The causes of price inflation & deflation: fundamental economic principles the deflationists have ignored.
Davidson, Laura F.
1. Introduction
IN OCTOBER 2008, IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, the Federal
Reserve began a massive expansion of the monetary base. In a period of
only two months commercial bank reserves leaped from $45B to over $600B,
an astounding increase of over 1200%. Despite the fact the money supply
has steadily grown since then, a number of commentators, purportedly
sympathetic to the Austrian school, have doggedly clung to a prediction
that prices-in-general will continue to fall. According to these
authors, price deflation in the wake of the financial crisis was caused
by an immense credit contraction, and prices cannot rise again unless
credit expands, a prospect they see as unlikely.
In the deflationists' view, "credit" is the all
important factor that affects prices-in-general. Even though commercial
bank reserves have expanded exponentially, the deflationists see little
possibility of either monetary or price inflation, because credit has
remained scarce, and is likely to remain so. Boyapati (2010) even calls
into question the notion that an expanding monetary base encourages
banks to issue additional quantities of fiduciary media. According to
that author, for many years banks have had the ability to issue credit
virtually at will, using a variety of methods to lower the reserve
requirement close to zero, and thus an increase in bank reserves does
not pose any particular threat of credit expansion--and hence monetary
inflation--that did not already exist. Indeed, says Boyapati, an
empirical analysis of commercial bank lending suggests the causality
between a change in the amount of reserves and that of credit is in fact
reversed, and therefore it is very unlikely prices will rise.
There are numerous faults with these arguments. First, is the
notion that a change in the quantity of credit is the most important
factor affecting prices when in fact there are other elements at play,
such as the reservation demand for money, which have all but been
ignored. Credit is but one factor affecting the money supply, which is
itself one factor affecting prices. Thus it is not conclusive that a
credit contraction was the principal cause of the price deflation
following the events of 2007 and 2008, and it is not inevitable that
prices can only rise again when credit expands.
Second, is the failure to distinguish between the effects of
different types of credit on the money supply. Credit arising out of the
fractional reserve process--which Mises termed circulation
credit--produces fiduciary media and does affect the money supply
whereas credit that arises out of genuine time deposits does not. (1)
Yet the deflationists have an unfortunate tendency to lump all credit
together in this regard and blithely assume the effects are the same.
Third, is the notion that because banks in the recent past have
been able to lower their reserve requirements close to zero, expansions
of the monetary base are immaterial. For while it is true that banks
have been able to use a variety of methods to circumvent the legally
mandated reserve ratio on demand deposits, it is not true to say they
have been able to reduce their needed reserves to exactly zero.
Therefore, the required reserve ratio is still a limiting factor on the
amount of fiduciary media that can be issued, and an expansion of
reserves--of several orders of magnitude--grants banks an unprecedented
ability to expand the money supply, an ability they would otherwise not
have.
Fourth, is the use of empirical analysis to suggest the causality
between changes in the quantity of reserves and that of credit is
reversed. This is doubly dubious because (a) an analysis of historical
data is a poor method of determining any kind of economic principles,
and (b) the empirical analysis itself is flawed because no attempt is
made to distinguish between the different forms of credit in analyzing
the data. Even if it is possible to demonstrate that expansions and
contractions in the level of credit historically have taken place prior
to changes in the level of reserves, this observation neither vitiates
the money multiplier theory, nor renders the fractional reserve process
obsolete, if some of the observed changes occur in a type of credit that
does not produce fiduciary media.
This is not to say the deflationists predictions will necessarily
turn out to be in incorrect. After all, unforeseen external influences
can always intervene to make just about any outcome possible. However,
by applying faulty economic theory to the data, the rationale for their
arguments is deficient. Economic theorizing and explicating economic
events, are separate disciplines, but the latter must rest on a sound
theoretical foundation. unfortunately, to the extent the deflationists
use any economic theory at all, it is often incorrect and not clearly
differentiated from either their historical account or their
prognostications.
It should be mentioned that economic theory involves deducing
non-quantitative laws a priori of the type, ceteris paribus if A then B,
without reliance on the use of empirical data. Provided the reasoning is
correct, such propositions are always apodictically certain because the
theorist--that is, the economist qua economist--assumes all other
exogenous variables are held constant. Explaining economic events, on
the other hand, is the work of the economist qua historian or
forecaster. It involves selecting the appropriate data, and then using
chains of reasoning that employ the relevant economic laws, to arrive at
a plausible argument.
The conclusions drawn by the economic historian or forecaster can
never be absolutely certain. Even though the laws they apply must be
absolutely true, the inclusion of specific causal factors, and the
assessment of their relative importance, rests on personal judgment and
understanding. (2) Moreover, while the historian has a set of existing
data available to him, the forecaster has no certain knowledge of the
future external influences that will be brought to bear. Anticipating
these influences lies well outside the realm of economics, relying on an
understanding of such things as the political, psychological and
technological conditions of the market.
While neither the historian nor forecaster can ever say with
certainty that the set of conditions, A, definitely caused B, or will
cause B, the theory that is used to support the analysis must be sound
if the overall argument is to be persuasive. The economic laws employed,
and the chains of reasoning applied, must be logically correct.
For this reason, a major part of the present article is devoted to
a discussion of the causes of price inflation and deflation from a
theoretical perspective, particular attention being paid to money and
banking. Sections 2 through 4 examine the factors that cause
prices-in-general to change, while section 5 looks at the factors that
cause prices to change in certain sectors of the economy, particularly
during booms and recessions. The purpose is not to provide an
all-encompassing account of the Austrian theory of prices or of Austrian
business cycle theory; rather it is to present a simple theoretical
framework that can be used to interpret the data. In section 6, the
theory is applied to recent economic data, to provide an historical
analysis of the major price movements since the onset of the credit
crisis. In section 7, some possible future scenarios are discussed.
Section 8 concludes.
2. Factors Affecting Prices-in-General
What is meant by the terms inflation and deflation? Much confusion
arises from the fact that many mainstream economists use these terms to
describe a rise and fall in prices, whereas those in the Austrian school
adhere to the original definition, namely, a rise and fall in the
quantity of money. unfortunately, the mainstream definition, by focusing
on prices, obscures the fact that it is changes in the money supply that
often cause changes to prices. (3) in the present article, the terms
"monetary" inflation/deflation or "price"
inflation/deflation shall be clearly stated to avoid any possible
confusion.
At the outset it is important to point out there is no single
number that can be assigned to a so-called price level, or to its
inverse the purchasing power of money. (4) The price of each good is
expressed in terms of the quantity of the monetary unit per unit of that
good; for example, $2 per pound of apples or $500 per television set or
$500,000 per house and so on. The problem with a price level is there is
no meaningful way to express an average price of two or more different
goods, because while the numerator is always expressed in terms of the
monetary unit alone, the denominator is expressed in terms of a unit
that is different in every case. We cannot average $500 per television
with $10,000 per car, or with $2 per pound of apples, because
televisions, apples and cars have different units.
Therefore the terms "price inflation" and "price
deflation" when applied to the economy as a whole refer not to a
single price level, but rather to an array of prices for all the goods
and services on the market, and to the concept that, in general, they
move in a certain direction, though individually not necessarily in the
same direction.
Indexes, such as the CPI and the PPI, which represent baskets of
goods can be indicative, but they are never definitive, of prices in
general because the goods selected and their relative importance within
the index are arbitrary. At times, it might even be difficult to
ascertain the trend when analyzing the data. Certain price movements
might be obvious within particular sectors of the economy, but not so
others. So, for example, there might be price deflation within the
electronics industry, and price inflation in real estate, while the
prices of most other goods and services might appear more or less
neutral.
From a theoretical perspective, however, it is possible to deduce
the direction of the general level of prices following a change in a
specified exogenous factor, ceteris paribus. At the most fundamental
level, the prices of all goods are determined by their individual demand
and supply schedules. Exchange demand is a factor of increase on prices,
and supply a factor of decrease on prices. It is not logically possible
to aggregate supply or demand schedules, for the economy as a whole, and
thus determine a unique price level for goods-in-general. Nevertheless,
provided it is always borne in mind that we are referring to an array of
prices, it is possible to say that, in general, the exchange demand for
goods consists of the stock of money minus the reservation demand for
money; therefore, the stock of money is a factor of increase on prices,
ceteris paribus, and the reservation demand for money, a factor of
decrease, ceteris paribus. And the supply of each good consists of its
stock minus its reservation demand, if any; therefore, the stock of
goods is a factor of decrease on prices, and the reservation demand for
goods is a factor of increase. (5) As stated by Rothbard (2004) p. 817:
Whether we treat one good or all goods, the price or prices will
increase, ceteris paribus, if the stock of money increases;
decrease when the stock of the good or goods increases; decrease
when the reservation demand for money increases; and increase when
the reservation demand for the good or goods increases.
The diagrammatic exposition in Figure 1 illustrates the foregoing
principles. (6)
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Arrows indicate cause and effect between the antecedent factor and
its consequent.
"+" indicates the consequent follows in the same
direction as the antecedent and "-" indicates the
consequent and antecedent move in opposite directions. Note that
they follow the rule of negation. For example, the reservation
demand for goods is a factor of decrease on the supply of goods,
which in turn is a factor of decrease on prices Therefore, the
reservation demand for goods is a factor of increase on prices.
(two negatives make a positive.) On the other hand, the
reservation demand for money negatively affects the demand for goods,
which in turn positively affects prices. Therefore the
reservation demand for money negatively affects prices. (a negative
and a positive make a negative) etc.
Referring to the diagram above, there are four principal factors
that affect the prices of goods-in-general. They are: the total stock of
money, the reservation demand for money, the total stock of goods, and
the reservation demand for goods. The next two sections are devoted to
discussing the variables that affect the money stock and the reservation
demand for money. Particular attention is paid to the banking system,
the different forms of credit, and their effect on the money stock.
3. Factors Affecting Prices-in-General: The Money Stock
The money stock, or money supply, is the total amount of money in
the economy. Money is the medium of exchange for which all other goods
are traded, and in a fiat system is the total amount of currency in
circulation--i.e. coins and federal reserve notes--plus money
substitutes. Money substitutes are forms of money that are redeemable on
demand for currency at par value. They include any financial instrument
or any account in which the depositor can demand payment instantaneously
"on-demand" for cash. (7) Demand accounts include checking
accounts held at commercial banks, credit unions, thrifts and other
financial institutions. But do they also include savings and share
accounts?
In years gone by, savings deposits were not instantaneously
redeemable; a depositor had to wait a certain number of days before
withdrawal could be made. Today, however, virtually all savings accounts
are on-demand, and thus legitimately can be considered money. (8) On the
other hand, deposits held in accounts which are not instantaneously
redeemable cannot be considered money. Thus, genuine time deposits, or
any account or financial instrument in which the depositor relinquishes
ownership for a specified period of time, and is unable to redeem the
funds at par until the term expires, is not money.
Rothbard (1978) and Salerno (1987) have each attempted a precise
definition of the money supply from an Austrian perspective, listing the
elements that constitute money or money equivalents. (9) Their
definitions are broadly similar and are tabulated below:
Currency in circulation Salerno / Rothbard
Checking accounts at commercial banks Salerno/
Rothbard (10)
Checking accounts at savings banks/credit unions Salerno / Rothbard
& thrifts
Savings accounts at commercial banks Salerno / Rothbard
Savings accounts at savings banks/credit unions Salerno / Rothbard
& thrifts
U.S. Savings bonds Salerno / Rothbard
Govt demand accounts at commercial banks and Salerno / Rothbard
the Fed
Foreign institutional accounts at comm banks and Salerno
the Fed
Foreign bank demand accounts at comm banks and Salerno
the Fed
Money market deposit accounts Salerno
overnight repurchase agreements Salerno
overnight eurodollar accounts Salerno
Instantaneously redeemable small denomination Rothbard
time deposits/CDs (11)
Cash surrender value of life insurance policies Rothbard
(not term)
Excluded from both definitions:
Large denomination time deposits
Small denomination time deposits not instantaneously redeemable
All corporate and government bonds except U.S. Savings bonds
Term repurchase agreements
Term eurodollar accounts
Traveler's Checks
Treasury securities
Money market mutual funds (12)
Some obvious omissions from Rothbard's definition are demand
deposits held by foreign official institutions and foreign commercial
banks, and money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), although to be fair,
MMDAs were not widely prevalent at the time he penned his article.
Rothbard includes small denomination certificates of deposits, and the
cash surrender value of life insurance policies, on the grounds they can
be instantaneously redeemable. (13) However, among Austrian economists
he stands virtually alone in including them as money. Most authors
exclude them, because to the extent they are redeemable prior to the
expiration of the term, it is always at a discount to par value.
An essential point to realize is that deposits act like cash as
long as market participants believe they are redeemable on demand at par
value. It is not required that they all actually have to be redeemable.
As Rothbard (1978) points out:
It might well be objected that since, in the era of fractional
reserve banking, demand deposits are not really redeemable at par
on demand, that then only standard cash (whether gold or fiat
paper, depending upon the standard) can be considered part of the
money supply. This contrasts with 100 percent reserve banking, when
demand deposits are genuinely redeemable in cash, and function as
genuine, rather than pseudo, warehouse receipts to money. Such an
objection would be plausible, but would overlook the Austrian
emphasis on the central importance in the market of subjective
estimates of importance and value. Deposits are not in fact all
redeemable in cash in a system of fractional reserve banking; but
so long as individuals on the market think that they are so
redeemable, they continue to function as part of the money supply.
since all checking and savings accounts today are insured, and
since the Federal Reserve always stands ready to act as lender of last
resort, it is doubtful that they could ever be viewed as anything other
than instantaneously redeemable and absolutely secure.
The data used to compute the money supply in section 7 of this
article shall include the following components from the FRB H6
statistical release:
From M1 components: Currency, demand deposits, and other checkable
deposits at commercial banks and thrifts.
From non-M1 M2 components: Savings deposits (including MMDAs) at
commercial banks and thrifts.
From Other Memorandum Items: Demand deposits at banks due to
foreign commercial banks and foreign official institutions, U.S.
Government demand deposits at commercial banks, U.S. Government deposits
at the Federal Reserve (general account only), and U.S. Government note
balances at depositories.
The critical question to ask is how does this money come into
being? From where does it originate in the first instance? Only when
this question has been answered is it possible to understand fully the
factors that affect monetary inflation and deflation. There are
essentially only two sources of money creation: The Federal Reserve and
fractional reserve lending institutions. The latter includes all regular
commercial banks, savings banks, credit unions, thrifts and all other
institutions which create fiduciary media.
The Federal Reserve and open market operations
The Federal Reserve can create fiat money at any time of its
choosing through open market operations. It is essentially a
counterfeiting operation since under a purely fiat system hard money in
the form of precious metals can never be redeemed. If the Fed wants to
increase the amount of money, it buys assets such as treasuries, or
other securities, and pays the sellers of those assets with newly
created money. The money is electronically created, ex nihilo, and
credited to the sellers' demand accounts held at commercial banks.
It thus becomes part of those banks' reserves. If the Federal
Reserve wants to reduce the amount of money, it sells assets, and
destroys the money it collects. This reduces the reserves of the banks.
Through this same mechanism, the Fed can adjust the so-called Fed funds
rate, the rate at which commercial banks lend reserves to each other.
The Fed also issues currency as and when the banks have to convert some
of their reserves into notes or coins at the request of their account
holders.
The total monetary output of the Federal Reserve--i.e. the
"monetary base" or "base money" or
"high-powered money"--consists of total commercial bank
reserves plus currency in circulation (notes and coins). The large
majority of bank reserves are held on deposit with the Federal Reserve.
As such the Fed acts as the banks' bank. A small portion, however,
is held as vault cash, which is cash that is not currently in
circulation, and which is used by banks as a float for their
customers' day to day requirements.
The term "high powered money" comes from the fact that
banks are legally permitted to use their reserves to create additional
quantities of money through the fractional reserve process. As will be
shown in a later section, money creation artificially lowers the
interest rate, results in misallocations of capital, and causes the boom
and bust cycle, but at this point we are interested only in the effect
on the total quantity of money.
The fractional reserve process
The fractional reserve process is a secondary money-creating
enterprise that allows banks--that is, all financial institutions that
engage in fractional reserve lending--to multiply the money the central
bank creates many times over, through the issuance of fiduciary media.
It is worth reviewing the process by which this occurs. Suppose the
securities seller, mentioned above, receives $100 of newly created money
from the Federal Reserve, which the Fed has duly deposited into his bank
account. His bank now has an extra $100 in reserves, while he, as an
account holder, has a demand claim, instantaneously redeemable at par
for $100. Thus the monetary base and the money supply have increased by
$100. Despite the fact the account holder retains ownership of the money
therein, the bank is legally permitted to lend up to 90% (assuming a 10%
minimum required reserve ratio) to someone else. Let us suppose the bank
lends out $90, keeping only $10 in reserve. It has now created $90 of
fiduciary media ex nihilo, money that has been created out of thin air,
since the bank still has a $100 demand obligation to the original
depositor. Once the newly created $90 has been lent by the bank and
spent by the borrower, it resides in the accounts of other individuals
or businesses, and becomes part of the reserves of their banks. These
banks in turn can lend $81 out of the $90, keeping $9 in reserve, and so
on.
Even though this process can be repeated many times over, the total
amount of reserves, split among the many different banks, will still be
$100 regardless of what the banks do in terms of lending.14 The total
amount of fiduciary media, however, will increase every time the money
is lent, and will tend towards $900 (i.e. 100 + 90 + 81 + .... etc).
Mathematically, this is the maximum that can be created from $100,
assuming a 10% minimum required reserve ratio. Once this point has been
reached, the total amount of money added to the system will have
increased from $100 to $1000.
The $100 demand claim held by the original depositor has thus been
transformed into $1000 of demand claims, now held by a multitude of
depositors. The source of this money is the initial $100 created by the
Federal Reserve plus the additional $900 of fiduciary media created by
the banks.
The combined change to the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve
and the banks are shown below:
Federal Reserve Balance Sheet:
Change to Assets Change to Liabilities
Securities: $100 Bank Reserves $100
Banks' Consolidated Balance Sheet:
Change to Assets Change to Liabilities
Bank Reserves: $100 (ex nihilo by Fed) Demand Deposits: $1000
Fiduciary Media: $900 (ex nihilo by banks)
Once money has been created in this way it acts as the general
medium of exchange for which all other goods are traded. It exists in
the accounts of any deposits which are instantaneously redeemable. It is
important to realize that in a fiat system the source of all funds in
these accounts originates from the money creating activities of either
the Federal Reserve through its open market operations or the banks
through fractional reserve lending, the latter process accounting for
the majority of newly created money since it is a multiple of the
reserves. There are no other sources. Thus, the total quantity of money
in all demand accounts owned by the public is equal to the total amount
of bank reserves plus the total amount of fiduciary media.
The crucial difference between the two basic forms of bank credit
Fiduciary media result in more than one person having a demand
claim, or title, to the same money. If all the owners of all the demand
accounts were to attempt to redeem their deposits for cash, the banks
would not have enough in their reserves to cover the claims, and the
money supply would shrink to an amount equal to that held in reserves
plus currency. It is only the fact that depositors are led to believe
they could redeem their accounts for cash, a belief that is undoubtedly
strengthened by the availability of federal deposit insurance and the
Federal Reserve's willingness to act as a lender of last resort,
that makes their deposits equivalent to cash, and thus a form of money.
Credit originating from genuine time deposits, however, does not
create fiduciary media and does not expand the money supply because the
depositor relinquishes ownership of the funds for a set period of time.
Because the depositor has no expectation that his deposit is available
on demand, no additional quantity of money is created. Suppose an
individual, call him A, lends $100 to another individual, B, for a year.
Title to the $100 is transferred to B, whereupon B can now spend the
money. A does not presume he can spend it at the same time. He knows he
must wait until B returns it to him with interest, one year hence. Even
though $100 of credit has been created, it is obvious this process has
not expanded the money supply. Suppose there is an intermediary
involved, such as a bank. If A lends money to the bank for one year, and
the bank lends the same money to B, here again no new money has been
created. $100 of credit has been granted to B, but since A has no
expectation he can use the $100 on demand, the process does not create
fiduciary media.
It is clear, therefore, that any amount of money deposited into a
time account creates an equivalent amount of credit that is benign in
its effects on the money supply. Similarly, any amount of credit that is
retired or sold that is accompanied by a corresponding reduction in time
deposits has no effect on the money supply. (15)
Currency
Currency is money in the form of notes and coins, issued by the
central bank, that is converted from bank reserves as and when
depositors redeem money in their accounts for cash. It is therefore part
of the monetary base. Even though the source of currency is the central
bank, the amount of currency in circulation is dependent on the
public's demand. Thus while the central bank has absolute control
over the total dollar amount of the monetary base through its open
market operations, it does not have total control over how much of the
reserves it creates are converted into currency.
if the public demand for currency increases, banks have to redeem
some of their reserves held on deposit at the Federal Reserve when they
do not have enough in their vaults. As the reserves are drawn down,
banks may have to simultaneously reduce the amount of circulation
credit--credit issued in excess of reserves--if the minimum required
reserve ratio is in danger of being transgressed. A large public
withdrawal of currency can therefore throw the fractional reserve
process into reverse, and lead to a severe contraction in fiduciary
media, and a concomitant reduction in the money supply. Banks can
quickly become insolvent when the public loses confidence in their
soundness and there are "runs". Bank runs demonstrate the
inherently bankrupt nature of banks, and the fact that they lend money
they do not own. They are the inevitable consequence of the practice of
fractional reserve banking.
Prior to the advent of deposit insurance, bank runs were a fairly
common phenomenon, and provided a sobering lesson to depositors about
the dangers posed by fractional reserve banks. Since 1933, however,
Federal Deposit Insurance has insured depositor's accounts
(currently up $250,000) to prevent runs from happening. It has been
extremely effective in alleviating public anxiety about the safety of
their accounts, reducing the possibility of en masse withdrawals almost
to zero, but it has increased the moral hazard. Federal deposit
insurance lulls the public into believing banks are inherently sound,
when they are not, and allows banks blithely to counterfeit money
without being called to account. Due to deposit insurance, bank runs
have not been a common feature in recent times and are unlikely to be
so. The concern that the FDIC could run out of money during a financial
panic is unwarranted, since the Federal Reserve in conjunction with the
government always stands ready to print enough currency to meet the
need.
A run is defined as a withdrawal of currency, which results in bank
credit deflation, and not a "flight" into treasuries or other
assets, which does not. For while a particular bank's reserves
might fall if depositors withdraw funds to purchase treasuries or other
securities, the reserves of other banks, where the sellers of these
assets maintain accounts, must increase. In this case, the banking
system as a whole is not forced to scale back fractional reserve loans,
and the money supply does not contract. The only exception to this is if
the Federal Reserve sells the treasuries and destroys the money it
collects. This does cause bank credit deflation, but the deflation in
this circumstance is caused by central bank policy rather than the
direct result of a loss of confidence in the soundness of the commercial
banks.
Government spending
All funds that the government spends are derived from tax revenues
or borrowing. Tax revenues do not increase or decrease the money supply;
the monies are simply transferred from accounts owned by the public to
those owned by the government, and back again after the tax revenue has
been spent. Government borrowing, on the other hand, always has the
potential to increase the money supply. In theory, the government could
sell treasury securities directly to the Federal Reserve, in which case
newly created money would be immediately deposited into the
Treasury's account, inflating the money supply. In practice,
however, the government sells treasuries to other entities first, in
which case money is transferred from the public's bank accounts to
the Treasury and there is no immediate inflationary effect. However, any
debt sold in this way must ultimately be settled through future tax
revenues, or by the issuance of new debt, or by the central bank
purchasing the debt from the public through open market operations. This
last case also inflates the money supply, and from an economic point of
view, is no different than if the government sells its debt to the
Federal Reserve directly. Whatever the method, any time the Fed
purchases treasuries, it monetizes government debt, and adds newly
created money to the economy. (16)
At any given time, less than 1% of the total money supply can be
found in government demand accounts. (17) This simply reflects the fact
that, while the government is a prime benefactor of money creation, the
monies it receives are quickly spent, and thereafter reside in the
accounts of the public.
Assets and liabilities
Figure 2 depicts stylized consolidated balance sheets for the
commercial banks and the Federal Reserve, and their relation to each
other and the money stock. (18)
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
From the chart, note the following equivalences:
Monetary Base (base money) = reserves + currency
Fiduciary Media = loans from demand deposits (circulation credit)
Money stock = demand deposits + currency
Money stock = monetary base + fiduciary media
Money stock = fiduciary media + reserves + currency
Reserve Ratio = demand deposits : reserves
Loans originating from time deposits (commodity credit) do not
affect the money stock.
Figure 3 augments the diagram of Figure 1 by including the factors
affecting the money stock discussed above:
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Arrows indicate cause and effect between the antecedent factor and
its consequent. "+" indicates the consequent follows in the
same direction as the antecedent; "-" indicates the consequent
and antecedent move in opposite directions.
Additional notes: Greater public demand for currency increases
currency in circulation, but decreases reserves. This by itself causes
no change to the money stock, but currency will be a factor of decrease
on prices, ceteris paribus, if the change to reserves causes banks to
reduce fiduciary media to comply with minimum reserve requirements.
Federal Reserve money creation is a factor of increase on prices in two
ways: (a) because additions to reserves directly increase the money
supply, and (b) because increases in reserves cause banks to expand
fiduciary media, which also increases the money supply. (19) Fractional
reserve lending is always a factor of increase on prices. Loans from
time deposits have no effect.
Other factors that affect the quantity of money
The minimum required reserve ratio is the minimum legal reserve
requirement that banks must maintain on checking accounts. In the U.S.
it is presently 10% for all depository institutions having greater than
$55.2 million in net transaction amounts. However, since the required
ratio on savings deposits is 0%, the effective required reserve ratio
for all demand accounts (checking accounts + savings accounts) is
usually considerably less than 10%.
Banks can reduce their effective reserve requirement even further
by counting on the fact that at any given time depositors rarely draw
down their demand accounts completely. Without the explicit consent of
their customers, banks frequently engage in the practice of temporarily
"sweeping" unused balances into Money Market Deposit Accounts
(MMDAs). (20) Because MMDAs fall under the same rules as savings
accounts and have a 0% reserve ratio, the sweeps program allows the
aggregate value of accounts subject to a 10% reserve ratio to be
minimized. The lower the effective reserve ratio, the greater is the
quantity of fiduciary media that can be produced.
one constraint imposed on banks in their money creation endeavors
is their capital adequacy ratio, the ratio between equity capital and
the value of risk-weighted assets such as loans and bonds. (21) Since
the advent of sweeps, this is frequently more limiting than the reserve
ratio. A bank's total assets are its loan portfolio, bonds and
other securities, reserves deposited at the Federal Reserve, cash,
treasuries, and property such as buildings. A bank's liabilities
are the money in its depositor's accounts (demand + time) and net
borrowings. The difference is shareholder equity. If borrowers default,
the book value of the asset side of the bank's ledger falls, and
the value of its equity capital must fall by the same amount. This is
because the dollar amount of its liabilities has not changed. Since its
equity position is usually much smaller than the value of its loans, the
ratio of equity to risk-weighted assets can fall dramatically if a large
number of borrowers default simultaneously. If it falls below a
proscribed limit, a bank is forced to shrink its balance sheet to bring
the ratio back above that limit. It can do this in two ways: either
retire old loans without renewing them, or attempt to sell some of its
existing loans. If banks attempt to sell their loans en masse, as can
occur during a financial crisis when the capital ratios of a large
number of financial institutions drop concurrently, the value of all
loans will tend to fall, even those which are not in danger of default.
This can compel banks to shrink their balance sheets further than they
would otherwise be required to do.
When banks, as a whole, reduce their loan portfolios to comply with
capital requirements, the liabilities side of the consolidated balance
sheet for the banking sector must contract by the same amount as the
assets side. The effect on the money supply is dependent on the kind of
liabilities that are reduced. If time deposits are reduced as loans are
divested, the money supply is unaffected. However, any amount of loans
that are divested without a reduction in time deposits, or in excess of
such a reduction, results in the elimination of fiduciary media, and
demand deposits decrease accordingly. In this case, the money supply
contracts.
The Federal Reserve has the ability through its open market
operations to shore up any bank's balance sheet by taking its
riskiest loans off its books and, at full value, exchanging them for
cash, thereby increasing the bank's reserves. Alternatively it can
exchange them for treasury securities. Since neither treasuries nor
reserves are counted as part of a bank's loan portfolio, this has
the effect of instantaneously restoring the equity-loan ratio above the
minimum, and obviates the need for the bank to shrink its balance sheet
further. During a financial crisis, this is one way in which the Fed can
head off an incipient credit contraction and prevent monetary deflation.
When the Fed initiates programs designed to bolster failing
financial institutions by monetizing their riskiest assets, it is
fulfilling its role as "lender of last resort," but it
increases the moral hazard by rewarding poor lending practices.
Furthermore, when the Fed purchases a sizable portion of a failing
bank's loan portfolio and expands the bank's reserves, it can
dramatically increase the bank's reserve ratio, over and above the
minimum required, and enhance the opportunity for it to engage in
further money creation through the fractional reserve process at some
point in the future.
Derivatives
Derivatives such as options, futures and swaps are financial
instruments that do not directly affect the total quantity of money in
existence. (22) They are bets between two parties that are essentially
zero-sum games. One party loses, while the counter-party gains. For
example, an options contract grants one party, upon payment of a
premium, the right to buy or sell an underlying asset within a specified
period of time at a specified strike price. If the option is not
exercised, the option buyer loses the premium paid to the issuer. If it
is exercised, the buyer gains from the seller the difference in the
exercise and strike price minus the premium. Money changes hands, but no
new money is created by this process. A credit default swap (CDS) is in
effect an insurance policy on an underlying loan. If the borrower
defaults, the loss is simply passed from the original bond holder to the
CDS issuer. In theory, if fractional reserve banks hold a large number
of derivatives and are net "losers," in the aggregate, to
non-bank entities, the consolidated balance sheet for the banks falls,
and this could reduce the money supply. However, the effect in this case
is indirect.
4. Factors Affecting Prices-in-General: The Reservation Demand for
Money
The reservation demand for money is the demand for money to hold by
those who already have it; sometimes referred to as the "demand for
cash balances," cash in this instance referring to all forms of
money, not just currency. It is the post-income demand. This is not to
be confused with saving, in which a person relinquishes ownership of his
money for a certain period of time while it is invested in goods or
services. Rather, the reservation demand is manifested in the fact that
people hold onto money, retaining title, without spending it. In
contrast to other commodities, money is not used up in consumption or
production; its only use is in exchange for consumer or producer goods.
Why then do people hold it? If future events were always known with
absolute certainty, a person could schedule their affairs such that all
funds received were instantaneously spent. Indeed, in such a world there
would be no need to retain money at all. But in the real world, it is
precisely because a person never knows what the future might bring that
he holds money.
When the social reservation demand for money changes, it can
neither be measured nor observed directly. Whether market participants
hoard money, or dishoard it, the amount of money in their wallets and
their bank balances in the aggregate remains exactly the same ceteris
paribus. There is no special place from which money flows, or to which
it flows, when the demand for cash balances changes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to observe the effects of the change.
Suppose, for example, prices-in-general are falling, and yet the supply
of goods in the market has not changed. From this it can be deduced that
the exchange demand for goods must have fallen. But let us also suppose
the money stock has not changed. This leaves only the reservation demand
for money as the causative factor for the reduction in the demand for
goods and the ultimate cause of the price deflation.
Price deflation that occurs as a result of an increase in the
reservation demand for money has been termed "cash building
deflation." (23) Care must be taken in using this term, however,
because as noted above, all things being equal, the amount of money
people "build" in the aggregate stays the same even when
market participants attempt to hoard it. Furthermore, the
"cash" that is hoarded refers to all forms of money, not just
currency. Cash building deflation is not to be confused with bank credit
deflation that occurs when a large number of people demand currency
simultaneously, or when other factors cause a contraction in the amount
of fiduciary media. Bank runs induce monetary deflation, but hoarding
money induces only price deflation and has no effect on the total
quantity of money. Indeed, unlike bank credit deflation, which is
associated with recessions, the effects of cash building deflation are
entirely benign.
The opposite of cash building deflation is price inflation that
results from a decrease in money's reservation demand. This is
particularly acute during a hyperinflation, when associated with
unrestrained money printing. Mises (1990A) detailed the three stages of
this process in his analysis of the German hyperinflation of the 1920s.
This episode is a useful lesson in demonstrating how a reversal of the
public's expectation of price deflation towards price inflation
causes the demand for cash balances (reservation demand for money) to
fall, and is a major factor in accelerating the upward movement of
prices. (24)
During the first world war, the German government resorted to
monetary inflation in order to fund their military operations. In this
first stage, the German people largely believed prices would return to
their prewar level after hostilities were over, and so curbed much of
their spending in anticipation of the mark's higher purchasing
power. Thus, the demand for cash balances was high, suppressing much of
the adverse effect of the money printing on prices, but masking a
dangerous condition that would in time reveal itself. Because prices
were only rising modestly, it seemed like a dream come true for the
German government, who, for a while at least, could print money with
virtual impunity.
After the war was over, however, prices continued to rise, and a
slow but perceptible shift in the psychology of the public began to take
hold. In this second phase, expectations of price deflation turned to
the realization that prices would continue to increase. As a result, the
reservation demand started to fall and people began to spend the money
they had previously been hoarding. Prices now started to rise faster
than the money supply, and as the PPM continued to fall and the cost of
living seemed to outstrip the public's available cash balances,
there were calls for the government to engage in additional rounds of
money printing to alleviate the apparent shortage.
At this point if the government had halted all money creation and
reduced spending, disaster could have been averted. Unfortunately they
did the precise opposite, taking the easy way out, and caving into the
public clamor. Thus began the third and final stage, where money
printing and prices chased each other upward at an ever-increasing rate
with tragic consequences. As the price level continued to accelerate,
doubling at ever-shorter intervals, the public's expectations
transitioned from merely inflationary to hyperinflationary, and the
reservation demand for money fell virtually to zero. In this final
"crack-up boom," people attempted to rid themselves of their
cash as fast as possible before it lost all value. As a consequence,
production plummeted, speculation ran rampant, the currency collapsed,
and most of the population were reduced to a life of barter and utter
impoverishment.
Since an increase in money's reservation demand, ceteris
paribus, leads to a reduction in the exchange demand for goods, and a
decrease leads to an increase in the demand for goods, it might be
surmised that these events are equivalent to a change in the so-called
velocity of money. According to this theory, when the velocity of money
slows down, prices fall, and when it speeds up, prices rise. However, as
Rothbard has demonstrated, this concept is deeply flawed. (25)
Advocates of this notion relate prices to velocity though irving
Fisher's equation of exchange, which states that the stock of
money, M, multiplied by the velocity of money, V, is equal to the price
level, P, multiplied by the volume of all goods traded, Q. (MV=PQ).
Unfortunately, the equation is a dead end. First, the general price
level, P, represents the average price, of the array of prices, of all
goods in the economy. But as has been shown, it is not possible to
quantify P as a single number. It is an abstract concept only. The best
that can be said is prices-in-general may move a certain way, but it is
not possible to predict by how much, nor even that they move by the same
amount. Second, V is defined as the fraction of the money supply that
turns over in a given period of time. However, because V is defined only
by referring to the other terms in the equation, it is not an
independent variable, and it makes the equation a trivial truism.
Consider an equation which is not trivial, Newton's second
law, which states Force = Mass x Acceleration. Because we can comprehend
force, mass and acceleration independently, Newton's discovery of
their interrelation makes a genuine contribution to the understanding of
the natural world. But now consider the equation of exchange, MV=PQ. Let
us overlook the problem of quantifying P for multiple goods, and
consider the case of just one good. Let us say its price, P, is
$10/unit. Suppose Q is 5 units/yr, and the total quantity of money in
the economy, M, is $100. From the equation, we calculate that V = 1/2
per yr. But note how we arrive at this number. We take P, multiply it by
Q, and divide by M. However, this is precisely how V is defined in the
first place. In essence, Fisher said let V=PQ/M. He then rearranged the
terms and proudly proclaimed to the world that he had discovered that
MV=PQ. Unlike, Newton's second law, Fisher's equation tells us
nothing new. The problem is that V does not exist independently in the
world of human action since it cannot be comprehended without referring
to P, Q, and M. It is simply an invented variable, defined in terms of
the other variables. If one of them changes, V changes also, but the
cause of the change is not a praxeological phenomenon; rather, it is
because the relation is a tautology.
When the reservation demand for money increases, and the exchange
demand for goods decreases, it does not necessarily mean buyers spend
less money per unit of time. It means they spend less money per unit of
good, and the quantity of goods demanded will be less. Mutatis mutandis,
the same argument holds true when money's reservation demand
decreases. Nowhere does time enter the picture.
Let us take the stock market as an example. Imagine two different
stocks, A and B, both of which at the opening bell are trading at the
same price. Suppose over the course of the day, the first stock is
thinly traded and the second traded very actively. The amount of money
changing hands in a given period of time for stock A might be half that
of stock B. But that does not mean A's price must fall to half of
B's. The velocity of money tells us nothing regarding the direction
of their prices. Indeed, during stock market panics, the velocity can be
far greater when prices are falling than when they are rising. What is
true for individual goods, or individual stocks is true for the market
as a whole. A change in the speed at which money changes hands tells us
nothing about the present or future direction of prices.
5. Factors Affecting Prices in Particular Sectors
The non-neutrality of money
As has been shown, it is a fallacy to believe that a single number
can be ascribed to a so-called price level for all goods and services or
to its inverse the purchasing power of money. The exchange ratios
between different goods are constantly changing, and are a reflection of
the shifting value scales of market participants. Thus, the purchasing
power of money constantly changes with respect to each good
individually, and is never brought to bear on the market as a whole,
affecting all goods to the same extent. (26)
It is equally erroneous to believe that any new influx of money
will affect the prices of goods evenly. Even if an equal proportion of
money were somehow magically deposited into every market actor's
account overnight, not everyone would spend the money immediately, or in
a way that reflected his previous spending habits. Overall, prices would
increase, but some prices would rise more than others. Furthermore, in
general, while people would be no better off than they were before, it
is not true to say that no one would be better off. Those who rushed to
spend the money first, before prices had risen, would benefit at the
expense of those who decided to wait.
When new money in the form of fiduciary media is created, it enters
the economy through the banking system. As a result, a relatively few
number of market participants--the recipients of credit--receive the new
money first. Not every borrower receives the same amount of money, or
uses it in the same way. Nevertheless, since the receivers of credit are
certainly in a position to offer more for goods and services than those
who have not so benefited, prices will initially be driven up in those
sectors where they are active.
It takes time for the price changes to diffuse throughout the
economy, from one sector to another, as the new money changes hands.
While this process is going on, it is clear there are those, besides the
original recipients of credit, who are in a position to benefit if they
can sell their goods or services at the higher prices while purchasing
the goods they require at the older prices. As such, they are able to
gain at the expense of those who must do the opposite. Because they
enjoy a temporarily higher purchasing power before the full impact of
the monetary inflation has been felt, the process gives rise to a
redistribution of income and wealth in their favor, at the expense of
those who are not so fortunate. When all the price changing
possibilities are exhausted, the wealth of market actors have been
affected unequally, and the final array of exchange ratios that exits in
this new paradigm are different from what they would otherwise have
been. (27)
Fiduciary media and the business cycle
In a purely free market economy the rate of interest is a
reflection of the pure rate and is determined by time preference; i.e.,
the preference by market actors for present over future goods. When the
social rate of time preference falls, the prevailing rate of interest
falls. Consumption is voluntarily curtailed while investment increases.
The added investment lengthens the production structure, resulting in
more roundabout processes that in time lead to increased production, new
and more plentiful consumer goods, and a higher standard of living.
In an economy where intervention exists, as is the case where banks
are permitted to engage in fractional reserve lending, an increase in
fiduciary media lowers the rate of interest below that which would
normally exist, given the prevailing social rate of time preference.
Overall investment is increased, but the amount of voluntary saving is
reduced, the difference amounting to "forced saving" arising
out of the newly created money. If the loans are predominantly extended
to businesses, as is usually the case, the artificially low interest
rate sends erroneous signals to entrepreneurs to engage in longer term
projects in higher order (early stage) industries, that would otherwise
not be started. Nonspecific factors of production are drawn into the
higher order processes as their prices are bid up. The production
structure is lengthened beyond that which would normally prevail, given
the level of consumption. In fact, the ensuing boom causes an increase
in consumer spending, leading to a more than proportional rise in the
prices of consumer goods, and drawing factors to late stage processes,
such as retailing. This overconsumption is not in harmony with the
malinvestment that is occurring in the higher stages of the production
structure. Eventually, it becomes apparent there are not enough real
resources available to complete the projects that were started. The
malinvestments have to be liquidated, businesses declare bankruptcy, and
loans cannot be repaid. As a result, banks are forced to reduce the
amount of fiduciary media, the fractional reserve process is thrown into
reverse, and the boom comes to an end.
The economy thus enters a recession. Provided there is no
additional money creation from the central bank, or legislative meddling
with the readjustment process by the government, interest rates rise to
reflect the pure rate, the money stock contracts, and prices of most
goods, including labor, fall, while the factors of production are
transferred to industries where they are most needed. Misallocations of
capital that occurred during the boom are reallocated during the
recession, and the structure of production is shortened as it is
reorganized. Seen in this light, the recession is thus the curative for
the excesses of the boom, allowing consumption to come back into harmony
with investment. Nevertheless, the productive structure that exists
after the readjustment is never the same as it would have been absent
the boom. Scare resources have been squandered, serious losses of
capital goods have occurred, and the productive output per capita has
fallen, resulting in a general impoverishment of society.
The scenario portrayed above is a feature of fractional reserve
banking. However, since 1913, booms and busts have always been triggered
by the Federal Reserve. Since recessions are always painful, there is a
great temptation by the government, through the central bank, to
alleviate their symptoms by expanding the monetary base. This has the
effect of increasing bank reserves and allowing the banks to engage in a
new round of lending before the excesses of the previous boom have been
fully resolved. This might temporarily halt the recession, but it merely
causes more malinvestment and sets in motion the tragic cycle yet again.
The recession is never allowed to do its work, and as a result the
general health of the economy declines relative to what it would have
been absent the intervention. under these circumstances, the money
supply never contracts, and prices, far from falling during the
recessionary periods, continue to rise, in both nominal and real terms.
Some authors have made the argument that if a significant portion
of the credit expansion is in the form of consumer rather than business
loans, the economic effects would not necessarily result in a recession.
However, it must be remembered that most consumer credit is used by
households for the purchase of durable consumer goods, which are in
reality true capital goods. The economic effects of consumer credit when
used in this way are indistinguishable from those that stem from credit
extended to businesses for the purchase of capital equipment. Even if
loans are used directly for current consumption, that is to say, for
non-durable consumer goods, then provided the credit satisfies a more or
less constant demand with respect to overall consumption, it merely
frees up additional credit for capital intensive processes that would
otherwise not have arisen.
Only if the credit expansion results in an increase in consumption
without credit being extended to businesses in the higher stages of the
production structure, and without additional capacity being freed for
those sectors, does the analysis of the business cycle have to be
modified. In this circumstance, prices of consumer goods rise while
those for capital goods diminish in relative terms, as higher order,
early stage processes are liquidated. A credit expansion such as this
results in very rapid capital consumption, a production structure that
is immediately shortened without there having been a prior lengthening,
and an even hastier impoverishment of society. Indeed, the effects of
this kind of credit expansion are precisely the opposite of the kind of
growth that results from an increase in voluntary saving. (28)
Time loans and the business cycle
It is clear that genuine time loans do not create fiduciary media
and do not have any effect on the money supply. But do they cause or
exacerbate the business cycle? Barnett and Block (2009A) argue that to
the extent that time deposits are not intertemporally matched to loans,
they do have an effect.
Suppose in order to provide a $100 loan with a term of two years, a
bank uses money from a one-year $100 CD at year zero to fund the first
year, with the intention of issuing another one-year $100 CD at year one
to fund the remainder of the term. This is shown below:
Time (year)
0 1 2
Depositor 1 $100 ------------------->
Depositor 2 $100 ---------------------->
Borrower $100 ------------------------------------------->
At first glance, the economic effect might seem to be no different
than if the bank were to fund the loan from a single depositor for the
entire period. Assuming all goes according to plan, no fiduciary media
will be created, since at no time will more than one person have access
on demand to more than $100. As long as the bank finds another depositor
for the second year, the value of the bank's deposits will always
exactly equal the value of the loan. (29)
What incentive might a bank have to borrow short and lend long in
this way? Consider that under normal circumstances, ceteris paribus, a
longer term loan has a higher interest rate than a loan of a shorter
duration, firstly, because it is less liquid and therefore its interest
rate carries a liquidity premium, and secondly, because a longer term
loan carries a greater risk of default, which adds a further premium
associated with risk. As a result, all things being equal, interest
rates on loans increase as a function of time to maturity. Put another
way, while the pure rate of interest--which reflects the social rate of
time preference--is the same throughout the time structure, the natural
rate--which includes risk, liquidity and PPM premiums--is higher for
longer term loans than shorter term ones.
Given this state of affairs, banks can exploit the difference in
interest rates, and generate a greater return by borrowing short and
lending long if they feel the current spreads are too wide. If, however,
a situation exits in which banks, in the aggregate, have on their books
a greater number of short term deposits relative to long term loans--we
are still assuming their aggregate value is the same--it demonstrates a
relative unwillingness by depositors to accept the existing premiums
being paid to banks on longer loans, and a relative reluctance by
borrowers to pay the premiums being paid by these same financial
institutions at the short end. In other words, the public views the
interest rate spreads as not wide enough. Absent the banks'
intervention stipulated in this scenario, either borrowers would have to
pay higher premiums to entice depositors to invest in long loans, or
depositors would have to accept lower premiums to convince borrowers to
accept shorter ones. It is clear, therefore, that if intertemporal
mismatching by banks is pervasive, it has the effect of narrowing the
spread; that is, lowering the long rate and increasing the short rate,
and thus altering the capital structure compared to the purely matched
scenario.
The consequence of this kind of "carry trade" is a
relative increase in investment in the higher orders of the time
structure of production, and a relative decrease in the lower orders.
If, as Barnett and Block (2009B) believe, the practice amounts to fraud
and represents an interference with the voluntary actions of market
participants, then the over/under investment is necessarily
ma/investment, not in harmony with consumer value scales. (30) As such,
it distorts the production structure, contributing to the business
cycle. It does so, however, without causing monetary inflation, ceteris
paribus. In contrast, fractional reserve lending, artificially lowers
the rate of interest for all loans, causing added investment
(malinvestment) across the entire production structure, with relatively
more in the higher orders, and achieves this in conjunction with an
increase in the money supply.
The effect of a change in demand for a particular good
Consider the case where the demand for a particular good, or group
of goods--call these, X--falls because of a decrease in credit
concentrated on X. If such credit originates from time deposits, the
demand for other goods rises, ceteris paribus, because money that would
otherwise have been spent on X is now being spent on other goods.
Neither the money supply nor the exchange demand for goods-in-general
has changed. Money has simply shifted from one sector of the economy to
another. (31)
Now consider the case where the reduction in demand for a
particular good or goods is caused by a decrease in fiduciary media, but
the money supply does not contract because of an offsetting increase in
the level of reserves. Like the previous example, the exchange demand
for goods-in-general does not decrease, ceteris paribus, and the
contraction in credit does not cause a general price deflation.
But what if in either of these circumstances the reservation demand
for money increases, causing a reduction in the general exchange demand
for goods anyway? Now the prices of most goods and services do indeed
decrease, but this situation is not caused by a contraction in credit.
As will be shown in the next section, this last example is precisely
what happened in the financial crisis of 2008. Contracting credit caused
a fall in demand for particular assets, but demand in general fell
because of an increase in the reservation demand for money.
Other factors affecting prices in particular sectors
New technology, changing consumer tastes, and the discovery of new
resources can all affect prices in certain sectors of the economy. For
example, in recent years, technological innovation in the electronics
industry has created ever more advanced and more plentiful
high-technology goods such as computers, cellphones, high definition
televisions, etc., causing not only their performance to increase, but
their prices to fall. Greater supply has led to growth deflation
occurring in that particular sector, despite monetary inflation.
In a recession, the reservation demand for certain assets falls
when they need to be liquidated. An example of this situation occurred
during the real estate market collapse. Under most circumstances, a real
estate owner has a reservation demand for his property, either to live
in it himself or to rent it to others. This applies to everyone, except
the home builder, whose reservation demand, if any, once the property
has been built, is based on speculation. When there is a reservation
demand, the supply curve slopes upward to the right; that is to say, the
property owner would normally only sell if the price were sufficiently
high. However, when a large number of borrowers default simultaneously,
and lending institutions are saddled with many foreclosed properties,
the situation is different. In these circumstances, unless banks have an
interest in using the repossessed real estate directly, or holding it
for speculation, both of which are unlikely prospects, their reservation
demand is close to zero. The supply curve for these properties is a
vertical line, because the banks have to sell at whatever the market
will bear. Looked at another way, the total demand (reservation demand +
exchange demand) for real estate falls, putting further downward
pressure on prices.
Summary
The following table presents an overview of the major variables
that cause price inflation and deflation, and their effect, if any, on
the business cycle:
VARIABLE GENERAL PRICE BUSINESS CYCLE?
INFLATION/DEFLATION?
Fiduciary Media Yes Yes
Reserves from Fed Yes. Yes x 2 if Yes. if fiduciary
open market ops fiduciary media media changes.
changes Otherwise no.
Currency "withdrawals Yes if change in Yes if change in
& deposits by public reserves affects reserves affects
fiduciary media. fiduciary media.
Otherwise no. Otherwise no.
Loans from time No. Yes if
deposits intertemporally
mismatched.
Otherwise no.
Reservation demand Yes. No.
for money
Stock of goods Yes. No.
Reservation demand Yes. No.
for goods
6. The Data: Inflation and Deflation During the Financial Crisis
We now turn to an analysis of the data, using the theoretical
arguments outlined above, to explain the movement of prices in the wake
of the financial crisis of 2008.
Figures 4 and 5 show the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the
Producer Price Index (PPI) for all commodities, from Jan 2007 to Jan
2011. Consumer prices were rising fairly rapidly until the middle of
September 2008, and then dropped sharply over a period of about six
months. Beginning in April 2009, prices-in-general started to increase
again, but at a slower pace. Producer prices traced a similar pattern.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
During this time, however, the money supply steadily grew as shown
in Figure 6. (32) From October 2008 until Jan 2011, the year on year
rate of monetary inflation increased, despite the allegedly huge
contraction in credit. (33)
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
For the three year period prior to October 2008, Austrian money
supply growth never rose above 5.5% per year. By November 2009, however,
it had reached 16.7% per year. In absolute terms, the money supply grew
from $5515 billion in October 2008 to $7245 billion in January 2011, a
total increase of 31.4% in just over two years.
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
If the money supply was growing rapidly during this period, why did
prices-in-general not rise nearly as fast? It is important to note, at
the outset, that while credit can directly affect particular prices in
those sectors where it expands or contracts the most, it can only affect
the general price level through its effect on the quantity of money.
Because the money supply expanded, it follows that at no time could the
credit contraction be responsible for a general price deflation or
reducing the rate of price inflation. Referring to Figure 1, there are
only three other factors that could act in opposition to monetary
inflation to keep the price level suppressed. of these, it is reasonably
certain that neither a sharp increase in the production of goods, nor a
sudden decrease in the demand to hold goods, was responsible.34 The most
likely factor was a dramatic increase in the reservation demand for
money. Uncertainty and fear was at its greatest between the end of 2008
and the beginning of 2009, which corresponds to the noticeable drop in
the CPI and PPI during this period. After that, prices started to rise
again, but slower than the growth in the money supply, so it is
reasonable to assume the demand for cash balances continued to remain
high and was very influential in restraining price inflation.
It must be emphasized that a fall in the amount of credit stemming
from reduced saving and investment does not directly cause an increase
in the reservation demand for money. one is not the flip side of the
other. Indirectly, a fall in credit might influence the public's
demand for cash balances, but this is a psychological phenomenon, not an
economic one. There is no praxeological reason why reductions in credit
must cause it to increase. (35) Moreover, credit can only affect general
prices by its effect on the money supply, and even then, only by changes
in fiduciary media. The reservation demand for money, on the other hand,
can affect prices independently of the quantity of money.
Why did the money supply increase despite a credit contraction?
Figure 8 shows the sources of money for the money supply. (36)
[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]
Prior to September of 2008, which marked the beginning of the
financial crisis, the total value of bank reserves held at the Federal
Reserve was approximately $45 billion. Relative to currency of $800
billion and fiduciary media of $4500 billion, it was so small that it is
barely visible on the chart. The ratio between reserves and fiduciary
media up until this point was approximately 1% and had been at this
level for several years. However, from 10 September 2008 to 12 November
2008, a period of only two months, the Federal Reserve injected over
$560 billion of new money into the system, causing reserves to jump to
over $600 billion, an increase of 1200%. During this same period,
fiduciary media fell from 4596 billion to 4095 billion, a drop of 11%.
Fiduciary media did not immediately expand, in what would be a normal
response to such a dramatic increase in reserves, because (1) banks were
scrambling to shore up their balance sheets, and (2) the Fed was
offering interest on excess reserves held at the Federal Reserve, which
disincentivized further fractional reserve lending. (37) The reserve
ratio thus rose to 15%.
It is noteworthy that the expansion of reserves was so
great--greater than the contraction in fiduciary media--that the money
supply grew. It is important to reemphasize that reserves contribute to
the money supply. They do not lie dormant, in a kind of economic limbo,
having no effect until banks use them for lending purposes. For every
dollar of reserves the Federal Reserve creates, there is a corresponding
dollar in someone's demand account, and this is so, whether or not
the banks use the reserve to create fiduciary media. Thus, all things
being equal, when reserves increase, the money supply grows, even if
banks do not "lend them out." If banks curtail lending, and
fiduciary media shrinks, but reserves are growing, and growing faster
than the contraction of fiduciary media, then the money supply still
expands. It does so more slowly than it would have done absent the
credit contraction, but it expands nevertheless.
Figure 9 is a chart of Federal Reserve liabilities. The bottom two
components (currency in circulation and reserve balances) are the
monetary base, and correspond to the same two components in Figure 8
above.
[FIGURE 9 OMITTED]
How and why did the Fed engineer such a massive increase in the
monetary base? Figure 10 shows Federal Reserve assets.
[FIGURE 10 OMITTED]
By October 2008, it was clear that numerous financial institutions
had on their books loans that simply could not be repaid, and as
borrowers defaulted, the capital ratios of many banks fell below
proscribed limits. Acting as the lender of last resort, the Fed
initiated a massive asset acquisition program to help restore the banks
to health. During the first few months of the crisis, it bought loans
through its term auction program, and its commercial paper facility, and
engaged in central bank swaps. However, by the first quarter of 2009, it
was clear that banks were still in trouble. Thus, the Fed began a new
program to buy mortgaged backed securities, replacing some of the
previously acquired debt, but increasing the overall total. This
maneuver simultaneously increased reserves and relieved the financial
institutions of their most "toxic" of loans, resurrecting the
banks' capital ratios by assailing the problem from both sides, so
to speak. Meanwhile, the Fed also began to buy back many of the
treasuries it had previously sold, which increased bank reserves yet
further, to an extent that more than compensated for the reduction in
fiduciary media.
[FIGURE 11 OMITTED]
Figure 11 depicts commercial bank assets from January 2007 to
January 2011. (38) The total book value of all loans, not including
interbank loans, reached a peak of $7023 billion on 17 October 2008.
Thereafter it fell by 13.3% to reach a low of $6088 billion on 24 March
2010. By January 2011, the total value of loans had recovered somewhat
to $6287 billion. Total commercial bank assets did not fall during the
entire period, however, because of the Federal Reserve's
intervention. Much of the approximately $1000 billion worth of loans
that disappeared from the commercial banks' balance sheets were
bought by the Federal Reserve and replaced with cash--i.e.
electronically created money--which became part of the banks'
reserves.
Bank credit originates from demand deposits--which results in
fiduciary media--and time deposits--which do not. During the first two
months of the crisis, fiduciary media fell by 11%, but thereafter it
steadily rose, and by March 2010 it reached pre-crisis levels. As of
January 2011, it stood at $5254 billion, fully 14% higher than it was
prior to the start of the crisis. since fiduciary media reached a low in
December 2008, but total credit bottomed out only in March 2010, it is
possible to deduce that bank credit sourced from time deposits accounted
for the difference. This is borne out by an examination of commercial
bank liabilities shown in Figure 12.
[FIGURE 12 OMITTED]
While demand deposits steadily grew, large time deposits contracted
from a high of $2149 billion on 17 September 2008 to $1756 billion on 26
January 2011, a fall of 18%. Thus it is clear that the credit
contraction was in large part caused by a reduction in loans sourced
from time deposits, bonds and other forms of lending, and not
exclusively by a reduction in fiduciary media.
It has been shown that despite a high rate of monetary inflation,
overall prices fell, or stayed relatively flat, not as a result of the
reduction of credit, but rather because of an increase in the
reservation demand for money. However, the prices of particular assets,
such as real estate did indeed fall as a direct result of the credit
contraction.
The boom in real estate was caused by the monetary expansion from
2001 to 2006, and represented a huge misallocation of capital that
occurred from an abundance of newly created money and artificially low
interest rates. There were a number of factors why real estate was the
focus of the boom. The government-sponsored enterprises of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac (39) encouraged banks to issue many new loans that would
otherwise never have seen the light of day. The Community Reinvestment
Act, an affirmative action law, required banks to issue a certain
percentage of new mortgages to persons who would normally have been
unqualified, resulting in numerous loans that fell below traditional
lending standards. And mortgage securitization, the practice of
purchasing loans from banks, pooling them into trusts, and issuing
securities based on the assembled pool, divorced purchasers of these
securities from any knowledge concerning the underlying risk, and
encouraged banks to issue loans without due regard to that risk.
On 2 January 2002 the total value of all real estate loans
(commercial, industrial, home equity) on the books of commercial banks
was $1755 billion. Over the course of the next few years, this figure
steadily rose, but did not reach a peak until 6 May 2009 when it stood
at $3,889 billion. Residential real estate loans, however, peaked in
late 2007 at approximately $1600 billion.
[FIGURE 13 OMITTED]
In most markets residential real estate price were falling by late
2007. It is clear that the inevitable bust, which was the consequence of
the boom, caused real estate prices to fall because credit was
contracting, or not expanding as fast, in that particular sector.
The demand for housing fell because loans were increasingly harder
to attain. at the same time, the supply of housing rose as an increasing
number of mortgages became delinquent. however, at no time was the money
supply contracting. Indeed the rate of monetary inflation after 2008 was
higher than it had been previously. Therefore, it is not true to say
that the credit contraction "spilled over" into other areas of
the economy, depressing prices-in-general. Only prices in specific
sectors were directly affected by the reduction in lending.
Summary
* In the wake of the 2001 recession, money creation by the Federal
reserve and the commercial banks led to a boom that was consistent with
austrian business cycle theory. From 2001 to 2004 interest rates fell,
money was plentiful, and loans were readily available.
* Various government incentives and directives led banks to issue a
large number of loans in the real estate sector. In conjunction with
increased mortgage securitization, much of the credit was issued to
borrowers without due regard to risk.
* The recession that started in late 2007 was the inevitable
consequence of the boom.
* The credit contraction caused prices in particular sectors to
fall, most noticeably real estate, where most of the loans had been
concentrated and where prices had been bid up.
* A large number of loan defaults caused banks' equity capital
to fall, leading to a financial crisis, and prompting massive
intervention by the Federal reserve in october 2008.
* Even though the amount of fiduciary media fell in 2008, Federal
Reserve expansion of the monetary base exceeded this contraction, and
thus the money supply continued to grow. Indeed, the rate of money
supply growth increased.
* By mid-2009, fiduciary media began to increase again, but overall
credit continued to contract because banks were reducing the total
dollar value of their time deposits.
* Because the money supply was growing, the contracting credit did
not directly cause a general fall in prices in 2008. Instead, prices
fell because of an increase in the reservation demand for money, almost
certainly as a result of uncertainty surrounding the financial crisis.
* During 2009 and 2010 the rate of monetary inflation reached over
15% because both reserves and fiduciary media expanded together, but
price inflation was only modest because the reservation demand for money
remained high.
7. Forecast Scenarios
Trying to predict future events is a risky proposition, for not
only are the future facts not known, it is not known how the external
agents will react to them. Predicting the nature and extent of future
exogenous variables requires not the logic of economics, but rather the
application of such disciplines as psychology, political science, and
technology, none of which can provide an answer that is certain.
Moreover, the prognosis requires examining the current data, predicting
how the principal actors will respond, deducing the outcome, and with
the forecast set of data, repeating the process all over again. The
challenge is that at every step along the way, the forecaster has to be
correct; at every fork in the road he must be accurate. And yet there
are an almost infinite number of forks at every point in time, and an
infinite number of points in time, and therefore an infinite number of
roads along which the prediction could travel.
With that caution in mind, a few possible future scenarios are
discussed here. The two major influences on the exchange demand for
goods-in-general are the money supply and the social reservation demand
for money. The size of the money supply is almost exclusively dependent
on actions by the Federal Reserve and the financial institutions.
Therefore, the three most apposite exogenous variables to consider are
public expectations of inflation/deflation, Federal Reserve policy, and
commercial bank lending.
What is the probability of future price deflation? Let us assume
that moderate monetary inflation continues. unless there is a dramatic
increase in the supply of goods and services--enough to overcome the
rate of monetary inflation--there would have to be a significant
increase in the reservation demand for money for prices to fall. But the
demand for cash balances is already high, and the likelihood of it
moving higher seems remote given that prices have already started to
rise, and public expectation seems to be turning from price deflation to
inflation.
What if there is another recession and a further contraction in
fiduciary media? Given the Federal Reserve's past performance and
recent statements by its chairman, Ben Bernanke, it seems likely that
the Fed would never allow the money supply to shrink. As was the case
during 2008, any contraction in fiduciary media would be met with
further expansions of the monetary base. Indeed, the Federal Reserve has
not allowed the money stock to contract since 1931, a period of time
when bank runs were a common phenomenon and the U.S. was still on a gold
bullion standard. It seems very unlikely to do so now. Therefore the
chance of sustained price deflation at any time in the foreseeable
future seems very remote indeed.
What are the chances of hyperinflation? hyperinflation, defined as
runaway price inflation and monetary inflation is a unique phenomenon
that requires both unrestrained central bank money printing, and a
rapidly falling reservation demand for money. There is no point at which
one can say specifically where public expectation turns from
inflationary to hyperinflationary, and where the crack-up boom begins.
Boyapati (2010), in an excellent section of his paper on the motives of
the Federal Reserve, believes that when a central bank is firmly under
the control of the banking establishment, as opposed to the government,
it is very unlikely to engage in policies that could lead to
hyperinflation. The central bank's primary interest is to increase
the money supply in a sustainable manner, thereby ensuring a steady
transfer of wealth from the majority of the population to those who are
the beneficiaries of money creation, without the extremely disruptive
effects that high rates of monetary inflation can bring. Politicians, on
the other hand, being more short-term oriented, and perhaps less
educated on the adverse effects of monetary inflation, are more likely
to resort to unrestrained money creation when they have greater control
of the central bank.
Let us assume the Fed is unlikely to engage in the kind of money
creation that occurred in the German hyperinflation of the 1920s, and
that the rate of monetary inflation continues to be moderate. If the
reservation demand for money were to fall from its presently elevated
position, prices would start to rise fairly significantly. If the Fed
did nothing, public expectations of inflation would increase, and the
rate of price inflation would likely increase also, outstripping the
rate of monetary inflation in short order. eventually, assuming the Fed
continued to do nothing, the rates of monetary and price inflation would
converge.
The Fed could of course attempt to counteract rising prices by
engaging in a policy of disinflation--reducing the rate of monetary
inflation--as Fed chairman Paul Volker did in the 1970s, but even so, it
would take time for the effects to be felt. unless there was a fairly
dramatic reversal of the current loose monetary policy, it would be hard
to turn public expectation around, and thereby reverse the falling
demand for cash balances.
What if there was another financial crisis? In the crisis of 2008,
the reservation demand for money rose because of great uncertainty
surrounding the financial markets. seemingly, there was no safe place to
invest, and public expectations of inflation were low. But if a
financial crisis occurred while public expectations of inflation were
high, the situation would be very different. In this case, it would not
be safe to hold money, so there would be a flight into real assets,
which would further increase the rate of price inflation. even if
another financial crisis resulted in a severe contraction in credit, it
is unlikely the money supply would contract, given central bank policy.
More likely the contraction would not occur in fiduciary media, but
rather in other forms of credit--which have no effect on the money
supply--as investors fled from bonds, time deposits and other fixed term
investments. Money would in this case move into hard assets such as
food, raw materials, and precious metals. under this scenario, a rapidly
decreasing demand for cash balances would increase the rate of price
inflation.
As of February 2011, the reserve ratio is at extremely high levels
as shown in the chart below.
[FIGURE 14 OMITTED]
If the reserve ratio were to fall back towards historical
norms--that is, if banks were to increase the amount of fiduciary media
relative to reserves--there would be a very rapid increase in the rate
of monetary inflation. What are the chances of this happening? The
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized the Federal Reserve to pay
banks interest on excess reserves--reserves in excess of the minimum
required. Banks view this option as more attractive than issuing new
loans at a time when their capital ratios are close to the minimum and
market interest rates are low. Thus the issuance of fiduciary media is
constrained and the reserve ratio remains high. Provided the Federal
Reserve does not abandon the program, and continues to offer competitive
interest rates, it would seem that the possibility for monetary
inflation through the issuance of fiduciary media remains slim.
Some commentators have worried that if price inflation takes hold
and market interest rates rise, the Fed would have to offer increasingly
higher rates of return to stay competitive. since the interest is paid
with newly created money, which adds to the reserves, this by itself
increases the money supply. The concern is that as the money supply
grows, interest rates have to increase further, and the Fed could be
boxed into a corner, where rising interest rates and additions to
reserves chase each other upwards in a reinforcing spiral.
However, what these authors overlook is that the Federal Reserve
can always reduce the level of bank reserves, at any time of its
choosing, through the sale of its assets. What if it ran out of assets
to sell? This is unlikely. Any institution that is permitted to create
money out of thin air, can, in conjunction with the government, create
assets. The government simply issues new treasury bonds, which it then
"sells" to the Federal Reserve. The Fed "pays" for
them with newly created money, but the money does not enter circulation;
rather it is held dormant in a special account. Meanwhile, the treasury
bonds can be sold by the Fed to the public through its open market
operations. In September 2008, at the Fed's request, the Treasury
created the Supplementary Financing Account, specifically for this
purpose. (40) Provided the public is willing to buy the bonds, the Fed
has the ability to reduce the level of bank reserves, and hence
constrain the issuance of fiduciary media.
Therefore, fears that the Federal Reserve would allow commercial
banks to be fully "loaned up" at their current level of
reserves, or that the Fed would at some point in the future be unable to
reduce the level of reserves, are probably overblown. A more likely
situation is that lending would start to increase, but the Fed would not
act quickly enough. The process of halting the fractional reserve
process takes time, but there is always the danger that acting too
quickly could jeopardize the banks' balance sheets and precipitate
another recession. If the Federal Reserve were too slow to respond to a
fall in the reserve ratio, monetary inflation could be very significant
before the process was stopped.
8. Conclusion
The deflationist's focus on bank credit deflation is misplaced
because of a basic misunderstanding of how credit affects prices. A fall
in the amount of bank credit can only affect prices-in-general when it
leads to a reduction in the amount of fiduciary media, and only when the
decrease in fiduciary media causes a contraction in the money supply,
and, furthermore, only when the fall in the money supply leads to a
reduction in the exchange demand for goods. Assuming that an increase in
the supply of goods does not offset the fall in demand, then, and only
then, does a credit contraction cause a general price deflation.
During the financial crisis of 2008, a contraction in bank credit
led to a relatively small reduction in the amount of fiduciary media,
but Federal Reserve intervention ensured that this was more than offset
by an increase in the level of bank reserves. During the entire time,
the money supply never contracted. A temporary general price deflation
occurred only because the reservation demand for money rose to an extent
that more than offset the rise in the money supply, but this was quickly
overcome by later increases in the rate of monetary inflation.
The credit contraction did lead to a fall in the prices of certain
assets in particular sectors of the market such as real estate,
consistent with Austrian business cycle theory, but the fall in credit
logically could not have been responsible for the general price
deflation.
The rise in the reservation demand for money was most likely
precipitated by fear and uncertainty surrounding the credit contraction
in the financial markets. However, the effect, if any, is only a
psychological one; there is no praxeological relation. Indeed, when
public expectation turns from price deflation to price inflation, the
social reservation demand for money can fall regardless of the level of
credit.
As of January 2011, the prospect of sustained price deflation seems
very unlikely. If the reservation demand for money falls, price
inflation will start to outstrip monetary inflation. The further
consequences will depend on the reaction by the Federal Reserve, the
banks, and the population at large.
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(1) For an analysis of the distinction between circulation credit
and commodity credit (credit arising out of genuine time deposits), see
Mises (1953) pp. 263-65.
(2) As such, an analysis of history can never be used to prove or
test any economic theory; it can only be used to illustrate it. On this
point, see Rothbard (1997A) pp. 58-77 and Mises (2007).
(3) For a discussion on how these terms came to be used by
mainstream economists in this way, see Salerno (1999).
(4) See Rothbard (1997B).
(5) The terminology "factor of increase" and "factor
of decrease" are the same that Rothbard (2004) uses. The terms
"positive correlation" and "negative correlation"
have been avoided since they do not make clear which is the antecedent
and which is the consequent.
(6) See also Salerno (2006) for a discussion of a model
demonstrating this same principle.
(7) See generally Mises (1953), Rothbard (1978), Salerno (1987).
(8) For a contrary opinion on savings deposits, see Shostak (2000).
(9) Shostak (2000) and Evans & Baxendale (2010) have provided
Austrian definitions of the money supply which omit savings accounts.
They do so on the grounds that claims on dollars held in these accounts,
even if they are redeemable on demand, do not act as a final payment on
goods and services, and as such do not circulate in exchange. However,
the present author sides with Salerno and Rothbard in this regard, in
that this argument is beside the point. When assessing the money supply
from an economic perspective, rather than a purely definitional one,
savings deposits should be included as money precisely because of their
on-demand redeemabilty. If depositors can transfer funds to checking
accounts, or withdraw them in the form of cash, and do so
instantaneously without any required period of waiting, the deposit acts
like money, and as such must be included in the money supply.
(10) Interestingly, Rothbard argues that accounts (held at
commercial banks) owned by savings and loan banks and other non-bank
money creators act as the reserves for their customers' demand
accounts, and thus to include them would be double counting, although
this is a minority view.
(11) Cash surrender value.
(12) Most Austrian economists do not include MMMFs as money.
However, for a contrary opinion see Haymond (2000).
(13) These he calculates by the formula: total policy reserves of
life insurance companies minus policy loans outstanding.
(14) The aggregate quantity of reserves in the economy can only be
changed through central bank open market operations, or by account
holders withdrawing or depositing currency.
(15) However, Barnett and Block (2009A) argue that intertemporal
mismatching of time deposits and loans contribute to business cycles,
even though they have no effect on the money supply.
(16) With the exception of money deposited into the Treasury's
Supplementary Financing Account. See section 8 for more details.
(17) This ratio has been derived from the FRB H6 statistical
release "Other Memorandum Items." for U.S. Government demand
deposits at commercial banks, U.S. Government deposits at the Federal
Reserve, and U.S. Government note balances at depositories.
(18) Some liabilities of the Fed, such as government accounts, have
been omitted for clarity. Government accounts are in addition to the
monetary base. They form only 0.7% of the total money stock. Vault cash
is also not shown. Vault cash is part of bank reserves and is equal to
total currency issued by the Fed minus currency in circulation. Vault
cash is approximately 10% of total currency issued.
(19) The exception to this is if open market operations involve
increasing reserves through purchases of fiduciary media, in which case
(a) is not applicable, but (b) is still applicable. The Federal
Reserve's actions in this case are still a factor of increase on
prices, but not doubly so.
(20) For a good discussion of sweeps see Charles Hatch (2005).
(21) Certain assets such as cash and treasuries are assumed to have
zero risk, and are therefore excluded in the calculation of the ratio.
For a more detailed explanation, see Thorsten Polleit (2008).
(22) Nor do they affect the equilibrium price of the underlying
asset.
(23) Salerno (2003).
(24) Also, see Rothbard (2008) pp. 67-74 and Bresciani-Tirroni
(1937).
(25) For a brilliant critique of the velocity of money concept and
Fisher's equation of exchange see Rothbard (2004) p. 831.
(26) See Mises (1990B).
(27) As long as the monetary inflation remains in place, the
transfer of wealth continues, with those on fixed incomes particularly
hard hit. Moreover, the relation between creditors and debtors is
altered, since borrowers are in a position to be able to repay the
principle on their loans, at a later date, using devalued currency.
(28) See Huerta de Soto (2006) pp. 406-408.
(29) However, according to Barnett and Block (2009B), there is a
clear ethical problem with respect to the money titles. At year zero,
depositor 1 has a note giving him title to $100 a year from now, whereas
the bank's note from the lender grants the bank the title in two
years. Thus two people have claim to the same $100 at the end of the
first year. Even if, in a year's time, the bank does find another
depositor to pay back depositor 1, at the outset, the bank is in effect
misrepresenting the claim it gives to the first depositor. Moreover, it
has created a loan of longer duration than would have occurred without
it acting as an intermediary.
(30) If the practice is fraud, it is necessarily malinvestment
because it involves violent intervention in the market. If it is not
fraud, then the economic effect is the same, but the result cannot be
considered "bad," because it originates in the voluntary
actions of market participants. See Block and Davidson (2010) for a
similar argument concerning the malinvestment caused by fiduciary media.
Business cycles are intuitively bad, but the reason they are bad is
because they caused by the issuance of fiduciary media, and fiduciary
media involve violent intervention.
(31) Cf. Rothbard (2004) p.817 "For each individual good, the
price will also increase when the specific demand for that good
increases; but unless this is a reflection of a drop in the social
reservation demand for money, this changed demand will also signify a
decreased demand for some other good, and a consequent fall in the price
of the latter. Hence, changes in specific demands will not change the
value of the PPM."
(32) For the components included in the Austrian Money Supply, see
section 2 of this article.
(33) Numerous articles appeared in the mainstream media, including
the Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, and The Economist, citing
a very significant credit contraction. However, while credit did fall
somewhat during this period, the evidence for a massive credit
"crunch" is not borne out by the data. See below. Also see
articles by Robert Higgs (2009) and Richard Ebeling (2009) refuting the
notion of a severe credit crunch.
(34) Price deflation that results from an increase in the supply of
goods is referred to as "growth deflation." see salerno (2003)
for an in-depth account of growth deflation.
(35) As Rothbard (2004) p. 774 explains, all things being equal,
there is no causal connection between the reservation demand for money
and consumption/investment preferences.
(36) Fiduciary media has been calculated by subtracting reserves
and currency from the total money stock.
(37) This it did through the Economic stabilization Act of 2008,
which permitted the Fed to offer commercial banks interest on their
excess reserves.
(38) NB: "Commercial bank" in this instance does not
include savings banks, thrifts, credit unions etc. As such it does not
show the total lending by all financial institutions.
(39) Fannie Mae: Federal National Mortgage Association. Freddie
Mac: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association.
(40) See Pollaro (2010) for a more detailed explanation of the
Treasury Supplementary Financing Account.
LAURA F. DAVIDSON *
* Laura Davidson (davidsonlaura@,hotmail.com) is an independent
scholar and a student of Austrian Economics.