Intergenerational mobility: evidence from Pakistan Panel Household Survey.
Javed, Sajid Amin ; Irfan, Mohammad
This paper, using data from Pakistan Panel Household Survey 2010,
finds evidence for higher (lower) intergenerational immobility
(mobility) for Pakistan. The results from transition matrix and
regression analysis suggest that the educational, occupational and
income status of the son is mostly determined by the socio-economic
position of the father.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pakistan over the years, since its independence in 1947, had a
rather erratic growth profile but on average GDP growth rate hovered
around 5 percent per annum with per capita income growth ranging between
2 to 3 percent. The structure of the economy graduated from being
predominantly agriculture in 1950s to being service sector orientated
since the turn of the century. The manufacturing sector grew from almost
insignificance in 1947 to a reasonable level accounting for around one
third of the GDP.
The demographic inertia associated with unchecked population growth
and emergence of job opportunities in urban areas led to massive rural
to urban migration, which resulted in a rather high level of
urbanisation. Concomitant changes in both the urban and rural labour
markets are visible too. Not only did average years of schooling of the
labour force rise but also changes in occupational classification
suggest a relative rise in white collar jobs and a substantial shift
from self-employment to wage employment.
An examination of the appropriation of the evolving mixes of
opportunities by people from different sections of the society is a
challenging task. Foremost among the challenges is the fact that
Pakistan encountered several structural breaks- one at the time of
partition when a massive shift of population took place between India
and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as the net gainer in terms of population
shift. Simultaneously a vacuum among the government services was created
due to scarcity of educated people, which also influenced the
acquisition potential of the future generations. Similarly, the
independence of Bangladesh in 1971 and influx of Afghan refugees in
1980s could be treated as structural breaks bearing upon the
participation pattern of people from the different sections of the
economy. This paper is an attempt to understand rather partially
the achievements made by people belonging to various walks of life
through a scrutiny of Intergenerational mobility.
Intergenerational mobility dynamics have long been bewildering
social scientists. The slogan of equality of opportunity underlies the
very motivation to understand intergenerational education, occupational
or earning (im) mobility. In particular income mobility has been
explored extensively. Leaving educational and occupational mobility
behind in terms of the empirical expeditions undertaken. A handful of
literature is available documenting the extent to which the economic
position of the father determines the income of the son rather than his
own education and skill. (1)
Currently improved econometric techniques have also resulted in
generating a volume of empirical studies. In contrast to emphasis on the
description of the shifts in ranking and positions and the descriptive
aspect of intergenerational mobility not much has been done to explore
the process underlying it. It needs to be kept in mind that the
allocative process depicting hierarchies and positions is a by-product
of the overall socio-economic and political set up. It is in this sense
that the study of intergenerational mobility becomes complex in nature
and demands a great deal of information.
It may, however, be noted that in this study the authors are
confined to a descriptive analysis of intergenerational mobility which
refers to the changes in the positions and ranking of individuals using
the transition matrix as a summary measure. The analysis is further
subjected to estimation of elasticity of intergenerational mobility by
applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stages Least Square
(2SLS). The normative aspects such as degree of inequalities in
opportunities can hardly be inferred from such an exercise.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: this section is
followed by section II furnishing a brief review of the literature.
Section III details the empirical illustrations while results and
discussion are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Research studies have highlighted that those who are born rich are
likely to remain rich since, along with other factors, a higher
investment in education precludes the chances of zero intergenerational
earnings correlations, as rewards/returns are higher on higher education
[Solon (2004)]. Income distribution can also be persistent because of
genetic differences. The intergenerational income mobility has outcomes
similar to those of income distribution but there are different reasons
underlying intergenerational income mobility in terms of policy
implications. The intergenerational mobility assigns an active role to
public sector to reduce the intergenerational differentials through
increased educational opportunities whereas the income distribution
leaves very narrow space for public policy [Black and Devereux (2010)].
Intergenerational income elasticity and correlation stand as the
most widely used measures. Intergenerational elasticity, the coefficient
of the father's log income in standard regressions, is preferred
over correlation, because it is unbiased to any measurement errors in
the son's income (the dependent variable). Intergenerational income
elasticity is also sensitive to the data period (T) used in the analysis
where it is an increasing function of T [Mazumder (2005)]. Also the
sensitivity of intergenerational income elasticity to the point in time
at which the income of the son and the father is observed, is a
revealing fact known as life cycle bias. (2) Nilsen, et al. (2008) also
provide evidence on the life cycle bias for Norwegian data.
Coming to the empirical studies in the field with respect to time
and region, Jantti, et al. (2006), studying six countries including USA
and UK, find the highest persistence or immobility for USA for the
earnings of the son. Bratsberg, et al. (2007) confirm the non-linearity
of the son-father income nexus using data for USA, UK, Denmark, Finland
and Norway. The intergenerational elasticity estimates for Italy and
France are estimated to be 0.5 [Piraino (2007); Mocetti (2007)] and 0.4
[LeFranc and Trannoy (2005)] respectively. Leigh (2007), Corak and Heisz
(1999) and Vogel (2008) report much lower intergenerational income
elasticity for Australia, Canada and Germany. This difference in
intergenerational elasticity estimates may stem, along with other
factors, from the public education system (3), political participation
[Ichino, et al. (2009)] and different labour market dynamics [Blanden
(2009)]. Credit constraints, as proposed by Solon (2004) can determine
the size of intergenerational income elasticities. Han and Mulligan
(2001), Grawe and Mulligan (2002), and Grawe (2004) provide the
theoretical underpinnings for the effect of credit constraints on
intergenerational elasticity. (4) The bulk of the empirical literature
on intergenerational income mobility, based on US data, especially in
the 1970s and 80s, reports intergenerational elasticity of 0.2 [Sewell
and Hauser (1975); Bielby and Hauser (1977); Behrman and Taubman
(1985)]. (5) The intergenerational mobility estimates, confined to USA
for a certain period, can now be traced across the globe including UK
[Nicoletti and Ermisch (2007); Dearden, et al. (1997)]; Brazil [Dunn
(2007)], Malaysia [Lillard and Kilburn (1995)], Chile [Nunez and
Miranada (2010)]; Finland [Osterbacka (2001)] along with many others.
(6)
To conclude the section, the literature was scanned to find
relevant studies on Pakistan in respect of intergenerational income
mobility indicators. The available studies examine the role of parental
characteristics on school enrolment of children in a choice theoretic
framework primarily focusing on parental capacity to invest in education
of children [Burney and Irfan (1991)] (7) and the rate of return on
education reporting the dependence of individual wages on his/her
father's wage and parental education [Shahrukh and Irfan (1985)].
Havinga, et al. (1986) deal with income and wealth intergenerational
mobility and social change in Pakistan at individual and family level.
Based on the findings emerging from a pilot survey, the authors found
upward intergenerational income and wealth mobility. A recent study by
Shehzadi, et al. (2012), based on a small survey, provides
intergenerational social mobility and child development link for
Faisalabad. The study at hand is different from the above studies on
Pakistan in nature and scope. First, none of these studies explores
intergenerational income mobility explicitly. Second, we improve on
methodology and estimation techniques through controlling the life cycle
bias and endogeniety involved in estimation of intergenerational income
mobility.
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data are taken from Pakistan Panel Household Survey (PPHS) 2010; a
survey administrated by Pakistan Institute of Development Economics
(PIDE) since 2001. (8) The PPHS, providing rich information on
socio-economic characteristics of households, covers 4246 households
divided into 2746 urban and 1500 rural units respectively. (9) Separate
modules for males and females were administrated to collect the
information at household level [for more detail, see Nayab and Arif
(2012)]. Data were extracted from the household roster and the education
and employment sections of the questionnaires and merged on the basis of
their common household identification codes. In the male module, the
data include the characteristics of sons and fathers respectively. All
information on daughters is excluded because of smaller number of
observations for working daughters. This paper focuses on co-resident
(10) sons and fathers reporting positive income. The study deals with
the sons falling in the following age brackets (1) less than 21 years,
(2) more than 20 years, (3) 25-39 years, and (4) 30-50 years for cohort
analysis. (11) The detail of sample size against different filters
imposed for analysis is given below:
Table 1
Sample Size Details
Sample Numbers
Non '0' income sons 2508
Non '0' income sons of working fathers 1398
Working fathers 1398
Working fathers (Urban) 392
Working fathers (Rural) 974
Fathers having non '0' income 1367
Sons having non '0' income and less than 20 years of age 608
Sons having non '0' income and more than 20 years of age 1900
Sons of working fathers less than 21 years of age 477
Sons of working fathers more than 20 years of age 921
Sons of working fathers more than 20 years of age (Urban) 227
Sons of working fathers more than 20 years of age (Rural) 694
Sons of working fathers having age between 25-39 years 550
Sons of working fathers having age between 30-50 years 247
Methodology
This study applies two methodologies for empirical analysis, namely
the construction of transition matrix and regression analysis, wherein
the former gives the relative position of the child as compared to the
father while the latter provides the extent to which the father's
economic status impacts the economic status of the son. Regression
analysis in its different variants is widely applied in
intergenerational mobility literature. (12) Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
remains the frequently used technique along with the instrumental
variable (IV) approach. This study applies both OLS and IV approach.
(13) The analysis starts with the OLS analysis by regressing the
son's log income on the father's log income in the first model
while in the second model other socio economic characteristics of the
son are introduced. OLS regression is performed on the fathers'
reported and estimated income. (14) We begin the methodological
illustrations with the following equation:
[[bar.Y].sub.iS] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] [[bar.Y].sub.iF] +
[[epsilon].sub.i] ... (1)
Where [[bar.Y].sub.is] and [[bar.Y].sub.iF] are lifelong log
incomes of ith son and father respectively and [[epsilon].sub.i] is
error term assumed to be distributed as N(0, [[sigma].sup.2]). The
constant term [alpha] comprises the environment that the generation of
the sons enjoys while [[beta].sub.1] is the measure of intergenerational
persistence or immobility. Conversely 1 - [[beta].sub.1] gives
intergenerational mobility. Generally [[beta].sub.1] takes the value
between zero (0) and one (1) where a higher value indicates the higher
chances that a son will hold the same socio-economic status as his
father did. [[beta].sub.1] = 0 means perfect mobility where all sons are
independent of the father's status, suggesting equality of
opportunities or merit based system while [[beta].sub.1] = 1, indicates
perfect immobility and suggests that the son, subtracting any random
errors, will exactly inherit the position of the father. [[beta].sub.1],
the elasticity measure by construction in Equation (1), indicates the
percent difference in the sons' income observed for each 1 percent
difference across the incomes of the fathers. A negative value for
[[beta].sub.1] would be indicative of lower economic status of the sons
in their own generation compared to the position of their fathers who
ranked high in income distribution.
In reality, however, the lifelong incomes of the son and father are
captured by the short run measure of income i.e. income measured at a
certain point of time (generally past one month or year) so;
[Y.sub.iS] (t) = [[bar.Y].sub.iS] + [[beta].sub.i] [A.sub.iS] (t) +
[v.sub.iS] ... (2)
[Y.sub.iF] (t) = [[bar.Y].sub.iF] + [[beta].sub.i] [A.sub.iF] (t) +
[v.sub.iF] ... (3)
Both [v.sub.iS] and [v.sub.iF] are assumed to be homoscedastic
distributed zero mean. [Y.sub.iS] (t) and [Y.sub.iF] (t) are short run
measures of income of ith son and father, while [A.sub.iS] (t) and
[A.sub.iF] (t) are their ages respectively. Solving Equations (2) and
(3) for [[bar.Y].sub.iS] and [[bar.Y].sub.iF] and substituting in
Equation (1) gives the standard intergenerational income mobility
specification as
[Y.sub.iS] (t) = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] [Y.sub.iF] (t) +
[[beta].sub.2] [A.sub.iS] (t) + [[beta].sub.3] [A.sub.iF] (t) +
[v.sub.i] ... (4)
Where [v.sub.i] = [[epsilon].sub.i] + [v.sub.is] - [beta]
[v.sub.iF]
To gauge the net effect of the father's economic status on the
son's income, and to avoid omitted variable bias, we, in the second
step, add in Equation (1) additional characteristics of sons and
fathers, which gives rise to Equation (5) below.
[Y.sub.iS] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] [Y.sub.iF] + [[beta].sub.i]
[X.sub.3i + [[epsilon].sub.i] ... (5)
Where [X.sub.i] is a set of control variables specifically
including the age of the son, the age of the father, the square of the
ages of the father and son, the occupation and education of the son etc.
What is worth mentioning, however, is that both the ages of the son and
father are incorporated simultaneously to account for the life cycle
bias as the income for both is not observed at the same point of age. A
homogenous income growth is, however, assumed across the individuals in
order to tackle the life cycle bias.
The education and occupation of the father are not included in this
specification purposefully as the father's income already simulates
their effect. The issue is dealt by introducing the estimated income of
the father in Equations (1) and (4) resulting in Equations (6) and (7).
[Y.sub.iS] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] [[??].sub.iF] +
[[epsilon].sub.i] ... (6)
[Y.sub.iS] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] [[??].sub.iF] +
[[beta].sub.i] [X.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i] ... (7)
Where [[??].sub.iF] is the estimated income of the ith father. The
rest of the notations are as explained above. [[??].sub.iF] is estimated
using the following equation:
[[??].sub.iF] = [varies] + [[beta].sub.1] [Age.sub.F] +
[[beta].sub.2] [Age.sup.2.sub.F] + [[beta].sub.2] [Edu.sub.F] +
[[beta].sub.3] [Occu.sub.F] + [[epsilon].sub.i] ... (8)
Equation (8), gives the income of the father adjusted for his age,
occupation and education. This estimated income is then placed in
Equations (1) and (5) to calculate the intergenerational income
mobility. The approach is very similar to the instrumental variable
approach though it operates indirectly.
Instrumental Variable Approach
The instrumental variable approach appears to be an important tool
in recent literature to tackle measurement biases. Different sets of
instruments for the father's income are used in the empirical
literature such as occupational status [Zimmerman (1992); Nicoletti and
Ermisch (2007); Nunez and Miranada (2010)], city of residence of the
sons [Bjorklund and Jantti (1997)] and state (province) of birth
[Aaronson and Mazumder (2008)]. (15) OLS will produce consistent results
only if both the sons' and fathers' income are distributed
normally as elaborated in Equation (9).
[[beta].sub.OLS] = {cov([Y.sub.iS], [Y.sub.iF])}/var([Y.sub.iF])
(9)
As we are studying some selective pairs of sons and fathers, OLS
will generate inconsistent results [Fertig (2001); Nicoletti (2008)].
Further the bias in OLS estimations is induced because of short run (one
year) estimate of incomes of the father resulting in downward bias in
intergenerational elasticity estimates (attenuation bias) [Solon (1992);
Zimmerman (1992)].
Most importantly the correlation between [v.sub.iF] and [Y.sub.iF]
causes endogeniety in Equation (4) referred to as the attenuation bias.
The attenuation bias can be minimised by averaging the earnings over a
certain period of time (generally 5 years). The alternative, and the
preferred way, to reduce downward estimation of intergenerational
elasticity is to use the IV approach wherein the fathers' income is
instrumented by different variables of which the father's
educational status and occupation remain most commonly used.
Equation (3) can be expressed as
[Y.sub.iF] (t) = [delta] [q.sub.iF] + [[beta].sub.i] [A.sub.iF] (t)
+ [v.sub.iF] = [theta][Z.sub.iF] + [v.sub.iF] (10)
Where [Z.sub.iF] = [q.sub.iF], [A.sub.iF] (t) and [q.sub.iF] denote
instruments.
This estimation methodology is superior to the OLS, in order to
control the measurement error effect. The measurement errors in the
instrument do not create any nuisance in results as far as these errors
are uncorrelated to the error term of regression. Further, education,
used as instrument for the father's life time earnings, is free of
transitory errors hence the IV approach gives consistent estimates for
(3) in Equations (1) and (5).
We estimate Equations (1) and (5) by applying the Two Stage Least
Squares (2SLS) approach. The education and occupation of the father,
along with some other variables, are used as instruments. The set of
instruments, other than the father's education and occupation,
varies with the specification depending upon the explanatory variables
used. The 2SLS estimations are performed only for the reported income as
the estimations based on estimated income are the indirect mode of 2SLS.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The percentage occupational and educational distribution of the
fathers and sons is reported in Table 2 where, quite interestingly, 48.6
percent of the sons of working fathers reported working in elementary
professions while 33.3 percent fathers worked in elementary professions.
(16) It is also evident from the information that 94.3 percent of the
sons and 95.2 percent of the fathers work in elementary services and
agriculture etc. respectively and a very small number join blue collar
professions like technicians. (17)
The situation improves with regards to education, because only 33.9
percent of the sons (though a big number in absolute terms) never
attended school as compared to 56.3 percent (18) fathers suggesting
improved status of school enrolments. The sons who completed the
matriculation were 17.1 percent compared to 9.6 percent fathers; while
10.7 percent of the sons completed graduation (14 years of education in
Pakistan) as against only 3.9 percent of the fathers. Table 2, in
general, indicates a better education attainment for the sons'
generation as compared to that of the fathers.
Transition Matrix
Educational Mobility
This section improves on the previous one as it provides results
based on the son-father (son of the same father) relationship. The
transition matrix details the "chance opportunity open to each
dynasty in the passage from one generation to the following'. The
intergenerational educational, occupational and income mobility is
reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The order of ranking is from
1st (lowest) to the last (highest).
Tables 3 and 3(a) provide information on the educational mobility
from the fathers' generation to the sons'. A "Vicious
circle trap" is clearly visible from the Table and there is high
probability that the educational status of the father will pass on to
the sons' generation. "Inheritance" seems to be playing
an important role in determining the final educational attainment
outcome. Those whose fathers never went to school have a 42 percent
probability of never getting enrolled in schools. The probability of
reaching to primary level for the sons of father's who never
attended school is 17 percent while the probability of earning a
graduate degree is only 7.2 percent. The chances of the sons of
remaining under primary and middle fade away as the father's
education reaches to graduation and above and their probability of
earning at least graduation or higher degree is 71 percent. The
probability of acquiring the highest degree increases along with the
increase in inherited educational status of the father as is evident
from the 2nd last column of Table 3. Similar results were observed when
the sample was split into rural-urban strata. These results show the
intergenerational persistence of educational attainment suggesting
unequal participation in the opportunities available in attaining
education. This may, partly, be an outcome of different educational
systems prevailing in Pakistan. (20) Another probable reason might be
poverty driven "earning hand" concept leaving the majority of
sons of uneducated fathers uneducated or unable to reach higher levels
of education.
Table 3(a) furnishes the educational transition matrix for the
cohort of sons with ages < 31 and [greater than or equal to] 31 years
respectively. The results indicate that ultimately the probability of
the sons meeting the same fate as that of their fathers is higher for
cohorts in age [greater than or equal to] 31 years. The probability of
attaining the highest degree for a son, having a father who never
attended school, is as low as 0.5 percent. A son, older than 31 years of
age, whose father has primary education has a 30 percent probability of
reaching to the primary level while the probability that he remains
un-enrolled in school is 26.1 percent; while the sons in cohort < 31
years of age, with the fathers having primary education, are 34.9
percent likely to reach to the same level of education; their chances of
never attending school are 14.5 percent however, which is much lower for
the son with the same background but falling in cohort [greater than or
equal to] 31 years of age, indicating higher enrolment for children born
after 1980. (21) Similar patterns of persistence are observed for both
cohorts for all categories of education. It may be added that inferences
regarding the vintage effect are difficult to be traced from a one-year
cross-sectional data. This study however suggests that despite the rise
in educational enrolments, a father in the poverty ridden elementary
occupation could not get his son to have a perceptible upward mobility
in education.
Occupational Mobility
Occupational mobility, which is classified somewhat differently
than under Labour Force Survey (LFS), from one generation to the
following is depicted in Tables 4 and 4(a) respectively where the latter
provides the transition probabilities against different cohorts of sons
with the same back ground. The numbers 1-4, in column and rows, rank the
occupations in increasing order and 4 is preferred over 1. (22) "In
the name of father" situation is evident from the results and there
is 71.6 percent probability that sons of fathers working in elementary
occupation will end up with the same fate while the probability of their
reaching to higher professions declines with the order of the occupation
and falls to 1.5 percent for the highest ranked occupations, indicating
that a son born to a father working in elementary sector has only 1.5
percent probability to be a manager or a professional.
The sons of fathers working in the services or agriculture sector
(occupation ranked as 2) have a probability of 56.9 percent to fall in
the same occupation. But more importantly, these sons have a probability
of 37.4 percent of joining a profession lower than their fathers. A
similar situation is observed for the sons whose fathers were
technicians and associate professionals (occupation 3) where the
probability for these sons to reach to the same occupational status is
only 14.7 percent, while the probability that these sons end up joining
occupations lower than their fathers' is 85.3 percent.
Floor and ceiling effects, a potential disadvantage of the
transition matrix, suggest that the movement below and above the bottom
and top groups respectively are not possible so the middle groups
portray a good picture of the intergenerational mobility. For the sons
of the fathers who are managers and professionals (the highest ranked
occupation, 4), the probability to reach to the same profession is only
15.6 percent while the probabilities of their falling in occupation I, 2
and 3 (lower than their father's occupational status) are 15.6
percent, 40.6 percent and 20.1 percent respectively. These figures
suggest an alarming situation of regression in occupational status where
the sons' generation is falling behind their fathers. This may be a
reflection partly of the ceiling effect but seems to be primarily
emerging from the ongoing meltdown in the labour market of the country
characterised by excessive labour supply due to high level of population
growth and poor performance of the economy on the labour demand side.
Similar patterns are observed for rural and urban samples and the cohort
of sons with ages < 30 and > 30 years respectively.
Income Mobility
Table 5, based on income quintiles, draws the information about
probability of moving from one income group to the other group where 1
stands for the lowest income group (poorest) while 5 indicates the
highest income group (richest). (23) The probability for a son to move
to the highest quintile from the lowest one is only 6.5 percent while
the probability of retaining the economic status equal to that of the
father is 43.5 percent, given that the father falls in the 1st quintile.
The sons born to fathers belonging to the middle income group (quintile
3) have a 10.1 percent probability of reaching the top quintile. As is
obvious from the 2nd last column of Table 5, the probability of a sons
reaching higher income groups is generally a positive function of the
economic status of his father.
Sons born to fathers at the tail end of income distribution are
more likely to be at the tail end of income distribution of their own
generation. In the rural sample the persistence is high with the
probability of 53.7 percent sons falling in the lowest income quintile,
given the fact that their fathers were in the same quintile. More
importantly, the probability of reaching to the highest quintile from
the lowest is 1.9 percent for a son born in rural Pakistan as compared
to 7.5 percent to the son born in an urban area, which is suggestive of
comparatively better opportunities available in urban areas.
Regression Analysis
The vulnerability of the transition matrix analysis of
intergenerational mobility to floor and ceiling effect is a reason to
use regression analysis. Starting from a simple linear regression, we
incorporate non-linearity involved in the analysis. Further, the
instrumental variable approach is used to tackle the potential
endogeniety stemming from correlation between the father's income
and the error term. (24) Sensitivity analysis is adopted wherein the
base model is run by regressing the sons' log income on the log
income of their father only and then, in the second step, the nexus is
controlled for other characteristics of the son and the father.
Regression analysis is also undertaken for rural and urban samples and
for different cohorts of sons separately and the results are reported in
Tables 6 and 7. (25)
Table 6 details the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
estimates against the fathers' reported and estimated income. (26)
The first column of Table 6, reporting the estimates against the fathers
reported income, shows that the father's income, without any other
controls, has a positive and statistically significant impact on the
son's income. The results suggest that, in Pakistan, slightly more
than one quarter (0.269) of economic advantage of the fathers'
passes on to the sons. The pass on ratio declines to one-fifth (0.207)
when the relation is controlled for the sons' own education, age
and age square.
The results, after decomposing the estimation into rural (N = 974)
and urban (N = 392) samples are suggestive of the higher persistence in
urban areas (column 2 Table 6) where 40 percent (0.394) of the earnings
are determined by the economic status of the father when no controls are
added in the regression, while this share declines to 25 percent after
adding the control variables. The coefficient of the father's log
income in the rural sample is somewhat similar to that of the full
sample.
The last half of Table 6 reports regression estimates against
estimated log income of the father which is adjusted for his age,
occupation and education. Broadly speaking, the reported income of the
father indicates the economic status while the estimated income is a
combined indicator of the socio-economic status of the father. The p in
reported income is different from that against estimated income as the
latter explains the variation in the son's income adjusted for age,
education and father's occupation. The results show that against
one unit increase in the father's estimated income, the son's
income increases by 0.33 percent as compared to 0.269 in case of
reported income suggesting that the intergenerational mobility also
depends, to some extent, on the age, occupation and educational status
of the fathers, which may connote the social status of the father too.
Interestingly, however, the pass on ratio of the fathers' status to
the son's income falls by a half when the son's own age,
education and occupation are introduced, implying that the extent of
intergenerational mobility is also sensitive to the education and cohort
of the sons' generation. (27) The coefficient for the father's
log estimated income is higher (0.378) for the rural sample (0.293 for
urban sample) indicating relatively lower intergenerational income
mobility in rural areas when both the social and economic status of the
father is accounted for. Sons born in rural areas will inherit most of
their economic status from their fathers and their own characteristics
have not much to add as is evident from a very marginal decline in the
coefficient of the father's log estimated income in the rural
sample when controls are added (from 0.378 to 0.310). The negative sign
on the coefficient of the fathers' log income, though insignificant
statistically, indicates that the sons, in their own generation, are
lower in economic status than their fathers were in their generation.
The age of sons has statistical significance in all regressions and
the value of the coefficient varies between 0.239-0.266, indicating that
age is a significant determinant of the intergenerational mobility
estimates. (28) The square of the age of the son carries a negative sign
across the specifications and is significant at 1 percent level
suggesting the non-linear nature of income-age relationship, implying a
fall in income against increased age after a certain limit. The
son's education and occupation register mixed result across the
specifications but retain positive sign with smaller coefficients,
leading us to conclude that in Pakistan the bulk of income of the
son's generation depends on the economic position of the previous
generation, which means lower mobility. The results confirm and
highlight the ground situation of the country where the poor are poor
because they were born poor. The provincial background determines the
income of the son's generation, significantly pointing towards
different dynamics embodied in the social set up of the respondents. The
adjusted [R.sup.2] for specifications with controls included ranges
between 0.269-0.316 across the specifications given in Table 6. Further
the probability of F-statistic in all cases is < 0.001 across the
regression models as reported in the bottom row of Table 6.
Cohort Analysis
Life earnings are sensitive to the point in time (age of father and
son) at which these earnings are observed. This presumed heterogeneity
of earnings' growth across the age groups may lead to different
levels of intergenerational mobility trends. The intergenerational
mobility estimates are conceived to be downward biased for young sons
and old fathers [Grawe (2006); Reville (1995)]. This work, building on
the life cycle bias hypothesis, undertakes cohort analysis and performs
regression analysis for all sons (more than 21 years of age), sons of
age 25-39 and 30-50 years of age. Cohort analysis based on the results
from Table 6 is undertaken. Table 7 reports the
OLS estimates for sons who are older than 20 years, 25-39, and
30-50 years of age. The cutoff point of 20 years is imposed to preclude
the potential inclusion of sons who are involved in studies. Also the
income reported at lower ages is not truly representative of lifelong
earnings.
A continuous decline for the coefficient of log income of fathers
is observed along the cohort and the higher the age of the son at which
income is observed, the lower the persistence. Conversely, higher
intergenerational income mobility is recorded when the earnings are
observed at the later stages of life, confirming the life cycle bias.
Slightly more than one tenth (0.113) of the economic status of fathers
is passed on to the sons when income is observed at the ages between
30-50 years (later stages of life) as compared to one-fifth when the
lower age limit is relaxed to 21 years, suggesting that immobility is
higher for sons observed in early stages of life. For a cohort of sons
at least 21 years old, the persistence is higher (0.381) in urban areas
as compared to those born in rural areas (0.179). Model 2 in Table 7
reports the OLS estimates when the controls are added to control the
son-father income status nexus, exhibiting similar patterns, but with
lower values of the coefficient for the fathers' log income.
Models 3 and 4 in Table 7 detail the regression estimates for
intergenerational mobility when the reported income of the father is
replaced with his estimated income for the cohorts as mentioned above.
The father's socio-economic status (income of father adjusted for
age, education and occupation) becomes an insignificant predictor of the
son's income when the earnings are observed at a point of time when
the son's age is between 30-50 years (column 4 Table 9). Opposite
patterns of mobility are observed for rural and urban samples with and
without age restrictions on the son. Excluding sons younger than 21
years of age, a higher immobility (0.391) is observed for sons residing
in urban areas, while it is the other way round when no age brackets are
imposed. In this case immobility is higher (0.378) in the rural sample
as compared to 0.239 for sons residing in urban areas. When the
son-father income nexus is controlled for the characteristics of the
son, lower values of pass on ratio of the father's economic status
are observed.
Instrumental Variable Estimations
To tackle the perceived endogeniety of the variables, the
intergenerational income mobility was estimated by applying Two Stages
Least Square (2SLS) and the results are reported in Table 8. (30)
Father's education and occupation are used as instruments for the
father's income. (31) The results confirm the argument that OLS
estimates of intergenerational mobility, by construction, are downward
biased as is evident from Table 8.
The coefficients for the father's log income are consistently
higher for all cohorts of the sons both with and without controls.
Interestingly, when controls are added, the highest of the coefficients
is for the father's log income as is obvious from model 2 of Table
8 where, at least, nearly half of the economic status of the son is
governed by the economic position of the father. The highest value is
observed when the son's income is observed at the later stages of
life (30-50 years).These results confirm the downward bias of OLS
estimates and suggest that the complexities of the intergenerational
mobility, if ignored, can give erroneous estimates by producing lower
elasticity estimates of intergenerational mobility.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Drawing inferences from intergenerational mobility, involving a
complex interaction of processes, based on estimates generated from a
single cross-section of data, may not suffice. Nonetheless, some
findings emerge from this study. First and foremost, despite all
controls, the father's socio-economic status remains the most
crucial determinant of the economic position of the son. (32) The rich
are rich because they are born rich while the fate of the poor by birth
is to stay poor. The inheritance burden is not easy to get rid of. A
plausible explanation can be the lower investment in education on the
one hand while, on the other hand, the inability of a poor father to buy
good quality education available to the rich in private sector schools
and failure of the public sector to provide quality education. In
addition, job allocation, to the extent it is driven by considerations
emanating from constituency built up (33) could be a major impediment to
intergenerational mobility because the poor have no influence. Further,
the mounting population pressure generating massive labour supply and
resultant unemployment poses a major challenge to an economically
stagnating country like Pakistan. The regression analysis of this study,
to some extent, seems to indicate that the situation in Pakistan is very
similar to Latin American countries where a high intergenerational
persistence is documented. It is worth reminding, however, that the
analysis of this study is confined only to wage earners, as
unavailability of data precludes the inclusion of the self-employed
segment of the working class. It is imperative to highlight that data
limitations as discussed in the paper must be kept in view while
interpreting the results. It may further be added that information from
one year data (cross-section) are insufficient to address the totality
of the factors bearing upon the mobility (simultaneously determining
education, occupation and income) where the each is intrinsically
generated by multiple factors across generations over the time. Limited
by data availability we tried to compensate by doing cohort analysis.
Worth mentioning also is that this study primarily explores income
mobility and only a slight description of educational and occupational
mobility is provided just as a recap for the reader. This study, while
exploring income mobility, denies in no way the totality of the
inextricably entangled mobility and interlinkages between all three
types of mobility namely educational, occupational and income. These
interlinkages rest on a number of assumptions. For instance a non-merit
based system, as it can be the case in many developing countries,
ruptures the association between educational and income mobility as well
as bears upon the occupational upward mobility. It must be kept in mind
that not only the labour market has expanded in size but also has
undergone compositional changes which can influence the above mentioned
interlinkages in the three facets mobility.
Appendices
APPENDIX-I
Variables
Annual Income: Annual income, the continuous variable, is
constructed using information reported in Section 3 of PPHS (employment)
and is a sum of all types of income. The log income of the son is used
as a dependent variable in regression analysis.
Age: The completed years of age as reported by the respondents at
the time of interview makes the variable "age". The age of the
sons and fathers is categorised separately into different categories
based on minimum and maximum values and the frequency distribution
against each category. The sons' age is recoded into 9 categories,
as those having 14 years fall at the most in the less than 15
years' category. Those who are older than 14 years are grouped
together into 8 distinct groups with 5 years' interval. Similarly,
the fathers having the age of up to 34 years are categorised into less
than 35, and those having more than 34 are grouped together into 8
distinct groups with 5 years interval.
Education: The completed years of education, excluding all
information on school going individuals, originally consisting of 16
discrete and 6 nominal categories, is recoded into 6 categories. Those
who have no education are defined as never attended school', those
who have availed 1 to 5 years of schooling as up-to primary, 6 to 8 as
middle, 9 to 10 years as matriculation, up to 14 as graduation and those
who have education equivalent to at least 15 years of schooling are
categorised as post graduates and merged into graduates.
Occupation: The respondent was asked about the type of profession
he/she is employed at the time of interview. Initially, occupation of
respondent is coded into 10 different categories according to the nature
and type of profession and then it is further recoded into 4 major
categories to be used in descriptive analysis and transition matrices.
These variables along with their categorical coding are illustrated
below
Variable Coding Categories
Age (Son) (1)Less than 15. (2)15-19, (3)20-24, (4)25-29,
(5)30-34, (6)35-39, (7)40-44, (8)45-49 & (9)50
and above.
Age (Father) (1) Less than 35,(2)35-40,(3)41-45, (4)46-50,
(5)51-55, (6)56-60, (7)61-65, (8)66-70 & (9)71
and above.
Education (0) Never attended school, (1)Up-to Primary,
(2)Middle, (3)Matriculation, (4)Graduation *,
(5)
Occupation (1)Armed Forces, (2)Prot'essionals, (3)Managers,
(original coding) (4)Technical and Associate Prol'essionals,
(5)Clerks, (6)Services, (7)Skilled Agri-Workers,
(8)Crafts and Related, (9)Operators &
(10)Elementary
Occupation-2 (1)Armed Forces/Elementary, (2)
(recoded) Clerks/Services/Skilled Agri-workers/ Crafts and
Related/ Operators, (3)Technical and Associate
Professionals & (4)Managers/ Professionals
* Also includes poly-technique, FA, CT, BA and B.Ed, MA,
M.Sc., M.Ed., Engineering, Medical and Degree in Law.
APPENDEX-II
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
This appendix details the information on age, education and income
of fathers and sons. The unit of analysis is working fathers and sons
reporting positive income. The age limit (> 20 years) for sons'
sample was put to exclude sons who were still studying. The mean age of
the fathers is 54.81 years while that of the sons is 30.07 years. The
minimum age for the fathers was observed to be 25 years while the
maximum age of 88 and 80 years were registered for fathers and sons
respectively.
It is important to note that the maximum age reported for the
father was 105 years under no restriction but limiting the sample to
fathers who are currently working gave 88 years as the maximum age for
fathers. The condition of "working fathers' was set as the
reported income was to be used in analysis for which both fathers and
sons must be working at the time of survey. No major differences were
observed for the mean age of the father across the provinces of
Pakistan, but the minimum age of fathers varied across the provinces and
was 38 years for fathers residing in Balochistan. Similar variations for
maximum age were observed for sons across the sample.
The minimum average education of 1.4 years is observed for fathers
residing in Balochistan. A clear divide is visible in rural and urban
areas where fathers have an average education of 2.6 and 4.2 years
respectively. Following the fathers, sons residing in Balochistan
recorded a minimum (4.2) average educational years while the situation
is, though surprisingly, much better in KPK where the sons'
generation has, on average, 8 years education. The rural urban divide,
in the son's generation, seems to be minimised and no major
differences in educational years are observed. Sons earn, on average,
more than the fathers as is evident from the mean incomes. But
interestingly, the sons' generation in KPK and Balochistan, though
the difference is negligible, earns less than the earnings of the
fathers. Fathers belonging to Punjab and sons belonging to Sindh
reported the highest amount of annual earnings respectively. A detailed
analysis of earnings will be offered in the next section of this paper.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Working Fathers Reporting Positive Income
Fathers Mean Min Max St. dev N
Full Sample
Age 54.81 25.00 88.00 9.71 1367
Education 3.07 0.00 16.00 4.02 1362
Annual Income 116881.45 11.00 3070000.00 175955.00 1367
Urban Sample
Age 53.19 27.00 76.00 8.71 393
Education 4.19 0.00 16.00 4.39 391
Annual Income 104098.73 11.00 967152.00 105101.00 393
Rural Sample
Age 55.46 25.00 88.00 10.02 974
Education 2.61 0.00 16.00 3.77 971
Annual Income 122039.16 132.00 3070000.00 197287.00 974
Punjab
Age 54.27 28.00 88.00 9.53 659
Education 3.24 0.00 16.00 4.02 655
Annual Income 101561.16 11.00 3070000.00 180782.00 659
Sindh
Age 54.27 25.00 79.00 10.11 388
Education 2.90 0.00 16.00 3.58 388
Annual Income 104048.53 132.00 1872500.00 165343.00 388
KPK
Age 56.46 34.00 81.00 9.00 211
Education 3.69 0.00 16.00 4.73 211
Annual Income 167763.03 7000.00 1000000.00 145365.00 211
Balocliistan
Age 56.75 38.00 82.00 10.26 109
Education 1.41 0.00 16.00 3.59 108
Annual Income 156690.86 10000.00 1296000.00 211513.00 109
Sons>21 Years Reporting Positive Income
Full Sample
Age 30.07 21.00 80.00 7.72 1900
Education 6.28 0.00 16.00 4.85 1896
Annual Income 134943.60 5.00 4200000.00 210265.00 1900
Urban Sample
Age 28.66 21.00 62.00 6.77 460
Education 7.11 0.00 16.00 5.03 457
Annual Income 126564.61 5.00 4200000,00 247584.00 460
Rural Sample
Age 30.52 21.00 80.00 7.95 1440
Education 6.02 0.00 16.00 4.76 1439
Annual Income 137620.23 2000.00 2200000.00 196882.00 1440
Punjab
Age 29.92 21.00 64.00 8.07 722
Education 6.27 0.00 16.00 4.45 719
Annual Income 128885.22 5.00 2200000.00 205599.00 722
Sindh
Age 30.01 21.00 80.00 7.74 500
Education 5.07 0.00 16.00 4.87 500
Annual Income 111179.38 2400.00 4200000.00 254622.00 500
KPK
Age 30.42 21.00 59.00 7.44 525
Education 8.08 0.00 16.00 4.64 524
Annual Income 161022.04 6000.00 1560000.00 147971.00 525
Baluchistan
Age 29.74 21.00 57.00 6.91 153
Education 4.20 0.00 16.00 5.23 153
Annual Income 151708.87 10000.00 2400000.00 242613.00 153
APPENDIX-III
Ordinary Least Square Estimates of Son's Log Income
Reported
Full Sample Urban
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log 0.209 *** 0.180 *** 0.381 *** 0.288 ***
Income
(0.028) (0.029) (0.064) (0.068)
Age ofSon 0.062 * -0.007
(0.032) (0.083)
Age Square of Son -0.001 0.0001
(0.000) (0.001)
Education of Son 0.019 *** 0.025 **
(0.006) (0.011)
Occupation of Son 0.090 ** 0.193 ***
(0.040) (0.069)
Province 0.070 ** 0.043
(0.028) (0.051)
Age of Father 0.005 0.009
(0.003) (0.007)
Constant 8.826 *** 7.325 *** 6.869 *** 6.932 ***
Prob (F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R-Square 0.058 0.111 0.134 0.195
N 892 884 225 225
Reported Estimated
Rural Full Sample
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log 0.179 *** 0.163 *** 0.298 *** 0.271 **
Income
(0.031) (0.033) (0.098) (0.111)
Age ofSon 0.081 ** 0.057 *
(0.036) (0.032)
Age Square of Son -0.001-* -0.001
(0.001) (0.000)
Education of Son 0.015 ** 0.0991 ***
(0.007) (0.007)
Occupation of Son 0.047 0.088 **
(0.050) (0.042)
Province 0.076 ** 0.123
(0.034) (0.028)
Age of Father 0.003
(0.004)
Constant 9.175 *** 7.334 *** 6.884 *** 6.478 ***
Prob (F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
Adjusted R-Square 0.045 0.092 0.009 0.078
N 667 659 917 909
Estimated
Urban Rural
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log 0.391 *** 0.048 0.276 *** 0.347 ***
Income
(0.183) (0.211) (0.119) (0.134)
Age ofSon 0.001 0.073
(0.088) (0.036)
Age Square of Son 0.0001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Education of Son 0.033 ** 0.015 **
(0.013) (0.008)
Occupation of Son 0.224 *** 0.033
(0.073) (0.051)
Province 0.103 * 0.129 ***
(0.053) (0.033)
Age of Father
Constant 6.767 *** 9.726 8.009 *** 5.426 ***
Prob (F-statistics) 0.033 0.000 0.021 0.000
Adjusted R-Square 0.016 0.122 0.006 0.070
N 225 225 692 684
*; **; *** stand for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively.
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.
Estimated Income of Father = Constant + Father's Age +
Father's Education + Father's [Age.sup.2] +Father's
Occupation.
APPENDEX-IV
Ordinary Least Square Estimates of Son's Log Income
Reported
25-39 30-50
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.178 *** 0.133 *** 0.113 ** 0.100 *
(0.033) (0.035) (0.052) (0,052)
Age of Son -0.174 0.066
(0.157) (0.178)
Age Square of Son 0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Education of Son 0.024 *** 0.027 **
(0.008) (0.012)
Occupation of Son 0.094 * 0.265 ***
(0.051) (0.086)
Province 0.098 *** 0.081
(0.037) (0.058)
Age of Father 0.003 0.011
(0.005) (0.007)
Constant 9.262 *** 11.658 *** 10.030 *** 7.349 **
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000
Adjusted R-Square 0.086 0.097
N 533 529 236 234
Indicators
25-39 30-50
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.089 *** 0.282 ** 0.155 -0.009
(0.011) (0.141) (0.182) (0.197)
Age of Son -0.180 -0.019
(0.153) (0.171)
Age Square of Son 0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.002)
Education of Son 0.022 *** 0.028 **
(0.008) (0.012)
Occupation of Son 0.089 * 0.286 ***
(0.053) (0.088)
Province 0.138 *** 0.104 **
(0.036) (0.056)
Age of Father
Constant 10.223 *** 10.136 *** 9.575 *** 10.507 ***
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.394 0.000
Adjusted R-Square 0.064 0.086
N 530 543 245 243
*; **; *** stand for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively.
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.
Estimated Income of Father = Constant +Father's
Age+Father'sEducation+Father's [Age.sup.2] +Father's
Occupation.
APPENDEX-V
Two Stage Least Square Estimates of Son's Log Income
No Age
Restrictions
Full Sample Urban
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log Income 0.575 *** 0.699 *** 0.394 0.890 ***
(0.123) (0.137) (0.255) (0.287)
Age of Son 0.085 *** 0.080 ***
(0.01) (0.02)
Education of Son -0.040 * -0.070 **
(0.024) (0.034)
Constant 4.470 1.262 6.443 -0.548
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000
R-Square 0.016 0.085 0.006 0.076
N 1398 1398 394 394
No Age More Than 20
Restrictions Years Old Sons
Rural Full Sample
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log Income 0.672 *** 0.632 *** 0.438 *** 0.467 ***
(0.144) (0.158) (0.108) (0.126)
Age of Son 0.084 *** 0.045 ***
(0.013) (0.012)
Education of Son -0.026 0.005
(0.033) (0.021)
Constant 3.407 1.923 6.245 *** 4.661 ***
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R-Square 0.022 0.093 0.018 0.044
N 1004 1004 921 921
More Than 20
Years Old Sons
Urban Rural
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log Income 0.404 ** 0.508 ** 0.459 *** 0.461 ***
(0.202) (0.219) (0.128) (0.16)
Age of Son 0.034 0.047 ***
(0.023) (0.015)
Education of Son -0.005 0.007
(0.028) (0.03)
Constant 6.608 *** 4.582 * 0.017 *** 4.641 **
Prob(F-statistics) 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
R-Square 0.018 0.058 0.019 0.041
N 227 227 694 694
*; **; *** stan(j for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively.
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.
APPENDEX-VI
Two Stage Least Square Estimates of Son's Log Income
Cohort Analysis
Indicators 30-50 25-39
Father's Log Income 0.383 0.418 0.408 *** 0.531 ***
(0.237) (0.298) (0.125) (0.168)
Age of Son 0.105 * 0.075
(0.053) (0.051)
Education of Son 0.024 -0.004
(0.063) (0.026)
Constant 7.012 *** 2.841 6.669 *** 3.136
Prob (F-statistics) 0.107 0.126 0.001 0.000
R-Square 0.011 0.024 0.020 0.039
N 247 247 550 550
*; **; *** stand for significant at 10 percent,
5 percent and 1 percent respectively.
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.
REFERENCES
Aronson, Daniel and Bhashkar Mazumder (2008) Intergenerational
Economic Mobility in the United States, 1940 to 2000. Journal of Human
Resources 43:1, 139-172.
Asghar, Saima and Sajid Amin Javed (2011) On Measuring
Inclusiveness of Growth in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review
(forthcoming)
Behrman, Jere and Paul Taubman (1985) Intergenerational Earnings
Mobility in the United States: Some Estimates and a Test of
Becker's Intergenerational Endowments Model. Review of Economics
and Statistics 67:1, 144-151.
Bielby, W. T. and R. M. Hauser (1977) Response Error in Earnings
Functions for Nonblack Males. Sociological Methods and Research 6,
241-280.
Bjorklund, Anders and Jantti, Markus (1997) Intergenerational
Income Mobility in Sweden Compared to the United States. American
Economic Review 87:5, 1009-1018.
Bjorklund, Anders and Markus Jantti (2009) Intergenerational Income
Mobility and the Role of Family Background. In Wiemer Salverda, Brian
Nolan, and Tim Smeeding (eds) Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Black, Sandra E. and Paul J. Devereux (2010) Recent Developments in
Intergenerational Mobility. (Discussion Paper Series //
Forschungsinstitutzur Zukunft der Arbeit, No. 4866,
(http://hdl.handle.net/10419/36911).
Blanden, Jo (2009) How Much can we Learn from International
Comparisons of Intergenerational Mobility? Paper No. CEEDP0111 (Centre
for the Economics of Education, LSE).
Bratsberg, Bernt, Knut Roed, Oddbjorn Raaum, Robin. A. Naylor,
Jantti Markus, Eriksson and Eva Osterbacka (2007) Nonlinearities in
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility: Consequences for Cross-country
Comparisons. Economic Journal 117, C72-92.
Burney, Nadeem A. and Mohammad Irfan (1991) Parental
Characteristics, Supply of Schools, and Child School-enrolment in
Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 30:1, 21-62.
Corak, Miles (2006) Do Poor Children become Poor Adults? Lessons
from a Cross Country Comparison of Generational Earnings Mobility. In
John Creedy and Guyonne Kalb (ed.) Research on Economic Inequality 13,
143-188.
Corak, Miles and Andrew Heisz (1999) The Intergenerational Earnings
and Income Mobility of Canadian Men. Journal of Human Resources 34,
504-533.
Davies, James, Jie Zhang, and JinliZeng (2005) Intergenerational
Mobility under Private vs. Public Education. Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 107, 399-417.
Dearden, Lorraine, Stephen Machin, and Howard Reed (1997)
Intergenerational Mobility in Britain. Economic Journal 107:440, 47-66.
Dunn, Christopher E. (2007) The Intergenerational Transmission of
Lifetime Earnings: Evidence from Brazil. The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis and Policy 7:2 (Contributions) Art. 2.
Durr-e-Nayab and G. M. Arif (2012) Pakistan Panel Household Survey
Sample Size, Attrition and Socio-demographic Dynamics. Poverty and
Social Dynamics Paper Series 1, PIDE.
Grawe, Nathan D. (2004) Reconsidering the Use of Nonlinearities in
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility as a Test for Credit Constraints.
Journal of Human Resources 39, 813-827.
Grawe, Nathan D. (2006) The Extent of Lifecycle Bias in Estimates
of Intergenerational Earnings Persistence. Labour Economics 13, 551-570.
Grawe, Nathan D. and Casey Mulligan (2002) Economic Interpretations
of Intergenerational Correlations. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6,
45-58.
Haider, Steven J. and Gary Solon (2006) Life-cycle Variation in the
Association between Current and Lifetime Earnings. American Economic
Review 96, 1308-1320.
Han, Song and Casey Mulligan (2001) Human Capital, Heterogeneity,
and Estimated Degrees of Intergenerational Mobility. Economic Journal
111, 207-243.
Havinga, Ivo C., Faiz Mohammad and Suleman I. Cohen (1986)
Inter-generational Mobility and Long Term Socio-economic Change in
Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 25:4.
Ichino, Andrea, Loukas Karabarbounis, and Enrico Moretti (2009) The
Political Economy of Intergenerational Income Mobility. (Institute for
the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn). (Discussion Paper No. 4767).
I-Hsin Li (2011) Intergenerational Income Mobility in
Taiwan.[www.wise.xmu.edu.cn/ labor2011/papers/I-Hsin%20Li.pdf].
Jantti, Markus, Bernt Bratsberg, Knut Roed, Oddbjorn Raaum, Robin
Naylor, Osterbacka, Eva, Bjorklund Anders and Tor Eriksson (2006)
American Exceptionalism in a New Light: A Comparison of
Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in the Nordic Countries, the United
Kingdom and the United States. (Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA),
Bonn). (Discussion Paper No. 1938)
Khan, Shahrukh Rafi and Muhammad Irfan (1985) Rate of Return to
Education and the Determinants of Earnings in Paksiatn. The Pakistan
Development Review 24: 3 & 4, 671-683.
Lefranc, Arnaud and Alain Trannoy (2005) Intergenerational Earnings
Mobility in France: Is France more Mobile than the US?
Annalesd'Economieet de Statistique 78, 57-77.
Leigh, Andrew (2007) Intergenerational Mobility in Australia. The
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7, Article 6.
Lillard, Lee A. and M. Rebecca Kilburn (1995) Intergenerational
Earnings Links: Sons and Daughters. Unpublished.
Mazumder, Bhashkar (2005) Fortunate Sons: New Estimates of
Intergenerational Mobility in the U.S. Using Social Security Earnings
Data. Review of Economics and Statistics 87, 235-255.
Mocetti, Sauro (2007) Intergenerational Earnings Mobility in Italy.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 7, Article 5.
Mulligan, Casey B. (1997) Parental Priorities and Economic
Inequality. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Nayab, Durr-e- and G. M. Arif (2012) Pakistan Panel Household
Survey: Sample Size, Attrition and Socio-demographic Dynamics. Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. (Poverty and Social
Dynamics Paper Series, PSDPS-1).
Nicoletti, Cheti and John Ermisch (2007) Intergenerational Earnings
Mobility: Changes across Cohorts in Britain. The B E. Journal of
Economic Analysis and Policy 7, Article 9.
Nilsen, Oivind A., KjellVaage, Arild Arkvik and Karl Jacobsen
(2008) Estimates of Intergenerational Elasticities based on Lifetime
Earnings. (Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), Bonn). (Discussion
Paper No. 3709).
Nunez, Javier I. and Leslie Miranda (2010) Intergenerational Income
Mobility in a Less-Developed, High-Inequality Context: The Case of
Chile. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy10:1
(Contributions), Art. 33.
Osterbacka, Eva (2001) Family Background and Economic Status in
Finland. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103, 467-484.
Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2006-07 is available at
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR200/FR200.pdf
Pekkarinen, Tuomas, Roope Uusitalo and Sari Kerr (2009) School
Tracking and Intergenerational Income Mobility: Evidence from the
Finnish Comprehensive School Reform. Journal of Public Economics 93,
965-973.
Piraino, Patrizio (2007) Comparable Estimates of Intergenerational
Income Mobility in Italy. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and
Policy 7, Article 1.
Saima Aghar and Sajid Amin Javed (2011) On Measuring
Inconclusiveness of Growth in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review
50:4, 879-894.
Sewell, W. H. and R. M. Hauser (1975) Education, Occupation and
Earnings: Achievements in the Early Career. New York: Academic Press.
Shehzadi, Nelum, Sair-ur-Rehman, Razia Sultana, and Zaib-un-Nisa
(2006) Intergenerational Mobility and Its Impact on Child Development--A
Case Study of Faisalabad (Pakistan). Journal of Agriculture and Social
Sciences 18132235/2006/02-2-72-74 9. [http://www.fspublishers.org].
Solon, Gary (1992) Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United
States. American Economic Review 82, 393-408.
Solon, Gary (2002) Cross-country Differences in Intergenerational
Earnings Mobility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, 59-66.
Solon, Gary (2004) A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation
Over Time and Place. In Miles Corak (ed.) Generational Income Mobility
in North America and Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Vogel, Thorsten (2008) Reassessing Intergenerational Mobility in
Germany and the United States: The Impact of Differences in Lifecycle
Earnings Patterns. (Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Berlin). (Discussion
Paper No.SFB649DP2006-055).
Zimmerman, David J. (1992) Regression Toward Mediocrity in Economic
Stature. American Economic Review 82, 409-429.
(1) See Bjorklund and Jantti (2009), Blanden (2009), Corak (2006),
Grawe (2004), and Solon (2002) for excellent survey.
(2) Refer to Haider and Solon (2006), Grawe (2006) for details.
(3) See Davies, Zhang, and Zeng (2005) for theoretical exposition.
Pekkarinen, et al. (2009) gives evidence on the issue.
(4) Grawe (2004) outlines the approaches to empirical analysis of
the argument. Mulligan (1997) provides empirical evidence for budget
constraint hypothesis.
(5) Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) criticise these studies on
account of ignoring measurement errors and sample bias.
(6) All these studies have similar findings and reach the same
conclusion that USA has severe income inequality issues compared to
other countries.
(7) Shahrukh and Irfan (1985) also examine determinants of child
school enrolment in Pakistan.
(8) PPI IS 2010 is 3rd round of the series with 2001 and 2004
completed previously.
(9) Urban sample is covered first time in PPHS 2010 while rural
panel comprises 3 cross-sections of 2001, 2004 and 2010.
(10) The exclusion of sons not living with fathers due to
unavailability of income and other characteristics, is a major
limitation of the data for this study.
(11) See Appendix I and II for variable construction and data
description respectively.
(12) Mulligan (1997), Solon (1992), and Zimmerman (1992) are some
examples of studies using models as given in Equation (1) and its
variants.
(13) The regression analysis adopted in this study is similar to
I-Hsin Li (2011).
(14) Income of father adjusted for age, occupation and education of
father as given in Equation (8) in methodology section.
(15) We use education of father, occupation of father and province
of residence of a son as instruments.
(16) The occupational classification used in this study is based on
the United Nations Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-1998).
(17) Given the fact that all major urban centres were not covered
in PPHS 2010, the occupational, educational and income distribution
could diverge from that reported in the surveys like PSLM and LFS.
(18) The number is 65.9 percent for sample of fathers when no
condition of working status is imposed. This figure may be an indicator
of lower enrolments for the old generation of fathers as the fathers
aged between 89-105 years get excluded under this condition.
(19) The smaller sample size against occupation 3 and 4 (Table
4(b)) leaves us unable to undertake rural-urban analysis.
(20) Different educational systems here refer to public and private
schooling.
(21) Any child of 30 years of age or younger in 2010 must be born
in 1980 or thereafter.
(22) "This classification, based on (ISCO-1998), though not
common in Pakistan, is adopted purposefully to get concise picture of
intergenerational occupational mobility where the reader can make easy
comparisons.
(23) "Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2006-07,
though based on wealth rather than income, titles these quintiles as
poorest, poor, middle, rich and richest ranked from 1-5 respectively.
(24) As discussed in section on methodology.
(25) Smaller sample for provinces, especially Balochistan limits
the analysis only to rural-urban clusters.
(26) Income of father adjusted for age, occupation and education of
father as given in Equation (8) in methodology section.
(27) It may however be kept in mind that education of son itself is
an outcome of fathers economic and educational position.
(28) Suggesting cohort analysis of intergenerational mobility.
(30) Detailed results are available in Appendix V. and VI.
(31) The 2SLSestimates are undertaken only for the reported income
of the father as instrumenting the fathers income by education and
occupation is similar to the OLS estimates based on the estimated income
of the father
(32) Saima and Sajid (2011) provide evidence on non-inclusiveness
of economic growth and inequalities of opportunities in education and
employment sector of Pakistan over a period of 1990-2008.
(33) Constituency built up here refers to the relation-based job
findings i.e. political motivated appointments both at higher and lower
job levels.
Sajid Amin Javed <sajidamin@pide.org.pk> is Senior Research
Fellow at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Mohammad Irfan is Ex-Joint Director at the Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics, Islamabad.
Authors' Note: We are thankful to G. M. Arif for beneficial
discussion(s), Masood Ashfaq and Waqas Imran for help in computational
exercise, and Rafat Mahmood and Sundus Saleemi for reading the proofs.
We also benefited from feedback of external referee.
Table 2
Percentage Distribution of Respondents with
Respect to Occupation and Education
Sons of Working
Indicators All Working All Fathers
Occupation Sons Fathers Fathers Only (c)
Elementary (a) 46.8 48.6 33.3
Services/Agriculture (b) 47.1 45.7 61.9
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 3.6 3.7 2.4
Mangers/Professionals 2.5 2.1 2.3
Total 2494 1391 1398
EDUCATION
Never Attended School 33.9 33.9 65.9 56.3
Up-to Primary 18.1 20.5 15.6 20.5
Middle 15.9 16.3 7.4 8.7
Matriculation 18.1 17.1 7.4 9.6
Graduate and Above 13.9 12.1 3.6 4.5
Others 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4
Total 2508 1398 2508 1398
(a) Elementary category includes armed forces also in which
2.9 percent sons and 0.2 percent fathers are employed
respectively.
(b) Clerks, Services, Skilled Agriculture Workers, Crafts
and related and Operators
(c) In occupational distribution, working fathers are unit
of the analysis so "all fathers" are exactly "working
fathers only".
Table 3
Sons ' Education against their Father's Education (%)
Education of Sons
Never
Full Sample Attended Upto
Education of Fathers School Primary Middle
Never Attended School 42.4 17.3 14.6
Up to Primary 23.6 31.3 15.9
Middle 14.1 14.6 27.0
Matriculation 9.2 9.2 21.1
Graduation and above 11.2 2.2 5.6
URBAN
Never Attended School 42.2 19.3 13.3
Up to Primary 29.0 26.2 13.1
Middle 15.1 6.8 30.1
Matriculation 10.4 5.2 24.7
Graduation and above 14.6 4.2 8.3
RURAL
Never Attended School 42.6 16.8 15.0
Up to Primary 21.6 33.2 17.0
Middle 13.4 19.6 25.0
Matriculation 8.3 12.0 18.5
Graduation and above 7.0 0.0 2.0
Education of Sons
Full Sample Graduation
Education of Fathers Matric and Above % (N)
Never Attended School 16.5 9.0 100 (1650)
Up to Primary 16.7 12.6 100 (390)
Middle 26.5 17.8 100(185)
Matriculation 25.9 34.6 100(185)
Graduation and above 22.5 58.4 100(89)
URBAN
Never Attended School 14.7 10.5 100 (353)
Up to Primary 16.8 14.9 100(107)
Middle 24.7 23.3 100 (73)
Matriculation 27.3 32.5 100 (77)
Graduation and above 27.1 45.8 100 (48)
RURAL
Never Attended School 17.0 8.8 100 (1287)
Up to Primary 16.6 11.7 100(283)
Middle 27.7 14.3 100(112)
Matriculation 25.0 36.2 100 (108)
Graduation and above 17.0 74.0 100 (41)
Table 3 (a)
Sons ' Education against their Father's Education by Cohort
Education of Son
(Less than 31 Years
Aged Sons) (%)
Full Sample Never Attended Up to
Education of Fathers School Primary Middle
Never Attended <31 (a) 43.20 19.90 15.10
School >31 40.80 11.40 13.60
Up to Primary <31 26:10 30.30 17.30
>31 14.50 34.90 10.80
Middle <31 15.60 16.30 27.20
>31 7.90 7.90 26.30
Matriculation <31 7.90 9.30 24.50
>31 14.70 8.80 5.90
Graduation and <31 11.0 3.0 6.0
above >31 11.0 0.0 6.0
URBAN
Never Attended School 44.70 21.80 13.80
Up to Primary 31.20 26.90 12.90
RURAL
Never Attended School 42.70 19.30 15.50
Up to Primary 23.80 31.80 19.20
Education of Son
(Less than 31 Years
Aged Sons) (%)
Full Sample Graduation and
Education of Fathers Matric above % (N)
Never Attended 14.50 7.20 100 (1157)
School 21.10 13.20 100(493)
Up to Primary 14.70 11.70 100 (307)
24.10 15.70 100 (83)
Middle 26.50 14.20 100 (147)
26.30 31.60 100 (38)
Matriculation 22.50 35.80 100(151)
41.20 29.40 100 (34)
Graduation and 23.0 58.00 100(71)
above 22.0 71.00 100(18)
Never Attended School 14.20 5.45 100 (275)
Up to Primary 16.10 4.36 100(93)
Never Attended School 14.60 7.9 100 (882)
Up to Primary 14 11.2 100 (214)
(a) <31 and >31 denotes sons of age less than or equal to 30
and sons older than or equal to 31 years of age
respectively.
Table 4
Son's Occupation against his Father's Occupation (%)
Occupation
of Sons Technicians/
Full Sample Services/ Associate
Occupation of Fathers Elementary Agriculture Professionals
Elementary 71.6 25.8 1.1
Services/Agriculture 37.4 56.9 3.7
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 47.1 38.2 14.7
Mangers/Professionals 15.6 40.6 28.1
URBAN
Elementary 64.8 31.0 2.1
Services/Agriculture 26.8 65.9 5.0
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 62.5 31.3 6.3
Mangers/Professionals 25.0 31.3 25.0
RURAL
Elementary 74.6 23.5 0.6
Services/Agriculture 41.1 53.8 3.3
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 33.3 44.4 22.2
Mangers/Professionals 6.3 50.0 31.3
Full Sample Mangers/
Occupation of Fathers Professionals % (N)
Elementary 1.5 100 (465)
Services/Agriculture 2.0 100 (860)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100 (34)
Mangers/Professionals 15.6 100 (32)
URBAN
Elementary 2.1 100 (142)
Services/Agriculture 2.3 100 (220)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100 (16)
Mangers/Professionals 18.8 100 (16)
RURAL
Elementary 1.2 100 (323)
Services/Agriculture 1.9 100 (640)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100 (18)
Mangers/Professionals 12.5 100 (16)
Table 4 (a)
Son's Occupation against his Father's Occupation-
Sons Aged Less than 31 Years (%>)
Occupation of Sons
Elementary Services/ Technicians/
Agriculture Associate
Occupation of Fathers Professionals
Elementary 72.3 25.4 1.2
Services/Agriculture 38.8 55.8 3.3
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 48.4 38.7 12.9
Mangers/Professionals 17.2 37.9 27.6
Elementary 64.9 31.3 2.2
Services/Agriculture 27.6 65.0 4.9
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 66.7 33.3 0.0
Mangers/Professionals 26.7 33.3 20.0
Elementary 75.7 22.6 0.7
Services/Agriculture 43.2 52.2 2.7
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 31.3 43.8 25.0
Mangers/Professionals 7.1 42.9 35.7
Occupation of Sons
Mangers/ % (N)
Professionals
Occupation of Fathers
Elementary 1.2 100(422)
Services/Agriculture 2.1 100(724)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100 (31)
Mangers/Professionals 17.2 100 (29)
Elementary 1.5 100(134)
Services/Agriculture 2.5 100(203)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100(15)
Mangers/Professionals 20.0 100(15)
Elementary 1.0 100(288)
Services/Agriculture 1.9 100 (521)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100(16)
Mangers/Professionals 14.3 100(14)
Table 4 (b)
Son's Occupation against his Father's Occupation--
Sons Aged More than 30 Years
Occupation of Sons
Technicians/
Services/ Associate
Occupation of Fathers Elementary Agriculture Professionals
Elementary 72.3 25.4 1.2
Services/Agriculture 38.8 55.8 3.3
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 48.4 38.7 12.9
Mangers/Professionals 17.2 37.9 27.6
Occupation of Sons
Mangers/
Occupation of Fathers Professionals % (N) (19)
Elementary 1.2 100(422)
Services/Agriculture 2.1 100 (724)
Technicians/Associate
Professionals 0.0 100(31)
Mangers/Professionals 17.2 100 (29)
Elementary category includes armed forces also in which 2.9
percent sons and 0.2 percent fathers are employed
respectively.
Table 5
Income Quintile Transition Matrix (%)
Quintiles of Annual
Full Sample Incomes of Sons
Quintiles of Annual Incomes 1st 2nd 3rd
of Fathers Quintile Quintile Quintile
1st Quintile 43.5 25.3 16.6
2nd Quintile 31.3 33.8 17.9
3rd Quintile 20.7 30.4 22.1
4th Quintile 21.3 24.5 23.1
5th Quintile 18.5 14.0 18.5
RURAL
1st Quintile 53.7 27.8 9.3
2nd Quintile 30.4 32.9 24.1
3rd Quintile 22.9 28.1 21.9
4th Quintile 22.4 37.8 21.4
5th Quintile 18.5 15.4 20.0
URBAN
1st Quintile 41.3 24.8 18.1
2nd Quintile 31.7 34.2 14.9
3rd Quintile 19.4 31.7 22.2
4th Quintile 20.7 17.3 24.0
5th Quintile 18.5 13.5 18.0
Quintiles of Annual
Full Sample Incomes of Sons
Quintiles of Annual Incomes 4th 5th
of Fathers Quintile Quintile % (N)
1st Quintile 8.1 6.5 100 (308)
2nd Quintile 11.7 5.4 100 (240)
3rd Quintile 16.7 10.1 100 (276)
4th Quintile 20.2 10.8 100 (277)
5th Quintile 26.0 23.0 100 (265)
RURAL
1st Quintile 7.4 1.9 100 (54)
2nd Quintile 8.9 3.8 100 (79)
3rd Quintile 17.7 9.4 100 (96)
4th Quintile 16.3 2.0 100 (98)
5th Quintile 21.5 24.6 100 (65)
URBAN
1st Quintile 8.3 7.5 100 (254)
2nd Quintile 13.0 6.2 100 (161)
3rd Quintile 16.1 10.6 100 (180)
4th Quintile 22.3 15.6 100 (179)
5th Quintile 27.5 22.5 100 (200)
(19) The smaller sample size against occupation 3 and 4
(Table 4(b)) leaves us unable to undertake rural-urban
analysis.
Table 6
Ordinary Least Square Estimates of Son's Income
Reported Income
Full Sample Urban
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.269 *** 0.207 *** 0.393 *** 0.257 ***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.062) (0.058)
Age of Son 0.238 *** 0.265 ***
(0.018) (0.038)
Age Square of
Son -0.003 *** -0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Education of
Son 0.010 * 0.017 *
(0.006) (0.010)
Occupation of
Son 0.070 * 0.087
(0.038) (0.061)
Province 0.087 *** 0.130 ***
(0.026) (0.042)
Age of Father 0.007 ** 0.007
(0.003) (0.005)
Constant 7.899 *** 4.341 *** 6.460 *** 3.537 ***
Prob.(F-
statistics) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted
R-Square 0.058 0.296 0.092 0.316
Total 1366 1358 392 392
Reported Income
Rural
Indicators M-l M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.244 *** 0.199 ***
(0.034) (0.031)
Age of Son 0.245 ***
(0.021)
Age Square of
Son -0.003 ***
(0.000)
Education of
Son 0.006
(0.007)
Occupation of
Son 0.058
(0.048)
Province 0.073 **
(0.032)
Age of Father 0.006 *
(0.004)
Constant 8,194 4.365 ***
Prob.(F-
statistics) 0.000 0.000
Adjusted
R-Square 0.050 0.292
Total 974 966
Estimated
Income ([dagger])
Full Sample Urban
Indicators M-1 M-2 M-1 M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.330 *** 0.166 0.293 * -0.172
(0.105) (0.103) (0.171) (0.187)
Age of Son 0.239 *** 0.266 ***
(0.018) (0.039)
Age Square of
Son -0.003 *** -0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.001)
Education of
Son 0.015 ** 0.030 ***
(0.006) (0.010)
Occupation of
Son 0.078 ** 0.126 **
(0.039) (0.063)
Province 0.135 *** 0.165 ***
(0.025) (0.043)
Age of Father
Constant 7.221 *** 4.971 *** 7.586 *** 8.456 ***
Prob.(F-
statistics) 0.002 0.000 0.087 0.000
Adjusted
R-Square 0.006 0.269 0.005 0.282
Total 1393 1385 392 392
Estimated
Income ([dagger])
Rural
Indicators M-1 M-2
Father's Log
Income 0.378 *** 0.310 **
(0.134) (0.131)
Age of Son 0.243 ***
(0.021)
Age Square of
Son -0.003 ***
(0.000)
Education of
Son 0.008
(0.007)
Occupation of
Son 0.052
(0.049)
Province 0.124 ***
(0.031)
Age of Father
Constant 6.702 *** 3.306 **
Prob.(F-
statistics) 0.005 0.000
Adjusted
R-Square 0.007 0.271
Total 1001 993
*; **; *** stand for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively. In parenthesis are reported
standard errors.
([dagger]) Estimated Income of Father = Constant +Father's
Age+Father'sEducation+Father's [Age,sup.2] +Father's
Occupation.
Table 7
Ordinary Least Square Estimates of Son's Log Income-
Cohort Analysis ([dagger])
Full
Sample
Cohort
Analysis
Models Independent Variables All Sons >20
REPORTED INCOME
1 Father's Log B 0.269 *** 0.209 ***
Income (0.029) (0.028)
Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
N 1366 892
2 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.207 *** 0.180 ***
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.027) (0.029)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 1358 884
province
ESTIMATED INCOME (a)
3 Father's Log [beta] 0.330 *** 0.298 ***
Income (S.E) (0.105) (0.098)
Prob.(F) 0.002 0.000
N 1393 917
4 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.166 0.271 ***
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.103) (0.111)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 1385 909
province
Full
Sample
Cohort
Analysis
Models Independent Variables 25-39 30-50
REPORTED INCOME
1 Father's Log B 0.178 *** 0.113 **
Income (0.033) (0.052)
Prob.(F) 0.000 0.030
N 533 236
2 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.133 *** 0.100 *
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.035) (0.052)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 533 234
province
ESTIMATED INCOME (a)
3 Father's Log [beta] 0.089 *** 0.155
Income (S.E) (0.011) (0.182)
Prob.(F) 0.000 0.394
N 530 245
4 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.282 ** -0.009
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.141) (0.197)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.005
occupation of son and N 543 243
province
Urban Sample
Cohort Analysis
Models Independent Variables All Sons >20
REPORTED INCOME
1 Father's Log B 0.393 *** 0.381 ***
Income (0.062) (0.064)
Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
N 392 225
2 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.257 *** 0.288 ***
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.058) (0.068)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 392 225
province
ESTIMATED INCOME (a)
3 Father's Log [beta] 0.293 * 0.391 ***
Income (S.E) (0.171) (0.183)
Prob.(F) 0.087 0.033
N 393 225
4 Fathers Log income. [beta] -0.172 0.048
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.187) (0.211)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 392 225
Rural Sample
Cohort Analysis
Models Independent Variables All Sons >20
REPORTED INCOME
1 Father's Log B 0.244 *** 0.179 ***
Income (0.034) (0.031)
Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
N 974 667
2 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.199 *** 0.163 ***
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.031) (0.033)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 966 659
province
ESTIMATED INCOME (a)
3 Father's Log [beta] 0.378 *** 0.276 ***
Income (S.E) (0.134) (0.119)
Prob.(F) 0.005 0.021
N 1001 692
4 Fathers Log income. [beta] 0.310 ** 0.347 ***
Education of son, age of (S.E) (0.131) (0.134)
son, age square of son, Prob.(F) 0.000 0.000
occupation of son and N 993 684
province
*; *; **; *** stand for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively.
In parentheses are reported standard errors.
(a) Estimated Income of Father = Constant +Father's Age +
Father's Education + Father's [Age.sup.2] + Father's
Occupation.
This table, presented in this way for brevity, reports only
coefficient of father's log income. Detailed results are
available in Appendix III and IV.
Table 8
Two Stage Least Square Regression Estimates
Cohort Analysis
Models Independent Variables
>20 25-39 30-50
1 Father's Log [beta] 0.438 *** 0.408 *** 0.383
Income (S.E) (0.108) (0.125) (0.237)
Prob (F) 0.000 0.001 0.107
N 921 550 247
Fathers Log
2 Income, [beta] 0.467 *** 0.418 0.531 ***
Education
of Son, (S.E) (0.126) (0.298) (0.168)
Age of Son Prob (F) 0.000 0.126 0.000
N 921 247 550
>20 Years
Models Independent Variables
Urban Rural
1 Father's Log [beta] 0.404 ** 0.459 ***
Income (S.E) (0.202) (0.128)
Prob (F) 0.000 0.000
N 227 694
Fathers Log
2 Income, [beta] 0.508 ** 0.461 ***
Education
of Son, (S.E) (0.219) (0.160)
Age of Son Prob (F) 0.004 0.000
N 227 694
*. **. *** stand for significant at 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent respectively.
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.