both the United States and Israel in terms of what they have to offer at the negotiating table makes Lebanon all the more important to Syria, as a buffer, an ally and a proxy combatant, as I mentioned earlier.

Syria knows it cannot challenge Israel militarily. I find it perplexing to see glib remarks about the current violence going to lead to full-scale war. I'm not quite sure what those articulating such views have in mind. I don't know whether they think that the Syrian military is going to present itself for the slaughter in some new 1973 scenario, or what, but Syria understands they are no match for Israel militarily. They don't have the option of presenting the kind of threat they did in 1973, but they can menace Israel from southern Lebanon, and that is important to them. They will need the buffer of Lebanon to try to stanch that vulnerability.

Their history would make them very concerned about a renewed peace effort involving pulling Lebanon away from Syria, and trying to negotiate a U.S.-brokered deal between Israel and Lebanon, not unlike the one that was attempted during the Reagan administration in the 1980s, or something similar to the Oslo accords of 1993 and 1994. Those fears must be waiting to be stimulated, should we ever get back to the negotiating track. I think this is a real problem in terms of our ability to influence the situation.

AMB. FREEMAN: I would just exercise my prerogative as moderator to say that I think the realistic danger is not all-out war in the Middle East, but that the collapse of Oslo and Madrid will extend to Camp David. That would indeed create a new situation.

It must be a side-effect of compassionate conservatism that no one has mentioned the new administration and its views of the region, such as we know of them. The administration came into power pledging not to treat the countries in the region as the means to a sole end, but to deal with them in their own right; not to make one issue the centerpiece of the region, but to deal with the multiplicity of issues. They said they were determined to take a more balanced region-wide view.

They also indicated that they did not wish to give any country a veto over bilateral relations between the United States and any other, which some took at the time to indicate an American receptivity to exploring new relations with the son of the late Hafiz al-Asad, assuming that Syrian economic reform proceeded to the point where it would facilitate such relations. Yet we've just had a discussion of this northern tier of the Levant without mention of the administration. In the nonpartisan spirit of the Middle East Policy Council, I would like the partisan people on the podium to ponder that and perhaps say a word or two either now or later about the positive or negative effects of the emerging distancing of the United States from the region that many people see to be happening.

Q: Dr. Kessler, in your comments about Syrian attitudes, you referred to "them." Could you give a little more detail about who "they" are? The president? General staff? The Baath? The man in the street?

DR. KESSLER: My distinctions in discussing how Syrian attitudes emerged from the 10 years of negotiations with the United States and Israel referred to those involved in the negotiations, either directly -- a very small group -- or those brought into the decision-making process during the 10 years. Separately, I think, the average Syrian emerged with the same negative attitudes towards Israel that they had held prior to the negotiations, even though there was a brief period from about 1993 to 1996 during which the Syrian government was clearly trying to prepare its population for the possibility of peace and had worked with various groups to start changing those attitudes. This has very quickly been reversed. I would count probably no more than 15 or 20 people included in the more nuanced understanding.

Q: I was struck by Dr. Irani's opinions about Rafik Hariri. I have lived in Syria, though not in Lebanon, and a lot of people seem to like Hariri and think that he did really care deeply about the Lebanese people. Where do those opinions come from? My second question is for Ms. Kessler. When I was living in Syria I noticed, although there was this entanglement with Lebanon, the economies of the two countries seemed very separate. How was this possible? And what are the implications for the continuing political occupation of Lebanon?

DR. IRANI: Hariri is a creation of Saudi Arabia. He is a Saudi-Lebanese citizen. In the 1992-98 period, his first government, he was perceived to be the savior of Lebanon, bringing his economic contacts, but it ended up being a disaster involving corruption, mismanagement and a huge deficit that we're still saddled with today. Also, Hariri had to bow to Syrian diktats in the presidential elections in 1995, when President Hrawi's mandate was over. There was a big debate over whether to expand Hrawi's mandate or elect a new president. The Syrians postponed the election for three years. In 1998, the current president, General Emile Lahoud, was elected. Even today, Lahoud doesn't have a good relationship with Hariri. Hariri is an implementer, and the next few months are going to show whether he is going to succeed or fail. They are now trying to downsize a bloated administration. For example, Middle East Airlines (Lebanon's national airline) has 1,200 political appointees within the company, and Hariri has decided to dismiss them. The Shiite leader Nabih Berri doesn't want that to happen. The same thing is happening in the telecommunications industry and other places. Plus, Hariri is hostage to what's going on in south Lebanon. Two days before he came to the United States (spring 2001), there was an attack in south Lebanon, which he condemned in his own newspaper. Then he had to backtrack. Hariri had a period of disruption in his relationship with Damascus. More recently, Hariri's relations with Damascus were rehabilitated. But he is a less powerful figure than he was before.

DR. KESSLER: I think the differences in economic orientation reflect the differences between Lebanon and Syria in their international orientation and their historical experience. They have developed quite different approaches to economic activity, with Lebanon being very laissez-faire and Syria following a socialist model. There was a lot of thought when Syria became so heavily involved in Lebanon that somehow the Syrians would learn from the Lebanese and be able to take their ossified system and model it more on the vibrancy that used to exist in the Lebanese economy. I was very skeptical of that. In the early days of the Baath party and Hafiz al-Asad's rule particularly, there was a real belief that liberal economies are unfair. And, while I think it's hard for some people to look at this very corrupt Syrian system and it's authoritarian ruler as having concerns about such issues as equity, I would remind you that Asad was a reformer when he started. He had a very different vision of where he wanted to take Syria than where he did in fact take it. Many of those ideas and sentiments persisted until he died. I assume he conveyed many of them to his son and that they are shared by many other leaders, particularly the old guard. I am not suggesting that the kind of corruption that exists in Syria is compatible with those kinds of ideas, but they have watched with some alarm what goes on in Lebanon. To be more specific, barriers were set up for decades to prevent the kind of economic interchange that you're talking about.

Q: Considering the great difference between how the Palestinian refugees are treated by the Lebanese government and the Syrian government, I'm wondering if the government of Syria tries to influence Lebanon. What are they doing relative to the Palestinian refugees? Secondly, both Faisal Husseini and the legal team with the Palestinian negotiators, when they talk about Palestinian refugees, refer to options, return to Israel being one. Yet the refugees in Lebanon don't talk about options at all, only about the right of return.

DR. GUBSER: With respect to Syria's trying to influence Lebanon's policy with respect to the rights of Palestinians in the Lebanese context, I don't see any evidence of it whatsoever. If they wanted to try to do that, I suspect that they could have some influence, but they don't see that they have interests in that regard, so why bother? There is another level of Syrian utilization of Palestinians, though, and that is through some of the factions of the PLO. A number of them are based in Damascus, and they have followers in Lebanon, but they apparently utilize that particular set of relations for their own interests. If there is a settlement, the Lebanese politicians are not interested in solving the Palestinian problem in a Lebanese context. They want to see them out.

DR. KESSLER: Although I think the Palestinian refugees in Syria do quite a lot better than those in Lebanon and are treated very differently, Syria's main interest in those communities is first, to make sure that they don't set off the same kind of destabilizing forces that they did in the 1970s and, second, to manipulate those communities to further Syria's interests in dealing with Israel. The rejectionist groups that Peter referred to are headquarted in Damascus, and Hizballah's activists among Palestinians are the most important tools. Over the course of the negotiations and throughout the conflict, going back decades, Syria has associated itself with the Palestinian cause in interesting ways and has been a great promoter of Palestinian rights, both cynically and seriously. It's important for those who watch this issue to note that Bashar al-Asad has gone to language that was abandoned for a long time after Oslo: comprehensive now means a Lebanese-Syrian track associated with the Palestinian track. I think that's going to be an issue that we have to deal with, should we be so lucky as to have negotiations start in earnest.

Q: Hizballah has changed considerably from being purely a terrorist/military organization to one that has a considerable political infrastructure and is now participating openly in the Lebanese political scene. Hizballah has ceased to recruit from Palestinians in the refugee camps of southern Lebanon. In the future perhaps there could be conflict between Hizballah and Iran. If Iran and Syria ever have disagreements, this could have a major impact on where Hizballah goes.

DR. IRANI: Certainly, Hizballah today is a player on the regional scene because of its connection with Syria and Iran, but Hizballah also has to be careful how it plays its cards. They know that there's always a Syrian veto controlling them, so they are partly an instrument of Syrian-Iranian policy. The problem now for Hizballah is to try to find a reason for its existence. Following the Israeli withdrawal a year ago, they lost a major card in their hand. Today we have the Shebaa farms conundrum. Two days ago, the U.N. representative in the Middle East, Terje Roed Larsen, who played an important role at Oslo, was saying that Shebaa farms had nothing to do with Israeli-Lebanese relations, they are Syrian territories occupied by Israelis. This means the Shebaa farms issue falls within Resolutions 242 and 338. U.N. Resolution 425 was totally implemented with the withdrawal of the Israeli troops. So the Syrians are using Hizballah and vice versa to maintain an active role in Lebanese politics.

Another issue is, what will be the outcome of the struggle for leadership of the Shia community in Lebanon? AMAL stays in power because of its patronage system. Most of the 1,200 employees of MEA are Shia appointed by Nabih Berri, speaker of the Parliament. Then you have the re-emerging leadership of the Sadr family, whose famous patriarch, Imam Moussa Sadr, disappeared in 1978. His family is now trying to come back. Then there is Hizballah, which also is wracked by a struggle between those who want to create an Islamic republic in Lebanon and those who want to create some kind of coexistence with the Lebanese Christians.

DR. GUBSER: Given that there is a void within the Palestinian refugee community in Lebanon, Hamas may have an opportunity. Hamas was aided by Israel during its founding and has taken on a life of its own, unlike what anybody imagined. Hizballah is recruiting Palestinians and organizing them, and it is obviously a somewhat successful organization. As a Palestinian branch of Hizballah, it could eventually split off into a new type of organization, one that could roil the Middle East.

DR. KESSLER: There has been the notion that Hizballah arose primarily as a result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. But this has been a misunderstanding. It missed the core values of this group, which are not dissimilar to those of the revolutionary types in the Iranian government: to change and re-Islamize the area. So the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon did not remove the raison d'etre of Hizballah. It merely made it politically more uncomfortable for them. That's why we have this strange Shebaa farms issue. I'm wondering whether that isn't more to deal with the sensibilities of Syria, which has always been deeply concerned about the Islamic revolutionary tendencies of Hizballah and has handled it very carefully. Shebaa farms is just the tactical, national reason for continuing the struggle.

Hizballah may be the most important player to watch in terms of what's going to happen. Shaikh Nasrallah has elevated himself to a real icon. He is the one who has led the group that has done the most to achieve what Arab governments and other groups have not been able to achieve: to menace the Israelis enough to withdraw. They have derived the notion that this is how we have to do it: we don't sit down at negotiating tables; we don't have all-out wars; we get ready for a very long haul. This is what Nasrallah has brought to the table and what Hizballah represents.

Finally, there are serious incompatibilities between Syria and Iran and between Syria and Hizballah. One of the major tests of Bashar al-Asad is how well he handles them. Syria under this leadership is a dedicated secular state. The relationship that Asad developed with Iran was for the purpose of containing Iran and keeping it from seeing Syria as an attractive target for anyone who wants to influence the Middle East. How to handle the relationship with Hizballah and Iran was the very first thing that Hafiz taught Bashar.

Q: I was wondering if you could talk about whether there will be municipal elections and the establishment of local government in the south.

DR. IRANI: The municipal elections are supposed to take place by next fall. They are very important for empowering the local leadership to take control, given the abandonment of south Lebanon by the central government. From a socioeconomic perspective, the South is suffering and has not been getting the attention it needs. Coming back to the question about the patronage system, we have the Council for the South, which is under the control of Nabih Berri. It has been used as a patronage network to help his people. That's why Hizballah was able to fill in the void that was left by the government. The Imam Sadr Foundation is involved in very useful medical and other educational work in south Lebanon.

Another thing to keep in mind is the question of land mines. Two days ago there was a very important conference in Beirut about land mines left by the Israeli army. The Israelis never provided a map of where they put the land mines, under the excuse that there is no peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon. Many innocent kids and others have been killed by these mines. The Lebanese government has finally started trying to do something about them. But as long as Lebanon's sovereignty has not been extended to that part of the country -- by sending the Lebanese army to the south -- this is a precarious situation. It is also linked to the regional dimension. The south may explode again. It's available to be used by the Syrians and the Israelis. The Syrians can at any time blow up the south and provoke the Israelis. They can also keep it quiet and not give Sharon any excuse for another adventure in Lebanon.

DR. GUBSER: We don't know whether the south is going to blow up again. Over the years of the conflict, the area was semi-depopulated. We're reading now that some people are returning. I suspect that the number will be nowhere near the number of people who left. People in Beirut are not going to leave their jobs. There has been talk about special money from this country and other countries for redeveloping the south, but a lot of it is being held hostage to the lack of the presence of Lebanese military in the south. I don't think we're going to see those monies voted by Congress for some time. As long as the political environment remains unstable, you're not going to see very much private investment, which is always what drives economic development. People with money have alternative places to put it.

Q: Dr. Gubser, you said, with regard to the Palestinian issues, the argument runs along three lines, one of them economic. The economy cannot sustain an addition of 7 to 8 percent to its labor force, most of whom are uneducated and unqualified. Second, not only ate you adding to the Christian-Muslim imbalance, you're also adding to the Muslim imbalance. Third, you're adding an ethnic dimension to all the problems that Lebanon has faced. Finally, a lot of Lebanese perceive that most of what has happened to them in the last 25-30 years has been caused by the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.

DR. GUBSER: The Lebanese are making their own problem. You said the Palestinian refugees are not well-educated. Well, they're not allowed to go to school. From a humanitarian standpoint, that's just flat-out wrong. Kids should be allowed to get an education. Then they will contribute to the economy in which they live.

Q: I had the unfortunate experience to be the managing director of one of the major pipeline operations in the Middle East. It was $8 billion of natural gas intended for the Indian subcontinent by way of the Gulf. The problem starting in 1995 with participation of American/Western capital in these projects got hung up between the Clinton administration and Senator D'Amato and his friends, who prohibited the investments that were necessary. Most of these projects do not go through the countries that we're talking about here today. However, the ones from Central Asia through Turkey, and from the Gulf to the subcontinent, are held hostage right now to the sunset clause of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which is due to expire on August 6. Whether or not that will happen will depend probably on things that happen within the countries here, such as whether Hizballah kicks up its traces and Congress gets exercised enough to not let that sunset clause disappear. Then it's back to square one.

For those of us old enough to have been living in Jordan before, during and after the 1967 hostilities, we find an intriguing possibility coming up now, not that I think it's very viable, but I've heard it several times. Back in the period between the end of the 1967 war, prior to Black September in 1970, there was a fear in Jordan that U.S. support of the Hashemite kingdom had dwindled to the point where the antipathy between Syria and Jordan was useful to the United States, which actually wanted to accommodate Israel. There was a tremendous outflux of refugees across the Jordan River into Jordan at that time. What was going to happen was that the United States would withdraw its support from the Hashemite kingdom, and Jordan would become Palestine.

I've heard this again in the past couple of months from reasonable sources, probably from elements that are not overly represented in this room today -- that Sharon will do a Nixon in China; that Syria will be offered everything down to the Tiberias shoreline, if the grinding up of the Palestinians is permitted to continue; that the Lebanese occupation will continue, that Hizballah will be capped; that the refugees will be dealt with in a political rather than a humanitarian way.

AMB. FREEMAN: With regard to your useful comments on pipelines, Middle East Policy last year published the transcript of a very interesting discussion of Caspian energy and the pipeline difficulties related to it [Vol. VII, No. 4, 2000].

DR. GUBSER: I have heard the scenario of "Jordan is Palestine again," despite what Prime Minister Sharon says, or maybe even because of what he says. I spent 1968 in Jordan, talking to East Jordanians. They talked about moving away from the Hashemites. A lot of that talk reflected the fact that King Hussein had just lost a war. After his defeat of the PLO in 1970, such talk ceased.

DR. IRANI: The Sharon government is very unstable, a national-unity government. I don't think that the Labor partners would allow any further crazy adventures. And there are a lot of dissenting voices now coming from the settlers. On Jordan, today the monarchy is very solid and has the total support of the United States and major Western powers.

DR. KESSLER: I am certainly old enough to remember that. Across the spectrum, those of Sharon's age group talked about Jordan as Palestine as a viable solution. I don't think it's unrealistic at all that that is out there as a possibility, because at this point, there are no good options. This has been part of the Israeli psychological history of this problem, turning Jordan into Palestine. The idea of buying off Syria is a twist that I haven't heard. I don't think any government in Syria would accept it or be able to survive it.

AMB. FREEMAN: The sustaining of Jordan as a state has rested in no small measure on its utility to all its neighbors as a buffer. That utility was jeopardized during the Gulf War, when Jordan cast its lot with Iraq. That raised serious questions on the part of many of Jordan's other neighbors about whether its viability was important or a strategic asset. I think that is now history, and that others would have a strong reaction to a scheme such as the one that you mentioned. This would include Saudi Arabia, for example, an important patron of Syria to which the Syrians pay some attention.

Q: The division of power among the various confessional groups in Lebanon is based primarily on a census taken many decades ago. There's been pressure to take a new census to redistribute power equitably. What is the status of that census, and what impact will the battle over the census have on the future of Lebanese internal politics?

DR. IRANI: This is a crucial question. The last census was done in 1932. There ate all kinds of statistics coming out on the Lebanese population. CIA estimates a few years ago gave the Shia population a relative majority. There is no question of introducing a census into the Lebanese political morass today, where they have so much on their agenda. Lebanon, as Michael Hudson defined it a few years ago, is a "precarious republic," some kind of virtual state kept together by outsiders and an elite that has used the country for its own purposes, without empowering citizens, without first creating a rule of law. We haven't had an official inquiry on what happened during the war. Who is responsible for the 100,000 people killed, the 17,000 disappeared, the 800,000 displaced and so on?

Second is the matter of confessional identity, which is stronger now than before the war. Today every community is jealous of its sectarianism and wants to keep the system. That, unfortunately, does not allow for the creation of a Lebanese citizen. What would happen if Syria leaves? I would wager that it Syria left Lebanon today there would be chaos, because there is no agreement among the Lebanese on what type of country they would like to have. Hizballah has a vision, the Christian right wing has a vision, Aoun has his vision, the Druze have theirs. The Druze are a minority of minorities. There are 400,000 of them in Lebanon, Syria and Israel. They are scared of the Shia majority surrounding them, who ate buying land in the Chouf Mountains. That is why today Druze warlord Walid Jumblatt is desperately seeking the return of the Christians to the mountains. I've been involved in a project on reconciliation in the Chouf Mountains. The Druze are desperate, they would like to have the Christians back to counter the Shia majority.

Q: There is a debate raging inside Israel about the implications of Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and what this means in terms of the intifada, in terms of the export of tactics used in Lebanon by Hizballah. Can you shed any light on relationships between Hizballah, the Islamic Jihad and Hamas?

DR. KESSLER: There are probably growing reasons pulling these groups into cooperative relationships. Linkages have always existed. The debate inside Israel goes on interminably, but looking back at the decision by Barak to withdraw unilaterally, it was a very serious mistake. He was driven by politics to do it; he had made promises. I think his mentor Rabin made a similar very serious tactical mistake in offering a referendum on an agreement with Syria. That too would have been a very serious impediment, had Rabin lived. But, I'm not sure that I see the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as being the impetus for the cross-fertilization and cooperation of these groups. Rather, it marks the very steady success that Hizballah has had over time of foiling the Israelis in a way that no other group has been able to. Obviously the circumstances of operating against Israel in southern Lebanon are dramatically different from the challenges of Hamas operating against Israel in the West Bank and Gaza and inside Israel proper, or other groups sitting in Damascus.

That there is probably going to be increasing cooperation has to do with a variety of circumstances. I think there are limits, also, on how much cooperation we will see. One of the big questions is, will there be an international terrorist front opened up over time? Chas. mentioned earlier that one of the things he's concerned about is this unraveling reaching all the way to Camp David. Another thing that we need to be very concerned about is that the unraveling will lead to the kind of international terrorism we've seen in the past. If it happens, I think the cooperation between these groups will escalate.

AMB. FREEMAN: Some of the principal instructors and the cross-fertilizers of the Al-Aqsa intifada are the Israelis and the Israeli armed forces. The escalation in the type of weaponry, the heaviness of the weaponry that's involved invites counterescalation. The use of political assassination invites counterassassination. And, unfortunately for the Israeli armed forces, this son of low-intensity conflict is one in which the advantages do not necessarily go to those who possess heavy weapons. So a whole curriculum of military instruction is being administered by the IDF to the Palestinian resistance, and the maquis that's emerging is much more united in its tactics and arguably more effective than it would have been if it had not faced unrelenting pressure tom Sharon's government and the Israeli armed forces.

DR. IRANI: The Israeli occupation of Lebanon was a taxing and costly adventure for the Israeli army, government and people. So their forced withdrawal was a combination of these factors. With regard to the second aspect of your question, I would mention the role that Iran is playing as a focus for all these radical Islamist and Palestinian groups, who are willing and ready to use terrorism/violence to bring back the old line, and to also extend Iran's reach in the region. As far as Hizballah is concerned, they can use the Al-Aqsa intifada to mobilize public opinion. Now they have another battle, the battle for Jerusalem, one of the objectives mentioned in the Hizballah literature. The Syrians, too, ate happy with it. If you take the case of two weeks ago, when the Israelis caught a boat full of weapons sent by Ahmad Jabril's faction up in Lebanon, this wouldn't have happened if Syrian intelligence weren't aware of it.

DR. GUBSER: I think the most important aspect of Hizballah is as a model for Palestinians in the streets. I was in the West Bank and Gaza a couple of months ago, and, while most of the people I talked to are not in favor of conflict and want to peacefully resolve things, I certainly heard a lot of them saying: We can fight just like Hizballah for a long period of time, and we will prevail. And remember, that model is also on TV in Lebanon from Hizballah TV and on radio. If Hizballah really is recruiting Palestinians, it's going to be even more powerful.

Q: I'm particularly struck by Dr. Irani's comments about the artificiality of Lebanon and the fact that it largely exists as a reflection of the interests of external actors. You said earlier in your remarks that the Lebanese government's national debt now was around $24 billion. My company operates in Lebanon, and we keep close track of where the economy is. I think things are worse than that. I'd like to hear you comment on the consumer economy in Beirut. I go there a lot, and I'm always fascinated by the enormous amount of activity in the private retail economy -- boutiques selling the very best Italian and French consumer goods. And there are all these hotels and restaurants, branches of most of the American chains, where there always seems to be a lot of activity. What's going on there? This is a country whose economy is sliding toward oblivion. And it's not Egypt, where there are bottomless reserves of fellaheen on whom to call and foreign aid as well.

DR. IRANI: This is an important question. In 2001 the public deficit is going to exceed $27 billion, 165 percent of GDP, one of the top rates in the world. Few of the folks that you see in the Beirut stores are buying. In Lebanon, according to a study that came out a couple of years ago, 1 million people live below the poverty line. You have a parasitic environment that is held together by a patronage system. Tele-Liban, the national TV company, has been shut down for three months because they don't have money to pay all the useless employees. The people you see buying or in the restaurants are always the same people, who made their fortune either selling weapons or drugs or in other kinds of nefarious activities, or made their fortune in Africa or Brazil, in the case of the Shiites of south Lebanon. The rest of the population is in dire straights. Many people are withdrawing their kids from school because they cannot afford the tuition. If Hariri doesn't succeed in accomplishing the economic reforms he promised the World Bank, I don't know whether he will be able to stay in power.

Q: Saudi Arabia has considerable interest in what happens in the eastern Mediterranean, in Syria and Lebanon. But, at the same time, Mr. Hariri has to reconcile this with what you described as the Pax Syriana and the interests of the new Asad regime. To what extent would you say these two issues are in conflict?

DR. IRANI: I wouldn't say it's a total conflict for him. Hariri in a sense is investing in Syria; he's an ally of the Syrian regime. Don't forget the parliamentary elections in which he won big time in Beirut. This would not have happened had it not been for the consent of the Syrians. Hariri's predicament today is the economic situation. When Hariri was here, his major message was, come and invest in Lebanon. He had closed meetings at CSIS and other places urging U.S. businessmen to invest in Lebanon. But how can we invest in a country where its sovereignty is a shambles, where the army is not doing its duty of going to the South to protect its border, where the economic situation is problematic and the laws too? When a foreign company invests in Lebanon, the laws are totally inadequate to protect it from corruption and arbitrary decisions. The Lebanese leadership are not willing to touch these issues. They are very sensitive about having their patronage system undermined. The Syrians are happy with this; they are feeding from the same trough. Syria is benefiting from its relationship with Lebanon. One billion dollars are siphoned off every year to Damascus. When Syrian workers come to Lebanon, they are treated better than Lebanese workers. This is partly because Lebanese don't work in menial jobs. And the Lebanese government does not guarantee a minimal salary. A Syrian will work for $3 a day, while the Lebanese would like to have a family and meet the cost of living.

AMB. FREEMAN: I would like to ask each of the panelists, Martha, George and Peter, whether they have a final word before we have to adjourn.

DR. KESSLER: Chas. asked us earlier to think about the options of this particular administration. And I must say I don't have the sense that they have made up their minds how they are going to manage. It's almost as if they're waiting for the inevitable explosion that will pull us in, whether we want to get re-involved or not. We seem to see a much greater concern about Iraq, which probably is a more manageable problem than what we have going on now in the Arab-Israeli arena.

DR. IRANI: For Lebanon to find some kind of sovereignty and independence, two things have to happen: peace between Syria and Israel -- a tall order -- and upheaval in Syria itself. Lebanon is a satellite of Syria like Poland, Hungary, Romania and Czechoslovakia were satellites of the USSR. When the USSR crumbled, all these countries emerged and created democratic societies.

DR. GUBSER: As Chas. has said, the current intifada could lead to the destruction of Camp David. I would hope that the United States, the Bush administration and others, would try to do something about it beforehand, because our fundamental interests are not only with Israel but also with some of our Arab friends. Egypt is a long-term ally, Jordan is a buffer but also important for the Arab-Israeli peace. If we don't do something, we could lose those allies.

ADDENDUM

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON, professor in the Departments of Anthropology and International Relations, Boston University

I was in Lebanon on a sabbatical leave when Israel withdrew. Although in the minority, I expected the border region to be calm and saw the Israeli exit as a remarkable opportunity for Lebanon to get on the path to recovery. After two decades of closely following events in southern Lebanon, I knew that there was little appetite in the area for going on the offensive against Israel, not least because the residents of the South were well-schooled in suffering. Lebanon was the victim of Israel's two-decade occupation. So long as Israel maintained its occupation in southern Lebanon, the long-awaited economic recovery of Lebanon would be on hold. There was considerable international sympathy for Lebanon, and it was plausible that this sympathy could be converted into substantial external assistance. If the doom-mongers were wrong, Lebanon might be rejuvenated by the withdrawal.

In order to capitalize on the situation, Lebanon needed to do one thing and one thing only: to meet its security responsibilities in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal. Israel withdrew under the terms of U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, the 1978 resolution that it had long spurned. Without anyone to "hand the keys to," as Uri Lubrani once put it, Israel now embraced 425, especially its clauses mandating that the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) assist the Lebanese government in the reestablishment of peace and security. To gain international confirmation of its exit, Israel put the ball in the court of the Security Council and the secretary-general.

If UNIFIL was to assist the government of Lebanon in the restoration of peace and security in the border region, clearly the prime responsibility remained with the government and its security forces. Under President Lahoud, Beirut refused "to guarantee Israel's security" or to deploy a serious military contingent southward until the Israeli withdrawal was meticulously confirmed, more or less meter-by-meter. That process took about two months, and even then the forces that were deployed were put under the command of the Internal Security Forces rather than the army. (The Internal Security Forces are led by General Jamil al-Sayyid, known to be very close to Syria's intelligence chief, General Ghazi Kanaan, who is effectively the Syrian pro-consul.) Equally significant, when the forces were eventually deployed, they were not authorized to move to the border areas, remaining several kilometers north. The point was to deny Israel any confidence about the security of its northern border and to underline the indispensability of an agreement with Syria.

Could it have been otherwise? Was it possible for the Lebanese government to adopt a higher profile in the South? Of course, it is foolhardy to expect the Lebanese government to challenge the power of Syria, not only the final arbiter in Lebanese politics but well-represented by allies and political clients in high positions. Nonetheless, my sense is that Lebanese officials protected Syrian interests so vigilantly that Lebanon's own interests were badly jeopardized. Even when officials lack substantial autonomy, they may play their parts with somewhat less vigor. But this presumes that there is an alternative to Syrian hegemony, that Lebanon has distinct interests, and that Lebanese leaders may be other than satraps for Syria. In the summer of 2000 it was demonstrated that the foregoing assumptions did not apply. Instead, the government projected a petty and uncompromising stance toward its clear responsibilities in the South. As a result, it disappointed Lebanon's many friends in Europe and the United States. In the autumn of 2000, it was not a surprise to see efforts to host an international donors' conference for southern reconstruction and recovery fizzle completely.

Given Lebanon's weakness, we should not be too quick to dismiss the country's vulnerabilities to both Syrian and Israeli mischief. This raises an obvious and as yet unanswered question: Why did U.S. and Israeli diplomacy virtually ignore Syria in the run-up to the withdrawal? After the failure of the Clinton-Asad summit in Geneva in March 2000, two months before the Israelis unilaterally withdrew, Syria was frantically signaling that it still wanted to negotiate with Israel. Barak and Clinton mostly ignored these signals. Given the Syrian capacity for mischief, it would have been far wiser to try to sustain a diplomatic dialogue with Damascus. Instead, the rhetoric deteriorated into a rather juvenile series of assertions about whether the ball was in Syria's court or Israel's. In retrospect, this diplomatic lacuna was a serious error.

The Israeli exit came with unexpected rapidity and chaos. The Israeli-controlled militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), was wracked by desertions and fear. Despite bravado from General Antoine Lahad, its commander, there was little question that the force would evaporate once its protector departed. In the event, the SLA crumbled while the Israeli exit was underway. Lahad now sips latte in the cafes of Herzliyya, and former SLA militiamen have been recruited to the Israeli border police to assist in the suppression of the Palestinian uprising.

The leading force in the resistance, Hizballah (the "Party of God") deputized itself to control the border area, thereby ensuring a sometimes testy relationship with UNIFIL, which was left in the awkward position of filling a vacuum that the government refused to acknowledge as its responsibility. Hizballah's role was endorsed by the Lebanese government and blessed by Syria and encouraged by Iran. Not only would there be no effort to disarm the resistance militia, but it would now function as an extension of the state. Hizballah principals argued that the group could serve Lebanon's security better than the army (which could be more easily deterred). With other resistance elements playing a minor, and sometimes disruptive role, Hizballah succeeded in confounding most of the experts. With minor exceptions, the South was remarkably calm after the Israeli exit.

It was inevitable that the resistance, and the Lebanese generally, would celebrate the Israeli withdrawal as an Israeli retreat under tire. Places that symbolized occupation and repression, especially the Chateau d'Beaufort and the horrendous former prison in al-Khiam, are now widely visited by Lebanese. The prison, with its primitive clinic, its lack of basic sanitation, its crowded cells, its torture sites, its air of fundamental evil, is a bracing reminder of the largely unchronicled suffering endured by many Lebanese. Hatred for the Israelis is now widespread in the south, stoked by such events as the Qana massacre in 1996, but the cumulative product of more than two decades of occupation. In my experience, the enmity is certainly more palpable and widespread today than it was in 1980, when I had my first extended encounter with South Lebanon.

For months following the Israeli exit, the South was remarkably quiet, other than for ritualized visits to the Fatimah Gate, long used by the IDF to move forces in and out of Lebanon, where crowds of Lebanese and sometimes Palestinians gathered to pelt Israel with stones. Hizballah conveniently left the stones in piles, and the few Israeli soldiers on the opposing side of the fence wisely stayed out of sight. Given the earlier premonitions of disaster in many quarters of Lebanon, the United States and Israel, the Fatimah Gate ritual was amazingly trivial.

Even before the Israeli withdrawal, however, the question of the Shebaa farms was bubbling up. The "farms" are 18 plots of land owned and titled by Lebanese, most of whom live in Shebaa, a predominantly Sunni Muslim village with a permanent population of 3,000 or so. In all, the plots account for about 25 acres in the occupied Golan Heights. Until the 1967 war, the Lebanon-Syria border was open, and Lebanese farmers worked the land without interference. Following the war, Israel incrementally fenced off the area so that by the 1970s the owners were cut off from their land. All Lebanese documentation, including all official maps published prior to 2000, show that the farms lie in Syria.

When the issue first arose in the spring of 2000, few Lebanese had even heard of the Shebaa farms, and even senior Hizballah officials were ignorant of the case. The Shebaa file was actively promoted by Speaker Nabih Berri (on instigation from Syria, I am told). When I visited the village in March 2000, the villagers I met talked openly about their cigarette-smuggling business, which entailed arduous eight- and ten-hour treks over the Golan with cigarette-laden caravans of donkeys. Although people did mention the loss of the farms area following the 1967 war, this was hardly a burning issue. Syria has acknowledged Lebanon's claims to the territory, but it has not done so in a manner that would unequivocally transfer the territory to Lebanon. In addition, I understand that if the land is recovered by Lebanon, Syria would then lease it on a long-term basis; i.e., keep it. The United Nations rejected Lebanon's claims, arguing the Shebaa farms were not covered by Resolution 425 but by Resolutions 242 and 338, and therefore, a matter for Israeli-Syrian negotiation. Lebanon and Syria have rejected this position, arguing that Israel has not completed its withdrawal from Lebanon, and that until it does, the resistance will continue.

This all remained somewhat academic until the al-Aqsa intifada erupted in late September. The anger unleashed in Palestine fostered political passion across the Arab world and created a context for Hizballah to initiate its campaign for the liberation of the Shebaa farms with the encouragement of Syria. In October, three Israeli soldiers were captured while patrolling the farms. Subsequently, a reserve lieutenant colonel, Emmanuel Tannenbaum, was allegedly captured in Beirut, although Israeli officials vaguely assert that he was kidnapped outside of Lebanon and transported to Beirut. For Hizballah, the capture of the Israelis not only underlined their commitment to liberate the Shebaa farms, but provides bargaining chips for the release of long-time Lebanese hostages still held by Israel, including Mustafa Durani, widely credited with the kidnapping and death of U.S. Marine Lt. Colonel William Higgins, and Shaikh Abdul Karem Obeid, a fiery Hizballah leader kidnapped by Israel. Since October, Hizballah has initiated a number of attacks on Israeli forces in the Shebaa farms.

There are very clear limits in the Hizballah campaign to liberate Shebaa; the attacks have been restricted to the confines of the disputed land, which is occupied by Israel. In this sense, the Hizballah leadership feels that it is acting in a restrained way and within the context of a deterrence system. General Secretary Hasan Nasrallah and many Hizballah supporters came to believe that they had actually deterred Israel with the ever-present threat of Katyushas. I think they underestimate Israel's ingenuity, and I am certain that they are playing a much more dangerous game than many supporters imagine. For its part, Syria and specifically Bashar al-Asad have egged Hizballah on, although Bashar's goal is a limited one. Syria's wants to make sure that it is not marginalized in any future negotiating framework. They ate perhaps being too clever by half, in view of the general international perception that Israel has completely left Lebanon and that the disputed land is part of occupied Syrian territory.

In April and June, after a lot of huffing and puffing, Israel finally actually struck Syrian targets, sending a shock wave to Damascus. In addition, following a Hizballah attack in the Shebaa farms, which provoked the April air strike, a long-brewing confrontation with Prime Minister Hariri erupted. His recovery dreams for Lebanon were not only put in jeopardy by Hizballah's continuous poking of Israel, but he was facing growing pressure from Europe and the United States to deploy the Lebanese army southward. The dispute broke into the open with a strongly worded editorial in Hariri's al-Mustaqbal on April 15. Relations between the prime minister and Hizballah continue to be very tense.

Of course, were Israel to evacuate the Shebaa farms, it would be a stunning success for Hizballah and its supporters. But this is hardly likely to happen anytime soon. There is no evidence that Israeli officials wish to further bolster Hizballah's revolutionary credentials. (I am not aware of any credible evidence to support Israel's claims that Hizballah is active on the ground in Gaza or the West Bank, although there is no doubt that Hizballah has provided an inspiring model for many Palestinian activists, and its television broadcasts certainly stoke the flames of resistance.) There are residual Lebanese territorial questions that could be exploited in the future, and Hizballah's rhetoric and recent actions lend no confidence to Israel that a withdrawal from the occupied farms would end the "resistance" campaign. Other potential causes include Nkhaile, a Lebanese village that was put under Syrian security in 1947 for a 10-year term, and the case of seven villages that were transferred to Palestine in 1922 during the British Mandate. Although Hizballah officials said previously that this was not a relevant issue, since the transfer pre-dated the independence of Lebanon in 1943, this judgment could change.

There are two likely possibilities: the pot will be kept simmering, with continuing jeopardy for the well-being of Lebanon (and, by extension, Syria); of there will be a broader conflagration, perhaps precipitated by miscalculation. Wars do not necessarily happen by design, and it may be instructive to recall the disaster ensuing from Nasser's game of brinkmanship in 1967. Syria does not wish to fight a war with Israel; Syria and Lebanon would suffer far out of proportion. It is more likely that the crisis will continue to simmer, but this presumes that all sides respect international borders. If Hizballah's campaign shifts from the disputed farms to Israeli territory per se, which has not happened at all to date, then the game will escalate markedly. (Israel's claims that Hizballah has attacked "Israeli territory" are only valid if one accepts Israel's annexations of the occupied Golan Heights as legitimate.) Meantime, Israel persists in violating Lebanese territorial waters and skies, which is also gratuitously provocative. Diplomatic remedies ate certainly necessary, but they are not in sight, notwithstanding some strenuous efforts by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a variety of European emissaries, and sporadic attention from the United States. Meantime, in southern Lebanon, the central government has regressed to its longstanding posture: excesses of rhetorical solidarity matched by a paucity of state resources. It is altogether a sadder picture than we should be seeing a year following the Israeli withdrawal.