Emerging issues in the implementation of irrigation and drainage sector reforms in Sindh, Pakistan.
Memon, Junaid Alam ; Mustafa, Usman
1. INTRODUCTION
Ever increasing demand for food, electricity and domestic water use
due to rapid growth in population has remained a key challenge for
Pakistan since the 1950s. The country has invested heavily in water
engineering projects to establish the world's largest
gravity-driven irrigation network on the Indus [Bandaragoda (2006);
Bengali (2009)]. Besides fulfilling a significant proportion of the
country's energy demand from hydropower installations, the system
irrigates about 14 million hectares of farmlands and supports
agriculture sector to contribute about 21 percent of the GDP, 60 percent
of the exports and 45 percent of the labour force [Bhutta (2006);
Pakistan (2012)]. Amidst its development, the elaborated irrigation
facility has left a deep footprint on productivity and environment of
the basin itself in the form of the rising levels of water-logging and
salinity and the degradation of deltaic ecology [Briscoe and Qamar
(2009); Memon and Thapa (2011)]. By the 1960s, every year about 40,000
hectares of fertile farmlands were turning into wastelands because of
water-logging and salinity in the basin [Bhutta (2006); Mulk (2009);
Qureshi, et al. (2008)]. Therefore, the country had no option but to
develop a remedial drainage network of thousands of kilometres of drains
and numerous tube wells parallel to the existing irrigation
infrastructure.
Investment in the irrigation infrastructure had been rationalised
based on the assumption that it will pave the way for social change in
the country [Haines (2011)]. However, once the major phase of irrigation
development completed, the policy-makers and the World Bank (with its
crucial role in the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, and subsequent
development of the basin) sensed the political economy of the agrarian
society; within which the irrigation infrastructure was unable to
recover even a small fraction of its operation and maintenance (O&M)
costs. The politically dominant feudal lords who possessed the major
share of farmlands, were not only interfering in the everyday affairs of
irrigation management [Mustafa (2002a)], but could also influence the
legislature and enjoy water subsidies in the name of small landholders
[Faisal (2009); Nabi, et al. (1986)]. Add-ins were the ethos and
colonial legacies of the hydraulic bureaucrats who kept themselves
isolated from the general public and had no option but to connive with
the feudal lords and operate the system at their will [Mustafa (2002a)].
Numerous policy and operational problems, such as unjustified irrigation
subsidies, low crop assessment and cost recovery, inequitable irrigation
distribution and widespread corruption in all tiers of water management,
emerged and caused the gradual deterioration of system infrastructure
and efficiency [Bengali (2009); Faisal (2009); Memon (2006); Prathapar,
et al. (2001)].
Concerning the situation, the World Bank stopped financing the
engineering solutions and explored the possibility of institutional
reforms. The idea was to reduce the discretionary power of water
bureaucrats and subsequent corruption and mismanagement through the
introduction of farmer-managed and participatory irrigation and drainage
(I&D) system. Obviously, this transformation was easier said than
done. The years of action research and policy dialogue finally yielded
the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities Act in 1997
[Bandaragoda (2006); Dinar, et al. (2004)]. The act facilitated the
formation of autonomous institutions at the different levels of
irrigation management. Under the umbrella of the provincial authorities,
Area Water Boards (AWBs) were to be established to manage the secondary
level channels or canals. Below this, farmers were to be organised into
Water User Associations (WUA) and Drainage Beneficiary Groups (DBGs) to
form Farmer Organisations (FOs) and manage the distributary/minor or
tertiary level l&D affairs [Memon (2006); Prathapar, et al. (2001)].
Sindh Province has been the second largest beneficiary of the
irrigation development on the Indus River. The provincial irrigation
facility itself stands as one of the largest contiguous irrigation
networks in the world (Figure 1). The provincial system irrigates about
five million hectare of farmlands through 14 canals, 1,446
distributaries/ minors and 45,000 watercourses [Memon (2006)]. Besides,
the system also features about 3,690 kilometres of drains. Since the
last 15 years, the province has been implementing irrigation and
drainage sector reforms. The provincial cabinet approved the Sindh
Irrigation and Drainage Act in 1997 and replaced it with the Sindh Water
Management Ordinance 2002 to accelerate the implementation of the
reforms [Sindh Governor House (2002)]. This study evaluates the extent
to which these reforms could be implemented and highlights some of the
emerging issues in this process. The next section describes the data
sources and methods and is followed by the result section highlighting
the major achievements towards the reforms. The final section discusses
key findings in the broader theoretical and policy context to draw the
conclusions and make policy recommendations.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Study Approach
At first, the broad indicators of progress in the implementation of
reforms were qualitatively analysed. Subsequently, we focused on the
three AWBs, namely, NC-AWB, GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, due to the fact that so
far the implementation of reforms in Sindh Province has been limited to
those areas. The emerging trends in the implementation were highlighted
through the descriptive statistical analysis of FO profiles. The reasons
for those trends were inquired through in-depth interviews conducted
with the purposively selected respondents.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
2.2. Data Sources
SIDA is primarily responsible for the implementation of proposed
institutional reforms in the I&D sector of Sindh Province. In 2009,
the agency published a one-page profile of 354 FOs in Sindh Province.
Since then, the profile has never been updated as there has been hardly
any progress in the FO formation. Data on key variables was extracted
from those profiles and was processed for descriptive analysis. Face to
face and telephonic interviews were conducted with the SIDA, AWB and
Water Sector Improvement Project (WISP) officials in order to explore
the reasons behind the emerging trends. Besides, formal and informal
discussions with some of the Management Committee members of FOs were
also insightful in understanding the underlying factors responsible for
the overall state of reform implementation.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Overall Implementation of Institutional Reforms
Despite years of action research by the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) and subsequent implementation by SIDA, the
I&D reforms in Sindh Province are still immature (Table 1). As a
precondition for the take-over of reforms, the SIDA has been established
and made operational since 1998. It was pursuing its mission to
decentralise the irrigation and drainage management at the canal and
distributary/minor levels. The SIDA was also functioning as the
'Regulatory Authority,' as the establishment of such
institution has been pending since the promulgation of Sindh Water
Management Ordinance 2002 [SWMO (2002)]. So far only three AWBs, namely,
the Nara Canal, the Ghotki Feeder Canal and the Left Bank Canal (Figure
1), could be established against the plan of establishing 14 AWBs on all
canals throughout the Province by 2008. On account of FO formation,
progress was conditional to the establishment of AWBs. At the provincial
level, only one fourth of the total targets of FOs formations could be
achieved while the progress in terms of actual Irrigation and Management
Transfer to FOs was less than one fifth of the targets (Table 1). Most
of the progress towards FO formation and IDMT was observed in the
above-mentioned three AWBs (Table 1 and Table 2). The NC-AWB was the
only subsystem where the targets of management transfer were almost
complete. It worth mentioning that the Nara Canal had been the pilot AWB
in Sindh province where the action research carried out by IWMI found
that participatory irrigation and drainage management was viable in
Sindh Province.
Most of the FOs of NC-AWB were formed during 2000-2003 and were
handed over the management responsibility during 2001-2004 and in 2008
(Table 2). In GCAWB and LBC-AWB, most of the FOs were formed during
2005-2008. However, the FOs in GC-AWB and LBC-AWB were bestowed with the
responsibility of managing their channels during 2007-2008 and
2006-2008, respectively (Table 2). Besides these three AWBs, some FOs
were also formed haphazardly in the command areas of other canals
(secondary level channels) which were still not handed over to the SIDA
for the establishment of AWBs and FOs. In total, about 16 such FOs were
formed outside the jurisdictions of the three AWBs of which only one
could be transferred the management responsibility till the time this
study completed (Table 2).
The achievements in FO formation were mostly the outcome of various
projects implemented by SIDA and voluntary contributions of various
government and non-government organisations (Table 3). The credit for FO
formation till 2000 goes to the 1WMI under the World Bank financed Left
Bank Outfall Drain Project (LBOD) and the Directorate of OFWM
(Agriculture Department, Government of Sindh) for their voluntary
contributions. However, most of the FO formation is attributed to the
SIDA and OFWM under the National Drainage Programme (NDP) during
2002-2007, also sponsored by the World Bank. Meanwhile, the World Bank
also sponsored the Sindh On-farm Water Management Project. This project
also had a component dealing with the FO formation--that too was
implemented by the OFWM. Besides those formal and sponsored attempts,
some local and international NGOs, such as OXFAM and SWAFCO, have also
formed FOs in the NC-AWB and outside the command areas of the three AWBs
(Table 3).
3.2. Composition of Farmer Organisations
Since irrigation right in Pakistan is a proxy to farmland
ownership, all those who have possessed or leased any farmland in the
command area of a channel were by default the members of its FO. Thus,
the membership size of a FO or its constituting WUAs was the function of
the command area that its respective irrigation channel was designed to
serve. On average, a FO of NC-AWB had 280 farmers/members out of which
about 24 were women farmers. In GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, although the average
number of farmers/members was substantially higher than that of the
NC-AWB, but the number of woman farmers/members was considerably less or
even negligible. The average landholding per farmer in a FO of three AWB
ranged between nine and 13 hectares but the distribution of land was
quite skewed towards the privileged small number of farmers. The average
landholding of the smallest farmer in any of the FO was not more than
five hectares while the average landholding of the largest landholder
could be as high as 100 hectares in NC-AWB, 85 hectares in GC-AWB and
about 175 hectares in LBC-AWB.
3.3. Institutional Attributes of Farmer Organisations
A complete transformation from the state-to a farmer-managed
irrigation system could only be observed in the case of NC-AWB (Table
5). The majority of the FOs in NC-AWB was near to complete the second
tenure of their MCs while a few of the FOs had already started the third
tenure. In GC-AWB and LBC-AWB, the majority of the FOs was still going
through the first tenure of their MCs (Table 5) mostly because FOs in
these AWBs were formed relatively recently (Table 2). However, while
comparing the FOs of GC-AWB and LBC-AWB which were formed during the
same time (Table 2), the percentage of FOs in their second tenure was
much higher for the GC-AWB than the LBC-AWB. This defect appears to be a
function of unknown status of MC tenures of 14 percent FOs of the
LBC-AWB (Table 5). When specifically inquired about the exact reason
behind the unknown status of the MC tenure of some FOs, it was revealed
that their re-election was pending due to a severe conflict among farmer
groups. Unfortunately, neither the SIDA nor the respective AWBs could
play any successful role in the resolution of the conflicts over
re-election.
From the information given in the FO Profiles 2009, the
participation of three farmer groups, namely, woman farmers, the
smallest farmers and the largest farmers, in the FO management
committees can be analysed. It could be observed that two- fifth of the
largest landlords of the FOs in NC-AWB, one third of the largest
landlords in the FOs of GC-AWB and LBC-AWB were MC members of their
respective FOs (Table 5). Most of the largest farmers in FOs across all
AWBs, who were members of MCs, were either Chairmen or other important
office-bearers and only a few of them were just the members (Table 6).
Compared to the largest landholders, the participation of the smallest
landholder in the MCs of FOs was in much lesser numbers. In all three
AWBs, only about 20 FO management committees had the participation of
the smallest landholders (Table 5). Most of the smallest landholders,
who were in the MC of their FOs, were just members while a few of them
could be found holding the offices of a chairman, vice chairman,
secretary and treasurers (Table 6). It can be further observed that the
composition of FO management committees was quite masculine. Compared to
the percentage of women landholders in FO general bodies across all AWBs
(Table 4), their participation in the MCs was negligible or completely
missing. Only four women could be found bearing an office, three of whom
were in the NC-AWB while only one in the GC-AWB. None of the
office-bearers was found to be a chairwoman (Table 6). In NCAWB, three
women were designated each as a Vice Chairwoman, General Secretary and
Treasurer; while the only woman in GC-AWB was just a member (Table 6).
4. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Although the need for water sector reforms has been uniform across
various countries, the underlying causes, the cost of implementation and
a certain degree of success in achieving the stated objectives varied
across different socio-political and geographical contexts [Dinar; et
al. (2004)]. In the case of Pakistan, improper O&M of irrigation
infrastructure, low crop assessment and revenue collection, inequitable
water distribution and corruption in water bureaucracy were compelling
reasons behind the I&D sector reforms [Memon (2006)]. Nevertheless,
like other South Asian countries, the design of reforms and push for
their persuasion mainly came from the World Bank having a major role in
the post-independence irrigation development in the country [Bandaragoda
(2006)]. Given the fact that the demand for reforms was not internally
generated by users and managers of irrigation facilities [Bandaragoda
(2006)], the findings of this study revealed that the prescriptions were
implemented half-heartedly. The establishment of SIDA was a cosmetic
step that partially transformed the Provincial Irrigation Department and
created a parallel institution that was made responsible for the
implementation of a farmer-managed irrigation system. After the initial
hike, not much progress has been made. So for, the farmer-managed
irrigation system is confided to NC-AWB, GC-AWB and LBC AWBs and could
not encompass the remaining 11 canals in the province. By the year 2000,
the Government of Sindh had already notified five canals to be brought
under a farmer-managed irrigation system. Nevertheless, the Irrigation
Department continues to operate the Begari Sindh and the Western Sindh
canals and never transferred these two to the SIDA for the establishment
of AWBs and the introduction of a farmer-managed irrigatipn model.
Even in the AWBs, where the SIDA was able to implement reforms, the
process had been quite slow and grinding to halt as no major achievement
has been made since 2009. Over the last 15 years, the SIDA could not
establish any mechanism to ensure the democratic election of the members
of AWB for any of the three canals where the system has been implemented
so far. The operations of these AWBs were in the hands of politically
installed feudal lords without having any representation of the farmers
at large. Besides, the FO formation and management transfer was still
incomplete in GC-AWB and LBC-AWB and will certainly require decades to
complete for the remaining canals at the current pace of implementation.
Surprisingly, despite knowing that reforms were supply-driven
[Bandaragoda (2006)] and a lengthy process, SIDA had not established any
programme-level staff for social mobilisation, FO formation or post
transfer management support to newly created FOs.
So far, most of the FO formation had been project-based, done
either through the project staffs of SIDA or by outsourcing other
governmental and non-governmental agencies. Evidences suggest the large
landholders, who were one of the reasons for the failure of the
state-managed irrigation system in the province, had already captured
the management committees of FOs by implanting either themselves or
their proxies on the key positions of MCs. Although such a tendency on
the part of the large landholders could have its roots in the skewed
power distribution in rural Sindh, another reason, as narrated by some
of the Social Mobilisers, could be the project-based approach of FO
formation persuaded by the SIDA and AWBs. According to them, their
supervisors compelled them to meet the targets of FO formation by
implicitly compromising over the quality of social mobilisation for
farmer participation and capacity building. Upon the condition of
anonymity, many of the social organisers confessed that they sought out
help from influential landlords and politicians in the formation of FOs
in exchange for the selection of MC members at their will.
Another major concern that had been missing from the debate on
institutional reforms was the total ignorance of drainage affairs
throughout the implementation of the reforms. Such an observation was
particularly valid for the low-lying topography of NC-AWB and LBC-AWB,
where the farmers highly acknowledge the importance of the drainage
network in maintaining the fertility of their farmlands. It was gathered
that almost half of the FOs in both of NC-AWB and GC-AWBs had some form
of drainage structures such as surface and tube well and tile drains.
However, virtually none of those FOs had formed any DBG for managing
their drainage structures. Farmer organisations were reluctant to take
over the responsibility of drainage management in purview of the payment
of drainage levy [Official Correspondent Daily Dawn (2004)]. Since the
government was not generating any revenue from the drainage facility, it
ignored O&M of these structures until absolutely inevitable. As a
result, the state of drainage structures was indeed miserable
characterised by the chocked drains and nonfunctional tube-wells. It was
virtually in a state what the major theorist of Commons Pool Resources
have explained as an open'access resource [Berkes and Farvar
(1989); Schlager and Ostrom (1992)] or an unmanaged common [Hardin
(1968, 1994, 1998)]--where everybody was a beneficiary but nobody was
bearing the management responsibility.
To a neutral observer, the existing state of the implementation of
institutional reforms in Sindh Province was not much surprising.
Surprising, however, was the fact that policy makers ignored or perhaps
concealed some of the major findings of the action research carried out
by IWMI under the LBOD Project. For example, Murray-Rust et al (2001)
found that FO formation was possible, but the sustainability of such
institutions was unclear since none of the FOs was handed over the
responsibility of O&M of their irrigation channels till the project
ended. Besides warnings that the well-established hydraulic bureaucracy
could impede the success PIM, Murray-Rust, et al. (2001) and
Bandaragoda, et al. (1997) found it unrealistic to assume that the large
farmers, for whom control over irrigation was the key to remain
advantageous in the local power structure, could relinquish it in favour
of the marginalised farmers. Similarly, other initial studies conducted
by the 1WM1 research team [Bandaragoda and Memon (1997); Bandaragoda, et
al. (1997)] and others [Mustafa (2002a); Mustafa (2002b)] also
identified various caveats in the implementation of reforms such as
rivalries of the hydraulic bureaucrats against institutional reforms,
the possibility of feudal lords and politicians capture and chances of
corruption among FO leaders. Nevertheless, perhaps the donor push was
strong enough to compel the policy-makers to ignore these caveats and
pick up only those conclusions which suggested the viability of the PIM
within the socio-political context of Sindh Province.
One of the S1DA officials who had been an instrumental advocate of
reforms expressed his frustration as, "the inception of reforms
shook the roots of a century-old water bureaucracy in Sindh; however, it
is the fact of today that over the time the water bureaucracy has
sustained those shocks and has re-emerged as a major threat to the
reforms." It is perhaps the peak time for the policy makers to
revisit the design of reforms before continuing the failed path of their
implementation persuaded so far. Despite the unsatisfactory progress so
far, the lessons learned could serve as the guiding principles for
setting the future directions of water management policies. Undoubtedly,
it requires more research, particularly in evaluating the performance of
FOs against the stated objectives of equitable irrigation distribution,
maintenance of channels and cost recovery. Besides, it is also necessary
to re-evaluate the prospect of PIM in the context of local power
structure, factors determining the willingness of water bureaucracy to
support the institutional reforms and the capacity and willingness of
farmers to manage the system. Understanding of such dimensions will
provide new insights and policy input for the redesign of reforms and
address some of the key obstacles in their implementation.
REFERENCES
Bandaragoda, D. J. (2006) Limits to Donor-driven Water Sector
Reforms: Insight and Evidence from Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Water Policy
8, 51-67.
Bandaragoda, D. J. and Y. Memon (1997) Moving Towards Participatory
Irrigation Management--Phase II report of pilot project for
farmer-managed irrigated attriculture under the Left Bank Outfall Drain
(LBOD) Stage I Project, Pakistan. International Irrigation Management
Institute, Lahore.
Bandaragoda, D. J., G. V. Skogerboe, and Y. Memon (1997) Prospect
of Farmer-managed Irrigated Agriculture in the Sindh Province of
Pakistan. Pakistan National Programme, International Irrigation
Management Institute, Lahore, p. 147.
Bengali, K. (2009) Water Management under Constraints: The Need for
a Paradigm Shift. In M. Kugelman, and R. M. Hathaway (eds.) Running on
Empty: Pakistan's Water Crisis. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.
Berkes, F. and M. T. Farvar (1989) Introduction and Overview. In F.
Berkes (ed.) Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-based
Sustainable Development. London: Balhaven Press, pp. 1-17.
Bhutta, M. N. (2006) Bringing Drainage Towards Integreted Water
Resources Management in the Indus Basin, The World Water Day. Lahore:
Pakistan Engineering Council, pp. 41-52.
Briscoe, J. and U. Qamar (2009) Pakistan's Water Economy
Running Dry. Oxford Uni. Press.
Dinar, A., T. K. Balakrishnan, and J. Wambia (2004) Politics of
Institutional Reforms in the Water and Drainage Sector of Pakistan.
Environment and Development Economics 9, 409-445 .doi: 10.1017/S13 5
5770X0300127X.
Faisal , K. (2009) Water, Governance, and Corruption in Pakistan.
In M. Kugelman and R. M. Hathaway (eds.) Running on Empty:
Pakistan's Water Crisis. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars.
Haines, T. D. (2011) Building the Empire, Building the Nation:
Water, Land, and the Politics of River-development in Sindh, 1898-1969.
Royal Holloway College. University of London, p. 292.
Hardin, G. (1968) The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162,
1243-1248.
Hardin, G. (1994) The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons. Trends in
Ecology and Evolution 9, 199-199.
Hardin, G. (1998) Extensions of "The Tragedy of the
Commons". Science (Washington) 280, 682-683.
Memon, J. and G. Thapa (2011) The Indus Irrigation System, Natural
Resources, and Community Occupational Quality in the Delta Region of
Pakistan. Environmental Management 47, 173-187.
Memon, N. A. (2006) Participatory Irrigation Management and
Institutionalising Irrigation Service in Sindh. In I. Hussain, Z. A.
Gill, Z. Naseer, and S. Sarwar (eds.) INPIM's 9th International
Seminar Participatory Irrigation Management. Lahore: 1NP1M. pp. 78-93.
Mulk, S. U. (2009) Pakistan's Water Economy, the Indus River
System and Its Development Infrastructure, and the Relentless Struggle
for Sustainability. In R. M. Hathaway and M. Kugelman (eds.) Running on
Empty: Pakistan's Water Crisis. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson
International Centre for Scholars, pp. 64-81. Murray-Rust, H., Y. Memon,
and M. Talpur (2001) Empowerment of Farmer Organisations--Case Study of
Farmer Managed Irrigated Agriculture Project, Sindh. Lahore:
International Water Management Institute. 24 pp.
Mustafa, D. (2002a) Theory Versus Practice: The Bureaucratic Ethos
of Water Resource Management and Administration in Pakistan.
Contemporary South Asia 11, 39-56.
Mustafa, D. (2002b) To Each According to His Power? Participation,
Access, and Vulnerability in Irrigation and Flood Management in
Pakistan. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20, 737-752.
Nabi, I., N. Hamid, and S. Zahid (1986) The Agrarian Economy of
Pakistan: Issues and Options. Karachi: Oxford University Press.
Official Correspondent Daily Dawn (2004) Mirpurkhas: Farmers to Pay
Drainage Tax Daily Dawn, Internet Edition ed. The DAWN Group of
Newspapers, Mirpurkhas.
Pakistan, Government of (2012) Pakistan Economic Survey 2010-2012.
Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Economic
Adviser's Wing.
Prathapar, S. A., M. Hassan, Z. I. Mirza, and Z. Tahir (2001)
Constraints on Enforcement of Water Policies: Selected Cases from South
Asia. In D. Brennan (ed.) Water Policy Reform: Lessons from Asia and
Australia (an International Workshop). Bangkok, Thailand: Australian
Centre for International Agricultural Research, pp. 171-176.
Qureshi, A. S., P. G. McComick, M. Qadir, and Z. Aslam (2008)
Managing Salinity and Waterlogging in the Indus Basin of Pakistan.
Agricultural Water Management 95, 1-10.
Schlager, E. and E. Ostrom (1992) Property-rights Regimes and
Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics 68, 249-262.
Sindh Governor House (2002) Sindh Water Management Ordinance 2002.
(Sindhi Edition). Hyderabad: Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority, p.
112.
Comments
Under various climate change scenarios, we are confronting water
crisis situation in the country and Sindh province in particular, So
this is a good effort to limelight the issue of Irrigation and Drainage
Sector reforms. The authors of this paper have done a good job of
reproducing the work of FO profile of 2009. The language of the paper is
excellent. Paper is addressing a very sensitive issue relating to the
majority of farmers involving a lot of controversies and huge sum of
public funds.
(1) To assess overall progress in implementation of institutional
reforms Authors are just relying completely on the study of information
collected by SIDA in the year 2009.
(2) There has been followed a stereo typed style as we observe in
similar kind of other studies in Punjab.
(3) Some of the information given in tables are confusing for
example in Table 5, it has been stated that the status of around 7
percent FOs regarding their MIT status is unknown. Similar is the case
with table 4 where data of only 26 FOs is being presented out of 92 FOs
found in LBC-AWB.
(4) The authors have discussed many issues in policy and
implication section which they were not touched in analysis. As for
instance there is no mentioning of social mobilisation and training
activities in the main text.
(5) For the qualitative analysis it would be good if performance
indicators are introduced for the distributaries which are being run by
the farmers or by the agency.
(6) A strong finding has been laid down in the paper based on
comparatively narrowed range of data (only 25 percent quantitative
targets have been achieved. For instance: Bureaucracy has re-emerged as
a major threat to the reforms. More or less same findings have been made
in the studies quoted by the authors.
Abdul Saboor
PMAS Arid Agriculture University, Rawalpindi.
Junaid Alam Memon <memon@pide.org.pk, memon@gmx.us> is Head,
Department of Environmental Economics, Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics, Islamabad. Usman Mustafa <usman@pide.org.pk> is Chief,
Training Programme, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,
Islamabad.
Authors' Note: The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan
generously funded the research for this paper. The authors are also
indebted to Mr Nazeer Ahmed Esani and Dr Fateh Muhammad Mari for sharing
of their invaluable resources and knowledge for the study.
Table 1
Overview of the Implementation of Institutional Reforms
in the Sindh Province
Progress indicator Target and achievements Remarks
--Formation of Sindh Irrigation and Complete.
Provincial Drainage Authority
Irrigation have been formed to
and Drainage oversee the
Authority irrigation and
drainage affairs at
the provincial
level.
--Formulation of Appropriate Incomplete. RA
Regulatory formation is still is operational
Authority awaited. Currently, through an ad
(RA) SIDA is functioning hoc arrangement.
as RA.
--Formulation of Out of 13 AWBs, only 23 % complete.
AWBs three (Fig. 1.)
could be formed as
of 2009. No progress
has been made
thereafter.
--Formulation of FOs Out of about 1,400 25 % complete.
in AWBs FOs, about 338 have
been formed in three
AWBs namely: NC-AWB,
GC-AWB and LBC-AWB.
Beside some 16 FOs
has also been formed
in the canal
commands where
irrigation reforms
are yet to be
implemented and AWBs
are to be
established.
--Irrigation and Out of 359, about For three AWBs,
Drainage 259 FOs have been the target is 73 %
Management transferred complete. At the
Transfer (IDMT) irrigation and provincial level,
to FOs drainage management only 18 %
responsibility. complete.
About 94% FOs of
NC-AWB, 38% FOs of
GC- AWB and 60% FOs
of LBC-AWB had been
transferred the
irrigation
management
responsibility of
their minors and
distributaries.
Note: Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. No substantial
progress in FO formation thereafter.
Table 2
AWB Wise Details of FO Formation and Irrigation
and Drainage Management Transfer
NC-AWB GC-AWB
Year Formed IDMT Formed IDMT
1998 2 -- -- --
1999 5 -- -- --
2000 17 -- -- --
2001 12 24 -- --
2002 94 54 5 --
2003 25 48 6 --
2004 5 16 -- 11
2005 -- -- 3 --
2006 -- -- 18 --
2007 1 -- 46 5
2008 -- 18 6 12
2009 -- -- -- --
Total 161+1 (a) 160 84 28
LBC-AWB other AWBs
Year Formed IDMT Formed IDMT
1998 -- -- -- --
1999 -- -- -- --
2000 -- -- 3 --
2001 1 -- 4 --
2002 5 -- 2 --
2003 7 11 -- --
2004 -- 2 -- --
2005 7 -- -- --
2006 27 14 1 --
2007 38 19 5 --
2008 4 15 1 1
2009 3 -- -- --
Total 92 61 16 1
Notes: (a) Value for one case is missing.
-- Figures in the table are the numbers of FOs.
Table 3
Different Agencies Involved in FO Formation During
the Years 1998-2009
NC- GC- LBC- Other
FO Forming Agency AWB AWB WB AWBs Total
SIDA 47 48 44 8 147
On-farm Water
Management (OFWM) 79 36 48 5 168
SIDA and OFWM Jointly 23 -- -- -- 23
International Water
Management Institute 11 -- -- 1 12
Other NGOs such as
OXFAM, SWAFCO 1 -- -- 2 3
Total 161 84 92 16 353+1a
Notes:
(a) Missing values.
-- Figures in the table are the number of FOs.
Table 4
Characteristics of FO Membership in Three A WBs of Sindh Province
NC-AWB GC-AWB
Salient Features of
FOs' Membership [bar.x] SD n * [bar.x] SD n *
Farmers/Members (Person) 280 231 161 347 400 72
Women Farmers/
Members (Person) 24 36 100 5 5 20
Land Holding per
Farmer (ha) 13.0 10.7 159 9.4 7.5 70
Land of the Smallest
Landholder (ha) 2.8 2.5 160 2.5 2.7 84
Land of the Largest
Landholder (ha) 97.8 84.5 160 84.3 106 84
LBC-AWB
Salient Features of
FOs' Membership [bar.x] SD n *
Farmers/Members (Person) 347 383 78
Women Farmers/
Members (Person) 9 11 26
Land Holding per
Farmer (ha) 11.9 7.4 77
Land of the Smallest
Landholder (ha) 4.7 22 91
Land of the Largest
Landholder (ha) 176 230 91
Notes:
* The number of cases valid in the calculation of x(s);
'[bar.x]' is the arithmetic mean and 'SD' is standard deviation
while 'n' is the number of cases valid for the calculation
of [bar.x].
--Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. There is no
substantial progress in FO formation after 2009.
Table 5
Organisational Feature of FOs in three AWBs in
Sindh Province
NC-AWB GC-AWB LBC-AWB
Organisational Details (n=162) (n=84) (n=92)
FOs signed IDMT Agreement 98.8 45.2 65.2
Tenure of FO Management
Committees
--1st tenure -- 79.8 75.0
--2nd tenure 92.6 19.0 10.9
--3rd tenure 0.6 -- --
--Status unknown 6.8 1.2 14.1
The Largest Landholder
of a FO in MC 39.8 35.7 32.6
The Smallest Landholder
of a FO in MC 17.4 20.2 20.7
Women Farmers in MC 1.8 1.2 --
Notes:
--Figures in the table are percentages.
--Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009. There is no
substantial progress in FO formation after 2009.
Table 6
Participation of Different Farmer Groups in FO Management
Committees
Positions in FO
management
committees
Not
Farmer Groups Participating Chair V. Chair G. Sec
NC-AWB (n=161)
--Women farmer 98.2 -- 0.6 0.6
--Smallest farmer 79.5 0.6 3.7 3.1
-Largest farmer 57.8 23.0 8.1 4.3
GC-AWB (n=84)
--Women 98.8 -- -- --
--Smallest farmer 78.6 3.6 2.4 3.6
--Largest farmer 64.3 22.6 6.0 1.2
LBC-AWB (n=92)
--Women farmers -- -- -- --
--Smallest farmer 79.3% 1.1 4.3 3.3
--Largest farmer 65.2 14.1 1.1 5.4
Positions in FO
management committees
Farmer Groups Treasurer Members
NC-AWB (n=161)
--Women farmer 0.6 --
--Smallest farmer 3.1 9.9
-Largest farmer 3.1 3.7
GC-AWB (n=84)
--Women -- 1.2
--Smallest farmer 1.2 10.7
--Largest farmer 1.2 4.8
LBC-AWB (n=92)
--Women farmers -- --
--Smallest farmer 2.2 9.8
--Largest farmer 4.3 9.8
Notes:
--Figures in the table are percentages.
--Calculations are based on FO Profile 2009.
There is no substantial progress in FO
formation thereafter.