Bicommunalism and the bifurcation of the immigration system.

Garcea, Joseph

ABSTRACT/RESUME

This paper examines the bifurcated nature of the immigration system in Canada, the factors that have produced it, and the effects that it has had on planning and managing immigration, federal-provincial relations, and the abilities of the federal and Quebec governments to achieve some of their key objectives pursuant to their respective nation-state building goals. The analysis suggests that bifurcation is a product of the bicommunalism paradigm that has prevailed in Quebec since 1960. It also suggests that although bifurcation has not had a major negative effect either on planning and managing immigration or on federal-provincial relations, its effects on both the socio-demographic and the national identity and state allegiance objectives of the Quebec and federal governments are indeterminate because the precise causal linkage between bifurcation and those objectives are difficult to gauge. The paper concludes that although bifurcation is ending in some facets of the immigration system, in other facets it w ill likely persist for some time.

Cette communication examine la nature bifurquee du systeme de l'immigration au Canada, les facteurs l'ayant produit et les effets qu'il a eu sur la planification et la gestion de l'immigration, les relations federales-provinciales et les capacites des gouvernements federal et du Quebec a atteindre certains de leurs principaux objectifs en vertu de leurs buts d'Etat national respectifs. Cette analyse suggere que la bifurcation est le resultats du paradigme du bicommunautarisme, qui a domine au Quebec depuis 1960. Elle suggere egalement que bien que la bifurcation n'a pas eu d'effet defavorable important sur la planification ou la gestion de l'immigration, ou sur les relations federales-provinciales, ses effets sur l'identite socio-demographique et nationale et les objectifs d'allegeance nationale des gouvernements federal et du Quebec sont indefinis parce que le lien de cause a effet precis entre la bifurcation et ces objectifs sont difficiles a evaluer. Cette communication conclut que bien que la bifurcation se termine en certaines facettes du systeme d'immigration, dans d'autres facettes il est probable qu'il persistera pendant un certain temps.

Introduction

Canada is approaching the new millennium with a bifurcated immigration system. Indeed, the system is so bifurcated that prima facie it appears there are two relatively separate and distinct systems. The fundamental characteristic of the system is two highly differentiated parts, one of which is designed to deal with immigration to Quebec, and the other to deal with immigration to the rest of the country. The key difference between the two parts of the system is the degree of jurisdictional authority exercised by the federal government vis-a-vis the Quebec provincial government as compared to other provincial governments. Whereas the federal government's role in planning and managing most facets of immigration to the rest of the country is relatively unfettered, its role in planning and managing immigration to Quebec is quite limited. The limitations on its role in planning and managing immigration to that province are the result of a series of bilateral agreements between various federal and Quebec government s, the most recent of which was signed in 1991.

The central objective in this paper is to examine the nature, determinants and effects of the bifurcated nature of the immigration system. In examining the effects, the focus is on planning and managing immigration, federal-provincial relations, and the abilities of the federal and Quebec governments to achieve their objectives in the field of immigration pursuant to their respective socio-demographic and political goals.(1) The section of the paper devoted to the effects of bifurcation underscores the paucity of valid data that exists on this particular matter and the difficulties that are likely to be encountered in trying to generate some of that data. The paper concludes both with some suggestions on the need for further research and some prognostications on bifurcation in the near and more distant future.

The Nature of Bifurcation

The bifurcated nature of the immigration system since 1991, and to some extent even since 1971, is evident along three important and inextricably related dimensions of the immigration system. The first dimension on which bifurcation is evident is the alignment of roles between Canada and the various provinces. In recent decades there has been an asymmetrical alignment of roles between Canada and Quebec as compared to Canada and the other provinces. A detailed analysis of the asymmetrical alignment of roles has been provided elsewhere by the author. (2) Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper it is useful to note the four key features of that asymmetry and the changes that have occurred to it in recent years largely as a result of immigration agreements concluded by the federal government with Manitoba and British Columbia.

First, Quebec has had unique roles in establishing immigration levels for that province. The 1991 Canada-Quebec Immigration Accord provided Quebec with a key role in determining the percentage of immigrants that would land in that province each year. To date no other province performs that precise role, including Manitoba to whom the federal government gave its undertaking in their bilateral 1996 agreement to provide the province with an annual level of immigration proportionate to its percentage share of the Canadian population. (3)

Second, Quebec has had unique roles in the recruitment of immigrants. Since the early 1970s Quebec has been authorized to undertake immigrant recruitment initiatives abroad and to place its provincial officers either in federal or provincial diplomatic missions for that purpose.

Third, Quebec has had unique roles in the selection of independent class immigrants. No other province has had a veto power comparable to Quebec's on the selection of independent immigrants. At most other provinces have had a very limited advisory role in the selection of some categories of immigrants or visitors. This role has not been changed by the new generation of agreements that the federal government has concluded with Manitoba and British Columbia which entitle those provinces "to nominate a set annual number of individuals for the provincial/ territorial nominees class, whose admission is considered by the Province to be of significant benefit to its economic development requirements." (4)

Fourth, Quebec has had unique roles in designing, administering, and delivering settlement and integration services for immigrants. This is particularly true of the period from 1991 until mid-1998. The reason for this is that under the 1991 Canada-Quebec immigration agreement, the federal government withdrew from designing, administering, and delivering most settlement, as well as linguistic, cultural, and economic integration, services. (5) In all provinces other than Quebec those services were generally designed, administered, and delivered by the federal government in consultation and coordination with the provincial governments. The most significant such process existed in Alberta where the federal and provincial governments had established a joint and integrated program for funding settlement service agencies. Eventually, however, in 1998 Canada concluded agreements with both British Columbia and Manitoba which contained provisions modeled on those in the Canada-Quebec agreement that transferred responsi bility for the design, administration, and delivery of settlement and integration services for immigrants and refugees to those provincial governments. (6) Although these particular arrangements have diminished the scope of asymmetry in the alignment of roles between Canada and Quebec compared to that between Canada and the other provinces in this particular facet of the immigration system, such asymmetry persists in the other facets of the immigration system noted above.

The second major dimension of bifurcation, one closely related to the first, is the difference in the policy and program frameworks of the various provinces. To date Quebec has been the only province to develop extensive immigration policy and program frameworks designed to supplement or even supplant those of the federal government. (7) Such policies and programs are found in most facets of the immigration process, but particularly both in the selection stage and in the settlement and integration stage. In the selection of immigrants, for example, Quebec has a policy that consists of two key sets of criteria--one to determine the suitability of independent immigrants and the other to determine the suitability of the sponsors of immigrants. To date no other province has had such a policy or sets of criteria. The result is that whereas independent class immigrants destined to other provinces are selected on the basis of federal selection criteria, those destined to Quebec are selected on the basis of provincia l immigration policies. Similarly, in the settlement and integration of immigrants the Quebec government has designed an array of policies and programs. Of these, some are directed only to immigrants, some are directed to all residents of Quebec, and others are directed to both. An example of the latter is Quebec's official language law enacted by a Parti Quebecois government that not only contains certain provisions that apply to all residents, but also contains provisions that make French the language of education for the children of all new immigrants. Furthermore, in recent decades, but particularly since 1991, successive Quebec governments have been actively developing various linguistic, cultural, and political integration programs designed to advance their nation-state building goals. This includes policies designed to foster, among other things, a proficiency in the French language, and an understanding of, and an affinity to the Quebecois culture and nation. (8) Collectively, such policies and progra ms provide civics training designed to foster what might be termed a provincial 'quasi-citizenship,' if not full fledged citizenship, in what sovereigntist provincial governments have deemed to be the Quebecois nation-state. (9) Although other provinces have some 'civics' policies and programs for their respective population, to date none has developed an extensive policy and program framework comparable to Quebec's that focuses on the integration of immigrants into a provincially based nation and nation-state that is distinct from the pan-Canadian nation and nation-state. It remains to be seen whether provincial governments in Manitoba and British Columbia will follow Quebec's example in this area now that they are obliged to perform a larger role in designing, administering and delivering integration services pursuant to their respective immigration agreements with Canada.

The third major dimension of the bifurcated nature of the immigration system is the difference in the organizational frameworks established for immigration to Quebec and those established for immigration to other provinces. Whereas immigration to Quebec is co-planned and co-managed by two highly institutionalized sets of governmental organizations (i.e., one federal and the other provincial) in which provincial government organizations perform key roles, immigration to other provinces is planned and managed almost exclusively by federal organizational units. To date, in these other provinces there is only very limited involvement by some small and fledgling provincial organizational units which perform more of an advisory and coordinating function, rather than the substantial policy or program development and implementation functions performed by their Quebec counterparts. (10) It remains to be seen whether the new roles being undertaken by provinces such as Manitoba and British Columbia in designing, adminis tering, and delivering settlement and integration will result in some institutional development in those provinces.

The Determinants of Bifurcation

The major impetus for the bifurcation of the immigration system has been provided by the bicommunalist paradigm espoused by Quebec governments since 1960. This particular paradigm has been at the root of the Quebecois nation-state building project which has had a counter-hegemonic role vis-a-vis both the French-Canadian nation-state building project that prevailed in Quebec before 1960 and the federal government's pan-Canadian nation-state building project that has prevailed since 1867. (11) More specifically, the Quebecois nation-state building project emerged in reaction and as a challenge to the traditional French-Canadian nation-state building project that had been spearheaded by Quebec provincial governments before 1960. The former challenged the conception of the nation that was embodied in the latter both in terms of its territorial basis and its ethno-linguistic characteristics. The pre-1960 era conceptualization of bicommunalism characterized the Canadian polity as consisting of a French-Canadian nat ion located largely in Quebec, but with a substantial component located in other provinces and territories, and the English-Canadian nation located largely outside Quebec. By contrast, the post-1960 era conceptualization characterized it as consisting of a Quebecois nation located almost exclusively in Quebec save for those sojourning elsewhere, and a Canadian nation consisting of anglophones, francophones, and allophones located largely outside Quebec. (12)

Another key difference in the Quebec government's conceptualization of the nation that began to emerge in the post-1960 era, and one that has become increasingly more pronounced over time, focuses on ethno-linguistic characteristics. The nation-building project espoused by successive Quebec governments in the post1960 era rejects the ethnically based conception of the nation in favour of a civic one. Membership in the nation is not predicated on one's ethno-linguistic pedigree, as was the case in the traditional nationalism of the past, but on one's affinity with, and integration into the socio-cultural and political spheres of the Quebecois community. (13)

Quebec provincial governments that have been in power since 1960 have rejected not only their predecessors' conception of the nation, but also their views on the means that the provincial state should use in pursuing nation-state building goals in various policy fields, including immigration. (14) Unlike their predecessors who had seen immigration as a threat to the goals of their nation-state building project, these provincial governments have tried to harness it to serve the goals of their Quebecois nation-state building project. This has been deemed essential both for influencing the thrust of federal immigration and integration policies and programs and performing key roles in planning and managing immigration destined to that province.

The Quebecois nation-state building project of the post-1960 era also emerged in reaction, and as a challenge to the hegemonic status of the pan-Canadian nation-state building project spearheaded by successive federal governments. (15) More specifically, it was in reaction to the deleterious effects that the federal government's initiatives, undertaken in pursuit of the goals of the pan-Canadian nation-state building project, had on the goals of the Quebecois nation-state building project. The prevailing view among Quebec governments since the mid-1960s has been that the federal immigration policies and programs did not serve the goals of the Quebecois nation-state building project very well. In their view federal recruitment and selection policies and programs did not attract enough francophone immigrants to Quebec, and federal integration policies and programs did not lead the majority of immigrants to opt either for French language training or integration into the French-speaking component of Quebec societ y. By the Iate-1960s they had concluded that efforts to influence federal immigration policies and programs to be more sensitive to the goals of the Quebecois nation-state building project would not suffice in changing immigration and integration patterns. This thinking led Quebec governments to challenge the federal hegemony in the field of immigration by, among other things, seeking to perform key roles in planning and managing immigration and by enacting provincial policies and programs related to immigration and immigrant integration. Toward that end they entered into a series of negotiations from the late 1960s until the early-1990s that produced four bilateral agreements between Canada and Quebec. (16)

The Effects of Bifurcation

What effects has the bifurcation of the immigration system had on planning and managing immigration, federal-provincial relations, and the objectives of Quebec and federal governments in the field of immigration designed to serve their respective nation-state building goals? The various parts of this question are dealt with in turn.

The Effects on Planning and Managing Immigration

The bifurcation of the immigration system has not only complicated the planning and managing of immigration, but it has also created some duplication and delays. Yet, contrary to what some federal immigration officials feared when the Quebec governments began demanding a larger role in planning and managing immigration, generally it has not produced any major insurmountable planning and management problems. One indicator of this is the remarkable paucity of complaints or debates among either government officials or the public both inside and outside Quebec that the extant bifurcated nature of the immigration system has had any major negative effects for planning and managing immigration. (17)

The major reason that bifurcation has not created insurmountable problems for planning and managing immigration is that officials for both orders of government have been able to design and operate the system in a way that is relatively efficient and effective. Toward that end such officials have exhibited considerable wisdom and prudence in, among other things: developing effective joint, or at least highly coordinated, planning and management frameworks; performing their respective roles efficiently and effectively; and coordinating and harmonizing their respective policies and programs. By doing so they have been able to minimize various problems that might have emerged. This includes policy and program problems for the immigration system; tensions and disputes both between themselves and between their respective governments; and political problems for their respective governments stemming from complaints that a bifurcated system is not only inequitable but also inefficient and ineffective.

The Effects on Federal-Provincial Relations

Although wisdom and prudence among federal and Quebec officials in planning and managing immigration within a bifurcated system has minimized tensions and disputes both among themselves and their governments, it has not precluded all such tensions and disputes. Such tensions and disputes between federal and Quebec governments have emerged periodically on matters such as the precise alignment of roles between them, their respective interpretations of the Canada-Quebec agreements, and the thrust of their respective immigration and integration policies and programs. (18)

Some tensions and disputes have also emerged periodically between the federal government and other provinces. Some of the other provincial governments have complained, and not always entirely without good reason, regarding three important matters. First, they have complained about what they perceive as the comparative advantages that the bifurcated system has provided Quebec in the selection of independent immigrants, and particularly those selected pursuant to the business immigration program. The larger provinces, notably Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia, that were seeking to maximize benefits for their own provincial economies under that particular program, felt that Quebec was able to develop policies and programs that gave it an unfair advantage in attracting a disproportionate share of such immigrants. Second, they have complained regarding the federal government's unwillingness to accede to their demands to perform roles in the field of immigration that are either more limited than, the same as, or at least comparable to, those performed by the Quebec governments. This is particularly true of Alberta and to a lesser extent of British Columbia which, since the late-seventies, have periodically sought a greater role in planning and managing immigration to those provinces. The most significant manifestation of their grievances is found in an effort to rectify what they perceived as inequitable treatment through a constitutional amendment. Sections 95A(2) and 95A(3) of the defunct Charlottetown Accord compelled the federal government to treat the provinces equally or at least equitably both in negotiating immigration agreements and in the terms and conditions specified therein. Third, various provinces have complained about the proportionately higher level of federal funds that are transferred to Quebec as compared to that transferred to other provinces. (19)

Although other provincial governments have been critical of the federal government's refusal to accede to their own demands, generally they have been supportive, at least outwardly so, regarding some of the concessions that the federal government has made to accommodate Quebec's demands for greater involvement in immigration. They did so publicly despite the fact that at times some of them have had some strong reservations about some of those concessions. The principal reason that they have not been critical of bifurcation is that, as has been the case with federal governments, they have understood its symbolic and practical importance in appeasing autonomist and sovereigntist sentiments in that province, thereby minimizing conflict between the federal and Quebec governments and reducing the risk of Quebec independence.

Although bifurcation of the system has created some tensions and problems in the area of intergovernmental relations, in judging its effects and merits it is important to consider whether more substantial tensions and problems would have emerged between the federal and Quebec governments if the system had not been bifurcated. What tensions and problems would have emerged, for example, if the federal government and its immigration policies and programs had been criticized repeatedly by Quebec governments and interest groups for creating social and political problems in that province? Similarly, what tensions or problems would have emerged if the federal government had not acceded to the demands of successive Quebec governments for an increased role in immigration? Furthermore, what effects would all such tensions and problems have had not only for federal-provincial relations but, given the ongoing separation project of Parti Quebecois governments in that province, ultimately also for national unity? Bifurcati on of the immigration system has been used by various federal and Quebec governments for their own political purposes. Both the federal and federalist Quebec provincial governments have used it to combat the incipient separatist threat in that province by pointing to bifurcation as evidence that federalism is sufficiently flexible to accommodate Quebec's unique immigration needs. For their part, Quebec's sovereigntist governments have used bifurcation as an integral part of their "etapisme" strategy in paving the way for their march toward sovereignty-association or independence. They did so despite the fact that some Quebecers have been critical not only of Quebec's involvement in immigration, but of the value of immigration for the nation-state building project. (20)

The Effects on Governmental Objectives

What effects, if any, has bifurcation had on the abilities of Quebec and federal governments to achieve their objectives in the field of immigration pursuant to their respective socio-demographic and political goals? (21)

Effects on Socio-Demographic Objectives

The federal and Quebec governments' socio-demographic objectives in the field of immigration pursuant to their socio-demographic goals for that province have been relatively, though not entirely, consonant. The two principal socio-demographic goals of these governments in the field of immigration relate to the size of Quebec's population as a percentage of the Canadian population, and the linguistic composition or profile of the province's population. In the case of the size of Quebec's population, a goal of successive Quebec governments has been to increase or at least maintain its proportionate percentage share of Canada's total population. In keeping with that particular goal, the two key objectives of successive Quebec governments have been: first, that Quebec receives at least its proportionate share of immigrants annually; and second, the retention of a large portion of all immigrants who land in Quebec. Successive federal governments have not objected to these particular goals or objectives. One reason for this may be that while the federal government has some general population objectives for the country as a whole, it does not have a policy or position regarding either the absolute or relative size of any province or territory.

In the case of the linguistic composition of the province, the shared goal of successive Quebec governments has been to substantially increase the size and proportion of Quebec's francophone community in that province by, among other things, enacting legislation that makes French the official language in that province. In keeping with that goal, their three objectives in immigration have been: to increase the percentage of francophone, duophone (i.e., bilingual French/English), and allophone immigrants, and decrease the percentage of anglophone immigrants; to increase the percentage of immigrants who opt for French language-training programs; and to increase the percentage of immigrants who integrate into the French-speaking portion of Quebec society. (22) Although successive federal governments have preferred that Quebec did not pursue a policy of unilingualism and did not limit either anglophone immigration or English language training for immigrants, they have shown some appreciation and even muted support for the francophonization initiatives of the Quebec governments. The reason for this is that some of those initiatives are consonant with their own overarching goal or vision of a bilingual country. (23)

To reiterate, Quebec governments have had two key objectives in the field of immigration that are related to the size of that province's population. The first has been to ensure that Quebec receives at least its proportionate share of immigrants, and the second has been to ensure that Quebec retains a large portion of immigrants. Quebec's success has been relatively modest on both of these objectives. The result is that Quebec governments have been unsuccessful in maximizing the size of that province's population as a proportion of the country's total population. Indeed, its proportion has declined from 27.9 percent in 1972 to 24.7 percent in 1996. (24) That decline in population, however, cannot be attributed primarily to the modest achievements of the aforementioned objectives. That decline has more to do with the high level of out-migration of immigrants and non-immigrants from Quebec to other provinces and the level of immigration and the low level of in-migration to Quebec from other provinces. Major con tributing factors both to the massive out-migration and relatively small in-migration from other parts of Canada during that era were the politics of language, the politics of sovereignty-association and independence, and a downturn in the province's economy. Although the relatively modest levels of immigration to Quebec have helped to offset the negative effects of high out-migration and low in-migration on the size of the population, they have not offset them completely.

The data indicate that the bifurcation of the system has not helped to increase Quebec's proportionate share of immigration. In fact, when bifurcation began in the early 1970s Quebec's share of immigration continued to drop as it had done since the mid-1960s. Ironically, Quebec's share of immigration was higher before bifurcation than it has been since what might be considered the first step toward bifurcation was taken, namely Quebec's creation of the Department of immigration in 1968. Whereas before the creation of that department Quebec was receiving approximately 20-23 percent of total immigration, the percentage has always been lower than that in subsequent years, except for 1991 when it reached 22.6 percent. The average for the period for 1971-1996 was 18 percent with a range from the maximum level of 22.6 percent in 1991 to the lowest level of 14.6 percent in 1973. Quebec's proportion of immigration was as follows: 16.5 percent for 1977-1981, 15 percent for 1982-1986, 19 percent for 1987-1991, and 15.1 percent for 1992-1996. (25)

Particularly significant about the data for 1992-1996 is that Quebec was still not receiving its proportionate share of immigrants as envisioned in the 1991 agreement. One of two possibilities might account for this. There are either not enough immigrants interested in landing in that province or, for reasons related to its other key objectives in immigration, Quebec has been applying its selection criteria very stringently to ensure that it only obtains immigrants who can contribute not only to the province's labour and capital needs, but also to its francophone character. If it is the latter, Quebec governments will have subordinated their goal regarding the size of the population to their economic and socio-demographic goals. Although Quebec's proportion of the total Canadian immigration generally has dropped during the past decade, the absolute number of immigrants destined to that province has nearly doubled since 1987. Whereas the total number for the decade before 1987 was 183,000, the total number for the subsequent decade was approximately 356,000. (26) That is little consolation, however, for those concerned with Quebec's numerical weight within the Canadian polity. The data presented above suggests that although bifurcation of the immigration system and Quebec's active involvement in immigration might have contributed to preventing an even greater decline in that province's share of immigration and ultimately to its share of Canada's population, it has not been able to reverse those downward trends. These trends have created considerable concerns for Quebec governments. This is quite evident in the attention that they have given to the relationship between immigration and population policies. (27)

The data also suggest that the bifurcation of the system has not contributed substantially to Quebec's objective of increasing the retention of immigrants in that province. Data for 1987-1995 reveal that Quebec lost approximately 17 to 25 percent of immigrants who landed in that province each year. The retention rates of immigrants destined to Quebec since 1987 have been relatively constant except for some notable fluctuations from 1992 to 1994 when the rate dropped substantially. (28) Ironically, this drop occurred just after Quebec issued its 1990 white paper on immigration and integration, and the signing of the 1991 Canada-Quebec agreement that enhanced the scope of bifurcation in immigration and integration. Interestingly there are no substantial differences in the retention rates for independent, family and refugee categories, but there is for business immigrants. (29) This suggests that although Quebec's recent emphasis on attracting independent immigrants may contribute to the objectives related to th e linguistic composition of the population, it will likely contribute very little to its objectives related to the retention of immigrants and the size of that province's population.

To reiterate, in pursuit of their goal to increase the proportion of the French speaking population in that province, Quebec governments have pursued two key objectives in immigration. The first of these has been to increase the proportion of French speaking immigrants (including those who speak both French and English) vis-a-vis anglophones and allophones, and the second has been to increase the proportion of immigrants integrating into the French-speaking portion of Quebec society. Quebec has achieved a limited degree of success on both of these objectives. (30)

The data from 1971-1996 suggest that Quebec governments have been successful in increasing the percentage of francophone immigrants significantly and in substantially decreasing the percentage of anglophones. However, despite those particular shifts, the percentage of anglophones remains slightly higher than francophones. Whereas in 1971 francophones (i.e., French only and French/English bilingual) constituted approximately 30 percent of total immigration, that increased to approximately 36 percent of immigrants from 1972-1986 but dropped to approximately 34 percent for the decade from 1987-1996. They have also had a modicum of success in reducing the percentage of anglophone (i.e., English only and English/French bilingual immigrants). Whereas they constituted more than 50 percent from 1968-1973, by the 1990s their proportion had decreased to the mid-30 percent range. It should be noted, however, that the reduction in the percentage of anglophones has been due more to an increase in the percentage of allopho nes than francophones. Whereas before 1977 allophones constituted only approximately 25 percent of total immigration, in the period from 1987-1996 they constituted approximately 42.4 percent of the total, compared to 37.2 percent anglophones and 34.3 percent francophones. (31)

Quebec governments have had two key objectives related to immigrant integration. The first has been to increase the percentage of allophone and anglophone immigrants taking French language training, and the second has been to increase the percentage of all immigrants who integrate into Quebec's francophone community. The data suggest that Quebec governments have had some limited success on both of those objectives, although, as shall be explained below, the extent to which their success can be attributed to bifurcation is debatable.

Data regarding immigrants who undertake French language training indicates that for the period since the emergence of bifurcation in the 1970s there has been an increase in the percentage of immigrants who take French, rather than English, language training. In large part, of course, this increase has occurred because opportunities for English language training have been curtailed considerably by Quebec's policy that, with the exception of immigrants who can demonstrate that English is essential for employment purposes, anyone seeking government-funded language training can only register in French courses. Although Quebec governments have been successful in displacing or at least subordinating English language training, they have not been very successful in significantly altering the number of immigrants who take language training. Much to the chagrin of Quebec governments, only a small number of immigrants take such training. Indeed, the percentage of immigrants who do so, especially given the high percentag e of allophones in immigration flows, is remarkably low, though not necessarily lower than the percentage of immigrants who opt for language training elsewhere in the country. Nevertheless, that percentage has been much lower than what Quebec governments have preferred. In its efforts to increase the proportion of immigrants enrolled in French language training, in the spring of 1998 the Quebec government announced that it would extend opportunities for such training to immigrants who have been in the province beyond the initial period of time that was previously specified. (32) This is something that many immigrant groups and settlement agencies have been advocating for some time in all provinces in Canada. That announcement makes Quebec the leader in relation to both the federal government and other provinces in increasing the timeframes for which language training is made available to immigrants. If the federal government follows Quebec's example, it could prove to be a case in point for those who wish to argue that bifurcation has some beneficial effects not only in Quebec but also in other provinces. With Quebec leading the way, the federal and other provincial governments will find it increasingly difficult not to extend their own time frames for which language training is available to immigrants.

Quebec governments have been relatively successful in their other objective to increase the proportion of immigrants who integrate into the francophone, rather than anglophone, community in Quebec. Data compiled in 1986 for immigrants who had been living in Quebec before and after 1971 indicate that whereas the percentage of French unilingual immigrants living in Quebec in 1986 increased steadily for the 1971-1986 period, the percentage of English unilingual immigrants dropped somewhat. The data also reveals that during that time the proportion of French/English bilingual immigrants dropped substantially. (33) That data also reveals a marked increase in the percentage of immigrants who became francophones. Whereas prior to 1976 only 34 percent became francophones, between 1976 and 1991 67 percent did so. (34) These data suggest, therefore, that Quebec governments have been most successful on two matters: first, at reducing the percentage of immigrants living in Quebec who speak both English and French, and se cond at increasing the percentage of those who speak only French. Their accomplishment in this respect runs contrary to the federal government's objective of increasing the level of bilingualism among all permanent residents across the country, but not to its objective of protecting and promoting the use of the French language in Canada.

Another set of data suggests that since bifurcation started to occur in the early 1970s, a higher proportion of immigrants are integrating into the French-speaking portion of Quebec society, or at least that they are not integrating into the anglophone community. That data compares language use in the home among immigrants over time. More specifically, it compares the language(s) used in the home of immigrants who arrived before 1971 with those who arrived at subsequent five year intervals. It reveals that although the use of English in the home by immigrants has dropped substantially over time (30 percent before 1971 compared to 14 percent for 19811986), the use of French has remained relatively constant ranging from 22 percent prior to 1971 to 25 percent for 1971-1980, and 19 percent for 1981-1986. It also reveals that by far the largest increase occurred in the percentage of immigrants who use a language other than French or English. Whereas they constituted only 35 percent of the total prior to 1971, they constituted 50 percent of the total for the period 1981-1986. (35) Not surprisingly, perhaps, these trends correspond to those related to the language capability of immigrants entering Quebec during that same period when immigrants who were allophones constituted a higher percentage than either francophones or anglophones.

Although it is clear that Quebec governments have been relatively successful in pursuing their linguistic integration objectives, what accounts for such success is less clear. It probably has as much, if not more, to do with Quebec's official unilingual language policies that have been in place since the 1970s than with the bifurcation of the immigration system per se. In other words, it probably has to do more with Quebec's intensive francophonization efforts through its official language policies and programs than with the roles that Quebec governments perform in immigrant selection or immigrant integration pursuant to their immigration agreements with Ottawa. The extent to which Quebec could have achieved the same level of integration of immigrants into the francophone community if it had not performed key roles in the selection and integration of immigrants specified in the 1991 agreement is debatable.

Effects on National Identity and State Allegiance Objectives

The most substantial and problematic differences between the federal and Quebec governments have existed in the pursuit of their respective national identity and state allegiance objectives pursuant to their respective nation-state building goals. (36)

In the case of their national identity objectives, they differ in their views on which national identity should be fostered, or at least the degree to which each of them should be fostered both among immigrants and other permanent residents. Whereas successive federal governments have sought to foster a pan-Canadian national identity among all permanent residents, including immigrants, since the Quiet Revolution Quebec governments of all political stripes have sought to foster a Quebecois identity. The major difference between Parti Quebecois governments and other Quebec provincial governments that have been in power in the post-1960 era has been the degree of their respective support for fostering a pan-Canadian identity among permanent residents in that province. Unlike the Parti Quebecois governments who have been intent on completely subordinating a Canadian national identity, Quebec governments of other partisan stripes have exhibited a greater appreciation for the existence of dual identities--one Quebe cois and the other Canadian.

Similar dynamics have existed between federal and Quebec governments in the pursuit of their respective state allegiance objectives. Whereas the principal objective of successive federal governments has been to foster an allegiance to the national component of the Canadian state, the principal objective of successive Quebec governments has been to foster an allegiance to the Quebec provincial state. Furthermore, as has been the case with the national identity objectives, since 1960 there have been some significant differences between Liberal, Union Nationale and Parti-Quebecois governments regarding the degree of allegiance that Quebec residents should have to the Quebecois state and the Canadian state.

What effects has bifurcation had on the ability of Quebec and federal governments to achieve their respective objectives in pursuit of their nation-state building goals in immigration? This is a very difficult question to answer with a high degree of confidence. The reasons for this are threefold. First, unfortunately, there are insufficient data either on the extent to which immigrants who arrived before and after bifurcation view themselves as either Quebecois or Canadian, or on the extent to which they feel an allegiance to the Quebec or Canadian state. (37) Second, such identities and allegiances tend to exist as ends of a continuum and not as distinct and mutually exclusive categories. Consequently, the nature and extent of one's attachment to one particular national identity or to a particular state is a relative, rather than absolute, matter. In other words, it is an issue of the degree of attachment and not one of exclusive attachment to one but not the other. Third, it is difficult to determine the e xtent to which the identities and political affinities of immigrants in Quebec are a function of bifurcation of the immigration system per se, or other governmental initiatives and social dynamics in that province. Notwithstanding these problems, however, data exist that provide some insights into the question.

One area in which Quebec governments seem to have had some success since the inception of bifurcation in the immigration system is in engendering a Quebecois identity among immigrants. A higher proportion of immigrants views itself as members of the Quebecois nation since the emergence of the bifurcation than did before. An analysis of two national surveys conducted in 1974 and 1991 reveals both that residents in that province have a substantially higher provincial identity than those in other provinces, and that there has been a substantial increase in a provincial Quebecois identity among all residents including ethnic respondents. (38) Still, two related questions remain. First, to what extent have new immigrants followed this trend toward an increased provincial Quebecois identity? Second, insofar as immigrants have followed this trend, to what extent can it be attributed to bifurcation rather than, for example, any of the following factors: the efforts of Quebec governments to embrace a civic conception of nationalism and thereby increase the openness of the Quebecois community to those who are not "pure wool" or "de vieille souche" members; other political socialization initiatives in Quebec directed at the population as a whole rather than just at immigrants; or the general phenomenon of more pronounced provincial identities and allegiances in various Canadian provinces in recent decades? In other words, given the general dynamics of nation-building and political socialization in Quebec, would the same proportion of immigrants have viewed themselves as Quebecois even if bifurcation of the immigration system, which is but one element of that nation-building initiative, had not occurred? More data are required to answer such questions than are readily available at this time. Unfortunately, the production of the requisite data would be very difficult if not impossible because of the difficulties that would be encountered in identifying or establishing the control groups needed to study the causal relationship s embodied in those questions.

Quebec governments have also had some success in engendering an allegiance to the Quebec state. Evidence of this can be found in the results of provincial elections from which it is possible to infer that the autonomist platforms of the two major parties resonate with, or at least are not repulsive to, not only the majority of non-immigrant voters, but also to the majority of immigrant voters in Quebec. In other words, there is a certain degree of support among immigrants and non-immigrants alike for a strong Quebec state that can advance the interests of all permanent residents in that province vis-a-vis various governments both within the federal and international system. Although a substantial portion of the immigrant population has been relatively supportive of that particular facet of state building, evidently it has not been very supportive of Parti Quebecois governments' goal of sovereignty-association or independence. Evidence of this is found in two major sets of political events. The first of these is the low level of support for the Parti Quebecois in constituencies with a high proportion of immigrant or ethnic populations, particularly in the Montreal area. (39) The second of these events is the results of the two referenda sponsored by Parti Quebecois governments in 1980 and 1995 on undertaking negotiations with the federal government on sovereignty-association and independence in which a majority of eligible immigrant voters did not support the pursuit of those particular options. (40)

Although the Quebec governments have enjoyed some success in their political objectives and goals in the field of immigration since bifurcation, such success has not had a devastating effect on the federal governments' political objectives and goals. This is equally true of the federal governments' national identity objective (i.e., to foster a pan-Canadian national identity among immigrants) and their state allegiance objective (i.e., to foster an allegiance to the Canadian state). Recent surveys suggest that although Quebec governments have been able to foster a Quebecois identity (i.e. a sense of belonging to the Qubecois nation) among immigrants and non-immigrants in that province, they have not been able to eradicate either their Canadian identity or their attachment to the Canadian state. Those surveys suggest that permanent residents in Quebec, including immigrants, have multiple identities and substantial affinity with, and allegiance to, the Canadian nation-state as well as Quebecois nation-state. (4 1) A 1997 CROP poll, for example, suggests that a higher percentage of immigrants see themselves as either 'Canadian Only' or 'Canadian then Quebecois,' than as either 'Quebecois Only' or 'Quebecois then Canadian.' Indeed the poll indicates that in Quebec there is a higher incidence of some degree of Canadian identity among immigrants than among non-immigrants regardless of whether their mother tongue is French or another language (see Table 1). The poll also indicates that the degree of allegiance to Canada and Quebec among immigrants is related to whether their country of origin is francophone or non-francophone. There is a higher incidence of a Quebecois identity among immigrants from francophone countries than those from non-francophone countries (see Table 2). The recent poll results seem to be consonant with the results of those conducted in 1974 and 1991 (see Table 3). In the absence of comparable data for the period prior to the start of bifurcation, however, it is difficult to say whether there has b een any change for the periods prior to and after bifurcation.

What is significant about these poll results is the marked difference among francophone and non-francophone immigrants in their identity as Quebecois. There is a much higher incidence of a 'Quebecois only' identity or 'Qubecois then Canadian' identity among francophone than non-francophone immigrants. Conversely, of course, there is a much higher incidence of a 'Canadian only' or 'Quebecois only' identity among non-francophone than francophone immigrants. The percentage of immigrants who see themselves as having both a Quebecois and Canadian identity is remarkably high. The challenge facing federal and Quebec governments is to make sure that they do not lose ground in this dual allegiance dynamic. Doing so has crucial consequences not only for their legitimacy but, ultimately, for the relationship between the Canadian and Quebec states in the future.

Although those poll results do not provide any evidence on the causal relationship between bifurcation and the political identity the majority of immigrants develop, they suggest that there may be a relationship between the language immigrants speak and their political identity. Federal and Quebec governments cannot overlook this relationship. After all, it suggests that in shaping the political identities of immigrants in that province, the language they speak at the time of arrival may be as important as which level of government is responsible for their selection and integration. In considering those causal relationships it must not be forgotten that invariably there are many other factors which ultimately contribute to shaping the political identity of immigrants, including the nature of the socio-political integration policies and programs directed at them and the rest of the population in that province.

The important point here, however, is that based on existing data it is difficult to determine the extent to which there is any causal relationship between bifurcation of the immigration system and the identities of immigrants. Once again, regardless of what existing or new data tell us about the political identities of immigrants in Quebec before and after the bifurcation of the immigration system, it would be difficult to infer that any change was the result of bifurcation. After all, quite apart from their roles, policies and programs related to immigration and immigrant integration, Quebec governments have been pursuing a very intensive integration or socialization project in areas that fall beyond the scope of the immigration agreements and the immigration sector. That integration or socialization project is directed at all permanent residents, but particularly non-francophones, as part of their Quebecois nation- and state-building projects.

The foregoing analysis of the effects of bifurcation suggests that it has not had any major devastating negative effects either on planning and managing immigration or on federal-provincial relations. Indeed, it suggests that bifurcation may have actually had some positive effects in both of those areas. That analysis also suggests that the effects it has had on the ability of Quebec governments to pursue some of their key objectives in the field pursuant to their overarching socio-demographic and nation-state building goals is open to question. On this particular issue the foregoing analysis suggests that there is insufficient data regarding the precise effects that bifurcation has had not only on the levels and demographic profiles of immigration flows, but also on immigrant integration patterns. While there is some correlation between bifurcation and changes in both the demographic profiles of immigration flows and in the patterns of immigrant integration, the extent to which these are a function of bifurc ation or of other factors is highly debatable. So too are the effects that bifurcation has had on, among other things, the affinity of permanent residents in Quebec to a particular nation or state, and the relationship between Canada and Quebec. Further research is needed and should be undertaken to address the questions regarding the effect of bifurcation on each of the foregoing matters.

Such research on the effects of bifurcation is essential to ascertain, among other things, the extent to which the bifurcated nature of the immigration system has greater value at the symbolic politics level than at the programmatic level. In other words, it will help to determine whether it has more value as a symbol of the nature of the relationship between Quebec and Canada, than as an essential element for the efficient and effective management of an immigration program designed to achieve the provincial government's key socio-demographic and political objectives. Such research is also essential to ascertain whether the socio-demographic objectives of Quebec governments could be served equally well by an immigration program that is planned and managed by the federal government but is highly sensitive and responsive to the needs and preferences of Quebec. It is also essential to ascertain whether, as the foregoing analysis suggests may have been the case to date, the political goals of Quebec governments c ould be served equally well if they devoted the bulk of their resources to development and implementation of linguistic, cultural, and citizenship or political integration policies policies. Such research could provide an important basis for determining the value of the bifurcated system and ultimately for its continuance in the new millennium. In undertaking such research, however, it is necessary to be cognizant of the challenges that will be encountered in isolating the effects of bifurcation from the effects of other factors on governmental objectives in the field of immigration designed to serve both their socio-demographic and political goals. Difficulties in compiling such data may render the issue of the effects of bifurcation on certain objectives and goals of federal and Quebec governments moot. If that occurs then the rationale for, and the continuance of bifurcation may rest as much, if not more, on leaps of faith than heaps of data.

The Future of Bifurcation

What will happen to the form or scope of bifurcation in the near and more distant future in the recruitment and selection stages of immigration on one hand and the integration stage of that system on the other? Will it remain the same, increase, diminish or end? Recent developments suggest that it will diminish or end in certain facets of the immigration system, but remain the same or possibly even increase in others.

The bifurcation that existed in the integration stage of the immigration system since the early 1990s ended in 1998 when, as part of its "Settlement Renewal" initiative, the federal government concluded agreements with British Columbia and Manitoba regarding their respective roles and responsibilities. (42) Negotiations for comparable agreements have also been undertaken with other provinces. To reiterate, the general thrust of that initiative has been to replicate the alignment of roles and responsibilities between Canada and Quebec for immigrant integration in the other nine provinces. The result is an integration system in which the provincial governments will perform the key planning and administrative roles and the federal government will be limited to setting and enforcing national principles and standards, and providing funding for settlement and integration programs.

By contrast, it is unlikely the bifurcation that exists in the recruitment and selection stages will end or diminish considerably in the near future. There are two major reasons for this. First, in recent years neither the federal nor other provincial governments have shown much interest in concluding agreements that would authorize the latter to perform the same type of roles as Quebec in the recruitment and selection of immigrants. What would happen if any province were to demand roles comparable to Quebec's in recruitment and selection of immigrants in the near future is unclear. Whether a federal government will be able to rebuff such demands by these other provinces, as it has at times in the past due to fears of the negative effects of greater fragmentation of the immigration system, depends on whether political imperatives at both the national and provincial levels would constrain it to live up to the principle of the equitable treatment of all provinces that had been included in sections 95A(2) and 95 A(3) of the defunct Charlottetown Accord. In addition to political considerations, however, the federal government will likely also be influenced by programmatic considerations. In particular, it will be influenced by calculations on whether the immigration system could operate as efficiently and effectively if it were even more variegated or fragmented than is the case under its current bifurcated form.

Second, given the autonomist and sovereigntist imperatives at the core of Canada-Quebec relations at this time, it is unlikely that a Quebec government will decide not to perform key roles in the recruitment and selection of immigrants in the near future. The bifurcation in the recruitment and selection of immigrants is based on highly institutionalized arrangements involving considerable bureaucratic and political organizational imperatives both at the provincial and the federal level that would prove to be major resistors to a substantial shift toward either decentralization or centralization. At the provincial level bifurcation has a substantial symbolic value for Quebec governments. Among other things, it serves as a prominent example that the province has unique needs that merit unique federal-provincial arrangements. Equally important, the roles of the Quebec government in the recruitment and selection of immigrants give it an important position and profile in the international community. Given these or ganizational and political imperatives, it is highly unlikely that a Quebec government would be willing to abandon any of the current roles in the field of immigration unless, of course, it faced very intense political pressure from the provincial electorate and intelligentsia. This is something that is unlikely to happen unless political or economic conditions were to precipitate strong opposition to immigration and, more importantly, to provincial government spending on immigration. This should not be considered an improbable scenario while Quebec remains within the federation. The history of governmental involvement in immigration in this country provides ample evidence of the effects that fluctuations in economic conditions and public sentiments can have on the willingness of federal and provincial governments to perform certain roles and expend resources in this field of public policy.

Similarly, at the national level bifurcation has substantial practical and political value for the federal government. Most importantly, it provides the federal government with a politically viable means for planning and managing immigration to that province. The federal government is aware that it does not have the confidence of the majority of the Quebecois to plan and manage immigration in a way that would have a positive effect on that province's immigration objectives and, by extension, on the Quebecois nation-state's building goals. The major reason for this is that the legacy of Lord Durham's strategy for the national government to use immigration as an instrument for the anglophonization of Canada continues to have a residual effect among many Quebecois who perceive it as a grand conspiracy to eradicate their language and culture. Given such perceptions it is doubtful that in the near future any federal government will be anxious to change the existing alignment of roles and responsibilities between i tself and Quebec in the recruitment and selection of immigrants. Given the aforementioned programmatic and political imperatives of the federal and Quebec governments, the scope of bifurcation could increase as they continue to use immigration to pursue the same type of objectives in this policy field in the near future that they have pursued in the past three decades.

Given that a bifurcated system is likely to persist in the near future unless Quebec secedes from Canada, an important question remains. What effect will bifurcation in the recruitment and selection stages have on planning and managing immigration, federal-provincial relations, and the abilities of the federal and Quebec governments to ensure that immigration serves their respective nation-state building goals in the first few decades of the new millennium? About all that can be said with some confidence in light of the foregoing analysis is that, ultimately, the effect of bifurcation on those areas will be as much a function of how governments plan and manage immigration and integration in a changing and dynamic domestic and global environment than with the bifurcated nature of the system per se.

One of the reasons it is difficult to speculate with confidence either on the precise form of the bifurcated immigration system or on its effects in the future is that there are many factors, including the volume and nature of immigration, which impinge on these matters. After all, immigration is not merely a neutral or inert tool to be used by governments for their nation-building purposes; it is a dynamic agent with transformative properties that, over time, can transform not only the demographic, cultural, economic, and political profiles of nations, but also the fundamental nature of nation-state building projects. Thus, in the first few decades of the new millennium we should expect that immigration will shape the nation-state building projects of the federal and Quebec governments as much as the latter have shaped, and continue to shape, the former. Furthermore, if the bicommunalist paradigm prevails and the sovereigntist option does not displace the federalist option in Quebec, the current form of bifu rcation could either change under some system of sovereignty association or it could end because Canada and an independent Quebec would likely have separate and distinct immigration policies and programs. (43)

NOTES

(1.) A philosophical or normatively based assessment of bifurcation is somewhat beyond the scope of this paper. For a normative and rights-based assessment of the moral soundness of the Quebec government's 1991 policy statement on immigration and integration see Carens, 1995: 20-81.

(2.) For a detailed analysis of the asymmetrical alignment of roles between 1971 and 1993 see Garcea, 1993: 96-135.

(3.) See sections 2.4 and 2.5 of the Canada-Manitoba Immigration Accord signed in 1996.

(4.) See section 2.6 of the Canada-Manitoba Immigration Accord signed in 1996; and the Agreement for Canada-British Columbia Co-Operation on Immigration signed May 19, 1998.

(5.) The services from which Canada agreed to withdraw are listed in 'Annex B' (section 1) of the 1991 Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and the Admission of Aliens.

(6.) See the Agreement for Canada-British Columbia Co-Operation on Immigration signed May 19, 1998; and the Canada-Manitoba Agreement to Realign Responsibilities for Immigrant Settlement Services signed June 29, 1998.

(7.) For an excellent overview of those frameworks see Fontaine, 1993: 31-48; Fontaine, 1995: 102-125; Shiosi and Fontaine: 91-110; Helly: 127-144; and Bauer: 26-93.

(8.) For an overview of recent immigration, linguistic, and cultural policies and programs see Quebec, 1995-1996. See also the web site for Quebec's ministry responsible for immigration. http://www.immq.gov.qc.ca

(9.) For a discussion of these 'civicship' policies and programs and the emerging Quebecois citizenship or 'quasi-citizenship' see Balthazar, 1992: 647-667; Balthazar, 1995: 83-95; Crete and Zylbenberg: 424; and Breton: 85-102.

(10.) For an excellent overview and analysis of Quebec's organizational and policy frameworks see Fontaine, 1993: 49-136.

(11.) For a discussion of the counter-hegemonic thrust of the Quebecois nation-building project see Meadwell: 203-241; and Balthazar, 1992: 647-667.

(12.) For a useful discussion on the type of nationalism in Quebec before and after 1960 see Breton: 85-102.

(13.) For an overview of the shift from ethnic to civic nationalism in Quebec and Canada see Breton: 85-102; and Balthazar, 1992: 647-667.

(14.) Although recent Quebec governments have placed more emphasis on immigration than procreation or pronatalism as a means to achieve their nation-building goals, they have not abandoned the procreation option entirely. For a discussion of the procreation policies of Quebec governments in recent decades see Maroney: 7-36, and Bernard: 111-129.

(15.) For an excellent overview of the relationship between the Quebecois and Canadian nation-state building projects and their effect on politics and public policy in Canada see McRoberts, 1995: 109-132; and McRoberts, 1997: 1-276.

(16.) For a detailed analysis of these negotiations that led to the agreements of 1971, 1975, 1978, and 1991 see Garcea, 1992: 274-300; Garcea, 1993: 157-359; Vineberg: 299-317; Bonin: 137-175; Hawkins, 1988: 371-400; and Dirks: 97-120.

(17.) For some perspectives on the effects of bifurcation on planning and managing immigration see Vineberg, 1986; Garcea, 1993; Bonin, 1990; Fontaine, 1993; and Dirks, 1995.

(18.) For a detailed analysis of the tensions and disputes between the federal and provincial governments prior to 1994 see Garcea, 1993: 157-479.

(19.) For an analysis of the Immigration Clause in the Charlottetown Accord see Garcea, 1992: 274-300.

(20.) For a discussion of some of the problems and concerns regarding Quebec's reliance on immigration and the Quebec governments' involvement in the field see Bernard: 130-139.

(21.) An analysis of the relationship between immigration and the economic objectives of the federal and Quebec governments is beyond the scope of this paper. For an analysis of the economic objectives of the federal and Quebec governments see Vaillancourt: 16-26.

(22.) Such linguistic goals are articulated in numerous publications produced by Quebec's ministry responsible for immigration in recent decades. For one of the most detailed statements see Quebec, 1990: 19, and 40-57. For a discussion of the tensions between the federal government's promotion of the bilingual and multicultural character of Canada and the Quebec government's linguistic and political integration policies see Labelle, et al.: 213-245.

(23.) For an interesting discussion on the nature of the relationship between the federal and Quebec governments on the management of linguistic and cultural issues see McAll: 1-36.

(24.) The data are drawn from Quebec, 1997: 17.

(25.) Ibid.: 23.

(26.) Ibid.

(27.) For discussions of the relationship between immigration and population policies in Quebec see Quebec 1990; Quebec, 1992; Quebec, 1996; and Quebec, 1997.

(28.) These data are drawn from Quebec, 1997: 53.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) For an overview of such objectives and some results see Juteau, et al.: 451-481.

(31.) Totals exceed 100 percent because the 13.9 percent bilingual French\English immigrants are being counted both as part of the francophone and the anglophone categories. For 1987-1996 those who spoke only French constituted 20.4 percent and those who spoke only English 23.3 percent. The data are drawn from the following publications: Quebec, Conseil de la langue Francaise, 1992:33, and Quebec, 1997:17.

(32.) See Canadian Press, "Minister Offers French Help," The Globe and Mail, April 16, 1998: A3.

(33.) The percentages for the various timeframes are as follows:

 Years French Only French & English English Only Neither French
 nor English

1966-1971 18 percent 49 percent 28 percent 5 percent
1971-1975 25 percent 49 percent 22 percent 5 percent
1976-1980 36 percent 41 percent 17 percent 11 percent
1981-1986 37 percent 29 percent 23 percent 11 percent
 Average 24 percent 45 percent 25 percent 6 percent

Data Source: Quebec, 1992: 19.

(34.) These data are drawn from Quebec, 1996: 145-147.

(35.) See Quebec, Indicateurs de la situation linguistique au Quebec, 1992: 24-25.

(36.) For a useful overview of the tensions between Canada and Quebec on these nation-building goals see Boismenu: 99-107; LaSelva: 699-719; and Gagnon: 21-29.

(37.) Available data generally deal with the identities of all permanent residents. Even some data that deal with differences in identity among Quebecers and other permanent residents in Canada generally do not distinguish between immigrants (i.e., new and established) and others. See, for example, Laponce: 3-8; Kalin and Berry: 1-15; Berry: 221-226; and Kalin: 26-44.

(38.) See Kalin and Berry: 12-13; Berry: 228-229; and Kalin: 35.

(39.) The results of the 1998 Quebec election reported by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's "Newsworld" on November 30, 1998, for example, reveal a strong support for the federalist Liberal Party in ridings in which the majority of voters were either anglophones or allophones.

(40.) For discussions of the role of immigrant and ethnic voters in Quebec politics and public policy see J.W. Berry, 1996: 221-233; Bernard, 1993; Bauer, 1993; and Anctil, 1996.

(41.) For some data on multiple identities in Quebec see the results of the CROP Polls conducted In March and April 1998 as reported in "Most Quebecers proud Canadians: poll," The StarPhoenix, April 6,1998: A8; and "Ottawa warned to wake upon national unity," The Globe and Mail, April 25, 1998: A2. For recent data on Quebecers' preferences on an independent Quebec or one within Canada see the poll conducted by the Groupe Leger and Leger in April 1998 as reported in "Poll finds Quebec wants vote on unity," The Globe and Mail, April 24, 1998: A1 & A6.

(42.) For an overview of the Settlement Renewal initiative see Canada, 1995: 1-15.

(43.) For some speculation on the immigration policies that might emerge in a sovereign Quebec see Juteau and McAndrew: 161-180.

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Vineberg, Robert A. "Federal-Provincial Relations In Immigration." Canadian Public Administration 30, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 299-317.

Table 1

Identity of Immigrants in Quebec Based on Origin and Mother Tongue
(1997)

 Francophone Non-Francophone Non-Francophone
 Quebecois Quebecois New Quebecer

Canadian Only 6 percent 22 percent 27 percent
Canadian then
Quebecois 16 percent 38 percent 37 percent
Equally Canadian
And Quebecois 21 percent 30 percent 22 percent
Quebecois then
Canadian 37 percent 2 percent 11 percent
Quebecois Only 22 percent 8 percent 3 percent

 Francophone
 New Quebecer

Canadian Only 12 percent
Canadian then
Quebecois 19 percent
Equally Canadian
And Quebecois 30 percent
Quebecois then
Canadian 24 percent
Quebecois Only 15 percent

Source: CROP, February/March 1997 poll: Table 1
Table 2

Identity of Immigrants in Quebec Based on Country of Origin Language
(1997)

 Francophone Non-Francophone
 Country Country

Canadian Only 6 percent 22 percent
Canadian then Quebecois 15 percent 40 percent
Equally Canadian And Quebecois 21 percent 27 percent
Quebecois then Canadian 36 percent 9 percent
Quebecois Only 23 percent 2 percent

Source: CROP, February/March 1997 poll: Table 1
Table 3

Identity of Quebec Residents (1974 & 1991)

 1974 1991

Canadian 20 percent 28 percent
British-Canadian 2 percent 1 percent
French-Canadian 45 percent 12 percent
Provincial 27 percent 50 percent
Other Ethnic Canadians 3 percent 5 percent
Other National 3 percent 4 percent

Source: Kalin and Berry, 1995: 8