Perpetual War within the state of exception.

Cooper, Simon

The implications of the Iraq war extend well beyond its borders. The construction of a new geopolitical framework resulting in the occupation of Iraq has legitimized certain forms of behaviour and patterns of understanding, and created a set of conditions that work to collapse any distinction between war and peace. The notion of perpetual war seems difficult to imagine for many people (though much less so for those in the underdeveloped world). However, a combination of political, economic and technological factors are leading us towards a state where civilian populations are permanently militarized, where the gap between war and peace collapses, and where peace as a mode of being distinct in its own right seems impossible to constitute. Undoubtedly the actions of the current US administration and its allies directly contribute to this situation. The aggressive uni-lateralism of the United States--not just in the pre-emptive war on Iraq and the threats of similar actions in Iran and Syria--but in relation to the Kyoto treaty on the environment and the International Criminal Court, amounts to a wholesale rejection of global governance. This in itself creates the possibility for continual war because the structural causes of the war in Iraq--and of global terrorism itself--have not been addressed. Future wars will be fought over declining natural resources, exacerbated by rising levels of unsustainable consumption. The break-up of the Soviet bloc has allowed for the possible dissemination of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The talking up of a new missile defence shield severs any agreement to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While human rights abuses under dictatorships have not gone away with the war on terror. (1)

It is a mistake, however, to simply claim that this heightened militarization is a result of neo-conservative zeal. Instead, a wider cultural shift is taking place, a shift inimical to any notion of sustainable peace. Essential to this shift is the structural impact of the global neo-liberal economy. As John Hinkson has observed, the postmodern economy marks a broad shift in values, culture and the social realm as much as any transformation in the market. (2) The social transformation enabled through the postmodern economy creates the conditions whereby citizens come to accept the idea of a perpetual war conducted in order to secure their freedom--a freedom increasingly defined in terms of the market. In the words of Christian Marazzi, 'War is the continuation of the new economy by other means'. (3)

The Outsourcing of Responsibility

Combined with the illegal nature of the invasion in the first place, the fabrication of Iraq's capability as an international threat ought to be a major scandal. Yet while there has been criticism, the level of outrage has not been as high as one might expect. No parliamentarian anywhere within the 'coalition' has been forced to resign. There is the promise of government inquiries, but in the future. By and large what appears to have been a war conducted via deception or gross incompetence has been successfully managed. Indeed, the war in Iraq seems to have acquired a kind of legitimation despite the facts indicating beyond all doubt that Iraq posed no threat. One can only conclude pessimistically that the facts themselves do not seem adequate to base an anti-war position on. Slavoj Zizek takes up this point in a critique of the anti theoretical approach underpinning Noam Chomsky's work. Zizek notes that for all his admiration for Chomsky's writing: 'it's an underlying premise of his work that you don't have to do any theory--just tell the facts to the people. The way ideology works today is much more mysterious ... there's an active refusal to know'. (4) Indeed, in many ways 'the message behind the US attack was not primarily addressed to the Iraqi people but to all of us witnessing the war--we were the true ideological and political targets'. (5)

This disavowal of knowledge is a key to the kind of exceptionalism that has driven US policy in its most spectacular form in the last two years. Since September 11, the prevailing mood within much of the West has been to abandon any analytic framework and replace it with a militarized one. The rejection of social analysis represents another version of Zizek's 'refusal to know'. Even normally sophisticated thinkers such as Michael Ignatieff now argue that historical or cultural analysis is largely unnecessary in the war on terror:

 What we are up against is apocalyptic nihilism. The nihilism
 of their means--the indifference to human costs--takes
 their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even
 out of the realm of war itself. The apocalyptic nature of their
 goals makes it absurd to believe they are making political
 demands at all. They are seeking the violent transformation
 of an irremediably sinful and unjust world. Terror does not
 express a politics, but a metaphysics, a desire to give
 ultimate meaning to time and history through ever-escalating
 acts of violence which culminate in a final battle
 between good and evil. (6)

What are the consequences of such a refusal to know as expressed by the de-politicization of the war on terror? For Alain Joxe it represents a 'sort of militarist lobotomy because it means replacing the identification of political and social interests with armed groups ... [made possible through] the negation of the social sciences as a search for causes ...' (7) With the denial of causation comes an unwillingness to engage with the histories which produced different cultures. Instead, the non-West simply waits for the spread of the 'capitalist revolution' to manifest itself. In the words of leading US neo-conservatives Kristol and Kaplan, 'we stand at the cusp of a new historical era ... it is so clearly about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the future of the Middle East and the war on terror. It is about what sort of role the US is to play in the twenty-first century'. (8)

While many writers have concerned themselves with the future of war through the framework of international relations, this article is equally concerned with the culture shift occurring within the West. What does it mean for populations within the West to wage a seemingly infinite war on terror (of which Iraq forms only a part)? While President Bush has regularly described the war on terror as 'World War III' and Dick Cheney has said it could go on for a 'long, long time, perhaps indefinitely', the majority of citizens are asked to play no part in this war. One only need recall President Bush's call to US citizens to 'shop, fly and spend' as he announced the war on terror. (9) Unlike previous calls for civic or individual sacrifice in the time of war or crisis, the war on terror merely requires its citizens to maintain regular patterns of consumption.

Bush's remarks are more significant than they might first appear. It reveals the dominance of neo-liberal rationality: the displacement of all other spheres of life by the market. It can perhaps explain the fact that support for many of the leaders of the coalition (with the partial exception of Tony Blair) has not plummeted despite the abandonment of many of the tenets of liberal democracy (the abuse of intelligence reports and agencies, misleading statements, suppression of civil liberties and so on). (10) The support of much of the media for the deception of their citizens on the grounds of pragmatism reveals the extent to which a neo-liberal framework has taken hold and has been able to rid itself of any vestiges of morality generated from sources outside the market. Indeed, the real question with respect to the contemporary political framework is how much legitimacy neo-liberal governance requires from a democratic vocabulary, that is, how much does neo-liberalism have to cloak itself in liberal democratic discourse and work with liberal democratic institutions. The fact that the answer seems at present to be 'not much' should not lead us to simply reject these institutions. However, neither should we simply long for them to be restored. Such a simple dichotomy leads to a deadlock on the part of the anti-war movement. How this deadlock might be resolved will be considered below.

We are faced with a strange and seemingly contradictory situation when the experience of war, of being part of a country involved in war, is becoming an increasingly tangential one for the majority of Western populations at the same time as these civilian populations are being militarized--legally, politically, aesthetically--to an unprecedented extent. Whereas traditional war was all encompassing for a society, an intense but distinguishable experience, contemporary war appears not to be intrinsic to the values of a society. Christopher Coker argues that wars are now tools of foreign policy and they are 'instrumental, rather than existential'. The attempt to couch the Iraq war within traditional grand narratives remains unconvincing for large sections of the population. If Hegel was able to see the World Spirit manifested in Napoleon's troops as they passed through Jena, can we say the same about today's high-tech warfare, often abstracted from any human relation, employed for shifting and self-contradictory rationales? (11) As Adorno predicted, since World War II it has become impossible for civilians to experience war as a social phenomenon. For Adorno, the technological mediation of war created a 'vacuum between men and their fate in which their real fate lies'. (12) Their real fate, as we shall see, lies in a peculiar transformation whereby civilian populations are alienated from the spirit of war, but are militarized themselves as the warring state declares a permanent state of emergency. If war 'no longer [tells] a story of how progress was made, tyranny defeated, and freedom dearly bought', (13) it does reconstruct our horizons so that other ways of engaging with the world are obscured.

And yet while the responsibility for war (as well as much of the actual military support) is being 'outsourced' away from the citizenry, away from the state--to private corporations, or at another level, to technology itself--it remains that culturally, societies are being militarized despite being only minimally involved in the process of war. If, as Michael Dillon remarks 'all wars are fought to shape an inside in the process of contesting the outside', (14) then the inside of Western societies is being shaped in very particular ways. As the distinction between war and policing collapses, as wars are waged through high-tech frameworks, and for instrumental reasons, it becomes easier not to know the ethical consequences of actions once taken for the task of the defence of national sovereignty, and now taking place within a new context. The collapse of any real distinction between war and peace will be considered in a number of ways. Firstly, the manner in which war is now waged through high-tech weaponry alters the cultural meaning of war so that it becomes easier to legitimize military conflict. I want to explore the significance of post-September 11 legislation in the West which effectively creates a 'state of emergency'. Such extended powers of surveillance are important not only because of the rights and liberties they curtail, but because of the cultural shift they enact in terms of who has a right to belong or to be excluded. Secondly, I will examine the way this cultural shift, which creates more strident forms of inclusion and exclusion, is reinforced by new surveillance technologies which shape high-tech forms of belonging and marginalization and reconstitute what it means to belong to a community or engage with those outside it. Many of these domestic technologies are drawn from a military framework, but they also work to militarize civilian populations at a cultural level. Thirdly, I want to look at how the aesthetic experiences of war and peace are becoming increasingly inseparable. If it was once possible to speak of a different sensory perception of war and peace, such a distinction is eroded when war is conducted, represented and experienced by both soldiers and civilians through the same filter--what James Der Derian calls the 'Military-Industrial Media Entertainment Network', or the convergence of military and civilian uses of communication and information technologies. (150 That the US Marine Corps regularly use computer games such as DOOM to train multi-person fire teams--thus enacting Ronald Reagan's suggestion that joystick-driven video games would make simulators to train fighter pilots (16)--serves as a case in point.

Finally, I want to explore what is the most significant factor enabling the collapse between war and peace--the global neo-liberal economy itself. I will explore the structural affinities between war and the new economy where the risk of deregulated finance and the risk of terror dovetail in their causes, effects and the strategies devised by Western powers to deal with them. Ultimately, the neo-liberal market generates a fundamental insecurity within cultures that opens them up towards a process of militarization in the name of security.

Post-human Warfare

Perpetual war under contemporary conditions is increasingly war waged at a distance. This abstract engagement divorces the combatants both physically and emotionally from their actions. (17) On a wider scale, the whole field of battle is being reconstituted through the information mode. The information revolution, regarded as a progressive force in the previous decade for its communicative potential, is now being directly harnessed in new modes of warfare. The rise of information-based warfare returns the Internet to its military origins. Within this new paradigm, the control of abstract spaces becomes more important in war than the occupation of actual territory. Indeed, the US Commission on National Security for the 21st Century maintained that 'Outer Space and cyberspace are the main arteries of the world's evolving systems. Through technical and diplomatic means, the US needs to guard against the possibility of 'breakout' capabilities in space and cyberspace that would endanger US survival or critical interests'. (18) This global strategy of prevention, extended into ethereal spaces, seems likely to escalate the possibility for conflict. As Chris Hables-Gray notes, 'it becomes clear that infowar in actuality will just expand war into a new place, cyberspace, and it will ... add new layers of command and control to the military ... it also continues the militarization of outer space, the growing integration of humans into weapons systems (cyborg soldiers) and the manic search for new technologies, the latest craze being nanotechnology'. (19) If infowar abstracts combatants from the actual theatre of war on the ground, it does so by militarizing our spatial categories of experience.

Information forms the dominant paradigm behind the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a paradigm shift in strategic thinking that has occurred in the last two decades. The revolutions in information and biological spheres are fused in what has come to be known as 'network-centric' thinking. The fusion of human and machine, the abstract policing of spaces from a distance, the emphasis on fluidity and transience are all key assumptions that lie behind contemporary military (and geopolitical) strategy. This dematerialized mode of conducting war means that 'territorial conquest and domination are not what network centric warfare is about ... [rather] network-centric forces will "swarm", gather and disperse in different volumes and formation, combinations and directions'. (20) Michael Dillon identifies several key features of network-centric warfare. Firstly, concentration moves from the weapon itself (tank, plane, missile, etcetera) to the network as the key military unit. Secondly, soldiers are no longer constituted as autonomous military units, instead they are defined in terms of a 'continuously evolving military system'. Thirdly, there is a reconceptualization of the war zone and all that inhabit it (both human and non-human) in biological terms; the military system is regarded as a constantly evolving organism, the battlefield its environment. Finally, there is an overarching principle that information as the prime mover behind all warfare is its basic unit. Military formations no longer simply 'rally around the flag; they form up, mutate and change around information networks'. (21)

Douglas Kellner describes the multiple ways the human-machine hybrid is being configured by the military:

 Cyborg soldiers are also utilizing the Global Positioning
 Satellite system (which can be accessed from a computerized
 helmet) for precise mapping of the 'enemy' and terrain. With
 the complex communications systems now emerging, all
 aspects of war--from soldiers on the ground and
 thundering tanks to pilotless planes overhead--are
 becoming networked with wireless computers providing
 information and exact locations of all parties. Robot scouts
 can roam the terrain sending back data instantaneously to
 commanders. SIPE (Soldier Integrated Protection Ensemble)
 is an army software program designed to merge all military
 digital technologies into one integrated data system. Even
 the physical state of the soldier can be monitored by
 computers, and one can imagine surgeons operating on
 wounds from continents away by using robots and the
 technology of 'telemedicine'. (22)

With the abstraction of war and the attempt to limit the actual physicality of conflict comes the difficulty in distinguishing actual war from its simulation. The territorial demarcation of war, the grounding of conflict within specific spatial and temporal limits, is replaced by a more controlled, smaller scale war, but a war without closure. According to Hables-Gray, 'Illusions of low-casualty conflicts have morphed into totally virtual battles in cyberspace, the blurring of the line between peace and war has dissolved into a general state of continual conflict, and dreams of controlling war have been transformed into fantasies of micromanaging every aspect of battle'. (23) There are many critics both within the military and without of reconstituting warfare in terms of a network. Some point out that the analogy between control and ownership of information is a false one. Information is meant to provide security, but in reality the sheer proliferation of information threatens to undermine any claim to security or even truth. Given this, many critics of post-human modes of war fear the possibility of the accident. (24)

The degree to which information-based warfare generates the possibility of the accident, or simply increases the possibility of the pursuit of unjust wars, can be illustrated by analogy with the operation of intelligence bodies in the Iraq war (but also much earlier). It is clear that the flow of intelligence to governments is now sourced from multiple bodies. As Guy Rundle notes:

 The network of US intelligence services--comprising not
 only the CIA, NSA, FBI, but also more obscure but extensive
 organizations such as the DIA (Defence Intelligence Agency)
 and their sometime allies such as MI5 and MI6--has
 expanded so much in size that these agencies have long since
 changed their character. They are now a territory-less state,
 with their own private sectors and powers of lethal force. (25)

The multiple and often self-contradictory flow of information sourced from these increasingly autonomous bodies with divergent agendas has already led to an unnecessary war. The relation between information and war is likely to become more intimate under the scope of the RMA where the provision of information and the application of force merge into a single objective. The resulting devolution of responsibility from the state, and from any direct form of accountability, moves us towards a state of perpetual war, not conducted via monolithic state bodies, but in a much more frightening mode through the militarized information network.

While these possibilities are themselves enough to give pause, it is important to recognize the degree to which something like networked forms of war accommodate themselves within the emerging geopolitical situation. Ideologically, the use of 'smart' weapons enables a transition towards a culture of pre-emptive strikes. The United States' blatant defiance of the United Nations, the aggressive policy it holds towards 'rogue' states, and the hopes it places in the missile defence shield for defensive/offensive purposes, may well mean that we will in the future witness the more frequent use of smart weapons to 'take out' what are regarded as legitimate (non-civilian) targets in the global arena.

In an age when the United States is unwilling or unable to distinguish between an industrial and a military installation, 'rogue' states are unable (according to the logic of pre-emptive security) to reach a sufficient point of development before their infrastructure is destroyed by smart weaponry. As Anthony Arnove points out 'every power station that is targeted means more food and medicine that will not be refrigerated, hospitals that will lack electricity, water that will be contaminated and people that will die'. (26) The combination of surveillance technologies and post-human weaponry establishes an expanded disciplinary framework where enemy populations are contained within narrow states of development. Instead of being more 'humanitarian', infowar facilitates a form of cultural totalitarianism as technologically advanced cultures undermine the autonomy and growth of others through militarized policing. The contemporary myth that all elements of life can simply be taken apart and reconstructed within technological systems, an ideology that underpins both the information and biotech revolutions that drive the RMA, equally underpins assumptions about the high-tech installation of democracy currently being attempted in the Middle East.

High-tech weapons abstract the link between acts and their consequences. We are moving from the cyborg soldier, where the human exists merely as part of a technological network, towards a scenario where humans (in so far as they are human in their capacity to judge) are removed from the theatre of war altogether. In the late 1980s Virilio noted this phenomenon:

 The disintegration of the warrior's personality is at a very
 advanced stage. Looking up he sees in the digital display
 (opto-electronic or holographic) of the windscreen
 collimator; looking down the radar screen, the onboard
 computer, the radio and the video screen, which enables
 him to follow the terrain with its four or five simultaneous
 targets; and to monitor his self-navigating Sidewinder
 missiles fitted with a camera of infra-red guidance system. (27)

The decentring of the soldier's decision-making capacity makes it easier to wage war. This much is well known. However, civilians are also abstracted from the consequences of war in this new framework. We have to take seriously the long-established link between human life and its relation to the moral calculus that governs whether or not to wage war. To decide whether the possibility of human sacrifice is justified in terms of some greater good has always governed the question of whether to wage war.

Indeed much of the opposition to the Iraq war came from people who did not want a repeat of Vietnam, who did not regard this war as worth the price of a soldier's life. High-tech weapons, which remove the human, also remove the basis for such decision making. It leads us back to the problem outlined by Walter Benjamin: 'the destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the elemental forces of society'. (28) Older questions of human investment, sacrifice and their connection to a wider social responsibility are obscured in the post-human military paradigm.

The more warlike scenarios are virtualized the more the question of responsibility is elided. James Der Derian describes the 'insidious threat' that emerges from high-tech simulations of war. If war has always been a form of virtual reality, too traumatic for integration into ordinary life (think of Ernst Junger's 'war as inner experience'), new virtual technologies normalize the experience of violent combat with disturbing consequences:

 In this high-tech rehearsal for war, one learns how to kill but
 not to take responsibility for it, one experiences 'death' but
 not the tragic consequences of it ... new technologies of
 imitation and simulation as well as surveillance and speed
 had collapsed the geographical distance, chronological
 duration, the gap itself between the reality and virtuality of
 war. As the confusion of one for the other grows, we face the
 danger of a new kind of trauma without sight, drama
 without tragedy, where television war and video war games
 blur together. We witness this not only at the international
 level ... but also on the domestic front, where two teenagers
 predisposed to violence confused the video game Doom for
 the high school classroom. (29)

This conflation of military and civilian aesthetic experience not only impacts upon the victims of contemporary warfare but also those who wage war on behalf of more powerful nations. The transition towards a state of perpetual war becomes easier in the absence of more traditional frameworks for responsibility. While the backlash against the Iraq occupation (increasing in proportion to the number of US casualties) has led some to believe that military activity might be forestalled, in the longer term troop casualties in Iraq will simply increase the desire for abstract warmaking, further severing the connection between ethical responsibility and embodiment.

If post-human forms of conflict erode the connection between act and responsibility, so too does the increasing privatization of war. Already, corporations are designing and maintaining much of the technological infrastructure underpinning the RMA. The Guardian reports in relation to the recent Iraq conflict that 'when the unmanned predator drones, the global Hawks and the B-2 stealth bombers went into action, their weapons systems ... were operated and maintained by non-military personnel working for private companies'. (30) And while the US army has downsized its personnel by over forty per cent in the past decade, many of these have transferred their labour and expertise to private firms. Indeed private corporations are the second biggest contributor to the coalition of the willing, well ahead of the United Kingdom, Australia and others. The Iraqi police force and army are being retrained and re-equipped by private firms. According to security analyst Peter Singer, 'for the first time in the history of the modern nation-state, governments are surrendering one of the essential and defining attributes of statehood, the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of force'. (31)

War waged by private corporations can occur without the normal parliamentary and media scrutiny applied to deployments made by the nation-state. Private military companies contracted for less than (US)$50 million do not have to be registered with congress. (32) The result is that the US government (to take the most obvious case) has little idea of the extent to which private forces are waging war for them.

The use of private security by multinational business in the Third World and the policing of 'rogue states' by Western governments using outsourced military personnel and technology means that these two activities have become increasingly intertwined. The increasing use of private military companies lowers the political cost of resorting to force. Deborah Avant argues that 'if you don't have to sacrifice your own uniformed military, it can be easier for generals to make the decision to use force'. (33) It becomes easier to maintain conflict, as in many recent African conflicts, such as that between Ethiopia and Eritrea where the conflict states hired private military forces to conduct much of their war. (34)

Needless to say, state authority is undermined in any situation where the state's capacity to provide security depends on outside private firms. As Anna Leander notes, 'a look at the fate of state authority in Colombia and Sicily--both notorious for their businesses of private protection--is an instructive reality check for anyone who thinks that founding state authority on private business is unproblematic'. (35) The abandonment of the principle of national sovereignty as evidenced in a culture of global preemption finds its complement in the commodification of violence inherent in the outsourcing of war. Conversely, the fact that security can be offered to those who can afford it, and withdrawn (or used against) others, means that splits and fractures within nation-states are often exacerbated by such privatization of security.

The Militarization of Civilian Populations

The collapse between modes of civilian and military life occurs not merely as a consequence of shared technology but also through a conflation of the purposes for which the technology is used. As the US government reinvests in the technology behind a satellite-based missile defence shield, we learn that satellites may be used to monitor the pollination of genetically engineered corn. By tracking and predicting the spread of pollen, researchers can determine the effects upon non-GE crops. (36) Will such satellite monitoring become a factor in future agreements on international biosafety? Will the same technology behind 'Star Wars' be used in the frontline of future trade wars?

The links between military technology and civilian media have been well established by theorists like Paul Virilio and Friedrich Kittler. That all new media, in the words of Virilio, have 'a negative horizon of war' is historically evident at the point of production and consumption. Indeed the militarized origins of communication media extend back to the US civil war:

 Phase 1, beginning with the American Civil War, developed
 storage technologies for acoustics, optics, and script: film,
 gramophone, and the man-machine system, typewriter.
 Phase 2, beginning with the First World War, developed for
 each storage content appropriate electric transmission
 technologies: radio, television, and their more secret
 counterparts. Phase 3, since the Second World War, has
 transferred the schematic of a typewriter of predictability
 per se; Turing's mathematical definition of computability in
 1936 gave future computers their name. (37)

This leads to the contemporary era, where computer simulations and computer games inform each other, where Hollywood producers are invited by the Pentagon to construct future terror scenarios, (38) and to the point where, according to Kittler, 'The entertainment industry ... is nothing but an abuse of army equipment'. (39) It is not simply that entertainment and communications media were developed initially through the military. Rather, it is that under contemporary circumstances, the merging of military/civilian use goes beyond the hardware to a conflation of uses and cultural contexts. Alliez and Negri note that in modernity 'the return to peace entails the natural restoration of the sensory world; the aesthetic restoration of being-within an outside'. (40) The aesthetic conflation of civilian and military experience undermines forms of resistance from the outside as the ontological horizon of peace recedes.

For instance, the role surveillance and information gathering plays in war is increasingly clear. Satellite technologies feed information concerning remote locations instantly to mobile soldiers. Such techniques, it is hoped, overcome the lack of actual knowledge of enemy terrain. However, such surveillance techniques increasingly are being adopted within urban environments to categorize and discipline civilian populations. As Phil Agre notes:

 One of the great dangers of any long-term war on terror
 is that it will institutionalise this kind of warfare, applying
 it not simply to dangerous individuals in foreign countries
 but to the civilians in the west--those who are behind the
 security cordon. This would come about not simply through
 the installation of certain devices, such as face-recognition
 cameras in train stations, but more importantly through the
 creation of professional networks, legal and policy
 frameworks, organizational skills for integrating and
 applying information from many sources, habits of public
 acceptance instilled in wartime conditions, secondary
 applications of the technology that assemble other political
 interests around its perpetuation, and so on. (41)

Witness the recent approval in the United Kingdom for the introduction of high-tech ID cards. The ID card scheme will be one of the largest technology projects ever attempted by the government. It will eventually entail a national database of 60 million people, including Britons living overseas, using electronically scanned images of their eyes and fingerprints. Tony Blair has justified this: 'If we are going to have the right security and the right systems within our public services for the future we do need to contemplate things that maybe a few decades ago we wouldn't'. (42) Such statements capitulate to the logic of perpetual war.

More and more sectors of civil society are being integrated into a global infrastructure generated through the military. Furthermore, frameworks of symbolic recognition are increasingly shaped via this military infrastructure. Brian Holmes provides the following illustration of the wider processes behind the use of something as innocuous as a Global Positioning System device. When you use GPS:

 You're connecting to the results of a rocket-launch campaign
 which has put a constellation of 24 satellites into orbit
 broadcasting the radio signals that will allow your device to
 calculate its position. The satellites themselves are fine-tuned
 by US Air Force monitor stations installed on islands
 across the earth. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this
 satellite infrastructure is that in order for one's location to be
 pinpointed, the clock in each personal receiver has to be
 exactly synchronized with the atomic clocks in orbit. So you
 have an integration into imperial time. The computer-coded
 radio waves interpellate you in the sense of Althusser, they
 hail you with an electromagnetic 'hey you!' When you use
 the locating device you respond to the call: you are
 interpellated into imperial ideology. (43)

The message is that integration into this network equates with security. From Blair's high-tech identification to devices such as the Digital Angel (a locative device hooked up to a satellite network used to watch over the elderly and infirm) to the demand that anyone entering the United States must now be fingerprinted, we are witnessing the technological reconstitution of civic identity so that belonging occurs via submission to various modes of 'bio-political tattooing'. For Georgio Agamben, who refuses to enter the United States now because of the demand that foreigners be fingerprinted:

 What is at stake here is nothing less than the new 'normal'
 bio-political relationship between citizens and the state. This
 relation no longer has anything to do with free and active
 participation in the public sphere, but concerns the
 enrolment and the filing away of the most private and
 incommunicable aspect of subjectivity: I mean the body's
 biological life. (44)

For Agamben, what the United States is now imposing on those wishing to enter its territory could well be 'the precursor to what we will be asked to accept later as the normal identity registration of a good citizen in the state's gears and mechanisms'. (45) It goes some way to confirming his claim that the political paradigm of the West is no longer the city state but the concentration camp.

This integration into the high-tech symbolic goes further than creating a new cordon of 'security'; it produces subjectivities and forms of symbolic recognition within the new imperial infrastructure. It has become a commonplace to speak of the change from Orwell's 'Big Brother' to the television show of the same name. Nevertheless the manner in which contemporary subjects are willing to engage with surveillance technologies marks a significant change that extends beyond any grasp at televisual fame. That subjects are both increasingly captured through data and express themselves though affective flows of data enables us to consider surveillance outside any opposition between the private self and the state, and rather as a set of encounters between subjects, technologies, networks and institutional forces. That this affective force can then be harnessed to both the new economy and state discipline reveals an unprecedented level of societal control.

Mark Andrejevic notes the increasingly important role of surveillance in the emerging online economy. (46) However, surveillance is achieved not through an external and invisible scopic or informational regime but, increasingly, is willingly embraced by participants in the online economy as part of the trade-off for greater consumption power, or more importantly, as part of an emerging subjectivity whose very formation is implicated within contemporary surveillance practices. Surveillance here works not as a form of social control from outside but assists in the formation of subjectivities that harness surveillance techniques as part of an affective process of symbolic recognition. From transient celebration of celebrity on reality TV to personalized data tracking in the form of customer optimization, there is a link between contemporary surveillance practices and the process of defining subjective identity. Furthermore, the online economy,

 relies on the assumption that individuality can be recovered
 from mass society through the process of individuation
 through customisation--that consumers can express their
 uniqueness by participating in forms of customised
 production. Crucially this process comes about largely
 through the process ... of surveillance--hence the equation
 of surveillance with creativity and self-expression. (47)

Andrejevic links the new economy and the creation of affective identity when he writes that 'the paradox of surveillance-based economy is that it pretends to individuals that they count ... when all it really wants to do is count them--to plug their vital statistics into a marketing algorithm'. (48) Again, this reveals how the dominance of a neo-liberal framework has marginalized non-market spheres of value. The fact that surveillance equates with symbolic recognition means that objections to the erosion of civil rights (the right to privacy) begin to pale when the meaning of surveillance is reconstituted in the ideology of freedom enabled by the neo-liberal market. This may provide one clue as to why many citizens have been relatively complacent about the erosion of their liberal rights in times of 'war'.

In this reconstituted civil society, legitimacy is granted to citizens only to the extent that they are integrated into a high-tech network. What impact does this have on the way we see ourselves, come to understand our security, and more importantly, how we view those outside the technological system, those unwilling or unable to be integrated? A state of emergency is now being constructed as the condition of possibility for any fragile state of 'peace'. The increasingly blurred lines between technology used for civil purposes, on the one hand, and military purposes, on the other, shape this state of emergency. The radical erosion of civil liberties since the pursuit of the war on terror provides the superstructural complement to this process.

Dillon asks 'how does the discourse of infinite threat impact upon the discourse of security that not only propels the war but foundationally legitimates the political order that is committed to waging it?' (49) The move to pre-emptive security legislation creates a legal and civil societal framework appropriate only for a state of emergency. On 15 August 2002 Human Rights Watch released a report that claimed: 'The U.S. government's investigation of the September 11 attacks has been marred by arbitrary detentions, due process violations, and secret arrests'. Human Rights Watch discovered that over 1200 non-citizens were secretly arrested and incarcerated and that:

 in some cases, the government has incarcerated detainees
 for months under restrictive conditions, including solitary
 confinement. Some detainees were physically and verbally
 abused because of their national origin or religion. The vast
 majority is from Middle Eastern, South Asian, and North
 African countries. The report describes cases in which
 random encounters with law enforcement or neighbours'
 suspicions based on no more than national origin and
 religion led to interrogation about possible links to
 terrorism. (50)

Apart from the human rights violations that occurred after September 11, many states enacted legislation granting unprecedented powers to intelligence and police bodies to discipline the civilian population. The notorious Patriot Act in the United States finds a broad parallel in other countries forming the coalition. In Australia legislation passed last year gives ASIO the power to detain and interrogate people believed to have information about terrorist activities. They can be held for a week, and questioned for twenty-four hours, with no right to contact their families. People detained under the laws face a five-year jail term if they refuse to answer questions, as well as the prospect of having to prove to ASIO that they do not have certain information.

The ASIO bill fundamentally alters some of the core elements of Australia's criminal justice system by removing many key rights, such as the right to silence and the presumption of innocence. As Jenny Hocking has written in relation to this bill, it moves ASIO 'clearly into the area of pre-emptive security policing and overturns aspects of both the rule of law and of long established civil and political rights'. Furthermore it constructs 'a state of permanent crisis, in which peacetime is seen only as a time before wartime, [where] exceptional powers become routine or normalised'. (51) Consider the impact of overturning the right to silence so that the only means of release from custody may well be through the provision of information--irrespective of whether such information is accurate. Are we not increasing the potential for an authoritarian and paranoid culture by making silence a punishable offence and the provision of information perhaps the only realistic possibility of release for someone detained and not charged with any known criminal offence?

Ultimately such legislation recasts social and political dilemmas within an anti-political framework, defined by security on the one hand, and risk on the other. If neo-liberalism as a political form generates highly individualized subjects, and works by shifting 'the regulatory competence of the state onto "responsible", "rational" individuals [with the aim of] encouraging individuals to give their lives a specific entrepreneurial form', (52) the self-governing individual is encouraged to equate moral responsibility with rational choice, and the collective symbolic horizon through which dissent might be generated disappears. Under these conditions the model neo-liberal citizen is not one:

 [w]ho strives with others to alter [their political or economic
 options] ... a fully realized neo-liberal citizenry would be the
 opposite of public minded, indeed it would barely exist as
 a public. The body politic [becomes] a group of individual
 entrepreneurs and consumers ... (53)

The expansion of consumption and the centrality of the media/information society allow for the transcendence of older social forms governed by family, community and region. If freedom could once take for granted the various institutions of everyday life that supported, and productively countered, its liberatory potential, this is no longer the case. Without such constraint the individual becomes a hyper-individual gaining their sense of identity and engaging with the world not through the tangible other--family, community and so on--but through information and hyper-consumption. (54) With contemporary freedom the market expands and politics becomes politics of the image. If global markets and information have helped overcome the sense of cultural alienation so important to the left project in the 1960s, the result is an alienation from the political process as the individual life project becomes the space for transformation and liberation. Those unwilling or unable to live without the older institutional supports that defended locality and more tangible forms of social identity are left behind--often left to harbour resentment. In an era where the globalization of the neo-liberal market reigns and takes the name of freedom, the 'failed person' and the 'failed state' represent different orders of magnitude of the same process. Both are subject to new forms of intervention: oppressive surveillance for the failed person in the privatized version of the welfare state, pre-emptive military action in the case of the failed state.

The Policing of Insecurity--War and the Neo-liberal Economy

We have examined how war is waged within a new technological paradigm and how forms of belonging and exclusion increasingly have become harnessed to surveillance technologies. However, if the move to a global neo-liberal economy has weakened the autonomy of the nation-state, it follows that war itself is being redefined within this new framework. In the Iraq war the invasion of a sovereign state was legitimized (insofar as it was legitimized) not so much through arguing principles of a just war as from the declaration of an already existing state of emergency--the 'war on terror'. What is the significance of this altered context for military intervention?

The fixation on 'security' since the World Trade Centre attacks in 2001 masks the fact that 'security' has been the guiding discourse of international relations for more than a decade. (55) If war and economics are linked in the privatization of war, in the growth of private investment in the RMA, in the conflation of business and the reconstruction of Iraq, it needs to be recognized that the links between the economy and war are much more comprehensive. In fact the intertwining of the neo-liberal economy and questions of security form a meta-context through which the global economy and perpetual war (masked as global security) now come to operate.

Post-Fordist production relies upon more fleeting forms of capital investment than its Fordist precursor. This instability reflects a wider shift in patterns of production and consumption. In the developed world, manual labour has shifted to the global south, replaced by forms of intellectual labour which are unstable to the degree that they rely on financial speculation and the creation of value through the flows of image culture. The rise of speculative capital, especially evident in the late-1990s new information economy, destabilized nation-states and entire trading regions (for instance, the South-east Asian financial collapse). The consequence of economic deregulation was not simply a weakening of state sovereignty, however, it was also the establishment of a prevailing culture of risk, on an unprecedented scale. Neo-liberalism abandons the regulative limits that underwrote liberal economies and instead ushers in a new stage of capitalism where unregulated risk becomes a constitutive principle of the global economy.

This has implications for how contemporary states legitimize their 'sovereignty'. As opposed to the Hegelian ideal of the state as universal representative of its citizens, the neo-liberal state is legitimized according to how successful it is in sustaining the market. As Lemke observes:

 Economic liberty produces the liberty for a form of
 sovereignty limited to guaranteeing economic activity ...
 a state that was no longer defined in terms of a historical
 mission but legitimated itself with reference to economic
 growth. (56)

The modern link between state security and the consolidation of the national economy is severed in a climate where the political security of the nation-state is reformulated such that global economic insecurity becomes a fundamental condition for economic growth. And, as Melinda Cooper remarks:

 The project of global economic deregulation could be
 characterised, in the first instance, as the generalization of
 a permanent state of economic emergency ... [furthermore]
 the globalisation of economic risk would have not been
 possible without the reinvention of juridical and political
 forms and even a transformation of the conditions of war. (57)
 [my emphasis]

We have observed the shifting notion of defence when warfare is reconfigured in terms of 'other non-linear systems such as commerce'. (58) The redefinition of war as global policing operates within the same strategic space as commerce, and is increasingly harnessed to manage the control of information and financial flows so as to ensure the maintenance of the neo-liberal paradigm. War, according to Cooper, 'needs to be understood as a constant and ubiquitous capacity to adapt to crisis, as uncertain and uncontrollable as its space of manoeuvre and we must assume as permanently mobilized as the threat of financial crisis'. (59) Contemporary states can react against this heightened climate of risk, not so much to eliminate it, but rather to control risk, even render a profit from it. This is applicable in terms of both the economy and national security.

That both neo-liberal economic and strategic thinking sit within the same horizon helps us to conceptualize the strategic fate of energy assets in the Middle East. For some time the distinction between defence and energy strategy has been blurred. In the Project for a New American Century, a 2000 report drawn up for a group that now constitutes the more conservative and rightwing elements of the current US administration (Cheney, Wolfowitz), it is stated that 'the United States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf regional security. While the unresolved conflict in Iraq provides the immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein'. (60) While it is so that the example of Iraq conflates (even defines) the objectives of the current US administration--military expansion, the terror war and the capture of energy resources--the present, more active strategic intervention into the Middle East ought to be seen in terms of the neo-liberal economy. Specifically, it can be seen as a reaction to the collapse of the 'new economy'. The collapse of the dot.com bubble, the decline of the NASDAQ, the scandal over the hyper-speculative practices of corporations like Enron, can be seen to culminate in the management of risk through securing resource assets in the Middle East. For Cooper, the 'situation is one in which the state of permanent crisis induced by economic deregulation dictates the imperialist strategy of land appropriation'. (61) Perpetual war, under the rubric of pre-emptive security, is generated by the risks endemic to the logic of neo-liberalism.

In the last two decades there have been calls to expand the scope of security beyond questions of military strategy and defence to areas such as the environment, health, food and water, and biotechnology. (62) This expansion of the discourse of security provides a mechanism for entrenching the militarization of civilian populations through legislation, surveillance technologies and so on. The biggest threat to the economic security of the West may well come from environmental rather than political terror, ironic given the Bush administration's rejection of the Kyoto treaty and denial of global warming or environmental catastrophe in general.

In late February, a leaked Pentagon report claimed that climate change represented a greater threat to security than terrorism. (63) It claimed that abrupt climate change was 'plausible' and would lead to chaos and anarchy. Countries could well increase their military capability in order to defend dwindling natural resources. The report's prediction of widespread famine and rioting--both its findings and its recommendation that the environment become the prime focus of security--have been backed by significant Pentagon officials, for example, Andrew Marshall, a key figure behind the current missile defence initiative.

A future environmentally induced 'total war' is at least possible. Will the West simply extend the current strategy, securing resources and submitting populations to surveillance while linking freedom to the neo-liberal paradigm, or might something like an immanent environmental catastrophe open up a different approach that could lead towards a sustainable form of peace?

Conclusion

Much of Western culture and society is moving towards a framework of perpetual war. While the actions of the Bush administration and the coalition have exacerbated this condition, most of the settings of this process were already in place. In essence, war seems to be an inevitable outcome of a globalized neo-liberal market. Those who oppose such an outcome have tended to veer towards opposing poles over the question of exactly what it is in the West that is under threat. One the one hand, there is a recognition that Western liberal institutions are facilitators of the current global Empire, (64) and that while remaining opposed to the US war machine one ought not mourn the liberal sphere but rather build new global coalitions and movements outside it. On the other hand, there are those who ground resistance in the defence of these very institutions. Anti-war struggles are based around international law, the defence of civil and human rights, and the institutions that sustain them. Neither position seems wholly satisfactory. The first places too much faith in a future based on openness, downplaying the structural affinities between libertarian anarchism and current neo-liberal modes of globalized exchange. On the other hand, any spirited defence of the liberal institutions now under siege mis-recognizes the fact that the Left has always had an uneasy relationship with those institutions. An anti-war position based largely around their restoration is unable to come to terms with the changed settings in which liberal institutions and principles now operate. The very fact that a very different social and political formation still partially legitimizes itself through the invocation of the liberal sphere, and indeed conducts barbarous acts in its name, ought to indicate the limits of this approach.

The social settings through which these institutions arose have been substantially transformed. While remaining critically aware of the limits of the liberal sphere, a genuine politics of peace might begin by asking to what extent might we need to restore those settings, while remaining critical of the institutions that reside within them. Ironically, the very openness generated by economic and technological globalization has produced unprecedented levels of civic and political closure. Freedom comes at the price of insecurity, not so much through terror as in the structures of market-orientated openness. A politics of peace might recognize that such unfettered openness undermines our own culture and certainly destabilizes others.

Perpetual war arises in an increasingly abstract setting. War is conducted at a distance, while civilian populations are constructed as individual consumers for whom increased surveillance secures ever greater market freedoms. In return the social realm requiring protection is fragmented by those freedoms. While to some extent the abstract relations and exchanges made possible by the market and by new technologies might be welcomed, we need to consider the extent to which the social whole can be constituted in that way. A preventative politics needs not merely to consider war in the narrow sense, but also the settings that now create the conditions for total war on civilians and enemies alike. This is a very different politics of prevention from any we have seen before.

(1.) Despite the stated desire to end human rights abuse by governments, the United States remains supportive of oppressive dictatorships in oil-rich places like Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia.

(2.) J. Hinkson, Arena Journal, no. 1, 1993, pp. 23-44.

(3.) C. Marazzi, Capitale e Linguaggio, cited in M. Cooper, 'The Catastrophic Enemy: from the Exception to the Emergency', available at http://amsterdam.nettime.org/ListsArchives/nettime-l-0302/msg00103.html.

(4.) D. Henwood, 'An Interview with Slavoj Zizek', available at http://www.leftbusiness observer.com/Zizek.html.

(5.) Zizek, 'Iraq's False Promises', Foreign Policy, Jan-Feb.2004, p. 2.

(6.) M. Ignatieff, 'It's War--But it Doesn't Have to be Dirty'. Guardian, 1 October 2001.

(7.) A. Joxe, 'Empire of Disorder, Hatred of Capitalism, ed. Lotringer/Kraus, Semiotexte, 2001, p. 92

(8.) W. Kristol and L. Kaplan, The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission, San Fransisco, Encounter Books, 2003.

(9.) See Wolin, 'Brave New World', Theory & Event, vol. 5, no. 4, 2002 for more discussion of Bush's remarks.

(10.) If support for George W. Bush is now falling, it relates to economic rather than international security issues, which reinforces the claim that market facility is the key legitimation criteria for nation-states and their leaders.

(11.) This is not to argue that previous wars have not also been waged for instrumental and imperialist motives. Of course they have. However, the grand-narrative used in the pursuit of war no longer holds. Witness the cynical reflexiveness of coalition governments as they move the ground in explanations of why Iraq had to be invaded. The arbitrary nature of 'humanitarian intervention' as a means to legitimize the pursuit of war is apposite here.

(12.) C. Coker, Waging War without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, London, Lynne Rienner, 2002, p. 185

(13.) Coker, p. 185.

(14.) M. Dillon, 'Network Society, Network-centric Warfare and the State of Emergency', Theory, Culture & Society, vol 19, no.4, 2002.

(15.) J. Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network, Boulder, Westview Press, 2001, p.xx.

(16.) F. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. and introduced, Winthrop-Young and Wutz, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1999. p. 140.

(17.) See P. James, 'In the Name of Freedom Comes the Totalizing War-machine', Arena Journal, no. 20, pp. 25-36 for an extended discussion of the ethical significance of the abstraction process.

(18.) Cited in M. Steel, 'The Secret Plans of the World's Most Dangerous Rogue State', The Independent, 19 October 2001.

(19.) C. Hables-Gray, 'The Crisis of Infowar', available at http://www.routledge-ny. com/CyborgCitizen/cycitpgs/infowar.html. See also Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age, New York, Routledge, 2001.

(20.) M. Dillon, 'Network Society, Network-centric Warfare and the State of Emergency', p. 74.

(21.) Dillon.

(22.) D. Kellner, 'The Politics and Costs of Postmodern War in the Age of Bush II', available at http//:gsseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/POMOwar.htm.

(23.) Hables-Gray.

(24.) For more on the 'accident' see: M. De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, New York, Zone Books, 1991; P. Virilio, Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology, trans. M. Polizzotti, New York, Columbia University, 1986.

(25.) G. Rundle, 'A Wilderness of Mirrors', Arena Magazine, no. 69, 2004, p. 1.

(26.) A. Arnove, Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, Cambridge, Mass., South End Press, 2002, Introduction.

(27.) P. Virilio, War and Cinema, London, Verso, 1989, p. 84.

(28.) W. Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', in Illuminations, Glasgow, Collins, p. 244.

(29.) Der Derian, Virtuous War, p. 11.

(30.) I Traynor, 'The Privatisation of War', The Guardian, 10 December 2003.

(31.) Traynor.

(32.) J. Kurlantzick, 'Outsourcing the Dirty Work' The American Prospect, vol. 14, no. 5, 2003.

(33.) Cited in J. Kurlantzick, 'Outsourcing the Dirty Work'.

(34.) For instance the Guardian reports that; 'Dyncorp, a Pentagon favourite, has the contract worth tens of millions of dollars to train an Iraqi police force. It also won the contracts to train the Bosnian police and was implicated in a grim sex slavery scandal, with its employees accused of rape and the buying and selling of girls as young as 12', in Traynor.

(35.) A. Leander, 'The Commodification of Violence, Private Military Companies, and African States', IIS Working Papers, no. 11, 2003, available at http://www.copri.dk/publications/ workingpapers.htm.

(36.) G. Jerrett, 'Satellites to Monitor Corn Pollination', Daily Nonpareil, USA, no. 20, p. 503.

(37.) Kittler, Gramophone/Film/Typewriter, p. 243.

(38.) See K. Brandon, 'Army Enlists Hollywood in Anti-terror War', Chicago Tribune, 15 October 2001.

(39.) Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, pp. 96-7.

(40.) E. Alliez and A. Negri, 'Peace and War', in Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 20, no. 2, 2003, p. 122.

(41.) P. Agre, 'Some Notes on War in a World Without Boundaries', available at http://dlis.gseis. ucla.edu/pagre/.

(42.) Cited in A. Travis and P. Wintour, 'ID Cards are On the Way', The Guardian, 12 November 2003.

(43.) B. Holmes, Drifting Through the Grid: Psychogeography and Imperial Infrastructure, 2003. Available at: http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-1-0305/msg 00055.html.

(44.) G. Agamben, 'No to Bio-Political Tattooing', Le Monde, trans. Truthout French language correspondent Leslie Thatcher, 10 January 2004.

(45.) Agamben.

(46.) M. Andrejevic, 'The Kinder, Gentler Gaze of Big Brother', New Media & Society, vol. 4, no. 2, 2002, pp. 251-70.

(47.) Andrejevic, p. 259.

(48.) Andrejevic, p. 266.

(49.) Dillon,'Network Society, Network-centric Warfare and the State of Emergency', p. 74.

(50.) See Human Rights Watch report, 'Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of PostSeptember 11 Detainees', at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/usdetainess081502.htm

(51.) J. Hocking, 'Counter-Terrorism and the Criminalisation of Politics: Australia's New Security Powers of Detention, Proscription and Control', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. 3, 2003.

(52.) T. Lemke, '"The Birth of Bio-politics": Michel Foucault's lecture at the College de France on neo-liberal Governmentality', Economy and Society, vol. 30 no. 2, May 2001, pp. 190-207, cited in Brown, 'Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy', Theory and Event, vol. 7, no. 1, 2003, p. 7.

(53.) W. Brown, 'Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy', Theory and Event, vol. 7, no. 1, 2003, p. 6.

(54.) See J. Hinkson, 'Good Times in the History of Freedom', Arena Journal, no. 20, 2002-3.

(55.) For an excellent discussion of the intertwining contexts of security, the neo-liberal economy and the changing context for war see M. Cooper, 'The Catastrophic Enemy: from the Exception to the Emergency' available at http://amsterdam.nettime.org/ListsArchives/nettime-l-0302/msg00103.html. The final section is this piece is indebted to Cooper's acute analysis.

(56.) T. Lemke, 'The Birth of Bio-politics' cited in Brown, 'Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy', p. 5.

(57.) Cooper.

(58.) Cooper.

(59.) Cooper.

(60.) The plan is available at http://www.newamericancentury.org/ RebuildingAmericas Defenses.pdf. For a critical discussion of the context through which the neo-cons currently operate see D. Kellner, 'An Orwellian Nightmare; Critical Reflections on the Bush Administration', available at http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/ orwelliannightmare.htm#_edn10

(61.) Cooper.

(62.) Buzan, cited in Cooper, p. 18.

(63.) M. Townsend and P. Harris 'Now the Pentagon tells Bush: Climate Change will Destroy Us', The Observer, 22 February 2004.

(64.) For example, the position taken by M. Hardt and A. Negri in Empire, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2000.