Hizballah: from radicalism to pragmatism?

Norton, Augustus Richard

No manifestation of the Islamist

phenomenon evokes more

antipathy from U.S. policy

makers than Lebanon's

Hizballah (Party of God). This is not hard

to understand; for more than a decade

Iran-backed Hizballah has positioned itself as an

opponent of U.S. policy in the Middle East,

and especially in Lebanon. Hizballah has

been connected with a number of notorious

incidents, including the 1983 attack on the

Marine barracks in which more than 240

marines died, the kidnapping of U.S.

citizens such as Terry Anderson and CIA

station chief William Buckley, as well as at

least one bombing of the U.S. embassy in

Beirut. The policy humiliations of the

Iran-contra affair stemmed directly from the

attempts of senior U.S. officials to gain the

release of U.S. hostages held in Lebanon

by Shii groups that were linked to

Hizballah, if not a part of it. The hostage

seizures were fully consistent with

Hizballah's declared goal of expunging

both the American diplomatic presence and

Americans from Lebanon, and the

hostages' fate was often manipulated in

order to serve the interests of Hizballah's

sponsor, Iran.

For more than a decade Iran has proved

to be a deadly and effective foe of Israel's

occupation of southern Lebanon, and it has

persistently called for the liberation of

Jerusalem and the destruction of Israel. In

recent years, Hizballah has been a vocal

critic of the peace process, and it has

refused to countenance any direct

negotiations with Israel. As though all of

this were not enough for U.S. policy

makers, Hizballah's close links to Iran,

from which it has received generous

financial and materiel support since 1982,

suggest that it is less a phenomenon of

Lebanese politics than a geopolitical

foothold for Tehran. Hizballah also

maintains a close working relationship with

Syria, with which it has willingly

cooperated, at least in recent years.

Hizballah's relentless attacks on the Israeli

occupation zone in southern Lebanon have

served Syria's purposes by violently

underlining the insistence of Damascus that

Israel withdraw completely from both the

Golan Heights and southern Lebanon.

Hizballah's rhetoric has consistently

matched its actions. Taking inspiration

from the virulent anti-American statements

of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the

United States has been condemned and

threatened for its pro-Israeli and anti-Islam

policies. There is no denying that

Hizballah has earned its reputation for

radicalism. Under these circumstances, it

is not surprising that officials in

Washington tend to view Hizballah as a

dangerous radical opponent.

Nonetheless, while it may be tempting

to dismiss Hizballah as an extremist or

terrorist group, this sort of labeling

conceals the fact that Hizballah has

managed to build an extremely impressive

social base in Lebanon. Hizballah is

arguably the most effective and efficient

political party in the country. Throughout

the areas where it enjoys a significant

presence, especially the dahiyah (suburbs)

of Beirut, the northern Beqaa valley, and

Baalbek in particular, and in parts of

southern Lebanon, including Nabatiyya,

the important center of Shii scholarship,

Hizballah provides an array of services. Its

medical facilities are far better than those

available in government hospitals, which

the poor would otherwise have to rely

upon. Its new hospital in the dahiyah (near

Harat Hurayk) is extremely impressive, and

a new hospital in Nabatiyya is in operation,

although construction still continues.

Doctors working in the hospitals report that

both Muslims and Christians may and do

use the medical facilities, although they are

found in areas where many Shii Muslims

live. In addition to medical care, a network

of schools, companies, community centers

and public-assistance facilities (e.g., food

distribution centers for the needy) fall

under Hizballah's wing. Hizballah

maintains its own engineering and

construction company, and it has been

quick to lend material support and

expertise to those whose homes have been

damaged or destroyed, whether by Israeli

attacks or as a result of internecine clashes

within Lebanon. The families of martyred

Hizballahis receive regular pensions and

other assistance from the party. As these

examples illustrate, the party reveals two

complementary aspects. It has committed

itself to the militant pursuit of its goals,

especially expelling Israel from South

Lebanon, while working extremely hard to

build and sustain a political constituency.

Thus, as an armed resistance force

Hizballah has demonstrated its

commitment to liberating the occupied

"security zone" in the South. In recent

years, especially since the signing of the

Taif accord in 1989, Hizballah has been

transforming itself, preparing for life after

resistance while simultaneously exploiting

its commitment to liberate the South in

order to gain political support.

Were Israel to withdraw from the

South, the interesting question is, how this

would affect Hizballah's political base in

Lebanon? Some analysts have suggested

that Hizballah's popular support would

shrink, as its raison d'etre for militant

radicalism disappears, while others argue

that Hizballah's popular support is durable,

and transcends its armed role. Before

turning to these important questions,

however, it is germane to examine the

social and political context in which

Hizballah has emerged.

THE SHIA OF LEBANON

The Shia have deep historical roots in

Jabal Amil, in southern Lebanon, and in

the Beqaa valley, but they have also been

mired in poverty for centuries.(1) Few were

recruited by the Ottomans for service in the

army because they were suspected of being

loyal to Persia, and they were disdained by

the Ottomans for their practice of the

heterodox path of Shiism. Over the course

of Ottoman rule, the Shia were treated with

suspicion and contempt. The Shii notables

(ayan) included a coterie of political bosses

or zuama whose wealth was grounded in

the Ottoman system of tax farming (iqtaa)

by which tenant farmers paid an annual

rent to the multazim (or tax farmer), who in

turn paid taxes to the Ottoman governor.

Although Lebanese Shii ulama helped to

implant Shiism in Safavid Persia in the

sixteenth century, in modern times the

clerics enjoyed little political power and

were usually clients of the zuama. With

the founding of the independent Lebanese

state in 1943, the Shia were the

third-largest community in Lebanon, after the

Maronite Christians and the Sunni

Muslims, and they were accorded the third

political office, the speaker of the

Parliament. In practice, the Shia exerted

proportionately little influence in Lebanese

politics. The speaker played a weak third

fiddle to the president and the prime

minister, and in the government Shia were

grossly underepresented in senior

appointments. Moreover, the community

had little economic clout; illiteracy was

widespread; and, until the 1940s, most Shia

were agricultural workers. In the 1950s

and 1960s, the forces of modernization

-- education, mobility and the increasing

access to communications -- promoted the

preconditions for the politicization and

political mobilization of the Shia. As

agriculture was modernized and the Shii

population grew, many rural-dwelling Shia

moved to Beirut and large numbers went

abroad to work in Africa and the Gulf. The

Palestinian refugees who fled from

Palestine to Lebanon in 1948 provided a

pool of cheap labor that further pushed the

Shia to seek their fortunes outside of the

South and the Beqaa. By the 1960s,

though the Shia remained relatively

impoverished, a significant middle class

was emerging. Simultaneously, the growth

of anti-status-quo political forces in

Lebanon, including the Palestinian

guerrillas and the various wings of the

communist movement, attracted many

young Shia to their ranks. The decade of

the 1960s was a time of radical fervor and

militant secularism, and many Shia were

moved to join those who promised reform

and revolution.

It was in this environment that a

charismatic Iranian cleric, al-Sayyid Musa

al-Sadr,(2) who traced his ancestry to

southern Lebanon (to Maarakah, a village a

few kilometers from Tyre), launched a

populist reform movement, harakat

al-mahautim (the Movement of the

Deprived). By 1974, the Movement had

attracted tens of thousands of Shia. In the

tumult of pre-civil war Lebanon, al-Sadr

also created afwaj al-muqawamah

al-lubnaniyyah (the Lebanese Resistance

Detachments), which is known by the

acronym "Amal." Al-Sadr roused many

Shia to political action, and he succeeded

in challenging the conservative Shii

establishment and especially the zuama for

power. Nonetheless, al-Sadr and his

movement were eclipsed by the civil war

that began in 1975. Amal was never a

particularly significant militia in those

days. While remnants of the group

survived, it seemed to be destined for

obscurity.

Three events occurred in 1978 to help

resurrect Amal. In August, while on a trip

to Libya, Musa al-Sadr disappeared.

Al-Sadr, by this time popularly known as

Imam Musa, became the new missing

Imam. Recalling the Shii doctrine of the

Imam in occultation (imam al-ghaeib), his

strange disappearance gave new life to

Amal and helped it to coalesce as a

political force. By 1978, though many Shia

had earlier joined the anti-status-quo

forces, they

grew tired of

militia warfare.

In southern

Lebanon, there

was growing

anger amongst

Shii civilians at

the armed

Palestinian

forces who

treated the

population roughly and exposed the people

to Israeli attacks through their military

actions. When Israel invaded Lebanon in

1978, the situation was ripe for a

self-defense force that would protect the

civilian population and take them out of the

deadly Israeli-Palestinian cross-fire. Thus,

the raison d'etre of Amal was

fundamentally security. In Iran, during

1978, the shah's regime was crumbling.

The victory of the Ayatollah Khomeini in

1979 provided an important exemplar for

action, which Amal was able to capitalize

on. In addition, several key figures in the

revolution, especially the late Mustafa

Chainran and the late Sadeq Ghotzabadeh

were closely linked to Amal and to Imam

Musa, and in the days following the fall of

the Pahlavi regime Amal seemed poised to

benefit from new levels of support from

Tehran. As it turned out, Amal's secular

reformers were not to the taste of the

Islamic Republic, and Iran lent its backing

to Amal Shii adversaries.

By the end of the 1970s, Amal was

unquestionably the most dynamic political

force in Lebanon. Increasingly

emboldened and encouraged by Syrian

support it took on the PLO toe-to-toe, so

that by the eve of the Israeli invasion in

1982, bloody PLO-amal clashes were

common. Israel's invasion dislodged the

PLO from

Lebanon and

seemed likely to

catapult Amal and

its Shii

constituents into

broadened

political power;

however, the

Israelis proved

strangely ignorant

of the Shia.

Moreover, the traditional power wielders in

Lebanon, the Maronites and Sunnis, were

little interested in sharing power with the

Shia.

Israel's 1982 military campaign led to

the evacuation of the PLO fighting force,

and, many Lebanese hoped, an end to the

country's continuing civil war. What might

have been an opportunity to end the

internal war, and to meet the Shii demands

for better access to government services

and a bigger share of power, was lost. The

United States, deeply involved in Lebanon

following Israel's massive invasion, was

slow to understand internal developments

and to push for essential reforms, and the

new government of President Amine

Gemayel was more intent on consolidating

Maronite power than reforming the

political system. Amal, initially patient and

quiet, was provoked to action by a pattern

of arbitrary arrests, shellings and

intimidation by the government. In 1984,

just as the U.S., French, British and Italian

multinational force was withdrawing from

Beirut largely as a consequence of the truck

bombings of the U.S. and French

contingents the previous fall, the western

portion of the city fell to Amal's control.

Meanwhile, in the South, Amal resistance

fighters played a major hand in opposing

Israel's occupation of Lebanon, forcing a

major Israeli redeployment in 1985.

The apex of Amal's power was in

1985, and even then the movement was

profoundly challenged by the more radical

Hizballah, which condemned Amal's

reformist stance and accused the movement

of collaborating with Israel and the United

States. Hizballah emerged in 1982 and by

1984 coalesced as a well-ordered

organization, including a leadership or

consultative council on which the Iranians,

as well as the Lebanese held seats. Over

time, as the civil war continued through the

1980s, the strength of the Iran-backed

Hizballah grew, so that it supplanted Amal

in the environs of Beirut (while Amal's

broad base in southern Lebanon was

sustained). Accusations of inefficiency,

corruption and poor leadership dogged

Amal; its earlier dynamism disappeared.

Despite the erosion of its support, Amal

retains a political base especially among

the villagers of southern Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the civil war in Lebanon ended

in 1990. Amal's leader Nabih Berri, was

appointed to parliament in 1991 and was

subsequently elected parliamentary

speaker. In the 1992 elections, Berri and

his slate of candidates in southern Lebanon

triumphed, a feat that he repeated in 1996.

Amal, the force that stood outside the

perimeter of power in Lebanon, was now

inside, and with the reforms of the Taif

accord that ended the war, Shii political

influence grew.

For a variety of complex reasons,

including the economic morass of

reconstruction, sectarian sentiments in

post-civil-war Lebanon are far more salient

than they were during most of the

1975-1990 civil war. Amal has promoted

confessionalism by creating an extensive

patronage network, but Hizballah has

benefited easily as much from providing a

political home for the Shia. Popular

support for Amal has shrunken. Many of

the professional middle class in the Shii

community, once a key base of support,

have deserted Amal, especially over the

past six years. In Musa al-Sadr's time, the

movement symbolized an alternative to the

zuama, the denizens of patronage who

dominated Shii access to the political

system. As Amal gained a major role in

the political system, it adopted the

patronage practices of the zuama that it had

sought to supplant, with the result that it

alienated many erstwhile supporters. Many

of these people now support Hizballah,

which they often contrast favorably to

Amal. It needs to be emphasized that this

shift of support does not necessarily reflect

a resurgence of religiosity. In point of fact,

many of the Shii supporters of Hizballah,

especially among the middle class, are

rather casual in their practice of religion.

HIZBALLAH AS POLITICAL PARTY

Some involved observers have argued

that Hizballah is simply a terrorist or

extremist group; that it has little real

support in the general population of

Lebanon or even among the 35 percent or

so of the Lebanese who are Shii Muslims;

that it is a creature of external support; and

that it has a vested interest in Israel's

continued occupation of southern Lebanon,

since it would forfeit its distinctive cachet

of militancy with no "security zone" to

attack -- and without that cachet it would

become a marginal player in Lebanese

politics.(3) Variations on these views are

frequently heard and read, especially by

those whose conclusions are based on

conjecture rather than field work. In my

view, the reality is very different, especially

in respect to the level of popular support

that Hizballah enjoys. It is certainly true

that Hizballah has exploited its resistance

role in order to build political support.

Thus, in the August-September 1996

parliamentary elections, one widely

distributed Hizballah campaign poster,

which was displayed in many districts of

Beirut, as well as the dahiyah (the heavily

Shii southern suburbs) recalled the

sacrifices of the Hizballahis who combat

Israel's occupation of South Lebanon:

"They resist with their blood. Resist with

your vote."

There is no question that Hizballah's

operations in the south are coordinated

with Syria (Hizballah officials freely admit

as much), but there is also no question that

the resistance is extremely popular among

the Shia. In fact, the Israeli occupation of

southern Lebanon is viewed with suspicion

and enmity by many Lebanese who worry

that Israel covets Lebanese land as well as

Lebanese water. Hizballah spokesmen

frequently assert that if Israel's presence in

the south was not resisted, Israel would

have little incentive to even consider

withdrawing its forces from the South.(4)

This assertion is widely shared in Lebanon

and the converse proposition that a

cessation of resistance activities would

induce Israel to withdraw is often

dismissed as laughably improbable. It is

not likely to soon be put to an empirical

test, since the resistance enjoys wide

support, especially among the Shia who

have been the prime victims of Israel's

occupation. Since the late 1960s, hundreds

of thousands of Lebanese have been

repeatedly displaced from their homes in

the South, more often than not as a result of

Israeli military action. In April 1996 alone,

some 200,000 fled their homes during the

battles between Hizballah and the IDF,

often in response to Israeli warnings of as

few as two hours.

In the ideology of Hizballah, Israel is

anathema. In contrast, while the United

States is considered an adversary and is

disliked for its support of Israel, Hizballah's

secretary general has claimed that the

United States is not a target for attack.

Other leading officials, including the head

of the Political Bureau have privately

explored the possibility of a dialogue with

the United States. The "Grapes of Wrath"

campaign in early 1996 tended to

corroborate the characterization of Israel as

evil in the eyes of many Lebanese, and

especially the Shia.(5) Israel's massacre by

shelling of more than 100 civilians in the

U.N. base in Qana has especially inspired

hatred for the Jewish state. Close to the

U.N. base, a memorial cemetery has been

created in which all of the victims are

buried. The cemetery has become a site of

pilgrimage for many Lebanese. Among

middle class professionals in the dahiyah,

trips to Qana, usually with their children in

tow, are becoming ritualized. The site is

festooned with banners (most in Arabic)

accusing Israel of terrorism and genocide

and invoking sayings by some of the

central figures in Shiism (such as Imam

Hussain). Many of the banners emphasize

the loss of innocent blood and demand

vengeance. One sign reads, "Qana is the

Karbala (the site of Hussain's martyrdom in

the year 680) of the twentieth century; it is

a land made holy by the Lord Jesus and

contaminated by the Zionist Satan (enemy

of God)." The Shia are well aware that

authoritative reports by the United Nations

and by Middle East Watch question Israeli

claims that the shelling of the U.N. base

was unintentional. The result of the

"Grapes of Wrath" operation, and

especially the Qana massacre, is that, even

if the IDF were to pull up stakes in

southern Lebanon, the underlying hatred

would continue to fester.

Whether in writing or in private

interviews, leading members of Hizballah

as well as Hojjat Islam Muhammad

Hussain Fadlallah, the spiritual guide" or

al-murshid al-ruhi of Hizballah, express

their distrust of Israel and emphasize that

peace with Israel may never be

countenanced.

Muhammad

Raad, an

articulate

Hizballahi

member from

Nabatiya,

pointing to the

recent election of

Benjamin

Netanyahu and Netanyahu's attitudes

towards the Oslo accords, also argues that

on a practical basis Israel cannot be trusted.

However defensible its rationale may be in

Israel's own eyes, there is little doubt that

Israel's presence in the South has fed

Lebanese radicalism. In that sense, the

occupation has been consistently

counterproductive for Israel.

Notwithstanding the ideological

posture of Hizballah, the organization has

shown practical flexibility. In fact, in a

July 1996 interview, Fadlallah emphasized

the need for dialogue, especially dialogue

with one's enemies. Characteristically, he

corroborated his argument with an ayat.

Asked if that includes dialogue with Israel,

he emphatically replies, "Yes, especially

with one's enemies." Strictly speaking,

Fadlallah does not speak for Hizballah, but

he has a wide following in the Shii

community, and his views are extremely

influential. Equally important, Hizballah

has shown a willingness to negotiate

indirectly with Israel, as it did in the

summer of 1996, when, with German

mediation, it agreed to exchange the

corpses of Israeli and SLA soldiers for the

bodies of Hizballahis.

The Israeli army has become

increasingly frustrated by its inability to

preempt Hizballah operations, which have

become efficiently deadly in recent years.

In marked contrast to the late 1980s when

Hizballah attacks

often involved

large Hizballah

losses, the ratio of

Hizballah

casualties to IDF

casualties is no

longer heavily

skewed in favor of

the IDF. Since

1995, the ratio of Hizballah to IDF/SLA

casualties has been less than 2:1, whereas

in the past it was more than 5:1. The IDF

is also stymied by the "rules of the game,"

which limit its ability to engage in

operations that collectively punish

Lebanese civilians.(6) In short, Hizballah has

proven more adept at moving within the

box that has come to be defined by the

unwritten agreement of 1993 and the

written agreement of 1996. Of course, this

could change. War is a game of move and

countermove, and Israel might regain the

upper hand that it enjoyed earlier in the

1980s, but this does not seem very likely in

the foreseeable future. It is noteworthy that

in the course of negotiations Israel has

never challenged the right of Hizballah to

attack its soldiers in Lebanon. Thus, they

have tacitly conceded that the IDF is an

occupation force in Lebanon.

The question that is crucial is, what

would Hizballah's reaction be to an Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanon? This question

is made all the more relevant by the fact

that the option of a unilateral Israeli

withdrawal from the south has now been

vetted by the Israeli government, probably

at the prompting of the IDF. The Hizballah

answer to this question has been

consistently ambiguous. Muhammad

Raad, the Hizballahi parliamentary deputy

from Nabatiyya, who was elected in 1992

and reelected in 1996, argues that a

withdrawal would be followed by a period

of "recuperation." In other words, there

would be a period of rebuilding in the

south. Raad adds that were Israel to

withdraw unilaterally, as proposed by Israel

in July 1996, this would create an

imbalance for Lebanon and Syria, but they

would recover. Most important, he

believes that Hizballah would be the

beneficiary of an Israeli withdrawal. He

bases this conclusion on two facts: the

popular base that Hizballah has built, and

the leading role that the party has played in

the resistance. When pressed on the

question of whether Hizballah would attack

Israel per se, Raad argues that the goal of

the opposition is to liberate Lebanese soil.

As for what will happen in the future, these

are practical questions that will be decided

in time.

In response to the observation that the

Hizballah position is ambiguous and

provides ammunition to those in Israel who

argue against withdrawal, Raad responds

that the Hizballah position is ambiguity,

clear ambiguity (waadih). For Raad,

political decisions are a reflection of costs

and benefits and relative power, which

implies that so long as Israel retains the

capacity to respond disproportionately to

attacks, there is little incentive to continue

the attacks southward. Raad also

emphasizes that Hizballah is not the only

player in the game, and that the Lebanese

government or Lebanese outside of

Hizballah may raise the question of the 27

Lebanese villages captured in the 1948 and

1949 fighting and incorporated into Israel.

These villages fell within the boundaries of

Le Grand Liban (Greater Lebanon), as

defined by France during the mandate

period. Seven of these villages were

populated predominantly by Shii Muslims.

Of course, other Lebanese forces have

attacked Israel's "security zone" as well,

including Amal and a variety of secular

militants belonging to Baathist, Communist

and Nasirist organizations, but Hizballah

has conducted the lion's share of attacks,

and none of the other Lebanese groups

espouse goals other than liberating the

South. The 325,000 Palestinian refugees in

Lebanon are another matter, especially

since many of them trace their roots to

Haifa and the villages of the Galilee, areas

which are now very much part of the state

of Israel. Although the camps were

disarmed in 1991, significant arms caches

remain, and camps like Ain al-Hilwah, near

Saida, have a number of armed factions

that reportedly maintain cooperative

relations with Hizballah. These groups

could certainly choose to mount

independent attacks against Israel, but they

lack the broad social base of Hizballah, and

they would risk a further exacerbation of

their already quite difficult relations with

the Lebanese.

Like Raad, Fadlallah argues that

ambiguity is the calculated position of

Hizballah and that this ambiguity increases

the anxiety and the fear of Israel. What

would happen in the case of an Israeli

withdrawal? He replies that they would

welcome this withdrawal, while adding that

Hizballah would not sign any agreement

with Israel or otherwise legitimate Israel.

Notwithstanding this reticence, Hizballah

has been willing to negotiate with Israel

through intermediaries. Not only has

Hizballah done so in order to redefine the

rules of warfare in southern Lebanon, most

recently in April 1996, but, with German

mediation, it entered into extensive

negotiations for the purpose of exchanging

the bodies of fallen fighters. The latter

negotiations culminated in the summer of

1996, and they may present a model for

future indirect negotiations. Fadlallah

admits, possibly with some delight, that the

withdrawal would cause some confusion in

the governments of Lebanon and Syria, and

in the Arab world. There would be a

necessary period of adjustment. Fadlallah

adds the formula that is now familiar,

namely that Muslims cannot ignore the

Israeli occupation of Palestine, which it is

the responsibility of all Muslims to liberate.

He adds that this is not a responsibility that

the Lebanese Muslims must shoulder on

their own and that the attacks against the

Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon are

for the purpose of ending the occupation of

Lebanese soil. He tacks on the politically

correct position that "we would also insist

on the liberation of the Golan Heights.

Despite the intentional ambiguity, one

walks away from such discussions with a

clear sense that Hizballah has no appetite to

launch a military campaign across the

Israeli border, should Israel withdraw from

the South. This is also the firm impression

that one gains from the supporters of

Hizballah, who neither hide their hatred of

Israel nor their view that attacks across the

border would only inflict further suffering

on the people of the South. Hizballah, of

course, must be mindful that the mood of

general support that it now enjoys is hardly

guaranteed, and that it would sacrifice

much of its support base if it provoked

violent Israeli retaliation against southern

Lebanon. For that matter, it is apt to

reiterate that Hizballah calculates that it

will be the beneficiary of an Israeli

withdrawal, given its celebrated role in the

resistance. Certainly, the modality of an

Israeli withdrawal would include

provisions for disarming Hizballah in the

South, as well as the creation of a security

regime for the area. It is precisely this

eventuality for which Hizballah has been

visibly preparing since its party congress in

July 1995. At that time, the Arab-Israeli

peace process enjoyed considerable

momentum, and although Hizballah

denounced the Oslo accord, as did Iran, the

party was making a Realpolitik

accommodation to the fact that the train

was moving whether Hizballah liked it or

not.

DOES INCLUSION PROMOTE MODERATION?

Given the vitality of Islamist

oppositional movements in Middle East,

there is a crucial question to be answered:

how does the inclusion of these movements

in the political game, including elections,

affect their behavior and their goals? In

most instances, even in fully free and

scrupulously conducted parliamentary

elections, the Islamist movements are

unlikely to win more than a quarter to a

third of the seats. In this sense, the

Algerian experience was a unique one,

since the structure of the winner-take-all

elections tended to exaggerate the victory

of FIS. Otherwise, the Islamist movements

have not been able to attract the support of

a majority of the population. Hizballah is

certainly in this category, given the

structural constraints of the Lebanese

system in which all of the Muslim seats

account for only 50 percent of the

parliament. Hizballah won a total of eight

seats in the 1992 elections (when

participation rates were extremely low due

to a boycott), and seven seats in 1996,

while its non-shii sympathizers won four

seats in each case. Hizballah has shown

itself to be a serious political party. At the

same time, there is no question that

Hizballah must take account of the

heterogeneous electorate in Lebanon. Even

at the most generous estimates, only 40

percent of all Lebanese are Shiis. Of these,

a significant percentage do not support

Hizballah. While there are some crossover

votes, as in the Beqaa, few non-Shia are

likely to vote for Hizballah.

Some scholars, including myself, have

argued that the opportunity to participate

tends to encourage pragmatism and

compromise. This is not a hard proposition

to comprehend. Given the logic of

majority decision making, any party or

grouping holding well less than 51 percent

of the vote must make bargains in order to

get its work done. This certainly applies to

Hizballah in Lebanon, which has controlled

less than 10 percent of the seats in

parliament. Lebanese parliamentarians,

including senior Maronites, a former Sunni

prime minister, and highly respected

Armenian deputies have noted in private

interviews (in 1995 and 1996) that the

Hizballah deputies have behaved

responsibly and cooperatively. They have

often built political alliances in the

parliament on pragmatic grounds, while

they are also among the most outspoken

members of the dwindling political

opposition. In the latter sense, their

positions have sometimes directly

challenged those favored by Syria. In the

view of a number of parliamentarians and

many other Lebanese insiders with whom I

have spoken, this experiment in political

inclusion is working, and Hizballah is

being gradually absorbed by the political

system.

Of course, the opposite view is that the

participation of these groups in politics is

purely instrumental. They seek to subvert

the process, and their participation is only a

subterfuge. In my view, this perspective is

mistaken, rooted in an idealistic vision of

participant politics that underestimates the

degree to which politics is an end in itself,

and ignores the "pragmatizing" effect of

ordinary politics. A decade or more ago

Hizballah came to terms with the realities

of Lebanon and jettisoned its commitment

to establishing a system of Islamic rule in

the country.

In other settings, such as Pakistan

(Jamaat i Islami), Turkey (Refah) and

Jordan (the Islamic Action Front), other

Islamist parties have competed successfully

in electoral politics and, in the process,

have come to terms with their inability to

restructure politics in their image, short of

revolution.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Increasingly, Hizballahi officials have

emphasized their desire for a dialogue with

the United States. For instance, in July

1996 Fadlallah stressed his desire for

dialogue (hiwaar). Other officials express

their desire to improve the image of

Hizballah in America. This is a publicrelations

job that would challenge the best

that Madison Avenue has to offer.

Moreover, Hizballah's calculated ambiguity

leaves too much to the imagination of those

who have been on the receiving end of

Hizballah violence. When pressed on his

views, Fadlallah emphasizes that he could

not show all of his cards, implying some

give in his position and the position of

Hizballah.

A dialogue of violence has been

underway in South Lebanon for some time,

defining the permissible limits of violent

action for both the IDF and the resistance.

Far less developed is a dialogue to end the

violence. Obviously, Hizballah's Syrian

allies will have a lot to say about that

dialogue, but if the violence is to come to

an end, Hizballah will have to peel away

the layers of ambiguity surrounding its

position. To this end, it would be

productive for U.S. officials to recognize,

publicly, that however opprobrious some of

its actions continue to be, Hizballah is a

fixture of Lebanese politics, not simply an

armed and violent faction. As U.S. policy

now stands, the ostracism of Hizballah

pushes it squarely into the arms of Syria.

Under some circumstances this might be a

useful result, but it also hands Damascus a

stack of chips, gratis. In fact, Hizballah's

interests and Syria!s are often at cross

purposes in Lebanon, and there may be

some merit in probing the contradictions.

While it would be politically risky for the

United States to open a high-profile

dialogue with Hizballah, it is going to be

very difficult to reach a settlement in

southern Lebanon without sustained

discussions in which Hizballah plays a role.

For its part, Israel has had some limited

success in direct negotiations, as evidenced

by the German-mediated negotiations in

1996.

Like it or not, Hizballah is a serious

player in Lebanon. Following an Israeli

withdrawal from the South and the

anticipated disarming of Hizballah, the

organization will almost inevitably fade in

importance, but it will certainly not

disappear. The party's organizational roots

now penetrate the Shia community and

they are not easily uprooted. Even after the

guns and Katyushas are collected,

Hizballah's reputation will benefit from its

leading role in the resistance, which, like it

or not, is widely admired in Lebanon,

especially among the Shia. Hizballah has

been able to build an efficient and

responsive organization that meets many of

the needs of its constituents, while avoiding

the tag of corruption that taints its political

rivals. Assuming that Syria's grip on

Lebanon persists, Hizballah will continue

to be a valuable asset in the game of

check-and-balance that Syria favors in order to

insure that viable challenges to its power

do not coalesce. Syria's friendly relations

with Iran also argue for keeping Hizballah

in the game, and, in any case, attempting to

squash Hizballah would have heavy costs

for Syria. All of the facts seem to

underline that while Hizballah's future as

an armed element may be somewhat

uncertain, its survival as a viable political

player is not.

(1) See Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of

Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987) for a more detailed analysis.

(2) Biographies of the leading personalities discussed here may be found in the

Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, four vols. (Oxford and New

York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

(3) Most of these views are expressed in a remarkable article by Yitzhak Baili

[Clinton Bailey], "Hizballah as Parable," Ha'aretz, October 19, 1995, p. B1.

(4) Hassan Nasrallah, "An Interview with Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah," Middle East

Insight, vol. 12, nos. 4-5 (May-August 1996), pp. 38-43, 84-86.

(5) See Rosemary Hollis, ed., Lebanon on Hold (London: Chatham House, 1996) for

analyses by leading American, European, Arab and Israeli experts.

(6) Of course, both sides have targeted civilians intentionally, but given the

disparity in hardware and destructive power, many more Lebanese civilians have

been killed and wounded than Israeli civilians. Since 1992, twelve Israeli

civilians have died as a result of Hizballah attacks, while over 500 Lebanese

and Palestinian civilians have died. See the important report by Joost

Hilterman, primary author, Civilian Pawns (Washington, DC: Middle East Watch,

19%).

Dr. Norton is professor of anthropology and international relations at

Boston University. He is the author of Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the

Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987, Arabic edition:

Beirut: Dar al-Maklud, 1987), and the editor of civil Society in the Middle

East, two volumes (Leiden, New York and Koln: E.J Brill, 1995, 1996) He

is beginning a sequel to Amal and the Shia in which he will consider the

political reconstruction of Lebanon, and especially the role of the Shii

community.