SYMPOSIUM: AFTER SADDAM, WHAT THEN FOR IRAQ?

Laipson, Ellen ; Clawson, Patrick L. ; Parasiliti, Andrew 等

The following is an edited transcript of the seventeenth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on January 28, 1999, in the Hart Senate Office Building.

CHAS. W. FREEMAN JR., President, Middle East Policy Council

We're here today to talk about an issue that has been surprisingly little discussed: what happens if we get what we want and Saddam actually is no longer in power in Baghdad?

The failure to translate a stunning military defeat of Saddam's forces in Kuwait in 1991 into a political humiliation for him is what has left him in power. After that defeat, the victors negotiated with themselves at the United Nations, not with Saddam, and imposed a very wide range of restrictions on Iraq in pursuit of objectives set out in U.N. resolutions. Since then, Saddam has been striving to free Iraq of these restrictions, to relieve Iraq of the impositions on Iraqi sovereignty that they represent, and to recover his own freedom of action. My own view is that weapons of mass destruction are merely a means to these ends rather than a major end in themselves for him. I believe this is the reason for the pattern of evasion, cheat and retreat on inspections and the peek-a-boo game the air force of Iraq is now conducting.

The United Nations is once again negotiating with itself about Iraq in a context where it seems the U.S. position is increasingly isolated. And perhaps for all these reasons, the United States is now belatedly focusing on the need to remove Saddam. It may be too late to do that. After all, considering the actuarial tables and the man's' obvious caution with his personal security, he might well be around for another 20 years.

But let's be optimistic and return to the question that we are here to discuss today. What if we get what we want, and Saddam no longer rules in Baghdad? What would that mean inside Iraq? What would it mean in the region? And what would it mean in Iraqi relations with the United States? What sort of regime would likely follow? Does it make a difference how Saddam goes? What sort of regime is possible in Iraq? Would a post-Saddam Iraq evolve into a democracy, or would it perpetuate the previous pattern of dictatorship?

Who would lead a post-Saddam Iraq? Would it be someone as shrewd but as stupid as Saddam or someone considerably smarter, more effective as an advocate of Iraqi national interests? What would be the effect of the fall of Saddam on the Iraqi people's definition of their national interests? Would they abandon his revanchism against Kuwait? Would they abandon his search for revenge against Saudi Arabia and other members of the coalition that administered the military disgrace in 1991? Would they abandon the current passionate hostility, to the United States?

Where would a post-Saddam Iraq stand on peace or the peace process between Arabs and Israelis (if there is a peace process at all)? Would a post-Saddam regime feel less threatened by the weapons of mass destruction in Israeli hands, less disturbed by the nuclear weapons in American hands, and less hemmed in by the now-nuclear India and Pakistan? Would a post-Saddam Iraq abandon programs for building weapons of mass destruction?

ELLEN LAIPSON, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

I am not speaking from a policy perspective, even though I have previously served in policy jobs. And I am not trying to give official views of the intelligence community. I hope you will take my remarks as the views of an individual analyst trying to frame this very important issue and how we are beginning to think about it. Secondly, I appreciate that the panel today has been tasked to skip over the question of how and when Saddam is removed, and I think that is a useful thing to do, although it needs to be said that the answers to how and when Saddam is removed obviously will have a major impact on the analysis.

Some of the others on the panel may want to explore this in greater depth, but my definition of "after Saddam" will be simply that neither Saddam's family, nor the inner circle of Tikritis are in power. I would not include in my definition of "after Saddam" that the Baath party, the Republican Guard, and the security apparatus as we know it will be out of power. They, indeed, may still be major players. Others may want to change the definition.

I will address four questions. Will Iraq after Saddam remain united? Will it be stable? Will it be democratic? And how will it relate to its neighbors, and its neighbors to it? The first three questions take as an assumption that Iraq will be master of its own destiny, and one would wish that that were the case. But, in fact, the future of Iraq will probably be an interactive process between, on the one hand, Iraq and its citizens and, on the other hand, many outside actors, including the immediate neighbors, the Western powers and the United Nations.

The odds are overwhelming that Iraq will remain united. We don't believe that there's any credible evidence that either the Shia or the Kurds have the intention to secede or have developed any real ideology that supports an independent status outside of the Iraqi state. There are, of course, proponents of independence, particularly among the Kurds, who might in an ideal world imagine an existence not part of Iraq, and perhaps not part of some of the other neighborhoods where Kurds are located. But I think there's also a recognition by their current leadership that these are long-term ideals and not viable politically in the near term.

It's important to remember that Saddam was not the unifier of Iraq. The Iraqi state existed in its current boundaries for at least four decades before Saddam came on the scene. He is not Tito of Yugoslavia, for example, and therefore his departure from the scene need not provoke the kind of identity crisis of "are we still viable as a nation-state in our current boundaries?" It's my view that the concept of a sovereign Iraqi state in its boundaries is still meaningful, and has some staying power.

Now, one would have to acknowledge that there may be subterranean fissures, perhaps in the south but more likely in the north, that we are not yet fully cognizant of and that wouldn't really manifest themselves until Iraq were in a period of chaos or under a less controlling leadership. I do believe it's a lower probability, but I would have to say that if change doesn't come for another decade or two, it is possible that these forces might become more powerful. But if we are assuming the change might come in, say the next five years, I think it's not the more likely scenario.

Will Iraq be stable? I'm using the term "stable" in a very neutral sense, not to connote prosperity or success but simply the absence of upheaval and turmoil. And I think the odds are strong that Iraq after Saddam will not be stable. I think there are too many imbalances that need to be addressed, economic, political and social. Some groups will want to settle scores. Groups will compete over resources to try to rebuild Iraq to the 1980s level of economic well-being. Some groups will remain very docile and intimidated. The society has been traumatized by Saddam's brutality and by nearly a decade of isolation. By definition, it will be a tumultuous period in Iraqi history.

Some of the turmoil may, paradoxically, produce very positive results in the longrun. I'm not saying that this period of instability is, by definition, a bad thing. But I do think that we should not expect an easy or quiet transition to a post-Saddam era.

Will Iraq after Saddam be democratic? Almost certainly not, at least for many years. I think there are three points to be made. It is possible, and this is the less likely scenario, that Iraq under effective new leaders can begin the process of establishing pluralistic institutions, greater accountability, etc. But we really can't say today how deep the aspirations for democracy are other than beyond the educated class, where I believe it's a genuine preference. If Iraq were to move on the path of greater democracy and a more representative form of government, Iraqis would have to learn to be citizens in ways that some of their neighbors, Jordan and Kuwait in particular, have learned' over the past decade. It's a slow process. It doesn't happen overnight. I'm not saying this will never happen for Iraq, but one should not expect it to happen easily or quickly.

Secondly, I think there's a legitimate argument to be made that there is probably a residual longing among many Iraqis for an authoritarian leader who will be able to solve problems, make decisions and get things done in the period after Saddam. Even absent the economic distress that Iraqis are currently feeling, many Iraqis probably do support a form of leadership and governance that does not meet Western standards of democracy. We should not, for example deduce from reports of anti-Saddam sentiment throughout Iraq that Iraqis therefore seek a democratic form of government. What they may want is simply a less cruel version of what they currently have. Over time this may change, but I think we should bear in mind that the Iraqi political culture is not like our own.

Lastly, we may possibly witness a resurgence of an Islamist expression in rebuilding Iraqi political institutions after Saddam. Iraq throughout the modern period has been a highly secular political system. It is possible that Islamist forces will participate in the debate over Iraq's political future, possibly in a more or less democratic fashion, but also perhaps to impose an Islamic alternative model on Iraqis. This could create some friction among Iraqis who prefer to keep a more secular form of government and those concerned about the Sunni/Shia fault lines in Iraqi society. I think it's too early to say. There are Islamists in the Iraqi political scene, and we don't know how relatively strong they are. It does seem to me that Islamists are strengthened or emboldened by the period of sanctions, due to a perception widely held among Iraqis that the West is at least in part responsible for the trouble they're in.

Let me speak to the role of the neighbors. Most of Iraq's neighbors will feel relief, greater security and also some ambivalence about change in Iraq. Governments and societies in the Middle East will want to believe that the suffering of Iraqi citizens is over, and there may be some significant, new economic interaction between Iraq and its former trading partners, as well as its former labor partners, such as Egypt.

The recent rhetoric from Egypt and Saudi Arabia in particular characterizing Saddam's brutal dictatorship in terms nearly identical to our own will make it a mainstream reaction to celebrate Saddam's passing from the scene. So, I think it will be relatively easy for the neighbors to have a positive response and want to be involved in the reintegration of Iraq. The governments of the neighbors will also want to think about reintegrating Iraq into the regional system and organizations, in the hope that the stress for the Arab world that the protracted Iraq crisis has created will abate.

But there will also be many questions about the ambitions and goals of a new Iraqi government, and probably the hope that the international community beyond the Arab world will help set some boundaries and limits for the Iraqi state, particularly in terms of its military programs and its ability to project power beyond its borders. Some Arabs will also quietly worry about a post-Saddam Iraq receiving financial support and political attention from the rest of the world that might again build up Iraq's ambitions at the expense of other Arab states. They may also be ambivalent about Iraq's potential leadership role in the Arab world. I believe that sentiment in the Arab world is shifting away from what was once a desire to have a Praetorian Arab state that would represent and protect collective Arab interests against a non-Arab threat. So the role that Iraq played in the seventies and eighties in the Arab world may be something the Iraqis would like to return to, but it remains to be seen whether its Arab neighbors would want Iraq to play that role again.

It is important to remember that some of the neighbors, Jordan for sure, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, could well be in leadership transitions themselves that might impede their ability to plot their own course and protect their own interests vis-a-vis Iraq. Particularly with the news from Jordan, we have to bear in mind that we may have relatively new and inexperienced leadership in several of the countries in this critical region.

Iran's relations with a future Iraq are also fraught with difficulty. Iran can take some satisfaction from Saddam's departure, but may also be uncertain about the intentions of the new government in Baghdad. On balance, though, I would argue that virtually no new Iraqi leadership would pose a direct danger to Iran, which will continue to be preoccupied with its internal situation. Iran might, on the other hand, feel unsettled by a new Iraq in the embrace of an international community at a time when Iran itself is still sorting out how close to the West it wants to be. So it may feel threatened, not by a direct military challenge from Iraq, but from the perception that Iraq will no longer be isolated politically and may have friends in the West.

I assume that the international community, including the United Nations, will revisit the many restrictions currently imposed on Iraq and work to develop more normal relationships with any new leadership in Baghdad. This will come with strings and conditions, but it will also come with aid and attention, two things that poor countries crave. This debate and the dynamic it sets in motion will have perhaps the greatest impact on Iraq's future leadership, how they define their near-term political goals, and in particular their foreign and defense policies. But at the same time, the more subtle and elusive task of reinventing the political culture of Iraq will happen principally among Iraqis and will be less susceptible to, though not completely immune from, international influence.

PATRICK L. CLAWSON, Director for Research, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

I am going to consider one particular situation in which Saddam has been replaced: namely, the opposition is brought to power with significant U.S. military support. This is the possibility that has been most widely discussed, certainly here on Capitol Hill. The question of the day is, how significantly should the United States pursue the policy of providing military support to the Iraqi opposition?

If the United States were to go down that route, and it turned out to be successful, it would be successful precisely because the strategy found an echo among the Iraqi people. There are no realistic scenarios under which the Iraqi opposition could defeat on the battlefield division after division of the Iraqi army and come to power. Instead, the concept of the Iraqi opposition coming to power through U.S. military support depends upon there being significant reaction by Iraqi troops, and among the Iraqi population, in favor of this operation.

Any hope that the Iraqi opposition could succeed in coming to power with U.S. assistance depends upon there being some kind of revolt, vaguely along the lines of what we saw in 1991, a revolt we all missed in 1991. We did not anticipate it was going to happen. Today we may perhaps also look at Iraq and not see many indications that such a revolt is coming. If it seemed that Saddam's regime were vulnerable, that it might indeed, fall, the situation could change rather dramatically. This is the nature of unpopular authoritarian regimes: when their rule no longer seems inevitable, it can end extraordinarily quickly. According to this concept, then, Saddam's army could well melt away. Let's remember that in 1991, the million-man army that we were all so worried about surrendered in massive numbers when they were firmly convinced that the alternative was to die on the battlefield.

The main point, however, for thinking about what Iraq will be like post-Saddam is that a strategy of bringing the opposition to power depends upon popular support. Under such circumstances, the new government that would arise is likely to be one that would reject decisively the policies of the past, that would emphasize how much it is breaking with the policies of the past. It's likely to be a government that is more friendly to the United States and to U.S. interests in the region.

What kind of government inside Iraq would be created as a result of this scenario? It is entirely uncertain how democratic this government would be, and how influenced by Islamist pressures and concepts. These are certainly very important questions for the future of the Iraqi people. It is not, however, so evident that they would influence the question of whether or not this new government in Iraq would be friendly to the United States and to U.S. interests. After all, there are governments around the world that are not democratic, that are under strong influence of quite traditional, conservative, Islamic religious practices and that are friendly to the United States. Some of Iraq's neighbors fall into that category.

So from the perspective of U.S. interests, this new government in post-Saddam Iraq -- brought to power by an opposition through significant U.S. military support -- government would change the situation in the region significantly to the benefit of the United States. First, this new government is likely to end the weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) programs that have been so responsible for isolating Iraq from the international community. This new government would realize that the only way to show the international community it has decisively broken with the unacceptable practices of the past is to follow systematically the obligations that it has accepted, not only under U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 ending the conflict, but also under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Chemical-Weapons and Biological-Weapons Conventions.

Second, the balance of power in the Persian Gulf would suddenly change dramatically. Instead of having two major powers hostile to the United States and one that works with the United States, we would have two major powers that work with the United States and one that is unsure what kind of relationship it wishes to have with the United States. In that situation, it could well be possible for the United States to significantly reduce its military presence in the region while still ensuring a balance of power that guarantees that no one thinks they can pursue aggression against their neighbors and try to dominate the area's oil resources. So it would be possible for the United States to achieve its goals in the region with a presence that is over the horizon rather than on the ground.

Third, in this post-Saddam Iraq, the United States could be much less reliant on Saudi Arabia for its security position in the Persian Gulf, something which would be better for Saudi Arabia and better for the United States. The heavy reliance the United States has had to place on Saudi Arabia has been uncomfortable for both sides. We are too different as peoples and as countries to be true allies. A more distant relationship would improve our ability to work together.

Fourth, an Iraq that was prepared to work with the United States is going to make Israel more relaxed about its eastern front. It's worth recalling that three times in the last 50 years, Iraqi troops have fought Israeli forces. In 1948, the Iraqi army reached as far as the suburbs of Tel Aviv. In 1967, Israel struck at Egypt precisely when the Iraqi army had reached the Jordan River because of a concern expressed by Israeli commanders of what would happen if that army crossed over into the West Bank from Transjordan. And in 1973, Iraqi troops fought on the Golan Heights. An Israel that is more relaxed about its eastern front is likely to be more prepared to make some concessions on the West Bank on security matters. This will also make it easier for Israel to consider what can be done about the Golan.

Fifth, with an Iraq that is more friendly to the United States, Syria's strategic situation changes dramatically. Syria would find itself more or less surrounded by countries that are friendly to the United States and interested in peace with Israel. Mr. Asad has shown that he's really quite good at reading power relationships. In 1990, for instance, he joined with the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. And if Asad realized that he is, quite literally, surrounded, he might change his tune significantly on the question of most concern to the United States, the peace process.

Last and certainly not least, the energy-security situation in the world would improve, and U.S. oil companies would have an opportunity to make significant profits. We should not be embarrassed about the commercial advantages that would come from a reintegration of Iraq into the world economy. Iraq, post-Saddam, is highly likely to be interested in inviting international oil companies to invest in Iraq. This would be very useful for U.S. oil companies, which are well-positioned to compete there, and very useful for the world's energy-security situation.

There will also be risks. First, there is the risk of instability inside Iraq. As Ellen Laipson said, the breakup of Iraq is not the issue; the question is instability. A settling of accounts is inevitable after Saddam leaves power, no matter how. So, unfortunately, there's going to be a massacre when Saddam leaves. That's true if he dies in his bed; it's true if he's overthrown. The opposition coming to power is not going to make that much difference in the degree of instability.

Finally, as to the international reaction to this policy, in politics, everybody loves a winner. If the United States is actually able to bring off this result, a lot of people who are now skeptical or even hostile will suddenly decide that they don't mind it so much.

In conclusion, a post-Saddam Iraq, where the opposition comes to power with significant U.S. military support, is going to be good for the United States. It will also be better for the Iraqi people, but just how much better is less clear.

ANDREW PARASILITI, Director of Programs, Middle East Institute

I would like to make some observations regarding our current policy toward Iraq and suggest some ideas about a post-Saddam Iraq. I believe what we do now, and what we expect later, should shape our current policy toward Iraq. Therefore, in devising a more effective U.S. policy, we should keep in mind three themes that will influence Iraq's future: the relative influence and effect of political forces inside and outside the country, the crisis within Iraq's economy and society, and the importance of regional consensus in our policy.

Let me begin with three of what I and most Iraq-watchers would consider to be self-evident observations about U.S. policy toward Iraq: that the Iraqi opposition will not overthrow Saddam Hussein in the manner envisaged by proponents of so-called liberation strategies, that sanctions against Iraq have created a crisis in Iraq's economy and society, and that our disarmament policies toward Iraq should be placed in a regional context.

First, the Iraqi opposition will not overthrow Saddam Hussein in the manner described by proponents of so-called liberation strategies. Deliberations on these liberation or rollback theories instead raise false expectations, distract us from putting forward a truly effective policy, and contribute to a cynicism among most Iraqis about the true intentions of U.S. policy. These liberation theories are based upon misguided, unfounded assumptions about the Iraqi opposition and the situation inside Iraq.

Without going into great detail, let me list the flaws in the rollback scenarios. [See Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack and Gideon Rose, "The Rollback Fantasy," Foreign Affairs. January/February 1999, pp. 24-41.] (A) The Iraqi opposition does not currently control territory in southern Iraq, the presumed base for this option. If such liberated zones were created, the lightly armed liberation army would still be no match for Saddam Hussein's forces. (B) Proponents of these policies are vague and perhaps a bit disingenuous about the extent of U.S. military support that would be required for the proposed Iraq liberation army. U.S. air power alone will not be enough to allow this liberation army to engage and defeat Iraq's military forces. (C) Neighboring regional powers reject this plan. Even Kuwait does not support the Iraq Liberation Act. Turkey would be concerned about the implications of such a strategy for Iraqi Kurdistan. And there are problems now in coordinating such a policy with Iran because of the state of the U.S.-Iran relationship. Iran supports the Islamist opposition group, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic in Iraq, which does have an established network in southern Iraq.

Rather than encouraging Iraqis opposed to Saddam Hussein, the proposed liberation and rollback strategies instead contribute to a cynicism regarding U.S. intentions. That is why SCIRI, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have declined their designation by the Clinton administration as potential recipients of military aid under the Iraq Liberation Act.

This cynicism is in some ways well-founded. You can go back to 1974-75, when the United Stales and Iran supported the Kurdish insurgency against Saddam Hussein's Iraq and then pulled that support after Saddam negotiated the Algiers Agreement with the shah of Iran, delivering a major setback to the Kurdish rebels. The United States had a strategic relationship with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War. In 1991, the president of the United States, following the liberation of Kuwait, called upon the people of Iraq to rise up against Saddam Hussein, and, when they did, U.S. forces stood by as the Republican Guards brutally suppressed the uprising. In 1996, Saddam Hussein's troops re-entered Iraqi Kurdistan at the invitation of the KDP, which had begun fighting with the PUK, and dealt a major blow to the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the U.S.-backed Iraqi opposition group based there. Finally, I would say the greatest contribution to the current cynicism is our sanctions policy, which I will discuss shortly.

The United States does not need to get into the game of picking winners among the Iraqi opposition groups. Those Iraqis opposed to Saddam Hussein want a serious U.S. commitment to a strategy that supports and encourages their aspirations for a post-Saddam Iraq, not half-baked rollback fantasies that are either naive or cynical. Many Iraqis want the United States to play a supportive and creative role in bringing Iraqis together to discuss the political and economic future of their country, along the lines of the State Department's 1997 plan of support for the democratic opposition in Iraq.

My second point is about sanctions. Proponents of sanctions make a strong point when they say that our sanctions policy has denied Saddam Hussein oil-export revenues, thereby reducing his ability to rebuild his military and WMD programs and threaten his neighbors. But sanctions are also taking a heavy toll on Iraq's economy, infrastructure and society. They have, in fact, contributed to a human tragedy in Iraq. The UNICEF report, Situational Analysis of Women and Children in Iraq 1997, describes the following conditions in Iraq under sanctions: high rates of pneumonia, diarrheal diseases and malnutrition; high infant and under-five mortality rate; uncertainty regarding polio eradication, measles control, and neonatal tetanus elimination; continued high rates of maternal mortality; inadequate water and environmental sanitation conditions; and limited access to and quality of education. There has been a breakdown of the socio-cultural fabric of Iraqi society due to impoverishment, as well as a decline of basic services. Sanctions have caused a substantial increase in the number of female-headed households, working mothers, homeless children and child laborers.

The U.N. oil-for-food program has contributed to appreciable improvements in drug/medicine distribution and the quality of drinking water, while stabilizing malnutrition and infant mortality rates (which still remain high). Benon Sevan, the director of the program, has cautioned, however, that oil-for-food "should not be confused with a development program ... It is a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people implemented within the context of a very rigorous sanctions regime." [Middle East Insight, 1998.]

We hear in Washington that the United States is losing a "propaganda war" or the "public relations battle" with Saddam Hussein over sanctions. Of course, anybody who knows anything about Saddam Hussein knows that the Iraqi people's suffering means nothing to him. His manipulation of the sanctions issue is calculated to advance his interests at home and abroad, nothing more. But we have to be honest with ourselves about what is taking place in Iraq. Sanctions is our policy, and today in the Arab world and elsewhere, despite the lack of sympathy for Saddam's machinations and atrocities, many simply do not understand why the Iraqi people, who have suffered so long under Saddam Hussein and his two wars, should continue to pay such a heavy price. Sanctions is a divisive and problematic policy for us, for our allies, and for our regional initiatives. If you don't think there is a human tragedy in Iraq, read the UNICEF, FAO and oil-for-food program reports. Talk to Iraqis, especially those who go into and out of Iraq or who talk regularly to those inside. The story of today's Iraq is a tragedy of epic proportions for the over 20 million people there.

My third point has to do with Iraq's weapons programs. If disarming and monitoring these programs is a priority for us, we are better off with UNSCOM or UNSCOM-lite than without. Threats and periodic bombing are not effective disarmament strategies in the long run. We should also keep in mind, as we implement some type of arms control, that Iraqi compliance with an inspections and monitoring regime requires some deft diplomacy at the United Nations and in Iraq, as well as the threat and possible periodic use of force.

I am convinced that Saddam Hussein, as long as he is in power, is determined to proliferate. That being said, I am not certain that Iraq after Saddam Hussein will not continue to proliferate, given the proliferation trends among Iraq's neighbors. The key point here is that our disarmament strategy, as well as our Iraq policy, should be conceptualized in a regional context.

I would like to make a few quick observations about the politics, economics and foreign policy of a post-Saddam Iraq. The political structure of a post-Saddam government is a matter of intense speculation because the current regime is so highly centralized around the Iraqi dictator. That being said, there are a number of possible political figures and groups that might be expected to play significant roles in what might initially be a relatively weak, coalition-style government. Many expect the military to be a key power broker in a post-Saddam Iraq. If the military forces out the old regime's inner circle, it may offer a respected general who has few political ambitions beyond assuring stability and the special interests of the military. The parliament, as a longstanding Iraqi institution, might be the foundation of political reform in a post-Saddam Iraq. One could also expect Baath party members not directly associated with the regime's atrocities to play some type of role. The situation could develop very much along the lines of post-Communist eastern European societies, where Communist-party figures re-organize and emerge after a period of quiescence following the toppling of the regime. It should be recalled that Arab nationalist parties in some form or another have played a role in Iraq's modern history, and that this trend should continue in a post-Saddam Iraq.

The Kurdish parties may seize the opportunity to push an autonomy deal with a post-Saddam regime on the best terms available. A deal on Kurdish autonomy would be a major step toward stability. Tensions with Iraqi Kurdistan would be a devastating blow to a new government in Baghdad. Kurdish reconciliation with Baghdad should be a priority for any post-Saddam mediation efforts.

Regarding the established Iraqi opposition parties, SCIRI, because of its network inside Iraq and its contacts with a strong neighboring power, Iran, will probably emerge as a player. A resurrection of the Iraqi Communist Party, a fixture of Iraqi politics prior to the regime's vicious crackdown beginning in the late 1970's, could also be in the mix. The role of those opposition figures and parties with no political base inside Arab Iraq, such as the Iraqi National Accord (INA) and the Iraqi National Congress (INC), will probably play roles as brokers for the U.S. government, trading on their influence in Washington and elsewhere, in order to facilitate aid and investment for Iraq.

One can also expect this government to be quite susceptible to influence from outside powers. Isam Al-Khafaji foresees a key role for Saudi-backed Islamic banks in Iraq's reconstruction. ["Prospects for an Iraqi Social Contract," in John Calabrese, ed., The Future of Iraq. Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1997, pp. 26-27.] Jordan, Iran and Turkey, among others in the area, will have their interests and influences with a post-Saddam regime.

The bottom line is that any new regime would probably work quickly to put the Saddam era behind it in order to cultivate good will with the West, lift sanctions and begin reconstruction efforts. The new leaders may talk the talk of political and economic reform, but the situation may be far from stable.

The political stability of any post-Saddam government will be determined by the economy. Assuming sanctions are lifted, we should see an appreciable and immediate improvement in Iraq's economy and society. Small-scale consumer industries that emerged in the private sector under sanctions should be able to expand output and employment when income and consumer demand increases. Most important, international oil companies and foreign investors will vie for influence and contracts to rebuild Iraq's economy and oil infrastructure.

Economic growth, including some measure of debt and reparations relief, will be essential to establishing stability in a post-Saddam Iraq. It is easy to envision a demagogic or nationalist figure railing against the unjust burdens imposed by the outside world for the crimes of the previous regime. For example, Iraq will have great difficulty achieving economic growth if it is required to repay its debt and reparations bills according to a strict amortization schedule. Under the most encouraging scenario, Iraq repays its debt and reparations only if it achieves a trade surplus; if a deficit occurs its reparations payments or debt ratio would be eliminated. Even in this case, positive economic growth, estimated at less than 1 percent, can be achieved only if Iraq's financial obligations are reduced by half and a 15 percent savings rate is achieved. If Iraq is relieved of its debt and reparations obligations, it could possibly achieve an economic growth rate of 5.4-7.4 percent. [Sinan Al-Shabibi, "Prospects for Iraq's Economy," The Future of Iraq, pp. 54-80.]

With regard to foreign policy, a post-Saddam regime should find cultivating good ties with the United States and the West one reason, among others, to rebuild its economy. The United States and the West can offer an end to sanctions and relief from debt and reparations obligations. It would be in Iraq's interest to play "good neighbor" and focus on reconstruction at home rather than adventures abroad. A post-Saddam Iraq may cooperate with UNSCOM or some other type of arms-control regime as a sign of its new direction. If the Iraqi economy, however, remains crippled because of debt and reparations obligations, it is not hard to imagine a nationalist Iraqi leader lashing out at Kuwait and others for making the country pay for the crimes of the former dictator. Many Iraqis perceive the postwar Iraq-Kuwait border demarcation as unjust. If Kuwait does not show good will, it may face a revanchist Iraq.

An end to Iran-Iraq tensions is also not assured with the passing of Saddam Hussein. Iran could press its own reparations claims, totaling $97.2 billion, and seek to redress longstanding border issues to its advantage. Furthermore, Iran's missile and nuclear programs could prompt Iraq to resurrect its own WMD programs as a necessary countervailing force.

Iraq's foreign-policy posture cannot be separated from developments in Arab-Israeli relations. If the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to worsen, Iraq may feel pressed into playing a more assertive role on that front. Syria will also seek to coopt and influence a post-Saddam Iraq. If the peace process is at a standstill, Syria will seek rapprochement with Iraq as means of achieving strategic depth in its confrontations with Israel and Turkey, as it has done since 1996.

Let me add three concluding points. First, we must be aware that political forces within Iraq, rather than those outside, will determine the direction of change after Saddam Hussein leaves power. We should therefore be more aware of what our opposition strategy communicates to those inside Iraq looking to move against Saddam and his inner circle. One thing the United States might consider, if it is serious, is to offer a general amnesty to all those not directly implicated in the regime's human-rights abuses or war crimes. Second, economic development and growth are key to Iraq's future. The United States, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should make a straightforward announcement that, once Saddam Hussein is out of power, sanctions, debt and reparations will be forgiven or at the very least "reconsidered" in the context of a Marshall Plan for Iraq. This gesture of good will would go a long way toward reducing animosity between Iraqis and Kuwaitis and would address the real economic problems that will face a post-Saddam Iraq. Third, the Iraq issue cannot be separated from the broader issues of regional security in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, arms proliferation and border disputes. Iraq will remain an important and influential power, and dealing with Iraq in the context of regional security will allow for a peaceful transition for Iraq and the region once Saddam Hussein is gone.

REND RAHIM FRANCKE, Executive Director, Iraq Foundation

No transition period in Iraq is going to be elegant. Any conceivable transition is going to be messy. The question is, should that deter us from seeking change? The answer is emphatically no. First of all, the problems that exist in Iraq are inherent in the regime of Saddam Hussein, and will not go away so long as he is there. Moreover, the longer he is there, the more they will fester, and the more intractable they will become. Eventually, these problems will have to be faced, even if Saddam dies like Stalin in his bed in 20 years time. It's much better to save the Iraqi people and the region the misery of another 20 years before we start solving them.

What will happen when the fighting stops? As has been said, there are two models for change, with variations. One of them is the classical military-coup model, which is clandestine and nobody knows about until the day it happens. It is generated within and limited to the armed forces. The other model, the one which Patrick was talking about, is an insurgency, involving popular forces, the civilian population, necessarily in collaboration with some units of the armed forces. It would really be generated from the grass roots and would then evolve.

I would like to talk about the two models and test them with reference to two yardsticks. One of them is legitimacy and the other is the ability to maintain internal stability. I want to add that the two are absolutely tied; you cannot separate legitimacy from stability. A military coup which bypasses the popular, civilian channels of opposition to the regime, I would argue, will fail both the test of legitimacy and the test of stability. There is no hierarchy of power in Iraq. What we have is Saddam Hussein, his two sons, and then a power vacuum. There is no pyramid in Iraq that gradually rises up to Saddam at the top. There is Saddam, there are his sons, and then there is a sheer drop. Below them there is a level plain on which there are several competitors for power. These competitors form a coalition with Saddam Hussein's family, the Al-Majid, but essentially they are made of the Sunni clans, what is called the Sunni core. These clans are closely identified with the military forces and with the security apparatus of the regime. They coincide or overlap with its fighting power, but they do not have power in and of themselves and they do not have authority.

Saddam Hussein has made sure that none of these clans rises above the others. He has made sure that they jostle and push each other around on this horizontal plain and are constantly at each other's throats. So we have the Tikritis, the Douris, the Jubur and so on. Many of them may not like the regime, but they don't love each other either. And I will give you an example. In 1992, shortly after the Gulf War, we heard of a very credible plot that was planned by the Jubur clan. In 1993, there was a plot by the Tikritis. In 1995 there was a revolt among the Deleim in Ramadi. What we have not seen is a plot that combines the Deleim, the Jubur, the Douris and the Tikritis.

The military and the security apparatus are not an independent and cohesive institution that can support a future united state structure. In fact, they reflect the fragmentation of the Sunni core and the careful balancing act that Saddam has used to keep all these clans in their place and constantly in conflict with each other. I would hypothesize that in the event of a military coup, each of these groups will push its claim to absolute power and rally its forces to oppose challenges by other clans.

However, it will be impossible for any single clan to emerge as the undisputed authority in Iraq, and none of them alone will be able to gain legitimacy or allegiance from the majority. Because of the fragmentation of these groups, and the intense rivalry that has been bred over decades, I do not believe that an alliance can be long-lasting. What I envisage, if there is a military coup, is a power struggle among these clans and violent conflict among heavily armed groups in the armed and security forces. This would include the Special Republican Guard, the Republican Guard, the Special Security Forces, parts of which have become special preserves and special fiefdoms for these individual competing clans.

A military coup presents the greatest danger for armed conflict in the center of the country, in Baghdad and the Sunni center. I would add that a military coup leading to a military regime is unlikely to arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the Kurds, or the Shia, or the other groups that have continued to oppose Saddam Hussein's regime. What will these groups do if they are faced with a weak and faction-riddled military government? Undoubtedly, the Kurds will press demands, become more secessionist, and assert their right to move further away from the center of government.

The Shia, who are conducting an armed resistance in the south, will escalate the resistance and find more opportunities to organize, arm themselves and challenge the new regime. There will be a serious threat of a split in the country, which may not be reparable.

So the other danger of a purely military regime, is the danger that it may split the country. In the very short term the military regime can perhaps maintain order, but I think this will be illusory, and that we will see a disintegration within such a military regime very quickly.

Moving on to the other scenario, a popular insurgency, I would argue that here legitimacy would be higher, but that attaining stability and order in the country would be less easy to achieve. A popular insurrection would face the problems of how to maintain order, establish an effective command, limit the potential for random violence and revanchism, limit the disruption to public services, and ensure supplies to the population. These are all serious problems that a popular insurrection is likely to confront from day one. They could lead to failure.

I do not envisage any factional fighting within the ranks of a popular insurrection. We did not see it in 1991. I know that there are accusations that the opposition is fractious and divided, but I think if there is an insurrection, there will be cohesiveness. The potential for disorder in the short-term is higher than in the case of a military coup, unless there is a control structure. Two adjustments to the insurrection scenario can be made that will enhance its ability to cope with problems. One of them is participation of the armed forces, especially units of the Republican Guard. In fact, I do not believe any insurrection can succeed unless it gets the support and cooperation of units of the armed forces, preferably the Republican Guard, and I do not think this is a very far-fetched possibility. We saw in 1991 units of the regular army joining forces with the uprising in southern Iraq, and I think that the circumstances for such cooperation are enhanced now rather than diminished.

The other adjustment that could help is the development of a credible framework for civilian leadership alongside a framework for a military leadership. One needs to keep in mind that an insurrection, insofar as it looks successful, and insofar as its chances for success increase, is itself likely to trigger a military coup. We keep imagining that there is going to be an insurrection emanating from the south, or the west, or the north, and that the very small core of Special Republican Guard or even Republican Guard who are fearful are sitting at home doing nothing. I don't believe that this will be the case. We may well see a preemptive military coup happen at a stage when an insurrection looks as if it may succeed.

Because of this likelihood, it becomes extremely important to develop, beginning now, a civilian opposition to the Iraqi regime that is credible and coordinated and can participate in the process of change, either on the ground or in the negotiating period that immediately follows Saddam's overthrow. I think that there is going to be an opening for a negotiated settlement, and it is very important to have a credible and coordinated civilian opposition in order to provide a negotiating interlocutor to other forces that are active inside the country.

If a civilian-military insurrection can be worked out, I believe such a combination has the greatest legitimacy, and the greatest chance of stability. A negotiated settlement between a civilian opposition and the armed forces is really the only way to ensure stability and legitimacy. Within that framework, it is easy to reach at least a perception of some kind of coalition government that can maintain the balance of domestic forces through one, two or maybe even three critical years of transition. This won't mean an end to serious problems.

As for the economic problems, I think Andrew Parasiliti made a very good case. Let me just add that, in terms of reparations, Iraq now has to pay $200 billion, nearly $100 billion to Iran alone. The United Nations has estimated that if Iraq pays $2 billion per annum, which represents 20 percent of Iraq's 1990 oil income, it will take Iraq 100 years just to pay the reparations bill. If we want to destabilize any future regime in Iraq and undermine it, then we should put difficulties in the path of economic recovery. What is needed is a Marshall Plan that the international agencies participate in. I suggested a Marshall Plan at a Middle East Institute conference last May, and the idea was thought ridiculous. I'm glad it is being mentioned now by a member of MEI.

We are going to have a weak transitional government, a very vulnerable one, and I want to raise a very important issue. We are going to have to deal with the legacy of Saddam and what to do with the Baath party and the Special forces. Organizations like the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security will not survive. But it is going to be much more difficult to decide what to do with the Baath party, which, after all, now has something like 1.8 million members. Whether they are voluntary or coerced makes no difference. The country is going to have to be run, and the entire civil service is in some way or another associated with the Baath and 30 years of Saddamism. You cannot import or suddenly create a ready-made civil service that is something like half-a-million strong and completely replace the old one with it.

One problem that Ellen Laipson raised I want to invert. Ellen spoke about the fears of the regional countries of a revival of Iraq. These regional countries will want boundaries and limits set by the international community on Iraq. I would say that the fear is the other way around. We are going to have a weak, fragile government. The temptation for interference by regional or not so regional countries in Iraqi affairs is going to be extremely high. I am not so much concerned about what Iraq can do to others as about what others can do to Iraq.

My fear is compounded, because the regional countries have such conflicting interests in Iraq and such suspicions of each other when it comes to Iraq, that any meddling by one country is going to invite meddling by others. Because of the weakness and fragility of the Iraqi state, the potential to destabilize is going to be immense. Iraq needs assurances from the international community and a kind of regional pact that there will be no such meddling in Iraqi affairs.

Q & A

Q: Given the fact that Iraqi nationalists believe Iraq has territorial grievances against many of its neighbors, and given the history of the Kuwait issue, would a post-Saddam regime respect the Iraq-Kuwait border? Second, given Iraq's defense problems, including the existence of a numerically superior Iran, would Iraq respect its obligations and the international norms against the development of weapons of mass destruction?

MS. FRANCKE: That really is an easy issue, because the United Nations and the international community will continue to have great leverage on any Iraqi government. Any economic package that is worked out for Iraq is not going to be without requirements that Iraq comply with U.N. resolutions and so on. Let me just put it in a broader context. It doesn't seem to me that any of these issues, whether it's WMD or Kuwait's borders or the Iran border, can actually be separated. Everything has to be looked at globally. For example, I talked about the question of regional interference in Iraq and the need of Iraq for protection from regional interference. I had very much in mind the fact that we have more powerful and larger countries around us, and that this will be a fragile state. In terms, by the way, of WMD, Iraqi people are extremely tired of militarism. And they know that Saddam's expenditures on the military and military adventures have destroyed the country. I have not met a single Iraqi who has expressed a wish to continue with WMD programs. So I think Andrew was misguided when he said that they will. That is completely unacceptable to any Iraqi that I have met.

DR. PARASILITI: I think the general point, that the international community will have a great deal of influence with a post-Saddam Iraq, is a correct one. A successor government, as a sign of its goodwill, may be inclined to accept some type of disarmament regime. As I mentioned, economic development and reconstruction, rather than arms, should be the priorities of a post Saddam-government. True, many Iraqis, as Rend said, are tired of this regime's obsession with weapons of mass destruction. But such idealism about Iraq's future may be the privilege of those who are not responsible for the security of their country.

Iraq cannot escape its neighborhood, which includes a nuclear India, a nuclear Pakistan, a nuclear Israel, a potentially proliferating Iran, Syria with its weapons of mass destruction, Turkish troops in Iraqi territory, etc. You don't need to be a dictator to understand the motivations for a nuclear or WMD deterrent in this part of the world. Such motivations defy regime-type analysis, extending to both dictator and democrat. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq and Iraq-Kuwait border problems date back to before Saddam Hussein came to power. In the absence of a regional security regime that addresses such issues as proliferation and borders, as well as economic development, it is possible to imagine why Iraq might proliferate. I am not saying it is a given.

Q: Given the reluctance of the United States in 1991 to involve itself in the popular revolt against Saddam's regime, despite all the brave talk now, what is the probability that the United States would commit to the use of force, including troops, in the event of a resumed revolt?

DR. CLAWSON: Certainly there are many people who were opposed to that. What those who are supporting the idea of providing assistance to the opposition now want to do is to ensure that the United States will be in a position to provide some support the next time that there is some kind of an uprising by the Iraqi people. Critics complain that the United States has in the past been unwilling and unable to deliver, but their policies would ensure that the United States would remain unwilling and unable to deliver. In the event of such an uprising, they would be the first to castigate the United States for being unwilling to deliver. What's appropriate for the United States to do now is to prepare itself to be in a position to assist the Iraqi people.

It is hard to know the mood of the people in a dictatorship like that in Iraq. It's extremely important that we be open for the possibility of a rebellion, which would be hopeful for the Iraqi people as well as for the region and for the United States. And in order to ensure that we will be in an effective position to provide assistance to the Iraqis, we should help create an opposition that has the practical means to provide that kind of assistance in the event of a revolt. Only by doing that now can we ensure that when the moment of opportunity arises something can be done. We do not want to send in thousands of American forces, which would guarantee problems for whatever new government got installed, as well as the United States.

This policy of leaving us unable to help the Iraqi people in the future seems to be the most cynical policy that I've heard. There's nothing sympathetic for the Iraqi people in that policy at all. It's leaving them disarmed, unable to take advantage of an opportunity, were one to arise.

So my answer to your question is, that the United States, if it is in a position to provide assistance, could well do so. If such an uprising were to occur tomorrow, however, there is little the United States could do. We just simply wouldn't know how to be able to provide that kind of assistance. Even if we wanted to be able to send in large numbers of ground troops, by the time that they arrived, they would no longer be able to be of assistance. Only if we take actions now that will put us in a position to do that in the future, will we be able to intervene.

DR. PARASILITI: Patrick Clawson has presented a plan for liberating Iraq that is rooted in dubious assumptions about the situation in Iraq, the strength of the INC (the main Washington proponents of the plan), and the extent of the American military commitment required to make it work. In my view, it borders on irresponsible to propose policies based upon false expectations, especially when American and Iraqi lives may be at stake.

As I mentioned, the proposed liberation army would be no match for Saddam Hussein's military. The Iraqi opposition does not control territory in the south, the presumed base for the liberation plan. And I don't think Patrick has been honest about the extent of the American military commitment required to make this plan work or, at the very least, keep the Iraqi liberation forces from getting massacred. The INC, upon whom Patrick relies for is understanding of the situation inside Iraq, has no bases inside the country and a very limited base outside. While Patrick may believe in an INC-led liberation idea, few Iraqis see the INC as a liberation movement for their country.

Rend made an interesting point about the best scenario, a revolt triggering a coup. Why didn't this occur in 1991 ? One reason was that the forces around the regime were concerned about some of the talk of those who were involved in the uprising about an Islamic government in Iraq. Fear of chaos, retribution, dismemberment, proxy forces by outside powers can have the reverse effect -- causing a rallying around the core, which happened in 1991. The liberation scenario does not account for that.

Change, when it comes to Iraq, will come from within. It is for the Iraqis, not the U.S. government, to choose those who will represent them. Our role should be to facilitate the ability of all Iraqi opposition groups, as well as independent Iraqi expatriates, to come together and discuss the political and economic future of their country.

AMB. FREEMAN: I would like to return if I might, to a previous question and address this to Rend first, but others may wish to comment. The Gulf War and the problems with Iraq began not because of Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction, or because of the cruelty of the regime in Baghdad, but because of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Rend, you spoke of the need for a post-Saddam regime to find legitimacy among Iraqis, as well as to define acceptable relationships with neighbors. To what extent is the Iraqi claim to Kuwait at the heart of the legitimacy issue? Is there a contradiction between the search for legitimacy by a regime in Iraq and the independence of Kuwait?

MS. FRANCKE: The issue of Kuwait has been always raised by Iraqi leaders who felt embattled and cornered, and in need of a slogan by which to assert their nationalism, their leadership, their patriotism. In times when we have had more normal government, the issue of Iraq's claim to Kuwait did not figure. In fact, if you look at Iraq's history, the periods in which any Iraqi leader has claimed Kuwait have been minuscule in comparison to the periods when the Iraqi government has had cordial, friendly, neighborly, brotherly relations with the government of Kuwait. This has been a bugbear, rather than a real issue. I don't think it is likely to come up.

Q: Would you explain your comment on U.S.-Saudi relations being problematic because the two cultures are so different?

DR. CLAWSON: The United States and Saudi Arabia have quite good relations and have a close strategic relationship that can work well. But it would be unrealistic to anticipate that that relationship will evolve into the same kind of close ties that the United States has with European countries, like Britain, with which we have much more in common on a whole variety of issues. In any case, there are always going to be very important issues on which the United States and Saudi Arabia differ. It's unrealistic to anticipate that there will be a time when the United States and Saudi Arabia see eye to eye, for instance, on the question of the state of Israel. The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia works best when the two countries can work together closely on those issues where they agree. Iraq is one such issue. The Saudi press has been frequently calling for the overthrow of Saddam, and there is a very clear indication from the Saudis that they'd like this problem resolved. Andrew said that there wasn't support from regional governments for a policy of overthrowing Saddam. Well, I hate to disagree, but all we need is support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and we've got that. Everybody else is irrelevant.

DR. PARASILITI: We don't have it yet Patrick. You know that.

DR. CLAWSON: I disagree.

AMB. FREEMAN: I think Rend wanted to comment on this question, and then I think we can take up the question of whether the specifics of the U.S. program to achieve the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad have regional support or not.

MS. FRANCKE: One of the problems that we've had over the past few years is the absence of U.S. consultation and coordination with the regional countries. This has caused great harm to the prospects of change in Iraq, and also great harm to U.S. policy. It's not enough for [Secretary of Defense] Bill Cohen to go to the region just before a strike and say, give us money; let us fly our planes. There has to be continuous political and diplomatic coordination. I think this is obviously developing now. I wish it had happened seven years ago.

AMB. FREEMAN: Let me just comment briefly, because I do disagree with Patrick on the question of the U.S. relationships with Saudi Arabia. I don't have any doubt whatsoever about the depth of mutual commitment or the intensity of cooperation between the two countries, which has gone on for more than 50 years and which continues to rest on a wide coincidence of views. Having said that, I think it's important that the United States continue to pursue relations with Saudi Arabia for their own value on their own terms, and with regard to those interests that we share with the Saudis rather than by reference to the views of some in the region who are disturbed by the strength of U.S.-Saudi relations. I don't think it's any secret that there are people in Iran, in Iraq, in Israel, in Yemen, and even in some of the other Gulf Cooperation Council members who believe that the U.S.-Saudi relationship is too central to U.S. foreign policy in the region and would prefer to see it attenuated.

I simply disagree with that. I think U.S. interests, when challenged, have provoked the United States in each instance to come to the aid of Saudi Arabia because the crisis reveals that that is a fundamental interest of ours in the region.

DR. PARASILITI: While the Saudi, Egyptian and Kuwaiti governments have increasingly expressed their hopes for a post-Saddam government in Iraq, I do not believe that they have actively committed themselves to a policy of regime-change. However, recent developments, including Saddam Hussein's rhetorical attacks on the Saudi and Egyptian leadership, have increased Iraq's isolation in the Arab world. This is partly due to Saddam Hussein's own misunderstanding about where he stands.

One of the criticisms of the liberation plan is that it doesn't have the support of neighboring powers. Recent developments in Iraq's relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may encourage them to work more closely with the United States in it policy of "replacement" in Iraq. This is a positive development for U.S. policy. I don't yet see our Arab allies committed to a coordinated replacement strategy at this time, although recent developments may move them closer to the U.S. position.

Q: The list of the Iraqi opposition groups that was recently obtained is headed by the pretender to the Hashemite throne of Iraq, which, was overthrown 40 years ago. What sentiment, if any, may exist in Iraq today for restoration of the monarchy under whatever other arrangements may exist?

MS. FRANCKE: It's a little difficult to gauge because we don't have a way of conducting an opinion poll in Iraq. Many groups from the far left to the far right, Islamists and so on, claim that they have the heart of the population, and therefore political clout. It's not possible to verify any claim. Constitutional monarchy is an idea that should be looked at, by all means. Around the Middle East, monarchies have been more stable than republics. And, amazingly enough, they have moved towards democracy with far steadier steps -- Kuwait, for example, if we can call it a monarchy or quasi-monarchy. So, it should be an idea that is put forward, but nobody can judge its acceptability by Iraqis.

DR. PARASILITI: The Iraqi monarchy, overthrown in the revolution of 1958, never had a strong popular base in Iraq. The monarchy was imposed by the British in 1920. After 30 years of Baath rule in Iraq, there may be some reconsideration or nostalgia for the monarchy in some circles, but I doubt that it is widespread, especially inside the country. The designation of the Movement for Constitutional Monarchy as a potential recipient of military aid is not taken seriously by most Iraqis whom I have spoken with. That being said, the United States should remain committed to working with all groups and individuals who support the transition to democracy in Iraq, and avoid bestowing most-favored status on those willing to accept military support. That is the problem.

MS. FRANCKE: The Iraqis I have spoken to have not dismissed the idea of a return of the monarchy. Many Iraqis now, perhaps unrealistically, look back on the monarchy as the golden age of Iraq. There was less repression, greater freedoms. There was hope for the country. They see a downward trend since 1958. So, emotionally, people still see the monarchy as a good time. They also recognize that a monarchy could be a symbolic unifier.

Q: What if Saddam doesn't go? What if he lives to his actuarial limit?

DR. CLAWSON: The Washington Institute published a book last year called Iraq Strategy Review, to which Andrew Parasiliti contributed a chapter that was a very nice exposition of what U.S. policy might be if the United States decided that we were going to have to find some way to deal with a Saddam who is going to be there for an extended period of time. What would be some policy options that would advance U.S. interests, that would minimize the likelihood that United States would have to use military force? Since Desert Fox the die seems to have been cast against pursuing such a policy. One could have made credible arguments in favor of such a policy. It's just that now the United States has announced that it is going to be supporting the replacement of Saddam and has launched itself into a policy of military strikes.

MS. FRANCKE: It would be a tragedy if he stayed on another 17 years. The tragedy will compound. I'm convinced that Saddam sees that he has a manifest destiny in the Middle East. Unfortunately, it always moves through Kuwait. And the concept of militarism is part of Saddam's iconography, part of his myth-making. So I would imagine that he would, as soon as possible, go back to rebuilding weapons, rebuilding the army. This man is hyperactive. He became president in '79; in '80 we had an eight-year war against Iran. We had a brief respite of two years. In 1990, he invaded Kuwait. And essentially you could say that Iraq has been in state of war since 1990. I don't doubt that we will go back to the same pattern. So, it will not only be tragic for Iraqis, it will be tragic for the region as well.

AMB. FREEMAN: Since I think the question is an important one, let me just add a sort of sub-question which was implicit in Pat Clawson's remarks. Let us accept for the sake of argument that the die is cast in terms of the administration's policies, that we are now committed to a rollback, containment and overthrow policy. I didn't hear agreement among the speakers earlier about whether this policy has any resonance or is acceptable at all to the countries in the region that must cooperate with it to make it effective. And I'd like to ask that we return to that question, since there are debates going on in the United Nations about American policy. There are discussions in the region going on with [Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright actually in the region discussing this policy. Does this policy that I accept for the sake of argument we have adopted find support in the hearts and minds of people in the region?

DR. PARASILITI: First, I agree with Patrick Clawson: if you want to understand this, read the chapter by Parasiliti in Iraq Strategy Review. In it I describe a deterrent policy toward Iraq. I assume that Saddam Hussein will remain in power, still the most likely scenario, and that the United States should define more clearly what our interests are and back them up with overwhelming military force, if necessary. These interests include keeping Iraq from threatening Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, aggressively deploying it WMD, and engaging in acts of terrorism against U.S. interests and allies. Under a deterrent policy, the United States must have the capability and will to attack Iraq if and only if it crosses these more clearly articulated "red lines." The idea behind deterrence is to put Iraq in perspective and get beyond the seemingly endless cycle of crisis and confrontation. Under deterrence, our policy toward Iraq would more resemble our policy toward North Korea, for example.

There are some problems with implementing a deterrent policy after the events of the last six months. Saddam Hussein's recent provocations against our Arab allies have increased his isolation in Arab circles. U.S. and British warplanes are now engaged in regular confrontations with Iraq over Iraqi airspace. Also, the Clinton administration is under increased pressure from congressional and Republican quarters to intensify our policy of regime change. I expect that pressure to increase in the course of the next presidential election campaign.

MS. FRANCKE: I want to distinguish between policy and strategy. A U.S. policy to replace Saddam Hussein has the support of all the regional allies -- all the countries of the region with the possible exception of Syria for the moment, and for very specific reasons. What we don't have is a developed strategy for change in the United States. Maybe one is developing now, but so far I don't see a clear, well-developed strategy for change and tactics -- who to support, how to do it. And it is this which I believe is troubling to U.S. allies in the region. What we don't agree on yet and haven't worked out is, what is the U.S. strategy, and can we, U.S. allies in the region, support it?

DR. CLAWSON: I agree with both of the previous speakers. It's particularly striking that the Saudi government -- which historically has had difficult relationships with its own Shia community, and which has often been influenced by the attitudes of those in the Saudi religious community who are hostile to Shiism -- has encouraged the U.S. government to talk to Baar Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq. And it was remarkable that the United States designated the Supreme Council as one of the groups it is supporting. This was quite well accepted, including on Capitol Hill. It suggests that while we have not yet formulated a strategy for how to accomplish the overthrow, there is more interest these days in options that would have been anathema both to regional parties and to the United States a number of years ago. Back in 1991, one of the reasons there was a lack of enthusiasm in the United States for supporting the revolts that were underway, was fear about the Supreme Council. And yet here we are today talking about possibly providing it with military. assistance.

Q: If Saddam, in fact, is coming to a point of desperation, as evidenced by his invitations to anti-Western terrorists to visit Baghdad, and if he chooses to, as he has said, leave Iraq in ruins as he departs by exercising some sort of Iraqi Samson option, what would the implications of that be?

DR. PARASILITI: If you follow the writings of Laurie Mylroie and Iraq News, you know that there has been circumstantial evidence that Saddam Hussein has ben involved with terror networks in Sudan and elsewhere. But the recent initiatives that he has undertaken -- the return of Abu Nidal to Iraq, meeting with Usama Bin Laden's men -- may represent a new twist in Iraq's foreign policy, reflecting Saddam's feelings of frustration and isolation. I think Saddam Hussein takes the recent U.S. policy shift toward regime change very seriously. One school of thought argues that this policy, combined with December's U.S. military strikes against the institutions of the regime's power -- the Baath party, the Republican Guard, intelligence establishments, etc. - have communicated to Saddam Hussein that the U.S. has crossed a line, in his mind. He may be developing some type of terror network that he could use against Arab allies or the United States. This now becomes a real threat, and it accentuates both his isolation and his potential for some type of terrorist action.

DR. CLAWSON: I'd agree with that. With Desert Fox, the United States has set in train a series of actions and reactions that are leading Saddam to take stronger steps against the United States where he can, and the United States in turn to take stronger steps against him. I don't think it can be very easy to reverse that momentum, and the invitations to Usama bin Laden and the presence of Abu Nidal are going to be powerful motivators to a president who is clearly so concerned about nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism.

AMB. FREEMAN: I would just add an alarming footnote to this discussion: If indeed Saddam's reasoning is, one ill turn deserves another, and if the policies on which the United States is now embarking may have a price in terms of explosions or other events in the United States, then we will really be putting to the test the extent to which we are serious about these policies, whether they relate to weapons of mass destruction or to other objectives in the region.

Q: In a thugdom like Iraq, the civil service tends to become corrupt and co-opted. The process of rebuilding will require some form of training and the creation of a more competent and fair civil service. Second, what can and should be done to alleviate the Iraqis' suffering under the sanctions, even before a change of regime?

DR. CLAWSON: The problem that we face in Iraq, post-Saddam, is going to be extraordinarily different from the problem that was faced in post-war Europe. The problem is not going to be quickly rebuilding institutions and facilities that have been physically destroyed in societies that have been fundamentally sound for some period of time and had fundamentally sound governments, with only a temporary interruption. The talk of a Marshall Plan for Iraq is rather puzzling. Iraq's economic future rests on how quickly it can develop its extensive oil resources. And what would make a tremendous difference for Iraq's economic future is more foreign investment that would bring those resources into play more quickly. Any talk about what we can do to help the Iraqi people, post-Saddam, should concentrate on how Iraq's oil resources can be more quickly developed.

No banker in the world anticipates that Iraq is going to repay its debts in full. Ten cents on the dollar would be a reasonable level. As for the continuation of the compensation payments mandated by the resolution ending the conflict in 1991, the U.N. compensation commission has divided those claims into several very sensible categories, and they will shortly complete paying the individual small claimants, such as all those people from India and Bangladesh who had to leave with their bank accounts frozen, as well as the Egyptians in a similar situation. Before too long the only claims that will be left will be the large claims from the Kuwaiti and the Iranian governments, and it would seem to me quite appropriate to cancel those claims. But it would be inappropriate to cease the compensation payments until the individual claimants had been reimbursed for their damages. After all, what they're receiving now is some nine years after the conflict, is a payment for damages without any interest whatsoever.

The oil-for-food program makes excellent sense as a humanitarian program, but it has expanded well past the humanitarian level. Andrew mentioned that the U.N. people who are implementing this program say that it's not also a development program. There is a well-established distinction made by relief organizations between humanitarian help and development help. We do not make our humanitarian assistance contingent upon a political test, but we do make our development assistance contingent upon a political test. That's very appropriate in these circumstances. The humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people is a matter of considerable concern and the best way to address it is to accelerate our efforts for the overthrow of Saddam.

The humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people is not even the worst in the Arab world. The same sources that Andrew cited point out that the situation in Yemen and Sudan is worse than it is in Iraq. Indeed, the situation of some 2 billion people around the world is worse than it is in Iraq. If our concern is the humanitarian suffering or our fellow human beings, Iraq is not the first place that I would concentrate on.

DR. PARASILITI: What I described were the implications of what's taking place in the Iraqi economy and society for Iraq's future, and the commitment that will be required to rebuild Iraq after almost 20 years of war and sanctions. There are countries that are worse off than Iraq, but sanctions is our policy, and our topic today happens to be Iraq. As to debt and reparations, I'll refer you to the Middle East Institute's publication The Future of Iraq, which describes the various scenarios for economic growth, given Iraq's debt and reparations obligations. [Sinan Al-Shabibi, "Prospects for Iraq's Economy," in The Future of Iraq, pp. 54-80.] Unless Iraq gets major relief from its financial obligations, the economy will not be able to grow, especially with oil prices so low. I am calling for a political gesture of goodwill from the United States, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and perhaps Russia, if possible, that says that only Saddam Hussein and his regime are responsible for the debts incurred from his policies.

MS. FRANCKE: When I spoke of a Marshall Plan, I was not suggesting the European model, because Iraq has tremendous resources. I meant it in the sense of massive international assistance, not just in loans, but debt relief and so on. But I don't see this massive international assistance only in the financial sector. And I want to go back to the civil service. I see the international assistance not only from the IMF, the World Bank and the European Union but also from U.N. agencies and NGOs, an enormous program taking expertise into Iraq, and not just technology, but ways of building civil society. I would like a lot of Iraqis brought out for training and so on. This is going to be necessary, if we want to see a stable Iraq that does not fall apart again.

AMB. FREEMAN: I'm sure that Patrick Clawson, making the points that he did about the suffering of the Iraqi people, did not in any way mean to imply that because others are suffering, somehow the suffering of the Iraqi people is deserving of less attention by the international community. If that were the point, I think most of us would be in violent opposition to him.

Q: What effect would the making of a sharp distinction between military-focused sanctions and economic sanctions have on the longevity of the regime?

DR. PARASILITI: Proponents of sanctions argue that they have been effective in curtailing Saddam's unfettered access to oil-export revenues, and thereby limiting his ability to rebuild his weapons programs. I don't know if sanctions were ever conceived as a way of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. In fact, he seems to be doing fine under sanctions since he manipulates the issue at home and abroad to strengthen his hand and further his own ambitions. Because Iraq's people suffer under sanctions, the policy is perceived as unjust by many throughout the Arab world and elsewhere. There are now a number of proposals calling for a lifting of economic sanctions and a continuation of military sanctions, in order to address the crisis in Iraq's economy and society.

Q: How significant are the current discussions at the United Nations, given in particular the views of the Chinese, French, Russians and others, in opposition to U.S. policy?

AMB. FREEMAN: I take the discussions at the United Nations as a very serious development, because U.S. policy in the Gulf was originally authorized and legitimized by a series of actions in the United Nations. The coalition that came into being following those authorizations is clearly now only a remnant. The consensus in the U.N. that has sustained the policy is badly frayed. And to some extent, the United States on these issues in the Gulf now finds itself increasingly friendless in New York. I think this is a serious challenge to U.S. diplomacy, and not to be dismissed as insignificant.

DR. CLAWSON: It was authorized by U.N. resolutions. There is also a broad U.N. coalition responsible for vigorous military action in Korea in implementing those resolutions, although in the last 45 years the United Nations has played essentially no role in the further consideration of those matters in the Korean peninsula. The United States, however, continues to point out that its activities in the Korean peninsula are authorized by the U.N., and for a long time they've had a U.N. Command that was in charge of the forces in Korea. That kind of a role for the United Nations is very appropriate -- initial authorization and then non-involvement in day-to-day activities, especially in circumstances where there are profound differences that emerge among the powers in the United Nations about that proceeding.

MS. FRANCKE: The Security Council is not a constitutional court. It's a political institution made up of states with political interests. To over-legalize the matter is unrealistic. Whether we agree or not, the United States is certainly taking a specific role for itself that may or may not be legitimized by U.N. resolutions. But the no fly zones, the protection of the Kurds, the overflights of Iraq are things that the United States is going to maintain. It may make some compromises in the Security Council on UNSCOM and maybe on sanctions in order to maintain this military overflight role in the south and the north. But this is political bargaining. It is not because we're going back to 'the Security Council and measuring this or that conduct by legislation. It's a political game.

AMB. FREEMAN: I find it somewhat ironic that this process, which began in defense of Kuwait, not only because of the implications for the oil market, but also because it was felt that the post-Cold War era should not begin with a gross violation of international law and the annexation of a small country by a large one may be coming to an end with disregard for the principles of international law which we sought to affirm in 1990 and 1991.

Q: Would it be possible to move beyond focus on Saddam and the current regime and to define a positive agenda for Iraq in the post-Saddam era?

AMB. FREEMAN: I think your suggestion is a very valuable one. In a period in which we are talking about the possibility of terrorism as a means of retaliation by Saddam for the efforts being made to overthrow him, in a period in which cat-and-mouse games are being played by air forces in southern and northern Iraq, it is very difficult for us to think about a positive vision for Iraq. But without such a positive vision there is very little prospect that we will be able to appeal to Iraqi nationalism or to have the sort of relationship with a post-Saddam Iraq that we should want to have. And without such a vision, it's unlikely that Iraq will accept the international norms of good behavior that we hope it will.

We have sought today to raise a question that probably should have been discussed a great deal more, in this city, in New York, and in the capitals of our coalition partners and friends in this enterprise. Namely, what if we succeed, what if we get what we want? It's always useful to consider what happens if your policy works. And the fact that we haven't had this sort of discussion in Washington in the past suggests to me that there are a lot of people here advocating our current policies who have no expectation whatsoever that they will produce any result.