Poland, a regional power through the European Union. A new direction of its foreign policy.

Mitrache, Marius-Mircea

In the wake of the Polish Presidency of the EU, that was set to start from July 1st 2011, and shortly after a G8 summit in France, Poland hosted an Eastern and Central European Summit in Warsaw, May 27th and 28th, having as a special guest President Obama himself. This latest Polish summit, the last major event preceding the EU Presidency taken over in July, was one of the latest examples of the high-esteem and influence that Poland has enjoyed lately among its European neighbours and American allies. It marked the height of a long and arduous process that changed Poland's image of a Eurosceptic, conservative, dispute-prone country, incapable of finding a suitable place in an ever-changing world.

Actually, in 2007 the coming to power of the pro-European, pragmatic and liberal right-wing party, the Civic Platform, led by the charismatic and capable Donald Tusk, set a new course for Poland's foreign policy, that struggled to change the previous image the country had, and the strained diplomatic relations with several major players, i.e. Germany and Russia. Nevertheless, more troubling was the attitude Poland had towards the EU, which gave the feeling that Poland, alongside the Czech Republic, was among the most Eurosceptic members of the Union. Following a non-pugnacious approach by Warsaw, due to combined efforts of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, and highly popular Foreign Minister Radoslav Sikorski, Poland started to be taken more seriously.

What is essential is the fact that a major shift on how the foreign policy should be carried out took place, a shift from a Romantic view, that claimed Poland to be the "Christ of Nations" always betrayed by the Westerners and Russians, to a much more pragmatic one. If the previous Kaczynski government over-emphasized the connection with the United States, Donald Tusk operated a much-needed rapprochement towards European capitals, especially Berlin. The fact that actual benefits from this special relationship with Washington did not pay off amounted for a lot of disenchantment.

Among the causes of this disenchantment we can identify the difficult and almost failed missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, that did not bring help in modernization of neither the Polish army, nor its economy, the decision to withdraw the missile shield, once proposed by the US, and probably the most painful disillusion of them all, the tough visa regime still imposed on Warsaw. The first fruits of this pragmatism showed up when German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, made his first official visit to Poland, and what's more important, he joined his counterpart Sikorski, into pressuring Belarussian president Lukashenko not to use force against those taking part in manifestations during the presidential elections in December 2010. Unfortunately, their efforts were in vain, but it made an encouraging precedent of Polish-German cooperation, that resonated very well in other European capitals (1). As Martin Krasuski points out in a paper for the Casimir Pulaski Foundation, even Moscow can benefit from the new change of tone coming from Warsaw. The Russian Federation knows that better relations with the EU are almost impossible without developing normal relations with Poland. If Moscow wanted to get the much needed and desired World Trade Organisation membership, it would require all the support it could get. Krasuski illustrates this interdependency between the two countries with the visit of Russian president Dimitri Medvedev to Warsaw, the first of its kind in 10 years, albeit a diplomatically but still meaningful one. For instance, there were discussions on radio spectrum coordination and navigation on the Vistula Lagoon, which represented small but sensitive matters for both sides.

Krasuski ends his plea for a pragmatic shift in Poland's foreign policy by mentioning the country's deficient presence in Brussels, and insisting on a more active presence in all European institutions. He recommends that Poland should emphasize support mechanisms for Central and Eastern European countries, thus enabling Warsaw to work alongside its neighbours. For him the ultimate risk is that if Poland isolates itself from the world, and refuses to carry a more pragmatic foreign policy from a bridge between West and East, Poland could quickly become a no man's land of Eastern Europe and a first class troublemaker. If Poland chooses to ignore pragmaticism over romanticism, it would be at its own peril (2).

Economic means to diplomatic ends

Of course, the willingness of Prime-Minister Donald Tusk to offer a position for Poland on the European and international stage requires much more than wishing and rhetoric, as fine as they might be. The truth is that the healthy shape of its economy and finances allowed Warsaw to be more at ease during an extremely difficult time for all countries. The recession that started in 2008, has watched countries like the United States, or other European ones like the United Kingdom, France or Germany to bail out their failed banks that prompted other financial and economic troubles for them and the world. Unlike other countries that saw their economies crashed, Poland actually enjoyed an economic growth. In 2007 it had an amazing 6,8% growth, and in the following years, more reasonable but still impressive figures like 1,7% in 2009 and 2,5-3% in 2010, becoming thus Europe's sixth economy without the housing bubble that allowed other Eastern European states to enjoy a financial yet--unsustainable boom. First of all, Poland was the biggest beneficiary of European funds for the 2007-2013 period, with 63,8 billion Euros co-financed from 100 billion Euros. How the crisis was caused by the fall of the private sector demand, the public sector could cushion the blow. Secondly, Poland, unlike her Baltic neighbours, never entered in a foreign currency credit bubble (like the euro or the Swiss franc) which would have been a tragedy considering the Zloty depreciation. Actually, since Poland proved so well, the depreciation of the national currency helped a lot the Polish economy, easing the pressure that other countries faced. Thirdly, the internal market was much larger and diversified than that of the other neighbouring countries (3).

As French journalist Florence Beauge states in an article for Le Monde "With its 38 million inhabitants, Poland has indeed a large domestic market. Less open than its neighbors, less dependent on exports, with a strong diversified economy, it has not experienced the dramatic slowdown in world trade. Take for instance the case of the Golden Terraces, a gigantic shopping mall opened in 2007 behind the Warsaw Central Railway Station, jostling seven days a week, 250 stores of western brands on five levels. "Here, a crisis is not seen as inevitable. People remember the time when they had nothing and know how to restrict. As soon as we entered the financial crisis, the issue of wages, which was the agenda, was put under a bushel by the unions. Difficult to imagine a different attitude in France, "said Francois Colombia, president of Auchan in Poland and Russia (4)."

The fact that it was not so dependent on import and foreign direct investments (only 7 % against 38% of GDP like the Czech Republic) helped Warsaw to avoid the fate of other countries like Spain, Ireland, Latvia or Bulgaria that tied their fortunes on the development of one sector, either construction or finance. Poland never had to bailout its banks, since this particular sector was never involved in the speculative schemes that crashed its Western counterparts. It had a solid bookkeeping, never spending more than it gained, like Hungary or, more infamously, Greece.

Moreover, more importantly, Poland has always had an impressive solid entrepreneurship tissue, because of the entrepreneurship and combative spirit that always hallmarked the Polish people. Through its exports and internal demand, Poland managed to survive one of the toughest financial crises since World War II.

Finally, in 2009, Poland demanded and got from the IMF a special Flexible Credit Line (FCL) offered only to economic stable countries, without any what so ever of the hard-liner, austerity measures countries like Greece or Ireland had to endure. This was mostly a PR stunt designed to promote the stability and the healthiness of its economy and financial system. The goal for Poland was to set itself apart from the same-perceived region of Eastern Europe, offering to the investors the message that this country is not like Romania, Latvia, Estonia or many others (5).

Fewer fences make good neighbours

This unique position, as one of the few countries in the world to experience growth during the recession, further strengthened Poland's position in the EU both economically and politically. A healthy economy ensured the means to promote its foreign policy goals. And one of the most important and crucial of these is the Eastern Policy (Polska polityka wschodnia) that she has pursued ever since 1998 from the beginning of the negotiations for EU accession. Its aim was to transform Poland into a West-East bridge, as it was stated in the National Integration Strategy developed by Polish European Integration Committee created in 1996. The very foundation of Poland's Eastern Policy lays it the so-called ULB doctrine, written by Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski 60 years ago, and published in "Kultura" magazine in Paris, a Polish-based emigre-journal. First thought and published in the days of the Cold War and of the Iron Curtain, and getting its name from the Ukraino-Lithuano-Belarussian trio, this doctrine stated the necessity of recognition of captive nations in Eastern Europe, the acceptance of pre-Yalta borderlines, reconciliation between these nations, and, more importantly, reconciliation and normalization of relations with Russia6. After the fall of the communism, the first non-communist Polish foreign minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, stated that one of Poland's major priorities was to sustain democracy in Ukraine, and Belarus, and to have good diplomatic and economic relations with Lithuania and, especially with Russia. Although over the years, this course was not always followed, a trend existed and today Poland is pursuing more or less these goals set back in the early '90s. Among these countries, Ukraine was always the privileged one in terms of attention.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Skubiszewski pleaded for an active Oriental foreign policy in front of the Sejm, claiming that the promotion of political liberalism and democracy was in the best interest of the Polish minorities living in these countries. Historian Timothy Snyder points out that the good relations between Poland and the newly created state of Ukraine settled the dispute of their new common border. Starting from this point onwards, Poland could have concentrated its energy on settling the German-Polish border, whose status was uncertain especially after the German reunification. (7)

As for Lithuania, a country who has a significant Polish minority, and between whom bilateral relations have been more difficult, Poland always portrayed itself as a vocal advocate for European integration. Although Poland was at the beginning part of the so-called Luxembourg Group that consists of countries who received green light with respect to EU from early 1998, it constantly expressed support for the Helsinki Group that started negotiation from 2000, Lithuania being one of its members. (8)

In 1998, Bronislaw Geremek, liberal foreign minister at the time, made an appeal to an "Eastern dimension" of the EU, and in 2003, Cimoszewicz, the socialist foreign minister stated that "... EU [Eastern Policy] should be flexible enough to enable the individual development of relations with each of the countries concerned without prejudicing their final formula". Poland wished to develop a policy plan towards this region, based on the successful Northern Dimension, and drawing lessons from the Spanish experience in promoting the Mediterranean policy (9). However, the results at the time were a failure, especially because of Western European countries' unwillingness to offer more to states like Ukraine, than they have already done through the European Neighborhood Policy. Furthermore, there were some fears that Poland's insistent lobby on more opportunities and incentives so that these countries could eventually join the EU was part of an American scenario to weaken the Union. In 2001, French President Jacques Chirac went as far as calling Poland "the American Trojan Horse." (10) However, in the wake of Poland's accession to the EU in 2004, foreign minister Anna Fotyga insisted that "the support for the pro-EU direction of Ukraine should be one of the Union's priorities."

Poland had to wait until 2008, when a successful Polish-Swedish joint-initiative, well received by the European Commission, for strategic and security reasons, brought together countries both for and against further enlargement. As Anna Pomorska writes, "The initiative was mainly 'cooked' in the two capitals, lobbied from there and benefited from a personal engagement of the two member states' foreign ministers. Such a partnership, according to the proposal, should be based on the ENP, but also on the principle of differentiation." (11)

As early as 2006 the Polish foreign minister Stefan Meller stated in his address to the Sejm that: "We will seek to ensure that the emerging Eastern Dimension of the Union's Neighborhood Policy draws the countries involved closer to the Union. At the same time, they should not be doomed to the role of 'eternal partners'. At least some of them--the ones with a pro-European orientation and advanced internal transformations--should be given the prospect of membership, however distant it may be." (12)

Eventually the Russian-Georgian conflict and the energetic dispute between Russian and Ukraine made it clear that the EU must have some sort of common policy concerning its Eastern neighbors. This initiative, called "The Eastern Partnership" is addressed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldavia, and Ukraine, and, as stated by the European Commission, its goal is to reach further than the ENP. This is done through the so-called Association Accords (AA) that is the legal bound of the EU with these states, the Action Plans, which contain the reforms that are going to be made, the development of a gradual free-market zone, and a more coherent energy policy towards Russia (13).

Nevertheless, perhaps the most important feature brought by the success of the Eastern Partnership, was for Poland the understanding that only through the European Union, and by following its rules, can it impose its views and achieve its goal, forging productive alliances, and gaining respect.

From today's point of view, the Eastern Partnership draws praises and encouragements from Western leaders. In an interview for The Economist on September 30 2011, following a related summit in Warsaw, British deputy prime minister Nick Clegg said : "It's not a permanent waiting area where excuses are found in order to maintain the divide between the current European Union and the countries that want to join. It is a platform. It should be regarded as a way in which we can make the relationship between the EU and Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and so on closer and closer. That then helps those countries to prepare themselves for EU membership. At the same time, it allows us to send, as the EU, a clear and unambiguous signal when we think political and economic reforms are not proceeding in the right direction. Clearly, the most notorious example of that is Belarus, where President [Alyaksandr] Lukashenko is behaving like a sort of medieval despot. He has no role at all in 21st-century Europe." Asked if he envisages members of the Eastern Partnership ever joining the EU, he answered: "Yes, absolutely. If the conditions are met--and I think we have to be very rigorous about them: political reform, administrative reform, rule of law, market economy--it's crucial that we continue to open our doors." (14)

An increasingly vocal advocate of the region

In recent months, Poland has become more and more a vocal advocate of countries like Moldova and Ukraine, by supporting their efforts towards a democratization, the rule of law, and getting the free-market economy status, all equally related to the Copenhagen Criteria, which a country needs to fulfill before starting accession negotiations with the EU. Concerning Central Europe, it is true that for a while Poland's interest were not focused in this region. Despite all that, Poland was a founding member of the so-called Visegrad Group (V4) that regrouped it with countries like Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, one of the most important announcements of early 2011 was Poland's seek to militarize the V4 with its own battle group. Surely the Russian-Georgian conflict had its weight, as the energy related quarrels between Kiev and Moscow, but truth be told, a change became more and more needed ever since NATO's New Strategic Concept that was adopted in late 2010. Through it, NATO, and the United States are starting to view Russia, more as an ally, than a rival or, even worse, an adversary (15).

On the contrary, the Obama administration actively sought Russia's support on various hot-topic issues, like Iran and North Korea. Consequently, the US ceased to be a guarantee of Central Europe's security, and for several politicians and analysts a militarized Visegrad Group became a necessity (16). Despite the freshness of the proposal, the militarization of Central Europe is not a new idea. As Richard Cashman, from the Henry Jackson Society proves it, the interwar Polish leader Josef Pilsudski entertained the idea of a militarized bloc called Intermarum, a bloc of countries between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea (thus the Latin name Marum) to counter the growing threat of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany (17).

In the present-day case, a militarized V4 Group with Poland as leader makes sense, especially since its model is the Nordic EU Battleground Group, that helped regional cooperation between Scandinavia and the Baltics. For the Visegrad Group it was feared that not all EU's countries (especially Western ones) perceive Russia as a threat combined with NATO's new and ambiguous Strategy Concept, that made these decisions to be taken.

A STRATFOR analysis points out that Poland became the inevitable leader of this group because it took the rotating presidency of the EU in July 2011, and because Poland has the best military ties with the United States of all other countries. News of this project has not gone too well with Moscow. On May 12, 2011 the Russian Prime Minister made a visit to Bratislava, officially to attend his country's performance to the ice-hockey world championship, but more likely to discuss with his Slovakian counterpart the growing issue of a militarized Visegrad Group (18).

The interest of Poland in Central Europe is part of a much bigger, newer foreign policy axis, a North-South one. If Warsaw always saw itself as a bridge between East and West, this time the advantages of North-South axis have started to be taken more and more seriously. In the North, Poland's oldest and historical ally has been Sweden. Even stronger diplomatic ties have covered tight banking and financial connections with the Swedes. Actually, Sweden was always some sort of a role model for Poland, who found support in its Nordic ally in its successful Eastern Partnership initiative, and an example both for the Visegrad battleground it seeks to create and the EU rotating presidency set to begin in July 2011. As for the South, Poland begins to take interest in areas long ago neglected like the Black Sea and the Western Balkans (19). Concerning the Black Sea region, as it is stated in a report for the Polish think-tank, DemosEuropa, Frank Umbach explained that this region is vital for the Great Energy Game of Eurasia :"Given the scarcity of conventional oil and gas resources in the world, its growing concentration in ever less and equally more unstable countries and the projected rapid rise of global oil and gas demand, Central Asia and the Caspian region (CACR) with its proven oil and gas resources can contribute to ensuring global energy security by increasing the diversity of oil and gas supplies through the Black Sea region as a strategically important transit route. However, Russia, China, the EU and the region states have very different strategic interest and agendas, which complicate or even hindering regional wide cooperation." (20)

Finally, Poland wants to build enduring liberal free-market democracy with the rule of law, but not only through official channels, but also through NGOs and Civil society actors heavily involved in the democratization process. In another report from the same think-tank, Tija Memisevic and Ivan Vejvoda say that "both Poland and Czech Republic can provide assistance and partnership to countries of the Western Balkans in particular fields such as agriculture, financial system reforms, preparation of strategies and projects in order to receive EU funding. They can warn against mistakes they made and provide ideas for practical solutions and reforms. Experiences from new EU member states, gathered recently and where many countries had to start building up institutions and developing policies from the scratch, are invaluable to Western Balkan countries." (21) Surely, Poland will not miss this excellent opportunity to prove itself and the world that it can act as a responsible role model and can offer assistance for willing countries like those in the Western Balkans.

With regards of Poland's ambition as a regional power probably nobody said it better than the current Foreign Minister, the acclaimed Radek Sikorski, in his early March address to the Sejm : "The mission of the Foreign Ministry, as drafted in a statement by its staff, "is to pursue the interests of the Republic of Poland through European and global cooperation for security, democracy and development." It is also expressed, more briefly, by our motto: "Serving Poland, building Europe, understanding the world." Let us bear in mind that Solidarity succeeded because its leaders deliberately acted in line with the motto of the Hanseatic city of Gdansk: "Nec temere, nec timide"--neither rashly, nor timidly." (22)

Bibliography:

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2. Bialozyt, Wojciech, (2011), "The North-South Line and orientation of Polish foreign policy", Liberte, [http://liberteworld.com/2011/ 02/15/thenorth-south-line-and-orientation-of-polish- foreign-policy/] 01 June 2011

3. Cashman, Richard, (2011), "Visegrad Battlegroup May Be Step Closer To Pilsudski And Mackinder's Vision--Analysis", Eurasiareview, [http://www.eurasiareview.com/15082011-visegrad-battlegroup-may -bestep-closer-to-pilsudski-and-mackinders-vision- analysis/] 01 September 2011

4. Euractiv, (2011), "A militarised Visegrad Group?", [http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/militarised-visegrad-group analysis-504824] 01 June 2011

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8. Memisevic Tija, Vejvoda Ivan, (2011), "On the Road to Stability: The Western Balkans Future in the EU", in Balcer, Adam (ed.) Poland and the Czech Republic: Advocates of the EU Enlargement?, Warsaw, DemosEuropa Center for European Strategy, [http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/raport_demos_grudz20 10_uk_v08_www.pdf 01 June 2011

9. Pomorska, Anna, (2011), "Are we there yet? From adaptation to Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy", Paper for EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference Boston, [http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/7j_pomorska.pdf] 01 June 2011

10. Sikorski, Radek, (2011), Minister's Annual Address 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, [http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20110316EXPOSE/expos e_2011_en.pdf , 01 June 2011

11. Snyder, Timothy, (2004), The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

12. Struk, Sarah, (2010), "La diplomatie polonaise : de la doctrine "ULB" au Partenariat Oriental", Nouvelle Europe, [http://www.nouvelleeurope.eu/node/916] 01 June 2011

13. The Economist, (2011), "An interview with Nick Clegg" , [http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/09/britainand-europe] 01 June 2011

14. Truchlewski, Zbigniew, (2011), "L'economie polonaise, premiere de la classe europeenne?", Nouvelle Europe, [http://www.nouvelleeurope.eu/node/834] 29 May 2011

15. Umbach, Frank, (2011), "The Black Sea Region and the Great Energy Game in Eurasia" in Balcer, Adam (ed.) The Eastern Partnership in the Black Sea Region: towards a New Synergy, Warsaw, DemosEuropa Center for European Strategy, [http://www.eucers.eu/wp-content/uploads/BSR ES-Cooperation-Demos-2011.pdf] 01 June 2011

* This work was possible with the financial support of the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number POSDRU/107/1.5/S/76841 with the title "Modern Doctoral Studies: Internationalization and Interdisciplinarity".

(1) Martin Krasuski, "A call for pragmatism of the Polish foreign policy", Nouvelle Europe, 18 February 2011 [http://drupal.nouvelle-europe.com/en/node/1020], retrieved 28 May 2011

(2) Ibidem, [http://drupal.nouvelle-europe.com/en/node/1020], retrieved 28 May 2011.

(3) Zbigniew Truchlewski, "L'economie polonaise, premiere de la classe europeenne?", Nouvelle Europe, 3 April 2010, [http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/ node/834], retrieved 28 May 2011.

(4) Florence Beauge, "Dans une Europe en crise, la Pologne fait figure d'exception", Le Monde, 10 March 2010 [http://vivrelinternational.blogspot.com/2010/03/ dans-une-europe-en-crise-lapologne.html], retrieved 29 May 2011.

(5) Zbigniew Truchlewski, "L'economie polonaise, premiere de la classe europeenne?", Nouvelle Europe, 3 April 2010, [http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/ node/834], retrieved 29 May 2011.

(6) Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2004, pp. 221-223.

(7) Ibidem, pp. 234-235.

(8) Sarah Struk, "La diplomatie polonaise : de la doctrine "ULB" au Partenariat Oriental", Nouvelle Europe, 23 August 2010, [http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/ node/916], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(9) Ibidem, [http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/916], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(10) Anna Pomorska, "Are we there yet? From adaptation to Europeanisation of Polish foreign policy", 3-5 March 2011, Paper for EUSA Twelfth Biennial International Conference Boston, p. 14. [http://euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/7j_pomorska.pdf], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(11) Ibidem, p. 7.

(12) Stefan Meller, Minister's Annual Address 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, [http://www.msz.gov.pl/Ministers,Annual,Address,2131.html], retrieved 01 June. 2011.

(13) Sarah Struk, "La diplomatie polonaise : de la doctrine "ULB" au Partenariat Oriental", Nouvelle Europe, 23 August 2010, [http://www.nouvelle-europe.eu/node/916], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(14) "An interview with Nick Clegg", 30 September, The Economist, [http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/09/ britain-and-europe], retrieved 01 June 2011

(15) "A militarised Visegrad Group ?", Euractiv, 13 May 2011, [http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/militarised-visegrad -group-analysis-504824], retrieved 01 June 2011

(16) Blazej Lenkowski, "Polish foreign policy to be reviewed", Liberte, 18 March, [http://liberteworld.com/2011/03/18/polish-foreign-policy-to-be-reviewed/], retrieved 01 June 2011

(17) Richard Cashman, "Visegrad Battlegroup May Be Step Closer To Pilsudski And Mackinder's Vision--Analysis", Eurasiareview, 15 August 2011 [http://www.eurasiareview.com/15082011-visegrad-battlegroup-may -be-step-closer-topilsudski-and-mackinders-vision- analysis/], retrieved 25 August 2011.

(18) "A militarised Visegrad Group ?", Euractiv, 13 May 2011, [http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/militarised-visegrad -group-analysis-504824], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(19) Wojciech Bialozyt, "The North-South Line and orientation of Polish foreign policy", Liberte, 15 February 2011, [http://liberteworld.com/2011/02 /15/the-north-south-line-andorientation-of-polish-foreign- policy/], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(20) Frank Umbach, "The Black Sea Region and the Great Energy Game in Eurasia", in Adam Balcer (ed.), The Eastern Partnership in the Black Sea Region: towards a New Synergy, Warsaw: DemosEuropa Center for European Strategy, 2011, p. 55. [http://www.eucers.eu/wpcontent/uploads/BSR-ES-Cooperation- Demos-2011.pdf], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(21) Tija Memisevic, Ivan Vejvoda, "On the Road to Stability: The Western Balkans Future in the EU", in Adam Balcer (ed.) Poland and the Czech Republic: Advocates of the EU Enlargement?, Warsaw: DemosEuropa Center for European Strategy, 2011, p. 96. [http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/raport_demos _grudz2010_uk_v08_www.p df], retrieved 01 June 2011.

(22) Radek Sikorski, Minister's Annual Address 2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, [http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/20110316EXPOSE/ expose_2011_en.pdf], retrieved 01 June 2011.

Marius-Mircea Mitrache **

** Marius Mitrache is PhD candidate at Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of European Studies. Contact: marius_mitrache@yahoo.com