The politics of hegemony: the United States and Iran.

Bill, James A.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has survived for over two decades. Among other challenges, it has had to overcome a punishing 95-month war with neighboring Iraq, the active hostility of the world's unrivaled superpower, and an internal political and economic situation that has sapped its strength and weakened its spirit. Because of its large population, geostrategic location, vast deposits of hydrocarbons, ideological zeal and fierce independence, Iran holds special interest for the United States. Washington has accused Iran of human-rights violations, international terrorism and political intransigence. Policy makers from five administrations have sought to weaken Iran and diminish its credibility in the international arena. These efforts have failed, and important voices in the U.S. foreign-policy establishment have concluded that it is time to attempt a fundamentally new approach. In this plan, the emphasis is upon creative diplomacy, constructive engagement and calculated steps to rapprochement.

ATLANTIC COUNCIL REPORT

Among the more serious intellectual efforts to address the problem of U.S.-Iran relations is the report prepared by the Atlantic Council's three-year working group on Iran. The Council gathered together a group of 60 policy makers (past and present), academics, think-tank stalwarts and knowledgeable observers to develop "a changed strategy" and "a new U.S. approach to Iran." The policy paper is thorough and creative. It is based upon a detailed account of U.S. "national interests," interests that are divided into three major categories: geostrategic, energy and economic. This important study recognizes all the major issues and contains a number of sensible recommendations.

The Atlantic Council report emphasizes, for example, the fact that U.S. sanctions and embargoes have failed to alter Iranian political behavior. In the view of the group, it is time to remove the counterproductive sanctions. In particular, the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) must be quietly allowed to lapse. According to the report, the lifting of the embargo "would clearly serve U.S. interests ... because the world is now entering a period of global energy scarcity and Iran accounts for 5 percent of worldwide oil production." The Atlantic Council report presents several other recommendations. The United States, for example, would do well to coordinate its Iran policy with actions taken by its European allies. Countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany maintain a sharply different perspective on Iran and its revolution. Perhaps even more important than U.S.-Europe coordination of Iran policy are the positions taken by China and Russia. Both of these nation-states have worked hard to develop close relations with the Islamic Republic.

RUSSIA AND IRAN

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia began to establish a new era of cooperation. Whereas the Soviet Union had enjoyed a position as "co-superpower," its political and economic collapse diminished the USSR significantly in the world's power rankings. The United States, now the sole global superpower, cautiously assisted the various Russian governments that faced severe economic and political crises. In return, the United States expected a weakened Russia to comply with American wishes. In the Middle East, this compliance meant overthrowing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, cooperating with the Western world on oil production and pricing, harassing the Islamic government in Iran, pursuing a benign policy in Central Asia, and abiding by U.S. wishes concerning the explosive Palestinian-Israeli issue. Russia resisted such a policy but stood quietly by during the two Gulf wars.

Then, as part of its internal need to build a post-communist country and to establish an effective foreign policy, Russia began to take independent actions that boosted its self-esteem and strengthened its international reputation. This political renewal centered to a large extent around issues concerning the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. While quietly maintaining ties with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Russia also sought to rebuild and strengthen its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In pursuing this kind of policy, Russia found itself clashing with the United States.

Despite U.S. preferences, Russia has entered into numerous political, economic, military and cultural agreements with Iran. Russian cooperation with Iran in the fields of nuclear energy, military weaponry, and trade and commerce has been roundly criticized by the United States. In this instance, Washington has failed to change either Iranian or Russian behavior. Instead, the opposite trend continues to develop. The more pressure exerted by the United States, the closer Russia moves toward Iran.

In March 2001, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami made a landmark trip to Russia, where the two countries established an unprecedented number of new bilateral agreements. Khatami was the first Iranian leader to visit Moscow since before the revolution, and he did so at the express invitation of President Vladimir Putin. President Khatami's visit resulted in a Russian promise to complete the Bushire nuclear power plant and to provide Iran with advanced conventional weapons. The United States complained sharply to Russia about the transfer of military technology to Iran. Iran and Russia responded by pointing out that the agreements were in the best interests of the region because they would help build stability in the Persian Gulf.

Given the strengthening relations between Iran and important world actors such as Russia and China, the United States has found itself increasingly alone. It has become even lonelier as Iran has reestablished and renewed relations with the other Persian Gulf states. Every year since 1988, the Islamic Republic has initiated high-profile conferences and meetings designed to build a meaningful rapprochement with these monarchies.

The Council's report places special emphasis upon the methodology of breaking the stalemate. In particular, it stresses the importance of building a new relationship through the use of commerce and trade. Once economic sanctions are lifted and the internal situation in Iran indicates that the timing is right, serious commercial engagement can begin. This in turn, supplemented by cultural and educational engagement, can prepare the way for political engagement.

These recommendations represent a badly needed new approach to Iran, but the the report would have been improved if the analysis were placed in a more coherent and comprehensive context. Both Iran and the United States stand as important members of the global community of nation-states, and their activities must be examined within this universe.

THE POLITICS OF HEGEMONY

In this analysis, I seek to use the Atlantic Council report as a springboard to a new understanding of U.S.-Iran relations. In so doing, I examine these relations through the lens of hegemony theory. This theoretical approach focuses on the rise and decline of global and regional superpowers or "hegemons," any nation-state that wields a disproportionate amount of power in its particular regional or global context (from the Greek "hegemonia" referring to the predominant influence of one state over another).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the unrivaled global hegemon. In the absence of a clear powerful adversary, the hegemon lacked a mission and scanned the world for new threats. Not surprisingly, work was soon found. The United States discovered a group of relatively independent regional hegemons whose influence dominated particular regions of the world and who consistently resisted the pressure of the global hegemon.

The United States has been quick to condemn these regional powers partly because they were noncompliant with U.S. wishes, labeling them "rogue," "renegade" or "outlaw" states. Already in 1985, President Ronald Reagan identified these stubbornly independent actors when he referred to "a confederation of outlaw states -- Cuba, Iran, Libya, Nicaragua and North Korea." In the past two decades, the United States has consistently identified these "outlaw states" (in descending order of offensiveness) as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and Cuba. China, Russia, Syria and Sudan are also often considered for this roster of political infamy.

This article hypothesizes that the United States seeks to prevent the rise of independent-minded regional hegemons. The more independent their behavior, the more pressure the United States exerts upon them. Also, the greater the difference in worldviews of the global and regional hegemons, the greater the political tension between them. Finally, the global hegemon especially seeks to control the behavior of regional hegemons in regions rich in geostrategic significance and natural resources. Iran is a regional hegemon of particular concern to the United States, as is China.

As part of its policy of containment and control, the United States enlists the support of regional allies. In the Middle East, this role is played by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Israel; in East Asia by states such as Taiwan and Japan. Besides Iran, China and Russia represent the most serious challenges to the global hegemon.

THE MIDDLE EASTERN AND EAST ASIAN SUBSYSTEMS

Iran and China stand at the center of Middle Eastern and East Asian international subsystems where influence reverberates across the globe. Figure 1 presents their diagramatic representation, placing U.S.-Iran relations in the context of U.S. relations with China and other East Asian actors. It helps explain the complex relationship between the global hegemon and key regional hegemons such as Iran and China. (1) These two countries are locked in political tension with the United States. Similarly positioned are the secondary Middle East hegemons Iraq, Syria and Libya. Important regional allies of the global hegemon in the Middle East include Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, of course, Israel. In East Asia, North Korea, a secondary regional hegemon, stands in tension with the United States, while Japan, Taiwan and South Korea represent strong regional U.S. allies.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

The United States relies strongly upon cooperative and compliant regional allies to protect its interests. Meanwhile, the global hegemon regularly condemns regional superpowers China and Iran for their human-rights record, their independent political demeanor, their drive to build strong military arsenals, and their perceived threat to U.S. allies. The U.S. condemnation of Iran and China has resulted in both intraregional and interregional alliances featuring Iran and China at the center of concentric circles of countries that resent and resist U.S. hegemony, including Syria and North Korea.

IRAN AND CHINA

Iran and China dominate their respective world spheres. Both countries have experienced twentieth-century revolutions and have been the scenes of considerable political upheaval. Both have faced severe economic challenges. Both have found themselves charged with human-rights violations. Both place a high value on political independence and national autonomy. Both countries have captured the attention of the United States, which seeks to influence their actions and policies.

The importance of China to Iran and of Iran to China was already recognized during the days of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. In August 1971, Iran recognized the People's Republic of China, and the two countries soon exchanged ambassadors. A year later, Empress Farah made a two-week visit to China. On the very eve of the revolution in December 1977, Chinese leader Teng Ying Chao was in Tehran seeking economic agreements.

With the Iranian revolution and the enormous political and economic pressure applied to Iran by the United States, Iran looked around in some desperation for international support. In September 1992, President Rafsanjani traveled to China, and the two countries signed an agreement whereby the Chinese promised to help Iran build two nuclear reactors to provide power for peaceful purposes. The global hegemon protested loudly and increased its pressure on China, accusing the country of massive human-rights abuses. The incident at Tiananmen Square had taken place on June 4, 1989, and over the next decade, the United States regularly criticized the Chinese government for human-rights transgressions.

It was during this time period that Iran and China significantly expanded their relationship. This rapprochement, which was partly a result of U.S. pressure on both countries, deepened in the mid-1990s. Between 1994 and 1996, Chinese-Iranian overtures increased to such an extent that China ranked number eight in the world in terms of Iran's total diplomatic overtures. The seven top-ranked countries (with the sole exception of India) are all states that border on the Islamic Republic. (2)

By the turn of the next millenium, Iran and China were on a path of unprecedented political and economic cooperation. June 21-25, 2000, Iranian president Muhammad Khatami, with a delegation of 170 officials, made a historic trip to China. While there, he sought to broaden Iran-China ties by signing five letters of agreement. Khatami stressed the long historic ties that bound the Chinese and Persian empires and condemned what he termed the "unipolar world" championed by the global hegemon.

During the 1990s, China sold missile technology to Iran. The United States pressured China to halt such sales. China has effectively resisted this pressure and has adopted an alternating policy, sometimes acceding to the wishes of the global hegemon and sometimes simply ignoring them. On November 21, 2000, for example, China agreed to cease selling ballistic missile technology to Iran after the United States campaigned against these sales. In return Washington promised to lift the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Chinese entities providing the technology. Meanwhile, China continued to provide Iran with non-ballistic and anti-ship missiles.

Today Chinese leaders insist that their country have a presence in the Persian Gulf. "Chinese leaders have a respect for, but a residual mistrust of, the use of U.S. power. Arms sales provide a wedge for China into the Gulf itself, where the United States is the preeminent power." (3)

Although the United States has applied diplomatic and economic pressure on both Iran and China, it has used more care when challenging China and has formulated a policy of "strategic engagement" with the Asian power. With Iran, however, the global hegemon has pursued a policy of confrontation built around trade embargoes. The difference is explained by the power and sheer size of China. Also, the Islamic Republic has stridently attacked the United States for opposing Iran's revolution and for siding with Saddam Hussein when he invaded Iran in September of 1980. Finally, China, unlike Iran, has not been burdened with the heavy baggage of the Palestinian-Israeli issue.

THE ISRAELI FACTOR

A major and seldom discussed reason for the antipathy that permeates Iran-U.S. relations concerns the existence of two particularly significant U.S. allies in the region, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia's privileged status is easily explained by its extraordinary oil wealth. Israel, on the other hand, maintains a most-favored-nation relationship with the United States that runs much deeper than oil deposits. Israel's interests and policies are furthered by its extraordinary political and economic support among American opinion leaders and U.S. congressional representatives.

Israel's staunch supporters in the United States have taken their cues from Israel with regard to Iran policy. Whereas Iran-Saudi relations have warmed considerably over the past few years, serious rapprochement between Israel and Iran is unlikely to occur any time soon. The Atlantic Council's prudent recommendation that the sanctions be lifted from Iran in order to begin a serious opening to the Islamic Republic has been stridently opposed by powerful pro-Israeli lobbying groups in Washington. The global hegemon continues to view Iran through lenses manufactured in Israel. While attempting to carry out an important reexamination of Iran policy, the administration of George W. Bush found itself outmaneuvered by AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee), a highly effective pro-Israeli lobbying organization. While the Bush administration was seeking to examine the effectiveness of the sanctions-driven policy towards Iran, AIPAC helped line up over 70 congressional representatives, who signed a petition to continue the sanctions against Iran. This effort was accompanied by a flood of articles in the press reintroducing Iran as a rogue state that must be subjected to continuing sanctions. The fact that such policy had proven to be counterproductive and had in fact compromised U.S. long-term interests made little difference to this influential group. (4)

Even the Atlantic Council Iran working group, a high-powered contingent itself and one that ultimately recommended an end to the sanctions, contained strong pro-Israeli voices that sought to formulate Iran policy on the basis of Israeli interests. In one draft of the report, for example, it is written that "the core security issue, however, remains the opposing positions of the United States and Iran regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict." In other words, the "core security issue" that shapes the policies of the global hegemon in the Middle East focuses on the interests of the state of Israel. According to the report, "Iranian behavior has been judged mainly on the basis of its opposition to the peace process and its support for terrorist groups involved in the conflict against Israel."

In sum, the return to normalcy of U.S.-Iran relations has been impeded by a special relationship between the global hegemon and a small but powerful regional ally. In the process, the United States has alienated Iran, a major regional hegemon and a country that in the long term is critical to U.S. national interests.

THE CLASH OF HEGEMONIES

Despite some small positive steps in the later years of the Clinton administration, the United States and Iran remain locked in a tense relationship costly to both parties. The national interests of each are compromised by this continuing conflict. The U.S. position rests on four interrelated arguments. According to the official American line, Iran supports international terrorism, seeks weapons of mass destruction, has an abysmal human-rights record, and opposes the Middle East peace process. These arguments are presented in a context evocative of 1979-80, when U.S. diplomats were taken hostage in Tehran.

The Islamic Republic forcefully presents its side of the story, which also rests on a foundation of four arguments: the United States opposed the Iranian revolution, supported Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in September of 1980, instituted a system of sanctions that have helped cripple the Iranian economy, and shot down a civilian Iranian airliner. (In July of 1988, a sophisticated American Aegis-class cruiser, the USS Vincennes downed an Iranian plane, killing all 290 passengers.)

Despite Iran's complicity in acts of terrorism, especially in Lebanon and Europe, Iran's foreign-policy record has in many ways been constructive and correct. Iran, for example, played a key role in obtaining the release of Western hostages in Lebanon. Iran carefully remained neutral during the Gulf War initiated by Saddam Hussein. In Central Asia, Iran has been a significant arbitrator and mediator. In Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Armenia/ Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic has worked hard to promote stability. In this context, one would note that it is Iran that is most engaged in combatting the militant fundamentalism of the Taliban group. And President Khatami has called for a dialogue between Iran and the United States.

Although there is an important element of authoritarianism in Iran's internal political system, the Islamic Republic, unlike many of its neighbors, has developed important mechanisms of participatory democracy. Iran's elections have been generally fair and free. Robust debate takes place in the Islamic Majlis. President Khatami scored an overwhelming victory when he stood for his second term as president in June of 2001. He and many of his associates are leading a battle for reform in the country. The United States has paid little attention to the drive for serious political development in Iran.

The Iranians have been upset and puzzled by the pettiness of many of the actions taken by the global superpower. Individual Iranian citizens have been singled out by U.S. officials for harassment and humiliation. Three examples will suffice. In July 1993, Iran qualified four youngsters for the international Physics Olympiad that was held in Williamsburg, Virginia. Friends, family and teachers gathered at Mehrabad Airport to see the bright youngsters off. The proud and excited teenagers only made it as far as Rome. Here, officious U.S. government officials refused to provide the students with visas, and they were forced to return to Tehran. When Iranian athletes such as wrestlers and soccer players traveled to the United States, they were photographed and fingerprinted as if they were common criminals. On one occasion, the Iranian wrestling team returned to Tehran rather than submit to the fingerprinting. In April 2001, award-winning filmmaker Jafar Panahi was picked up by the Immigration and Naturalization Service while in transit through JFK airport on his way from Hong Kong to South America. When Panahi refused to be fingerprinted and photographed, he was handcuffed and chained to a bench overnight in leg irons. After 18 hours, the filmmaker, an artist whose work had been critical of government oppression in Iran, was unchained, recuffed and escorted to a plane that took him back to Hong Kong. These kinds of mean-spirited actions have not gone unnoticed by Iran and other actors in the international system.

Even its allies have begun to question U.S. methods. Samuel Huntington warns that the United States is not only a lonely superpower, but is becoming a "rogue superpower." Many countries across the globe view the United States as "intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical and applying double standards, engaging in what they label `financial imperialism' and `intellectual colonialism'...." (5)

Despite the continuing antagonism between the United States and the Islamic Republic, they share many interests in the region. Both desire stability in the Persian Gulf and in Central Asia. Both seek an end to the runaway drug trade that contaminates the region. Both share an economic interest in the exploration and production of oil and natural gas. Both have vested interests in opposing the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Given these shared interests and the relative importance of both states on the international stage, a U.S.-Iran detente would seem to be a natural development. For this to happen, however, both parties to the feud must practice creative diplomacy. The global hegemon, for example, needs to engage the regional hegemon as a sovereign independent member of the community of nations and treat the citizens of Iran with the respect and dignity they deserve. The regional hegemon, in turn, needs to eschew the use of extra-legal violence, soften its harsh rhetoric, and introduce genuine participation into its political process.

POWER AND HEGEMONY

In its attempt to protect and expand its hegemonic power, the United States has pursued policies designed to weaken regional powers such as Iran and China. The pressures applied by the global hegemon often have unintended, counterproductive consequences. U.S. pressure, for example, acts as a catalyst strengthening and solidifying relations between and among dominant regional hegemons. Figure 1 indicates how two regional hegemons, Iran and China, have come to form a fundamental cross-regional alliance. U.S. condemnation has resulted in both intraregional and interregional alliances featuring Iran and China at the center of concentric circles of countries that resent and resist U.S. interventionary hegemony. In the Middle East and East Asia these nation-states include Syria and North Korea respectively.

The global hegemon seeks to anchor its foreign policy in military might. Despite a huge defense budget and sophisticated armaments, however, the United States has discovered that its power is not unlimited, as the confrontation with Iraq has demonstrated. Billions of dollars in U.S. military expenditures have not altered Saddam Hussein's behavior. Over the last decade, the United States has unleashed more than 700 Tomahawk cruise missiles at a cost of nearly $1 billion against Iraq and targets in Sudan and Afghanistan. Washington is beginning to understand that delicate social and political problems cannot be bombed out of existence. (Nonetheless, the George W. Bush administration has plans to pursue the expensive missile defense system, a system that is strongly opposed by Europe, Russia and China.)

The policy of the global hegemon differs with respect to the particular region of regime. These differences can be explained by the differing worldviews that mark other cultures and civilizations. In this context, leading regional hegemons such as Iran, North Korea and China represent cultures that seem particularly alien to the United States. China is often viewed as a huge backward nation of inscrutable drones who live in poverty and ignorance. North Korea is accused of "capricious and whimsical behavior" and, in the words of one observer: "There is enough that is weird about North Korea to gobsmack you." Iran is considered to be a nation of cats, caviar and carpets, where religious fanaticism triumphs over rational discourse and where little value is placed on human life. After a long article analyzing Iranian politics and the elections of June 2001, an American journalist inexplicably ends her analysis by claiming that President Muhammad Khatami planned to conclude his electioneering at a breakfast "where he will serve up an Iranian specialty -- stewed sheep brains." (6)

CONCLUSIONS

As global hegemon, the United States is in an excellent position to take the initiative in pursuing a new Iran policy. The Atlantic Council report recommends that the current stalemate be broken because it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. Given Iran's regional power position and its great hydrocarbon wealth and large population, the United States must one day soon develop relations with the Islamic Republic. The Atlantic Council study provides compelling reasons for this detente. It is also important, however, that any rapprochement also be in the national interest of the Islamic Republic. Iran is interested but is unlikely to approach the United States formally and publicly. President Khatami has asked that the United States indicate its good will through deeds and not only through words. If the United States were to lift the embargo, for example, Iran is likely to respond positively and constructively.

The heavy military presence of the global hegemon in the Persian Gulf is a matter of grave concern to Iran, the dominant regional hegemon. At the same time, U.S. activities in the Gulf are proving to be very costly to the United States -- both economically and politically. One important consequence of a U.S.-Iran rapprochement would be for the Islamic Republic to take on some of the local political responsibilities. Iran is the natural balance wheel against Iraq. It would be in the interests of the global hegemon to slowly disengage from its day to day confrontation with Iraq and allow the dominant regional hegemon, Iran, to take on its historic role.

As the global hegemon begins to rethink its policy and place in the world, there are six recommendations that might be considered. First, allow regional powers to pursue their goals while maintaining their own independence and dignity. Confronting them and referring to them as rogues and renegades only drives them into one another's arms. The result is the establishment of alliances between countries like Iran and China of Iran and Russia. From the very beginning, these alliances take on an anti-American flavor.

Second, develop a strategic plan that will help guide it in a world caught in the midst of fundamental transformation. Iran, for example, will have a population of over 100 million in 25 years. Whether the leader of Iran wears a turban, a military helmet or a baseball cap, Iran will have a major presence and power in the Persian Gulf. Saudi Arabian leaders have come to recognize this fact and, beginning in earnest in 1996, have established and strengthened Saudi relations with the Islamic Republic.

Third, the United States as sole global hegemon carries moral responsibilities along with its military and political responsibilities. It is in the American interest, for example, to promote human rights and political development fairly across the world. It is not acceptable for the global hegemon to single out regional hegemons such as Iran, Syria and Libya for special condemnation while overlooking the transgressions of allies in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

Fourth, the United States as global hegemon should do away with its officiousness and bureaucratic harassment against individual citizens of recalcitrant regional hegemons. It is beneath the United States to punish individuals who have been sought out only because they hail from countries such as Iran and Libya, for example. The United States has shown it can and will work with countries like North Vietnam and North Korea. Why can't it communicate with countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Fifth, U.S. foreign-policy makers must not contaminate their policies towards one problem area by formulating policies based on conditions that dominate in other problem areas. This is especially true in the Middle East, where U.S. policy towards Israel takes precedence over other major issues in the region. The global hegemon's close and uncritical views of Israel run directly against the interpretations of other major countries in the region. Iran, which has been particularly outspoken about the situation of the Palestinians, has been singled out for special condemnation by pro-Israeli voices in the United States.

Sixth, the global hegemon desperately needs to develop a serious understanding of other cultures and civilizations. American leaders have shown little sensitivity towards developments in Iran and are often extremely illiterate concerning Shii Islam. Some of this is due to ignorance; some is due to bias; some is due to politics. The global hegemon cannot afford to be ignorant about its neighbors in this shaking and shrinking world.

The frozen state of U.S.-Iran relations is not only damaging to the interests of both parties but it has a negative impact upon the global system more generally. In the long term, the global hegemon needs to communicate and cooperate with Persian Gulf hegemon Iran. At the same time, a rapprochement between Iran and the United States is in the interest of the Islamic Republic. When the leaders in both countries recognize this reality, then they must carefully and cautiously begin to develop new diplomatic approaches.

(1) There are, of course, other hegemonic actors and subsytems. One of the most important is Russia, which we have discussed above. Because of the special role of China and because of the strong Iran-China linkage, we have focused our analysis upon the Middle East and East Asian regional subsystems.

(2) An "overture" is defined as a diplomatic meeting between two nation-states at the under-secretary level and above. Between 1994 and 1996, China and Iran engaged in 26 different diplomatic overtures. The only countries that ranked above the China number are Russia, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, India, Turkey and Kazakhstan.

(3) John Calabrese, "China and the Persian Gulf: Energy and Security," Middle East Journal, No. 52, Summer 1998, p. 365.

(4) See, for example, Congressman Tom Lantos, "Let's Not Reward Iran for Bad Behavior," The Washington Post, May 28, 2001. For a discussion of the role of AIPAC in support of renewing the Iran-Libya sanctions act, see Alan Sipress, The Washington Post, June 9, 2001.

(5) Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, March/April 1999, pp. 35-49.

(6) Molly Moore, The Washington Post, June 7, 2001.

Dr. Bill is professor of government and director emeritus of the Reves Center for International Studies at the College of William and Mary. He is the author of The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations and coauthor of the forthcoming Roman Catholics and Shii Muslims: Prayer, Passion and Politics.