How does an increase in government purchases affect the economy?
Eichenbaum, Martin ; Fisher, Jonas D.M.
Introduction and summary
A classic question facing macroeconomists is: How does an increase in
government purchases affect the economy? Our interest in this question
is motivated by the desire to evaluate the properties of different rules
and institutions for setting fiscal policy. For example, should
government purchases vary systematically over the business cycle? What
would the macroeconomic consequences of a balanced budget amendment be?
What would the effect of a permanent decline in defense purchases be on
aggregate employment and real wages? If we had observations on otherwise
identical economies operating under the different fiscal policies that
we are interested in evaluating, it would be easy to answer these types
of questions. But we do not. So we have no choice but to attack them
within the confines of economic models.
Which model should we use? We have at our disposal a plethora of
competing business cycle models, each of which incorporates different
views of the way the economy functions and makes different
recommendations for macroeconomic policy. So one's views about the
costs and benefits of different policy proposals depends critically on
the model being used to assess the proposal. In this sense, research
aimed at assessing the empirical plausibility of competing models is a
crucial input to the policy process. One approach for choosing among
competing models is to compare their predictions for the consequences of
a shock for which we know how the actual economy responds.(1) To the
extent that different models give rise to different predictions, some
will be counterfactual and can be eliminated from the field of choice.
Shocks to government spending are likely to be useful in this regard.
This is because many models give rise to different predictions for the
effects of an increase in government purchases on real wages and average
labor productivity (output per man hour). Neoclassical models of the
sort discussed in Barro (1981), Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum
(1992) and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998) assume constant
returns to scale and perfect competition. Models of this sort predict
that real wages fall after an exogenous increase in government
purchases, that is, after a change in government purchases that was not
caused by other developments in the economy. For reasons discussed
below, other models which deviate from the assumptions embedded in the
neoclassical model generate different predictions. For example, models
embodying increasing returns and imperfect competition of the sort
considered by Devereaux, Head, and Lapham (1996) and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) predict that real wages ought to rise. Which of the two
predictions is correct?
Competing business cycle models also give rise to different
predictions for how average labor productivity responds to an increase
in government purchases. For example, some authors assume that average
productivity of firms depends on the level of aggregate economic
activity (for example, Baxter and King, 1992 and Farmer, 1993). Others
assume that increasing returns to scale occur at the firm level (see
Farmer, 1993). These models predict that average labor productivity
should rise after an exogenous increase in government purchases. This
prediction also emerges in models that allow for labor hoarding and
variable capital utilization rates (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo,
1993 and Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996). Standard neoclassical models
with constant returns to scale production functions (Aiyagari,
Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1992) predict that average labor
productivity should fall. As with real wages, the key question is: Which
prediction is correct?
The major difficulty in answering this question is identifying
exogenous changes to government purchases. Simply observing what happens
to real wages and average labor productivity after government purchases
change does not reveal the effects of the changes in government
purchases per se. This is because government purchases themselves are
affected by developments in the private economy, say because of attempts
to stabilize the business cycle. In these cases movements in real wages
and average labor productivity confound the effect of government
purchases and the factors that caused those purchases to change.
Various approaches for identifying exogenous changes in government
purchases have been pursued in the literature.(2) Here, we build on the
approach used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and Ramey and Shapiro
(1997) who focus on exogenous movements in defense spending as a proxy
for exogenous movements in total government purchases. To isolate such
movements, Ramey and Shapiro (1997) identify three political events that
led to large military build ups which were arguably unrelated to
developments in the domestic U.S. economy: the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, and the Carter-Reagan military build up. We refer to these events
as Ramey-Shapiro episodes. As in Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher
(1998), our basic strategy is to document the behavior of various macro
aggregates after the onset of the Ramey-Shapiro episodes, controlling
for other developments in the U.S. economy.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows.(3) First, aggregate
output and employment rise after an increase in government purchases.
Second, real wages fall after an increase in government purchases. This
is true across a broad range of real wage measures, including the
measure used by Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) who argued that real wages
rise after a positive shock to government purchases. Third, there is
mixed evidence regarding the response of average labor productivity to a
positive shock in government purchases: It falls in the manufacturing
sector but rises in the private business sector as a whole.
Our first finding is consistent with the predictions of all the
models discussed above. Our second finding casts doubt on the empirical
plausibility of the class of business cycle models which predict that
real wages rise after an increase in government purchases. Our third
finding suggests that it is premature to eliminate any of the competing
models based on the response of average productivity to a shock in
government purchases.
In the next section, we summarize some competing models and their
predictions for the response of real wages and average productivity to a
shock in government purchases. Then we assess the empirical plausibility
of these models by analyzing what actually happens after a shock to
government purchases.
Shocks to product demand and the labor market
Two of the many dimensions along which competing business cycle
models differ are their assumptions about the degree of competition in
product markets and the degree to which households internalize increases
in tax liabilities associated with changes in government purchases.
These differences give rise to different predictions for the response of
real wages and average productivity to an increase in government
purchases.
Neoclassical models assume that, at least to a first approximation,
1) product and labor markets are perfectly competitive, 2) if a firm
increased the input of all its factors of production by a given
percentage, then its output would rise by the same percentage, that is,
output is produced using a constant returns to scale technology, and 3)
in the short run, due to some factors of production being in fixed
supply, the increase in output that results from hiring an additional
worker, that is, the marginal product of labor, declines in the amount
of labor hired.(4)
The first assumption implies that it is optimal for a firm to hire
labor until the real wage equals the marginal product of labor. This
rule gives rise to a demand curve for labor of the type labelled DD in
figure 1. This curve specifies the amount of labor that the typical firm
is willing to hire at any given real wage rate. Assumption 3 implies
that the demand curve for labor is downward sloping: Other things equal,
an increase in the real wage rate reduces the firm's demand for
labor.
According to models embodying assumptions 1-3, the only factors that
shift the market demand curve for labor are those which affect the
marginal product of labor schedule. An example is a technological
improvement that raises the entire marginal product of labor schedule.
In contrast, an increase in government purchases or the demand for goods
from overseas has no effect on the marginal product of labor schedule.
So, these types of changes would not affect the demand curve for labor.
We now turn to the supply of labor. Many business cycle models assume
perfectly competitive labor markets in which workers decide how much
labor to supply, taking as given the real wage (see King and Rebelo,
1998, for a review). The representative labor supplier behaves in a way
that equates the marginal benefit and marginal cost of working. The
marginal benefit equals the real wage rate times the marginal utility of
wealth. The marginal cost equals the marginal utility of leisure. Under
standard assumptions, this behavior implies that an individual's
supply of labor will be an increasing function of the real wage rate.
This relationship is summarized by the curve, labelled SS, depicted in
figure 1.
Equilibrium in the labor market is depicted in figure 1 by the point
E where the labor supply and demand curves intersect. Shocks to the
economy affect employment and real wages by shifting one or both of
these curves. We have already argued that, in the neoclassical model, an
increase in government purchases does not affect the demand for labor.
So to affect equilibrium real wages and hours worked, an increase in
government purchases must affect the supply of labor. It does this by
affecting the marginal utility of wealth.
Suppose that individuals are rational, forward looking, and
understand that an increase in the present value of government purchases
raises the present value of their tax obligations and lowers their after
tax wealth. Other things equal, this raises individuals' marginal
utility of wealth and shifts their labor supply curve to the right.(5)
Put differently, the fact that individuals feel poorer because of the
rise in their tax obligation causes them to offer more labor at any
given real wage rate. In Figure 1 the new labor supply curve is labelled
D[prime]D[prime]. The new equilibrium is depicted by the point F. It
follows that in neoclassical models a rise in government purchases will
lead to a rise in employment and output but a decline in real wages and
the marginal product of labor.(6) For many specifications of technology,
the decline in the marginal product of labor also implies that average
labor productivity falls.
Based on empirical evidence discussed below, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992) argue that the predicted fall in real wages is counterfactual. To
remedy this claimed defect, they abandon the assumption that firms are
perfect competitors in the goods market. Instead they assume that firms
have some market power and can set price above marginal cost. We refer
to the ratio of price to marginal cost as the markup. With market power,
firms will hire labor up to the point where the marginal product of
labor is equal to the markup multiplied by the real wage rate.
Note that variations in the markup will affect the demand for labor
just as technological improvements do. Suppose that a rise in the demand
for goods drives firms' markups down, that is, markups behave in a
countercyclical manner. Then the demand curve for labor will shift to
the right, say to D[prime]D[prime] in figure 1, that is, at a given real
wage rate firms will now wish to hire more labor. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992) discuss a variety of models of imperfect competition in which
markups fall when the demand for goods is high.
For simplicity, suppose that consumers do not internalize the rise in
tax liabilities associated with a rise in government purchases. Then,
only the labor demand curve will shift in response to an increase in
government purchases. The new equilibrium is depicted in figure 1 by the
point Q. So here an increase in government purchases leads to an
increase in real wages as well as employment and output. As in
neoclassical models, the marginal and average product of labor falls.(7)
So the key difference between these models lies in their prediction for
the response of real wages.
Of course one could allow for labor supply effects in models with
imperfect competition, as Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) do. Under these
circumstances, both the demand and the supply curve would shift to the
right when government purchases rise. Real wages would rise or fall
depending on whether the demand or the supply effect dominated. Given
Rotemberg and Woodford's (1992) assumptions, the demand effect
dominates and real wages rise. This situation is depicted in figure 1 by
the point H which lies at the intersection of the curves labelled
D[prime]D[prime] and S[prime]S[prime].
Other models exist in which the real wage could rise after an
increase in government purchases. For example, Baxter and King (1992)
and Farmer (1993) discuss models in which perfectly competitive firms
produce output using a technology that exhibits constant returns to
scale in firms' own factors of production. But, unlike all of the
models discussed above, it is assumed that each firm's output is an
increasing function of aggregate output. Now suppose that an increase in
government purchases leads to a shift in the supply of labor. Given the
assumptions in Baxter and King (1992) and Farmer (1993), the increase in
aggregate output leads to an upward shift in the marginal product of
labor schedule. This in turn shifts the demand for labor to the right,
that is, at every given real wage rate firms would like to hire more
labor. After all adjustments have been made, the net result will be a
rise in employment and output, and if the externalities are sufficiently
large, a rise in the marginal product of labor, the average product of
labor, and real wages.(8)
Finally, we note that neoclassical models and models embodying
imperfect competition can be modified to reverse their prediction that
average labor productivity falls after an increase in government
purchases. For example, Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1993) and
Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) modify a neoclassical model by allowing
for labor hoarding and variable capital utilization. In their models,
labor effort and capacity utilization rise after an increase in
government purchases. For example, firms could increase line speeds or
add extra shifts. The result is that in response to an increase in
government purchases, employment, output, and measured average labor
productivity all rise, while real wages continue to fall. Presumably one
could modify Rotemberg and Woodford's (1992) model in a similar way
to overturn the prediction that measured average productivity falls
after a positive shock to government purchases.
In sum, competing business cycle models generate different
predictions for the effects of a shock to government purchases. Next we
assess these models by analyzing what actually happens after a shock to
government purchases.
Identifying exogenous movements in government purchases
As discussed above, government purchases, [G.sub.t], respond to many
developments in the economy. Consequently we must make assumptions to
isolate movements in [G.sub.t] that were not caused by the response of
the government to factors affecting the private economy. Various authors
have argued that defense purchases, [g.sub.t], are less likely to
respond to private sector developments.
Based on their reading of history and contemporary news accounts,
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) argue that they are able to isolate three
arguably exogenous events that led to large military build ups: the
Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan build up. They date
these events at third quarter 1950, first quarter 1965, and first
quarter 1980.(9)
As background to our analysis, panel A of figure 2 reports the log of
real defense expenditures with vertical lines at the dates of the
Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Panel B of figure 2 reports the share of defense
spending in gross domestic product (GDP). Note that the time series on
real defense expenditures is dominated by three events: the large
increase in real defense expenditures associated with the Korean War,
the Vietnam War, and the Carter-Reagan defense build up. The
Ramey-Shapiro dates essentially mark the beginning of these episodes.
Various econometric procedures can be used to exploit the identifying
assumption that the Ramey-Shapiro episodes corresponded to the onset of
exogenous increases in government purchases. The procedure that we used
is described in box 1. Our basic strategy is to summarize how the
economy evolves over time using a statistical model which was estimated
using quarterly U.S. data for the first quarter of 1948 through the
fourth quarter of 1988. We chose this sample period to preserve
comparability with Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). Edelberg, Eichenbaum,
and Fisher (1998) present results obtained using data from the first
quarter of 1948 through the first quarter of 1996.
Given our statistical model, we use a simulation procedure to
estimate how the economy responded to the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro
episode. The simulated response functions which we report below give the
impact of an average increase in defense expenditures, where the average
is taken across the three Ramey-Shapiro episodes. Under our assumptions,
these correspond to an estimate of how the variable of interest would
respond to a similar exogenous increase in government purchases. As a
matter of terminology, we refer to the dynamic response of a variable to
the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode as the response of that variable to
a positive shock in government purchases.
Empirical results
The response of output and employment
Figure 3 reports our estimates of the dynamic response of real
defense spending, total government purchases, and aggregate output to
the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode. The black lines display our point
estimates. The colored lines correspond to 68 percent confidence
interval bands. Consistent with results in Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (1998), we find that the onset of a Ramey-Shapiro episode leads
to a large, persistent, hump-shaped rise in real defense expenditures.
These initially rise by about 1 percent, with a peak response of 30
percent roughly six quarters after the shock. The response of total real
government purchases is similar to that of defense purchases. While the
response is smaller, it is still substantial: Total government purchases
rise in a hump-shaped pattern with a peak response of 12 percent.
Next we consider the response of aggregate output to a shock in
government purchases. Paralleling the rise in defense expenditures,
there is a delayed, hump-shaped response in real GDP, with a peak
response of about 3.5 percent four quarters after the shock. The
increase in private real GDP, defined as GDP minus federal, state, and
local government purchases, is much smaller, with a peak response of
about 1.8 percent. In their analysis, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)
measure aggregate output using private sector value added, defined as
real gross national product (GNP) minus real value added by federal,
state, and local governments. From figure 3 we see that real GDP, real
GNP, and private sector value added respond in similar ways to a shock
in government purchases. However the peak increase in private sector
value added is considerably larger than the peak increase in private
GDP.
Figure 4 displays the response of employment to a positive shock in
government purchases. Notice that total private employment rises in a
hump-shaped pattern which parallels the hump-shaped increase in defense
and total government purchases. The response of employment in the
manufacturing sector is qualitatively similar to the response of total
private employment but is larger with a peak increase of roughly 5
percent. Employment in both manufacturing durables and nondurables
grows, with the increase in the first sector exceeding the increase in
the second sector.(10) Consistent with Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher's (1998) finding that structural investment rises after a
positive shock to government purchases, we see that employment in the
construction sector rises. Finally, figure 4 indicates that employment
by the federal government also increases.
We conclude, as do Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Ramey and Shapiro
(1997), Blanchard and Perotti (1998), and Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (1998), that a positive shock to government purchases leads to a
broad-based expansion in aggregate economic activity, with private
output expanding by less than total output. Since this finding is
consistent with all of the models discussed in the second section of
this article, we cannot use it to discriminate between them. For that,
we must turn to the responses of real wages and average productivity.
The response of inflation and real wages
All of our measures of the returns to work are constructed deflating
some nominal measure of wages by a price index. Therefore it is useful
to understand how the different price indexes we use respond to a shock
in government purchases. Figure 5 summarizes the response functions of
four price indexes and the corresponding inflation rates. These price
indexes are the GDP deflator, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the
Producer Price Index (PPI), and Rotemberg and Woodford's (1992)
private value added deflator.(11) The key result here is that all four
price levels and inflation rates rise in response to the shock in
government purchases.
With this as background, we now consider the way the return to work
responds to an exogenous increase in government spending. Figure 6
displays the response patterns of eight measures of real compensation:
compensation in the private business sector and in the manufacturing
sector, each deflated by the four price indexes discussed above. Two key
results emerge here. First, regardless of which measure we use, real
compensation falls after a positive shock to government purchases.
Second, compensation in the manufacturing sector falls more than
compensation in the overall private business sector. Therefore
compensation falls more in the sectors of the economy experiencing the
largest growth in employment after the shock to government purchases.
Next we consider the response of real wages in the manufacturing
sector. Figure 7 displays the response of eight different measures of
real wages to a positive shock in government purchases: before- and
after-tax real wage rates in the manufacturing sector, calculated using
the CPI, the PPI, the GDP deflator, and the private value added
deflator, respectively.(12) The key results here are 1) as in Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998), every measure of real wages falls after a
positive shock to government purchases, and 2) after-tax real wages fall
by more than before-tax real wages.(13) This second result is noteworthy
because it is the after-tax real wage rate that is relevant for
assessing the response of labor supply to an increase in government
purchases.
It is worth emphasizing that the real wage measure, denoted
Manufacturing Wages/Private Value Added, is the same as the one used by
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). These authors argue that real wages
increase after an increase in government purchases. The only difference
between our analysis and theirs is the way exogenous increases in
government purchases are identified. Like us, Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992) seek to identify exogenous movements in government purchases with
movements in defense purchases. But their procedure for isolating
exogenous movements in defense purchases is different from ours.
Specifically, they identify such movements with the error term in a
regression of military purchases on lagged values of itself and the
number of people employed by the military. Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and
Fisher (1998) argue that there are at least three reasons for being
skeptical of regression-based measures of exogenous shocks to government
purchases. First, the estimated innovations may reflect shocks to the
private sector that cause defense contractors to optimally rearrange delivery schedules, say because of strikes or other developments in the
private sector. Second, private agents and the government may know about
a planned increase in defense purchases well before it is recorded in
the data. For example, suppose that the government receives information
at a particular date that causes it to commit to a stream of defense
purchases in the future. The variables used in the regression for
military purchases may not contain this information. If this is the
case, then the regression-based procedure would generate, at best, a
polluted measure of exogenous shocks to government purchases. Finally,
inference using regression-based measures of shocks to government
purchases appears to be quite fragile to perturbations in the sample
period used as well as the list of variables used (see Christiano,
1990).
To see what impact adopting the regression-based procedure would have
on our results, we adopted as our measure of a shock to defense
purchases the error term obtained by regressing [g.sub.t] on four lags
of the log level of real GDP, the net three-month Treasury bill rate,
the log of the Producer Price Index of crude fuel, and [g.sub.t].(14)
Figure 8 displays the corresponding estimated response functions of
defense spending, total government purchases, and Rotemberg and
Woodford's (1992) real wage measure. Three key results emerge.
First, the new shock measure continues to generate a hump-shaped
increase in defense spending and total government purchases. Second,
after an increase in the new shock measure, the before-tax version of
Rotemberg and Woodford's (1992) real wage measure briefly falls,
but then rises. We conclude that the reason for the difference between
our results and those of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) is that we
identify an exogenous increase in government purchases in different
ways. Third, even with the new shock measure, the after-tax version of
Rotemberg and Woodford's (1992) wage measure falls in response to a
rise in government purchases. Viewed overall, we believe that the
preponderance of the evidence is clear: Real wages fall, rather than
rise, after an exogenous increase in government purchases.
The response of average productivity
Figure 9 presents our estimates of the response of average
productivity to a positive shock in government purchases. As can be
seen, average productivity falls in the manufacturing sector.
Interestingly, it falls by more in the sector where output and
employment rise the most: durables manufacturing. This is consistent
with models which assume that output is produced using a constant return
to scale technology and which abstract from varying labor effort and
capacity utilization. However, average productivity in the business and
nonfarm sectors appears to rise. This offers support to alternative
theories which allow for increasing returns to scale, labor hoarding,
and/or variable capacity utilization. It would clearly be of interest to
track down the reasons for the difference in the response of average
productivity in the manufacturing, business, and nonfarm sectors.
Unfortunately, the data to do this are, to the best of our knowledge,
unavailable. Absent a resolution of this puzzle, we are unwilling to say
which of the competing theories is favored by the average productivity
evidence.
Conclusion
This article builds on results in Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher
(1998) to characterize the effect of an exogenous increase in government
purchases on output, employment, real wages, and average labor
productivity. Our results shed light on the empirical plausibility of
alternative business cycle models. Our main finding is that after a
positive shock to government purchases, employment rises but real wages
fall. This is consistent with models that stress the effect of higher
tax obligations associated with a rise in government purchases. It is
inconsistent with models that stress the importance of increasing
returns to scale in production and/or counter-cyclical markups. Our
results presume that exogenous changes in defense purchases are a
reasonable proxy for exogenous changes in total government purchases.
This is an important maintained assumption in much of the literature. It
is certainly open to challenge. It would be interesting to obtain other
measures of exogenous increases in government purchases and aggregate
demand to see if they too lead to a rise in employment and a fall in
real wages.
Box 1
Our econometric procedure
The statistical procedure that we used can be described as follows.
Define the set of WAR dummy variables [D.sub.t], where [D.sub.t] = 1 if
t = {1950:Q3, 1965:Q1, 1980:Q1} and zero otherwise. Denote by [X.sub.t]
the time t value of the set of macroeconomic variables that we are
interested in studying. We assume that [X.sub.t] consists of a group of
k variables which evolves over time according to:
1) [X.sub.t] = [summation of] [A.sub.i][X.sub.t-1] where i = 1 to L +
[summation of] [B.sub.i][D.sub.t-1] where i = 0 to L + [u.sub.t].
Here [A.sub.i] and [B.sub.i], i = 1, ..., L are sets of k x k
matrices and [u.sub.t] is a vector of identically and independently
distributed random variables which are uncorrelated with [X.sub.t-i],
[greater than] 0, and [D.sub.t-i], i [greater than or equal to] 0.
Equation 1, which is referred to as the vector autoregressive
representation (VAR) of [X.sub.t], describes how the economy evolves
over time as a function of past history and current shocks to the
system. Given estimates of [A.sub.i] and [B.sub.i], we can estimate the
dynamic response of [X.sub.t] to a shock in defense expenditures by
simulating the system in equation I under the assumption that [D.sub.t]
takes on the value of one. Under our assumptions we can obtain
consistent estimates of these matrices using equation-by-equation least
squares.
Unless otherwise stated, in our analysis the vector [X.sub.t]
consisted of the log level of time t real GDP, the net three-month
Treasury bill rate, the log of the producer price index of crude fuel,
the log level of Ramey and Shapiro's measure of real defense
purchases, [g.sub.t], and the log level of the variable whose response
function we are interested in. In the case of inflation, we include the
time t rate of inflation in [X.sub.t].
We computed standard errors for our estimated response functions
using the following bootstrap Monte Carlo procedure. We constructed 500
time series on the vector [X.sub.t] as follows. Let [Mathematical
Expression Omitted] denote the vector of residuals from the estimated
VAR. We constructed 500 sets of new time series of residuals,
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]. The tth element of [Mathematical
Expression Omitted] was selected by drawing randomly, with replacement,
from the set of fitted residual vectors, [Mathematical Expression
Omitted]. For each [Mathematical Expression Omitted] we constructed a
synthetic time series of [X.sub.t], denoted [Mathematical Expression
Omitted], using the estimated VAR and the historical initial conditions
on [X.sub.t]. We then reestimated the VAR using [Mathematical Expression
Omitted] and the historical initial conditions, and calculated the
implied impulse response functions for j = 1, ..., 500. For each fixed
lag, we calculated the 80th lowest and 420th highest values of the
corresponding impulse response coefficients across all 500 synthetic
impulse response functions. The boundaries of the confidence intervals
in the figures correspond to a graph of these coefficients.
NOTES
1 See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998) for a review of the
literature that uses this strategy to distinguish between competing
models of the monetary transmission mechanism.
2 See Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998) for a discussion.
3 Many of the results reported in this paper appear in Edelberg,
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998).
4 For a recent review of this class of models, see King and Rebelo
(1998).
5 To simplify the discussion we have implicitly assumed that taxes
are lump sum in nature.
6 See Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1992) for a formal
discussion of this point.
7 This follows from the assumed properties of the technology for
producing goods.
8 See Farmer (1993) for models of imperfect competition and
increasing returns to scale at the firm level that generate the same set
of predictions as the models just discussed.
9 See Ramey and Shapiro (1997) for a detailed discussion of how these
dates were chosen. Also see Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998) for
a discussion of robustness of results to perturbations in these dates.
10 This is consistent with results of Eichenbaum, Edelberg, and
Fisher (1998) who show that output in the durables manufacturing sector
expands by more than output in the nondurables manufacturing sector.
11 The private value added deflator is constructed by dividing
nominal value added produced in the private sector by constant-dollar
value added in the private sector.
12 After-tax wages are constructed using the annual average marginal
tax rates reported in Fairlie and Meyer (1996).
13 Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1998) show that before- and
after-tax real wage rates in the durable goods, nondurable goods,
wholesale trade, and construction sectors also fall.
14 Estimated impulse response functions were obtained using a vector
autoregression assuming military spending does not respond within the
quarter to the other variables in the system.
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Martin Eichenbaum is a professor of economics at Northwestern
University, a consultant to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and a
research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Jonas
Fisher is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The
authors thank Judy Yoo for Research assistance.