Ethics or social justice? Heritage and the politics of recognition.

Smith, Laurajane

Abstract: Nancy Eraser's model of the politics of recognition is used to examine how ethical practices are interconnected with wider struggles for recognition and social justice. This paper focuses on the concept of "heritage' and the way it is often uncritically linked to 'identity' to illustrate how expert knowledge can become implicated in struggles for recognition. The consequences of this for ethical practice and for rethinking the role of expertise, professional discourses and disciplinary identity are discussed.

Introduction

Heritage is not just a pretty place; it is a political resource. This paper offers a reconsideration of the idea of 'heritage', and in doing so argues that the AIATSIS Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies (AIATSIS 2000) is not simply a set of ethical practices or codes of conduct, but rather a policy document discursively constituted by the politics of recognition. The recent review of this document offers an opportunity to consider the potential consequences and the implications the Guidelines have for research practice and knowledge development. Ethical research practices are not simply about 'doing the right thing', but are framed by wider struggles for recognition and social justice. Ethical research, if theorised in this way, must lead to rethinking the values, knowledge claims and discourses that researchers both work within and promulgate. Heritage is one of those taken-for-granted, or 'common sense', concepts that bears critical scrutiny. In rethinking the idea of 'heritage', the ways in which the political and cultural claims of Indigenous peoples have been regulated by the discourse of, and knowledge claims about, heritage is exposed. Also revealed are the ways in which the AIATSIS Guidelines may potentially challenge this regulation. Further, 'heritage', and the core assumption that it is intimately linked with 'identity', is a useful focus to illustrate how research practices and expert knowledge claims sit within negotiations over the political legitimacy of identity claims for Indigenous peoples. Here, 'identity claims' refers simply to claims for recognition and special treatment based on appeals to identity and the past; however, identity claims are not confined to Indigenous peoples and are also made by communities of expertise (Smith, L and Waterton in press). Thus, it is also important to examine how the professional identity claims of researchers and experts are themselves regulated and maintained by such assumptions. Indeed, the Guidelines document is itself discursively mediated, and is a textual product of the negotiation and re-negotiation of identity claims and forms of expert knowledge.

In developing this argument, the paper first reviews Nancy Eraser's work on the politics of recognition (e.g. 1995, 2000, 2001, 2005). This work provides a useful framework for understanding not only what is at stake in terms of ethical research, but how such practices may be understood as being implicated in struggles for social justice. Heritage, and its close association with identity, is then examined in this context and the paper explores how in the past the term 'heritage' and the knowledge claims and bodies of expertise that invest in defining and 'protecting' heritage were mobilised in regulating 'identity politics'. Doing so helps to underline not only the ethical, but also the political, importance of the AIATSIS Guidelines. In addition, this should illuminate the potential role of the Guidelines in supporting parity of participation of Indigenous peoples in research and public policy development and, ultimately, redistribution of resources. However, parity of participation, and any move towards social justice that flows from that, cannot be achieved only through the development and adherence to codes of practice. An associated reconsideration of the discourses that we use to structure practice and the knowledge developed from those practices is also required.

The politics of recognition

As Fraser observes, 'recognition of difference' became a definable form of political conflict in the late twentieth century (Fraser 1995, 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 2000). Demands for the acknowledgment or recognition of cultural and identity claims became entwined with struggles for the distribution of resources. 'Identity politics' is sometimes dismissed as gestural, or as working to essentialise and thus marginalise identity claims, or as simply pernicious and irrelevant. For instance, Appleton (2003) characterises the repatriation of Indigenous remains from Britain to Australia as simply gestural politics, arguing that such a gesture of recognition of Indigenous identity and cultural values will have no material impact on the economic and social inequity of Indigenous Australians (see also submissions to DCMS 2003; also Fforde 2004 and Smith, L 2004a for a critique of this view). Meanwhile, those new-age Druids who, on the basis of claims to the status of 'indigeneity', demand participation in decisions over the disposition of human remains originating in Britain, appropriate Indigenous identity and thus work to 'marginalise, eclipse and displace' (Fraser 2000:108) the claims of Indigenous peoples in settler societies (see Sayer 2009 for discussion). Rather than rejecting identity politics as either gestural or inadequate, Fraser argues that a critical theory of recognition is required, which defines the cultural politics of difference as a legitimate and fundamental aspect of struggles for justice and which is, or should be, linked to the politics of redistribution, such as the equitable redistribution of material resources including finance, education, housing and so forth (Fraser 1995).

The 'politics of recognition', as defined by Fraser, allows for the observation that different community groups, with different histories, needs, aspirations and identities, make claims for recognition in both symbolic and material forms, and that these claims for recognition will have material consequences for equity and justice. Not only is recognition about respect and self-worth, but it may also have consequences for legal standing, access to a range of resources and equitable participation in the development of public policy, legal codes and codes of ethics (Fraser 2000). In Fraser's framework (2000, 2001), the politics of recognition becomes an emancipatory model based upon an idea of justice that requires a 'dismantling [of] institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction' (2005:73). Importantly, it is a model that supports defensible claims for equality while also recognising the legitimacy of difference (Fraser 2001:22). In terms of the Guidelines and the recent amendments (as discussed and documented by other papers in this issue), recognition of Aboriginal cultural and social justice claims has helped to create a document which, at least potentially, provides opportunities for the parity of participation in the development of research and in negotiations over research practice, outcomes and knowledge development.

In her early work, Fraser developed a bi-focal analysis of the politics of recognition to remedy the tendency that a simple emphasis on 'identity politics' has for obfuscating institutional and economic inequalities. Her emphasis on redistribution is crucial--by emphasising the overlapping nature of the economic and cultural aspects of social justice issues, she turns our attention to the material consequences of overreliance on the value of simply validating identity and associated historical treatments based on that identity. For Fraser, recognition, and by inference misrecognition, are not issues of ethics requiring judgments about the validly of identity (Fraser 2001:23). Rather, it is about politics, justice, and distribution of power and resources. Recognition is thus not simply about 'valorizing group identity' (Fraser 2001:25), nor can it be reduced to a 'generic human need' or self-realisation (Fraser 2003:45; for further debate see Honneth in Fraser and Honneth 2003). Recognition is about addressing misrecognition and the lack of status and parity this affords. There are many ways misrecognition can occur. For example, it can refer to the devaluation of the legitimacy of identity claims by individuals or communities, or it can, for instance, refer to 'recognition' of identity predicated on racist and other prejudicial assumptions. Misrecognition will occur when expressions of self-identity of groups or communities are ignored or discounted. It is in this way that the misrecognition of Aboriginal identity has come to underpin Australian history and the treatment of Aboriginal people. Thus, recognition is about identifying the 'social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication' that lead to cultural injustice (Fraser 1995:71). Both cultural and economic injustices are intertwined, each influencing the other. This is not to say, however, that any claim to recognition must be given legitimacy. Instead, Fraser contends that those requiring public recognition must show, first, that majority cultural norms deny justice and, second, that any remedies to injustice do not themselves deny parity to group or non-group members (Fraser 2001:35).

More recently, Fraser (2005) has identified a third dimension of justice concerned with 'representation' and 'misrepresentation' in political arenas. Misrepresentation is not reducible to misrecognition and is concerned with how recognition in political spheres is achieved. That is, how boundaries are drawn to include or exclude people participating in struggles and contests over justice (Fraser 2005:76). Globalisation is increasingly calling into question the boundaries of political communities and the legitimacy of states to define the procedural boundaries of conflicts. Thus, the frameworks of how justice is drawn and revised have themselves become legitimate targets, such that as movements assert 'their right to participate in constituting the "who" of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the "how"', that is, 'the accepted procedures for determining the "who"' (Fraser 2005:84; see also Avendano 2009). Subsequently, redistribution and recognition become entwined with representation, as Fraser (2005:86) states:

 as the circle of those claiming a say in frame-setting
 expands, decisions about the 'who'
 are increasingly viewed as political matters,
 which should be handled democratically,
 rather than as technical matters, which
 can be left to experts and elites. The effect
 is to shift the burden of argument, requiring
 defenders of expert privilege to make
 their case. No longer able to hold themselves
 about the fray, they are necessarily embroiled
 in disputes about the 'how'. As a result, they
 must contend with demands for meta-political
 democratization.

The AIATSIS (forthcoming) Guidelines for Ethical Research in Indigenous Studies is a policy document based on a desire by AIATSIS to 'encourage and facilitate equal relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people in the research engagement' (AIATSIS 2010:9). The Guidelines have been continually reviewed, revised and renegotiated. Through this process, attempts have been made to ensure that the revised document provides for equity of participation in the processes of knowledge construction within Indigenous studies by Indigenous peoples. It defines a code of conduct that is not simply based on ethical judgments, but on a regard for the justice claims of Indigenous people. As such this is a political document implicated in both recognition and representation as it seeks to not only recognise the identity claims of Indigenous groups, and all that flows from that for access to land and resources, but also to define the frameworks of representation. Importantly, in advocating equal parity of participation in research, the Guidelines have the potential to not only redefine practice, but also the way knowledge is constructed and used.

Research and expert knowledge have a long and fraught history of contributing to and bolstering colonialism and contributing to Indigenous misrecognition. Understood within the model offered by the politics of recognition, the Guidelines cannot just be viewed as a code of 'good' practice, but rather as part of a process concerned with rethinking and re-negotiating the frameworks of knowledge construction. Researchers and experts are required to participate not only in 'informed consultation', but also to engage with what that means in terms of how knowledge is produced and for whom--that is, researchers are embroiled in disputes about the 'how'. In effect, if the guideline simply validates identity claims (the who) without also redefining the way knowledge is framed and deployed (the how), then the political and cultural achievements may be limited.

To illustrate exactly how non-Indigenous researchers/experts are imbricated in the political (as opposed simply to the ethical), it is useful to examine the concept of heritage. Heritage is a key concept within public discourses and the disciplines of archaeology, anthropology, history, geography, architecture and art history, among others. It is a concept that assumes a certain common sense understanding--we think we know what we mean when we apply this term, but do we understand what this term does?

Heritage and identity--is it really common sense?

Heritage--we manage it, look after it, define ourselves and others by it, we inherit it, we go to museums and sites to look at it. However, this materialistic understanding of heritage, this common sense view, obscures its role in the governance of populations and groups and the way it is used to misrecognise and/or de-politicise the politics of recognition. Indeed, as I have argued elsewhere (Smith, L 2006), heritage is not a thing, place or monument, but rather a 'discourse'.

The idea that heritage is a discourse has been argued before, by, for instance, Byrne (1996) and Stuart Hall (1999), but here I am explicitly using the definition of discourse as advanced in critical discourse analysis, which, in short, defines a discourse as being both reflective and constitutive of social practices. As Fairclough (1992:64) states, it is 'a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning'. Discourses make the world meaningful and intercede in the negotiation of social relationships and relations of power (Fairclough 2001:229; see also Fairclough 2003; Waterton 2010; Waterton et al. 2006).

Discourses of heritage constitute and reflect a range of social practices that, among other things, are used to give meaning to group identity, historical narratives and collective and individual memories, and these in turn organise social relations and identities around nation, class, culture and ethnicity. In effect, heritage is not a 'thing' but a cultural process of meaning making and of negotiating the meanings and values given to identity, memory and sense of place (see Smith, L 2006). It is, in Harvey's (2001) terms, a 'verb', in which sites, places and/or objects are used to negotiate the meanings and value of history, culture and memory.

Material remains are not themselves 'heritage', but rather theatres or sites of memory (Nora 1989; Samuel 1994) at which individuals, policymakers, bodies of expertise and so forth, engage in performances that construct and negotiate cultural and social identities and the various values that buttress these identities. The acts of visiting or managing places and objects are performances of remembering and memory making in which the negotiation of identity and sense of place are undertaken by individuals, groups and nations not in response to 'historical realities' but, rather, to changing cultural, social, economic and political needs and circumstances (see Smith, L 2006:44f.). In effect, what heritage is and what it does is to continually create and recreate identity and cultural and historical meaning and thus cannot be defined as a 'thing'. The ability to control the 'moment of heritage', when these cultural processes and negotiations come into play at or over the care of places defined as 'heritage', is vital in ventures concerned with self-determination. However, the moment of heritage is inevitably arbitrated and regulated by what I have called the authorised heritage discourse (AHD) (see Smith, L 2006:29f.).

This dominant Western discourse stresses materiality, monumentality, grandiosity, time depth, aesthetics and all that is 'good' in history and culture (Smith, L 2006:29f.). It takes as a given the symbolic importance of heritage places and objects for representing or symbolising identity, while also assuming that heritage in some way 'creates' identity without ever critically scrutinising the nexus between the two. The AHD privileges the authenticity of fabric and assumes that fabric is, in some way, inherently valuable. It also stresses national or 'universal' values of heritage, emphasising the idea of collective human values, which often works to obscure local and specific sub-national expressions of heritage. In doing so, the AHD may also facilitate the appropriation of group identities, or aspects of a group's heritage, as 'national' heritage. In this way the 'heritage' of elite groups can, as I have argued in the case of England (Smith, L 2006), come to stand in for the nation, but it can also see the uncritical commandeering of, for instance, Aboriginal art as part of the representational pantheon of a generic Australian identity. The AHD also identifies and privileges expertise over other forms of knowledge and practice in the management and curation of heritage places and objects. In particular, the AHD identifies the authority of archaeology, architecture and art history as those disciplines best suited to act as stewards of a nation's heritage.

The AHD originated in western European nineteenth-century architectural conservation debates about authenticity and the 'moral' duty of the present to conserve and respect architectural design values. This debate saw the emergence of a 'conservation ethic' that stressed the need to 'conserve as found' while also placing emphasis on the pastoral role of experts to educate the public about the value and meaning of the past. This debate found synergy with liberal concerns to guide and educate populations into becoming 'good citizens' as certain forms of expertise were used to facilitate the governance of populations through their adherence to emergent national identities and values (Smith, L 2004b:81). The role of museums in this process is well documented by Bennett (1995); however, heritage, and more particularly authorised definitions of heritage, also became part of the processes of fortifying and regulating national identity and citizenship at this time.

The Western AHD has been institutionalised within Western national heritage agencies and within the policies and practices of intergovernmental agencies such as UNESCO and nongovernmental organisations such as ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites) (see Smith, L 2006; Smith, L and Waterton in press; Waterton 2010 for further discussion). It is important to note, however, that the AHD is not the only heritage discourse, but it is the most pervasive and persuasive. It is not only embedded in powerful professions and institutions, but is constitutive of the practices of heritage management and conservation that work to reinforce the dominance and authority of the AHD. While different national contexts will have different dominant or authorised ways of defining heritage, in the West, at least, the core assumptions of materiality, innate value and the stewardship of expertise remain constant. In Australia, unlike in many European contexts, the AHD will also include aspects of Australia's flora, fauna and landscape images as part of the collective dominant vision of heritage (see Smith, L 2006:162f. for a fuller discussion of the Australian AHD).

In defining the AHD, I have so far sidestepped the issue of contest and challenge. The AHD is, of course, open to challenge by contesting notions of heritage. Indeed, we can see such a challenge internationally with the growing interest in and debate about the legitimacy of intangible heritage, following the adoption of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. The AHD works to create, sustain and validate consensus history and cultural narratives and values. It naturalises certain visions of national and group identity by accepting as unproblematic the links between heritage and identity, and through a range of practices that see heritage places conserved to preserve innately valuable fabric. Identity in effect becomes intimately linked to the authenticity of fabric and place, and subject to the management and conservation of expert practice. Heritage management is inherently contested, as demonstrated by the history of local resident action groups, conservation groups and Indigenous communities, among others, who have fought to have certain places preserved, re-interpreted or acknowledged (and even de-accessioned) as heritage. In my definition of heritage as a 'cultural process', I make the point that such conflicts are heritage--that heritage is not only about the mediation of cultural and social conflicts, but is ultimately about the mediation of cultural change (Smith, L 2006:82). However, the AHD, in defining what is being contested, also defines and controls the arena of conflict, and the frameworks and value systems used to adjudicate on those conflicts. This power or authority does not only come from the pervasiveness of the AHD, or its underpinning of heritage policies and legal instruments; it also derives from the history and nature of the knowledge and expertise that validates and deploys that discourse.

Of particular interest to my arguments here, and to an understanding of the potential of the AIATSIS Guidelines, is the way certain bodies of expertise have come to not only underpin and propagate the AHD, but have themselves become dependent on it. I want to turn now to examine the interrelationship of archaeology with the Australian AHD, and note that there is a strong conflation between 'archaeology' and 'heritage'. This conflation is not one of happenstance, but actively derives from the way in which archaeological knowledge has tended to be deployed within the Australian context.

Archaeological knowledge, alongside other forms of expertise such as anthropology, architecture, history and so on, has had a particular role to play in conflicts over the control of cultural heritage and associated political negotiations for the political and cultural legitimacy of identity claims. I have, in earlier work (Smith, L 1999, 2004b), drawn on a critical reading of the Foucauldian thesis of 'governmentality' to help identify the authority of archaeological knowledge in these conflicts. Within this framework archaeological knowledge can be identified as part of the suite of disciplines that contribute to the mentalities of rule and governance. Indeed, archaeology may be identified as a 'technology of government'. This is a concept developed by Rose and Miller (1992) and defines a body of knowledge that state apparatus, policymakers and legislators will deploy to render certain social conflicts, in this case conflicts over identity claims, understandable and thus subject to regulation. These mentalities of rule work to render populations and the problems they pose subject to regulation and governance through the way they are defined and represented. Particular forms of knowledge become privileged in this process over other forms of knowledge due to their ability to 'speak' to the existing cultural values and epistemological understandings of policymakers and their ability to make claims to 'truth'. The intellectual authority and power of 'rational' knowledge claims, therefore, finds synergy with liberal forms of governance. Disciplines such as archaeology, which make both historical and contemporary claims to scientific rationality, become taken up as technologies of government by making populations and social problems not only 'thinkable' but also subject to regulation and resolution through the disciplined analysis of rational thought (Rose and Miller 1992:182). Thus, intellectual knowledge is implicated in the governance of certain social conflicts (Dean 1999).

In the past, the assertion of archaeological scientific practice and knowledge construction through adherence to 'processual' theory, linked to concurrent claims about the legitimacy of archaeological 'stewardship' over the past, has been key in defining and authorising the discipline's role as a technology of government. This role has also been made concrete by the development in the 1970s of Cultural Heritage Management (CHM) policy and legislation, which has seen archaeology become one of the dominant disciplines defining CHM and other heritage practices. This development occurred alongside key developments within the Australian and international archaeological discipline. During the 1960-70s Anglophone archaeology began to aggressively assert for itself its new-found identity as a 'science', while at the same time developing a rhetoric about the discipline's 'professionalization' (see Johnson 1999; McNiven and Russell 2005; Moser 1995; Trigger 1989). Archaeologists during the 1960s and 1970s were also active as lobbyists for the development of Australian policy and legislation to protect their data base--in particular Aboriginal material culture, sites and places. This lobbying, undertaken within the newly minted disciplinary discourses of scientific neutrality and professionalism, was readily listened to by policymakers working both within a 'common sense' understanding of science and the rational model of public policy development that was dominant during the 1970s (Fischer 2003:4-5). However, in this process the pastoral position of 'steward' for the past, so dominant in the disciplinary discourse of the period (Zimmerman 2000), became linked to notions of 'heritage', with its underlying sense of patrimony and inheritance. In a practical and conceptual sense, archaeological data 'became' heritage.

The CHM process controls the use, value and meanings given to certain cultural objects and places, and provides procedures through which archaeological knowledge and expertise may be called upon and deployed in a policy context. Thus, cultural and social conflicts that rest on understandings of the past become converted into technical issues of site management and de-politicised. Moreover, conflicts over heritage become conflicts in which archaeological knowledge defines the 'how' and the 'who' within the sphere of contest. The benefit to the discipline of archaeology is that data is protected and archaeological access to it is maintained. Moreover, the authority of the discipline's knowledge is continually reinforced through its role as a technology of government and the status of its data as 'heritage'. However, archaeological discourse and knowledge is itself regulated within this process, as the discipline must continue to involve the discourses of scientific rationality and stewardship while also continually asserting the status of its data as 'heritage' in order to maintain its position as an underpinning expertise of the AHD. Failure to do so will jeopardise both the discipline's position of authority bestowed by its role as a technology of government and the dominant sense of disciplinary identity.

The implementation of archaeology as a technology of government does not mean that, like the AHD, the discipline and its knowledge and practices are not contested or challenged. In Australia, archaeology has been publically and comprehensively challenged by Aboriginal communities and activists (see for instance Ah Kit 1995; Four-mile 1987, 1989; Langford 1983 among others). For the most part, the archaeological discipline in Australia has responded positively to this-the Australian Archaeological Association, for instance, implemented its own code of ethics in 1991 to ensure informed consultation (see Smith, C and Burke 2003)--and community consultation and engagement is now accepted practice (see for instance Clarke 2002; Greer 2010; Greer et al. 2002; Hemming and Rigney 2010; Prangnell et al. 2010 among others).

The state use of archaeological knowledge as a technology of government does not mean that archaeological requirements and desires are always supported by the state, nor that they are all powerful, or that they will always override Indigenous or other interests. The point here is that the deployment of archaeological knowledge in the mitigation of certain problems or conflicts, whatever the outcomes of those conflicts, ensures that certain knowledge frameworks are never really challenged. Archaeology maintains its utility and authority with the state because it renders certain problems thinkable--in doing so it confines the parameters of debate and thus other forms of knowledge (and more specifically other ways of knowing or thinking about the past and 'heritage') are constrained. The implications are that any set of practices, regulated by ethical guidelines or not, will also be regulated by various discourses. Underpinning these discourses will be layers of jockeying over the legitimacy and utility of knowledge and epistemological claims.

Conclusion: heritage is a political resource

The unpacking of a simple concept such as 'heritage' has unveiled a number of layers of political and cultural affect. What is at issue here is not whether negotiations over the political legitimacy and utility of knowledge claims about heritage has positive or negative outcomes, either for researchers or for Indigenous peoples, but that they occur. Understanding the layers of politics that underpin the use of knowledge and the discourses that frame that knowledge is important for helping researchers navigate the 'demands for metapolitical democratization' (Fraser 2005:86). The identification of heritage as a resource of power reveals the multiple layers of overt and covert consequence that expert discourses can have. It also reinforces the observation that researchers, whatever their fields, in engaging with ethical codes of practice also explicitly engage in the redeployment of resources of power and privilege, which may have implications for recognition and representation and ultimately social justice. This analysis of 'heritage' also reveals the extent to which certain forms of knowledge have become institutionalised, not only in terms of their incorporation in public policy and associated practices, but by being simply naturalised as self-evident. Embedded in heritage management and conservation practices are authorised discourses that both draw on and underpin the position of disciplines as technologies of government. In any ethical practice, researchers are obliged to not only critically scrutinise practice, but to allow room for the reconsideration of the utility and authority of the discourses that frame the way knowledge and practice are negotiated and legitimised.

The Guidelines are a product of the continuing challenges to, and re-negotiations over, the legitimacy of expert knowledge claims. The document is a set of practices that implicitly acknowledges that the politics of recognition be taken seriously. While the Guidelines are clearly predicated on a sense of the political and cultural legitimacy of Indigenous identity and knowledge claims, what is perhaps less clear is the implications the Guidelines have for the identity claims of expertise. As Fraser (2000, 2001) points out, in some struggles for recognition it may become necessary, if justice is to be achieved, for identities to be rethought and redefined; this is especially the case where misrecognition has occurred. However, recognition, or the acknowledgment of misrecognition, can only occur in a context where the relations of power have been themselves recognised--those 'doing' or facilitating misrecognition are themselves identified. Thus, the politics of recognition in this context requires not only recognition of Indigenous identity and knowledge claims, but also recognition of how disciplinary identities have themselves contributed to misrecognition. This is not to claim that researchers and experts need political recognition as Fraser has framed it, but rather that any recognition of identity and justice requires a corresponding self-recognition or acknowledgment and a corresponding rethinking of expert identity and the discourses that maintained those identities. The Guidelines provide an important set of policies and practices for research that has implications for recognition and representation. However, they also require that researchers rethink not only practice, but also what is being researched and why. That is, they require a rethinking of the discourses that are used to frame research and the identities of 'expertise'.

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Laurajane Smith

School of Archaeology and Anthropology, The Australian National University

Laurajane Smith is a Future Fellow, Heritage and Museum Studies, School of Archaeology and Anthropology, Research School of Humanities and the Arts, The Australian National University. She works in the area of heritage studies, and is editor of the International Journal of Heritage Studies.

<laurajane.smith@anu.edu.au>