Pakistani bureaucracy and political neutrality: a mutually exclusive phenomenon?
Tanwir, Maryam ; Fennell, Shailaja
This paper examines the reasons for the early dominance of the
bureaucratic elite in Pakistan and the downsizing that was brought about
by the administrative reforms of 1973. The perceptions of bureaucrats
and ministers indicate that loyalty to political establishment is now
regarded a crucial requirement in a bureaucrat. This shift from the
principle of political neutrality to the practice of political
allegiance has affected both the development agenda as well as the
institutions of the country.
JEL classification: H11, D73
Keywords: Bureaucracy, Political Neutrality, Politicisation,
Governance, Weber
the first thing I want to tell you is that you should not be
influenced by any political pressure, by any political party or
individual politician ...... governments are defeated, prime ministers
come and go, ministers come and go, but you stay on, and therefore there
is great responsibility placed on your shoulders. You should have no
hand in supporting this political leader or that; this is not your
business .... (1)
The Pakistani state has been regarded as 'a weak state'
for the last three decades on account of the inability of the elected
government to successfully broker political stability. The development
literature locates this weakness in the political and ministerial
machinations rather than attributing it to any inherent characteristics
of the bureaucracy as an organisational structure. In the 1990s, the
literature emerging from international institutions and academia located
Pakistan's failure to develop in the malfunctioning apparent in the
Pakistani bureaucracy. This shortcoming was linked to the increasing
politicisation of the bureaucracy and its growing and explicit links to
the ministerial structures [World Bank (1998)]. In particular, there was
a focus on the inability of individual bureaucrats to follow the
organisational rules due to a set of perverse incentives that were
misaligned with the development objectives of the bureaucracy. Such an
organisational shortcoming came to be regarding as a lack of capacity
with regard to governance functioning within the bureaucracy [Khan
(2000, 2001)]. In more recent years, the inability of the Pakistani
state to ensure development and to maintain the peace has marked it out
as a fragile or failed state [Kaplan (2008)]. There is now a growing
concern that the inability of the Pakistani state has been due to an
excessive politicisation of the Pakistani state.
This article examines the role of the bureaucracy in Pakistan by
drawing on qualitative data on the perceptions of bureaucrats in
Pakistan. The intention of the article is to evaluate whether the
implications drawn regarding the bureaucratic behaviour, in particular
the need to have a politically neutral bureaucracy, have any traction
with the subjective perceptions of the bureaucracy.
Methodology
The aim of the research was to investigate the dynamics
underpinning the Pakistani bureaucracy; to examine their views on the
institution that they were a part of, their perceptions of themselves,
their colleagues, their bosses, and the institution they represented.
The primary focus was the subjective experience of the individuals
interviewed. (2)
This article is based on primary research undertaken in Pakistan
during October 2007 to June 2008. Atotal of 33 qualitative interviews
were conducted, 29 were senior bureaucrats and 4 of ministers. The
Subjects arc selected because of who they were and what they knew,
rather than by chance. The interviews were mostly of retired
bureaucrats, and some serving senior officers. There was a larger focus
on the retired bureaucrats because they had more years in service, hence
could offer richer insights. Also they could be more candid as they had
little to lose in terms of career prospects. But to ensure triangulation
some serving bureaucrats and ministers were interviewed.
Every individual bureaucrat being interviewed was a primary unit of
analysis and an individual case study. The field research was limited to
Lahore and Islamabad. Since the senior most bureaucrats are posted to
the federal capital Islamabad and they usually retire there at grade 22
as federal secretaries, hence it was the best place to obtain interviews
from them.
1. THE STATE OF PAKISTAN
Since September 9/11, the Pakistani state has been increasingly
designated as a failed state [Kaplan (2008)]. This is a disclaimer
against the ability of the Pakistani state for it indicts all arms of
the state, including the bureaucracy in its inability to deliver
development, even in relation to its most basic attributes o f internal
law and order.
This notion of the failed state differs from that of the fragile
state, one that has a lack of capacity and/or will to first foster an
environment conducive to sustainable development, and suffers from
failures of legitimacy, service delivery and accountability [Stewart and
Brown (2009)]. The malfunctioning bureaucracy is, regarding in this
literature, as an example of a dysfunctional arm of the state which
could contribute and/or further exacerbate the failure of development.
The weak state in contrast is a consequence of a state formation where
non-state players might be dominant and which demand that the state make
a political settlement to ensure state legitimacy and therefore must
need relegate development to a lesser objective [Khan (1996)]. These
three notions of state incapacity have been used rather indiscriminately
in recent years resulting in a reduced understanding of how the various
arms of the state do or do not deliver development objectives.
Additionally, the importance of an impersonal and non politicised
bureaucracy as a prerequisite for a functioning state is swept away in a
hasty sweep in the policy sphere that regards the presence of
ministerial and bureaucratic corruption as an indication of state
failure. This flies in the face of the reality on the ground that
countries that have a similar level of corruption have very different
growth rates [Przeworski (1996)]. Also there are countries which have
had considerable growth despite close links between the bureaucracy and
the contractual process [c.f. Malaysia, see Khan and Jomo (2000)].
Finally, there is little clarity of the causality of these two
phenomenon: the benefit of untangling the impact of failed states as a
consequence of ministerial and bureaucratic corruption [Khan (2001)]
from the obverse strand that regards the increasing politicisation of
the bureaucracy as an incipient cause of state failure [Shafqat (1999)]
needs to be undertaken to understand what is happening in the Pakistani
bureaucracy.
Political Neutrality and the Consequences for Development
Political neutrality for the purpose of this paper primarily
implies that the bureaucracy is above and beyond politics. It is neutral
and impartial. It is not aligned with, has a preference for, or biased
against any political party. Loyalty is to the public and not to one
political personality or party. The primary objective of the bureaucrat
(3) is to provide public service without political alignment, bias,
preference, or interference. Political neutrality also implies that
there is no political interference in appointments of public servants.
And appointments are made purely on the basis of merit and competence.
Political neutrality if it holds, gives the public servant a sense of
security. The bureaucrat will be assigned to a post based on his merit,
and it would be his skill of execution that would be sufficient to take
him to the next hierarchal level. All bureaucrats would work based on
principles of hard work and independent and impersonal thinking, and
there would be no benefit to be gained from currying favours with the
political masters. Hence for the bureaucracy to be productive there is
the need to make it independent from political intervention and
pressures that would enable the civil servant to perform public service
in an efficient and professional manner.
Politicisation of the bureaucracy on the other hand is one of the
key causes of the decline in the civil service systems. The lack of job
security due to politically motivated decisions on recruitment,
promotion and dismissal and the lack of career perspective for the staff
due to the ever increasing number of posts subject to political
appointments all contribute to declining efficiency of the bureaucrats.
The incentive to work hard, to be fair, to be efficient erodes in such
contexts. The link between performance and reward is broken and
individual merit is relinquished by political interventions and the
efficiency and productivity of the organisation are compromised. In
senior, significant positions like secretary of education, economic
affairs, commerce, and finance etc, the qualities of ability and
competence should be the criteria for the appointment, as the appointee
and its skills are for the execution of tasks essential for national
development. In a situation where these positions are awarded to
political loyalists and not to those who are the best equipped for the
job, economic development is held hostage. When a bureaucrat is not
politically neutral and is politically aligned to serve the interests of
a co-opted individual, who is pursuing personal benefit, at the cost of
national interest, then service delivery suffers. Political alignment
results in serving merely the interests of politicians and their
constituency, ensuring the politicians' vote bank, working for
selected interests and not for the common man. So lack of political
neutrality would imply that the public servants are serving selected
individuals interests and not the common man. Economic development of
the country is not the priority but the interest of particular
individuals and their parties takes precedence. And the bureaucracy is
no longer following and respecting the guiding principles of its
profession.
Max Weber and the Ideal Bureaucrat
The established and now traditional literature on the bureaucracy
is largely derived from the work on the 19th century social scientist
Max Weber. The Weberian bureaucrat was expected to conform to norms of
rationality, specialisation, political neutrality, meritocratic
recruitment and long term career ladders among other characteristics
[Weber (1968)]. The notion of political neutrality set out in the
Weberian framework requires that the bureaucracy to be indifferent to
the political party in power and to ensure that their actions are based
on neutrality and impartiality with regard to all political parties. The
bureaucrat is regarded as a public servant who operates solely in the
interest of the public and should not bow to pressure from the political
process or parties. The Weberian construction of the ideal bureaucrat as
a rational, efficient, and achievement-oriented provides the template
for evaluating the actions and effectiveness of the bureaucrat. The
Weberian bureaucrat is regarded as an agent of the state; an agent who
is characterised as functioning not on an inherent sense of motivation
but on an externally imposed set of criteria. The implication is that
the actions of the bureaucrat should not be driven by any intrinsic
values but are instrumental in nature. The duties of the bureaucrat in
the civil service are restricted to policy implementation as part of the
executive arm of the state. (4) The instrumentality of bureaucratic
behaviour is a consequence of the autonomy gained from externally
imposed rules. It is the very principles of meritocratic recruitment
that ensures that bureaucrats embark on well defined, non-politicised
and predictable long term career paths. These rules provided the basis
for a Weberian bureaucracy that was achievement and goal oriented,
protected from political interference, and following norms of
rationality, discipline, specialist knowledge. These objective standards
and impersonal rules that provided the framework for running the
bureaucracy in turn ensured stability and predictability in the
organisation. The bureaucratic organisation was consequently the most
stable, predictable and 'Once fully established, bureaucracy is
among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy'
[Weber (1968), p. 87].
The notion of political neutrality is based on the theory and
historical experience of Western European states which have undergone a
separation of church, state and society, through the course of the 18th
and 19th centuries. (5) This notion of political neutrality has been
taken as a characteristic with which to evaluate the ability and
performance of the bureaucracy in developing countries. The bureaucrat
is regarded as successful in the Weberian sense, if public service is
provided without any favours being granted to the political
establishment and without interference from any political quarters.
[Cheema and Sayeed (2006)]. The reality in many developing countries
where political interference and alignment are the norm rather than the
expectation in the government so that it is commonplace for bureaucrats
to be transferred by ministers [Wade (1985)] gives rise to a political
economy where the bureaucrat seeks to maximise his private income while
in a particular office rather than to place the top priority on the
delivery of development objectives.
Early studies of the bureaucracy in Pakistan indicate that the
power of the bureaucracy emanating from a full set of objective rules
and standards was present at independence but began to dwindle shortly
thereafter. (6) To understand the reason for the existence of a full set
of rules at independence has much to do with the tracing the historical
origins of Pakistani bureaucracy and political neutrality under the
British colonial rule. The British system of administration was
developed to suit the needs of a colonial power. The British imperial
civil service regarded this bureaucratic machinery as the appropriate
instrument to rule colonies effectively, to establish their hegemonic
rule, to effectively collect revenue.
The basic objectives of the British Indian system of public
administration, which incorporated some important features of the
Mughal administrative system, and which remained unchanged until
the partitioning of India and creation of Pakistan in 1947, lay in
the maintenance of law and order, revenue collection,
dispensation of justice and the provision of basic services. (7)
Pakistan incorporated this system of bureaucratic rule without much
modification at independence in 1947. In the face of a new political
establishment, incorporation of the inherited civil service structure
remains questionable. As the newly independent state, the Pakistani
government faced a different mandate that of promoting economic and
social development, and what was an effective institution used to govern
colonies might no longer be appropriate or adequate to ensure that the
development objectives were met.
The Pakistani administrative system inherited clearly delineated
legacy, based on a constitutional structure with well defined rules and
regulations. The role of the bureaucrat within this set up was
restricted to that of the policy implementer. The context of
Pakistan's history with a set of political parties that largely
develop after partition and independence results in relative fragility
in the political system in contrast to the administration institution
[Alavi (1972)]. (8)
There have been numerous studies (9) that have examined the extent
of political neutrality prevalent within the functioning of the
Pakistani bureaucracy in the earlier decades of the inception of
Pakistan. In the current development discourse there is increasing
importance awarded to the significance of transparency, accountability
and political neutrality of the bureaucracy to ensure good governance. A
recent evaluation by the Brookings Institution uses the 'the lack
of accountable political institutions' and the lack of 'the
ability of the state bureaucracy to function effectively, independently,
and responsibly, has been used as one of the criteria to assess the
level of weakness and fragility of a state. (10) In such a context where
there is little evidence of feedback mechanisms and punitive sanctions
for misdemeanor by a bureaucrat the Weberian model is unlikely to
provide an automatic remedy [Wade (1985)]. In its stead, there is a
strong rationale for the existence of a state model based on political
settlement where all stakeholders within the state apparatus are made
side payments to ensure the stability of the existing weak state [Khan
(1996)].
The proposition that the Pakistani bureaucracy is a Weberian
institution has become a subject of considerable interest. One yard
stick against which to evaluate the Pakistani bureaucracy has been to
ascertain whether Weberian characteristics of meritocratic recruitment
and long-term career ladders are in evidence. (11) Another consideration
has been with regard to adherence to the system of rules in the
Pakistani bureaucracy. (12) What is less clear is whether political
neutrality, a quintessentially Weberian characteristic, should continue
to be used as a characteristic to classify a bureaucracy as Weberian.
(13) While the constitutional position is clearly important, the focus
of the article is on the relationship between the bureaucrat and the
minister. (14) The environment in Pakistan, within which bureaucrats
operate, cannot be based on an idealised notion of political neutrality;
In fact, such a proposition becomes a hollow objective and a meaningless
recommendation within the context of the incentives that are faced by
these individuals. Where bureaucratic performance is rewarded in
relation to the bureaucrat's ability to please his or her political
masters, promotion on the grounds on competence and expertise are few
and far between. In fact a bureaucrat who chooses to follow principle of
Political Neutrality is far more likely to be removed on the basis of
political grounds.
The following section examines the extent of political neutrality
exercised by the bureaucracy in its earlier decades of Pakistan
political and administrative history.
2. THE POLITICAL, INHERITANCE IN PAKISTAN 1947-1972
The kingpin position went to the district magistrate under the
British administration and the prominence accorded to the bureaucracy
continued in full glory after the gaining of independence in 1947.
Rowland Egger (1953) reviewing the bureaucratic system in Pakistan
concluded that the bureaucracy had hardly changed the days of the
British Raj. (15) An important reason for bureaucratic potency in the
initial years was their ability to consolidate their importance in the
inherited colonial system. The early advantage gained by the bureaucracy
was difficult to dent and this led to an imbalance between bureaucratic
power and political directives, with the former being far more dominant
than the latter [Alavi (1990)]. It has even been argued that the
bureaucracy actually grew in relative importance within the government
after 1947 as the civil service used the well established set of rules
and standards to control and direct the behaviour of the entire
administration, including the directives of the politicians [Sayeed
(1967), p.76].
The increasing importance of the bureaucracy in the Pakistani
administration was evident in the early laws and acts brought in by the
Pakistani government. Sayeed (1967) cites the example of the Public and
Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, (PRODA) 1949, which gave
the central government the right to dismiss defiant or corrupt
provincial politicians under Section 92 A of the Act. This act went a
long way in strengthening the hold of the bureaucracy, Saeed (1967)
recounts that this act gave the impetus to the bureaucracy which
resulted in the premier of Sindh being dismissed on charges of
corruption and misconduct in April 1948, and the west Punjab ministry
was dismissed in January 1949 and several other dismissals and
ministerial changes were experienced in the province of Sindh during
1948-51. (16)
Kennedy (1987) in his seminal work on the Pakistani bureaucracy
informs that the bureaucracy managed most key portfolios in the early
formative years. In 1953 the national government, under Nazimuddin, was
itself was dismissed by Ghulam Mohammad, a civil servant who had begun
his career in the British Indian audit and accounts service.
Additionally, the key posts in this government administration were held
by civil servants: General Iskander Mirza was a civil servant given
charge of the Ministry of Interior and of states and frontier regions;
Chaudry Mohammad Ali, a civil servant was appointed Minister for Finance
and Economic Affairs; and General Ayub was given the portfolio of the
Ministry of Defense.
The deliberate sidelining of the politicians within the political
administration and the manifest preference for bureaucrats and generals
as appointees to key ministerial posts was commented among by the
international broadsheets.
With so many illiterate people, politicians could make a mess of
things..... there was no point in having the fine administrative
system with good traditions that Pakistan has inherited unless it
was run in the British way. A district officer or magistrate must
be given full powers to deal with any situation. Politicians
could make policy, but they must not interfere.... (17)
The major rationale given for the preferment of the bureaucracy
over the politicians by Sayeed (1967) was that there was an urgent need
to deliver effective programmes; particularly in relation to the
rehabilitation of migrants coming over from India, in the aftermath of
the Partition and also to embark on a national development plan. In
these early decades the officers of Audit and Accounts, Railways and
Indian Political Service dominated the national economic and political
decision-making processes while the political leaders found it difficult
to develop any consensus on a framework for developing a political
system. During the early decades while there was no evidence of a
radical shift from the imperial system there was slowing down of the
execution of bureaucratic operations such as the practice of writing
longer and longer marginal notes on files, congestion at the top, over
centralisation, over coordination and excessive cross referencing that
was bringing the bureaucratic machine to a grinding halt [Sayeed
(1967)]. (18) Also the imbalance in the administration between civil
servants and politicians where political elites were unable to control
key governmental roles had a highly detrimental effect on the growth and
maturity of the political party system. The intra-state jousting within
Pakistan resulted in the repeated victory of military or bureucratic
elites. The failure of the politician in knocking down these elites
resulted in a very under-developed political party system and also
rendered the Pakistan Muslim league incapable of consolidating its role
in the country [Heeger (1973)]. There was a strong social distinction
between the civil servant and the politician, where the former was
regarded as urban, skilled and astute, while the latter appears as a
rural farmer, untutored and undiscerning and therefore not suited for
high office. The seeming ineptitude of the politician provided the
rationale for the wresting of control by the bureaucracy over the first
quarter century of Pakistan's independent existence. Laporte (1974)
informs that it was the overarching structure of the civil service that
facilitated Pakistan's growth in the economic sphere and continued
to undermine political development in the country.
The mismatch in the authority of the bureaucrat and the politician
is at the heart of the political dismantling that occurred in Pakistan
between the 1950s and 1970. The disdain and disregard of the views and
demands of the political classes was also reflected in the Constituent
Assembly debates in 1956 where provincial ministers complained that
officials refused to carry out their orders because they believed that
they (the ministers) had no power to take action against recalcitrant
officers who defied their order. In this environment it was commonplace
to ignore or bypass political appointees when making administrative
decision. The incompetence and ineptitude of the political classes even
came to be cited as reasons for at the time of the coup d'etat in
1958 by President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan [Alavi (1990)]
(19)
The political vacuum, political instability, and lack of
experienced and resourceful politicians all paved the way for the
bureaucrat to redefine his role taking over the major decision making
including formulation and implementation of policy. The views of key
authors and their reasons for this decided imbalance between the
bureaucracy and the political classes are summarised in Table 1.
The decided by skewed between the various arms of the state
received little remedy and reform in the civil service and remained
limited till the 1970s. The relationship between the bureaucracy and the
political parties altered in the 1970's. From holding the bastion
of power, being the prime decision makers, having the strength to be
politically neutral and having the constitutional guarantee on their
side, the tide changed against the bureaucracy. The introduction of
bureaucratic reforms were brought on by changes in the national
institutional forces due to the considerable student disturbances of
1968-69, dismemberment of the country, and rise of the Pakistan
Peoples' Party (PPP) [Shafqat (1999); Kennedy (1987)]. On the 2nd
of December 1969 the resentment culminated in the form of Martial Law
Ordinance No. 58 by President Yahya Khan. As a consequence of this
Order, 303 Class-I Officers were removed from service. This measure of
Yahya Khan was widely acclaimed by the media and opinion-makers of the
country and he was portrayed as 'a leader who was trying to
eliminate the corrupt officers of the Civil Services' [Shafqat
(1999)]. (20)
Secondly, the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan led to the
separation of East Pakistan further weakening the position of the
bureaucracy in Pakistan. The CSP was further weakened as a cadre because
89 Bengali CSP officers holding posts above Deputy Secretary level (28
of whom were Joint Secretary or above), after the dismemberment of
Pakistan opted for Bangladesh considerably downsizing the bureaucratic
institution and thereby reducing the influence of the CSP as a cadre
[Kennedy (1987)]. The rise of the PPP and its leader Mr Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto during these years also turned the tide against the Pakistani
bureaucracy. There was a huge swing in public perception and the CSP
officer began to be perceived as a hindrance to the development of the
country. Laporte (1974) informs that there was a growing desire among
the middle class (including non central service bureaucrats) for
increased status and participation which provided a manpower alternative
to the regime. Bhutto formed an administrative reform committee in 1972
which was to review and formulate recommendations to change the
prevailing bureaucratic system. The prime consideration was to ensure a
shift from an administered state to one that was driven by the political
processes [Ziring and Laporte (1974)].
In an address to the nation on August 20, 1973 on the state of his
economic reform, Bhutto expressed his opinion of the bureaucracy:
It is often averred that the bureaucratic apparatus is a neutral
instrument which can be bent to any kind of policy. But this neutrality
is mythical. The bureaucracy itself is a powerful vested interest,
concerned more with its own good than with the good of the public. No
institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national
life as to what is called Naukarshahi. It has done so by imposing a
caste system on our society. It has created a class of Brahmins or
mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery and arrogance, insulated from life
of the people and incapable of identifying itself with them.
[Jones (1997)]
The avowed political neutrality that was to characterise the
Pakistani bureaucracy was thereby swept away and replaced by a less
rational, politically mired, non-meritocratic presentation of the
bureaucrat. The Naukarshahi accusation pointed to the subservience
demands by this class of public servant, the rule of the public servant
or Civil Servant as ruler, is indicated by the particular terminology.
The high-powered Administrative Reforms Committee set up in April
1972 under the chairmanship of Khurshid Hasan Mir was of the view that
the first step in the direction of administrative reform should be the
replacement of the colonial structure of the services by a modern and
scientific system responsive to democratic aspirations. Z.A. Bhutto made
the recommendation in favour of a unified civil service. In August 1973,
the Government accepted the Report, initiating colossal changes in
Pakistan's Civil Service. All the services and cadres were merged
into a unified grading structure with equality of opporttmity for all
who enter the service at any stage based on the required professional
and specialised competence necessary for each job. All classes among the
government servants were abolished and similarly replaced by a unified
grading structure. The existing classification of the services into
class-I to class-IV was also done away with and the road to the top was
opened to all on merit. The use of service labels was discontinued. (21)
The civil services reforms of 1973 also introduced a new system of
common Training programme and all the occupational groups were required
to undergo a mandatory combined training at the civil services academy,
Lahore. The batch of officers who attended the civil services academy in
1973 is now recognised as "the 1st common". Lateral entry was
introduced which was a direct threat to the bureaucrats because now
political appointees would be a part of their system. (22)
3. THE BHUTTO REGIME AND THE BEGINNING OF BUREAUCRATIC REFORM
The implementation of Bhutto's reforms significantly altered
the cadre system of organisation of the bureaucracy with the abolition
of the CSP, the lineal descendant of ICS. Its members were regrouped
into the newly created District Management Group (DMG). Additionally,
group privileges such as benefits from service associations and the
reservation of key posts in the secretariat for the CSP was
discontinued. With the creation of All Pakistan Unified Grade System
there was no longer a distinction between CSP, PSP and other groups.
Lateral entry was introduced, allowing professionals and political
appointees to enter the system. While the constitutions of 1956 and 1962
retained the right of civil servants to have recourse to the courts the
1973 reforms dismantled this mechanism.
The reforms provided greater access for the political process to
direct the activities of the bureaucrat [Kennedy (1987)] thought this
did not always lead to greater institutional ability to deliver public
service. The shift in power between the political and bureaucratic
classes permitted politicians to intervene in the actions of the
bureaucrats as well as to castigate them for past actions that were not
regarded as in the political interest. In particular, the Abolition of
service cadres made it easier for politicians to use arbitrary powers of
punishment such as removal of the civil servants [Laporte (1981)].
The political economy that provided the context for the
bureaucratic reforms and the radical changes that were wrought in the
relationship between the arms of the state and its implications for the
self-perception of the bureaucrat are dominant themes in the interviews.
After the elections Bhutto took over, that when the politicians
started exerting a lot of pressure on the civil servants. But still the
CSS was by and large intact, it was still a cohesive group, and that
time Mr Bhutto also remarked at the Dinner at the Civil service academy
that the CSP are responsible for whatever ill prevails in the system,
they interfere with the political system, they are not willing to carry
out the writ of the government, and he said that I want to finish them,
I want to reform and finish this CSP cadre, very shortly he appointed
this man as the establishment secretary, who controlled all the policies
regarding the personnel, transfers posting, a very important post, he
was not a CSP, he started these big reforms, the first step was to do
away with the service labels. The CS association was banned. The CSP
were not allowed to have any association, then 1973 reforms came, and
the CSP now had to go higher to compete. This was the first big change.
(Bureaucrat 11)
The sense of a political contestation between the bureaucratic and
political classes to gain the lions' share of power was sharply
etched in the response of the bureaucrats. The loss of the legal
guarantee whereby the bureaucrat was insulated from the political
process was a particularly sore dimension of the loss that bureaucrats
had to accept in the changed political environment after the 1973
reforms.
The ministers' are supposed to be making policy not
interfering with actual implementation, but in actual practice they
flout that. They are more interested in doing day to day administration,
than in making policy. So the bureaucrat has to suffer, he has to be
willing to take one of methods the government has provided to punish the
officer to make him an officer on special duty. This means no job, no
assignment, no perks, so officer is afraid of that, as he loses the
chance to have all the facilities if he does not obey his political
bosses. The bureaucrats had political insulation before the constitution
of 1973 when Bhutto changed the constitution. But not now they
don't have political insulation.
(Bureaucrat 1)
The consequences of these changes were often couched in terms of
the objective set of laws and standards these bureaucrats had come to
regard as their raison d'etre. The argument is these accounts was
strongly developmental, and it was clear that these bureaucrats regarded
themselves as the agents of the delivery of programmes that would bring
about social and economic transformation of Pakistan.
My personal perception of bureaucracy is that bureaucracy in a
developing country has to be free and impartial to perform. If it is
free and impartial and is allowed to perform then this is the most
stabilising factor in a developing country. The politicians can play
around, the governments can come and go, but if there is a stable
bureaucracy there is constant development in the country that is what
happened till 1973, when the new constitution came into existence. Mr
Bhutto I think dealt the most severe blow to the services, by
withdrawing constitutional guarantee from the civil services.
(Bureaucrat 8)
The manner in which the 1973 reforms detracted from the ability of
the bureaucrat to ensure effective delivery of duty was set out in
relation to (i) the now 'undue' interference from the
political establishment and (ii) the lack of group support and networks
that resulted from the removal of the service associations.
The constitutional guarantee was a very good safeguard for the
civil servants to perform and be independent. Once that guarantee was
withdrawn the civil servants felt very weak, gradually as time passed
they became aligned with one particular party or the other. This is one
thing I could not do. I was the last person who would go to a politician
or even a general if the army was involved and seek protection. Why, if
my conduct is above board, if my integrity is not in question, my
ability to function, ability to perform is not questioned, why should I
seek anybody's protection. My own performance, my own integrity is
the biggest protection that I have. And then 1973 constitution came into
existence, the guarantee's were withdrawn, the bureaucracy started
to become weak and weak..... Once the politicians and the government
started making a choice of their own without merit of jumping seniority,
of giving important posts to people who were not trained in that
particular department or that that service the whole structure became
confused.. That is where favouritism started.... Anybody who has some
self respect, who is proud of his own integrity cannot survive in this
system, it is not possible ... you have to listen to his (Minister)
whims, his orders. That is the thing that killed the spirit.
(Bureaucrat 8)
The associations were already weak, and then banned, so the
CSP's could not resist the 1973 reforms. And there had been
co-optations of individuals. The military had co-opted individuals. The
CSP's became aligned with the military. Bhutto, Ayub and Yahya had
all thrown out officers most of them were CSP officers. I know one
gentleman who was honest to the core, Bhutto had some differences with
him, and Bhutto threw him out. In 1975 they divided the Civil service in
two groups the DMG and the secretariat service. At that time the idea
was that the district management will gradually go away, at that time
the Cornelius report had recommended that district administration should
be run by elected representatives.
(Bureaucrat 11)
Bhutto's civil service reforms programme 1973 shattered the
bureaucratic Brahmanism. The shakeup provided by the reforms transformed
the bureaucrat from a mandarin to a manager thereby creating a
fundamental break in the political organisation, both in relation to the
previous hierarchy in the services as well as by permitting rapid
lateral entry into the civil service [Khan (2002)]. The civil service
began to resemble a fragile house of cards that was exposed to new winds
driven by the whims of politicians. The removal of insulation from
political pressure and the sudden fall in their administrative power
caused bureaucrats to adopt a low-profile approach [Khan (2002)] (23)
that resulted in a slowing down of bureaucratic process and a growing
lethargy in the administrative machinery. The administrative reforms had
humbled the mighty civil servant and created new dissensions among
Pakistan's professional elites [Ziring and Laporte (1974)]. In the
Pakistani reforms of 1973 the disenchantment manifest itself through a
growing misuse of bureaucratic authority, particularly in relation to
growing use of public office for personal gain, i.e., forms of financial
corruption. (24)
4. THE ZIA YEARS AND NEW INSTITUTIONAL ALLIANCES
In 1977, Bhutto's regime was overthrown by a military coup
spearheaded by General Zia Ul Haq. The authoritarian rule under a
military head of state that followed was unusual in its moderate
treatment of existing institutions [Burki and Baxter (1991)]. The
bureaucrats were not required to relinquish their existing posts, nor
did the new government institute any drastic transfers of bureaucrats.
To the contrary, the Zia administration chose to constitute the
Anwar-ul-Haq Commission to rehabilitate and promote some level of
confidence, among the Civil Services, particularly the CSP.
There appears to be a contradictory swing between existence of
political democracy and possibility of pursuing political neutrality in
Pakistan. While the democratic government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto
undertook widespread and extreme 1973 administrative reforms,
particularly the removal the constitutional guarantee, the dictatorial
regime under Zia was keen to consolidate the functions of the
bureaucrat. In a similar comparison, the PPP, under Benazir
Bhutto's government (and PML under Nawaz Sharif) regarded political
neutrality with suspicion as bureaucrats were regarded as being
supported of the erstwhile party in power and therefore oppositional to
the new government. On the other hand, the military dictatorship of
General Pervez Musharraf was relatively supportive of the bureaucracy.
My experience was that by in large the military process was more
rational, they at least understand the issues, compared to the
democratic leaders, the attitude of the democratic leaders was, that now
we are the boss and we have to decide ... In my experience the army
generally was more rational and abiding by the law.
(Bureaucrat 1)
This oppositional relationship between democracy and political
neutrality is in stark contrast to the established proposition that
democratic government will direct the bureaucracy to follow principles
of political neutrality. The explanation may lie in the fact that the
bureaucracy as a part of the executive arm of the state is regarded more
favourably by strong authoritarian forces that adopt a statist approach
while democratic governments that must ensure a political settlement
tend to consider the existing bureaucracy in an oppositional light.
In a political environment where bureaucrats are regarded as
oppositional to a new incoming elected government, the principle of
political neutrality transforms into a negative feature, one that
indicates an absence of allegiance to the new government.
In your mind you can be neutral, but you can't tell them on
their face. Others will be more politically inclined than you and you
will look bad in comparison. You will not then be successful. Your
friend will be District Commissioner (DC) Lahore and you will be DC of
some God forsaken place. And the boss will give the reason 'he does
not have initiative, he can't do his job well.
(Bureaucrat 6)
We bureaucrats suffer; we are always trying to clarify the
perceptions, and say "no I am not with so and so". You seem to
just go around giving explanations and talking to the politicians, that
"it seems that you are annoyed with me?
(Bureaucrat 25)
Under the present circumstances it is not possible to be
politically neutral.... the politicians expect the bureaucrat to pitch
in one side or the other. There is the concept of loyalty, it is not
loyalty to the state, it is not even loyalty to some organizations, but
loyalty to the person. So if one is loyal to Nawaz Sharif or Benazir
their chances of success are higher when they come into power.
(Bureaucrat 25)
Bureaucrats who persist in following the political neutrality
principle find that they are singled out for punishment for a lack of
loyalty to the new administration. The new found power that politicians,
particularly ministers had over the careers of bureaucrats was regarded
as a considerable hardship by bureaucrats.
Once I left the service I was hounded for a bit, wherever I would
get a job, the prime minister would interfere and get me sacked. I guess
he really disliked me. He (then PM) got me sacked from two
organisations, and then I finally got a job because his government was
toppled.
(Bureaucrat 12)
The increasing interference of the ministerial class over the
bureaucracy emerges as a particularly contentious area. Both sides
accuse the other of exceeding their brief and thereby obstructing the
delivery of development programmes.
5. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WITHIN TIlE
PAKISTANI STATE
The reason for the decline in political neutrality that is
uppermost in the mind of bureaucrats in Pakistan is the rise demand for
politicians for preferential, and increasingly illegal, services. The
increasing pressure makes it harder for the bureaucrat to remain
politically neutral as there is a rising penalty for the refusal to
acquiesce to such political demands. The framework of external laws and
standards that should be applied in relation to the delivery of public
service becomes increasingly untenable in the face of growing political
demands. The increasing pressure was identified as a key theme by
various interviewees.
One reason why I left was when I was posted as director general
development authority, 1988 elections were on, the first election after
Zia ul Haq went, the then Chief minister came to me and said 1 want
plots. He said I want plots for my candidates, I said for what reason?
He said because they need to contest elections, I want 200 plots. I said
there are no plots available. He said I need them, I said I can't
give them too you. He asked why? I said because it is illegal, first you
will get arrested, then I will get arrested, and I will not give them to
you. I gave him only the available plots, which was legal. He got very
annoyed with me and immediately after the elections he transferred me to
my old post, and after four months he made me an OSD (25) for 18 months.
(Bureaucrat 11)
Since the 70s, bureaucrats could not afford to be neutral. Before
the 1970's it was possible, as they had the constitutional
guarantee on their side. But this changed since the 1970's. I
myself twice I was told, in so many words, 'we will not ask you to
do anything illegal, but you see we have to look after the interests of
the party and therefore what we tell you needs to be done.'(the
then PM) I just listened and I thought that I would not last very long
at the job. Well in one case I did not last, the other case they kept
delaying my promotion.
(Bureaucrat 13)
The greatest sense of disaffection among the bureaucracy was with
regard to the withdrawal of the constitutional guarantee that prevented
the administration from intervening in the decisions and actions of the
bureaucrats through imposition of penalty, punitive transfers and
outright dismissal. The constitutional guarantee had provided the
bureaucrat impunity from the political system and thereby worked towards
ensuring the separation of powers of the state. The guarantee had
therefore come to be regarded as the lifeline of the bureaucrat, and its
withdrawal left them feeling vulnerable and exposed to other parts of
the state administration as well as the broader political system.
No, it is not possible to be politically neutral, not in the
present setup. If only the constitutional guarantee had continued. You
know what a constitutional guarantee is? That means that the government
can't fire you without giving you a good reason, and then the
reason and the firing is fully justifiable, and you can go to the court
and get relief, and the government needs to justify why they did it. Now
there is no constitutional guarantee, it is not possible.
(Bureaucrat 8)
Well there was no problem until the constitutional guarantees were
there. There was a regularly laid down procedures. So survival was not a
thought utmost in mind. Survival came when purge of 1972, 1984 took
place. And then the various martial law regulations etc. when these
issues arose then you started looking for protectives. You started
looking for lobbies, you started looking for linkages. You started
looking for friends of the ruling party. When Nawaz Sharifcame you
started looking for survival by cultivating his friends. Same goes for
PPP and Musharraf's rule. Survival is really based on connections.
(Bureaucrat 25)
With the changes brought about by administrative reforms, changing
power configuration across the arms of the state and the associated
downsizing of the political clout of the bureaucracy there emerged
reasons for negating the value of political neutrality within the
bureaucracy. The implication of the requirement that bureaucrats show
political allegiance was that any observance of an external set of laws
and standards was now an obstacle rather than an assurance of promotion
and career progression. Additionally, the failure of a bureaucrat was
often linked to the inability to show adequate political allegiance and
there was considerable emphasis on the qualities of wiliness and
duplicity that the bureaucrat needed to develop in order to continue to
be effective in delivering development while appearing to support the
political establishment.
As you go up you also need to learn the art of political
management, you need to be politically savvy.
(Bureaucrat 16)
Apple polishing and buttering them up is part of our culture.
(Bureaucrat 21)
Once you get into higher positions, you have to play some sort of
political games.
(Bureaucrat 22)
When the bureaucrats were asked, the questions and answers resulted
as follows:
Q. Do you think that it is possible to be successful and
politically neutral?
A. 18 out of 21 said that it is absolutely not possible.
Q. Is it possible to have political immunity in the administrative
system?
A. All of the bureaucrats felt that it was not possible at all.
This increasing need to please political masters has resulted in
political neutrality being sidelined in favour of public display of
allegiance through practices that signal loyalty to the politicians. In
particular, it is the interference by ministers that has been regarded
as offensive, often being very detrimental to the career of the
bureaucrat. The perceptions of ministers regarding this turnaround in
the power structure in the Pakistani administration underlines the
importance accorded to loyalty of the bureaucrat to his political
superiors, particularly so in relation to the minister concerned.
The ministers don't want not loyalty they want blind obedience
from the bureaucracy, towards their own constituency, they are not
pushed about the mega picture.
(Minister 4)
'I think the bureaucrats are totally been made impotent, they
are not allowed to move at all.
(Minister 3)
Yes I agree that the ministers did not let them work freely...now
the only survival is that if the bureaucrat takes the side of some
political party.... Not impersonal, no one is ... Minister is not so
much to blame. Because in this scenario, the chief executive of the
federal or provinces has his go ... and his friends or his cronies are
the ministers.... They are not holding it exactly ... for example if you
want to post some one DPO or DCO, it is not done, by the secretary
finance or by the chief secretary ... the chief minister is involved in
it ...
(Minister 2)
The implications for the delivery of development programmes of such
a system of explicit evidence of loyalty among bureaucrats for their
ministerial bosses have been rather negative. The lack of dovetailing of
bureaucratic and ministerial objectives, the delay in target setting and
the often poorly designed and selected performance targets result in
poor and insufficient delivery of public service. The ineptitude is not
restricted to a particular development programme but becomes endemic to
the career trajectory of the bureaucrat who comes to regard political
allegiance as part of the job and therefore moves away from external set
law and standards of the Weberian ilk to regarding the ministerial
demands as the criterion against which to measure performance.
That is true, political interference is there most of the time ...
the politician's concern is not to improve the ministry's
performance, because a minister is not judged for his performance in the
ministry, and again in our government the prime minister sets up a frame
work for checking the ministry and we were asked ourselves to set up
your own targets. We set those targets.... And there was a cell in the
prime minister house which used to monitor the advancement of those
targets as far as you were concerned as a minister.., but then if you
did not meet those targets there was no penalty ... because once you
start penalising a minister there are political repercussions, which the
government is not willing to bear ... but I think that also has to be
done ... the minister head of the policy, they do come with a political
background and a political mind set ... but at the same time when they
are heading a technical ministry ... they should be judged in some
way..... if a bureaucrat does not listen to the minister then he is made
an OSD, ... there are issues bureaucrats are total sycophants the
minister should be total incompetent and that's a very good team if
you want to take ministry in the wrong direction ... but somebody has to
change that ...
(Minister 4)
In early mid career when you became DC, the whole concept of
"Mai Baap" (Parent) of the district, to sort out the problems
of anybody and everybody who comes to him. ... the concepts began to
change Mid career, when we went through the revolutionary upheaval
brought in by the PPP party and with each passing day, one became more
and more cynical. One wanted to get to key positions, the objective had
changed, and it was no longer serving the people. I am sorry to say it
became more selfish. One started looking at post retirement economic
benefits, perhaps a settled life, social connections, friends, marriage
of children, yourself preservation became an important issue in the
later part of mid career. In your final years of course, your job
becomes more and more dependent on the political whims of people, you
began to bend the rules, the idealism went, and you are no longer the
sort of person you were earlier, so it meant that you did not say no so
frequently.
(Bureaucrat 25)
The realisation that the singular pursuit of political neutrality
would not bring about career such was indicated in the interviews where
18 out of 21 answered that it was not possible to be successful by
remaining politically neutral. There was unanimous consensus that there
was no political immunity for the Pakistani Bureaucrat. The Retired
bureaucrats were of the opinion that as they had continued to abide by
the principles of political neutrality they had been victimised by the
politicians.
The difficulty that bureaucrats have felt in coming to terms with
the reduced public control that they can exercise in the execution of
government policy is still couched in terms of the Weberian notion of a
meritocratic, rational and objective state actor. This notion has been
severely tested by the administrative reforms brought about by the
various political regimes that have ruled Pakistan since independence.
In particular, the growing demand for public displays of loyalty to the
ministerial class, most often in relation to deference to ministerial
compulsions and machinations has been regarded as unpleasant but
inevitable in the new political settlement that has emerged in Pakistan
in the last few decades. The negation of political neutrality is
witnessed in the growing presence of corruption, administrative slowdown
and politicisation of bureaucratic decision making. The uncomfortable
compromise that the bureaucratic class has had to make with the
increasingly dominant political classes is that there will be a
pandering to the need for political allegiance to maintain the political
settlement within the state while still working to ensure the delivery
of development.
6. CONCLUSION
The article shows that the initial dominance of the bureaucratic
elite in Pakistan was a consequence of an overdeveloped bureaucracy on
account of a colonial inheritance [Alavi (1971)]. The bureaucratic
overhang that was an outcrop of the colonial administration was regarded
as elite, brahmanical and mandarin like in its attitudes to society and
particularly its engagement with politicians and political parties. The
imbalance in the Pakistani state that has resulted from this highly
unequal power sharing between bureaucratic and political players made it
almost impossible to come to a stable political settlement within the
state [Khan (1996)]. This position of bureaucratic dominance was
undermined by the administrative reforms brought in under during
Bhutto's early years in office and this took away many bureaucratic
privileges, most particularly the safeguard against political
interference provided by the constitutional guarantee.
The consequences for the delivery of development is an increasingly
inefficient and poorly designed and executed programmes by the
bureaucracy as the demands of the political process overtake the
requirements of the programme. The damage done is not only to the
development agenda but to the very institutions of the country. By
replacing political neutrality by political allegiance there has been a
shift in the rules by which the bureaucracy was playing. In place of the
externally set standards of merit and impartiality there is now an
emphasis on publicly supporting political demands and ensuring that
bureaucratic action did not directly contradict political sentiment. The
Pakistani bureaucracy is entrenched in a quagmire of political intrigues
and is miles away from the ideal a political officer that Weber (1968)
envisaged.
After analysing the perceptions of the bureaucracy regarding the
political complexities they encounter in their professional lives, it
appears that it would be a mistake to use the Weber's heuristic
notion of bureaucracy to sort out organisational perplexities of
Pakistan's civil service. It is not a bureaucracy in the classical
sense. It is far too complex, with far too much history, to be relegated
to such a simple characterisation [Jones (1997), p. 364].
APPENDIX
Table 1
Basic Monthly Pay Scale
Pau Scale Minimum Increment Number of Pay Maximum
(Rs) (Rs) Points (Rs)
BPS-1 1,245 35 16 1,770
BPS-2 1,275 44 16 1,935
BPS-3 1,320 50 16 2,070
BPS-4 1,360 58 16 2,230
BPS-5 1,400 66 16 2,390
BPS-6 1,440 73 16 2,535
BPS-7 1,480 81 16 2,695
BPS-8 1,540 88 16 2,860
BPS-9 1,605 97 16 3,060
BPS-10 1,660 107 16 3,265
BPS-11 1,725 116 16 3,465
BPS-12 1,830 130 16 3,780
BPS-13 1,950 144 16 4,110
BPS-14 2,065 161 16 4,480
BPS-15 2,190 177 16 4,845
BPS-16 2,535 197 16 5,490
BPS-17 3,880 290 13 7,360
BPS-18 5,085 366 11 8,745
BPS-19 7,750 385 11 11,600
BPS-20 9,195 440 11 13,595
BPS-21 10,190 545 11 15,640
BPS-22 10,900 610 11 17,000
Pau Scale Sample Position
BPS-1 Sweeper
BPS-2 Quasid
BPS-3 Daftri
BPS-4 Dispatch Rider, Driver
BPS-5 Urdu Typist
BPS-6
BPS-7 Telex Operator
BPS-8
BPS-9
BPS-10
BPS-11
BPS-12 Stenotypist
BPS-13 Accountant
BPS-14
BPS-15 Stenographer
BPS-16 Admin Officer
BPS-17 Private Secretary
BPS-18 Agronomist
BPS-19 Deputy Secretary, Senior Agricultural
Economist
BPS-20 Economic Consultant, Joint Secretary
BPS-21 Senior Joint Secretary
BPS-22 Secretary
Source: World Bank (1998) Pakistan a Framework for Civil Service
Reform in Pakistan. Report No. 18386-PAK. p. 68.
Authors' Note: We are thankful to anonymous referees of this
journal for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. The usual
disclaimer applies.
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(1) From Briabanti, R. Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.
Durham: Duke University Press. 1966. Appendix 1.
(2) The paper examines the bureaucrats' own perception of
their profession and the manner and extent to which they have been able
to maintain their political neutrality. The bureaucrats have identified
political interference as a major consideration. While other factors
such as a fall in the real income of the bureaucrat or the change in the
service conditions of the bureaucrat might also play a role these were
not identified as major factors by the interviewees. As the research
methodology was to analyse the perceptions rather than a comprehensive
set of objective conditions that face the bureaucracy factors not raised
by the bureaucrats have been further investigated.
(3) As the Ideal Bureaucrat envisaged by Weber (1968).
(4) Adapted from Weber's "Ideal" Model in Robert
Simmons and Eugene P, Dvorin, Public Administration: Values, Policy and
Change (New York, 1977), pp. 192 94.
(5) Khan (2007) questions whether the separation of the church and
state in western European societies can be considered as complete given
that there are many symbols and practices of Christianity that are still
upheld through state procedures and practices.
(6) For further depth see Alavi, Hamza 'Authoritarianism and
Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan' In Subrata Mitra (ed.) The
Post-Colonial State in South Asia. (London and New York) 1990, Ziring
and Laporte Two Views Author(s): :The Pakistan Bureaucracy: Source:
Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 12, (Dee., 1974), pp. 1086--1103 Published
by: University of California Press.
(7) From Khan, A. 'A historical review of elitism in the
federal bureaucracy of Pakistan and a critical analysis of
Pakistan's higher public administration' National Development
and Security, Vol. X, No. 3, Spring 2002.
(8) This has been regarded as an 'overhang' from the
colonial period when the bureaucrats were extensively trained as lowly
administrators, later expanded to cover the higher positions of
provincial governors.
(9) See Table 1 in the essay for a summary of those studies.
(10) The Brookings Institute index for weak and failed states,
Pakistan ranks 33 out of 141 states.
(11) Rauch and Evans (1999) have examined countries based on this
yardstick.
(12) Hyden, et al. (2003) have researched extensively on this
yardstick.
(13) It is not within the scope of this essay to discuss whether
the political neutrality that Weber envisaged is possible or not. He
himself realised that no ideal type of bureaucracy could ever exist and
all existing bureaucracies would be less efficient than the Ideal model.
This research will primarily focus on whether the Pakistani Bureaucracy
follows Weber's dictate of political neutrality.
(14) There is a distinct, and very large, literature on the role of
the judiciary in Pakistan and this aspect will not be covered in the
current article.
(15) For further information see Rowland Egger, The Improvement of
Public Administration in Pakistan. (Karachi,1953) and Bernard L.
Gladieux, Reorientation of Pakistan Government for National Development.
Karachi, 1955.
(16) For a detailed analysis, see Sayeed, K. The Political System
of Pakistan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1967.
(17) 'The Times (London), October 30, 1954.
(18) From Sayeed (1967) The Political System o fPakistan. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, chapter 6.
(19) For further detail see Alavi, Hamza 'Authoritarianism and
Legitimation of State Power in Pakistan'. In Subrata Mitra (ed) The
Post-Colonial State in South Asia, (London and New York) 1990.
(20) See Shafqat, S. (1999) Pakistani Bureaucracy, Crisis of
Governance and Prospects of Reform. The Pakistan Development Review
38:4, 995-1017.
(21) For further detail See Group Research Paper, Faculty Advisor.
Brig. Shahid Akram Kardar 'Civil Service Reforms; Building Public
Sector Leadership' Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore,
(82nd National Management Course).
(22) Despite the administrative reforms there has been little
change in the pay and grade structure of the Pakistani administration.
The reforms focus largely on a reorganisation in relation to the
organisational behaviour of the bureaucracy, most specifically in
relation to reducing its combative power against the ministerial class.
Please see table for the pay scale of the bureaucracy.
(23) For further depth see Khan, A. A Historical Review of Elitism
in the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan and a Critical Analysis of
Pakistan's Higher Public Administration. National Development and
Security 10: 3, Spring 2002.
(24) For further depth see Shafqat, S. (1999) Pakistani
Bureaucracy, Crisis of Governance and Prospects for Reform. The Pakistan
Development Review 38 : 4,995-1017.
(25) OSD stands for Officer on Special Duty. It is the worst
transfer order given to a bureaucrat, it implies the officer has no
portfolio, no office, and he relinquishes his post to remain at home
till further notice.
Maryam Tanwir <mt383@cam.ac.uk> and Shailaja Fennell <ss
141 @cam.ac.uk> work in the Department of Land Economy, University of
Cambridge, UK.
Table 1
Summary of Research on Bureaucratic Dominance
Author Name of the Book/ Emhthasis on
Palcier
Hamza Alavi Authoritarianism and The state power in
Legitimation of Pakistan since
State Power in independence has
Pakistan. been concentrated in
the hands of a
military
bureaucratic
oligarchy.
Khalid B. Sayeed The Political Role Since independence
of Pakistan's Civil the civil servants
Service. played an even more
powerful role than
their imperial
predecessors
primarily due to
weak political
parties, and
military dominance.
Saeed Shafqat The Pakistani Ayub cut down the
Bureaucracy. Crisis dominance of the
of Governance and CSP, which was
Prospects of Reform. further cut to size
by Bhutto. The 1973
reforms adversely
affected the
bureaucracy.
Lawrence Ziring The Pakistan The bureaucracy
Bureaucracy; Two after independence
Views. was strong and
domineering.
Bhutto's reforms
altered the
situation, which
could have been
averted it the
bureaucracy had been
a little
compromising.
Robert Laporte The Pakistan The Pakistani
Bureaucracy; Two bureaucracy retained
Views. the colonial
character. Filled
the power vacuum
after independence.
Bhutto took away the
power of the
bureaucracy.
Khalid B. Sayeed The Political System The bureaucracy
of Pakistan, 1967. after independence
filled the power
vacuum which the
politicians were
unable to fill. He
describes in detail
the hierarchal set
up of the CSP.
Charles Kennedy The Bureaucracy in Describes Pakistan
Pakistan. 1987, as a bureaucratic
Oxford University polity. Describes
Press. its dominant rule in
Pakistan. Describes
the politicisation
of the bureaucracy
since the 1973
reforms.
Ralph Briabanti Research on the It contains a record
Bureaucracy of of documents
Pakistan. pertaining to the
administration of
Pakistan. And
discusses various
facets of the
administration. it
contains critical
information and can
be used as a
reference book.
Gerelad Heeger Bureaucracies, He argues that
Political Parties Bureaucratic
and Political dominance in
Development. Pakistan resulted
not due to
organisational
superiority but
because of
monopolisation of
key governmental
offices in the
political system by
bureaucratic elites.
Source: Authors' compilation.
Figure 1. Political Influence in the Civil Service
Always/often 23%
Seldom/Never 77%
Note: Table made from pie chart.
From: Haque, N. and I, Khawaja (2007) Public Service Through the Eyes
of Civil Servants. Pide Series on Governance and Institution.
Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2007
