How desperate should we be?
Ryn, Claes G.
This article is based on an after-dinner speech given at the annual
meeting of the Academy of Philosophy and Letters in June of 2014. The
invitation had come from the president of the Academy, who had also
proposed the above title, an allusion to my then-recent novel A
Desperate Man. The structure and tone of the text is due to the setting
for my remarks and my somewhat awkward assignment, which was to discuss
the novel as a work of fiction and relate it to our historical
situation. As the novel is relevant to the state of America and the
Western world in many ways, I might have explored possible parallels
between the stark, fictional circumstances of the narrative and our
actual predicament, but I used the occasion primarily to set forth a
philosophical argument. I concentrated on a philosophical problem that
has long occupied me and that the novel raises in acute form. The topic
is relevant to any historical circumstances, but trends in today's
American society seem to me to give it urgency.
The subject is as large as it is difficult: the meaning or form of
morality, particularly as it relates to politics. My concern is with
what I consider a dubious tendency in Western moral philosophy since the
ancient Greeks. That tendency seems to me detrimental to morality's
ability to find its way in actual circumstances, especially in highly
charged and hard-to-understand situations. What is questionable is the
habit of defining morality as adherence to a preexisting rational or
ideal standard. The problem is not with the assumption that human beings
must respect a moral imperative over which, in a crucial sense, they
have no control. Morality does have a universal dimension and its own
morally binding authority. The problem is with a particular, abstract,
reifying conception of that authority Under this conception, moral
actors are to apply supposedly universal "principles" or
standards to specific moral choices. But so removed and different from
the specific and changeable and often confusing and stressful situations
of real life are these supposedly unchanging, dispassionate moral norms
that they are hard to apply. In practice, they are usually ignored or
become an obstacle to good conduct. Politics as ordinarily understood is
but one area of life in which situations are often so complex, unstable,
and tense that they threaten simply to overwhelm abstract or ideal moral
notions and trigger rash, desperate action. I contend that what makes a
decision moral or immoral is different from what is assumed in moral
theories of the mentioned type. Morality demands respect for a universal
moral authority, but morality is misconceived as conformity to
ready-made norms or models.
Why a Novel?
The argument to follow will not assume familiarity with A Desperate
Man, but in order to explain the argument's connection to the novel
I will briefly discuss the impetus behind the novel and give a
description of its contents without depriving potential new readers of
suspense by giving away too much of the plot.
A prominent aspect of the story is the moral perturbations and
anguish of the central character and the morally challenging
circumstances of several others. These people face nerve-racking, highly
complex choices for which their experience and moral inclinations have
not prepared them and that are ill-served by allegedly fixed preexisting
rational or ideal norms. The desperation that the novel describes is
attributable to the fictional perilous state of America, but also to a
wrenching disorientation. The situation of the main protagonist
illustrates concretely the kind of problem that a dubious notion of
morality will accentuate.
Why would a person like me who has spent his career on issues of
philosophy want to write a novel in the first place? Other than that the
novel badly wanted to be written, my reasons for starting and finishing
it are not entirely clear, not even in hindsight. For long periods I
could not work on it at all, but it kept pulling me back. Whatever other
need it satisfied, I think it helped me articulate what is happening in
America and Western society and what kind of developments might ensue.
Specifically, working on the novel let me explore in experiential terms
an issue of deep and growing concern to me, the predicament of civilized
persons who are caught in historical circumstances that seem to conspire
against everything they value. What I wanted to say seems to have
required the form of fiction.
Those who know something of my scholarly writing are familiar with
the epistemological theme that the imagination and the arts are
ultimately more influential and more fundamental in human consciousness
than the conceptual, reasoning mind. But I did not start writing a novel
because of impatience with the limits of philosophy and political
theory. I was not moved by the thought that appealing primarily to the
imagination, as in a novel, would improve my chances of persuading
others. I certainly did not intend to produce a manifesto in the form of
a novel, following the path of an Ayn Rand. I did not envision the
characters of my novel as spokesmen for ideas. Besides, I can confirm
what other novelists have reported: that the characters in a work of
fiction tend to acquire a life of their own. Nevertheless, I undoubtedly
wrote this story about decent human beings in a declining, increasingly
perverse society in order to say something about life. It must have been
a desire to express that something in the most tangible, concrete way
that made me choose fiction.
I knew from the start that the narrative would feature an
essentially admirable but flawed male protagonist, a person of some
prominence and privilege who lives with his family in Washington, D.C.
As I wrote, I discovered that this man, Richard Bittenberg, had deep
family roots in Charleston, South Carolina. He is a professor of history
at National University. He is profoundly troubled by what he thinks is
his country's precipitous decline. Richard loves America and feels
morally obligated to help change its course. But how? He is pained by
his inability to make a difference. Beginning to despair because of his
powerlessness, he seizes an opportunity to act that he could never have
foreseen. He is thrown into events for which his earlier life has not
prepared him. A man of conscience, he has difficulty finding his way in
new, intensely stressful, and increasingly harrowing circumstances. He
conceals from his wife, Helen, that his life has taken a sharp turn. She
can tell that he is under great pressure, but she is used to his making
too many professional commitments and attributes his preoccupied
demeanor to a particularly bad case of overwork. Helen is highly
intelligent, strong-willed, and a good wife and mother. She does not
really disagree with her husband about the state of America, but she
will not let worries about her country weigh her down. She tries to
shield their two children from Richard's sadness and often acerbic
comments about the signs of American decline. At the same time, she
tries to make her husband relax his hectic pace.
The novel starts in Paris where the family is on a brief vacation
to which Richard, the supposed workaholic, has miraculously agreed,
though at the last moment. The milieus of the novel are Washington,
D.C., first of all, but also Paris and environs, and Charleston. Among
the other notable characters are a group of alienated Washington
insiders, a South Carolina congressman who is also Richard's best
friend, two Paris detectives, a senior American diplomat at the American
embassy in Paris, and a French nobleman. Before telling the story of
Richard's new life, protracted ordeal, and crisis, the novel
describes his early life and family background, which help explain his
love for America and his willingness to endure great pressure and danger
to defend it. Helen has to face a nightmare of her own.
The novel might be classified as a political thriller and a
"mystery," but is, at bottom, a moral and psychological drama
in which the chief protagonist is driven to desperation. In the novel,
destructive trends familiar to today's Americans have intensified
and done more damage to the country's fabric. America seems to
Richard to be in a precarious state. He is initially despondent, at his
wit's end trying to figure out what he should be doing to help save
the situation. The novel shows how his personality and frame of mind
influence his conduct. He and other key characters see themselves as
acting in catastrophic circumstances.
I believe that I wanted to give vivid experiential expression to
certain central problems of our time and to disconcerting potentialities
inhering in them. I was drawn to the moral challenge that this
hypothetical historical situation would present. Despite its dystopian
aspects, the America of the novel is sufficiently close to current
conditions that readers should have little difficulty relating to it. As
if by design, but without obvious premeditation on my part, the events
of the novel bring the previously mentioned issue of morality to the
fore.
A Dubious Moralism
It is time to turn to philosophical analysis of the questionable
tendency in traditional Western thought and sensibility. Whether
predominantly classical or Christian, the rationalistic or idealistic
strain of moral speculation seems to me to be philosophically defective
and to stand in the way of dealing at once morally and effectively with
concrete situations, notably with the darker potentialities of life,
including those of politics. One of the reasons why I have been so
concerned to demonstrate this weakness is probably an intuition that
current trends in the Western world may be unleashing such darker
potentialities on a large scale. There are reasons to fear that
morality, if it will have anything at all to do with handling the
burgeoning crisis, will be, because of the mentioned philosophical and
practical weakness, ill-prepared for the task.
The problem can be traced back to a dubious form of Greek
intellectualism, often tinged with a type of romantic idealism, that
mars a largely very admirable classical heritage. It is a form of
ahistoricism that has tended to divorce moral norms from the world of
concrete experience. It has placed these norms somewhere outside of
history, where their supposed purity and nobility are not threatened by
the indignities and messiness of ordinary life. This overly abstract,
"idealistic" conception of moral universality has made it
difficult for morality to find its way in the actual, specific
circumstances of a much different human existence.
The paradigmatic example of this tendency of thought and
sensibility is the notion of political virtue and justice set forth in
Plato's Republic. It is a blend of rationalism and quasi-romantic
spirituality. Plato attaches his notion of morality to a transcendent
sphere of "fixed and immutable realities," to a realm where
"all is reason and order." (1) The higher realm is thus
defined as radically different from man's historical existence, in
which change, movement, and disorder are ubiquitous. Plato's brand
of universalism saddled moral philosophy with the difficulty of applying
a putatively rational, unchanging, and universal standard to a life of
particularity, diversity, and change. The problem does not lie with the
idea that morality has an enduring, transcendent dimension. On the
contrary, I believe that it is being closely attentive to the nature of
the latter that inspires resistance to the dubious strain of moralism.
The problem is the assumption that moral universality is static,
unhistorical, and ethereal, which must give it but the most tenuous
connection to the life that human beings have to live. Universality is
made diffuse and distant, not clearly relevant to the here and the now.
Already Aristotle sensed the inadequacy and ultimate artificiality of a
wholly transcendent moral good and reacted rather strongly against it,
but he had in him too much of a similar intellectualism to be able fully
to extricate himself from it.
Christianity brought the promise of a revised understanding of
goodness. The idea of the Word becoming flesh brought universality and
particularity more closely together. The notion of the Incarnation
increased sensitivity to the higher potentialities and meaning of
man's historical existence. Christianity intuited the possibility
of union between universality and historical particularity, but it was,
partly because of the influence of Greek intellectualism, slow to
discern the philosophical and other implications of this insight.
Christianity also saw more clearly than the Greeks that the crux of the
moral life is not to think rightly but to change--to will rightly.
"I am the Way, and the Truth and the Life" (John 14:6) is not
a call to adopt the right doctrine but to change the will, to embody, to
incarnate, the Holy Spirit in practical action. Nevertheless,
Christianity continued in its theology and philosophy to be affected by
the Greek tendency to distance what is morally normative from the
particulars of man's historical existence. The philosophy of
natural law might be said to have resisted that tendency in that, partly
under Aristotle's influence, it affirmed the value of concrete
worldly life, but it also exhibited an opposite propensity for moral
rationalism and legalism, less so perhaps in Thomas Aquinas than in
various Thomists and neo-Thomists. The tendency for the ahistorical,
abstractionist strain in the natural law tradition to break free of more
historically, experientially rooted elements became particularly evident
as it started blending with the natural rights theorizing of modern
liberalism. The rationalist trend of neo-Thomism was prominent in the
mid-twentieth century and forward. In recent times, it gave rise to the
tortuous legalism and abstractionism of the so-called new natural law
theory propounded by such thinkers as Germain Grisez and John Finnis.
Over the centuries, making allegedly universal
norms-"principles"--relevant to concrete situations proved
difficult, leading to often convoluted, intricate, sometimes absurd
exercises in casuistry. One who challenged the rationalistic fondness
for abstract "principles" was Edmund Burke. He reacted most
strongly against French Enlightenment and Jacobin thinking, which had
taken the preference for ahistorical universality in a radical
direction, but he was generally averse to a mind-set favoring the
simplicity of rational constructs over complex, historical reality. He
opposed the rationalistic fondness for "the nakedness and solitude
of metaphysical abstraction." (2) There were echoes of natural law
thinking in Edmund Burke, but he also argued strenuously and incisively
against the ahistorical, rationalistic temperament. What was original
and groundbreaking in his thought was his perceiving the potentially
intimate connection between universality and history. To be sure, most
of history was to Burke unedifying or worse, but such nobility, wisdom,
and beauty as humanity had achieved had acquired concrete, historical
form. The good, the true, and the beautiful revealed themselves in
experiential particulars.
Contrary to superficial interpretations of Burke as a "value
relativist"--an "historicist," in the terminology of Leo
Strauss and his followers--he never doubted the validity of a
distinction between good and evil, true and false, and beautiful and
ugly. For Burke, this distinction is no mere creature of convention. He
stressed the importance of history and experience not in order to put
tradition in the place of moral universality but because he recognized
their intimate association: that universality becomes present to human
beings only in the historical concrete. In their attempts to understand
and appreciate universal values, morally weak and intellectually limited
human beings are greatly dependent on what previous generations have
been able to discover, articulate, and transmit through tradition. A
soundly traditional society evolves an intricate pattern of norms that
warns people away from destructive ways and helps orient them towards
the higher life, but these norms are not turned into fixed, rigid
abstractions but are understood in context. Not even tradition at its
best contains any final word, and life keeps changing. Tradition needs
continuous self-examination and adaptation to new circumstances. That
this process should be guided by fresh intuition of how to advance
universal good does not lessen man's dependence on the past.
Burke's revulsion for "abstract" reason, as distinguished
from historically grounded rationality, showed his awareness of the
historical nature of human existence and of man's apprehension of
universality. It is not surprising that the Straussians with their
anti-historicism and abstract notion of natural right should be severe
critics of Burke. They represent a particularly thoroughgoing type of
moral rationalism--this despite the fact that, ultimately, many of them
reject the notion of moral universality.
What abstract, anti-historical theories of universal right have in
common is the assumption that universality and history are, by
definition, separate, or connected by the thinnest possible thread. To
this mind-set, what is universal cannot at the same time have
particular, historical form. Although the notion of synthesis between
universality and particularity would seem to be grounded in actual human
experience-universal values showing their reality and worth in concrete
manifestations of goodness, truth, and beauty--synthesis is to moral
rationalists a contradiction in terms, a violation of what they take to
be the fundamental rule of logic, the principle of identity: A must be A
and cannot also be non-A. Particularity and individuality as such must
be meaningless. But to think of what is normative as empty of concrete
particulars--to turn it into a set of abstract rules or ideas--is to
look away from the needs of specific situations. The first requirement
of morality, think the moral rationalists, is knowing the right
"principles" or models and keeping them in your head. The
abstractionist mind thus distracts the moral actor from what is actually
there, in the here and now at the frontline of life.
Starting with Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the trend of looking away from
the concrete, actual texture of life turned in a more radical, dreamy,
and sentimental direction. Rousseauistic and romantic imagination
produced a flighty, revolutionary mentality, which goes much further
than the older ahistorical mind-set in neglecting or disdaining the
potentialities of the ordinary world. What exists is now assumed to be
vile and oppressive. This romantic form of anti-historicism, this modern
"idealism," takes its bearings by an imaginative vision of the
world wholly transformed. Plato's Republic, too, contemplates a
radical remaking of society, but, unlike Rousseau, Plato never comes
close to assuming that there are no evil potentialities in man with
which to contend. On the contrary, he believes that the flaws of human
nature will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to turn the ideal
polis into reality.
The rationalistic or idealistic notion of moral choice has made it
hard to reconcile moral universality with the demands of practical life.
The idea that moral actors should compare present possibilities to
preexisting prescriptions does not well describe how people of
conscience actually try to do the right thing. That images of what ought
to happen--intuitions of possible outcomes--play a central role in moral
deliberation is not in dispute. In fact, moral rationalism greatly
underestimates the importance and prominence of imagination in
determining what ought to be done. Yet the intuition that assists moral
choice must not be likened to a road map on which the actor consults the
applicable part and with reference to which he then executes the
appropriate turn. Partly because the situation is not yet clear, the
intuition is a work in progress. The intuition interacts with reason in
a process in which the conscientious person is trying as best he can to
understand the situation and make the best of it. Rarely, if ever, are
the facts clear. Even more important, the intuition must interact with a
will that is often torn. The conscientious person must scrutinize his
desires and struggle to purify his motives. He must, to use an old
phrase, "examine his conscience." Because of the complexity of
situations and the risk that a subtle egotism will masquerade as moral
conscience, the moral course is rarely obvious. As the present situation
is never a replica of any previous situation, some improvisation and
innovation are always required. Guessing and taking risks are often
necessary. Despite the best of intentions people sometimes fail because
they misunderstand the circumstances or bring about unintended
consequences.
Whatever one might think in theory, in practice acting morally is
not something like following a blueprint. Supposedly preexisting
universal rational or ideal standards are general and univocal, but
actual situations are particular, complex, and only partially
transparent. People of conscience do as well as they can. One effect of
rule- or model-bound moralism is to draw attention away from the special
characteristics of the present and to underestimate the need for
creative intuition and adaptation to dynamic historical reality Moral
rationalism does not understand that, in order to become efficacious in
the unique present moment, the universal must assume specific form,
become embodied in action adapted to the needs of the moment, which
involves subtle interactions and adjustments among will, imagination,
and reason--i.e., involves the whole person. Genuine moral universality
does not preexist in abstract directives, only as an obligation to try
to find and perform the action that will contribute most to good. The
specific form that moral universality will need to assume has to await
the person's finding his way in the particular situation. The actor
must achieve union, synthesis, between the universal imperative and the
moral potentiality inhering in the specific case--a possibility that
moral abstractionism dogmatically denies.
The allegedly universal abstract or ideal principles of moral
rationalism need not be irrelevant; at best, in the most suitable
circumstances, they can assist in guiding will, imagination, and reason
and help the person intuit what should be done here and now. But at
worst, ahistorically conceived standards do, precisely because of their
abstractness and poor fit, become a distraction. In some circumstances
they may, because they assume very different circumstances, positively
stand in the way of finding the right course. The reason why
rationalistic and idealistic moralism does not have a worse reputation
than it does is that in actual moral deliberation intuition and general
creativity provide the connection to the actual world that is missing
from the theory.
That reasoning plays an important role in morality is, as far as I
am concerned, not at issue. But moral rationalism misunderstands and
exaggerates that role and greatly underestimates the importance of
character and imagination. Christianity sharpened the awareness that the
main obstacle to good conduct is a perversity of the will. It traced
that perversity back to original sin. For morality to be possible and
for a common good to be advanced in politics, human beings must learn to
rein in their self-indulgence. Moral good is a creature first and
foremost not of intellect but of a special kind of will. Christianity
associates that higher will with divine grace. Without character, there
can be no morality or common good. But Greek moral rationalism and
idealism, reinforced by other schools of thought, kept distracting
Western man from the centrality of moral character and from the need for
synthesis of moral universality and concrete, varied, ordinary life.
Specifically, Platonic moral rationalism and idealism, though
theoretically strongly committed to moral virtue, left very vague how
moral universality might become integrated with actual politics. Plato
conceived of political virtue as being so distant from ordinary politics
that, barring the cleansing of society of all such politics, this virtue
should not even be expected to make an appearance. Except in that it
indicated the necessity of disciplining desire, the Platonic notion of
political morality and justice left actual politics stranded.
The Machiavellian Challenge
Machiavelli protests the Platonic idea of political good and the
general genre of models of virtuous politics as having little to offer
to statesmen. The typical representative of moral rationalism and
idealism assumes that Machiavelli is adopting an amoral or immoral view
of politics and advocating practical efficiency for its own sake.
Because Machiavelli rejects their kind of moralism and is chiefly
interested in action that might work in the real world, he must be
trying to drive morality from politics. The Prince seems to these
critics to offer proof of his cynicism, callousness, and general moral
perversity. Machiavelli is to them the one who derails the old Western
tradition of insisting that politics must respect a moral standard. He
is "a teacher of evil," et cetera. To suggest to such
commentators that Machiavelli's challenge to associating good with
"imagined states and princedoms" might be largely justified
and that one might draw upon him to strengthen moral philosophy is to
invite incredulity. (3) Yet it can certainly be argued that the
ethereal, rationalistic, and romantic elements of Plato's political
theory did limit the latter's utility for actual politics.
Plato's notions of virtue and justice are, after all,
indistinguishable from a dream of society transformed. His hope is not
to make the best of politics but to abolish it. His moralism is, in
other words, attached to the hope of achieving something inherently
impossible, politics being an inescapable part of human existence, not
just in matters relating to government. Moral thought prone toward
merely ideal possibilities is ill adapted to politics in general, but
especially to situations far removed from the presumed ideal, for
example, ones involving intense conflict and general disorder. Such
conditions are not rare and somehow negligible. They occur frequently,
not just in politics narrowly understood but in life generally. Having
little to say about how good might be advanced in circumstances of that
kind represents evasion, one-sidedness, and imbalance and must be
regarded as a major deficiency in any moral philosophy, especially any
political philosophy.
Both among Machiavelli's critics and defenders, a simplifying
and even simplistic interpretation of his thought is common. On both
sides he is viewed by many as setting aside moral considerations and
caring only about the efficient pursuit of power, the latter having its
essence in physical coercion. According to this interpretation,
Machiavelli not only stresses but revels in the need for deceit and
harsh methods. What his critics dislike--his supposed disdain for
morality--his admirers regard as refreshing "realism." But
both camps demonstrate a lack of philosophical agility and subtlety. The
critics betray a reluctance to acknowledge or face life's darker
dimension and exhibit a correspondingly truncated conception of
morality, while the defenders betray a reductionistic view of power and
an equally regrettable neglect of moral considerations.
Machiavelli may be prone to an overly dark view of politics, due in
part to his historical circumstances. He may open himself up to
moralistic scolding by employing sweeping, categorical statements and
hyperbole. Some of his specific recommendations that would have looked
harsh but not extraordinary to a sixteenth-century Italian, must also
appear extreme to a modern observer used to thinking of politics in
terms of humane, peaceful relations and the rule of law. In addition,
Machiavelli is not a philosopher concerned to write with precision and
to include every relevant nuance and qualification. He formulates his
alternative to moral idealism and rationalism in a partly unfortunate
manner, making it appear that, in his view, political good often
requires performing actions that are substantively evil. I would suggest
that he is really trying to say something different, but is failing to
express himself well, partly because he is entangled in the same dubious
moralism that he is challenging. I see him as struggling in The Prince
to reconcile political good, even morality, with the necessities of
politics as they arise in particularly disordered, turbulent
circumstances.
What makes Machiavelli appear insensitive to the demands of
morality is that, paradoxical as it might seem, he is still associating
morality with traditional Western moral norms and that he is, in a part
of himself, conceiving of them in a rather legalistic manner. But he
also recognizes that sometimes circumstances leave statesmen no choice
but to break these norms. Because he remains to some extent the captive
of a rule-bound conception of morality, he can see no alternative to
approving "evil means" in politics, provided that they serve
the greater good of society, what he calls "glory."
Machiavelli may not fully recognize that he is, in effect, not so much
exempting politics from morality in tough situations as attempting to
redefine political morality. The reason Machiavelli seems so cynical and
immoral to many is that the context in which he is trying to articulate
his groping insight regarding political good is the radically unsettled,
formidable circumstances described in The Prince. In that context,
physical violence and treachery are ubiquitous and must be handled by
corresponding means by anyone trying to create order. Although it is in
this particular setting that he discusses what is necessary to realize
political good, Machiavelli is trying to make room for a more generally
applicable idea: that political good must be served very differently in
times of great travail and danger than in peaceful circumstances. He
muddies the water by not making a clean break with the notion of
morality as adherence to pre-existing rules.
It is revealing that while heaping disdain on Machiavelli his
moralistic critics do not spell out how their allegedly superior
approach to politics would deal effectively with the kind of
circumstances that he addresses in The Prince. A display of moral
indignation is deemed sufficient to refute him. For Machiavelli to pay
such close attention to the special problems of harsh and anarchic
situations is to his moralistic critics in itself proof of a low view of
politics and of disinterest in the moral purpose of politics. Does then
morality not need to concern itself with highly unsettled, fractious
circumstances? I suggest that one of the reasons why Machiavelli reacted
against idealistic moralism was precisely its reluctance to deal with
that prominent part of human existence. The indiscriminate moralistic
condemnation of Machiavelli is an example of the seemingly chronic
reluctance in Western moral speculation to take the darker side of life,
including dirty politics, fully into account.
The historical and political context of Machiavelli's
observations in The Prince has made it easy to caricature him as
predisposed to cruelty and general ruthlessness. But what was on his
mind in that work was the troubled situation of Italy at the time and
how peace and order might be created out of these unpropitious
circumstances. There was no choice, it seemed to him, but to employ
methods scorned by conventional morality. Of the classical thinkers, the
temperament of Aristotle is not fundamentally different from
Machiavelli's. Aristotle made rather Machiavellian-sounding points
about order as the most basic need of politics. But Aristotle's
main emphasis was on how to make already existing order, however flawed
and precarious, more stable and conducive to the common good. When
Machiavelli contemplated the state of Italy there was no already
existing moral philosophy that covered systematically and in depth what
morality might mean when disorder reigns and citizens and statesmen are
even in danger of their lives. The political philosophers had concerned
themselves with what political arrangements are ideally the best or the
best practicable in societies that are already holding together and
functioning. Machiavelli did what earlier thinkers had failed to do,
write about what might overcome appalling historical conditions. He
realized that a good tied to ideal models or inflexible rules was
inadequate. The habit of applying ill-fitting or clearly irrelevant
moral standards had to be broken. That he brought into the open the
moral evasiveness and wishful thinking of so much earlier political
thought was to his credit. Although he initiated rather than completed a
much-needed reconsideration of political morality, he provided an
important ingredient for that project.
My main point in bringing up Machiavelli is not that rule-bound
moral philosophy needs to supplement its list of "principles"
with ones that define in advance just when deceit and harsh methods are
permissible--that moral philosophy needs some counterpart of "just
war" criteria for domestic use. The point is rather that morality
may not be defined by rules in the first place--which is not the same as
saying that the moral life can do without rules. Morality is often,
perhaps always, aided by existing rules to some considerable extent. The
civilized society is defined in part by the network of prohibitions,
encouragements, and nudges through which it helps convey the quality of
a meaningful existence. For practical reasons government punishes
violation of many of these rules, punishes severely in some cases. Taken
together, the norms of society sketch a picture of the general
characteristics of a civilized society, of the general direction in
which to find a life worth living. But this intuitive vision of a
desirable whole is nothing like a blueprint of Justice. Only in a
formalistic, routinized, traditionalistic rather than traditional,
social milieu do moral and other prejudices rigidify, so that particular
norms are mistaken for absolutes that permit of no exceptions regardless
of circumstances.
To sum up, moral norms are in the moment of moral choice
transcended by what is morally required in the specific situation.
Morality is always qualitatively the same--it demands trying to do what
is most conducive to a good outcome-but its concrete specifics must vary
greatly as it handles very different circumstances. The picture of
Machiavelli as one with a special fondness for coercive methods and for
dealing ruthlessly with opponents is a vulgar misrepresentation whether
it shows up among his critics or his defenders. He is well aware that in
peaceful circumstances what will be most conducive to political good is
vastly different from what might work in turbulent times.
There is no reason to confine Machiavelli's desire for realism
and adaptability to circumstances of disorder and conflict. His
willingness to take life as it is applies as much to ordered
circumstances. There peaceable and subtle methods more in accord with
conventional mores will be not only morally appropriate but more
efficacious. Deceit and ruthlessness may there be shameful.
What is important to moral philosophy in Machiavelli, then, is
certainly not some general preference for dealing harshly and
deceitfully with opponents; he has no such preference. What is needed is
some of his readiness to confront situations actually at hand even when
they seem discouraging and daunting. Although Machiavelli does not make
the point himself, we can learn from him some of the kind of flexibility
and adaptability that can make morality efficacious in all
circumstances.
Conventional moralists are suspicious of Machiavelli's strong
interest in questions of acquiring and holding on to power. But why do
they assume, as Plato does, that being interested in power is always a
sign of having amoral or immoral motives? Without power no change can be
achieved in the real world, the world of human action. Without
power--without resources to effect change--political morality would be
an empty abstraction. To make a difference in the world of human beings
morality must be able to assert itself, exercise some modicum of power.
No blame should attach to studying how available resources can be best
deployed to achieve desirable results. The question of supreme interest
to moral philosophy is, power for what purpose? For as long as the world
remains the kind of place it has been, morality will often have to find
its way in difficult territory. It must hone its skills, employ
resources creatively in the world as it is. It is simply wrong to assert
that Machiavelli does not care about the quality of political action as
long as it brings success for the individual political actor. His
condemnation of the skilled, brutal, audacious climb to power of
Agathocles the Sicilian is but one refutation of the picture of
Machiavelli as an amoral worshipper of ruthless efficiency. (4) True,
Machiavelli offers no more than a tentative, partly confused
redefinition of political morality. His word "glory" as the
proper end of statesmanship is insufficient to convey the
more-than-personal higher goal of politics. But others who are not
caught in abstract, reality-averse moralism can work out the
implications for moral philosophy of Machiavelli's willingness to
make the best of any given circumstances, including those least to the
taste of traditional moralists.
It is in large measure because of the strong influence of moral
rationalism and idealism that Western moral philosophers have had such
difficulty establishing a more than tenuous connection between moral
universality and actual politics. Plato even admits that justice and
virtue, as he understands them, have a way of pulling people away from
the world of politics. He conceives of political virtue as an expression
of high spirituality. Its nobility abhors comingling with anything as
mundane and contemptible as ordinary politics. As already mentioned,
Plato wants to abolish ordinary politics. So what form of morality is to
handle politics in the world as it is? Platonic idealistic morality
exhibits with respect to actual politics a pretentious passivity. With
its vagueness and hankering for an abstract perfection it positively
discourages exploring what morality might mean in unreformed, ordinary
politics. We have no business looking for it there. The practical effect
of this Platonic longing for an ideal moral purity is to undermine
morality in politics. Creating a vast distance between the moral
standard and the sphere for which it is supposed to be normative, this
idealism generates a strong tendency simply to ignore morality, namely,
in proportion as actual situations deviate from the preconceived model
of moral good. Because it disarms, confuses, and discourages attempts to
make the best of real situations, there is even warrant for calling this
idealism immoral.
The assumption that the standard of morality sits outside of
history and shows its high nobility only in ideal circumstances induces
a kind of disinterested spectator view of politics. It lets the moralist
display his moral superiority by sitting on the sidelines and bemoaning
"dirty politics." Moral rationalism and idealism do, then,
weaken what genuine morality would appear to require most: a disposition
of will, imagination, and reason to make the best of situations at hand.
A sound moral education would foster not the memorization of "moral
principles" but the kind of character, imaginative acuity, and
intellectual incisiveness that would help the person find his moral way
in any circumstances, including the most unsettled and disturbing. A
central purpose of moral education is to enhance a capacity for creative
adjustment to actual situations.
Abstract and idealistic moralism, by contrast, tends to put the
person in a one-track mode. Because ill-suited to moving with changing
circumstances, this moralism generates discomfort with anything that is
distant from the best, particularly the unexpected and unfamiliar. In
the face of radical and disturbing threats to normality, inflexibility
and lack of imagination produce confusion, ambivalence, and
demoralization--weaknesses of which the morally unscrupulous are quick
to take advantage. A putative moral scrupulousness that abhors dealing
with harsh opposition even encourages ruthlessness.
Some traditionalist readers will be muttering to themselves.
Criticizing Plato? Defending Machiavelli? Questioning firm moral
principles? This author is surely going much too far. If it had been my
task fully to argue the case for a reform in moral philosophy, I would
now go on to address the predictable objections to what I have said. But
my main reason for explaining and criticizing a dubious strain in
Western moral speculation has been to answer the question of what
measure of desperation might be appropriate to our historical situation.
Morality for Real Life
When I started to write A Desperate Man I did not have a plan to
illustrate a problem in moral philosophy, yet the story moved inexorably
into the general territory that I have here sketched in philosophical
terms. The main protagonist, Richard, finds himself in the kind of
circumstances for which moral rationalism and idealism could not have
prepared him. The America of the novel has begun to fracture.
Traditional moral standards are yielding to every kind of
irresponsibility and self-indulgence. Constitutionalism and the rule of
law are frail or a mere front for political arbitrariness and
ruthlessness. Greed is out of control. Chaos threatens at the same time
that the federal government is becoming dictatorial and
quasi-totalitarian.
In such circumstances, what does morality demand? How should decent
people behave? For a long time a hankering for a no longer possible
normality has made people in America and Europe simply discount or look
away from the ubiquitous signs that their society is falling apart and
that the future may be grim. Rather than getting ready in mind and
spirit for possibly turbulent, scary times, many commentators tout the
same old same old, escaping into a world of ideology and fetishes. Many
supposed conservatives, for example, assume that our problems will be
corrected by persuading others of the correct interpretation of the U.S.
Constitution or by reviving and expanding the free market. Some extreme
ideologues have been dreaming of global democracy through armed American
world hegemony. Academic moral and political philosophy that has not
abandoned the idea of universality or transcendence is strongly prone to
ahistoricism. Straussian natural right thinking is explicitly and
emphatically antihistorical. Needless to say, Goody Two-Shoes is as
upset about Machiavelli as ever.
But where is the moral philosophy that is amenable to creative
adaptation to unfamiliar, perhaps disturbing circumstances? My question
does not hide an assumption that rejecting moral rationalism and
idealism and other forms of escape from reality would produce a
particular solution to the problems of our historical situation.
Expectations of that kind are the stuff of rationalistic, idealistic, or
escapist speculation.
Although there is a clear need for greater willingness to face
historical facts and to hone a corresponding moral intuition, what men
and women of greater realism and more supple mind and imagination will
see as the best way forward cannot be determined in advance.
Disagreement is inevitable--but now less so, one hopes, because of
wishful thinking.
I did not start writing A Desperate Man to advocate some practical
solution to the problems of our deteriorating society. It is not obvious
to me why I told the kind of story that I did tell, but I think one of
the reasons was a desire to puncture the bubble of escapism within which
so many people seem to live today. What happens in the novel is but one
possible outcome of America's decline, but it is one that makes it
difficult for morality to take its bearings. I have to think that many
readers of the novel asked themselves the question that the author has
long asked himself: Would we be ready to handle anything like the
fictional circumstances of the story? I am told that readers have found
the novel engaging. It would surprise me if they also perceived it as
pushing a particular political agenda.
Richard Bittenberg is too insightful, down-to-earth, and honest to
give in to escapism. But although he decides to break out of ingrained
habits and does something radical and daring, he is too much the product
of the declining society not to have great difficulty adjusting to the
life he must now live. Just what his travail is about I will not reveal.
Suffice it to say that Richard must act in dark, sometimes oppressive
circumstances of which he has had no earlier experience. He finds
himself deeply torn between moral sensibilities formed in his previous
life and the requirements of a new, grueling present. Richard's
mentor in the dangerous endeavor that he has joined is a senior, very
experienced statesman. At a time when Richard is utterly distressed and
exhausted, his mentor analyzes why Richard is so troubled. He says:
"You have a conscience, and it's been operating in the
circumstances of a normal life. You've lived an essentially
ordered, predictable, even sheltered life. You've been one of the
pillars of a deteriorating society, helping to enforce its highest
standards and setting a good example for others. What's important
in the present context is that you've never had to ask yourself
what conscience might demand in very different, previously unknown
circumstances. You've had no practice handling situations in which
the world is being turned upside down." (5)
Richard's closest friend, the congressman from South Carolina
who agrees with him on the need for radical change, comments in a
conversation on the situation of people like them whose world has
shifted under their feet and who must endure the relentless pressure of
a perilous, very chancy undertaking. Richard keeps fretting over the
need to deceive family members, friends and others, and his friend
thinks the resulting anxiety illustrates a problem endemic to the
civilization from which they both stem: "Our deepest reflexes are
conditioned by fairly tranquil circumstances. So the question, Dick, is
whether people like us are cut out for the job. Damn it, the long and
short of it is that we're probably too civilized-no, that's
not quite what I mean. I mean, we, too, are infected by our
progressively corrupt culture.... We lack imagination, lack
adaptability. We think we're realistic and canny. We see better
than others that our country's in danger and that radical action is
necessary, but we have a very hard time breaking out of a mode of being
that's inappropriate to the new circumstances. We're morally
myopic, inflexible, caught in patterns that don't apply.
That's decadence, Dick. Even the better people--people like you and
me, brother, who think they're better than others--have their own
version of that avoidance of tough problems that's become chronic
in our society." (6)
The issue here is not whether in the novel the two men have chosen
the right or wrong path, but whether they have the moral wherewithal to
handle their historical situation.
It is when we are ill-prepared for dealing with urgent problems,
when we are under great pressure to act but do not know what to do, that
we become desperate. The desperado acts recklessly because events are
overwhelming him and he cannot see any way out. He lashes out blindly,
partly in frustration over his own confusion and powerlessness. Compare
such conduct to that of a well-trained soldier who finds himself pushed
into a corner on a battlefield. He is in acute danger and realizes that
his chances of survival may be small. But because of his training he
knows what he should do. He must assess the situation realistically and
take prudent, if very dangerous, action. He does not throw caution to
the wind and give in to some wild abandon. In fact, the good soldier
knows that in some circumstances the only acceptable course is to
surrender. What I am arguing here is not that desperation is necessarily
the consequence of being ill-equipped to handle force and physical
danger. That side of life has come into the foreground only because of
the earlier discussion of Machiavelli's Prince and the context of
my novel. Desperation may result from being woefully unprepared in any
sphere of life. Even in peaceful circumstances, desperation may result
from ill-fitting preconceptions or predispositions standing in the way
of understanding and dealing effectively with urgent and important
matters.
Knowing how to choose in unexpected or unfamiliar circumstances
requires preparation. Morally conscientious persons are by definition
sensitive to the moral imperative of human existence, but, if my
argument is correct, this should mean that they are morally dexterous,
ingenious, and resourceful in meeting the contingencies of life.
Anchored in moral character, they are also imaginative and
intellectually supple. Not even in the most stable historical
circumstances should moral education neglect the darker side of life and
the need to prepare for it. Given the nature of human beings, that side
is never far away, though for most people it will rarely, if ever,
involve circumstances as drastic as those discussed in The Prince. But
moral rationalism and idealism do in their preoccupation with abstract
formulas put themselves to the side, issuing directives in the manner of
a broken record.
One of the dangers of moral rationalism and idealism is that they
set human beings up for desperation. Especially in unanticipated and
highly charged situations, moral ideas and expectations that are too
detached from concrete life leave people disoriented. Finding it hard to
relate accustomed moral principles to disturbing events, they are in
danger of becoming despondent and acting rashly.
The same kind of confusion is induced by any frame of mind that
permits neglecting uncomfortable facts and that stands in the way of
engaging the world as it is. A prime ex ample that runs parallel to
moral rationalism and idealism is political ideology, the habit of
viewing politics through a more or less rigidly held interpretative
scheme and dealing with problems according to preconceived formulas. To
the extent that they succumb to ideology, liberalism, socialism,
conservatism, and libertarianism do not admit the existence of problems
that might defy their ready-made classifications and be resistant to
their standard remedies. As the current formulaic approaches to
political problems show more and more of their inadequacy in our
historical situation, ideologues will be at a loss. Especially if
America continues to fracture, they will become confused, afraid, and
prone to desperation.
Conservatives have often claimed to be non-ideological, more rooted
in the real, historical world than others and therefore less prone to
escapism and utopianism, but many of those who are called conservatives
today seem to be no more immune than others to ideological pipe dreams
and wishful thinking. Trusting in free markets and deregulation to set
society right is a particularly striking example. But the tendency to
evade reality takes many forms. For my entire academic career I have
defended a decentralized, community-oriented society--love of neighbor,
de Tocqueville, et cetera. The image of the front porch has great appeal
to many. So does Norman Rockwell's picture of America. Trying to
save what might be saved of traditional American community life is a
worthy task, but conservatives as much as others have to resist a
propensity for idyllic, escapist dreaming. The present situation has to
be assessed with ruthless honesty. The possibility of frightening,
transformative developments has to be anticipated in the imagination so
as to make possible an attunement of moral sensibility to changed
circumstances.
A temptation to which some American conservative intellectuals seem
prone is to assume a supposedly devout religious posture of a kind that
is not unrelated to the strain in Western moral speculation that I have
criticized. The posture is one of withdrawal from a world of troubles,
into the catacombs, as it were. The adoption of this putatively noble
passivity with regard to the ordinary world has had great appeal to many
since Plato. He offers supposedly noble souls the classical excuse for
not even trying to improve a mundane, discouraging society.
Claiming to be a form of high spirituality, a type of holiness,
this passivity simply yields to the dark forces but nevertheless claims
moral credit for retreating. Ethereal and distant from real life as it
is, this spirituality may be charged with escapism and a kind of moral
incompetence or perversity. My criticism is not directed against all
individual acts of withdrawal or turning the other cheek but against a
generalized moral passivity dressed up as moral nobility.
Exhibiting a similar form of evasion of reality, some adopt
ostentatious and dogmatic religious belief as the only answer to our
civilizational crisis. They assume that they belong to just the right
church and have just the right creed. The problem with this
self-important religiosity is twofold. First, the churches are today a
major source of moral and spiritual pollution. The religious sensibility
of every person is susceptible to infestation from a spiritually,
intellectually, and artistically corrupt culture. It behooves all
supposedly religious people to scrutinize their beliefs and to make sure
that the God about whom they are speaking and to whom they are praying
is not a projection of some self-serving, shoddy, escapist imagination.
But the pretentious believer thinks himself exempt from corrupting
influences. He does not need greater theological and philosophical depth
or rigor or to guard against premature certainty. Second,
truebelieverism is not intent on trying to reverse present trends. This
spirituality may speak loudly and confidently, but it is not a
predisposition to act. It is mostly self-applause and an attempt to
suppress doubt. Instead of looking for ways to address actual and acute
problems, it merely plants a flag. This spirituality has much the same
practical effect as catacomb religiosity, to abandon the field, which
serves well the objectives of those who would like to have a monopoly on
effective action.
The proper antidote to desperation, then, is for our moral
sensibilities to be as attuned as possible to historical reality, not in
the sense of approving or condoning whatever that reality may be, but in
the sense of being predisposed to look for and to act on its moral
potentialities. The proper frame of mind for envisioning the way forward
should be a calm and deliberate, if passionate, desire to know the facts
and to find ways for morality and the spirit of civilization to
outmaneuver hostile forces.
In case speaking of outmaneuvering hostile forces calls to mind the
vulgar caricature of Machiavelli, it should perhaps be underlined that
there is no necessary relationship between being morally realistic and
inventive in politics and resorting to treachery or other draconian
measures. Not even in distressed situations or intense conflict are such
methods inevitable. What I have sought to demonstrate is the need for
moral versatility. Even at a time of severe discord, moral realism and
creativity might in some circumstances call for the opposite of
harshness or deceit, perhaps for a disarming gentleness, frankness, or
honesty. Sometimes in a tense confrontation, the best way forward may be
to avoid battle and try the unexpected. Not even a soldier is expected
always to take the violent course. Also, much or most of the time
circumstances do not even minimally resemble battlefield conditions. On
occasion, genuine morality may even meet with the approval of Goody
Two-Shoes. My argument is that although morality will always have the
same quality--the quality of advancing good--it must look substantively
different depending on what opportunities are available to it.
Richard Bittenberg is no desperado. He is well-informed, realistic,
and cautious. He acts only upon reflection, perhaps too much so. When I
picked the title for the novel I did not start out from the definition
of desperation that I have set forth here. I used the term more loosely,
as we ordinarily do, to label the emotional state of a person who is
despondent and moved by deep frustration. Observing the decline and
fracturing of his society, Richard sees no alternative to what he
decides to do. He knows that he is acting against high odds. Although
Richard does not exemplify the kind of desperation that throws all
caution to the wind, is he nevertheless desperate in the special sense
of being morally unprepared in the way that I have here discussed? That
will depend on how you assess his historical situation and how you
regard him as a person. Some might say that what he ultimately does
shows him to be not quite desperate in the sense of being morally unfit.
Another possible interpretation is that his moral tribulations exemplify
the effects of an overly static and abstract notion of morality. If he
is morally ill-prepared for what he attempts to do, he, and the society
from which he comes, may be culpable in a sense that needs to be better
understood. How to judge Richard Bittenberg and the nature and extent of
his culpability, I must leave to the reader.
The question I was asked to address was, how desperate should we
be? The assignment assumed that desperation might be an understandable
reaction to developments in America. So it is. Feelings of desperation
are likely to spread in America and other Western societies. But I have
argued that this reaction to tough circumstances is a consequence of
being ill-prepared. Desperation is a sign of failure, born of a
reluctance or inability to face real life. Because human beings cannot
possibly be ready for all situations, desperation is to some extent
unavoidable, but one of the purposes of moral education is to reduce the
risk of it to a minimum by promoting moral versatility--the general
readiness for life that comes from moral character, creative
imagination, and historically grounded reason supporting each other. A
Desperate Man is, I think, among other things a commentary on the kind
of moralism that is bound to give people bad surprises, confound them,
and cause desperation. We who live now may, because of the state of our
culture, be in particular danger of events morally paralyzing us.
However late it may be, we should get better prepared. I am far from
suggesting that approaching the problems of our time with the
appropriate moral and other realism will produce an action plan. How our
historical situation might best be addressed is a daunting topic. But
reflection in the spirit of moral realism and versatility will
counteract the influence of abstract formulas and wishful thinking and
offer some protection against confusion, surprise, discouragement, and
fear--all sources of desperation.
Claes G. Ryn
The Catholic University of America
(1) Plato, The Republic (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1987), 297
(500c).
(2) Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 7.
(3) Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992),
42.
(4) Ibid., Ch. VIII.
(5) Claes G. Ryn, A Desperate Man (Washington, D.C.: Athena Books,
2014), 572.
(6) Ibid., 472.
Claes G. Ryn is Professor of Politics at the Catholic University of
America, Chairman of the National Humanities Institute, and Editor of
Humanitas.