Understanding the Korean and Thai currency crises.
Burnside, Craig ; Eichenbaum, Martin ; Rebelo, Sergio 等
Introduction and summary
In late 1997, Southeast Asia was rocked by banking and currency
crises. While dramatic in scope and intensity, this episode was only the
latest in a series of "twin crises." Other prominent examples
include Argentina (1980), Chile (1981), Uruguay (1981), Finland (1991),
Sweden (1991), and Mexico (1994). In this article, we review and
interpret the recent Korean and Thai experiences, focusing on the
pivotal role of unfunded contingent government liabilities. We
concentrate on the Korean and Thai cases both because their crises were
severe and because neither country appeared to be a likely candidate for
a currency crisis, at least not from the perspective of standard
economic models.
In addition to being of independent interest, the lessons learned
from the Korean and Thai episodes should be useful in predicting and
averting future twin crises. [1] In a nutshell, these lessons are as
follows. First, twin crises are likely to erupt in countries whose
governments have large prospective deficits stemming from guarantees to
failing financial sectors. Such guarantees typically insure
creditors--both domestic and foreign--against realizing large losses
when financial institutions that they have lent money to become
insolvent or go broke. Second, past deficits are, at best, a noisy
indicator of how large a government's prospective deficits are.
Accurately measuring the latter requires a careful analysis of the
nature of a government's guarantees and the probability that those
guarantees will be called upon. It may never be possible to predict
precisely when a twin crisis will occur. But more accurate measures of
prospective deficits are likely to be helpful in predicting where twin
crises will occur. Finally, to avoid currency crises, governments must
have credible plans to finance contingent liabilities with credible,
explicit fiscal reforms. Such reforms include concrete measures to cut
government expenditures or raise taxes.
In the body of the article, we provide the empirical background for
our analysis. We begin by motivating empirically the importance of past
banking crises as a source of government liabilities. We then briefly
review the salient features of the recent crises in Korea and Thailand.
These can be summarized as follows.
1. Both currency crises were difficult to predict on the basis of
standard economic indicators, such as inflation rates, monetary growth
rates, or past government deficits.
2. Neither banking crisis was difficult to anticipate, certainly
not if one used publicly available information about the market value of
financial firms in Korea and Thailand.
3. When the crises came, they came with a vengeance. The Korean won and Thai baht rapidly depreciated by over 50 percent and 80 percent,
respectively, vis-a-vis the dollar before partially rebounding in value.
In addition to the large social costs associated with severe recessions,
the crises saddled the Korean and Thai governments with very large
liabilities. These arose both from their implicit guarantees and the
need to restructure their respective banking systems. As we discuss
below, these costs are now estimated to exceed 25 percent of
Korea's and Thailand's gross domestic product (GDP).
4. After the crises, the rates of inflation and money growth rose
in both countries, though not by nearly as much as the rates of
depreciation of the won and the baht. The rise in the price of tradable
goods was much larger than the rise in the price of nontradable goods.
Later, we provide an explanation of the way in which prospective
deficits could have caused the currency crises. The basic idea is that
the Korean and Thai financial sectors were in trouble prior to the
currency crises and investors knew this. Given the Korean and Thai
governments' implicit guarantees to their banking sectors, market
participants revised upwards their estimates of future government
deficits. Given the difficulty of raising tax revenues or lowering
government expenditures in the wake of a severe banking crisis, private
agents expected that future deficits would be financed, at least in
part, by higher seigniorage revenues. This led to expectations of higher
future inflation rates and a reduction in the demand for domestic
currency. The resulting drain on official reserves of foreign currency
triggered the currency crises. Finally, because many financial
institutions did not hedge the currency mismatch in their assets and
liabilities, the currency crises exacerbated the initial banking crises
and raised the associated fiscal costs.
We articulate these ideas using a simplified version of the model
in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). In versions of the model
roughly calibrated to Korean data, a speculative attack occurs after the
information about higher future deficits arrives but before the new
monetary policy is implemented. So the model is consistent with the idea
that the fixed exchange rate regimes in Korea and Thailand collapsed
after agents understood that the banks were failing, but before
governments actually started to monetize their deficits. Thus the model
can account for facts 1 and 2 discussed above: The banking crises were
predictable but standard indicators of bad government policy--high
deficits, high inflation rates, and rapid money growth--were not
observed prior to the crises.
While successful on a number of important dimensions, the benchmark
model suffers from several shortcomings. First, it implies a larger rate
of inflation than actually occurred after the crises. Second, the model
predicts that the domestic Consumer Price Index (CPI) moves one to one
with the exchange rate. So it is inconsistent with the fact that the
rise in measured inflation was smaller than the rate of depreciation in
the won and baht. In addition, since the benchmark model assumes that
all goods are tradable, it cannot address the post-crises differential
rates of inflation in traded and nontraded good prices. We briefly
discuss ongoing research that shows how the benchmark model can be
modified to overcome these shortcomings. [2] From the perspective of
this article, the key point is that the modifications do not alter the
model's message about the connection between prospective deficits
and currency crises.
Finally, we turn to the issue of which countries might be at risk
for the kind of twin crises experienced by Korea and Thailand. Here we
reproduce and discuss Standard and Poor's recent estimates of
governments' contingent liabilities to financial sectors. These
estimates reveal that a government's exposure to future contingent
liabilities is not well estimated by conventional debt measures. Since
future deficits can be just as important as past deficits in triggering
currency crises, policymakers who focus only on conventional debt
measures do so at their peril. When the storm comes, they will be taken
by surprise. Our research suggests that they need not be, provided that
they spend more resources on measuring the extent of their contingent
liabilities.
Basic facts
Our analysis of recent events in Southeast Asia leans heavily on
the notion that the Thai and Korean governments faced serious fiscal
problems because of implicit, unbudgeted guarantees to their banking
sectors. In this section we accomplish two tasks. First, we provide some
evidence on the fiscal implications of banking crises in a variety of
countries. Second, we briefly review the twin crises and their aftermath
in Korea and Thailand.
Fiscal costs of past banking crises
Table 1 summarizes estimates of the fiscal costs of banking crises,
as a percentage of GDP, taken from the studies summarized by Frydl
(1999). Table 2 contains estimates of the costs of the recent banking
crises in Southeast Asia, taken from Standard and Poor's Sovereign
Ratings Service. [3]
Comparing tables 1 and 2 we see that, while large, the magnitude of
the bailouts in Southeast Asia was by no means unprecedented (see, for
example, table 1 on the costs of the Argentinian, Chilean, and Uruguayan
banking crises in the 1980s). No doubt there is substantial uncertainty
about the precise fiscal cost of any given banking crisis. Still, two
things are clear. First, banking crises occur with depressing
regularity. And second, when they happen, they impose large fiscal costs
on governments.
Brief review of the twin crises in Korea and Thailand
Here, we briefly review the prelude and aftermath of the twin
currency--banking crises in Thailand and Korea. In addition to providing
general background for our analysis, we substantiate the claims
summarized as facts 1 through 4 in the introduction.
The currency crises
Figures 1 and 2 display the exchange rates of the baht and the won,
where the exchange rate is defined as the price of a dollar in units of
local currency. [4] It is evident that Thailand and Korea experienced
severe currency crises in the latter part of 1997. The crises were
severe in the sense that both currencies underwent very large
depreciations in a short period of time: The value of the baht relative
to the dollar declined by over 50 percent between June 1997 and January
1998; and the value of the won relative to the dollar declined by over
48 percent between October 1997 and January l998. [5]
The banking--financial sector crises
Both Korea and Thailand experienced severe banking--financial
sector crises that began before their currency crises. Corsetti,
Pesenti, and Roubini (1999) report that pre-crisis nonperforming loan
rates were 19 percent in Thailand and 16 percent in Korea, or roughly 30
percent and 22 percent of GDP, respectively. That being said, the
currency crises certainly exacerbated the financial crises. [6]
According to J.P. Morgan (1998), as of June 1998, the rate of
nonperforming loans in both Korea and Thailand had risen to roughly 30
percent. By June 1999, the cost of recapitalizing and restructuring the
banking system in Thailand reached 35 percent of GDP (see table 2). As
of December 1999, the corresponding cost in Korea had reached 24 percent
of GDP.
Was the public aware of the banking crises before the currency
crises? In our view the answer is yes. First, proprietary information
from some bank rating services and investment banks had raised doubts
about the health of the local banks. Second, the market value of the
banking and financial sectors in Thailand and Korea declined
precipitously before the currency crisis hit. Table 3, extracted from
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999), reports indexes of the stock
market value of publicly traded banks and financial firms in Thailand
and Korea. In addition, we report the analog value of the commercial and
manufacturing sector in Thailand and Korea, respectively. [7] The column
labeled "Pre-crisis peak" pertains to the date of the peak
value of the banking sector in the two countries. Three features of
table 3 are worth noting. First, in both countries, the value of the
banking and finance sectors fell by large amounts before the currency
crises. For example, in the period between the pre-crisis banking pe ak
and the day immediately prior to the currency crisis, the value of the
Thai and Korean finance sectors fell by 92 percent and 52 percent,
respectively. Second, in the case of Thailand, the value of the
financial sector fell by a large amount relative to the decline in the
commerce sector. In the case of Korea, the manufacturing sector index
actually rose up to the day before the crisis. So the decline in the
value of the financial sectors did not simply reflect a decline in the
overall stock market. Markets seemed particularly concerned about the
financial sector.
Both Thailand and Korea had low inflation rates prior to their
currency crises. Over the two previous years, the CPI in Thailand and
Korea rose at annual rates of 5 percent and 4.6 percent, respectively,
[8] giving no hint of the currency crises to come.
Figures 1 and 2 display measures of the CPI, the Producer Price
Index (PPI), and indexes of export and import prices in the periods
immediately before and after the currency crises. In both countries
overall consumer and producer price inflation was moderate in the
aftermath of the devaluation. For example, in Thailand, the CPI rose
roughly 11 percent between June 1997 and June 1998, and only rose a
further 1 percent by March 2000. In Korea, the CPI rose 7.2 percent
between October 1997 and October 1998. Also notice that import and
export prices moved much more in response to movements in the exchange
rate (see figures 1 and 2) than either the CPI or the PPI.
So, the behavior of inflation after the crises can be summarized as
follows. First, in both Korea and Thailand, there was a moderate rise in
inflation, measured using either the CPI or the PPI. But the rise in
overall inflation was much less than the rate of depreciation in the
respective exchange rates. Second, tradable goods prices rose
substantially, with the rate of increase being similar in magnitude to
the rate of depreciation of the won and the baht. An important issue we
return to later is how to account for these two facts.
Fiscal deficits and debt
Prior to their crises, Thailand and Korea had been running fiscal
surpluses and had fairly modest debt to GDP ratios. [9] The overall
fiscal position of the Thai government; inclusive of interest payments,
was positive, with a surplus of close to 3 percent of GDP in 1994 and
1995 and 0.7 percent of GDP in 1996. The amount of government debt held
by domestic residents was very small before 1997, while public sector
external debt was roughly 10 percent of GDP before 1997. In Korea, the
government's overall fiscal position and primary balance
(government expenditures minus tax revenues) were always in surplus,
though close to zero, in 1994- 96. The government's domestic debt
at the end of 1996 was just 7.6 percent of GDP, while consolidated
public sector external debt was just 6.1 percent of GDP.
Since the crises, both countries have been running fiscal deficits
and have accumulated substantial amounts of new debt. By the end of
1998, the Thai government's domestic debt had jumped to almost 10
percent of GDP, while external public sector debt rose to almost 25
percent of GDP. In Korea, the government's domestic debt rose to
19.1 percent of GDP by the end of 1998, while public sector external
debt rose to 11.4 percent of GDP.
We conclude that 1) traditional measures of government deficits or
debt gave no indication of the currency crises to come in Korea and
Thailand, and 2) the debt situations of the governments in both
countries appeared radically different before and after the twin crises.
Monetary policy since the crises
In the immediate aftermath of their crises, Thailand and Korea both
followed tight monetary policies. Neither country allowed its monetary
base to expand rapidly. Indeed, by the end of 1998 both countries had
roughly the same amount of base money as they had at the onset of their
crises.
The monetary authorities did extend enormous credit lines to their
banking systems. From the onset of the crises to the end of 1997, Thai
central bank credit to deposit money banks rose 761 percent. The
corresponding figure for Korea was 281 percent. The period of
"tight money" concluded by the end of 1998. In 1999 both
countries significantly raised their money supplies, with the base
rising more than 50 percent in Thailand and about 37 percent in Korea.
Based on this evidence we conclude that the Thai and Korean
governments eventually moved to partially monetize their debt, but there
was a substantial lag until they did so.
Real activity
The costs of the twin crises in terms of aggregate economic
activity were very real, with both countries suffering large recessions.
[10] In Thailand, the recession began in early 1997. By 1997:Q4 real GDP
was 4.4 percent lower than it had been in 1996:Q4. The first half of
1998 saw real GDP fall a further 15 percent. In the following six months
the economy grew at a fast pace, but by 1999:Q4 real GDP was still 5.8
percent below its level in 1996:Q4. In Korea, real GDP (seasonally
adjusted) grew about 4 percent in the first three quarters of 1997, and
then fell about 9 percent in the next three quarters through mid-1998.
Since then growth has rebounded. Real GDP in 1999:Q4 was 7.1 percent
above its level in 1997:Q3.
With this brief and selective review as background, we turn to our
interpretation of the crises in Korea and Thailand.
Prospective deficits and currency crises: A benchmark model
In the introduction we argue that the Korean and Thai currency
crises were caused by large prospective deficits associated with
implicit bailout guarantees to failing banking systems. Here we
formalize this argument using a simplified version of the model in
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). Our objectives are twofold.
First, we explain the basic mechanisms at work in the more complicated
model. Second, we show that the simple model can account for a key fact
about the East Asian currency crises: They erupted after the banking
crises began but before high deficits and excessive money growth were
observed.
The key ingredients in the benchmark model are as follows. A small
open economy with no barriers to trade is initially operating under a
fixed exchange rate regime. Output is given exogenously and is constant.
[11] At some point in time agents receive information that future
deficits will be larger than they originally believed. Agents assume
that the government will pay for the increase in the deficit entirely
via seigniorage revenues. It is understood that the government will do
this via a change in monetary policy that begins sometime in the future.
Agents' demand for domestic real balances is decreasing in the
domestic interest rate and increasing in real output. The government
faces the usual intertemporal budget constraint. As is standard in the
literature, we assume that the government follows a threshold rule
according to which the fixed exchange rate regime is abandoned in the
first period that net government debt reaches some exogenous upper
bound. Thereafter, the economy operates under a floating exchange rate
regime.
Turning to specifics, we assume that the model economy is populated by three sets of agents: domestic agents, a government, and foreigners.
There is a single consumption good and no barriers to trade, so that
purchasing power parity holds:
1) [P.sub.t] = [S.sub.t][[P.sup.*].sub.t].
Here, [P.sub.t] and [[P.sup.*].sub.t] denote the domestic and
foreign price level respectively, while [S.sub.t] denotes the exchange
rate (units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency).
According to equation 1, the real cost of buying the good is the same in
the domestic economy as abroad. For convenience, we assume that
[[P.sup.*].sub.t] = 1 so that foreign inflation is zero.
For simplicity, we assume that domestic agents' per period
real income, Y, is constant over time. Private agents are competitive
and can borrow and lend domestic currency at the nominal interest rate,
[R.sub.t]. The total demand for domestic money is given by: [12]
2) log([M.sub.t]/[P.sub.t])=log([theta])+log(Y)-[eta][R.sub.t].
Here, [M.sub.t] denotes the beginning of period t domestic money
supply, and [theta] is a positive constant. According to equation 2, the
demand for money depends positively on Y, and negatively on the
opportunity cost of holding money: the nominal interest rate, [R.sub.t].
The parameter [eta] represents the semi-elasticity of money demand with
respect to the interest rate.
In the absence of uncertainty, the nominal interest rate is equal
to the real rate of interest, [r.sub.t], plus the rate of inflation,
[[pi].sub.t]:
3) [R.sub.t] = [r.sub.t] + [[pi].sub.t].
By assumption, the home country is small relative to international
capital markets so that [r.sub.t] is exogenous from that country's
perspective. So, absent capital market restrictions, [r.sub.t] is the
same as the risk-free real rate of interest in international capital
markets. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this rate is
constant so that [r.sub.t] = r for all t.
The government of the home country purchases goods, [g.sub.t],
makes transfer payments, [v.sub.t], levies lump sum taxes,
[[tau].sub.t], and can borrow at the real interest rate r. Again, for
simplicity, we assume that [g.sub.t], [v.sub.t], and [[tau].sub.t] are
constant over time and equal to g, v, and [tau], respectively.
A sustainable fixed exchange rate regime
Suppose that the home country is initially in a fixed exchange rate
regime so that [S.sub.t] = S. Equation 1 implies that the domestic rate
of inflation, [[pi].sub.t], is equal to the foreign rate of inflation,
[[[pi].sup.*].sub.t], which we assume equals zero. It follows from
equation 3 that the nominal rate of interest is equal to the constant
real interest rate: [R.sup.t] = r for all t [greater than or equal to]
0. Under a fixed exchange rate, the domestic money supply is endogenous:
It must equal the level of money demanded, given the exchange rate, S,
4) M = S[theta]Y exp(-[eta]r).
If the government tried to print more money than M, private agents
would simply trade it, at the fixed exchange rate, for foreign reserves.
Consequently, as long as the country is in a fixed exchange rate regime,
the government cannot generate seigniorage revenues. [13]
Under what circumstances is the fixed exchange rate regime
sustainable? In our model the answer to this question reduces to whether
the money supply can be constant over time. Whether this is possible
depends critically on whether the government can abstain from raising
seigniorage revenues. This in turn depends on the government's
fiscal policy.
To see the nature of the required restrictions on fiscal policy,
note that with money constant for all t, the government's flow
budget constraint is:
5) [b.sub.t] = [rb.sub.t] + g + v - [tau].
Here, [b.sub.t] represents the government's stock of real
debt, net of any assets, and [b.sub.t] denotes the derivative of
[b.sub.t] with respect to time. According to equation 5, the change in
[b.sub.t] (more precisely, [b.sub.t]) is equal to the interest cost of
servicing government debt, [rb.sub.t], plus the primary deficit, g + v -
[tau]. Imposing the condition that the present value of [b.sub.t] goes
to zero in the infinite future, we obtain the government's
intertemporal budget constraint, [14]
6) [rb.sub.0] = [tau] - g - v.
According to equation 6, for the fixed exchange rate to be
sustainable, the government surplus must be just large enough to cover
the interest cost of servicing its initial debt. When this is the case,
the government does not print money. It simply stands ready to trade
domestic money for foreign money at the exchange rate S. Since the
demand for money is constant, so too is the supply. So, as long as
equation 6 holds, the economy will be in a sustainable fixed exchange
rate equilibrium with [S.sub.t] = S for all t.
A currency crisis
To see how a banking crisis can generate a currency crisis, suppose
that equation 6 initially holds. Then, at time t = 0, private agents
learn that there has been an increase in the present value of the
deficit equal to [phi], say because of an increase in future transfer
payments associated with bank bailouts. Also, suppose private agents
correctly believe that the government will not undertake a fiscal reform
to pay for the bank bailouts; that is, they will not raise taxes or
lower real government purchases or transfers. While we could allow for a
partial fiscal reform, for simplicity we assume that g, v, and [tau]
remain constant at their initial pre-crisis values. [15] It follows that
the only way that the government can satisfy its intertemporal budget
constraint is to embark on a monetary policy that generates a present
value of seigniorage revenues equal to [phi]: [16]
7) [phi] = PV(Seigniorage) =
[[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.[t.sup.*]]
[M.sub.t]/[P.sub.t][e.sup.-rt]dt + [[sigma].sub.i]
[delta][M.sub.i]/[P.sub.i][e.sup.-ri].
Here, [t.sup.*] denotes the time when the economy moves to a
floating exchange rate regime, [M.sub.t] is the derivative of the money
supply with respect to time, and
[[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.[t.sup.*]]
[M.sub.t]/[P.sub.t][e.sup.-rt]dt represents the present value of the
resources that the government raises by printing money. The term
[[sigma].sub.i] [delta][M.sub.i]/[P.sub.i][e.sup.-ri] represents changes
in seigniorage revenue following discrete jumps in the money supply.
These terms must be included because the money supply may jump
discontinuously when the fixed exchange rate regime collapses or because
of government monetary policy (see Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
1999 and 2000a).
Could the fixed exchange rate be sustained once new information
about higher deficits arrives? Suppose, for a moment, that it could.
Then the money supply would never change and the government could not
collect any seigniorage revenues. So all the terms on the right-hand
side of equation 7 would equal zero. But then the government's
budget constraint would not hold. This contradicts the assumption that
the fixed exchange rate regime is sustainable. We conclude that the
government must at some point move to a floating exchange rate system.
The precise time at which this occurs depends on 1) the
government's rule for abandoning fixed exchange rates, and 2) the
government's new monetary policy.
With respect to 1, we follow a standard assumption in the
literature that the government abandons the fixed exchange rate regime
according to a threshold rule on government debt. [17] Specifically, we
assume that the government floats the currency in the first time
instance, [t.sup.*], when its net debt hits some finite upper bound. As
it turns out, this is equivalent to abandoning the fixed exchange rate
whenever the amount of domestic money sold by private agents in exchange
for foreign reserves exceeds [chi] percent of the initial money supply
(see the appendix). In addition to being a good description of what
happens in actual crises, the threshold rule assumption can be
interpreted as a short-run borrowing constraint on the government: It
limits how much reserves the government can borrow to defend the fixed
exchange rate. [18]
With respect to 2, we assume that at some point in the future, time
T, the government will engineer a discrete increase in the money supply
of [gamma] percent relative to M, the level of the money supply during
the fixed exchange rate regime. In addition it will set the growth rate
of the money supply from then on equal to [micro]. The parameters
[micro] and [gamma] must be such that the government's
intertemporal budget constraint, equation 7, holds. This specification
decouples the endogenous timing of the speculative attack from the time
at which the government undertakes its new monetary policy. Because of
this we can allow for a delay between the end of the fixed exchange rate
regime and when the government moves to monetize the debt.
Before turning to the quantitative properties of our model, we note
that the rate of inflation, the money supply, and the level of
government debt can be discontinuous in our perfect foresight economy.
However, the exchange rate path must be continuous. To see why, suppose
to the contrary that there was a discontinuous increase in the exchange
rate at time [t.sup.*]. Since purchasing power parity implies that
[P.sub.t] = [S.sub.t], inflation would be infinity at [t.sup.*]. This
would imply that the nominal interest rate would also be infinity at
[t.sup.*] so that money demand would be equal to zero. Private agents
would want to sell all of the domestic money supply to the government.
But the government is only willing to buy [chi] percent of it. Hence,
this cannot be an equilibrium.
Equilibrium of the model: Numerical examples
In the appendix, we show how to solve for the equilibrium of the
model economy. Here, we describe the characteristics of the equilibrium
for a calibrated version of the model.
* We normalize real income, Y, and the initial exchange rate, S, to
1.
* We set the parameter to [phi] 0.25, a conservative estimate of
the cost of Korea's banking crisis relative to its GDP.
* We set the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the
interest rate, [eta], equal to 0.5. This is consistent with the range of
estimates of money demand elasticities in developing countries provided
by Easterly, Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1985). Since Korea is not
included in that study, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to
this parameter.
* We assume that the risk-free real interest rate, r, is equal to 1
percent and set the constant, [theta], in money demand so that the model
is consistent with the ratio of real balances to GDP in Korea before the
crisis. See Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999, 2000a). For [eta] =
0.05, this implies a value of [theta] approximately equal to 0.06.
* Based on the evidence in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999),
we set the threshold parameter, [chi] to 0.03.
* For simplicity we normalize the government's initial stock
of debt, [b.sub.0], to zero.
* The monetary base in Korea was roughly the same at the end of
1998 as at the beginning of the crisis. However, by the end of 1999, the
base had risen by over 30 percent. Given these facts, the key question
in deciding on a value for T is: When did agents become convinced that
the government would have to bail the banks out? This is a difficult
issue to resolve. Here we report results for T = 3. While our
qualitative results are robust to this choice, we think further research
on this question is important. At the end of this section we briefly
consider one interesting implication of setting T = 1.
* We set the parameter [gamma] to 0.1. Finally, we solve for the
value of [micro] that satisfies the government's intertemporal
budget constraint ([micro]= 0.043).
Figure 3 displays the equilibrium path of the benchmark model. Two
features are worth noting. First, the collapse of the fixed exchange
rate regime takes place at time [t.sup.*] = 2.19, after the new
information about the deficit arrives (t = 0) but before the new
monetary policy is implemented (T = 3). Second, inflation begins to rise
at [t.sup.*], before the change in monetary policy. So, consistent with
the classic results in
Sargent and Wallace (1981), future monetary policy affects current
inflation. Because of purchasing power parity and the absence of
nontradable goods, the rate of inflation is the same as the rate of
depreciation of the exchange rate.
Next, consider the behavior of the money supply and net government
assets ([-b.sub.t]). As we argued earlier, the level of the money supply
is constant as long as the fixed exchange rate regime lasts ( t [less
than] [t.sup.*]). It then drops by [chi] percent as agents trade
domestic money for foreign reserves. Since the government's foreign
reserves fall at [t.sup.*], the government's net assets fall by a
corresponding amount. Thereafter, the money supply is constant until the
government begins its new monetary policy. At time T there is a
policy-induced jump in the money supply to [M.sub.T] after which it
grows at the constant rate [micro]. Since the government engineers
increases in the money supply by retiring debt or purchasing foreign
reserves, net government assets jump at time T and then increase at a
rate that depends on the timing of the government bank bailouts.
Why doesn't the fixed exchange rate regime collapse at time 0?
The reader may wonder why the fixed exchange rate doesn't
collapse at t = 0 when agents receive the new information about future
deficits. To understand why the collapse generally occurs after t = 0,
two things must he kept in mind. First, as long as the government has
access to foreign reserves and is willing to use them, it can fix the
price of its currency. It does so by exchanging domestic money for
foreign reserves at the fixed price S. In our model the government is
willing to do this until the level of domestic money falls by [chi]
percent. Put differently, a fixed exchange rate regime is a price fixing scheme that will endure as long as the government has the ability and
the willingness to exchange domestic currency for dollars. If the
government was not willing to endure any increases in its debt, that is,
it was not willing to buy back any of the domestic money supply at
[S.sub.t] = S, then the exchange rate regime would collapse at t = 0.
Given the government's willingness to buy back no more than [chi]
percent of the money supply, the key determinant of when the fixed
exchange rate regime collapses is when money demand falls by [chi].
Second, as a result of the discrete increase in money supply at time T,
inflation is monotonically increasing between [t.sup.*] and T (see
Bumside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2000a). This reflects the fact that in
standard Cagan money demand models, the price level at time t is a
function of discounted current and future money supplies. An important
feature of this function is that the further out in time is the increase
in the money supply, the less impact it has on the initial price level.
[19] In general, inflation is too low at time zero to produce a fall in
money demand large enough to trigger the government's threshold
rule. [20]
The preceding arguments suggest that the higher the interest rate
elasticity of money, the sooner the fixed exchange rate collapses.
Consistent with this intuition, we find that when [eta] = 1, [t.sup.*]
1.24. When [eta] = 0.1, [t.sup.*] rises to 2.85. Notice that 1) even at
the high value of [eta], the fixed exchange regime still collapses after
t = 0, and 2) even at the low value of [eta], the fixed exchange rate
regime still collapses before T.
Consistent with the previous intuition, the appendix shows that
[t.sup.*] satisfies:
8) [t.sup.*] = T + [eta]ln ([chi]/[chi]+[gamma]+[micro][eta]).
So, other things equal, the longer the government delays
implementing its new monetary policy (the larger is T) and the more
willing the government is to accumulate debt (the higher is [chi]), the
later the fixed exchange rate regime will collapse. In addition, the
higher is the interest rate elasticity of money demand (the larger is
[eta]) and the more money the government prints in the future (the
higher are [gamma] and [micro]), the sooner the speculative attack will
occur. [21]
Some caution is required in interpreting these results because we
are not free to vary the parameters on the right-hand side of equation 8
independently of each other. For example, equation 8 indicates that
[t.sup.*] is increasing in the threshold rule parameter, [chi], taking
the parameters that control monetary policy ([gamma], [micro], and T) as
given. But these parameters must be adjusted whenever a different [chi]
is considered because the government's intertemporal budget
constraint must hold. This issue is addressed by Burnside, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (1999), who show numerically that the qualitative conclusions
emerging from equation 8 remain intact even after the appropriate
adjustments are made. This is also the case for the simple model
considered here. For example, if we set T to 1, then with one exception
the equilibrium path of the model is qualitatively similar to the one
depicted in figure 3. The exception is that [t.sup.*] falls to 0.18 or a
bit over two months. Interestingly, this is the time lag b etween when
forward premia on baht--dollar exchange rates began to rise
significantly and the Thai currency crises occurred (see Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 1999).
Strengths and weaknesses of the benchmark model
On the positive side, the benchmark model does what it was intended
to do: It illustrates the fact that new information about prospective
deficits can cause the collapse of a fixed exchange rate regime after
information about the deficit arrives but before the government starts
its new monetary policy. In addition, the model reproduces the fact that
CPI inflation initially surges in the wake of the exchange rate collapse
and then stabilizes at a lower level. [22]
On the negative side, 1) the model clearly overstates the actual
rate of inflation in Korea after the crises, particularly in the period
between [t.sup.*] and T (see figure 2), and 2) the model does not
account for the different response in tradable and nontradable goods
prices. In assessing these shortcomings, it is important to note that
the model's implications for inflation depend heavily on two
simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the only additional
source of revenues available to the government in the aftermath of the
currency crisis is seigniorage. Second, there is only one good in the
model economy, and purchasing power parity holds. It follows from
equation 1 that an x percent rate of devaluation is necessarily
associated with an x percent rise in the price level. This is clearly
counterfactual. In the next section, we discuss work in Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999, 2000a) that examines the implications of
relaxing these assumptions. [23]
Perturbations to the benchmark model
Allowing for nonindexed government liabilities
In the benchmark model, we assume that all of the government's
liabilities are perfectly indexed, so that their real value is
unaffected by a devaluation. In reality, governments have liabilities
denominated in units of local currency that are not indexed to the rate
of inflation. These liabilities are of two types: a) domestic bonds
issued before information about a banking crisis becomes known, and b)
obligations to programs like Social Security or commitments to purchase
labor services and other nontraded goods whose value is preset in units
of the domestic currency. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999, 2000a)
discuss the impact of these types of liabilities on the implications of
the benchmark model.
The basic point is that inflation reduces the real value of
nonindexed liabilities and acts like a partial fiscal reform,
effectively providing the government with a source of revenue other than
seigniorage. But to gain access to these revenue sources, there must be
inflation. In our model, inflation is possible only in a flexible
exchange rate regime. So the presence of nonindexed liabilities does not
allow the government to escape a currency crisis. However, it does allow
the government to print less money than it would have to in the absence
of nonindexed liabilities. This in turn implies that the modified model
does a much better job of accounting for the observed post-crises rates
of inflation in Korea and Thailand. [24]
Allowing for nontraded goods
The benchmark model assumes that all goods are tradable and that
purchasing power parity holds. Because of this, it is inconsistent with
two key facts about the crises in Korea and Thailand: 1) the rate of CPI
inflation was much lower than the rate of depreciation in the won and
the baht, and 2) the price of tradable goods rose much more than the
price of nontradable goods after the fixed exchange rate regimes
collapsed.
In modifying the benchmark model we are forced to confront the
question What underlies the empirical failure of purchasing power
parity? In its simplest form this condition asserts that the real cost
of buying the CPI basket of goods is the same in all countries. In
reality some goods simply aren't traded, so there is no reason for
their prices to be the same in different countries. Consequently, the
real price of the CPI basket will not be equalized across countries.
Purchasing power parity may also fail because transportation and
distribution costs prevent tradable good prices from equalizing across
countries.
Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2000) argue on empirical grounds that
total distribution costs (including wholesale and retail services,
marketing, and so on) are often more significant than the costs of
transporting goods across countries. They study the role played by the
distribution sector in shaping the behavior of real exchange rates
during exchange rate based stabilizations. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2000a) show how to use Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo's
analysis to break the benchmark model's counterfactually tight link
between the inflation rate and the rate of depreciation of the exchange
rate. The key result is that once some stickiness in nontraded goods
prices is allowed for, the modified model does a reasonable job of
accounting quantitatively for the different post-crisis responses of
traded and nontraded goods prices in Korea and Thailand.
The basic features of the modified model can be described as
follows. As in Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2000), assume that it takes
[delta] units of nontraded goods to distribute one unit of the traded
good to the domestic retail sector. Let [[P.sup.NT].sub.t] and
[[P.sup.T].sub.t] denote the time t price of a nontraded good and the
time t price of a traded good before distribution. Suppose for
simplicity that the distribution and retail sectors of the economy are
perfectly competitive. Then the retail price of a traded good is equal
to [[P.sup.T].sub.t] + [delta][[P.sup.NT].sub.t]. The CPI is defined to
be the geometric average of the price of the nontraded good and the
retail price of the traded good:
9) [P.sub.t] = [([[P.sup.T].sub.t] +
[delta][[P.sup.NT].sub.t]).sup.[omega]][([[P.sup.NT].sub.t]).sup.1-[o
mega]],
where [omega] is a number between 0 and 1.
The demand for real balances is given by equation 2, where
[P.sub.t] is given by equation 9. By assumption, purchasing power parity
holds for the price of traded goods, exclusive of distribution services.
With [[P.sup.*].sub.t] equal to 1, this implies [[P.sup.T].sub.t] = S.
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) also allow for nominal
rigidities in the price of nontradable goods. With these changes, the
modified model is qualitatively consistent with facts 1 and 2 above.
Much work remains to be done in assessing the empirical
plausibility of the modified versions of the benchmark model discussed
in this section. Still, the results in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(1999, 2000a) suggest that these types of models are capable of
explaining the large departures from purchasing power parity and
relatively low inflation rates observed in the wake of currency crises.
Just as important, bringing the models into closer conformity with these
aspects of the data does not alter our basic message: Unfunded
prospective deficits can be an important source of currency crises.
Prospective deficits: Other countries
Throughout this article, we examine the role of unfunded
prospective deficits as a potential cause of currency crises. We are not
alone in this view. At the end of 1997, Standard and Poor's began
to report estimates of contingent government liabilities stemming from
implicit guarantees to financial sectors. Next, we discuss these
estimates and their relationship to conventional debt measures.
Table 4 reproduces Standard and Poor's contingent government
liability estimates as of January 2000. To arrive at these estimates,
Standard and Poor's first estimates the lower and upper percentages
of financial intermediaries' loans that are at risk under various
scenarios it deems to be likely. These are reported in the column
labeled "Group." These bounds are multiplied by a measure of
the size of the financial system relative to GDP to generate estimates
of lower and upper bounds for government contingent liabilities. These
are reported in table 4 in the columns labeled "Lower bound"
and "Upper bound." Note that these estimates can be large
either because the financial system has substantial exposure to
nonperforming loans or because a country's banking system is large
relative to its GDP. The final column in table 4 summarizes the size of
existing government debt relative to GDP.
Two features of table 4 are worth noting. First, there is enormous
variation in the size of government liabilities across different
countries. The performance of some countries on the low end like Denmark
and Canada reflects very solid financial institutions, while the
performance of countries like Bulgaria reflects the small size of their
financial sector. At the high end, the performance of countries like
Japan, Panama, Malaysia, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Korea, and
Thailand reflects financial sectors that are both large and risky.
Second, there is not a tight link between existing government debt
and contingent liabilities. For example, Belgium's government has a
very high debt to GDP ratio of 111 percent, but low contingent
liabilities (the upper bound is 12 percent of GDP). In contrast,
Malaysia's government has a moderate debt to GDP ratio of 37
percent but high contingent liabilities (the upper bound is roughly 60
percent of GDP). Some countries, like Japan, have both a high debt to
GDP ratio (roughly 130 percent) and large contingent liabilities (the
upper bound is approximately 60 percent of GDP).
We conclude by emphasizing, as does Standard and Poor's, that
the estimates reported in table 4 embed a host of assumptions and must
be interpreted with caution. Still, there is clearly enormous variation
in the exposure of different governments to future contingent
liabilities, and that exposure is not well estimated by conventional
debt measures.
Conclusion
This article reviews and interprets the recent currency crises in
Korea and Thailand. We argue that a prime cause of the crises were
large, implicit government guarantees to financial sectors. To
articulate this view, we present and analyze versions of the model in
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999). While successful on a number of
dimensions, the model clearly leaves out various factors that were
important parts of the story. For example, we assume that agents
discovered at a particular point that the banks were failing and that
the government was going to bail them out. The truth is obviously more
complicated. Market participants--like generals--must operate in the fog
of battle. Without a doubt, the fog was thick in Korea and Thailand. The
process by which agents cut through the fog and converged on their views
about banks' future prospects influenced the exact timing of the
crises. Modeling that process would almost surely overturn the stark
implication of our benchmark model that the timing of the currency
crises was perfectly predictable. [25] However, it would not overturn
the basic message: Large unfunded prospective deficits can be a prime
source of currency crises.
Craig Burnside is a senior economist at the Wand Bank. Martin
Eichenbaum is a professor of economics at Northwestern University, a
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
and a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Sergio Rebelo
is a professor of economics at Northwestern University and a research
associate of the NBER.
NOTES
(1.) See Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999) for an empirical analysis of
twin crises.
(2.) We refer the reader to Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2000a) for a detailed analysis of the modified model.
(3.) Given space constraints, we refer the reader to the papers
cited in table 2 for the methodology used to generate these estimates.
Basically, the numbers reflect authors' estimates of the aggregate
net worth of protected insolvent institutions.
(4.) Values of the Thai and Korean currencies were obtained from
the IMF International Financial Statistics.
(5.) Notice also that there is an overshooting pattern apparent in
the exchange rate data, in the sense that each currency appreciated from
its value in January 1998 until the end of our sample period, March
2000. Taking this into account, by March 2000, the baht and won had
depreciated by roughly 32 percent and 18 percent of their respective
pre-crisis values. In this article, we do not formally address possible
causes of the overshooting pattern. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2000a) argue that a version of the benchmark model in which output
first declines and then recovers after the crises can qualitatively
account for the observed overshooting pattern of exchange rates.
(6.) If banks have open exposure to foreign currency risk, a
currency devaluation will lead to a decline in the real value of
banks' assets, reduce their net worth, and result in an increase in
bank failures. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000b) discuss how
government guarantees to banks' foreign creditors led banks to not
hedge the currency mismatch in their assets and liabilities, leaving
them exposed to precisely this kind of currency risk.
(7.) All stock market data were obtained from Bloomberg. The
mnemonics for Thailand are SETBANK, SETFIN, and SETCOMM, respectively.
For Korea the mnemonics are KOSPBANK, KOSPFIN, and KOSPMAN. These
indexes reflect values in local currencies.
(8.) Statistics on prices in Thailand were obtained from the
"Data bank" at the Bank of Thailand website,
www.bot.or.th/.Korean price data were obtained from the
"Statistics" section of the Bank of Korea's website,
www.bok.or.kr/ and from Datastream.
(9.) The data on which this discussion is based are taken from the
following sources, Statistics on fiscal indicators for Thailand were
obtained from the Central Bank of Thailand website "Data bank"
and from IMF (2000b). For Korea, the data were taken from IMF (2000a).
(10.) Statistics on GDP in Thailand were obtained from the Bank of
Thailand "Data bank" website. Korean GDP data were obtained
from the Bank of Korea's "Statistics" website.
(11.) This last assumption is clearly counterfactual. Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) modify the model to allow for a decline
in output after a currency crisis, followed by a recovery. The basic
message about the link between prospective deficits and currency crises
remains unaffected by this modification.
(12.) Specifications of money demand like equation 2 are often
referred to as "Cagan money demand functions."
(13.) If there were growth in either the foreign price level or
domestic real income, the government would collect some seigniorage
revenue in a fixed exchange rate regime. However, this would not affect
our basic argument, The present value of such seigniorage revenues would
be pledged to help cover the present value of the deficit that was
anticipated in the initial fixed exchange rate regime.
(14.) Technically, this requirement is given by the condition
[lim.sub.t[right arrow][infinity]] [e.sup.-rt][b.sub.t] = 0.
(15.) Our basic result would not be affected by a fiscal reform as
long as the present value of the change in the primary surplus induced
by the reform was less than [phi].
(16.) This result is formally proved in the appendix.
(17.) See, for example, Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984),
and Lahiri and Vegh (1999).
(18.) Drazen and Helpman (1987), as well as others, have proposed a
different rule for the government's behavior: Fix future monetary
policy and allow the central bank to borrow as much as possible provided
the present value budget constraint of the government is not violated.
This rule ends up being equivalent to a threshold rule. See Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999).
(19.) In our model, the price level at time t is given by:
In([P.sub.t]) =[eta]r-ln[theta]-ln(Y)+[[eta].sup.-1]
[[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.t] [e.sup.-(l-t)/[eta]]In([M.sub.i])di.
(20.) To see why the speculative attack must occur before time T,
suppose to the contrary that the attack actually occurred at time T.
Since the government raises the money supply discretely at time T,
inflation and the nominal interest rate would be infinity at T. But then
money demand would be zero and the money market could not clear.
(21.) It can be shown that whenever equation 8 implies a negative
value for [t.sup.*], the exchange rate regime collapses at t = 0. This
will happen for: 1) sufficiently high interest elasticities of money
demand; 2) low values of [chi], or 3) large values of [gamma] and
[micro] required to finance the prospective deficit. In this case the
exchange rate will jump at time zero. This does not contradict our
argument that the exchange rate path must be continuous. This is because
the discontinuity in the exchange rate at time zero coincides with the
arrival of the unanticipated news about prospective deficits.
(22.) For example, in the model, the inflation rate during the year
from October 1997 to October 1998 is 11.25 percent. The inflation rate
in the year after is roughly 4 percent. The corresponding rates of CPI
inflation in the Korean data are roughly 7 percent and 1 percent,
respectively.
(23.) Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000a) also discuss the
implications of relaxing the assumption that output is constant after
the speculative attack.
(24.) For example, steady-state inflation in the modified model
drops by a factor of three relative to its value in the benchmark model.
(25.) Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2000c) analyze a model in
which government guarantees to banks' foreign creditors imply that
a currency crisis will almost surely occur. But the time at which it
occurs is stochastic.
NOTES
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo, 2000a,
"How do governments pay for twin crises?," Northwestern
University, manuscript.
_____, 2000b, "Hedging and financial fragility in fixed
exchange rate regimes," European Economic Review, forthcoming.
_____, 2000c, "On the fundamentals of self fulfilling currency
crises," Northwestern University, manuscript.
_____, 1999, "Prospective deficits and the Asian currency
crises," Northwestern University, mimeo.
Burstein, Ariel, Joao Neves, and Sergio Rebelo, 2000,
"Distribution costs and real exchange rate dynamics during
exchange-rate-based stabilizations," Northwestern University,
mimeo.
Caprio, Jr., G., and D. Klingebiel, 1996, "Bank insolvencies:
Cross country experience," World Bank, working paper, No. 1620.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini, 1999,
"What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?," Japan
and the World Economy, Vol. 11, pp. 305-373.
Drazen, Allan, and Elhanan Helpman, 1987, "Stabilization with
exchange rate management," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
102, pp. 835-855.
Dziobek, C., and C. Pazarbasioglu, 1997, "Lessons from
systematic bank restructuring: A survey of 24 countries,"
International Monetary Fund, working paper, No. 97/161.
Easterly, William, Paolo Mauro, Klaus SchmidtHebbel, 1995,
"Money demand and seignioragemaximizing inflation," Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 27, pp. 583-603.
Flood, Robert, and Peter Garber, 1984, "Collapsing exchange
rate regimes: Some linear examples," Journal of international
Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 1-13.
Frydl, Edward, 1999, "The length and cost of banking
crises," International Monetary Fund, working paper, No. WP/99/30.
International Monetary Fund, 2000a, "Republic of Korea:
Statistical appendix," staff country report, No. 00/10, February.
_____, 2000b, 'Thailand: Statistical appendix," staff
country report, No. 00/20, February.
J. P. Morgan, 1998, "Asian financial markets, third quarter
1998," report, July 17.
Kaminsky, Graciela, and Carmen Reinhart, 1999, "The twin
crises: The causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 473-500.
Krugman, Paul, 1979, "A model of balance of payments
crises," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 11, pp.
311-325.
Lahiri, Amartya, and Carlos Vegh, 1999, "Delaying the
inevitable: Optimal interest rate policy and BOP crises,"
University of California, Los Angeles, mimeo.
Lindgren, C-J., G. Garcia, and M. I. Saal, 1996, Bank Soundness and
Macroeconomic Policy, Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Polackova, H., 1999, "Contingent government liabilities: A
hidden fiscal risk," Finance and Development, A Quarterly Magazine
of the IMF, Vol. 36, No. 1.
Sargent, Thomas, and Neil Wallace, 1981, "Some unpleasant
monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Vol. 5, pp. 1-17.
APPENDIX
Solving for the equilibrium of the benchmark model
Here, we show how to solve for the equilibrium path of the
benchmark model and determine the time of the speculative attack. Recall
that the demand for domestic money is given by:
A1) log([M.sub.t]) = log([theta]) + log(Y) + ln([P.sub.t]) -
[eta][R.sub.t].
Using the fact that [R.sub.t] = r + [[pi].sub.t] = r +
[P.sub.t]/[P.sub.t], and solving for ln([P.sub.t]), we obtain
A2) ln[P.sub.t] = [eta]r - log(theta) - log(Y) +
1/[eta][[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.t] [e.sup.-(i-t)/[eta]]
ln[M.sub.i]di.
Equation A1 implies that for all t [less than or equal to]
[t.sup.*],
A3) log(S) = log(M) - log(Y) - log([theta]) + [eta]r.
At the time of the speculative attack, [t.sup.*], ln
[S.sub.[t.sup.*]] = log S, so that equation A1 implies,
A4) ln [S.sub.[t.sup.*]] = long (M) - log (Y) - log ([theta]) +
[eta]r.
However, purchasing power parity and equation A2 imply that
A5) ln [S.sub.[t.sup.*]] = [eta]r - log(Y) - log([theta]) +
1/[eta][[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.[t.sup.*]]
[e.sup.-(i-t)/[eta]] ln[M.sub.i]di.
Equations A4 and A5 and continuity of the price level and [S.sub.t]
imply
A6) log(M) = 1/[eta][[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.[t.sup.*]]
[e.sup.-(i-[t.sup.*])/[eta]] ln[M.sub.i]di.
The government's flow budget constraint is given by:
A7) [delta][b.sub.t] = - [delta][m.sub.t] if t [epsilon] I
[b.sub.t] = r[b.sub.t] + g + v - [tau] - [m.sub.t] -
[[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t] if t [not in] I,
where [m.sub.t], + [[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t] = [M.sub.t] / [P.sub.t]
represents seigniorage revenues. As in Drazen and Helpman (1987), the
household's budget constraint (equation A7) takes into account the
possibility of discrete changes [M.sub.t] in and [b.sub.t], at a finite
set of points in time, I. These discrete jumps occur at the point in
time when the exchange rate regime collapses, [t.sup.*], and the point
in time T, when the government begins to implement its new monetary
policy.
The flow budget constraint, together with the condition
[lim.sub.t[right arrow][infinity]][e.sup.-rt][b.sub.t] = 0, implies the
following intertemporal budget constraint for the government:
A8) [b.sub.0] = [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.0]
[e.sup.-rt]([tau] - g - v + [m.sub.t] + [[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t])dt +
[[sum].sub.i[epsilon]I][e.sup.-ri][delta][m.sub.i].
According to this condition, the present value of future surpluses,
including the value of seigniorage revenues, must equal the value of the
government's net initial debt. Given our assumption that government
purchases, taxes, and transfers are constant for all t, after receiving
the news about the deficit, the government budget constraint implies:
A9) [phi] = [[[integral].sup.[infinity].sub.0] ([m.sub.t] +
[[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t])[e.sup.-rt] dt +
[[sum].sub.i][delta][m.sub.i][e.sup.-ri].
Recall that we assume that the government adopts a threshold rule
for when it abandons the fixed exchange rate regime. One way to
formulate this rule is as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1999):
The government abandons the fixed exchange rate when net debt is equal
to [psi] percent of GDP. Since we assume that Y = 1 and [b.sub.0] is
equal to zero, at [t.sup.*], [b.sub.[t.sup.*]], satisfies
[b.sub.[t.sup.*]] = [psi] = (M - [M.sup.*])/S.
It follows that we can reparameterize the threshold rule as one in
which the government abandons the fixed exchange rate when the money
supply falls by [chi] percent From the previous expression, it follows
that the money supply at time [t.sup.*] satisfies
A10) [M.sup.*] = M[e.sup.-[chi]],
where [e.sup.-[chi]] is equal to (1 - [psi] S/M).
At time T the government increases the money supply by [gamma]
percent instantaneously and then lets the money supply grow at the rate
[micro]. Consequently,
A11) [M.sub.t] = M[e.sup.[gamma]+[micro](t-T)], t [greater than or
equal to] T.
Equations A10 and A11 imply that we can write equation A6 as,
A12) log(M) = 1/[eta] [[[integral].sup.T].sub.[t.sup.*]]
[e.sup.-(i-[t.sup.*])/[eta]] ln([Me.sup.-[chi]])di +
1/[eta] [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.T]
[e.sup.-(i-[t.sup.*])/[eta]](ln M + [gamma] + [micro](i - T))di.
Evaluating the different integrals and solving for [t.sup.*] we
obtain:
A13) [t.sup.*] = T + [eta]log [chi]/[chi]+[gamma]+[micro][eta]
[phi] = [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.0] ([m.sub.t] +
[[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t])[e.sup.-rt] dt +
[delta][M.sub.[t.sup.*]][e.sup.[-rt.sup.*]] +
[delta][M.sub.T][e.sup.-rT].
Using the fact that 1) between [t.sup.*] and T, [m.sub.t] +
[[pi].sub.t][m.sub.t] = 0, 2) [R.sub.t] = r + [[pi].sub.t] = r + [micro]
for all t [greater than or equal to] T, and 3) [m.sub.t], =
[theta][Ye.sup.-[eta][R.sub.t]] along with equations A10 and A11, we can
rewrite the government budget constraint (equation A9) as:
A14) [phi] = [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.T]
[theta][micro][Ye.sup-[eta](r+[micro])][e.sup.-rt]dt + ([Me.sup.-[chi]]
- M/S)[e.sup.-[rt.sup.*]] + ([Me.sup.[gamma]] -
[Me.sup.-[chi]]/[P.sub.T])[e.sup.-rT]
= [theta][micro]Y/r[e.sup.-[eta](r+[micro])][e.sup.-rT] +
([Me.sup.-[chi]] - M/S)[e.sup.-[rt.sup.*]] + ([Me.sup.[gamma]] -
[Me.sup.-[chi]]/[P.sub.T])[e.sup.-rT].
In order to proceed, we must solve for [P.sub.[T.sup.*]] Equations
A2 and A11 imply that
A15) ln[P.sub.t] = [eta]r - log(Y) - log([theta]) +
1/[eta] [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.t]
[e.sup.-(i-t)/[eta]][log(M) + [gamma] + [micro](I-T)]di
for all t [greater than or equal to] T, or
A16) ln([P.sub.t]) = [eta]r - log(Y) - log([theta]) +
[micro](t + [eta]) + log(M) + [gamma] - [micro]T.
It follows that
A17) [P.sub.T] = M/[theta]Y[e.sup.[eta](r+[micro])+[gamma]].
Substituting equations A3, A13, and A17 into A14, we obtain
A18) [phi]/[theta] = [micro]Y/r[e.sup.-[eta](r+[micro])][e.sup.-rT]
+ [Ye.sup.-[eta]r] ([e.sup.-[chi]] - 1)[e.sup.-[rt.sup.*]] +
[Ye.sup.-[eta](r+[micro])-[gamma]]([e.sup.[gamma] -
[e.sup.-[chi]])[e.sup.-rT]),
where [t.sup.*] is given by equation A13. Note that given values of
[phi], [theta], [eta], r, [chi], [gamma], and T, equation A18 is one
equation in one unknown: [micro].
Finally, for [t.sup.*] [less than] t [less than] T, [P.sub.t] can
be computed as follows:
ln [P.sub.t] = [eta]r - log([theta]) - log(Y) +
1/[eta] [[[integral].sup.T].sub.t] [e.sup.-(i-t)/[eta]]log
[M.sub.i]di +
1/[eta] [[[integral].sup.[infinity]].sub.T] [e.sup.-(i-t)/[eta]]log
[M.sub.i]di
= [eta]r - log([theta]) - log(Y) +
log M + [e.sup.(t-T)/[eta]]([micro][eta] + [gamma])-
[1 - [e.sup.(t-T)/[eta]]][chi].
It follows that
d ln [P.sub.t]/dt = 1/[eta] [e.sup.(t-T)/[eta]]([micro][eta] +
[gamma]) + [chi]/[eta][e.sup.(t-T)/[eta]].