Targeting performance of community-based development interventions: an econometric analysis of a women-focused and women-managed non-governmental organisation in Rural Pakistan.
Khan, Hidayat Ullah ; Kurosaki, Takashi
This paper investigates whether the community-based development
(CBD) approach effectively reaches out to the poor. The CBD approach is
expected to improve targeting performance by reducing leakage to the
non-poor, elite capture, and programme placement costs. However, the
existing literature lacks comprehensive and innovative ways to assess
the targeting performance involving women. We thus examine the targeting
performance of CBD interventions adopted by a women-focused and
women-managed non-governmental organisation (NGO) in north-western
Pakistan. The NGO intervenes through female organisations called
Community Organisations (COs), which is rather unusual for a
male-dominated society like Pakistan. To assess the targeting
performance, we employ rich village- and household-level survey data and
compare villages with and without COs on the one hand and member and
non-member households on the other hand. The comparison is in terms of
poverty and vulnerability. The study shows that the NGO, with proactive
involvement of women, has been able to successfully target poorer and
environmentally vulnerable villages as well as households.
JEL Classification: 01, 02, 013, 015
Keywords: Community-based Development, Targeting Performance,
WomenFocused and Women-Managed NGO, Pakistan
1. INTRODUCTION
The approach of community-based development (CBD) is expected to
improve targeting and reduce programme costs of poverty reduction
policies, besides other positive contributions [Mansuri and Rao (2004)].
(1) Furthermore, the use of local knowledge is expected to bear greater
relevance in a situation where credible monetary data for potential use
in targeting activities are not available. According to Alatas, et al.
(2012), in developing countries--where the majority of potential target
group is employed in the informal sector--the availability of verifiable
income records is always an issue. Therefore, it is difficult to
identify target groups by employing conventional targeting techniques
such as means tests. For these reasons, identification through the CBD
approach is expected to improve targeting.
However, the absence of institutional support and/or homogeneity
within a community may diminish the usefulness of local information. In
the absence of local governance institutions, it is difficult to ensure
accountability in the course of implementing CBD initiatives in
decentralised settings. For instance, according to Conning and Kevane
(2002), within-community heterogeneity may result in a variety of
perceptions vis-a-vis poverty, and this may adversely impact targeting
performance. The situation becomes worse when the perceptions of donors
(i.e., governments, non-government organisations (NGOs), multilateral
donors, and philanthropists) with regard to poverty differ from those of
the local community. These conditions may create an environment
conducive to elite capture.
In addition, even when the CBD approach is able to target poorer
villages, it may fail in reaching out to the poor households within each
village [Mansuri and Rao (2004)], which can be termed as "poor
targeting or mistargeting."For instance, the study of Galasso and
Ravallion (2005)--whose motivation closely resembles that of this
paper--investigates the targeting performance of the Food-for-Education
(FFE) Programme in Bangladesh. The targeting mechanism adopted for the
programme comprises two stages: selection of the participating
communities by the central government and the identification of eligible
households by the communities concerned. By employing both household and
commurtity-level data, Galasso and Ravallion (2005) show that the larger
a programme is, the lower the levels of land inequality and remoteness
therein are, the lower the number of shocks is, and also the lower
private redistribution of transfers is, the more improved the
within-village targeting becomes. Furthermore, the decision-making
ability of the community has a strong influence on the programme
outcomes and the centre's programme placement did not take into
account village attributes that may potentially help in reaching out to
the poor.
Given these findings within the literature, this paper attempts to
gamer a better understanding of targeting performance for the case of
Pakistan. (2) First, we employ village and household-level data that
contain an array of geographic, socioeconomic, demographic, and
vulnerability-related measures, to analyse the targeting performance.
The list of variables therein is more comprehensive than any adopted in
the existing literature. Second, some of the parameters--like networking
with the local elite and environmental vulnerability--are used here for
the first time, to analyse the targeting performance of CBD
interventions. In assessing the performance of targeting, we define
"good" targeting as the success of an implementing NGO in
placing its programmes in poor villages (in terms of lower adult
literacy, poor access to basics amenities, higher level of
susceptibility to the natural disasters, etc.) and reaching out to the
poor households (poorer access to basic civic services and environmental
vulnerability). This is because the aim of the NGO is to improve the
livelihood of poor and vulnerable households.
The rest of this paper is organised in the following manner.
Section 2 describes the study area while Section 3 elaborates the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 proposes the empirical
strategy, followed by Section5 that shows quantitative results. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2. STUDY AREA AND THE NGO
Pakistan is an under developed country in terms of both economic
and human development. As per the United Nations Development Programme
[UNDP (2013)], Pakistan is ranked the 146th of 185 countries on Human
Development Index. Moreover, the country has very low mean years of
schooling, i.e.4.9 years and per-capita gross national income, i.e. USD
2,566 (in purchasing power parity dollars of 2005). Meanwhile, over 60
percent of the Pakistan's population dwells in rural areas. The
rural population of the country has generally poor access to basic
amenities and is highly vulnerable to various shocks.
Given the public sector's failure to deliver basic public
services to the nation--and especially to the rural poor--NGOs have been
actively intervening and providing such services. Several of them have
adopted CBD approaches since the 1990s. To analyse the targeting
performance of such NGOs and success or failure to outreach the rural
poor, in 2010, we began a study on an NGO called the Pakistani Hoslamand
Khawateen Network (PHKN), which has its headquarters in District Haripur
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP).
PHKN intervenes in areas of microfinance, human resource
development (HRD) training, microinfrastructure projects, and the like.
In providing these services, PHKN adopts a CBD approach, under which
dwellers of a village or rural community are outreached and organised
into community-based organisations. In the case of PHKN, such
organisations are called "Community Organisations" (COs).
Owing to socio-cultural norms, PHKN has separate COs for males and
females. On average, the COs have 16-40 members. PHKN is a woman-led and
a women-focused NGO. Its current president is a woman, all members of
its board of directors are women, almost three-quarters of the COs are
managed by women, and most of its activities are focused on women. This
characteristic distinguishes PHKN from other NGOs in the region. Such
NGOs are rare in the context of the male-dominated society of Pakistan
[Khan (2013)].
The formation of a CO involves a number of steps (Khan et al, 201
l). (3) Under the CO formation process, some of the contacted villages
may refuse to form a CO in their village(s). Similarly, some of the
non-CO villages can eventually become CO villages, although this did not
happen frequently after we began our survey in 2010. Once a CO is formed
in a village, PHKN's interventions become active and routine. (4)
3. DATA
During September-December 2010, we implemented a benchmark survey
comprising three tiers; the three tiers are villages, COs, and
households. Khan, et al. (2011) describe the survey in detail. In this
paper, we employ village- and household-level data.
The village survey was designed as a census survey to cover all
villages that were (potential) target areas of PHKN. We gathered 105
observations of villages, of which 99 are located in District Haripur.
COs of PHKN existed in 40 out of 105, all in District Haripur. We call
them CO villages. The rest, 65 villages, are called nonCO villages.
Table 1 lists variables taken from the village survey and analysed
in this paper. The variables include village population, the
occupation-based distribution of the populations of the villages, the
literacy rate,5 connectivity with canal-irrigation system, access to
amenities, health and education institutions, local-governance
institutions (we call them dispute settlement forums, or DSFs below),
and susceptibility to shocks including damages due to the July-August
2010 floods.
In the household data, three types of households were randomly
chosen: (i) those who have been members of PHKN activities (henceforth
referred to as T-group households), (ii) non-member households
(henceforth called as Q-group households) living in CO villages, and
(iii) households living in non-CO villages (henceforth labelled as
C2-group households). The total size of the sample is 583, divided into
249 T-group households, 234 Ci-group households, and 100 [C.sub.2]-group
households. (6) The sample represents predominantly rural households
living in Haripur District that are potential targets of PHKN.
Table 3 lists variables taken from the household survey and
analysed in this paper. The variables include demographic
characteristics, education, housing conditions, access to amenities,
assets holding, susceptibility to shocks, and social status of the
sample households and their networking with the local elite (native and
social status, and relationship with local elite). The statistics
suggest household-level disparity in education between male and female
members, which is a reflection of male domination in the study area. The
housing conditions and asset holding reveal that most of the sample
households are poor. We consider housing conditions and land ownership
exogenous to PHKN's outreach, while livestock ownership and access
to amenities as potentially endogenous to PHKN interventions.
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To assess the targeting performance of the CBD approach, we test
the two following hypotheses. First, we test Hi: Whether CO villages are
systematically poorer and more vulnerable than non-CO villages. As a
statistical test, we employ the null hypothesis that observable
characteristics of CO villages and non-CO villages are the same. Second,
we test [H.sub.2]: Whether CO members (7-group) are systematically
poorer and more vulnerable than non-members ([C.sub.1]-group) within CO
villages. As a statistical test, we employ the null hypothesis that
observable characteristics of 7-group and [C.sub.1]-group households in
CO villages are the same.
To focus on targeting--rather than on impact--throughout this
paper, we mainly analyse the predetermined and exogenous factors that
reflect the targeting performance of the PHKN, which makes non-CO
villages a valid counterfactual.7We conduct both bivariate and
multivariate regression analyses to obtain robust results. The reason we
conduct regression analyses is that many of variables are correlated so
that partial correlation controlling for other variables may be more
meaningful. The multiple regressions exactly controls for other
variables.
4.1. Inter-Village Comparison
Testing [H.sub.1] is an inter-village targeting analysis. If, in
the course of testing H" we find that CO villages are poorer than
non-CO villages, say the CO villages have lower adult literacy, access
to basic amenities, and higher susceptibility to the natural disasters,
etc., we will conclude that the PHKN targets poorer villages. This
finding would reflect the net effect of two mechanisms: that the PHKN
endogenously approaches poorer villages, and that poorer villages elect
themselves in approaching the PHKN.
Hypothesis [H.sub.1] is tested both using village-level
characteristics and household-level characteristics. We compare (i) CO
villages and non-CO villages, and (ii) households living in CO villages
and households living in non-CO villages. Considering PHKN's
community mobilisation process described in Section 2, we test [H.sub.1]
by altering the definitions of "CO villages" and "non-CO
villages." As the results are qualitatively similar, we report only
the results based on the default definition in this paper due to the
space limit (Khan, 2013). To implement (ii), we compare the weighted sum
of 7-and [C.sub.1]-group households (those living in CO villages) and
that of [C.sub.2]-group households (those living in non-CO villages). As
the sampling probability is different across villages and across the
three groups of sample households (7, [C.sub.1], and [C.sub.2]), we
employ the weighted average when we use household-level observations to
test Hi.
4.2. Intra-Village Comparison
Hypothesis [H.sub.2] is tested using household-level
characteristics. It is a comparison between the 7-group (member
households in CO villages) and the [C.sub.1]-group (nonmember households
in CO villages).In other words, this is an a-village targeting analysis.
If we test [H.sub.2] and we find that member households have worse
access to amenities and are more vulnerable to natural disasters than
non-member households, we infer that the member households are poorer
than the non-member households. This would reflect the self-selection of
households, as we analyse [H.sub.2] only using households in CO
villages.
In the bivariate analysis (the comparison of means between T and
[C.sub.1] households), we employ the weighted average to control for the
difference in sampling probability. In the multivariate analysis
(regression analysis), we also add village fixed effects to the list of
explanatory variables, to cleanly identify the difference.
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Comparison of CO and Non-CO Villages using Village
Characteristics
Table 1 shows empirical results comparing CO and non-CO villages
using village-level variables in a bivariate way. It reports statistical
tests of equality of means.
CO villages are characterised by a literacy rate lower than that of
non-CO villages by 8 percentage points. Both village types are similar
in their population size. Non-CO villages have a higher level of
occupational diversification, which is an indication of their higher
standard of living. The two sets of villages are similar in their access
to basic amenities like clean drinking water and market access roads,
whereas they are noticeably different in accessibility to natural gas,
cable TV, and internet. Non-CO villages have better access to the
aforementioned amenities, which are generally associated with
economically better-off areas. Non-CO villages tend to have more grocery
shops called Karyana shops and hence a better village market place.
We find no difference between the two sets of villages in access to
formal health facilities, whereas CO villages have better access to
informal health services, e.g., trained TBAs, than CO villages.
Similarly, the villages are similar in the availability of formal
educational facilities, whereas CO villages have better access to
informal education facilities, e.g., community-based schools, than
non-CO villages. The strong presence of informal institutions and
facilities in CO villages suggests minimal presence and/or effectiveness
of government at the grass-root level in the study area and PHKN's
provision of these informal services.
DSFs provide a basis for local governance. No difference is found
between CO and non-CO villages in terms of the presence of a traditional
DSF (e.g. jirga)--a characteristic exogenous to PHKN interventions and
is evenly spread across all the villages. However, the number of
nontraditional DSFs in CO villages is significantly larger than that in
non-CO villages; (8) this reflects the strong presence in the CO
villages of local-governance institutions essential to the effective use
of local information, the presence of accountability, and hence better
targeting performance [Mansuri and Rao (2004)].
Regarding the incidence of damage due to the 2010 floods, the
damages were higher in CO than in non-CO villages. This suggests that CO
villages tend to be more vulnerable to natural disasters.
Table 2 shows the regression results using the dummy for CO
villages as the dependent variable and variables analysed in Table 1 as
the explanatory variables. As the multivariate analysis is meant to be
used solely for descriptive purposes, we employ a linear probability
model. (9) Owing to the small sample size and inherent multicollinearity
issues, we opt for a reduced-form regression model. (10) In Model 1, we
employ as explanatory variables only those time-invariant variables that
are clearly determined prior to PHKN interventions, with the objective
of analysing only the targeting result. We include some potentially
endogenous variables in Models 2-5, but only as robustness checks. The
aforementioned endogenous variables are non-traditional DSFs (dsf),
availability of CBS (cbsch), and availability of TBAs (tba).
The results of the multivariate analysis agree with those of the
bivariate analysis, with varying levels of statistical significance.
Once we control for other factors, the literacy rate is no longer
associated with the presence of a CO in a village. The pattern of
pro-poor targeting persists, regarding the access to natural gas,
internet, and grocery shops, and susceptibility to disasters. These
results provide slightly weaker evidence than that suggested through the
bivariate analysis but the direction of targeting remains robust.
Unexpectedly, the coefficient on market road access (rd length)
becomes significantly negative in multivariate regressions. This
suggests that CO villages are more likely to beat shorter distances from
a major market than non-COvillages, when controlling for other factors.
Although this is against our expectation of pro-poor targeting, we
interpret this as a reflection of a cost-minimisation strategy on the
part of PHKN--especially in the wake of rising transportation costs.
When we add the potentially endogenous variables (dsf, cbsch, and
tba) to Models 2-5, positive and significant correlations are derived;
this accords with the results of the bivariate analysis. What is
important here is that the inclusion of the potentially endogenous
variables does not qualitatively alter coefficients on the more
predetermined variables. (11)
To summarise the village-level analysis using village
characteristics, we found that a village that is closer to a major
market, lacks amenities, and is prone to natural disasters is more
likely to be targeted by PHKN and hence form a CO. This suggests that
the overall targeting by PHKN is pro-poor. The results of both bivariate
and multivariate analysis support this.
5.2. Comparison of CO and Non-CO Villages using Household
Characteristics
Table 3 shows empirical results comparing households in CO villages
and households in non-CO villages using household-level variables in a
bivariate way.
The two sets of households are similar in demography, whereas the
education level is higher in non-CO villages than in CO villages. We
also find a sharp contrast regarding household assets. Except for the
livestock assets, the T and [C.sub.1] group households are poorer than
those in the [C.sub.1] group in terms of housing conditions (i.e., house
flooring and access to drainage) and access to amenities (i.e., gas,
internet, and cable TV). The livestock asset level is higher among the T
and [C.sub.1] group households than those in the [C.sub.1] group,
probably reflecting the PHKN's facilitating role for the poor
households to accumulate livestock. Overall, the bivariate analysis
shows a tendency that the T and [C.sub.1] group households are poorer
than [C.sub.1] group households in various aspects. Moreover, the T and
[C.sub.1] group households are highly vulnerable to shocks (e.g., wild
boar attacks), compared to the [C.sub.2] group; this result reflects
village-level PHKN placement and supports our earlier claim of pro-poor
targeting by the PHKN, that is, the PHKN can successfully outreach
environmentally vulnerable segments of society. A larger number of the T
and [C.sub.1]group households are native, compared to the [C.sub.2]group
households; however, among the former, there is a lower proportion of
households with higher social status. Both of these characteristics
suggest that CO villages are homogenous and the least socially
empowered, which once again confirms that PHKN targets the marginalised
segments of Pakistani society. We find an interesting difference between
the CO village households and non-CO village households, based on their
networking with the local elite. The T and [C.sub.1] group has better
networking with the local elite than the [C.sub.2]group households.
coefficients on most of the explanatory variables bear signs that are
similar to the one seen in the bivariate analysis. A significantly small
proportion of the T and [C.sub.1] group households use natural gas for
cooking, while a significantly larger proportion of the same exhibit
radio ownership and usage, compared to the [C.sub.2] group households.
The use of radio could be interpreted as the sign of relative poverty.
The [C.sub.2] group households have larger land holdings than the T and
[C.sub.1]group households. On the other hand, the T and [C.sub.1] group
households have stronger networking with the local elite than the
C2group households.
To summarise the findings of village-level analysis using household
characteristics, we found that villages whose households have poor
access to basics amenities (e.g. natural gas), less land assets, and
strong networking with the local elite are more likely to be served by
PHKN.
5.3. Intra-Village Analysis Comparing Member and Non-Member
Households
Within CO villages, what kinds of households are more likely to be
a member? To address this issue, the results of bivariate comparison
between member and nonmember households in CO villages are reported in
Table 5. Mostly, the two groups are highly similar. At the 5 percent
level, only two variables show a statistically significant difference:
Member households are more likely to be affected by the 2010 floods than
non-member households; member households are less connected with the
local elite than non-member households. Although significant only at the
10 percent level, member households are more likely to be affected by
wild boar attacks than non-member households. In contrast, the two
groups of households have similar characteristics in demography,
education, and assets. We interpret these patterns as an outcome of
self-selection, that is, the households prone to natural disasters and
have less network connections, even within the same village, are more
likely to join a CO. These findings thus support the pro-poor targeting
of PHKN interventions within CO villages.
Table 6 shows multiple regression results to predict the
probability for a household living in a CO village to participate in a
CO. We regress a dummy that represents the T group households on a set
of household-level variables from Table 5, as well as all village
dummies as explanatory variables, for a subsample of CO villages. The
results confirm that the two groups are highly similar. There are two
variables whose coefficients are statistically different from zero at
the 1 percent level: A significantly smaller proportion of the T group
households use natural gas for cooking; the T group households have
better access to cable TV than the [C.sub.1] group households. Although
the sign is the same, these two variables were associated with
insignificant differences in the bivariate analysis. The negative
correlation with the gas access is a sign of pro-poor targeting. On the
other hand, we interpret the positive correlation with cable TV as more
aware and socially sensitised are more likely to become CO members owing
to their access to independent and vibrant electronic media on cable TV
than the state-run terrestrial TV network. The higher probability for
households prone to natural disasters to be a member is confirmed from
the regression analysis as well, statistically significant at the 5
percent level.
To summarise the findings of household-level analysis within CO
villages, we found that member households and non-member households are
somewhat similar in their characteristics. If something, the tendency
for the poor and less-connected to become a member was found. Regarding
vulnerability to natural disasters, we found that more vulnerable
households were more likely to join a CO.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we quantitatively investigated the targeting
performance of the CBD approach using detailed primary data at the
village and household levels. The village-level data was collected
through a census survey, whereas the household-level data was collected
from a random sampling survey that covered both member and non-member
households of a woman-led and women-focused NGO in rural Pakistan.
We found that villages whose households are poorer in terms of
access to amenities and more susceptible to natural disasters are more
likely to have a CO of the NGO. The correlation involving the networking
showed an interesting contrast: Villages where networking with the local
elite is strong are more likely to form a CO, while within such villages
with a CO, households whose networking with the local elite is weak are
more likely to become a member. In contrast to the sharp contrast
between CO villages and non-CO villages, the difference between member
and non-member households within CO villages was not highly significant.
In other words, the NGO's pro-poor targeting functioned well at the
selection of recipient villages, whereas we found no evidence of
anti-poor targeting within CO villages.
To conclude, the women-focused NGO has been able to target villages
and households that are poor and vulnerable to natural disasters. The
results suggest that the CBD approach through woman-led and
women-focused NGOs is able to improve targeting performance of a poverty
reduction policy. The higher likelihood of more socially endowed
villages joining the NGO may raise concerns about potential elite
capture. The results for within-village analysis presented here and our
preliminary analysis using the same dataset and later rounds of primary
data (see Chap. 4, Khan, 2013, for details) do not support these
concerns, however.
In the current paper, we were not able to separately identify the
endogenous placement effect and the self-selection effect. In future
research, we intend to overcome this shortcoming by having further
rounds of surveys and through collection of recall data.
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Hidayat Ullah Khan <masmaleo@yahoo.com> is affiliated with
the Department of Economics, Kohat University of Science and Technology,
Kohat. Takashi Kurosaki <kurosaki@ier.hit-u.ac.jp> is affiliated
with the Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo,
Japan.
Author's Note: The authors are grateful to Xavier Gine, Katsuo
Kogure, Yutaka Arimoto, and participants of the 30th Conference of the
Pakistan Society of Development Economists (PSDE), the P'National
Conference on Emerging Trends and Challenges in Social Sciences
(ETCSS' 2014), and the 5th South Asian International Conference
(SAICON)for their useful comments on the earlier versions of this paper.
All remaining errors are ours.
(1) The CBD approach is also expected to contribute to the
decentralisation of power; the creation of high-quality, low-cost public
goods; and empowerment. These, however, are not the focus of this paper.
2 There is not much quantitative evidence regarding the CBD
approach in Pakistan using a microeconometric approach. Notable
exceptions include Khwaja (2004), Kurosaki (2005), Khwaja (2009), and
Kurosaki and Khan (2012).
(3) The CO formation process involves the following steps. First,
PHKN contacts a village through a meeting with peer leaders (e.g.,
village elders, school teachers, local elected members, and religious
leaders). At the first contact, initial assessment of the area is
undertaken, covering general information on the village society and on
its development needs. The introduction of PHKN to a village can be made
through PHKN staff members who find potential villages from available
secondary information, the concerned local administration (e.g., social
welfare, agriculture, health, education, and livestock departments) or
local politicians, and the peer leaders of a village. The first route
i.e. contact through the PHKN staff is employed most frequently. After
the initial contact, PHKN holds a series of meetings with peer leaders,
local communities, and stakeholders. This stage is called the 1st
Dialogue, and it is recorded in the PHKN log books. Subject fo
satisfying the minimum criteria qualification and eliciting the
willingness of a considerable number of villagers, a CO is formed. This
stage is called the 2nd Dialogue. During the 2nd Dialogue, community
development tools such as participatory rapid appraisal and village
resource mapping are employed to identify developmental needs and
priorities, and CO office bearers (the president, secretary, and
activists) are elected and trained on how to run a CO (i.e.,
record-keeping, accounting, and savings management). All interventions
undertaken by PHKN are categorised as the 3rd Dialogue.
(4) Usually, COs have a monthly meeting called the general body
meeting, where CO members discuss PHKN activities, prevailing issues in
the village, and future plans to address issues. CO members also deposit
savings during these meetings. CO savings are recorded in individual
savings accounts. All COs are provided with HRD training, the emphasis
of which is on the development of income-earning skills and
microenterprise management; the exact training differs from CO to CO,
reflecting each community's unique needs. In villages with deficits
in educational institutions, PHKN sometimes provides assistance to
community-based schools. Similarly, in villages with poor health
facilities, PHKN may train and mobilise informal health workers, such as
traditional birth attendants (TBAs). PHKN staff members regularly visit
each CO, with the average visit frequency being once every two months.
During these visits, PHKN personnel discuss various issues with CO
members while also checking CO records.
(5) Both the occupational distribution of population and the
literacy rate figures are consistent with that at the national level.
(6) See Khan, et al. (2011) for the detail of sampling procedures.
Regarding T-group households, in the first stage of sampling, 50 sample
COs were chosen, and in the second stage of sampling, we collected
information on five-member households, randomly chosen from the member
list. To collect information on C]-group households, we surveyed
non-member households living in the CO village where T households were
surveyed. The sample for [C.sub.1] households was randomly selected from
the electoral list of the villagers, at the rate of one per one T
household. Regarding [C.sub.2]-group households, we randomly selected
five households from 20 non-CO villages; these 20 villages were randomly
selected from the village list.
(7) As robustness check, we also investigate factors that are
potentially endogenous to PHKN interventions, particularly in the
village-level multivariate analysis.
(8) This illustrates PHKN's facilitation in bringing about a
local-governance system that is more inclusive than traditional
institutions. Analysis in this vein is left to future research.
(9) The Probit results are qualitatively the same as the results
reported in this paper.
(10) A number of variables have a potential association with some
other variables, or do not show variation in the bivariate comparison;
they are not included as explanatory variables in multivariate analysis.
(11) See Khan (2013) for a quantitative analysis of the causal
impact of PHKN's interventions.
Table 1
Comparison of CO villages and non-CO villages (bivariate analysis)
Variable Definition
Demography
lit_rate Adult literacy rate (%)
vil_pop Village Population
agri_prof_~c %age of total population in agriculture
services %age of total population in services
self_emp %age of total population in self employment
lab_nform %age of total population in non-farm labour
other_prof %age of total population in others
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops
irrigated_~e Connection to canal irrigation (dummy variable)
rd_length Length of the road (in km) connecting the village
with a major market
cln_drnk_wat Clean drinking water availability (%age of total
village population)
gas Availability of gas connection in the village
(dummy var.)
c_tv Avail, cable TV connection (dummy var.)
i_net Avail, internet connection (dummy variable)
kar_shop Avail. Karyana (grocery) shop (dummy var.)
veg_shop Avail, vegetable shop (dummy var.)
frt_shop Avail, fruit shop (dummy var.)
Existence of medical facilities in the village (dummy variables)
bhu Basic Health Unit (Govt)
rhu Rural Health Center (Govt)
dr_bhu_rhu Doctor's presence in BHU or RHC
tba Avail, traditional birth attendant (TBA)
Existence of education institutions in the village (dummy variables)
prim_school Primary school (1st to 5th grades)
mid_sch Middle school (6th to 8th grades)
hi_scho High school (9th to 10th grades)
cbsch Community based school
d_madra Deni Madrassah (religious school)
Dispute settlement forums (DSF) (dummy variables)
jirga Avail. Jirga--traditional DSF
dsf Avail, non-traditional DSF
ler Locally elected representative is from the village
Susceptiblity to natural disasters
dis_prone_~l Village is prone to disaster (dummy var.)
Mean for each group Difference (A)-(B)
(A) CO (B) Non- Mean (S.E.)
villages CO
(n=40) villages
Variable (n=65)
Demography
lit_rate 49.13 57.54 -8.41 * (3.86)
vil_pop 2252 2612 -360 (369)
agri_prof_~c 55.28 52.06 3.21 (4.36)
services 16.80 22.11 -5.31 (+) (2.97)
self_emp 5.60 9.14 -3.54 * (1.47)
lab_nform 15.10 11.58 3.52 (2.29)
other_prof 7.23 5.11 2.12 (1.65)
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops
irrigated_~e 0.250 0.292 -0.042 (0.090)
rd_length 14.13 15.51 -1.38 (2.22)
cln_drnk_wat 71.38 76.52 -5.15 (6.64)
gas 0.025 0.323 -0.298 ** (0.064)
c_tv 0.175 0.323 -0.148 (+) (0.084)
i_net 0.100 0.354 -0.254 ** (0.077)
kar_shop 0.725 0.877 -0.152 (+) (0.082)
veg_shop 0.625 0.492 0.133 (0.100)
frt_shop 0.325 0.431 -0.106 (0.097)
Existence of medical facilities in the village (dummy variables)
bhu 0.125 0.185 -0.060 (0.072)
rhu 0.025 0.062 -0.037 (0.039)
dr_bhu_rhu 0.125 0.215 -0.090 (0.074)
tba 0.825 0.646 0.179 * (0.085)
Existence of education institutions in the village (dummy variables)
prim_school 0.850 0.877 -0.027 (0.070)
mid_sch 0.325 0.369 -0.044 (0.096)
hi_scho 0.250 0.200 0.050 (0.085)
cbsch 0.250 0.092 0.158 * (0.078)
d_madra 0.475 0.446 0.029 (0.101)
Dispute settlement forums (DSF) (dummy variables)
jirga 0.850 0.769 0.081 (0.078)
dsf 0.925 0.769 0.156 * (0.067)
ler 0.650 0.738 -0.088 (0.094)
Susceptiblity to natural disasters
dis_prone_~l 0.975 0.831 0.144 ** (0.053)
Notes: 1. The standard errors (SE) are reported in parenthesis,
estimated under the assumption that allow unequal variance of two
groups. 2. The definition of a CO village is the default definition
(listed as having a CO or similar activities in the PHKN village
list). 3. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, (+) p < 0.1. 4. The table is
prepared by the authors.
Table 2
Correlates of Village-level Participation (Multiple Regression
Results)
Dependent variable: CO
village - dummy (d_col)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Village-level variables
lit_rate/100 -0.1812 -0.0471 -0.1163
(0.300) (0.329) (0.329)
vil_pop/l000000 -0.0069 0.0008 -0.0038
(0.039) (0.038) (0.034)
agri_Prof_Prc -0.0021 -0.0030 -0.0040
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Basic amenities, infrastructure,
and shops
irrigated_village -0.0420 -0.0440 -0.0700
(0.139) (0.137) (0.136)
rd_length -0.013 ** -0.014 ** -0.013 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
cln_drnk_wat 0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
gas -0,436 * -0.380 * -0.436 *
(0.195) (0.179) (0.193)
i_net -0.2180 -0.2140 -0.1980
(0.182) (0.167) (0.172)
kar_shop -0.1600 -0.1580 -0.1500
(0.151) (0.157) (0.147)
Access to education and medical
facilities
prim_school -0.0490 -0.0310 -0.0520
(0.144) (0.146) (0.144)
mid_sch -0.0730 -0.0740 -0.0750
(0.111) (0.109) (0.110)
hi_scho 0.0950 0.0590 0.0860
(0.154) (0.157) (0.152)
d_madra 0.1520 0.1600 0.1030
(0.116) (0.116) (0.112)
bhu 0.0960 0.0350 0.0650
(0.164) (0.165) (0 164)
Susceptibility to natural
disasters
dis_prone_vil 0.2550 0.2830 0.1970
(0.156) (0.155) (0.159)
Potentially endogenous variables
dsf 0.246 *
(0.118)
cbsch 0.289 *
(0.138)
tba
Intercept 0.852 ** 0.5630 0.926 **
(0.284) (0.310) (0.290)
R-squared 0.291 0.321 0.327
F-statistics for zero slopes 6.045 4.503 6.985
Level of Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dependent variable:
CO village - dummy
(d col)
Model 4 Model 5
Village-level variables
lit_rate/100 -0.1657 -0.0208
(0.300) (0.294)
vil_pop/l000000 0.0082 0.0131
(0.038) (0.034)
agri_Prof_Prc -0.0022 -0.0034
(0.002) (0.002)
Basic amenities, infrastructure,
and shops
irrigated_village -0.0980 -0.1150
(0.139) (0.134)
rd_length -0.012 ** -0.012 **
(0.004) (0.004)
cln_drnk_wat -0.0010 -0.0010
(0.002) (0.002)
gas -0.354 * -0.419 *
(0.177) (0.175)
i_net -0.2380 -0.2140
(0.172) (0.162)
kar_shop -0.1930 -0.1770
(0.134) (0.140)
Access to education and medical
facilities
prim_school -0.0600 -0.0480
(0.137) (0.139)
mid_sch -0.1110 -0.1060
(0.113) (0.111)
hi_scho -0.0060 -0.0190
(0.155) (0.155)
d_madra 0.1590 0.1190
(0.116) (0.113)
bhu 0.0900 0.0230
(0.158) (0.156)
Susceptibility to natural
disasters
dis_prone_vil 0.2980 0.2570
(0.152) (0.155)
Potentially endogenous variables
dsf 0.1640
(0.130)
cbsch 0.260 *
(0.128)
tba 0.312 ** 0.252 *
(0.097) (0.104)
Intercept 0.679 * 0.5860
(0.299) (0.329)
R-squared 0.352 0.393
F-statistics for zero slopes 5.901 8.110
Level of Significance 0.000 0.000
Notes: 1. In addition to those explanatory variables listed above,
intercept, Mansehra dummy, and Abbottabad dummy are also included. 2.
Estimated by OLS (linear probability model), with robust standard
errors (reported in brackets). 3. The number of observations is 105.
4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 . 5. Number of observations is 105.
6. The table is prepared by the authors.
Table 3
Household-level Comparison of CO Villages and non-CO Villages
(Bivariate Analysis)
Variable Definition
Demography
hhsize Number of household members
fem_rate Ratio of female over male members
fem_hh Dummy for a female-headed household
hh_edu Years of education of the household head
hh_lite Literacy dummy of the household head
hh_age Age of the household head
Education
educ_yrs Average years of education of adult
household members
fem_edu Av. yrs of education of female members
mal_edu Av. yrs of education of male members
d_lit Adult literacy rate
fem_lite Female literacy rate
mal_lite Male literacy rate
Household asset indicators
h_floor The flooring of the house is paved (dummy var.)
drainge The house has drainage (dummy var.)
gas The house is connected with gas for cooking
(dummy var.)
land_val Value of land owned (Rs. 1,000,000)
livestock_val Value of livestock owned (Rs. 1,000,000)
radio The household has and uses a radio (dummy)
internet The household uses internet (dummy)
cab_tv The house is connected with cable TV
(dummy)
Susceptibility to natural disasters
fldaffected_hh Affected by 2010 floods
wildboar_attack Suffered damages due to attacks by wild
boars
Social status
native Native household
sol_status Social status is high
networking Blood or non-blood relation with local elite
Weighted Mean for Difference:
Each Group (Tand [C.sub.1])-
([C.sub.2])
(T and
[C.sub.1]) ([C.sub.2]) Mean (S.E.)
Households Households
in CO in non-CO
villages villages
Variable (n=483) (w=100)
Demography
hhsize 6.088 6.681 -0.593 (0.561)
fem_rate 1.127 1.042 0.085 (0.125)
fem_hh 0.097 0.050 0.046 (0.031)
hh_edu 5.847 6.846 -0.999 (0.840)
hh_lite 0.701 0.744 -0.043 (0.077)
hh_age 50.164 50.518 -0.354 (1.953)
Education
educ_yrs 5.603 7.018 -1.415 ** (0.538)
fem_edu 2.170 2.912 -0.742 ** (0.251)
mal_edu 3.594 4.623 -1.030 * (0.469)
d_lit 0.746 0.775 -0.029 (0.035)
fem_lite 0.318 0.321 -0.003 (0.029)
mal_lite 0.428 0.454 -0.026 (0.034)
Household asset indicators
h_floor 0.083 0.461 -0.378 ** (0.098)
drainge 0.424 0.819 -0.394 ** (0.057)
gas 0.001 0.822 -0.821 ** (0.045)
land_val 0.491 0.670 -0.179 (0.374)
livestock_val 0.015 0.003 0.012 ** (0.002)
radio 0.334 0.290 0.044 (0.097)
internet 0.000 0.167 -0.167 * (0.085)
cab_tv 0.003 0.341 -0.338 ** (0.102)
Susceptibility to natural disasters
fldaffected_hh 0.329 0.289 0.040 (0.084)
wildboar_attack 0.333 0.066 0.268 ** (0.034)
Social status
native 0.961 0.768 0.194 * (0.086)
sol_status 0.927 1.000 -0.073 ** (0.018)
networking 0.408 0.058 0.350 ** (0.063)
Notes: 1. Means are weighted to reflect differences in sampling
probability. 2. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 3.
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1. The table is prepared by the
authors.
Table 4
Correlates of Village-level Participation (Household-level Multiple
Regression Results)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable:
Dummy representing T or [C.sub.1]
household with [C.sub.2] household
as the reference
Explanatory Vars (d t cl)
Village-level variables
lit_rate/100 -0.300 -0.300 -0.298
(0.304) (0.305) (0.307)
vil_pop/1000000 0.051 0.051 0.052
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
agri_prof_~c -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
rd length/100 0.015 0.017 0.007
(0.768) (0.769) (0.767)
cln_drnk_wat -0.001- -0.001 -0.0013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household education
d_lit 0.052
(0.055)
fem_lite 0.059
(0.060)
mal_lite 0.044
(0.065)
fem_edu/10 -0.003
(0.054)
mal_edu/10 -0.013
(0.067)
Household asset indicators
h_floor 0.041 0.041 0.043
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
drainge -0.054 -0.054 -0.052
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
gas -0.690 *** -0.691 *** -0.691 ***
(0.132) (0.132) (0.133)
land_val -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
radio 0.051 * 0.051 * 0.052 *
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
internet -0.151 -0.147 -0.141
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142)
cab_tv -0.04 -0.04 -0.038
(0.090) (0.090) (0.090)
Household level susceptibility
to natural disasters
fldaffecte~h -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
wildboar_a~k 0.037 0.038 0.039
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028)
Household level social status
and networking
native 0.296 ** 0.296 ** 0.299 **
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
sol_status -0.081 -0.08 -0.081
(0.047) (0.046) (0.047)
networking 0.137 * 0.137 * 0.138 *
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Intercept 0.809 *** 0.812 *** 0.840 ***
(0.214) (0.214) (0.210)
R-squared 0.578 0.579 0.578
F-statistics for zero slopes 71.067 68.376 68.953
Level of Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses. 2. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.3. The number of observations is 583. The table is
prepared by the authors.
Table 5
Comparison of Member and Non-member Households within CO Villages
(Bivariate Analysis)
Weighted Mean for
Each Group
([C.sub.1])
(7) Member Non-member
households in CO households in CO
villages (n=249) villages (n=234)
Demography
hhsize 6.403 5.899
fem_rate 1.123 1.130
fem_hh 0.088 0.102
hh_edu 6.098 5.697
hh_lite 0.738 0.680
hh_age 50.046 50.235
Education
educ_yrs 5.767 5.505
fem_edu 2.157 2.178
mal_edu 3.773 3.486
d_lit 0.763 0.735
fem_lite 0.317 0.318
mal_lite 0.447 0.417
Household asset indicators
h_floor 0.115 0.063
drainge 0.456 0.406
gas 0.000 0.002
land_val 0.553 0.454
livestock_val 0.016 0.014
radio 0.319 0.343
internet 0.000 0.000
cab_tv 0.008 0.000
Susceptibility to natural
disasters
fldaffected_hh 0.405 0.284
wildboar_attack 0.397 0.296
Social status
native 0.977 0.952
sol_status 0.936 0.922
networking 0.322 0.460
Difference: (T) -
([C.sub.1])
Mean (S.E.)
Demography
hhsize 0.504 (+) (0.280)
fem_rate -0.007 (0.095)
fem_hh -0.014 (0.033)
hh_edu 0.401 (0.533)
hh_lite 0.058 (0.054)
hh_age -0.189 (1.598)
Education
educ_yrs 0.262 (0.262)
fem_edu -0.021 (0.209)
mal_edu 0.287 (0.216)
d_lit 0.028 (0.027)
fem_lite -0.002 (0.023)
mal_lite 0.030 (0.023)
Household asset indicators
h_floor 0.052 (+) (0.029)
drainge 0.051 (0.058)
gas -0.002 (0.002)
land_val 0.100 (0.133)
livestock_val 0.002 (0.003)
radio -0.023 (0.055)
internet 0.000 (0.000)
cab_tv 0.008 (0.006)
Susceptibility to natural
disasters
fldaffected_hh 0.121 * (0.053)
wildboar_attack 0.101 (+) (0.054)
Social status
native 0.025 (0.021)
sol_status 0.014 (0.031)
networking -0.138 * (0.055)
Notes: 1. Means are weighted to reflect differences in sampling
probability. 2. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 3.
** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, (+) p < 0.1. The table is prepared by the
authors.
Table 6
Correlates of Household-level Participation Within CO Villages
(Multiple Regression Results)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable:
Dummy representing T household with
[C.sub.1] household as the
Explanatory Vars reference (d_t)
Household Education
d_lit 0.025
(0.058)
fem_lite -0.018
(0.074)
ma_Mite 0.080
(0.100)
fern_edu 0.001
(0.009)
mal_edu 0.020 *
(0.009)
Household level susceptibility
to natural disasters
h_floor 0.097 0.094 0.089
(0.066) (0.063) (0.064)
drainge 0.031 0.030 0.038
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046)
gas -0.380 *** -0.373 *** -0.386 ***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.038)
land_val -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
radio 0.007 0.007 0.003
(0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
cab_tv 0.479 *** 0.487 *** 0.472 ***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.076)
Household level susceptibility
to natural disasters
fldaffecte~h 0.107 * 0.108 * 0.110 *
(0.046) (0.047) (0.043)
wildboar_a~k 0.094 * 0.091 * 0.087
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Household level social status
and networking
native 0.272 0.184 0.255
(0.133) (0.119) (0.131)
sol_status -0.054 -0.056 0.015
(0.083) (0.084) (0.040)
networking -0.104 -0.112 -0.11
(0.074) (0.075) (0.087)
Village fixed affect Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 0.118 0.113 0.088
(0.151) (0.152) (0.137)
R-squared 0.075 0.076 0.079
F-stat for zero slopes 122.43 88.81 26.20
Level of Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 483 (only a subsample of
households belonging to CO villages is used). 2. Standard errors in
parentheses. 3. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.00l. 4. The table
is prepared by the authors. 5. "F-stat for zero slopes shows the
F-statistics for the null hypothesis that all slopes are zero except
for the intercept and village fixed effects.