Death by sashimi (1): the survival of the Southern Bluefin Tuna.

Tanter, Richard

In the late 1980s, Greenpeace International campaigned against the Japanese government's unilateral 'scientific whaling research program' with a famous joke in a newspaper advertisement. Above a photograph of a large Japanese whaling ship on a lovely blue ocean, the text read:

Question: How do you define a Japanese fishing researcher?

Answer: Hungry!

For many people outside Japan, the joke expressed the Japanese government's deceptive intentions in its unilateral whaling research program. What kind of 'research' was it, people wondered, where thousands of the animals killed for science ended up on the tables of Japanese restaurants? One result of that research program was serious damage to the reputation of Japanese marine research for impartiality and objectivity.

That aroma of suspicion is drifting back today, this time not just about whales, but about that expensive Japanese delicacy, southern bluefin tuna. Is it possible that Japanese greed for sashimi will mean a death sentence for an entire species?

In August 1999, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ordered Japan to suspend its unilateral experimental fishing program for southern bluefin tuna, and to re-enter negotiations with Australia and New Zealand. The three countries, which are the members of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, have been locked in a three-year disagreement concerning the size of southern bluefin tuna stocks. Unable to secure agreement to its proposed joint research program from Australia and New Zealand, Japan had launched a unilateral 'experimental fishing program' in 1998, with Japanese fishing boats taking 1440 t. of southern bluefin for scientific purposes, on top of the 5588 t. which is Japan's annual quota under the Commission. Unfortunately for Japan's international scientific image, not only has the research been criticized as scientifically inadequate, but once again the scientific research materials have been sold in Tokyo's world-famous Tsukuji fish market.

Southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) are wonderful looking fish that flash through the cold waters of the Southern Ocean above Antarctica, travelling up to the extreme southern coast of Australia, Africa and South America. Mature bluefin can be over two metres in length, and weigh up to 200 kg. They are long lived, maturing at about eight to twelve years, and often living to more than forty. Highly migratory, they breed from September to March in the warm waters between Java and northwestern Australia, returning to feed in the cold waters south of Australia and in the southern Indian Ocean--which make up the southern bluefin fishery--in July and August. Unfortunately for their chances of survival, southern bluefin tuna are delicious, and fetch a high price as sashimi in Japan. More than ninety per cent of the 15,000 t. caught each year by Japanese, Australian, New Zealand, Taiwanese, South Korean and Indonesian fishing fleets, and by the large number of vessels operating under 'flags of convenience', is imported into Japan.

The dispute between the three countries has both legal and scientific aspects, but the most important is the difference of scientific opinion about the state of the stocks. Both sides are agreed that the massive unrestrained catch of southern bluefin tuna by Australia and Japan between the mid-1950s and the mid-1980s devastated stocks to a critical level. The Japanese catch started from zero in 1952, raced to 60,000 t. in 1959, and peaked at just under 80,000 t. in 1961. In the following years global catch levels by weight fell quickly, although the number of fish caught by the Australian fishing fleet increased rapidly, until the early 1980s.

Informal and voluntary Australian-Japanese co-operation to manage the collapsing southern bluefin stock began in the early 1980s. In 1993, Australia, New Zealand and Japan established the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, under which the total allowable catch remains 11,750 t., and set agreed quotas for the three countries. Under the voluntary agreements of the 1980s and the commission regime, Japan and Australia accepted very substantial cuts in their respective catch levels, with the Japanese allocation declining by more than half between 1985 and 1990.

The 1993 'total allowable catch' was set at a level the Commission decided was adequate to allow the fish to return to its 1980 stock level by 2020. Now, according to the Japanese government, stocks are recovering more quickly than expected, and consequently, an increased total allowable catch--and an increased quota for Japan--is reasonable. The Australian and New Zealand governments have rejected this claim, arguing that the research studies on which the Japanese government is relying are scientifically inadequate. Japan's decision to commence a unilateral experimental fishing program in 1998, to continue until 2001 with an annual catch of up to 2000 t., followed three years of failed negotiations within the Commission to establish a joint research program.

Japan has temporarily suspended its experimental fishing program as ordered by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, but has not abandoned either the experimental program or its requests under the commission for a much higher quota in the future. New negotiations ordered by the Tribunal have been fruitless, and the dispute is certain to go for final resolution to an arbitral tribunal under the UN Law of the Sea in the coming year. Knowledge of marine ecology in general is still very underdeveloped compared to that of terrestrial ecology, and little is really known of the complex life-cycle and requirements of highly migratory large fish like the southern bluefin tuna. Moreover, the scientific differences between Australia and New Zealand on one side, and Japan on the other, are very complex, involving disagreements about ecological modelling and mathematical techniques, as well as the assumptions underpinning research design, and its execution. These issues are not going to be easily resolved, even in an atmosphere of goodwill.

What is clear, and immediately threatening for the future of southern bluefin tuna, is the rapid expansion of fishing for this species in the 1990s by states that are not members of the Commission--to more than 4,500 t. in 1998. South Korea and Taiwan have expressed some interest in joining the Commission, but demand that the total allowable catch be raised to allow them to maintain their existing catches. Taiwan's entry is diplomatically sensitive because of China's 'one-China policy', and severe economic recession has made South Korea more anxious than ever to maintain export income. Indonesian entry is even more unlikely, and there has been little global progress about the issue of 'lag of convenience' fishing fleets.

While Japan maintains that its experimental fishing program is simply a matter of scientifically establishing a rational basis for judging the appropriate sustainable catch, Australian officials clearly believe that the Japanese motive is economic. The Japanese fishing industry, they point out, has undergone severe rationalization in recent years, with more pressure to come, to allow higher levels of fish imports. Japanese aggressiveness to expand its own southern bluefin tuna catch, it is argued, derives from a government commitment to maintain the remaining long-range fishing sector in good health. Coincidentally, this would also benefit the ruling party in Japan.

On the other hand, Australia maintains that its actions are motivated by principled commitment to ecologically sustainable development. Stock levels are still in an extremely vulnerable condition, Australian scientists argue, and the pressure of Japan's experimental fishing program, plus that of the non-Commission member states, could well push southern bluefin stocks towards near-extinction levels. While this is undoubtedly a real possibility, Australian government economic advisers have made another motive abundantly clear. Australian marine exports have climbed dramatically in recent years, as successive Labor and Liberal governments have emphasized the need for increased exports and the need to maintain Australian competitiveness in global export markets. These advisers emphasize the possibility of much larger Australian exports in the future if the stock is allowed to recover sufficiently.

In other words, while scientists on each side may well be carrying out research to their best ability and advocating their positions in good faith, the governments are clearly motivated by profits and local economic welfare.

The Japanese government seems to have a serious misunderstanding of at least one aspect of the politics of the situation. Officials I have spoken to firmly believe the reason for the strength of the Australian government's position is its fear of powerful environment organizations. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, organizations such as the Australian Conservation Foundation, the Wilderness Society, and Greenpeace Australia had considerable influence over environmental policy formulation under the Hawke and Keating Labor governments. However, with the election of the Liberal Party-National Party coalition in 1993, the influence of environmental NGOs has declined dramatically. Indeed, with regard to the most important 1990s environmental policy debates, such as greenhouse gas emissions, and uranium mining in Kakadu National Park, the Howard government has an appalling record. The conservative coalition has been extremely resistant to policy advice from the main environment groups, and in any case, these NGOs have suffered a general decline in size and strength. Amongst the larger Australian environmental NGOs, only Greenpeace Australia has taken up the southern bluefin tuna as a campaign issue. Smaller groups, such as the Conservation Council of South Australia, and others with international links like the Humane Society and TRAFFIC, have been active, but overall their influence has been small. The Japanese government is misinformed when it blames Australian resistance to its plans on the power of Australian environment groups.

The real sources of the Australian determination to resist Japanese over-fishing appears to be two-fold: the certainty amongst Australian government scientists that the species is on the brink of commercial extinction; and the determination of the conservative government to protect the species as a base for an ongoing aquaculture export industry. On this occasion, the Australian government appears to be following the advice of senior government scientists who have long been concerned about rampant over-fishing of southern bluefin tuna.

What is interesting is that the Howard government, despite its poor environmental record, has allowed this scientific advice to direct its policy to the point of provoking a major international dispute with a powerful economic partner. The most likely explanation for this determination is that the government fears that over-fishing will lead to the collapse of South Australian southern bluefin tuna aquaculture. Tuna farming in the small South Australian town of Port Lincoln began in only 1991, when the local fishing catch had collapsed. Begun as a last throw to save the town's dying economy, local fishing companies, with considerable support from Japan, rapidly developed tuna farming to the point where it is now worth more than A$100m a year in exports to Japan, and employs more than 1,000 people. Moreover, under the Australian government's drive to expand exports, tuna aquaculture exports to the Japanese sashimi market are expected to continue to rise, in competition with wild fishing on the high seas --as long as the southern bluefin tuna stock is maintained at a sustainable level. Hence the willingness to take Japan to court under international law.

If we leave to one side the question of which side is actually right on the scientific issues, there is still an important policy question in the face of the high level of uncertainty surrounding the state of southern bluefin stocks. No one really knows the state of the stock, nor, more importantly, its future. The predictions being debated in international legal forums have many uncertainties built into them. This can be seen in the following table, which sets out the likely outcomes of a 'high-level' catch (understood as considerably higher than the present total allowable catch, as Japan has requested) and at a 'low level' (understood as the present total allowable catch or less).

This illustrates the politics of the distribution of ecological risk. If Japan's optimistic view is correct, then a low catch (say, the present catch level or less) will allow relatively fast recovery of the stock to 1980 levels by 2020, and a high catch would allow a slower recovery. If Australian and New Zealand scientists' pessimistic views are correct, a low catch would also allow recovery, at a slow pace. However, if Australia's and New Zealand's pessimism is justified, the stock will collapse, and the risk of commercial extinction becomes very real. Little would be lost by Japan abiding by the existing total allowable catch, and allowing the stock to recover, rapidly if its scientists are right, more slowly if not. The alternative is a much greater likelihood of collapse of the fishery. And all for sashimi.

Southern bluefin tuna are sold almost entirely on the Japanese sashimi market. The risk of provoking a collapse in the southern bluefin fishery and commercial extinction for the sake of a rich country's luxury food is almost unbelievable. At present, the issue is a relatively small one in international scientific and environmental circles, with little public interest in the issue in Australia and New Zealand. However, this silence is unlikely to continue if there are firmer indications that the pessimistic view is correct, as seems very likely.

The optimistic view is based virtually exclusively on data from Japanese fishing industry sources (records from fishing boats) rather than independent scientific observation. Australia's lawyers at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea pointed to the lesson of the northern (Atlantic) cod fishery off Canada, which collapsed in 1991, costing the Canadian government more than $US3 billion in re-establishment costs and social security expenses. All of the many official assessments of the northern cod prior to 1991 relied on fishing industry sources, and all spectacularly failed to predict the crisis. Australia and New Zealand have been pressing for more independent and scientifically valid research, since only such independent scientific research gave any hint of the imminent northern cod collapse prior to 1991.

There has been some progress within the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission. Japan will introduce a system of certification to indicate the country of origin of imports into Japan. This will immediately identify imports from flag of convenience vessels operating outside the Commission, and should lead to restrictions of such imports. Indeed in December 1999, following criticism from Greenpeace and TRAFFIC Japan, and anticipating the introduction of the certification scheme, the largest Japanese importer of tuna--Mitsubishi Trading Company --announced that it would cease purchases from flag of convenience sources. This still leaves the serious problem of high and rising levels of imports from non-Commission member countries, Taiwan, South Korea and Indonesia.

The key, however, is Japan. At the moment, Japanese southern bluefin fishing is effectively unrestrained, since Japan has twice raised its catch levels. The Commission itself is all but dead as a means of regulating the southern bluefin fishery. The findings of the upcoming arbitral tribunal are legally binding on all parties, meaning Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Hopefully, the arbitral tribunal will order Japan to abandon its unilateral 'experimental fishing program'. Even so, the Commission works by consensus, and is therefore likely to remain stalemated. Japan has suggested transferring responsibility for management of southern bluefin tuna to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, but Australia and New Zealand have rejected this on the understandable ground that it is well known to be toothless. Although they do not say so, the fact that the majority of member countries are relatively poor and susceptible to Japanese financial influence would weigh on their minds.

With continuing unregulated fishing by Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia, and with the possibility of Japan leaving the Commission altogether, one of the few remaining options for protecting the southern bluefin tuna would be nomination of the species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES). Listing under Appendix 2 of CITES would bind all countries to arrangements which set trade at sustainable levels. This would necessarily include Taiwan, Korea and Indonesia, as well as Japan and Australia and New Zealand.

In the past, the Australian government has rejected this route, arguing that the Commission is more effective. Yet if the moribund Commission collapses completely, there will be a rapid increase in political pressure on the Australian government to consider nominating the southern bluefin tuna under Appendix 2. No doubt Japan would respond fiercely, as it did when Sweden nominated the very vulnerable Northern Bluefin Tuna in 1991, following decades of mismanagement by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas. At this point, the Japanese government's fear of pressure from international environmental NGOs would be justified, since there would be a very substantial public response, beginning in Australia and New Zealand, but spreading rapidly. Japan would be left in isolation, defending the indefensible--the right to drive a species to the brink of extinction, in order to eat unlimited amounts of tuna sashimi.

From the point of view of responsibility towards nature, the Australian position is, on this occasion at least, admirable, and the Japanese reprehensible. But the situation demands further action to protect the surviving southern bluefin tuna stocks. Professor J. R. Beddington, an eminent British fisheries scientist, was called as an independent expert witness by the Australian and New Zealand side at the international tribunal last year. In his evidence, Beddington said that leaving aside the areas of disagreement between Japanese, and Australian and New Zealand scientists, he would recommend a reduction in catches. Indeed, the implication of much of the Australian and New Zealand analyses would support such a demand, especially in the face of an expanded catch by Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia.

The nomination of a species under CITES can only be done by the government of a nation-state. This requires either a high level of disinterested responsibility towards nature, usually with a lack of direct economic involvement in the exploitation of the species concerned (as with Sweden and the northern bluefin tuna in 1991), or a judgement that a country's capacity to exploit a species in the long term is best protected by strong global regulation.

The post-war period has been marked by a rolling back of the principle of the 'freedom of the high seas', which has led to a profound decline and restructuring of the Japanese fishing industry. Voluntary species management arrangements such as the Commission for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna are an intermediate and inadequate step towards comprehensive global management of all commercially exploitable species. CITES nomination is the next logical step. However, the fact that CITES, like the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank and so many other institutions of global governance, is a body made up only of nation-states places serious limitations on their capacity to exercise democratic responsibility. What is needed are procedures whereby groups in civil society--such as international environmental protection organizations--can make nominations, and participate in an appropriate manner in decision making. Here issues of responsibility towards nature and issues of democracy come together, since there are many occasions on which a system of government by nation-states fails on both grounds.

Likely outcomes of TAC at different levels, according
to different predictions of state of SBT stock level

 Optimistic view Pessimistic view
 correct correct
 (Japan) (Australia/New Zealand)

Low catch Recovery at a rapid pace Recovery at a slow pace

High catch Recovery at a slow pace Fishery collapse, risk of
 commercial extinction

(1.) A Japanese version of this article appeared as 'Sashimi no Ke' Parts 1, 2, and 3, Kankyo Zatsugaku Magain, December 1999 and January 2000.

Richard Tanter teaches international relations in the school of Environmental and Social Inquiry at Kyoto Seika University. Richard Tanter co-edited the recently published special issue of the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars on East Timor, 'Indonesia and the World Community: Repression, Resistance and Responsibility'.