Anglo-Russian relations during the 1730s: evidence of the impact of "Germans" at the court of Anna Ioannovna.

Bitter, Michael

Historians of Russia traditionally view the reign of Anna Ioannovna (1730-1740) as a period during which ethnic Germans dominated the Russian court and its policies, to the detriment of ethnic Russians. Yet few concrete examples exist of the way in which these German advisors to the tsaritsa interacted with each other and with foreign, especially British, representatives. Sources from a relatively obscure eighteenth-century diplomatic exchange demonstrate how the ethnic German members of the Russian court of Anna Ioannovna dealt with representatives of Great Britain. A clear example of this Anglo-German-Russian interaction can be seen in the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734, particularly with regard to the counterbalancing roles of the two main Russian negotiators, Vice Chancellor Count Andrei Osterman and the infamous Count Ernst Johann Biron (Btihren), both ethnic Germans. Documents surrounding these negotiations also support the revised view of the influence of German-born advisors during the reign of Anna Ioannovna. They provide new insight into the historical role and perception of the tsaritsa's favorite, Count Biron, whose traditional image as the evil and controlling German influence behind the throne is so persistent that the reign continues to be described as the Bironovshchina, the "Era of Biron."

The negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 provided the occasion for the ministerial interactions discussed here. The treaty has been described by Douglas Reading as post-Petrine Russia's first formal commercial agreement with any western European power. (1) It placed the substantial trade between the two signatories on a modern legal foundation for the first time in the history of their long commercial and diplomatic relationship. The treaty granted English merchants trading under the auspices of the Russia Company exceptional economic advantages and ensured their rights and privileges in Russia. Anthony Cross has credited this treaty with ushering in the "golden age" of the Russia Company's "power and influence" in St. Petersburg. (2) The British had pursued this type of commercial agreement with Russia for decades. The natural resources and agricultural products of the eastern Baltic region had long provided England with important naval commodities such as masts, pitch, tar, flax, and hemp. These supplies were essential to the maintenance and hegemony of the British navy. The navy, in turn, was essential to Great Britain's national security and commercial success. As Russia began to dominate the trade of the eastern Baltic, the stability and profitability of Anglo-Russian trade became increasingly important to the English court.

In 1733, the British crown dispatched to St. Petersburg a diplomatic mission with the explicit purpose of negotiating a formal commercial agreement. By the end of the following year, the English merchants of the Russia Company celebrated the signing of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734. Commerce between Britain and Russia flourished in its wake. Later Anglo-Russian negotiators used this first treaty as a model for all subsequent eighteenth century commercial agreements.

The documents detailing this exchange are the official and personal papers of Great Britain's chief negotiator, George, Lord Forbes, who traveled to St. Petersburg expressly to conclude the Anglo-Russian treaty. Great Britain's King George II sent Forbes as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the court of the Russian tsaritsa, Anna Ioannovna, in May of 1733. He returned to England a year later having settled nearly every commercial dispute between St. Petersburg and London to Britain's advantage. His correspondence, diary, and journal of observations provide a wealth of information regarding Russia and the treaty that resulted from his mission. They describe the negotiations, as well as the Russian court and the individuals closest to the tsaritsa. Though scholars have recognized the potential value of the Forbes documents for some time, the inaccessibility of the Forbes family papers prevented their examination until recently. (3) These sources, combined with Forbes's official reports to the Foreign Office, contribute to a more complete and detailed view of events and personalities at the Russian court, and they are particularly valuable as a record of the interaction between British, German, and Russian ministers in St. Petersburg.

In his private account of Russia, Lord Forbes recorded his observations concerning the leading figures at the Russian court. Perhaps most surprising is his portrayal of the individual who is traditionally considered the most despised German figure at the tsaritsa's court, Anna loannovna's favorite, Ernst Johann Biron. Lord Forbes presented Biron as a forthright, honest, and likeable character, one of the very few to be described as a "good friend" to Britain. Though he noted the favorite's shortcomings, Forbes was far more comfortable dealing with him than with the other leading German advisor to the tsaritsa, the evasive and calculating minister in charge of foreign affairs, Count Andrei Osterman. He described Count Osterman as "a German of the Province of Wesphaly," noting that "He has Married a Russ of Family, is very well with the Nation, and tho a Lutheran himself he breeds up his Children in the Greek perswasion.... " (4) Forbes wrote that "He [Osterman] generally differs in oppinion (sic) with Count Biron in all that is agitated in the Cabinet.... " emphasizing the difference he observed between the two men. Yet, these advisors, along with a third high-ranking German, Count Lewenwold, were largely responsible for setting Russian policy. Forbes observed, "Count Biron, Count Lewenwold, and Count Osterman, have the only share in the Direction of Affairs, the Russ have no Part at all only in the Execution & Administration ... " (5) Despite their power and influence under Anna Ioannovna, these men readily acknowledged that they were "foreigners" in Russia, and Forbes recognized that they were envied and hated by many Russians. This situation appeared to influence their official conduct, since they were "desirous of the Protection of some Foreign Power" as insurance in the event of a regime change within Russia. To this end, each of them favored the representatives of the foreign court that seemed to promise the greatest potential security.

A close examination of Lord Forbes's observations also supports the ongoing revision, begun by Alexander Lipski in the 1950s and continued by Evgenii Anisimov more recently, (6) of the traditional and persistent view of Anna Ioannovna's reign as an era of unified German domination and exploitation of the Russian state. In fact, the two most influential advisers to the tsaritsa, both of whom were of German ancestry, pursued the goal of Anglo-Russian alliance using opposing methods. On one side, the Russian Vice-Chancellor, Count Andrei Osterman, refused to discuss matters of trade in isolation. He insisted that commercial negotiations were only one facet of the much larger issue of Anglo-Russian political relations. From the Vice-Chancellor's perspective, this diplomatic relationship would ideally include the exchange of mutual guarantees of territory between the two courts, something London was determined to avoid. When Lord Forbes insisted that his instructions authorized him to discuss only commercial arrangements, Osterman allowed the negotiations to stall, leaving Forbes with little progress to show for his months of residence in the Russian capital.

Osterman's opponent at court with regard to these methods of negotiation was Count Ernst Johann Biron. Officially, Biron had no position within the Russian bureaucratic hierarchy, but was influential by virtue of his personal relationship with the monarch. According to Lord Forbes, Biron was much less demanding and deceitful than the Vice-Chancellor, making him significantly more popular with the British representatives. He supported the swift conclusion of a commercial agreement advantageous to Great Britain in order to demonstrate, in a tangible way, Russia's firm commitment to a stronger, more comprehensive Anglo-Russian relationship. Biron sought to indulge Britain's commercial desires in the hope of reversing the British refusal to negotiate a strategic and political alliance.

Unlike Count Osterman, Biron endorsed increased economic concessions with the expectation that closer ties would eventually lead to a change in British policy. Yet, Biron's ultimate goal was the same as Count Osterman's. Both men sought the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian defensive alliance. The different methods by which these two advisers to the tsaritsa pursued the same goal resulted in endless confusion and delay for Lord Forbes and his mission. In fact, the regular and detailed observations supplied by Lord Forbes during his residence in St. Petersburg confirm his observation that the two most influential "German" advisers to the tsaritsa, Counts Osterman and Biron, opposed each other at nearly every opportunity.

A leading goal of the British negotiators was to improve the balance of trade with Russia. Merchants of the Russia Company purchased vast quantities of naval supplies from the Baltic while exporting and selling relatively little British merchandise, mainly textiles, to Russia. Contrary to the dictates of eighteenth-century mercantilist doctrine, London's commerce with St. PeterSburg resulted in a significant British trade deficit. According to the estimates of the Russia Company at the time, the British were forced to pay for nearly seventy-five percent of their Russian purchases with gold and silver, an annual sum amounting to 225,000 [pounds sterling]. (7) The principal method by which they sought to reverse this costly trend was by displacing Prussian cloth merchants in Russia. The Prussian merchants had capitalized on the period of animosity between London and St. Petersburg during the 1720s by supplying the Russian army with cloth for its uniforms. This type of coarse woolen fabric was known as "soldiers' cloth." The contracts for soldiers' cloth were both large and lucrative. British recovery of these contracts on a permanent basis would serve the dual purpose of impeding the growing international competition of the Prussian textile industry and reducing the British trade deficit with Russia through the annual export of large quantities of British cloth to St. Petersburg.

Unlike the British, the Russian leaders were less concerned with their favorable balance of trade than with the possibility of promoting closer political and diplomatic ties with their largest trading partner, Great Britain. Without losing sight of the importance of the annual British bullion payments to the Russian treasury, the chief Russian negotiators sought to link any formal recognition of commercial relations to a defensive alliance that would include mutual guarantees of territory. This Russian goal of a more intimate political union with Great Britain was shared by many in St. Petersburg, but the means by which the two most powerful groups at court sought to conclude such an alliance varied considerably. Though based on the observations of an "outsider," the record of the disputes between the tsaritsa's closest advisors regarding the most effective method by which to engage the British representatives in political, as well as commercial, negotiations provides a unique view of the personalities at the Russian court during this period.

Pressure From Poland

Shortly after Lord Forbes's arrival in St. Petersburg at the beginning of June, 1733, the goals of his mission to Russia began to be overshadowed by a political event of great importance to the courts of northern Europe. Earlier that year, the King of Poland had died, leaving the succession to this elective monarchy in question. The court of Anna Ioannovna supported the deceased king's son, the new Elector of Saxony, as his successor, but the French crown backed Stanislas Leszczynski, a former King of Poland and father-in-law of the French monarch. This situation led eventually to the War of Polish Succession.

The conflict was, at the same time, both helpful and harmful to Lord Forbes's progress in negotiating a commercial treaty. On the one hand, those officials who agreed with Count Osterman were increasingly inclined to delay the conclusion of any trade agreement that lacked a defensive component. This group was willing to use the situation in Poland, and the Russian court's preoccupation with it, as an excuse to avoid the resumption of substantive trade negotiations. They argued that the tense political situation left little time and energy for matters of a purely commercial nature. From the outset, Count Osterman insisted upon a link between the commercial treaty and a defensive alliance. Indeed, during one of their first discussions, he had told Lord Forbes that, with regard to the treaties, "he thought that the one could not be treated of without the other." (8) Recognizing Great Britain's continued reluctance to guarantee the security of a country as vast and distant as Russia, Osterman began to ignore British initiatives of a solely commercial nature.

Count Osterman initially endeavored to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Poland. He did not want Russian troops involved in the conflict. As late as the end of July, 1733, Lord Forbes wrote of the Russian involvement in Poland, "I believe baron Osterman is very uneasy, that things are like to come to a rupture; he has done all he could to hinder their engaging too far, but count Biron's counsels have prevailed ... " (9) Clearly, Osterman and Biron disagreed on the level of military backing St. Petersburg should provide its choice as Polish monarch. Yet, once the tsarina had committed herself to the military support of the Saxon candidate, Osterman, characteristically, used Russia's international situation to delay purely commercial negotiations with Lord Forbes.

On the other side of the issue were those individuals, led by Count Biron, who felt that Russia's growing involvement in Polish affairs, and hence in European politics, warranted a significantly more formal association with London. They viewed the negotiations with Lord Forbes as a timely opportunity to draw Great Britain into a more intimate alliance. Increased commercial engagement with Great Britain would be a greater incentive toward a defensive alliance than the evasion, delay, and inevitable disappointment practiced by Count Osterman. The current international situation appeared to make an alliance even more immediately desirable. For instance, in the event of open hostilities, a British squadron in the Baltic could be a powerful deterrent to French naval support of King Stanislas Leszczynski.

In Count Biron's opinion, if Russia engaged in a military dispute in Poland, the tsaritsa would be well advised to cultivate as close a relationship as possible with the British court. The most obvious and timely method of developing such close relations was through the generous negotiation of the commercial treaty that London so earnestly desired. If a defensive alliance could be combined with a commercial agreement, so much the better. If not, the advantageous terms of an Anglo-Russian trade treaty would convince the British of Russian good will and eventually persuade them to approve more important defensive guaranties. In addition, the commercial agreement itself would serve to demonstrate to other European powers that the British and Russian courts had common interests. This had always been the goal of Russian policymakers.

The validity of this confidence in the political and diplomatic ramifications of the commercial treaty was eventually confirmed. In his analysis of British foreign policy during the administrations of Robert Walpole, Jeremy Black wrote, "In 1734 the Anglo-Russian trade agreement was seen, correctly, as having political overtones." (10) As Russian military intervention in Poland progressed, Count Biron became increasingly resolute in his desire to conclude any viable agreement with London.

Under these circumstances, Lord Forbes hoped that the Russian court would be particularly willing to negotiate and sign a commercial treaty. Although he understood that his government strictly forbade him to sign any type of political alliance, Forbes believed that he could use the Russian desire to conclude a defensive agreement to induce the tsaritsa's advisers to negotiate a commercial treaty. Events in Poland would add urgency to the discussions and, with luck, speed the process along. He wrote:

 They are very desirous to engage the king of Great-Britain into an
 alliance with them, so that under the favour of this conjuncture, I
 hope, a treaty of commerce may be happily concluded. (11)

Like counts Osterman and Biron, Lord Forbes understood that the beginning of hostilities in Poland would have a direct effect upon the Anglo-Russian negotiations. Each man would determine his own course of action. It seems that Lord Forbes and Count Osterman would forever be at cross-purposes in their negotiations. On the other hand, Count Biron's perspective, at least to a certain degree, seemed to blend compatibly with the commercial goals and expectations of Lord Forbes.

If Count Biron's views supported the goals of Forbes's mission, his unique position at the Russian court presented a serious obstacle to the successful conclusion of an Anglo-Russian agreement. As he so often declared, Biron was not a minister and he had no official powers within the Russian bureaucratic hierarchy. It was Count Osterman who was the Vice Chancellor and the acknowledged master of Russian foreign affairs. Formal negotiations for any type of Anglo-Russian agreement fell within his domain. As Lord Forbes would unfortunately discover, negotiations between Russia and Great Britain progressed solely at the Vice Chancellor's discretion.

On August 5th, 1733, Lord Forbes officially presented himself to the tsaritsa at Peterhof and kissed her hands. The pressure of the new and tense international situation was apparent. He reported that he had been "talked to again about Her Majesty's great desire to enter into a treaty of alliance with His Majesty," (12) and that he had answered with his usual arguments in opposition to such a treaty. Perhaps not coincidentally, it was at this same time that the tsaritsa allowed Lord Forbes to take possession of his official residence in St. Petersburg and provided him with an honor guard of distinction. He notified London of these special honors:

 Just now the duchess of Mecklenburgh's house, one of the best in
 town, which has been designed for me of some time, was delivered to
 me with my own apartment in it furnished, and a guard of 16 men
 appointed for the character the king has been pleased to give me,
 which is above double the number that any foreign minister here
 has. (xiii)

During the period in which Count Osterman was lobbying most vociferously for a British alliance, the Russians took every available opportunity to show their special regard for the British envoy and his court. The timing of these honors could not have been better designed to influence London to act in Russia's favor.

Discord Between German Advisors

Even at this early stage in Lord Forbes's discussions with counts Biron and Osterman, the pattern of the future negotiations was apparent. In stark contrast to his historical reputation, Count Biron was by far the more engaging and amenable of the two men. Forbes immediately recognized these qualities, was personally drawn toward Biron's open, straightforward manner, and, in his letters to London, frequently expressed his preference for dealing with the favorite. Despite this strong personal inclination, and his many disparaging comments regarding Count Osterman's cunning ways and tendency toward subterfuge, Lord Forbes's correspondence leaves no doubt that he also recognized the skill, influence, and political power wielded by the Vice Chancellor. Over the course of his stay in St. Petersburg, Forbes gradually began to understand that Count Osterman was far more experienced and skillful than the Grand Chamberlain, Count Biron. Although Biron exercised substantial personal influence over the tsaritsa, Osterman was undoubtedly the more adroit politician.

Forbes informed the Secretary of State in London. Lord Harrington, that the Russian court continued to raise the question of a formal alliance. He emphasized that "in every conversation" the Russian ministers "press us to know His Majesty's resolutions as to an alliance with them, the name of which without any particular engagement I am humbly of opinion would quiet them." (14) The intense pressure from Count Osterman for a defensive alliance strained the relationship between the two men and virtually halted the negotiations for a commercial treaty.

According to the Northern Department in London, the rift developing between the courts of St. Petersburg and Berlin due to events in Poland promised to be extremely advantageous for British commercial interests. Prussian influence in Russia was waning, largely as a result of Berlin's indecision regarding events in Poland. In addition, a personal animosity had developed between the King of Prussia and Ernst Johann Biron, the tsaritsa's favorite. Count Biron confided to Lord Forbes that the Prussian monarch was angry with the Grand Chamberlain because he had spoiled a Prussian plan to have a prince of Brandenburg elected Duke of Courland upon the death of the last Duke of the house of Kettler. (15) Moreover, Biron claimed that "he had persuaded Her Imperial Majesty not to give her niece, the princess of Mecklenburgh, to a prince of Brandenburgh." (16) At the same time, the favorite threatened that the Russians would remember Prussia's halting and questionable actions in the Polish crisis, if ever Berlin required assistance from the tsarina. When the Prussian minister to Russia finally declared that his king was prepared to send large numbers of troops to assist in the event of a French invasion, Biron directly insulted the Prussian monarch by suggesting that Berlin must have known the French would definitely not invade in order for the king to promise to commit such a considerable body of his troops.

The reports Lord Forbes sent of the deterioration of relations between the northern courts sparked considerable interest and optimism in London. In the past, Prussian merchants had replaced the English in supplying the huge quantities of soldiers' cloth needed to outfit the Russian army. With Russia moving toward war in Poland, the need for uniforms would increase substantially. Now, the rift between St. Petersburg and Berlin suggested an opportunity for the English merchants to recover this most lucrative branch of their woolen export trade to Russia. Lord Harrington specifically directed Forbes to exploit the existing situation as fully as possible. He wrote:

 It is hoped that the late conduct of the king of Prussia with
 respect to the Czarinna, will have much lessened the influence of
 that prince's minister at St. Petersburgh; and that your lordship
 will be able to make the best use possible of any coldness or
 dissatisfaction between those two courts to recover to the english
 the sale of cloths proper for the russian troops, which was mostly
 fallen into the hands of the prussians. (17)

While Lord Forbes also hoped that the diminished influence of Prussia would directly benefit English merchants, he was becoming less optimistic regarding the overall progress of commercial negotiations. With relentless determination, Count Osterman continued to press for discussions leading to a defensive, rather than simply a commercial, alliance.

At the beginning of September, Lord Forbes had been in St. Petersburg for four months. Although he had presented Count Osterman with written articles for a treaty of commerce early in August, the Vice Chancellor claimed that he had not yet had time to consider them. This inaction, along with Osterman's repeated attempts to use French treaty offers to alarm the British ministers, only served to confirm Forbes's earlier, rather poor opinion of the Vice Chancellor's character and trustworthiness. By contrast, the British envoy's opinion of the Grand Chamberlain, Count Biron, grew more favorable as time passed. To some extent at least, in the eyes of the British representatives, Biron's credit rose simply by comparison with Count Osterman's declining credibility.

Often, Biron would privately acquaint Lord Forbes with important matters, of which it was Count Osterman's official duty to inform the British minister. For Lord Forbes, the difference in the way the two men communicated the same information was both frustrating and instructive. Early in September, Count Osterman used the repeated and very generous French offers of assistance and alliance to demand some equivalent action from London. He told Forbes that the tsaritsa had rejected the latest French proposals, and that she had specifically ordered him to acquaint the British envoy with her decision, "not doubting of equal returns from the king, my master." (18) The pressure from the Vice Chancellor for some action toward the negotiation of an Anglo-Russian defensive alliance was constant and intense.

Once again, in direct contrast to these "ministerial" tactics of Osterman, Count Biron espoused a very different approach. The favorite had, in fact, informed Lord Forbes of the latest French offers long before they were communicated officially by Osterman. He dealt openly with the British envoy and assured him that the tsaritsa had no intention of accepting any French proposals. On a personal level, Lord Forbes clearly preferred dealing with the Grand Chamberlain. He did not hesitate to express his preference and personal convictions to Lord Harrington. Of this most recent incident, he wrote:

 Your lordship will please to observe that the great-chamberlain
 communicated this affair to us fully and clearly, as if he intended
 only to cultivate a mutual confidence; the other communicated it
 partially and darkly, as if it were intended to alarm. (19)

Forbes emphasized that Count Biron, unlike the Vice Chancellor, "upon all occasions expresses the greatest respect and regard for His Majesty, is very open to us, and immediately communicates whatever he thinks may relate to US." (20)

In a private letter to Lord Harrington, Forbes portrayed the differences between Counts Biron and Osterman as essential elements of their characters. He sent this letter to London by way of a Mr. Brien, who was attached to the British delegation in St. Petersburg. The added security of having this correspondence travel directly to London in the hands of a trusted courier encouraged Lord Forbes to share his opinions more openly. Of Biron and Osterman he wrote:

 The first of these is all powerful by favour, the second all
 necessary from his experience and capacity; the first has all the
 good qualities of the heart, the second all those of the head with
 some of the vices of the heart. (21)

Despite the very different approaches of Biron and Osterman, the two men pursued the same goal. They both desired a closer alliance between Great Britain and Russia. In a real sense, both men were working toward the perceived best interests of the Russian court, though they were going about it in entirely different ways. In addition, they were competing with each other for influence with the tsaritsa. Unfortunately, this competition resulted in attempts by each to present the actions of the other in the worst possible light. The two leading "Germans" in St. Petersburg were clearly at odds, and foreign representatives at the Russian court were forced to tread lightly in their transactions with both men in order to avoid offending either.

Lord Forbes was caught in the middle and he found his position in St. Petersburg increasingly precarious. Although Biron encouraged Lord Forbes to expect the mutually satisfactory conclusion of a treaty of commerce, it was evident that he could do very little to accelerate the pace of the negotiations, which officially fell under the control of the Vice Chancellor. Commercial negotiations were at a standstill. Four months into his mission, Lord Forbes began to doubt his ability to successfully conclude a commercial treaty.

Delays and Doubts

The British envoy made little progress in treaty negotiations over the course of the next few months. Count Osterman remained indisposed owing to a bout of his well-known "political illness." Count Biron admitted to the British minister that the treaty of commerce "and some other things made baron Osterman sick, for that Her Majesty had often ordered him to dispatch that treaty." (22) Biron occasionally said "very hard things" of Count Osterman. Lord Forbes was convinced that, if he was asked, the favorite would influence the tsaritsa to appoint another minister to take over the affair. After debating this strategy with the more experienced, but lower ranking, British Resident at the Russian court, Claudius Rondeau, Forbes rejected it, fearing the consequences of angering the Vice Chancellor. (23) Lord Harrington agreed with this decision, adding that Count Osterman "has too much power to do us mischief to have such a slight put upon him." (24) He instructed Lord Forbes to continue to deal with the Count, unless it became absolutely impossible to proceed. In that event, the king gave Forbes and Rondeau permission to use their own judgment in deciding how best to serve British interests.

The new year brought very little change to the status of Anglo-Russian commercial negotiations. Toward the middle of January, 1734, Forbes admitted that he and Rondeau were "forced to wait the dilatory resolutions of baron Osterman, and the more dilatory methods he has put it [the treaty] into." (25) He did not understand whether Osterman opposed treaties of commerce in general, or only this treaty in particular, because of its potential to damage the commercial interests of Prussia. The Vice Chancellor seemed to favor the interests of the king of Prussia at the Russian court.

The Prussian ministers had been working diligently for several months to undo what little progress the British had made. Forbes and Rondeau were keenly aware of these efforts, yet they doubted the ability of the Prussians to have any detrimental effect on their affairs. Questionable Prussian conduct with respect to the Polish crisis had forced Berlin's reputation at St. Petersburg to a new low. If concern over the commercial interests of Prussia was delaying Anglo-Russian negotiations, Count Osterman was almost certainly responsible. Whatever his reasons for the delay, Osterman held the fate of the Anglo-Russian negotiations in his hands.

It seemed there would be no end to the count's delaying tactics. In frustration, Forbes attempted to force Osterman's hand by confronting him with the lengthy delay and asking whether their negotiations were, in fact, at an end. With uncharacteristic candor, the count insisted that not only were their discussions to continue, but that, with regard to the treaty, "there was a disposition to conclude it to our [British] liking." (26) A policy of continued commercial engagement apparently prevailed at court. However, Osterman again repeated his demand that commercial discussions could not continue without corresponding negotiations regarding a defensive alliance. In Count Osterman's words, "one depended on the other." (27) Despite the Vice Chancellor's openness, Lord Forbes was now even more doubtful about the success of his mission.

Count Biron, who had always assured Forbes of a satisfactory outcome, was increasingly troubled by the difficulties, delays, and potential consequences of Russian intervention in Poland. Although he had originally been the most influential advocate of a military solution to the question of the Polish succession, the uncertainty of the situation early in 1734, weakened his resolve. Forbes feared that Count Biron could lose his valuable position at court as a counterweight to Osterman. In a period of potential crisis, the Vice Chancellor's talent and abilities put him firmly in control of court affairs. The British envoy, attempting to characterize the situation for Lord Harrington, acknowledged that "as baron Osterman is the only man of resource among them; the other [Biron] seems, as if he would give up the helm, as the weather grows rough." (28) Nevertheless, he had little recourse but to continue to rely on Count Biron's assistance.

Once again, Forbes asked the favorite to explain Osterman's continuing demands for a defensive agreement. Biron believed that the Vice-Chancellor's actions were ultimately designed to draw Russia into a closer relationship with the Prussian court at Berlin. Frustrated at this reply and by his own inability to move negotiations forward, Lord Forbes wrote Harrington:

 Your lordship will judge from this how difficult it is for us to
 act between these two great men, on whom all the favours and
 business of this court roll. (29)

Letters of Recall

Shortly before the twenty-third of March, 1734, Lord Forbes received a letter from Lord Harrington informing him that the king wished to employ hint in the navy and that his "letters of revocation" were being prepared and would be sent by ship to Riga. Harrington advised him to begin putting his affairs in order, so that he would be prepared to leave St. Petersburg and return to London as soon as his letters of recall arrived. He expressed the hope that Forbes could conclude the treaty of commerce before his departure. If this was impossible, and "the same dilatoriness continues," Forbes was to place the entire matter into the hands of Claudius Rondeau, who would conclude the treaty "if the moscovites are sincere in the good dispositions they profess." (30) Within a week, the Russian court received word of the recall from Prince Kantemir, the tsaritsa's minister in London. This news had a profound effect on the Russian attitude toward commercial negotiations with Great Britain.

On March 29th, 1734, Count Biron took Lord Forbes and Claudius Rondeau aside at a gathering in his residence. The Grand Chamberlain informed them that the tsaritsa, who was well aware of the king's friend, hip for her, desired nothing more than to "preserve and increase" the friendly relations between the two courts. To that end, she was willing to take every opportunity to prove the sincerity of her intentions, and, consequently, had ordered that the treaty of commerce should be concluded before the departure of Lord Forbes from St. Petersburg. This was one of the clearest statements of Russian intentions to date. The British ministers returned the pledge of friendship in the king's name and explained the difficulties that they believed had obstructed the treaty's progress. These difficulties, Forbes wrote, Count Biron "entirely charged on baron Osterman, as usual." (31) This private interview was particularly significant, as Lord Forbes later reported, since the tsaritsa was "standing in a door behind a curtain all the time," listening. (32) It represented the Russian court's first reaction to the news of Forbes's recall, and it seemed to bode well for the eventual success of his mission.

Five days later, the British envoy received a short note from Prince Ivan Andreevich Shcherbatov, asking Forbes to send him a person from his entourage "which if does not understand Russ Language, at least that should be expert in English or French." (33) This sudden desire for assistance with translation seemed to be a sure sign of progress in the previously stalled treaty negotiations. In a postscript to his message, Prince Shcherbatov explained his request:

 I don't believe that any translator in the Colledge of Foreign
 affaires that know [sic] in perfection English or French, therefore
 make bold to desire one from your Lordship's party. (34)

The Prince's message contained a noticeable element of urgency. He asked that the British assistant be sent to him the following afternoon, so that he could conclude his examination of the translation, enabling Lord Forbes to continue negotiations "without delay." In the opinion of Prince Shcherbatov, at least, the Russian attitude toward the stalled Anglo-Russian commercial negotiations had evidently changed.

Earlier, at the end of March, Count Biron, with the tsaritsa listening, had assured Lord Forbes that the Russian court had every intention of signing the commercial treaty before his departure. Within ten days of this meeting, the tsaritsa took what would turn out to be possibly the most important Russian step toward the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734. In his weekly dispatch, dated April 13th, Lord Forbes wrote:

 On monday last, baron Shafiroff, the president of the college of
 commerce, acquainted me, Forbes, that Her Majesty had ordered him
 to treat and conclude this affair [the treaty] with me, and count
 Osterman gave me the same intimation by letter; whether the latter
 is pleased to be rid of this affair or dissatisfied with it--we
 don't know, but we have not any ways proposed to take it out of his
 hands. (35)

Without any formal request from the British ministers, the tsaritsa removed Count Osterman from his responsibility for the commercial negotiations. There is little doubt that Count Biron's influence with the tsaritsa contributed substantially to his rival's removal. In the face of Forbes's recall, Count Biron's advocacy of an exclusively commercial approach to Great Britain had gained the tsaritsa's total confidence. With the delaying tactics of the Vice Chancellor finally eliminated, commercial negotiations progressed rapidly.

Baron Petr Pavlovich Shafirov was sixty-five years old when he took over the Anglo-Russian negotiations from Count Osterman. His ability with foreign languages and familiarity with Western Europe had allowed him to serve Peter the Great and his successors as a diplomat. (36) The reports and letters Lord Forbes sent to London leave little doubt that he viewed Baron Shafirov's appointment as a significant, even pivotal, improvement in the status of the commercial negotiations. Within five days of being notified of the alteration, Forbes attended a very productive conference with Shafirov, in which the baron:

 ... declared that he was satisfied that the points, which we had
 objected to in their demands, ought to be dropped, and, on running
 over the whole, he said, that he hoped in a very short time to
 conclude with us to our mutual satisfaction. (37)

This type of decisive and direct communication appealed to Lord Forbes. He began to recognize the extent of the personal control over commercial negotiations that Count Osterman had possessed during the preceding months. Now, it seemed, the conclusion of an Anglo-Russian trade agreement was genuinely in sight. Later, he wrote to Lord Harrington:

 Your lordship will see that 1 had no reason to hope for any
 conclusion of this treaty till it got into baron Shafirov's hands
 ... (38)

The succession of Baron Shafirov to Count Osterman's duties with regard to negotiation resulted in a burst of activity on the Russian side of the commercial talks. Progress was rapid, and many formerly insurmountable obstacles vanished in the new atmosphere of urgency and cooperation.

Fewer than ten days after first reporting Baron Shafirov's appointment, Lord Forbes received the diplomatic packet from London containing his letters of revocation. At this point, his optimism with the current state of Anglo-Russian negotiations was so great that he was willing to delay his departure from the Russian capital in the hope of concluding the commercial discussions. He reported that Baron Shafirov had met with him that morning for five hours and that they had "debated fully every one of the articles." They had not reached any specific conclusions, since the baron first wished to make a report to the tsaritsa. With these discussions in mind, Forbes wrote to London:

 ... I hope it will not be disagreeable to the king, that I delay
 making use of my letters of recall a few days if I find any hopes
 of putting the finishing hand to this treaty in a few days. (39)

However, by the 27th of April, 1734, Lord Forbes informed London through his regular weekly dispatch that he no longer anticipated concluding the commercial treaty before his departure from St, Petersburg. Surprisingly, the decision not to sign the treaty was his own. Forbes admitted to Lord Harrington that he and Rondeau had "got this court in a full disposition to conclude the treaty of commerce and have almost settled every point, we hope to mutual satisfaction." (40) Despite this achievement, he was reluctant to sign the treaty without approval of the final draft from London. Lord Forbes had received his letters of revocation several days earlier and, although he was quite willing to delay their official presentation for a short time, the two months or more that it would take to receive official approval from London of the final draft of the treaty was another matter.

The British envoy's refusal to sign the agreement before his departure shocked the Russian court. The appointment of Baron Shafirov and the Russian willingness to drop several long-standing demands had clearly been aimed at concluding the treaty before Forbes left St. Petersburg. Count Biron had confirmed this objective in the presence of the tsaritsa almost a month earlier. Now, much to the disappointment of the Russian negotiators, it was Lord Forbes who halted the unprecedented progress toward the Anglo-Russian commercial treaty. He explained his decision in his weekly report to Lord Harrington:

 ... this court was startled yesterday, when, upon their demanding
 if I, Forbes, would sign the treaty, I declared that I could not
 sign on account of some alterations contrary to my instructions,
 which I had let pass in the draught; upon which they asked me--if
 they regulated the treaty entirely to my satisfaction, whether I
 would then sign? I was forced to tell them, that I could not till I
 wrote to, and heard from England, which, being on my departure,
 there was no time for ... (41)

The astonishment of the Russian negotiators and their apparent offer to alter the treaty articles in order to satisfy all British demands seem to have presented Forbes with a uniquely powerful negotiating opportunity. It is particularly significant that this question appears to have come from a Russian negotiator, since, later, the German favorites at court were reluctant to press for greater concessions to the British seemingly due to their status as "foreigners" (see below). Yet, it is unclear what concessions the Russian court might have been inclined to grant for the privilege of Lord Forbes's signature. In addition, Forbes was reluctant to use the Russians' shock and confusion at his refusal to sign the draft to extract greater commercial privileges for British merchants. He simply insisted that the final draft be sent to London for approval before it was signed by any British representative.

Lord Forbes had his audience of leave with the tsaritsa on the second of May, 1734, and left the Russian capital five days later to return to England by land. On separate occasions, both counts Osterman and Biron assured the British envoy of their monarch's strong desire "to live in the strictest friendship and amity with His Majesty." (42) In addition to these sovereign assurances intended for George II, Lord Forbes also received several marks of the tsaritsa's favor for him personally. He recorded in his diary that the day before his departure, "in the afternoon, Prince Courakin (43) came to see me, and he brought a Diamond Ring from her Majesty that she usually wore on her finger." (44) Though gifts to parting diplomats were common, Forbes seemed to attach special significance to the fact that the ring was a personal possession of the tsaritsa.

Claudius Rondeau, who remained as Britain's Resident in St. Petersburg, finally signed the Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 at Count Osterman's residence on the second of December, 1734, seven months after Lord Forbes's departure. With a few minor exceptions, the articles signed by the British representative were identical to those negotiated by Lord Forbes in the final days of his mission to the Russian court. Though Rondeau tried to use his influence with Count Biron and the other leading German at the Russian court, Mr. Loewenwold, to obtain even greater concessions, they refused to pursue his request. In an unusually candid and insightful assessment of his own situation at the Russian court, Count Biron, according to Rondeau, "desired me to put myself in their place, and consider, as they were foreigners, that they could not take such an affair on themselves." (45) Biron's recognition of his position as an outsider, an ethnic German among Russians, and its ultimate limitations appears to anticipate his historical reputation.

Count Osterman, attempting to salvage as much diplomatic utility from the situation as possible, wasted no time in making the new Russian position with respect to the treaty clear. Rondeau reported:

 After the treaty was signed, count Osterman told me, that as all
 the articles were in favour of the english; so he hoped that would
 convince the king, my master, how desirous Her Majesty was to
 cultivate his amity and friendship. (46)

In defeat, Osterman had, of necessity, adopted his rivals' attitude toward the commercial treaty. In the end, the approach of Anna Ioannovna's favorite won out over that of the Vice Chancellor, and the Russian court settled for a policy of strictly commercial engagement with Great Britain. Yet, the resulting trade agreement provided the foundation for substantially improved commercial and diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Russia in the future.

MICHAEL BITTER

University of Hawai'i, Hilo

Notes

(1) Douglas K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938).

(2) Anthony Cross, By the Banks of the Neva (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 46.

(3) See Betty Kemp, "Sir Francis Dashwood's Diary of His Visit to St. Petersburg in 1733," Slavonic and East European Review, XXXVIII (1959): 196, note 15. Francis Dashwood took advantage of Lord Forbes's mission to travel to St. Petersburg. He remained in the Russian capital for about three weeks.

(4) The original manuscript of this account is held in Castle Forbes, County Longford, Republic of Ireland, but photocopies of this manuscript are in the collection of the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) in Belfast. The PRONI reference number for the account is T3765/H/6/11/6.

(5) Lord Forbes's account of Russia. PRONI reference T3765/H/6/11/6.

(6) For the earlier reassessment of Anna Ioannovna's reign, see Alexander Lipski, "A Reexamination of the 'Dark Era' of Anna Ioannovna," The American Slavic and East European Review, XV (1956), No. 4: 477-88. The most recent revisionist view by Evgenii Viktorovich Anisimov can be found in his article "Empress Anna Ivanovna, 1730-1740," in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., and A.A. Iskenderov, comp., The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996): 37-65.

(7) Douglas K. Reading, The Anglo-Russian Commercial Treaty of 1734 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938) 40.

(8) Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkogo lstoricheskogo Obshchestva (St. Petersburg: Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1889), Vol. 76: 40. Hereafter, the abbreviation SIR10 will be used to refer to this document collection. For reasons of convenience and accessibility, I have provided SIRIO references for as much of Lord Forbes's official correspondence as has been reprinted in that collection.

(9) SIRIO, vol. 76: 46.

(10) Jeremy Black, British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd., 1985) 13.

(11) SIRIO, vol. 76: 46.

(12) SIRIO, vol. 76: 58.

(13) SIRIO, vol. 76: 61.

(14) SIRIO, vol. 76: 74.

(15) The reference here to Courland reflects that fact that it was already known in diplomatic circles that Count Biron favored his own election as the next Duke of Courland. In fact, Anna Ioannovna procured this title for Biron in 1737, after the death of the last member of the house of Kettler.

(16) SIRIO, vol. 76: 74.

(17) SIRIO, vol. 76: 77.

(18) SIRIO, vol. 76: 95.

(19) SIRIO, vol. 76: 96.

(20) SIRIO, vol. 76: 92.

(21) SIRIO, vol. 76: 102.

(22) SIRIO, vol. 76: 143.

(23) Though Rondeau's diplomatic rank was considerably lower than that of Forbes, he had become a very close acquaintance of Count Biron's. British interests benefited from this relationship on many occasions.

(24) SIRIO, vol. 76: 162.

(25) SIRIO, vol. 76: 163.

(26) SIRIO, vol. 76: 177.

(27) SIRIO, vol. 76: 177.

(28) SIRIO, vol. 76: 177-178.

(29) SIRIO, vol. 76: 180.

(30) SIRIO, vol. 76: 181. Lord Harington's use of the term "moscovites" here betrays his attitude toward Russia. Further documentation of the Northern Department's attitude and its reluctance to recognize growing Russian authority will be found in my forthcoming treatment of Claudius Rondeau's term of service at the Russian court.

(31) SIRIO, vol. 76: 196.

(32) SIRIO, vol. 76: 196.

(33) This note can be found in the copies of the Forbes Papers, located in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI) in Belfast. The PRONI reference number is T3765/H/6/9/7. It is dated the 4/15 of April, 1734. Prince Shcherbatov states in the note that he has been "encharged to examine a Translation of some known to your Lordship articles with the rus original." Shcherbatov clearly acknowledges a time constraint on his examination of these articles when be explained that he made his request for assistance "with the view to dispatch it correctly, that by that mean your Lordship without delay might have a Conference with the ministers of the same." In his twenties, Prince Shcherbatov had lived and studied in Great Britain for at least three years (1719-1721). His note to Lord Forbes was written in English.

(34) "Prince Scherbatow's Letter to Lord Forbes wrote [sic] in English." PRONI reference number T3765/H/6/9/7.

(35) SIRIO, vol. 76: 202.

(36) In fact, it was Shafirov who had arranged Anna Ioannovna's marriage to the young Frederick William, Duke of Courland, in 1710. His disgrace and exile for corruption in 1723, allowed Count Osterman to assume Shafirov's position within the College of Foreign Affairs. After Peter I's death in 1725, Baron Shafirov's titles and rank were restored, but he did not return to his former diplomatic office. Count Osterman guarded his new position jealously, fearing the baron's influence and endeavoring to keep him away from the center of power. Instead, Shafirov became president of the Commerce College. By 1732, he had reconciled with Count Osterman. Shafirov's origins are somewhat obscure, and it is likely that he was of Jewish ancestry, but had converted and been baptized in the Russian Orthodox Church. His origins may have given some in the Petrine and post-Petrine hierarchy the opportunity to treat him as yet another type of "outsider."

(37) SIRIO, vol. 76: 202.

(38) SIRIO, vol. 76:211.

(39) SIRIO, vol. 76: 208. Letter from Lord Forbes to Lord Harrington, dated April the 23rd o.s. 1734.

(40) SIRIO, vol. 76: 210.

(41) SIRIO, vol. 76:210-211. This happened on April 26th, 1734.

(42) SIRIO, vol. 76: 216.

(43) Aleksandr Borisovich Kurakin (1697-1749) Son of Prince Boris I. Kurakin, one of Peter the Great's closest companions and most trusted diplomats. Aleksandr Kurakin was one of the first Russians to be educated in Europe. He served as Russian ambassador in Paris from 1722-1724, returning to Russia in 1729, after spending twenty years abroad.

(44) "Lord Forbes: His Diary in Russia," Monday, May 6, 1734. As of 1993, this diary was still located in the private office of the Ninth Earl of Granard in Castle Forbes, County Longford, Republic of Ireland. A photocopy of the diary is among the Forbes Papers in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland in Belfast, identified as the "Diary kept by the 3rd Earl while in Russia. May 1733-June 1734". Its reference number is T3765/H/6/2/1. Claudius Rondeau reported the value of the diamond ring given to Lord Forbes at five or six thousand rubles. A marginal note in Forbes's diary states: "This Ring was valued by a jeweller in London at 1100 [pounds sterling] Sterl. and he offered 9(10 Guineas."

(45) SIRIO, vol. 76: 333.

(46) SIRIO, vol. 76: 335.