Picard, Louis A. and Terry F. Buss. A Fragile Balance: Re-Examining the History of Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy.
Chen, Kai
Picard, Louis A. and Terry F. Buss. A Fragile Balance: Re-Examining
the History of Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy. Sterling. VA:
Kumarian Press, 2009. 317 pp.
In the twenty-first century, foreign aid is still an essential
approach of implementing foreign policies. Foreign aid has achieved
successes to some degree. For understanding the weak points of foreign
aid offered by the United States and the "potential contradictions
between foreign aid and the other components of foreign and security
policy"(p.10), A Fragile Balance: Re-Examining the History of
Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy discusses the United States foreign
aid in Africa, Asia, Latin America, including Cuba, Haiti, and Liberia,
Turkey, Persia, Thailand, Philippine and China. In the context of
historical patterns of international relations, Louis A. Picard and
Terry F. Buss analyze U.S. foreign aid through the approach of public
policy, examine the corresponding impacts on international security, and
consider the evolutions of state-sponsored foreign aid as "a
product of the two World Wars and the Cold War sequel" (p.60).
Humanitarian and development assistance had its origins in the
eighteenth century and the Enlightenment (p. 17). The universal
implications drawn from one country would not be applicable to other
countries or regions. As Picard and Buss conclude, "history makes
it clear that institutions and institutional relationships cannot
realistically be transplanted from on society to another"(p.290).
Through the historical methodologies, such as what Robert Cowley calls
"Counterfactual" history, this book analyzes "failures
and successes as lessons for future foreign assistance
approaches"(p.4) in the context of diplomacy and security policy.
As Picard and Buss note, the motives of foreign aid are varied:
"technical specialists were sometimes missionaries, sometimes had
commercial ties, and often defined their roles in moral or even ethical
terms"(p.59), which challenge the narrow calculations of
cost-benefit analysis in the literature. For the United States,
interagency framework of foreign aid has been made up of the USAID,
private sector and NGOs. In the views of the authors, there are three
motivations of foreign aid: "self-interest", "a concern
for national security", and "a sense of obligation and charity
as some form of humanitarian reasonabilities" (p.284).
There are three challenges in the application of this approach:
"sufficient skilled staff", "flexible politics" and
"absence of incentives"(p. 176, 183). For example, NGOs have
limited budgets to hire "sufficient skilled staff", and
personnel of many NGOs are not direct hires. Donors also increasingly
rely on personnel services contractors, who often have no administrative
training in aid procedures. At the same time, if foreign aid is
inappropriately utilized, this can make situation much worse.
This book highlights two unusual developments in the foreign aid
hosting of the United States: first, "the co-option of foreign aid
by the military"(p.9-10), such as in the Vietnam War, an important
case of foreign aid's militarization by the United States. Since
the Cold War, military intervention and foreign aid have always been
intermingled, which tainted foreign aid policies into the future.
Secondly, the foreign aid of the United States has been supported by
private sector for a long time. Since the 1980s, "privatization and
contracting out each became an increasing part of foreign
aid"(p.129). At present, private foundations and NGOs, which work
more efficiently, are regarded as alternatives to implementing foreign
aid policies. After the Cold War, the United States left much of foreign
aid in the hands of INGOs and NGOs. Moreover, for-profit contractors
employ a separate nonprofit-affiliated group or form a permanent
alliance with a nonprofit to compete for grants (p.206).
During the past decade, United States foreign aid policy has
shifted toward dealing with asymmetrical conflicts. Picard and Buss
analyze the motives and individual dilemmas of the United States'
foreign aid in a cautiously optimistic way. In the words of Picard and
Buss, foreign aid still faces considerable challenges, for example,
corruption within the international administration service system
supported by the United States. In addition, "leaders in recipient
states sometimes have private ambitions and interests on their
agendas"(p.289). In the concluding section, the authors suggest the
whole-of-government approach, which was popularized by the Pentagon
after the 2003 Iraq war, and "view implementation as an effort of
the entire administration without fiscal, personnel, or organizational
boundaries (p.176), in which the civilian-military relationship plays a
essential role. Though militarization of foreign aid and for-profit
contractors have been discussed in this book, more attention should have
been given to the impact of private security companies or private
military companies on foreign aid, which is largely abseat in the
literature of foreign aid.
As a commentary on historical development and influences of foreign
aid in the United States, A Fragile Balance: Re-Examining the History of
Foreign Aid, Security, and Diplomacy explains the influences of foreign
aid at the critical points in history, and discusses the decision-making
and implementation of foreign aid policies. This book is not only
clearly intended to be a must-read for undergraduate-level courses in
foreign aid and foreign policy, but is also valuable to specialists in
international relations.
Kai Chen
Zhejiang University, China