Conduct unbecoming: allegations of sexual misconduct at the United States Air Force Academy.

Emery, Charles R. ; Benton, James E.

CASE DESCRIPTION

The primary subject matter of this case involves the detection of cause factors and proposal of corrective actions to eliminate chronic sexual misconduct in an organization that rewards machismo. Despite the Academy's emphasis on officer integrity and honor, previous attempts over the last decade, to correct these problems have failed. Secondary issues examined include leadership, ethics, whistle blowing, sexual harassment, and the confidentiality of reporting along with how to develop character and plant seeds for organizational change. The objective is to make the students develop an investigative process that examines interrelated and often subtle cause factors to develop well justified corrective actions. This case is appropriate for junior or senior undergraduate students as well as graduate students studying business policy or strategy, human resource management, organizational behavior and ethics. This case can be easily varied in its scope through the array of focused discussion questions. The case is designed to be taught in one class hour and is expected to require three to four hours of outside preparation depending upon the level of sophistication; it is ideal for either individual or team assignments/presentations.

CASE SYNOPSIS

Imagine the outrage if one out of five female American P.O.Ws said they had been sexually assaulted by Iraqi. Well, that's how many female Air Force cadets say they have been assaulted--not by the enemy, but by men supposed to be their comrades in arms. This case study chronicles the June-September, 2003, investigation of a decade of alleged sexual misconduct at the United States Air Force Academy. A panel of investigators, appointed by the Secretary of Defense and headed by the Honorable Tillie K. Fowler, examined the awareness of misconduct and the Academy's organizational culture, climate, structure, curriculum, reporting and response procedures and leadership (internal and external) in an attempt to identify root causes and to provide lasting recommendations for the prevention and intervention of any future abuses.

BACKGROUND

It was September 17, 2003 and the Honorable Tillie K. Fowler sat in her temporary office in Washington D.C. contemplating what recommendations her Panel of six investigators might give Congress next week that would finally resolve a decade of sexual misconduct at the United States Air Force Academy. Tillie, a former Congressional representative from Florida (1993-2001), had been chosen by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to execute Presidential Order H.R. 1559; the review of sexual misconduct allegations at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA). This Panel was given ninety days to investigate and prepare a report of findings and conclusions to Congress. The Panel's prime directive was to (1) review actions taken and contemplated by Academy and other Air Force personnel in response to allegations of sexual assault, (2) review the effectiveness of the process, procedures and policies used at the Academy to respond to allegations of sexual misconduct, and (3) review the relationship between the command climate for women at the Academy, including factors that may have produced a fear of retribution of reporting sexual misconduct, and the circumstances that resulted in the sexual misconduct (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2003). Note: this was the fourth investigative team chartered during 2003 to exam sexual misconduct at the USAFA and the only one not formally affiliated with the Department of Defense.

Pressure for results (and in some cases, heads) was coming from all directions and the press was fanning the flames of outrage. Government statistics indicated that three percent of women in college report rape or attempted rape-it was over seven percent at the Air Force Academy. Further, there was reason to believe that there was a higher rate of unreported cases at the Academy than a typical university. Sixty female cadets had come forward within the last year to allege that they were raped or assaulted. Sadly it appeared that senior civilian and military leadership of the Air Force and the Air Force Academy were aware of serious and persistent problems of sexual assault and gender harassment at the Academy since 1993. While numerous cause factors had been identified by previous teams, their recommendations had failed to resolve the problem. Also, it's particularly surprising that the problems haven't been resolved given that a high percentage of female cadets come from military families. Certainly, this begged the questions of whether the root causes had been truly identified and whether corrective actions had been taken with resolve.

For example: in February, 2003, Senator Wayne Allard, member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, presented the Secretary of the Air Force with a two-page letter requesting investigation and/or clarification of several constituent complaints. The following are key excerpts from that letter (McAllister, 2003).

1. There is some confusion about the number of cadets that have been raped or sexually assaulted at the Academy. Provide the number of cadets that have reported rapes and sexual assault to each of the following: the CASIE Program, the counseling center, and the Academy hospital.

2. Several cadets who may have been raped or sexually assaulted were punished before the rape or assault investigation was completed.

3. Some former and current cadets have reported difficulties in securing the rape kits and investigative reports. The AFOSI stated that their rape kits and investigative reports were lost.

4. A number of victims have complained about not being permitted to bring someone with them to AFOSI questioning sessions or to meetings with senior Academy officials.

5. All of the former and current cadets have expressed concern about not knowing whether or not their alleged assailant was punished.

6. When a cadet is raped or sexually assaulted, in many cases, alcohol is involved. While it is well-known that cadets are not permitted to drink, it appears that the consumption of alcohol is common practice. What is the Academy doing to discourage underage drinking?

7. What, if anything, did the Academy do with the 1994 General Accounting Office (GAO) recommendations to reduce an environment conducive to sexual harassment?

In March 2003, findings of the Allard investigation and interim findings of the Air Force General Counsel's investigation, prompted the Air Force to issue an immediate "Agenda for Change"--a series of preliminary efforts to improve the safety and security of every cadet and regain the trust and confidence of the American people in the Academy. It was developed by officers and leaders with experience at the Academy, other academies, and Air Force ROTC in an effort to swiftly start the process of implementing decisive changes. Shortly after the "Agenda for Change" was issued, the Secretary of the Air Force directed the Air Force Inspector General to undertake a parallel investigation (to the General Counsel's) into every case where a victim felt that justice had not been done so as to assess command accountability. While the Air Force must be commended on its sense of urgency, it should be noted that many of the strategies touted as reforms are actually measures that have been tried under past administrations. Of 25 items on the "Agenda for Change" that affect cadets directly, at least nine aren't new at all.

In June 2003, Air Force General Counsel Mary L. Walker released The Report of the Working Group Concerning Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy (hereafter referred to as the "Working Group Report"). The Working Group Report covered many aspects of cadet life, Academy policies and sexual assault reporting procedures in place at the Academy during the last ten years. While the investigation found factors contributing to an unhealthy climate for female cadets (e.g., perceived negative consequences for reporting assaults), it stated that there was "no systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the academy, institutional avoidance of responsibility, or systemic maltreatment of cadets who report sexual assault. In short, it avoided any reference to the responsibility of Air Force Headquarters for the failure of leadership which occurred at the Academy. Recommendations from the "Agenda for Change" and the General Counsel's final report were translated into 63 action items for implementation and tracking (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2003).

On July 11, 2003, James Roche, Air Force Secretary, announced that General Dallager, the commander of the Air Force Academy from 2000 to 2003, will be demoted as he retires. Roche said, "He failed to detect and stop the school's sexual-assault crisis." "He should have taken notice of the indicators of the problems and he should have aggressively pursued solutions to them." The rebuke represented a reversal for Roche, who originally said the general and other academy leaders shouldn't be blamed for long-standing problems (Soraghan, 2003). (Note: The three star to two star demotion is equivalent to a fine of $10,000 per year in retirement pay)

Over the past month, at least 22 other women-13 former cadets and nine currently enrolled-have made similar charges, accusing academy officials not only of failing to investigate sexual assaults but of actively discouraging women from reporting them, and retaliating when they did. In the past decade, only one academy cadet had been court-martialed on a rape charge and that cadet was acquitted. One cadet summed up the victims' feelings toward leadership by saying, "the guy who did this to me knew nothing would happen to him" (Thomas, 2003).

Last week, the DoD IG released its follow-on report on the United States Air Force Academy Sexual Assault Survey. The survey of 579 female cadets in the Academy classes 2003-2006 (87.9% of the total female population) found that: 43 cadets (7.4% of all respondents)--including 15 members of the Class of 2003 (11.7% of that class)--indicated they had been victims of at least one rape or attempted rape in their time at the Academy; 109 cadets (18.8% of all respondents) indicated they had been victims of at least one instance of sexual assault in their time at the Academy; Cadets indicated that only 33 (18.6%) of the 177 sexual assault incidents were reported to the authorities; 143 (80.8%) were indicated as not reported; 143 of the 177 sexual assault incidents were recorded by the victims as not being reported to any authority because of embarrassment (in 77 incidents), fear of ostracism by peers (in 66 incidents), fear of some form of reprisal (in 61 incidents) and the belief that nothing would be done (in 58 incidents). The top two reasons given for why cadets thought that victims were not reporting (after embarrassment) were fear of ostracism by peers and fear of being punished for other infractions. Especially disturbing was the finding that 88.4% of cadets who were rape or attempted rape victims disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "most cadets are willing to report a sexual assault incident regardless of loyalty to the offender." Obviously, things didn't appear to be getting better at the Academy despite this year's intense press coverage and investigative attention. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.63).

The last 83 days of the investigation, under the harsh spotlight of public opinion, had been intense, illuminating and at some times frustrating. Early in the investigation, there were the typical cries of "witch hunt" and "whitewash" and one of our panelists was pushed to resign after telling AP Radio that, "Due to the fact that many of the women making the allegations were involved with drinking, partying, strip poker, what I call high-risk behaviors ... the veracity of theses allegations may be suspect" ("United States", 2003). As the investigation progressed, however, the press and the general public became one of our most valuable sources of information. It truly appeared that the problems were long-standing and deeply imbedded in the fabric of the Academy. Further, they appeared to be specific to the Air Force Academy; interviews with officials at the other military academies and the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and the Merchant Marine Academy said they had relatively few cases of sexual assault, and that they had rigorous systems to ensure that complaints were thoroughly addressed. We realized there weren't going to be any quick fixes. Our investigation examined the awareness of misconduct over the last decade and the Academy's organizational culture, climate, structure, curriculum, reporting and response procedures and leadership (internal and external). We experienced the gravity of this crisis first-hand. We were stunned to hear stories from victims, many still too afraid to go public with their stories and, more disturbing, too afraid to make an official report of the crime. They shared with us how their lives have been torn apart by a violent assault and an aftermath that most of them suffered alone and in silence because of an atmosphere of fear and retribution by peers aided by either indifference, incompetence or a combination of both by an Academy leadership they believed failed them. Now was the time to pull all of our findings together, identify the root causes and provide lasting recommendations for the prevention and intervention for any future abuses.

WARNING SIGNS: A DECADE OF AWARENESS

Prior to 1993, few sexual assaults were reported at the Academy. This infrequency combined with the perceived high quality of entering cadets may have caused Academy leaders to believe the institution was virtually free of sexual assaults. That perception ended sharply in 1993 when 16 cases of sexual assault were reported. The surge of sex crimes at the Academy contrasted sharply with the low rates at other military academies. In response to the incidents, Brig. General Hosmer, then-Superintendent, reached out to the cadet population, and to female cadets specifically, to gain a better understanding of the cadet experiences and perceptions about sexual assault and sexual harassment. His meeting with female cadets made it clear that the problem was significantly greater than he previously suspected. A few days after meeting with the women, the general met with all the male cadets to get their perceptions. Interestingly, while more than 50 percent of all the female cadets had said they knew of sexual harassment cases, only 9 percent of the men did. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.25)

General Hosmer attempted to improve the Academy environment by making changes to the Academy's sexual assault response program, including establishing an informal policy of confidential reporting. He commissioned the Academy's Center for Character Development to improve the overall character of the cadet population through educational and training programs. He also created a sexual assault hotline operated outside of the chain of command that offered counseling to victims of sexual assault with the assurance of confidentiality. Another change was the institution of a victim amnesty program to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults. Under the amnesty policy, the chain of command could forego punishment of victim misconduct in order to encourage the reporting of sexual assault. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.25).

In January 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report on sexual harassment at each of the Service Academies which indicated that women were subject to harassment at all of the Service Academies at a level that portended a serious threat to the mission of the Academies to educate and train future military officers. While the focus of the GAO report was sexual harassment and not sexual assault, it should have provided a significant indicator of culture and climate problems with the treatment of women. Further, it should have prompted an investigation at the Air Force Academy; particularly in light of the previous year's incidents. However, there is no evidence that the Academy took any direct action in response to this GAO report. Another more direct indicator in 1994 of the extent of sexual assault problems at the Academy was the formation of an "underground" support group initially comprised of five cadet victims of sexual assault who did not have confidence in the Academy's formal reporting system. Some female cadets who were victims of sexual assault did not want to report the incidents to law enforcement. Instead, they chose to obtain support from other victims and not make formal reports that would involve the chain of command. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.26).

Also, in 1994, a sophomore cadet alleged in a lawsuit that during the vigorous and realistic Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape program, fellow cadets choked her into unconsciousness, splattered her with urine and shook her so hard she received chest injuries. One cadet, acting in the role of captor, took her into the woods, made her take her shirt off and lie down while he simulated a rape. An Air force investigation dismissed 15 of her more serious complaints, including a claim that male cadets had videotaped her undergoing the simulated rape and that she had been maliciously targeted. The service, however, acknowledged she had been slapped, shaken, called obscene names and forced to walk with a stick in her pants to simulate masturbation. (Pearce, 1996).

In March 1995, the GAO issued a follow-on report to its 1994 investigation of sexual harassment, and concluded that the issue had not improved at any of the Academies. Female students interviewed for the study said, overall, that they had seen no improvement in the atmosphere for reporting sexual harassment and that they continued to fear reprisals from male students and commanders if they did report incidents. William E. Beusse, an assistant director of the accounting office said that "The indications are there's been relatively no change, despite what the services have done to sensitize cadets and midshipmen about the issue and dealing with cases when they come up." The 1995 report also found that 78 percent of the Air Force Academy's female cadets claimed to be harassed on a recurring basis--a significant increase from the 59 percent reported in the 1990-1991 study. The most common forms of harassment were verbal abuse or personalized graffiti. Female cadets at the Air Force Academy noted, "We've been called so many names that sometimes it doesn't even register that they are inappropriate. The lack of respect that the men have here for women is appalling, and challenging their actions only ostracizes women from the unit." (Schmitt, 1995)

In 1996, Air Force Headquarters recognized that the procedures to address sexual assault, were not working at the Academy as expected. It was hoped that the counselors within the confidential reporting system could encouraged or persuade the victims to report the crimes to the Academy's Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) and the chain of command. It appears that over time, counselors did not perform this function and the investigation and prosecution of sexual assaults became secondary to victim treatment and counseling. The result was the confidential reporting program provided counseling for sexual assault victims but interfered with the timely investigation and prosecution of assaults. The majority of cases were going unreported and even those that were reported were reported a number of days after the incident. The AFOSI stated that the Academy's program of confidentiality promoted the perception of cover-ups, jeopardized the safety of other cadets and the ability to bring offenders to justice, and could result in the commission of an unsuitable officer (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.28).

On June 3, 1996, a psychiatric consultant working for the Air Force Surgeon General briefed the then-Chief of Staff of the Air Force that "the problem of sexual assault and victimization continues at the Academy in large measure due to a cultural or institutional value system. This climate promotes silence, discourages victims from obtaining help, and increases the victim's fear of reprisal." Additionally the consultant stated that the Academy lacked a coordinated policy linking the various support agencies into a safety net for the traumatized victim, and expressed concern about the policy that allowed victims of assault to determine if they would identify the perpetrator or press charges (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.31).

By 1998, the Academy's leadership had every reason to believe sexual misconduct was an issue worthy of attention. The Chief of Sexual Assault Services at the Academy provided a briefing entitled "We Have a Problem" to the school's leadership ("top six") which estimated that 24% of female cadets responding to the 1997 Social Climate Survey indicated that they were sexually assaulted since coming to the Academy. It is not evident what the leadership did in response to learning that a sizable portion of the female cadet population reported being sexually assaulted after arriving at the Academy. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.35).

In 1999, the Academy was rocked by another highly publicized rape. Freshman cadet Fullilove had joined some friends to watch a movie at a lecture hall on school grounds where no alcohol is allowed. As Fullilove and three girlfriends were leaving, an upperclassman they knew offered them a ride to their dorms. Fullilove was the last to be dropped off. She recalls that she wasn't particularly worried when he pulled over and locked the doors. However, seconds later "He forced himself on me. I tried to scream and fight, but of course everybody's in shape at the Academy. Me against him was no fight." Dazed and confused, she told no one in the days afterward what had happened. He was an upperclassman who could ruin her career with just one accusation. She knew all too well from older female cadets the consequences of reporting a rape. "We were told if you want to stay at the academy, don't report it. They'll get you [thrown] out." But when her attacker walked unannounced into her dorm room two days later, saying he was "sorry if he had done anything inappropriate," she realized the threat would always be there. She decided to leave. Four months later, she decided to report the rape but that proved fruitless; even for an officer's daughter ("Rape scandal", 2003).

In August 2001, a Task Force assessing the Academy's Honor Code, Honor System, and the conditions surrounding the Honor System reported that confidence in the Honor System had declined and stated that "the honor environment and culture needs constant scrutiny and frequent review by Academy's leadership to insure accomplishment of the school's character-building mission. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.41).

At the beginning of 2003, a new round of sexual assault allegations surfaced in the press. Also, a survey conducted by Inspector General of the Department of Defense reported that nearly 12 percent of the women who graduated from the USAFA this year were the victims of rape or attempted rape in their four years at the academy with the vast majority never reporting the incidents to the authorities. Just last week, embarrassment arose again when a senior cadet was charged with using his computer and the academy's network to arrange group sex (Graham, 2003). Things didn't appear to be getting better.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY

The United States Air Force Academy is located on an 18, 500 acre campus near Colorado Springs, Colorado, at the base of the Rampart Range at an elevation of 7, 163 feet. It is the youngest of the four service academies; the first class entered in July 1955. Since then, more than 35,000 cadets have graduated in 44 classes; approximately 51.2 percent of the graduates are still on active duty. Currently there are 4, 072 students enrolled with the following demographics: 84% male, 16% female, 1% American Indian, 4% Asian, 5% Black, 7% Hispanic, and 83% White. Cadets graduate with a bachelor of science degree in any one of 30 academic majors. The most popular majors are engineering (22%), biology (9%), operations research (9%), and political science (7%). Class size is intentionally small to maximize discussion and accountability; 78% of the classes have fewer than 20 students; 22% have between 20 and 50. There are 558 full-time faculty members which equates to a student/faculty ratio of 7:1. The academic experience is primarily conducted within Fairchild Hall's 250 classrooms, 45 science labs and 13 major lecture halls. The cadets are housed in two dormitories; Vandenberg Hall (1,325 rooms) and Sijan Hall (936 rooms). They are fed within the Mitchell Hall dining room which covers 1.7 acres; the staff serves the entire cadet wing at the same time--in and out in only 25 minutes. (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm)

By every standard, this undergraduate only institution, is considered as "most selective" by higher education rating authorities. Twelve percent of all applicants are selected and 100% of those selected attend. The average selectee had a 3.8 high school GPA and SAT scores of 625 verbal and 649 math. Fifty-six percent were from the top tenth of their high school class, 87% in top quarter, and 99% in top half. Despite the extremely rigorous first year, ninety-two percent of the freshman return for their sophomore year. The average cost to put one cadet through the four-year program is $282,562; the education portion is valued at about $123,000. (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm).

The academic experience is designed to produce officers who have the knowledge, character, and motivation essential to leadership. As such, the curriculum consists of four developmental areas: military, academic, physical and character. Each of these areas is designed to instill self-discipline and ethical accountability for one's actions. Further, the experience is offered in an environment of trust and respect, where all people can achieve high productivity, are committed to organizational goals, and can reach their full potential. (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm)

The Air Force has led the way in the integration of women into the Service Academies. Although integration was not mandated until 1976, in 1972 the Air Force was the sole Service to begin strategizing the integration of women. During the first year of integration, the Air Force Academy accepted women as 10% of its incoming class (compared to 6% at the Naval Academy and 8% at West Point) and those women graduated at a higher rate than their counterparts at the Naval Academy and West Point. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.69).

Vision and Mission

The vision of the Air Force Academy is to be "Recognized worldwide as the premier developer of aerospace officers ... leaders with impeccable character and essential knowledge ... prepared and motivated to lead our Air Force and nation." The mission is to "Inspire and develop outstanding young men and women to become Air Force officers with knowledge, character and discipline; motivated to lead the greatest aerospace-force in service to the nation." As one can see, character development is a critical part of both the Academy's vision and mission and as such, should have quantifiable and measurable objectives; none were evident. Character is defined by the Academy as "One's moral compass: the sum of those qualities of moral excellence which move a person to do the right thing despite pressures or temptations to the contrary." In addition to the emphasis on character, several core values are established to help link the organization's culture to its vision. These core values (i.e., integrity first, service before self and excellence in all we do) form the centerpiece of a cadet's ethical standards and good conduct and are tied to the military profession's unique demand for self-discipline, stamina, courage, and selfless service to the nation. (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm)

Organizational Structure

The Air Force Academy is commanded by a Superintendent (Lt. General, 3-star) who reports directly to both the Secretary of the Air Force (civilian) and the Air Force Chief of Staff (4-star). Six organizational commanders report directly to the Superintendent: the Commandant of Cadets (1-star), the Director of Athletics, the Dean of Faculty (1-star), the Air Base Wing Commander, the Prep School Commander, and the Director of Admissions. The focus of this investigation was primarily on the organizations headed by the Dean of Faculty and the Commandant of Cadets. The Dean of Faculty among other things is in charge of the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. The Cadet Counseling Center is part of this organization. (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm),

The Commandant of Cadets is in charge of the Cadet Wing. The Cadet Wing is structured similar to an active duty Air Force Wing. The Wing is broken out into four Groups, and each Group is further subdivided into nine squadrons. The First-Class cadets make up the Cadet Officer leadership, and Second-Class cadets fill the Cadet Non-Commissioned Officer leadership positions. Each Squadron is assigned an active duty officer, Air Officer Commanding ("AOC") and an active duty non-commissioned officer, Military Training leader ("MTL"), to mentor and assist the cadet leadership and entire squadron in its training and educational missions (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.66). (Note: Over the last 5 years, approximately 20% of all AOCs and MTLs have been female and approximately 15.5% of the 155 cadet First-Class leadership positions have filled by women.)

Cadet Training

Only the best and brightest, the top 20% of their high school class, have a chance at admission; this is the most selective of the service academies. The male to female ratio is maintained at approximate 8-1 to reflect that of the active duty Air Force. Over the last decade athletes have been actively recruited; currently, recruited athletes represent 25% of the freshman class. Each cadet is on a government-paid scholarship following a congressional or presidential appointment, and each graduate is required to put in at least five additional years of military service. Interestingly, the Air Force Academy has the lowest alumni giving rate, 18% versus 42% and 30% at the other academies. A significant organizational aspect of any military academy, which differentiates it from the purely academic focus of a civilian university, is its military training component. The cadets are held to a higher moral standard than most college students ("The Best", 2003).

Training begins with Basic Cadet Training ("BCT"), conducted under the umbrella of a training structure known as the "Fourth-Class System." Freshmen are known as Cadets Fourth-Class. The rest of the cadets are considered upperclassmen and are divided by class as well. Sophomores are referred to as Cadets Third-Class, juniors are Cadets Second-Class and seniors are Cadets First-Class. The purpose of the Fourth-Class System is to place new cadets into an environment in which their intellect and resources are tested under continuous stress to learn how to perform with competing demands. In general, the military conditions people to use force to accomplish objectives. The training at the academies focuses on the use of control and power in command--some take it too far. Further, the panel recognized that any system in which people are placed in a position of power over others has the potential for abuse. The cadet authority structure establishes a disparity of power that may make subordinate cadets, particularly female Fourth-Class cadets, more vulnerable to upper class male cadets who might abuse their authority. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.68).According to a 1998 graduate, a typical example of this type of abuse was when upperclassmen order pajama-clad female cadets to do push-ups in bed so they could glimpse their breasts. Now in basic training, freshmen women are told "you're not required to go to an upperclassman's room alone or walk out in the woods with an upperclassman in the middle of the night." In addition, females in basic training are currently given various forms of prevention and awareness training to prevent sexual assaults. However, even given these interventions, 53 percent of the sexual assaults victims were first-year students. (Graham, 2003)

The potential for abuse of power at the Academy exists due to many factors, including close living conditions, the Academy and the cadet area's remote location from the rest of the base population and facilities, the controlled and disciplined environment in which all cadets (especially Fourth-Class cadets) are expected to live, the supervisory role upperclassmen have over Fourth-Class cadets, and the mission of transitioning cadets from civilian life to a military environment that emphasizes teamwork but is based upon rank structure. Freshmen are openly called "doolies," derived from the Greek word for slave. A "firstie," as a senior is known, is defined on a website run by cadet parents as "the immortal, having superhuman powers and disposed to acts of great wonder and cunning" ("Roots of sexual", 2003).

In late 1992, the GAO reviewed all the Service Academies' Fourth-Class Systems and their relationship to one form of abuse of power: hazing. It found that internal investigations and major overhauls of the Fourth-Class System at West Point in 1990 and the Plebe System at the Naval Academy from 1990-1992 resulted in a significant drop in hazing. The Air Force Academy did not conduct similar internal reviews of hazing cases and therefore failed to see any decrease in hazing complaints. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.80).

Another common criticism of the Fourth-Class System is that the nature of BCT tends to instill or foster an ethic that promotes loyalty to peers above loyalty to values. This contributes to a tolerance of behaviors that can lead to sexual assault and in some instances a failure to report sexual assault. Beginning at BCT, cadets are placed in situations which tend to unify them in an effort to accomplish a particular goal or mission or to survive a shared experience. Over time, and perhaps not even as a conscious decision, cadets grow to rely on and trust each other above all else. Violations of that trust have severe consequences. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.81).

Moreover, for some cadets, the fear of retribution, reprimands and shunning prevents reporting of abuses. In the past, when Fourth-Class cadets arrived at the Academy, they were immediately indoctrinated into a harsh discipline system that involved constant yelling. This type of discipline continued throughout BCT and most of the Fourth-Class year until recognition in the spring. While at BCT, cadets were challenged physically, emotionally and mentally in an effort that some believe is intended to "break their spirit" and help them "adjust" to the military. The Fourth-Class System is actually intended to eliminate factors such as economic status, background and race and gender issues while teaching the value of teamwork, dedication to the mission and putting the unit above oneself. However, a consequence of such treatment is often a lowered self-esteem and a sense that to survive the environment one must wholly rely on one's peers to help make it through this shared experience. During BCT, one first-year cadet said that an upper classman offered to store her contraband: CDs, radio, and DVDs which are not permitted for freshman. The male cadet then threatened to expose the arrangement to coerce sexual acts. (Note: That kind of scenario, however, has prompted the Academy to now grant amnesty from minor infractions when allegations of sexual assault are involved.) Another female cadet told investigators, "I feel sexually harassed daily and feel I have no where to go and no one to tell. I get poor military grades from officers and cadets due to my gender. It makes me sick what I have to go through every day, and I think about quitting all the time." Female cadets left the school at higher rates during their early years. In the class of 1981 (the second class with females), for example, 58 percent of female cadets left the academy, compared with 40 percent of the men. While the gap is closing, a double-digit gap still exists. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p. 81).

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Organizational culture is generally defined as the values, beliefs, expectations, norms, symbols, myths, rituals and heroes that influence behavior (Schein, 1985). A strong culture (i.e., one in which the majority of members have the same beliefs) is highly resistant to change. Our interviews indicated that the Academy has an extremely strong culture and one whose very fiber celebrates excessive machismo and a male dominated power structure. This attitude and structure places young women under the unquestioned authority of male upperclassmen and emphasizes teamwork and loyalty over the safety and well-being of its most vulnerable charges. Outside experts say a culture like the Academy's--where males dominate and the youngest women have little or no power--commonly fosters female harassment and opens the door to sexual assault and rape. "Harassment denigrates women and contributes to a 'lesser than' mentality. Under this type of environment, it's easier to violate them, hurt them or cheat them in some way," said Nelson, an Ohio psychotherapist who wrote the book "For Love of Country: Confronting Rape and Sexual Harassment in the Military." Firestone, a University of Texas sociologist, concurs that the really bad stuff, like assault and rape, almost never happens if the environment is free of harassment ("Roots of sexual", 2003). Similarly, a University of Iowa study noted that rape, sexual harassment and discrimination are related to negative attitudes toward women. These negative attitudes contribute to a climate of acceptance, i.e. that it is OK to do these kinds of things.

Climate Survey

Social Climate Surveys are a standard tool used by commanders across the Services to keep informed about sensitive issues and the attitudes of service members. In turn, these surveys should be used to generate corrective actions. The Academy conducted climate surveys on such issues as adherence to the Honor Code, alcohol use, fraternization and discrimination. In 1996, the surveys began to include questions on sexual assault. There was no evidence that any of the survey years had generated corrective actions. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.66).

In order to determine the actual cultural climate for women at the Academy (e.g., negative attitudes, incidents of harassment), we requested the Social Climate Surveys from 1976 through 2003. Unfortunately, the Academy was unable provide us with information on climate surveys prior to 1998. Further, they indicated that they did not perform a climate survey in 1999 and that the surveys performed in 1998, 2000, 2001 and 2002 were statistically invalid. Yet, interestingly, the Academy officials failed to provide an acceptable explanation of why they repeatedly administered invalid surveys with no apparent efforts to develop a valid survey tool. Even given unrepresentative findings, cadet responses and written comments should have alerted leadership that improved questionnaires would provide valuable insights, and that certain issues were worthy of immediate investigation. For example, the 2003 survey of 579 female cadets found that nearly 70 percent said they had been the victims of sexual harassment, of which 22 percent said they experienced "pressure for sexual favors. Nineteen percent said they had been the victims of sexual assault and more than 7 percents said that assault took the form of rape or attempted rape. Four out of five of these women never came forward to report that they had been assaulted." The 2001 survey showed that 47% of the female cadets said they had been sexually harassed by other cadets, 63% reported derogatory comments and 66% felt they had been discriminated against by other cadets on the basis of gender. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.66).

An earlier survey indicated that 42 percent of the female cadets said they had been subjected at least once in the past year to "physical, gender-related behavior that interfered with their performance or created a hostile environment, or unwelcome, deliberate physical conduct of a sexual nature. Additionally, forty percent indicated that they would hesitate to report sexual harassment for fear of reprisal (Schmitt, 1995). Additionally survey statements such as the following should have been cause for concern:

"Though I have not been subject to sexual assault, two of my friends have been during the spring semester. Both were raped by other cadets, and neither disclosed this information. I think this serves as testimony to the unstable social climate at USAFA, a fact not everyone seems conscious of."

"It was typical for a female (freshman) cadet to wake up in the middle of the night, and have a male cadet with his hands in the wrong places."

"Fourth Class male cadets are rewarded by upperclassmen for audacious female harassment or lewdness."

"It is tough having to constantly put with up an attitude that sexual harassment is funny. For example, on several occasions I've had to take down Playboy centerfold hanging in the dormitory with my roommate's face pasted onto the picture".

"Male upperclassmen often tell male "Fourth Class" cadets to disregard orders from female upper class cadets."

"We heard about assaults ... people getting into trouble, but it is taboo to bring it up."

"At times the three of us (roommates), all of who are physically strong and not inclined toward fearfulness, slept in our room with the light on and chairs stacked in front of the door."

"Retaliation is unavoidable for anyone reporting any offense to a higher level. Sexual harassment and improprieties were common and retaliation for reporting them is particularly severe and persistent."

"It happened to me and I am afraid it will happen again."

"My chain of command told me that I was the one that had the problem, and if I was uncomfortable with the situation, I should leave because I would not make a good officer."

"The campus climate considers women to be weak."

"If you make it through all four years without being sexually assaulted, you're lucky. If you want to have an Air Force career, you should not report it."

Further, our interviews with female cadets indicated a high degree of fear on many levels. Fear of being punished by command; fear of having their friends punished by command; fear of being harassed or ostracized by other cadets; fear of having to remain in contact with the perpetrator; fear that they will not be believed or supported; and fear of the impact on their reputation or status at the Academy or on their Air Force career. Further, it wasn't just sexual-assault victims who had such fears. Other cadets, chaplains and officers also said that cadets fear the consequences if they report an assault. Because these problems remained unaddressed from year to year, it is not surprising that some cadets doubted whether their responses could make a difference.

While some female cadets indicated an improving environment within the last six months, male cadets have grumbled that the Academy is getting too touchy-feely and risks drifting from its main mission. "It seems they're teaching all these women's issues when they should be focusing on issues for everyone." Additionally, some female cadets expressed concern that increased attention on female safety and harassment was suffocating and hurting the concept of a truly integrated training experience and ultimately an integrated Air Force. "Frankly, the men blame us for all the changes. As a result, explicit sexual harassment seems to be evolving to more of a gender harassment." (Schmitt, 1994).

Character Development

The American public expects military officers to perform their duties in our nation's defense while maintaining the highest standards of integrity. This public obligation is instilled at the Academy from the very beginning of a cadet's career through many avenues, the foremost being the Honor Code. The Honor Code is meant to represent the "minimum standard" of conduct for cadets. This minimum standard is often referred to as the "letter of the code" and is the foundation upon which each cadet builds a personal concept of professional ethics and character. The current Dean of Faculty quickly acknowledges that "Some [cadets], because of the way they grew up or where they grew up, don't have a moral compass. If they don't have it coming in here, no amount of shaping or reinforcing will give it to them. The academy's job is to weed them out." ("Roots of sexual", 2003)

Clearly, sexual assault in the environment of the Academy represents a failure of character, and that sexual assault is a character-related problem. The development of character--personal integrity--is a fundamental mission of the Academy. The cornerstone of the Academy's culture is two-fold: (1) the Honor Code; and (2) the Air Force's Core Values." The Honor Code mandates that cadets "will not lie, steal, or cheat, nor tolerate among them anyone who does." "The Air Force Core Values require Integrity First, Service Before Self, and Excellence in All We Do." The cadet environment and organizational culture at the Academy revolve around these pillars; however, by their actions, perpetrators of sexual assaults do not hold these same ideals. Because character deficiencies are a key aspect in the deterrence of sexual assault, it appears that deficiencies in either the Honor Code System or in the character development programs may contribute to or foster the occurrence of sexual assault at the Academy (http://www.usafa.af.mil/pa/factsheets/quickloo.htm)

Academy officials have often battled widespread cadet indifference to the code; particularly the notion that cadets should turn in fellow cadets for breaches to the code. According to interviews and records, cadets wouldn't turn in their classmates because they feared physical retribution, were reluctant to punish friends, and didn't want their own transgressions revealed in return. Further, cadets often suggest that sexual harassment and assault are not literally part of the code and as such, doesn't require one to turn in offenders. The current Commandant, however, is quick to clarify that cadets are clearly accountable to the UCMJ and that the Honor Code is a minimum standard. Failure to meet this minimum standard should result in expulsion ("Roots of sexual", 2003).

The Center for Character Development's present mission is to facilitate character development programs and activities throughout all aspects of the Academy experience. The CCD's objective is to graduate officers with forthright integrity and who voluntarily decide the right thing to do and do it. In furtherance of its missions, the CCD is divided into four divisions: Honor, Human Relations, Character and Leadership Development and Excellence. The Honor Division provides Honor Code education instruction equivalent to one academic course throughout the cadets' four years at the Academy. In the first two years, this instruction focuses on understanding and living under the Code. In the final two years, it focuses on helping others live under the Code. The Code is the foundation upon which a cadet builds a personal concept of professional ethics and a minimum standard of integrity, and demands complete integrity in word and deed. The Human Relations Division focuses on programs that encourage respect for human dignity, and is designed to develop officers equally valuing individuals of different races, national origins, religions, gender and cultural backgrounds. The programs involve classroom instruction and activity-based exercises for Third- and Fourth-Class cadets, an experimental on-site program for Second-Class cadets, and participation in a Character Capstone program for graduating First-Class cadets. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.77).

The Character and Leadership Division organizes symposiums, operates an adventure-based learning program to encourage character development and conducts seminars, including various Academy Character Enrichment Seminars ("ACES"), which provide an opportunity for members of the Academy community to consider their role in creating the best possible environment for cadets. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.77).

The Excellence Division provided cadets opportunities for practical application of their character and leadership education through various programs. The National Character and Leadership Symposium brings together distinguished scholars, armed forces leaders, corporate presidents and others to explore various dimensions of character and leadership. During the 2002-2003 academic year, 48 speakers attended. Furthermore The Falcon Heritage Forum, held twice a year, creates opportunities for cadets to interact on a personal level with highly distinguished military veterans, including representatives from each branch of military service, numerous Medal of Honor recipients, Tuskegee Airmen and many former prisoners of war. While the CCD offers several programs related to character development, none is a prerequisite for graduation or commissioning. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.78).

In May 2000, the Character Development Review Panel's assessment of the character development program indicated that there weren't any methodologies for assessing results. The report suggested that the Academy consider several indicators to assess the strength of character of the Cadet Wing, to include indicators of loyalty to individuals over loyalty to unit, acts of reprisal, and poll data reflecting fear of reprisal and sexual misconduct, especially involving abuse of authority. There was no evidence to indicate that actions had been taken to consider the panel's recommendations. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.37).

Masculine Culture

Clearly the Academy's cocky flyboy culture is structured to reinforce the characteristics of masculinity. Unfortunately, this has the potential to create a gender bias against anything feminine. As such, feminine characteristics are viewed with a negative attitude. As recently as the 2002 Social Climate Survey, one in five male cadets believed that women do not belong at the Academy. These statistics are particularly striking when one considers that the first women graduated from the Academy 23 years ago in 1980. Additionally, in this survey, some male cadets took the time to respond with specific written derogatory comments regarding the presence of women at the Academy including "even with women in the Armed Forces, they should not be at the military academies," and "women are worthless and should be taken away from the Air Force Academy". Similarly, our interviews noted the popular male attitude that women are not wanted at the Academy, because they will potentially be taking up cockpit space that belongs to men (Roots of sexual, 2003).

We also received reports that members of the graduating class of 1979 routinely attend Academy functions, including athletic events, and display license plates, caps, and t-shirts with the logo "LCWB." The logo supposedly stands for "Last Class With Balls" or "Last Class Without Bitches (or Broads). Officially the men state that the letters came from the four honorable words --loyalty, courage, wisdom and bravery." While some may find this public display of animosity toward the presence of women at the Academy humorous, it contributes to an environment in which female cadets are made to feel unwelcome. In the same vein, the cadets, faculty and staff had repeated voted to maintain the sign, "Bring Me Men" over the ramp that leads to the main quad on campus. Only after this year's embarrassing press coverage on the Academy's gender bias was the sign finally brought down (Roots of sexual", 2003).

A major contributor to tensions between male and female cadets is the tendency to value physical prowess above all else, and to look down on students who can't perform at the highest level. Women cadets, despite being in the top one percent of the female population physically, are often weaker than their male colleagues and thus often the subject of scorn. Young men typically goad their female classmates, telling them they were too slow or too weak to be warriors. Typically, the young women grit their teeth and take it, determined to show they would make it no matter what. Females are clearly the subject of abuse and often treated as objects. For example, females were referred to as "wall bang" and "jail bait", were asked when they last shaved their legs or masturbated, and were criticized if their bra straps were visible through their uniforms. Female cadets who gained weight were given the "Colorado Hip Disease" award. Sometimes the abuse was disguised as a game. For example, one male cadet described a game called "midget tossing". Cadets pick the smallest in their group of females and throw her down a mattress-covered hallway. The group making the farthest pitch is declared the winner ("Roots of sexual", 2003

Security

The fact that over half the investigated allegations of sexual assault occurred in the dormitories has prompted officials to investigate the supervision of cadets in the dormitories, alcohol consumption and policies, and rules on emergency access to telephone. Prior to this year, the dormitories were effectively unsupervised from 30 minutes past Taps (10:30 p.m. weekdays, 12:00 a.m. on training weekends, and 1:30 a.m. on non-training weekends) until 6:00 a.m. The AOC and MTL offices are located in the dorms, but the staff would normally depart in the early evening during the week and by mid-afternoon on training weekends. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.71)

This year, the "Agenda for Change" called for clustering of women in dormitory rooms near the women's bathrooms. Some cadets, however, indicate they are starting to feel a little isolated from their male colleagues because of the physical separation. One cadet leader finds it harder to stay in touch with the eight men whom she oversees; instead of running into them in the halls and chatting causally, she now communicates more by e-mail and has fewer personal encounters. (Graham, 2003) (add the knock on door quote)

At least 50% of investigated cadet-on-cadet sexual assault allegations involved the use of alcohol by the cadet suspect, the cadet victim, or both. This year the Academy mandated that the use of alcohol would result in immediate disenrollment of cadets using or providing alcohol to an underage cadet (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.72).

Further, some female cadets expressed concern to us that gaining access to phones to register a complaint, call the hotline, or seek help for a sexual assault would be difficult or near impossible. They stated there are a limited number of phones, and expressed concern about the locations of the phones and the requirement that Fourth-Class cadets get permission to use them. Third-Class cadets may purchase and carry cellular phones for personal use. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.73).

In the recently released findings of the DoD IG's survey of female cadets conducted in May 2003, an overwhelming majority (over 90%) indicated that they feel "very safe" or "safe" in every location at the Academy, except when "alone on the Academy grounds during hours of darkness." However, some legislators appear unconvinced that these steps by the Air Force leadership will have any meaningful effect. Representative Dian DeGette, Democrat of Colorado, called them "window dressing." Noting that one proposal requires cadets to knock before entering another cadet's dorm room, she said, "If someone's hellbent on raping a female cadet, they're not going to knock first." Representative Heather A. Wilson, Republican of New Mexico, questioned plans to cluster female cadets in dormitories around the women's bathrooms. "This is not about segregating women from men," said Representative Wilson, who graduated in the very first class of women cadets at the academy in 1980. "It's about segregating rapists from the academy." (Schemo, 2003b)

LEADERSHIP

In June 2003, Air Force General Counsel Mary L. Walker released The Report of the Working Group Concerning Deterrence of and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the U.S. Air Force Academy ("Working Group Report"). The Working Group concluded that there was "no systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the Academy or institutional avoidance of responsibility." Further, another team of investigators focusing on the 43 assault allegations involving cadet victims and suspects from 1993 to 2002, concluded that Academy leaders correctly handled all but one. Senator Wayne Allard, Republican of Colorado empathetically disagreed with both these findings. "Clearly, given the history involved and the lack of attention paid in the past, an external review [to the USAF] is necessary to examine the internal and external supervision of the Academy [i.e., the Academy's command structure and external supervision, such as the Air Force Secretary, Air Force Chief of Staff and Air Force Inspector General]."

Command Supervision of the Academy

During the last decade, attention to the Academy's sexual assault problems ebbed and flowed depending on the interest of the leadership. It appears that the transitory nature of Academy leadership assignments may have disrupted institutional knowledge and the ability to anticipate and find long-term solutions for complex problems like sexual misconduct. For example, over the past twenty years, Superintendents have served for an average of three years, and Commandants of Cadets typically have served for 18-24 months. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.54).

One might say that Academy leadership first recognized that they had a sexual misconduct problem with the 18 allegations reported in 1993. General Hosmer, then-Superintendent, attempted to improve the Academy environment by making changes to the Academy's sexual assault response program, including establishing an informal policy of confidential reporting. Further, he commissioned the Academy's Center for Character Development to improve the overall character of the cadet population through educational and training programs. He also created a sexual assault hotline operated outside the chain of command that offered counseling to victims of sexual assault with the assurance of confidentiality. Another change was the institution of a victim amnesty program to encourage the reporting of sexual assaults. Under the amnesty policy, the chain of command could forego punishment of victim misconduct in order to encourage the reporting of sexual assault (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.26).

Beginning in 1995, the next Superintendent established a Social Climate Process Action Team (PAT) comprised of cadets, faculty and staff, to study sexual assault issues at the Academy. The PAT concluded that "most cadet sexual assaults are not reported," that "the institution is unaware of the extent of the problem and cannot plan how best to respond," and "that a major impediment to the reporting assault was a lack of trust in the system." Several changes were implemented throughout the year, including establishment of the Sexual Assault Services Branch within the Cadet Counseling and Leadership Development Center and establishment of the Sexual Assault service Committee (SASC). The committee's purpose was to integrate the various sexual assault services at the Academy, facilitate the exchange of information among its participants and permit discussion of sexual assault cases and issues. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.50).

Despite these efforts to resolve the sexual misconduct problems, the victims consistently characterized the Academy's leadership as unbelieving, unsympathetic and unresponsive. For example, some victims were called liars, made to feel that voicing allegations would tarnish the reputation of the Academy, and generally told to keep their mouth shut. One former cadet told KMGH-TV of Denver that she had left the academy after commanders responded to her rape complaint by charging her with violating rules against drinking, fraternizing with upperclassmen and having sex in the dormitories. Similarly, several female cadets said they were aghast, that after summoning the courage to make formal reports, they were given swift punishment for breaking rules against socializing with upperclassmen and for minor infractions while their assailants went about their lives as usual. Routinely victims were placed in a restricted status (e.g., loss of privileges) until an investigation of the allegation was complete. While the leadership claimed this was not punishment, it was certainly perceived as such by the cadets. Further, leadership often suggested that incidents of sexual misconduct were the result of a few "bad apples". Also, it was suggested that the occasional abuse of power is a normal risk to the operation of training officers. In other words, some senior cadets may give inappropriate orders and set inappropriate goals for those under their command but that's a suitable risk. ("Pentagon panel", 2003)

Statements by two of the top leaders in 2003 at the Academy seem to validate the students' perceptions. For example, the Academy Commandant defended the school's conduct in a written response to questions about one reported assault, in which a cadet said she had been raped after a night of drinking and a strip poker game. After a hearing, the Academy decided not to press charges against the man she named as her attacker. Further, the Commandant specifically criticized her conduct and not the attacker. He said there was "no justification" for the reported assault and added: "When you put yourself in situations with increased risk, you have to take increased precautions to mitigate those risks. For example, if I walk down a dark alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it doesn't justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risk by doing what I did" ("Pentagon panel", 2003).

Another example came from the Colonel in charge of cadet conduct and discipline. She said that she had never seen a case of "true rape" among cadets, by which she meant a "true violent assault." Rather, she said, the problem was rampant alcohol use and a permissive environment, which led women who had consented to sex to later cry rape. Further she said that she was unaware of the Air Force's definition of rape and seemed to hold the attitude that cadets claimed sexual assault only to receive amnesty from other violations (e.g., drinking, fraternization). Essentially, she created an environment where the perception of fear, punishment and reprisal became an accepted reality. Further, her treatment of some victims had a negative impact on the willingness of cadets to report any incidents of sexual misconduct (Schemo, 2003a).

The current Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Roche, readily acknowledges that the amnesty concept has in fact been selectively applied. He admits that in the vast majority of cases that did not lead to formal prosecution, investigators subsequently charged the cadets making the accusations with the very infractions they had promised to overlook. The practice contributes to the sense that it was more dangerous, for the victim and friends who might have been present when assaults occurred, to report rape than to remain silent. Further, he stated the Academy misstated the legal definition of sexual assault, raising "unrealistic expectations of prosecution in the minds of victims" (Senate Armed Services Committee, 2003).

External Oversight--Board of Visitors

The Board of Visitors, like a corporation's Board of Directors or a University's Board of Trustees, was established to provide oversight of the Academy's leadership. The Board is required under its charter to visit the Academy annually and to inquire into the morale, discipline, curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods, and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider. The Board is comprised of 15 members. The President of the United States appoints six members. The other nine board members are from either the US Senate or House of Representatives. The Vice President of the United States or the President pro tempore of the Senate designates three members, two of whom are members of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The Speaker of the House of Representatives designates four members, two of whom are members of the House Appropriations Committee. The Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee or its designee, and the Chairman of the House Arms Services Committee or its designee fill the last two positions. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.45).

Despite its wealth of senior leadership and experience, the Board of Visitors was minimally involved in monitoring any actions at the Academy. Typically, members were provided only a "good news" slide show stating the institution's accomplishments, met with only one or two handpicked cadets and were taken on a tour of the Academy. Further, meetings of the Academy's Board of Visitors were not well attended by its members. Some Board members have apparently not attended any meetings, while other were credited with attending the entirety of multi-day meetings at which they were present for only a few hours or less. Attempts to hold meetings in Washington, D.C. to accommodate the schedules of Congressional members, including scheduling meetings in August during the Congressional recess, had not substantively improved attendance. Less than one-half of the Congressional members typically attend, while two-thirds of the civilian members attend. In 2001, the Board of Visitors had no formal meeting. In short, the Board either did not know about sexual misconduct at the Academy or unquestioningly accepted the Academy's assurances that matters were under control. Also, the Academy found it difficult to get the Board to approve agendas for and reports of its meetings, even though the Academy would prepare proposed drafts for the Board's input, approval and criticisms. The academy has also had problems in getting the Board to address issues deemed substantive or important by the Academy, and has found that the meetings often tended to be little more than social gatherings. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.45).

Headquarter USAF

Understandably the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Air Force Secretary have a host of priorities, but it appears there was little effort to investigate, resolve and monitor follow-up corrective action prior to 2001. For example, although the Air Force IG regularly conducts compliance investigations of the Major Air Force Commands every three years, it did not conduct any inspections of the Academy during the last ten years other than in response to individual complaints. Further, there is no evidence that actions were taken to resolve the past findings of GAO and DoD IG inspections on sexual misconduct.

In August 2001, the new Commandant of Cadets was given his marching orders by the Air Force Chief of Staff, to fix the discipline and standards at the Academy. In response, he took a number of actions to instill accountability, enforce existing standards regarding wear and appearance of uniforms and improve the physical condition of the cadet area. But he was told by senior Academy members that while the Academy previously had problems with sexual assaults it had implemented the Cadets Advocating Sexual Integrity and Education ("CASIE") program in response. The CASIE program was considered a model sexual assault response program by other schools and Service Academies. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.40).

In March 2003, shortly after the interim Working Group Report, Mr. Roche raised the possibility that earlier administrations at the academy could also be held responsible for failing to address hostility toward women cadets. He vowed that if Defense Department investigations show that "credible information came to their attention that they should have acted upon, or that they failed to follow due process, they will be held accountable." Mr. Roche also asked: "Was there information available to recent leadership that should have raised their awareness of climate problems? Did any administration put in place additional barriers that prevented victims from coming forward?" This reversal came less than a week after the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff made statements that appeared to exonerate the Academy's leadership even before the Air Force General Counsel's investigation was complete. (Note: their preemptory exoneration had prompted considerable Congressional ire). Further, the Air Force Secretary publicly acknowledged for the first time that a longstanding policy guaranteeing amnesty to victims of rape who come forward had in many cases been ignored. (Schemo, 2003c)

On August 14, 2003, Secretary Roche directed the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (SAF/MR) to prepare and implement other oversight processes. Specifically, he directed the Assistant Secretary to work with and oversee the Academy superintendent to ensure effective implementation of the 65 recommendations of the Working Group and the Agenda for Change and any agreed to recommendations of our panel. Further, he directed the establishment of "permanent processes (e.g. oversight, support and assessment) to insure that the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force are frequently, regularly and adequately informed of significant matters relating to sexual assault and sexual harassment at the Academy".

The Assistant Secretary is considering other initiatives to provide continual oversight of the Academy, including the following: The Air Force Chief of Staff's annual climate survey shall now include the Academy; the Air force IG shall conduct regular compliance inspections of the Academy at least every three years; the Air Force Auditor General shall conduct regular audits of the Academy; the function of liaison with the Board of Visitors shall be moved from the Academy to the Air Force Secretariat; and there shall be additional emphasis on Academy issues at all CORONAs, especially the Fall CORONA held at the Academy. (Note: CORONA meetings are attended by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, all Assistant Secretaries, the General Counsel, all four-star Air Force generals, and the Superintendent of the Academy.) In addition, the Air Force is directing the development of a permanent performance management system (with specific goals) for the Academy. (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.56).

Congress

As part of Congress' oversight of the Executive branch, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees are responsible for oversight of activities at the service academies. In the past, these committees demonstrated little follow through of discrepancies noted in inspection reports from the GAO, DoD Inspector General, and AF Inspector General. For example, in 1994, the GAO conducted an investigation into whether Department of Defense military academies were complying with the Department's requirement for sexual harassment eradication programs (Report #NSIAD 94-6). The GAO found that between half to about three quarters of academy women experienced various forms of harassment at least twice a month. In 1995, the GAO issued a follow-up report that indicated things had not improved. It is particularly significant that these reports were early signals of problems and the need for and monitoring of consistent and aggressive corrective action. In short, it appears that until Sen. Wayne Allard's 2003 comment, "Enough is enough--it's time to take action", Congress failed to demand a comprehensive investigation of alleged misconduct at the Air Force Academy despite a decade of constituent reports (McAllister, 2003).

It should be noted, however, that Congress is moving quickly to make up for a decade of neglect. The 'proposed' National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 contains several provisions to address sexual misconduct at the Service Academies. The legislation requires an annual assessment of each Academy's policies, training and procedures to prevent sexual misconduct and an annual report on sexual misconduct. The legislation requires transmission of the annual report to the Secretary of Defense, the Board of Visitors and the Committees on Armed Services (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.62).

REPORTING AND RESPONSE

Statistics indicate that a lot of sexual assault cases go unreported. It's natural for any female victim to hesitate because of embarrassment, self-doubt or even false guilt, human relations. Perhaps not reporting incidents is even more likely at the Academy because of additional pressure. Reporting is seen as betrayal of the unit. Almost 50 percent of the women indicated that they feared reprisals (e.g., ostracism by some members of their squadron, thereby making life at the academy very uncomfortable). Further, they see what happens when their peers report sexual assault. They fear that they're going to lose their career, be thrown out of the academy, and receive never ending harassment. Also, when women or men leave the academy early before their commitment is over they are sometimes forced or liable to pay for the tuition that they have incurred. Cooper, 2003)

Reporting

In late 1996, the Academy realigned the Cadet Counseling Center and placed it under the Dean of Faculty to separate the counseling services from the disciplinary process [under the Commandant of Cadets]. Also, the Academy's Social Climate Surveys for the first time included questions on sexual assault. Additionally, a 24-hour rape hot line was set up in 1996. Since then, there were at least 99 calls reporting some form of sexual assault, from inappropriate touching to rape. However, most female cadets reportedly were afraid to use it because it's staffed by fellow cadets. One cadet shared, "I kept it all inside because the first thing you learn is to keep your mouth shut and not make waves. Reporting to the hot line could be like broadcasting it over the campus" ("Pentagon panel", 2003). Additionally, the Academy requested and was granted the Headquarters USAF approval to waiver the requirement for Academy medical personnel to report sexual assault incidents to command and AFOSI. The Academy believed the waiver would encourage the reporting of sexual assaults by respecting victim privacy, confidentiality and desires. Unfortunately, this waiver would have an unintended effect on the investigation and prosecution of cases. In addition, General Nardotti, Commander of AFOSI, suggested that the anonymous hot line left the authorities with no means to investigate allegations of assault, and wondered if the former Superintendent, had anticipated that he was "creating a systemic problem." (Schemo, 2003b).

In June 2003, the Working Group Report acknowledged that the USAFA has a less than optimal environment for responding to allegations of sexual assault against female cadets because of inadequate reporting procedures, inattentive commanders and a lingering resistance to women at a formally all male institution. Further, the report faulted a system of reporting allegations of abuse that shielded the confidentiality of victims from commanders at the school and largely left to the victim the decision whether to prosecute. Consequently, there was often very little information to act upon in dealing with assailants. The AFOSI noted that delays in cadet decisions to provide information can significantly impair the ability to obtain the evidence necessary to a successful prosecution. Additionally, this has the result of impairing the academy leadership's ability to assure justice and to prevent commission of cadets who are not fit for military service. In May, confidentiality was abolished thereby bringing the system in line with that of the regular Air Force, which requires reports go to commanders and investigators (Pam Zubeck, 2003).

Our interviews with the victims, however, raises concern over the policy outlined in the "Agenda for Change" that eliminates any form of confidential reporting of sexual assaults. Stripping away all confidentiality takes the Academy backwards to 1995 when the lack of confidentiality resulted in underground support groups and unreported crimes. It seems that a balance must be maintained between the support and treatment of victims and the prosecution of assailants. Confidentiality is the fulcrum on which that balance can exist and it must remain an option for all victims of sexual assault at the Academy. Further, the "Agenda for Change" overlooks an established form of privileged communication that is currently available throughout the Armed Forces and could benefit cadet victims: the psychotherapist-patient privilege. This method of confidentiality has been available to the Academy since the psychotherapist-patient relationship was recognized in 1999 by Presidential Executive Order, and implemented in Military Rule of Evidence 515. It is in use by both West Point and Annapolis (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.88).

Additionally, the Working Group concluded that the sexual assault prevention and awareness training was ineffective for the following reasons: (1) The definition of sexual assault used in Academy Instruction 51-201 was confusing, not in compliance with the law associated with sexual assaults and inconsistent with the definition used throughout the Air Force; (2) The Fourth-Class cadets who received the training during BCT were too tired to process the information. The training was conducted at 7:00-9:30 p.m. following twelve hours of in-processing; (3) The self-defense training given to Fourth-Class women often occurred too late in the semester to be effective; and (4) The training had little focus on the moral, leadership or character component of deterrence. Also, the investigation also found that while the Academy's leadership was engaged in sexual assault issues in the early 1990s when it launched a program to deter it, attention gradually waned. That, along with other factors, produced an environment less attentive to victim concerns and factors in Academy life affecting sexual assaults, and which was less capable of a coordinated response to individual cases than in earlier years (Panel of House Armed Services; 2003, p.83).

Response

Each academy has largely refrained from pressing criminal charges against cadets accused of rape, allowing them to resign rather than face court-martial. In the 27 years since West Point first admitted women, one cadet has faced court-martial for rape; he was acquitted. By comparison, an Air Force Academy official said, "142 sexual assaults were reported since 1993, 56 were investigated and only two cadets have been charged with rape. One was acquitted and the other pleaded guilty at a court-martial and was sentenced to seven months in jail." In eight other cases, the Air Force Secretary has allowed the cadets to resign rather than face court-marshals. Sadly, repeated offenses are not uncommon; four of the alleged assailants were accused of attacking more than one woman. ("USA: Women cadet", 2003) Further, it is noted that sixteen Air Force Academy graduates accused of rape or sexual assault while attending the academy are still on active duty as officers in the United States military ("Accused academy", 2003).

Unfortunately, despite all the press coverage, investigation and intervention activities, sexual misconduct continues. Between April and August 2003, the academy's sexual-assault response team was activated 12 times for reports of four alleged rapes, six alleged sexual assaults, one case of inappropriate sexual contact and one case of sexual harassment (Emery, 2003). Clearly, the Academy continues to have conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman.

CONDUCT UNBECOMING AN OFFICER AND GENTLEMAN

Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (2002) dictates that any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. Conduct violative of this article is action or behavior in an official capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the person as an officer, seriously compromises the officer's character as a gentleman, or action or behavior in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the person's standing as an officer. There are certain moral attributes common to the ideal officer and the perfect gentleman, a lack of which is indicated by acts of dishonesty, unfair dealing, indecency, indecorum, lawlessness, injustice, or cruelty. Not everyone is or can be expected to meet unrealistically high moral standards, but there is a limit of tolerance based on customs of the service and military necessity below which the personal standards of an officer, cadet, or midshipman cannot fall without seriously compromising the person's standing as an officer, cadet, or midshipman or the person's character as a gentleman. This article includes acts made punishable by any other article, provided these acts amount to conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. For example, knowingly making a false official statement; dishonorable failure to pay a debt; cheating on an exam; opening and reading a letter of another without authority; using insulting or defamatory language to another officer in that officer's presence or about that officer to other military persons; being drunk and disorderly in a public place; public association with known prostitutes; committing or attempting to commit a crime involving moral turpitude [e.g., rape, sodomy, attempted sexual assault]; and failing without good cause to support the officer's family.

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Charles R. Emery, Lander University

James E. Benton, Lander University