Empowering states and provinces or unshackling local governments: does it matter for peace, order, good government, and growth?
Shah, Anwar
Globalisation and the information revolution are profoundly
influencing the division of power within, across, and beyond
nation-states. Within nations, this mega change has led to a diminished
economic relevance of the intermediate order of government (states and
provinces) and an enhanced need for home rule (empowered local
governments) in both unitary and federal countries. Considerations of
peace, order, and good government further warrant that intermediate
orders of governments must assume a relatively less prominent role in
multi-order governance. The recent fiscal crisis and the ever-growing
concern about corruption have further heightened the need to the get the
government right, thereby creating additional pressures to limit the
size of the government by possibly downsizing the role of the
states/provinces and reconstituting these as provincial councils of
local governments to perform inter-local functions and coordination.
These economic imperatives, calling for an hourglass model of
federalism, are at odds with the political realties in countries
conforming to the traditional dual federalism model, i.e., federalism of
the provinces model of economic governance as prevalent in Australia,
India, Mexico, and Pakistan, among others. The political order in these
latter countries has blocked local governments from assuming their due
role as the primary agents of the people providing oversight on the
shared rule and as facilitators for network governance to improve the
economic and social outcomes. Such a role of local government is also
critical to international competitiveness and growth as demonstrated by
the experiences of China, Japan, Korea, and the Nordic countries. This
paper outlines reform options for multi-order governance to conform with
the new world economic order. The paper elaborates the role of local
governments under "glocalised governance'--the new vision of
multi-order governance--and argues that growth and economic prosperity
of nations in the coming decades would critically depend on how quickly
political and institutional impediments to the new (or the oldest?)
paradigm of local governance are overcome. The paper concludes that path
dependency makes such radical reforms infeasible in countries with
strong provincial governments run by feudal, military, and industrial
elites.
INTRODUCTION: MOTIVATIONS FOR RETHINKING FISCAL FEDERALISM
Globalisation and the information revolution are profoundly
influencing economic governance in both the industrial and the
industrialising world. Globalisation has lifted millions of people out
of poverty and the information revolution has brought about a degree of
citizen empowerment and activism in state affairs that is unparalleled
in past history. They have also acted as catalysts for
"'reshuffling" government functions within and beyond
nation states [Friedman (1999); Courchene (2001); Castells (1998); Shah
(1999, 2002); Boadway and Shah (2009)]. Globalisation has also meant
liberating markets and bringing market discipline to governments. Recent
global financial crisis has significantly shattered common faith in the
workings of free markets. Providing bailouts to markets have also
endangered the fiscal health of governments around the globe while
creating a crisis in public confidence in national politics and
leadership. This paper reflects upon special challenges in adapting
multi-order governance to make it incentive compatible with growth with
equity and fiscal sustainability, urgency of which is brought home by
these mega changes.
Because of globalisation, it is increasingly apparent that "
... the nation-state is becoming too small for the big problems of life,
and too big for the small problems of life" [Bell (1987), pp.
13-14]. In other words, nation-states are gradually losing control of
some of their customary areas of authority and regulation, including
macroeconomic policy, corporate taxation, external trade, environment
policy, telecommunications, and financial transactions (see Box 1).
Globalisation is also making small open economies vulnerable to the
whims of large hedge funds and polarising the distribution of income in
favour of skilled workers and regions with higher skills and access to
information, thus widening income disparities within nations while
improving overall levels of incomes and standards of living. Because of
the information revolution, governments have less ability to control the
flow of goods and services, ideas, and cultural products. The twin
forces of globalisation and the information revolution are also
strengthening localisation. They are empowering local governments and
"beyond-government" service providers, such as neighbourhood
associations, non-governmental non-profit and for-profit organisations,
self-help groups and networks to exercise a broader role in improving
economic and social outcomes at the local level through greater
connectivity to markets and resources elsewhere. Localisation is leading
to citizen empowerment in some areas while simultaneously strengthening
local elites in others. Courchene (1993, 2001) has termed the overall
effect of these changes "glocalisation", which implies the
growing role of global regimes and local governments and beyond
government entities and changing roles of national and provincial
(state) governments in an interconnected world. The culture of
governance is also slowly changing from a bureaucratic to a
participatory mode of operation, from a command-and-control model to one
of accountability for results, from being internally dependent to being
competitive and innovative, from being closed and slow to being open and
quick, and from being intolerant of risk to allowing freedom to fail or
succeed. Recent global financial crises has hampered this change, but
with improved macro stability in future, the new vision of governance is
expected to gradually taking hold in the 21st century (see Table 1).
Nevertheless, in many developing countries, this vision may not take
hold or may take a long time to materialise because of political and
institutional difficulties.
Box 1
Emerging Rearrangements of Government Assignments: Glocalisation
Beyond nation-states: Regulation of financial transactions,
corporate taxation, international trade, the global environment,
telecommunications, international standards, international
migration, surveillance of governance conditions, global security
and risk management, transnational production, investment and
technology transfer, combating of money laundering, corruption,
pandemics, and terrorism.
Centralisation: Social and environmental policy through
international agreements, skills enhancement for international
competitiveness, securing common economic union through bridging
economic, social and digital divide within nations, social safety
nets, oversight, financing of education, social services and
technical assistance to sub-national governments.
Localisation, and Privatisation: All regional and local functions.
Source: Boadway and Shah (2009).
The three emerging trends resulting from this mega change in the
shifting balance of powers within nations are: (a) the role of the
central government is slowly changing from that of a managerial
authority to a leadership role in a multi-centred government environment
with enhanced emphasis on securing a common economic union through
economic and social risk management and dealing with economic and
digital divide within nations; (b) a steady erosion in the economic
relevance of the role of the provinces (used inter-changeably with
states in this paper)--the second (intermediate) tier--and (c) an
enhanced but redefined role of local government in multi-order
governance to serve as the primary agent of people providing oversight
on the shared rule and as a facilitator for network governance for
economic and social uplift of its residents.
This paper is concerned with potentials and perils associated with
adaptive responses to these challenges especially in reshaping the role
of provinces and local governments. The paper is organised as follows.
Section 2 discusses the role of the provinces (states) and local
governments under a traditional fiscal federalism approach. Section 3
discussion the same under a new vision of multi-order governance.
Section 4 draws implications of the alternate models for peace, order,
good government and growth from cross country and country case studies.
A final section draws broader policy implications of this analysis.
2. EMPOWERING PROVINCES AND STATES--POTENTIALS AND PERILS
Federalism represents either a "coming together" or a
"holding together" of constituent geographic units to take
advantage of greatness and smallness of nations. Traditionally it
represented a "foedus" (treaty or compact or alliance) among
states (provinces) "each of which recognised the legitimacy of an
overarching central government to make decisions on some matters once
exclusively the responsibility of individual member states" as done
in the USA [Inman (2007), p. 530]. "Coming together" has been
the guiding framework for mature federations such as the United States,
Canada, and more recently the European Union. The alternative
"holding together" view of federalism, also called the
"new federalism" represents an attempt to decentralise responsibilities from federal government to the states or provinces with
a view to overcome regional discontent with central policies and
forestall secessionist tenmdencies. This view is the driving force
behind the current interest in principles of fiscal federalism in
unitary countries and relatively newer federations such as Brazil, India
and Pakistan and emerging federations such as Iraq, Nepal, Spain, Sri
Lanka and South Africa. In Pakistan this was the primary motivation for
unanimous consent to a recent passing of the 18th Amendment to the
Pakistan's constitution to empower provinces. Federal countries
broadly conform to one of two models: dual federalism or cooperative
federalism. A third model, the so called 'competitive
federalism'. Where all governments have overlapping
responsibilities and compete vertically and horizontally to establish
their clientele of services, is simply a theoretical construct and not
practiced anywhere. Under dual federalism, federalism compact is between
federal and provincial governments and they have separate and distinct
responsibilities and local governments are typically creatures of the
provinces as in Canada, USA, India and Pakistan. Under cooperative
federalism, central and provincial roles can assume one of three forms:
interdependent spheres as in Germany, marble cake with overlapping
responsibilities as in Belgium or independent spheres as in Brazil. In
all these models with the sole exception of independent spheres model,
provinces have a strong constitutional role and local governments remain
creatures of provinces and states.
The dual federalism model empowers provinces and states. This is
considered a welcome move as it moves decision making somewhat closer to
people and it also has the advantage of dealing with ethic and
linguistic conflicts if provinces are numerous and are small enough in
geographic area and represent population with relatively homogeneous
characteristics and similar tastes and preferences for a menu of taxes
and public services (as Cantons in Switzerland). If provinces are
properly delineated as economic regions then they could also enhance
efficiency of the internal common market by exploiting economies of
scale and scope. They also have the potential to deal with inter-local
spillovers and intra-regional inequities. Provincial governments can
also be responsive to citizen preferences if provincial government is
not captured by feudal, industrial and military elites. The absence of
well developed communication and transportation system and a lack of
urbanisation also makes provinces almost a necessity for countries that
span a large geographic area.
The dual federalism model empowering provinces, nevertheless, has
significant shortcomings.
Tragedy of Commons Associated with Common Pool Resources. Under
dual federalism, both the centre and the provinces compete to claim a
larger share of the fixed national pie. This accentuates universalism and pork barrel politics leading to a tragedy of commons where all
federating units outcompete each other in profligate spending and
giveaways in taxes and subsidies. This tug of war over resources and the
resulting swings in the balance of powers within nations is a perpetual
feature of dual federalism model.
A Leviathan Model of Governance. Empowering provinces leads to a
potential for greater duplication of government structures and processes
at central and provincial levels leading to increased costs for the
exchequer and higher transactions costs for citizens. This may also lead
to overgrazing by politicians and bureaucrats. As a result the growth in
the size of government becomes unrelated to quality and quantity of
service delivery. Opportunism and pork barrel politics leads to
governments acting as employment creation agencies detracting them from
their primary role in financing public services.
Agency Problems with Incomplete Contracts. In most large countries,
empowering provinces does not necessarily imply that the decision making
moves closer to people. Provinces and states are often larger in
geographic size and population than smaller countries. Governments of
New York, California, Ontario, Sao Paulo, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan,
and Indian states of Bihar and Gujarat have jurisdictions exceeding the
size of many countries. Having decision making far removed from people
implies that provincial governments have incomplete contracts with their
citizens and could not be held to account by people at large. In
countries where politics is dominated by feudal, military and industrial
elites such as Pakistan, this leads to complete alienation of
governments from their people. This lack of accountability in governance
is further accentuated by a constraining of voice and exit options under
provincial empowerment.
Weaker and Fragmented Local Governance. Empowered provinces create
incentives for weaker and numerous local governments. The exigencies of
provincial politics dictate that local governments are given straight
jacket mandates with little resources and are kept under tight
provincial reigns as in done in India and Pakistan [see Shah (1997)].
The empowered provincial governments typically encourage local
fragmentation in the interest of higher degree of intrusive controls. In
India, there are 254,119 local governments responsible for a pitience of
(5 percent) of national expenditures. Most of these expenditure go
towards financing the salaries and allowances of civil servants and 3
million elected officials with little left to deliver public services.
In contrast, in China where provincial role is restricted and local
governments are empowered, there are only 43, 965 local governments
accounting for 51.4 percent of national expenditures [see Qiao and Shah
(2006)].
Stifling Local Innovations. Provinces and states often impose one
size fit all straight jacket mandates that constrain local choices and
flexibility and stifle any innovative approaches. In Pakistan,
provincial ordinances in 2000 required all local governments, small or
large, to have 16 departments and fixed number of positions. In the
United States, outdated state laws that are rooted in unjustified
distrust of local decision making have stifled successful cities to
develop and implement any coherent vision of their future and serve
their residents better [see Frug and Barton (2008)].
Constraining Good Govenzance and Strangling Metropolitan Growth.
Empowered provinces typically block rationalisation of local government
functions especially when the local government empowerment implies
chipping away at their own powers. A classic example in this regard is
the powers assigned to metropolitan areas under dual federalism. Fiscal
federalism literature suggests that large metropolitan areas should have
autonomous two tier regional governments with powers equivalent to that
of a province and with direct interface with the centre. For this
reason, Shanghai and Beijing , Bangkok and Seoul local governments are
treated by China, Thailand and South Korea respectively as provinces. In
contrast, in India and Pakistan, where provinces are relatively more
powerful, metropolitan areas with large populations and significant
economic bases such as Mumbai, New Delhi, Karachi and Lahore among
others are treated as typical local governments with limited autonomy.
Such treatment deprives residents of the benefits of home rule and
constrains their efforts in local economic development.
Fragmentation of Internal Common Market. Empowered provinces also
have the potential to create internal barriers to trade and factor
mobility through domicile (residence) requirements and by creating
protective regulatory and trade barriers across provincial borders.
Mature federations like the USA have circumvented these problems through
interstate commerce clause in the constitution. These barriers, however,
are formalised in the political and bureaucratic system of India and
Pakistan resulting in fragmented common economic union.
Increased Threat of Succession. Empowering provinces represent a
potential threat to the political union especially in countries with
ethnic, linguistic and religious divides and having smaller number of
provincial jurisdictions with one or more dominant provinces such as
Pakistan. Fiscal federalism literature shows that as a rule of thumb all
dual federalism models with less than 10 provincial jurisdictions are
likely to face internal conflicts and potential political instability.
Diminished Economic Relevance of Intermediate Order of Government
(Provinces and States) under Glocalised Governance. Finally and most
importantly globalisation and information revolution are working to make
the economic role of provinces largely redundant. Globalisation empowers
supranational regimes and local governments at the expense of national
and provincial governments. Globalisation also implies that
international competitiveness of a nation is decoupled from its resource
base but directly linked with its knowledge base. This suggests a
greater role of national government in financing education and training.
National government also assumes greater importance in social risk
management due to vagaries of global system and social dumping by
corporations to stay internationally competitive. National government
also assumes a greater role in securing a common economic union.
Provincial economic role on the other hand is on the wane as the
information revolution makes national coordination and oversight over
local governments and horizontal coordination at the local level through
inter-local partnerships feasible as done in Finland. In view of the
above pressures, states and provincial governments are under growing
tension to reposition their roles to retain economic relevance. The
political role of states and provinces, however, remains strong in all
nations and even on the rise in some nations as in Germany, Pakistan and
India. In Germany, the Lander has assumed a central role in implementing
European Union directives and in policy making for regional planning and
development. In India, states have effectively blocked implementation of
the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution empowering local
governments. In Pakistan provinces have recently moved to scale back the
fiscal and administrative autonomy of local governments. In conclusion
while economic considerations warrant a leaner role for provinces and an
expansive role for local governments, developing countries are unlikely
to adapt a smooth transition of such role reversals.
3. UNSHACKLING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS--EMERGING IMPERATIVES
Motivations for Rethinking the Role of Local Governments
Globalisation and information revolution has brought about a
paradigm shift in international competitiveness of nations. Economic
prosperity of a nation is now more closely linked to the knowledge,
skills and information base of its citizens rather than the
country's resource endowments. It is increasingly recognised now
that local governments, especially cities, are at the core of the future
prosperity of a nation in view of their better positioning to forge a
competitive advantage to spur economic growth by fostering a new
knowledge based economy. With capital mobility and deregulation, local
governments as providers of infrastructure related services, are more
appropriate channels for attracting domestic and foreign investment.
Cities are increasingly becoming important players in international
economic alliances. Global financial crisis has diminished people's
trust both in the markets and role of central governments in regulating
such markets. With a cloud of fiscal distress looming over the world
horizon from bailouts of financial markets, local governments may also
hold the key to fiscal heath and sustainable public finances as costly
centrally determined and delivered services are replaced by locally
demanded and competitively delivered services at the local level. Closer
to home, people are increasingly more likely to link their identities
with local jurisdictions and are demanding higher quality local services
to improve economic and social outcomes. But local governments with few
exceptions (e.g. China, Denmark and Finland) are hamstrung to play a
leadership role in local economic development in view of the constraints
imposed by higher orders of government. To reshape the role of local
governments to conform to the new world economic order, one has to
review both the theory and the past legacy in practice.
Roles and Responsibilities of Local Governments: Analytical
Underpinnings
There are five perspectives on models of government and the roles
and responsibilities of local government: (a) traditional fiscal
federalism, (b) new public management (NPM), (c) public choice, (d) new
institutional economics (NIE), and (e) network forms of local
governance. The federalism and the NPM perspectives are concerned
primarily with market failures and how to deliver public goods
efficiently and equitably. The public choice and NIE perspectives are
concerned with government failures. The network forms of governance
perspective is concerned with institutional arrangements to overcome
both market and government failures [see Shah and Shah (2006, 2007)].
Local Government as a Handmaiden of a Higher Government Order:
Traditional Fiscal Federalism Perspectives
The fiscal federalism approach is focused on internalising benefits
and costs of service provision to the same jurisdiction and treats local
government as a subordinate tier in a multitiered system and outlines
principles for defining the roles and responsibilities of various orders
of government [see Boadway and Shah (2009) for such a framework for the
design of fiscal constitutions]. Hence, one sees that in most
federations, as in Canada and the United States, local governments are
creatures of state (intermediate order) governments (dual federalism).
In a few isolated instances, as in Brazil, they are equal partners with
higher-level governments (cooperative federalism), and in an exceptional
case, Switzerland, they are the main source of sovereignty and have
greater constitutional significance than the federal government. Thus,
depending on the constitutional and legal status of local governments,
intermediate order governments in federal countries assume varying
degrees of oversight of the provision of local public services. In
general, this perspective constrains the role of local governments as
their" expansive role comes at the expense of the powers of the
intermediate order of government. As globalisation and information
revolution leads to diminished economic relevance of the intermediate
order" of governments, these conflicts are accentuated and
intermediate order governments have a tendency to play a more intrusive
role at the local level to stay politically relevant. The fiscal
federalism perspectives serve as a response to market failures and
heterogeneous preferences with little recognition of government failures
or the role of entities beyond government.
Local Government as an Independent Facilitator of Creating Public
Value: New Public Management Perspectives
Two interrelated criteria have emerged from the NPM literature in
recent years determining, first, what local governments should do and,
second, how they should do it better. It argues that the role of public
managers in local governments is to tap free resources of the community
(goodwill, good Samaritan values) and push the frontiers of improved
social outcomes beyond what may be possible with meagre local revenues
[Moore (1996)]. Thus, public managers create value by mobilising and
facilitating a network of providers beyond local government. This
environment, focused on creating public value, encourages innovation and
experimentation, bounded by the risk tolerance of the median voter in
each community. The main current of the NPM literature is concerned not
with what to do but with how to do it better. It argues for an incentive
environment in which managers are given flexibility in the use of
resources but held accountable for results. Top-down controls are thus
replaced by a bottom-up focus on results.
Local Government as an Institution to Advance Self-interest: The
Public Choice Approach
The public choice literature endorses the self-interest doctrine of
government and argues that various stakeholders involved in policy
formulation and implementation are expected to use opportunities and
resources to advance their self-interest. This view has important
implications for the design of local government institutions. For local
governments to serve the interests of people, they must have complete
local autonomy in taxing and spending constrained only by direct
democracy provisions and they must be subject to competition within and
beyond government. In the absence of these prerequisites, local
governments will be inefficient and unresponsive to citizen preferences
[Boyne (1998) and Bailey (1999)].
The Government as a Runaway Train: Neo-institutional Economics
(NIE) Concerns with the Institutions of Public Governance
Shah and Shah (2006) apply NIE principles in developing a framework
for analysing fiscal systems and local empowerment and for comparing
mechanisms for local governance. This framework is helpful in designing
multiple orders of government and in clarifying local government
responsibilities in a broader framework of local governance. According
to the NIE framework as interpreted by Shah and Shah (2006), various
orders of governments (as agents) are created to serve the interests of
the citizens as principals. The jurisdictional design should ensure that
these agents serve the public interest while minimising transaction
costs for the principals.
The existing institutional framework does not permit such
optimisation, because the principals have bounded rationality; that is,
they make the best choices on the basis of the information at hand but
are ill informed about government operations. Enlarging the sphere of
their knowledge entails high transaction costs, which citizens are not
willing to incur. Those costs include participation and monitoring
costs, legislative costs, executive decision-making costs, agency costs or costs incurred to induce compliance by agents with the compact, and
uncertainty costs associated with unstable political regimes [Horn
(1997); Shah (2005)]. Agents (officials of various orders of
governments) are better informed about government operations than
principals are, but they have an incentive to withhold information and
to indulge in opportunistic behaviours or "self-interest seeking
with guile" [Williamson (1985), p. 7]. Thus, the principals have
only incomplete contracts with their agents. Such an environment fosters
commitment problems because the agents may not follow the compact. The
situation is further complicated by three factors--weak or extant countervailing institutions, path dependency, and the interdependency of
various actions. Countervailing institutions such as the judiciary,
police, parliament, and citizen activist groups are usually weak and
unable to restrain rent-seeking by politicians and bureaucrats.
Historical and cultural factors and mental models by which people see
little benefits to and high costs of activism prevent corrective action.
Further, empowering local councils to take action on behalf of citizens
often leads to loss of agency between voters and councils, because
council members may interfere in executive decision making or may get
co-opted in such operations while shirking their legislative
responsibilities. The NIE framework stresses the need to use various
elements of transaction costs in designing jurisdictions for various
services and in evaluating choices between competing governance
mechanisms.
Local Government as a Facilitator of Network Forms of Local
Governance
Given the high transaction costs and perceived infeasibility of
market and hierarchical mechanisms of governance for partnerships of
multiple organisations, a network mechanism of governance has been
advanced as a possible mode of governance for such partnerships--the
kind to be managed by local governments. The network form of governance
relies on trust, loyalty, and reciprocity between partners with no
formal institutional safeguards. Networks formed on the basis of shared
interests (interest-based networks) can provide a stable form of
governance if membership is limited to partners that can make
significant resource contributions and if there is a balance of powers
among members. Members of such networks interact frequently and see
cooperation in one area as contingent on cooperation in other areas.
Repeated interaction among members builds trust. Hope-based networks are
built on the shared sentiments and emotions of members. Members have
shared beliefs in the worth and philosophy of the network goals and have
the passion and commitment to achieve those goals. The stability of such
networks is highly dependent on the commitment and style of their
leadership [Dollery and Wallis (2001)] and the catalytic and mediating
role played by local governments.
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]
A Synthesis: Reshaping the Role of Local Governments for the 21st
Century
We have reviewed ideas emerging from the literature on political
science, economics, public administration, law, federalism, and the NIE
with a view to developing an integrated analytical framework for the
comparative analysis of local government and local governance
institutions. The dominant concern in this literature is that the
incentives and accountability framework faced by various orders of
government is not conducive to a focus on service delivery consistent
with citizen preferences. As a result, corruption, waste, and
inefficiencies permeate public governance. Top-down hierarchical
controls are ineffective; there is little accountability because
citizens are not empowered to hold governments accountable.
Multi-order governance practices around the world are focused on
structures and processes, with little regard for outputs and outcomes.
These practices support top-down structures with preeminent federal
legislation (that is, federal legislation overrides any sub-national
legislation). The central government is at the apex, exercising direct
control and micromanaging the system. Hierarchical controls exercised by
various layers of government have an internal rule-based focus with
little concern for their mandates. Government competencies are
determined on the basis of technical and administrative capacity, with
almost no regard for client orientation, bottom-up accountability, and
lowering of transaction costs for citizens. Various orders of government
indulge in uncooperative zero-sum games for control. This tug of war
leads to large swings in the balance of powers. Shared rule is a source
of much confusion and conflict, especially in federal systems. Local
governments are typically creatures of states or provinces and given
straitjacket mandates. They are given only limited home rule in their
competencies. In short, local governments in this system of
"federalism for the governments, by the governments, and of the
governments" get crushed under a regime of intrusive controls by
higher levels of governments. Citizens also have limited voice and exit
options.
The governance implications of such a system are quite obvious.
Various orders of government suffer from agency problems associated with
incomplete contracts and undefined property rights, as the assignment of
taxing, spending, and regulatory powers remains to be
clarified--especially in areas of shared rule. Intergovernmental bargaining leads to high transaction costs for citizens. Universalism
and pork-barrel politics result in a tragedy of commons, as various
orders of government compete to claim a higher share of common pool
resources. Under this system of governance, citizens are treated as
agents rather than as principals.
On how to reverse this trend and make governments responsive and
accountable to citizens, the dominant themes emphasised in the
literature are the subsidiarity principle, the principle of fiscal
equivalency, the creation of public value, results-based accountability,
and the minimisation of transaction costs for citizens, as discussed
earlier. These themes are useful but should be integrated into a broader
framework of citizen-centred governance, to create an incentive
environment in the public sector that is compatible with a public sector
focus on service delivery and bottom-up accountability and also
incentive- compatible with globalisation. Such integration is expected
to deal with the commitment problem in various levels of government by
empowering citizens and by limiting their agents' ability to
indulge in opportunistic behaviour. Table 2 provides general principles
for rethinking the role of local government based upon a synthesis of
the conceptual and empirical literature.
The framework emphasises reforms that strengthen the role of
citizens as the principals and create incentives for government agents
to comply with their mandates. The commitment problem may be mitigated
by creating citizen-centred local governance--by having direct democracy
provisions, introducing governing for results in government operations,
and reforming the structure of governance, thus shifting decision making
closer to the people. Direct democracy provisions require referenda on
major issues and large projects and require that citizens have the right
to veto any legislation or government program. A "governing for
results" framework requires government accountability to citizens
for service delivery performance. Hence, citizens have a charter
defining their basic rights as well as their rights of access to
specific standards of public services. Output-based intergovernmental
transfers strengthen compliance with such standards and strengthen
accountability and citizen empowerment. Formula based revenue sharing arrangements, on the other hand, weaken government accountability to
citizens.
Implications for Division of Powers Within Nations: Role Reversals
for Central, Provincial and Local Governments
The framework described above has important implications for
reforming the structure of government. Top-down mandates on local
governance will need to be replaced by bottom-up compacts. Furthermore,
the role of local government must be expanded to serve as a catalyst for
the formulation, development, and operation of a network of both
government providers and entities beyond government. Local
government's traditionally acknowledged technical capacity becomes
less relevant in this framework. More important are its institutional
strengths as a purchaser of services and as a facilitator of alliances,
partnerships, associations, clubs, and networks for developing social
capital and improving social outcomes. Two distinct options are possible
in this regard, and both imply a pivotal role for local governments in
the intergovernmental system. The options are (a) local government as
the primary agent, subcontracting to local providers,
provincial/regional (state), and federal or central government
authorities and engaging networks and entities beyond government, and
(b) local, provincial/regional (state), and national governments as
independent agents.
Option A: Local Governments as Primary Agents of Citizens. In this
role, a local government serves as (a) a purchaser of local services,
(b) a facilitator of networks of government providers and entities
beyond government, and (c) a gatekeeper and overseer of province/state
(intermediate order) and national governments for the shared rule or
responsibilities delegated to them. This role represents a fundamental
shift in the division of powers from higher to local governments. It has
important constitutional implications. Residual functions reside with
local governments. Provincial legislatures would not be directly elected
and would simply be constituted from local government representatives to
perform inter-municipal services. The provincial chief executive
(governor) could either be directly elected or nominated by the Centre
subject to confirmation by the provincial legislature (provincial
council). The provincial council will make policies on inter-local
issues and provide oversight on the provincial executive headed by the
governor. The governor could be removed by a three-fourth majority of
the provincial council. In Finland--a country with no provincial
(intermediate order) governments--inter-municipal functions are
performed through voluntary partnerships among local governments. The
national government is assigned redistributive, security, foreign
relations, and interstate (inter-regional) functions such as
harmonisation and consensus on a common framework. The Chinese and the
Swiss systems bear some affinity to this model and Finland incorporates
elements of this framework.
Option B: Various Orders of Government as Independent Agents. An
alternative framework for establishing the supremacy of the principals
is to clarify the responsibilities and functions of various orders as
independent agents. This framework limits shared rule. Finance follows
function strictly, and fiscal arrangements are periodically reviewed for
fine-tuning. Local governments enjoy home rule, with complete tax and
expenditure autonomy. The Brazilian fiscal constitution incorporates
some features of this model, albeit with significant deviations.
Feasibility of Options. Option A is well grounded in the history of
modern governments and is most suited for countries with history of
internal or external conflict in recent times. It is already practiced
to some degree in Switzerland, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and China. War,
conquest, and security concerns have led to a reversal of the roles of
various orders of governments and to a reduction in local government
functions in more recent history. Globalisation and the information
revolution have already brought pressures for much larger and stronger
roles for local governments. Although a majority of governments have
done some tinkering with their fiscal systems, the radical change
recommended here is not in the cards anywhere. This is because the
unlikelihood of overcoming path dependency--a tall order for existing
institutions and vested interests-makes such reform infeasible. Under
such circumstances, option B may be more workable, but here the clarity
of responsibilities may not be politically feasible. In general, there
is unlikely to be political will to undertake such bold reforms.
Piecemeal adaptation of this model will nevertheless be forced on most
countries by the effects of globalisation and by citizen empowerment,
facilitated by the information revolution.
The Practice of Local Governance and Lessons for Reform
The legal status of local government varies across countries, with
local government deriving authority from national constitutions in
Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, and Sweden;
from state constitutions in Australia, Switzerland, and the United
States; and from national legislation in the United Kingdom and New
Zealand and from provincial legislation in Canada and Pakistan and from
executive order in China. It is interesting that there is no clear
pattern in the autonomy and range of local services provided by local
governments deriving their status from national and state constitutions.
However, local governments that are created through legislation are
significantly weaker.
The relative importance of local governments is compared in Figure
1 using local government share of consolidated public sector
expenditures. Using this indicator, Japan, South Korea, China, Denmark
are the leaders; Indonesia, Thailand, USA, UK, Poland, France,
Phillipines, and Brazil are in the mid range; Pakistan, Australia and
India are in the lowest range. Considering another indicator i.e. local
government share of GDP, local government in Denmark stands out,
claiming about 50 percent of total expenditures, which account for about
30 percent of GDP. Among the industrial countries, Australia is an
outlier with local expenditures accounting for less than 3 percent of
GDP.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Relative importance of local government is quite small and local
government role m local economic development is quite weak in Australia
("roads and rubbish" only), India (largely ornamental),
Pakistan, France and United Kingdom. In these countries local
governments were seen in the past more as instruments of political
participation rather than autonomous institutions for self-government
and service provision. This view has been reshaped to give greater
autonomy to local governments in municipal services in recent years in
UK and France. Local governments are relatively more important and play
a moderate role in local economic development in Japan, Germany, Canada,
USA and Brazil. In these countries, local governments have an exclusive
role in municipal services but limited role in social services. The role
of local government is expansive in Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and Finland), Switzerland and China. In Nordic countries, local
governments act as the primary agent of citizens and provide a broad
role in support of a client-oriented welfare state. For example, in
Finland, local governments assume a predominant role in social services
[Moisio, Loikkanen, Oulasvirta (2010)]. In Switzerland cantons (higher
order of local governments) enjoy autonomy not only in fiscal matters
but also in such areas as immigration, citizenship, language and foreign
economic relations. China affords its local governments one of the
strongest role in local economic development. Local governments below
provincial level employ 89 percent of the public workforce and command
51 percent of public expenditures. A unique feature of local government
in China is that local autonomy varies directly with success in local
performance as measured by local economic development, service delivery
and citizen satisfaction. Nordic countries, Switzerland and China appear
to have local government role more consistent with the demands of new
world economic order. In these countries, intermediate orders of
government have limited (China) or no role (Nordic countries).
Some Lessons
Historical evolution and the current practice of local governance
is instructive in drawing lessons for reform of local governance. There
is great diversity in practice in local governance in industrial
countries, but there are also some common strands. The diversity is in
the institutional arrangements, which have evolved incrementally over a
long period. This evolution has resulted in diverse roles for local
governments and diverse relations with central governments across
countries. In Nordic countries, local government serves as the primary
agent of the people, whereas in Australia, that role is entrusted to
state governments, and local government has a minimal role in local
affairs.
There is no uniform model for local government size, structure,
tiers, and functions across OECD countries. There are nevertheless a
number of interesting common features. First, most countries recognise
that finance must follow function to ensure that local governments are
able to meet their responsibilities efficiently and equitably. Second,
home rule is considered critical to meeting local expectations and being
responsive to local residents. Therefore, local governments must have
significant taxing, spending, and regulatory autonomy, and they must
have the ability to hire, fire, and set terms of reference for employees
without having to defer to higher levels of governments. Only then can
local governments innovate in management by introducing
performance-based accountability and innovate in service delivery by
forging alternative service delivery arrangements through competitive
provision, contracting, and outsourcing wherever deemed appropriate as
done in Finland [see Moisio, Loikkanen, and Oulasvirta (2010)]. They can
also facilitate a broader network of local governance and harness the
energies of the whole community to foster better social outcomes. Third
and most important, accountability to local residents has been the
factor most critical to the success of local governance in industrial
countries. This accountability is strengthened through democratic
choice, participation, transparency, performance budgeting,
citizens' charters of rights, and various legal and financing
provisions that support wider voice, choice, and exit options to
residents.
In conclusion, a synthesis of the conceptual literature suggests
that the modern role of a local government is to deal with market
failures as well as government failures. This role requires a local
government to operate as a purchaser of local services, a facilitator of
networks of government providers and entities beyond government, and a
gatekeeper and overseer of province/state and national governments in
areas of shared rule. Local government also needs to play a
mediator's role among various entities and networks to foster
greater synergy and harness the untapped energies of the broader
community for improving the quality of life of residents. Globalisation
and the information revolution are reinforcing those conceptual
perspectives on a catalytic role for local governments. This view is
also grounded in the history of industrial nations especially Nordic
countries and ancient civilisations in China, India and Pakistan. Local
government was the primary form of government until wars and conquest
led to the transfer of local government responsibilities to central and
provincial/regional governments. This trend continued unabated until
globalisation and the information revolution highlighted the weaknesses
of centralised rule for improving the quality of life and social
outcomes. The new vision of local governance (Table 2) presented here
argues for a leadership role by local governments in a multi-centred,
multi-order, or multi-level system. This view is critical to creating
and sustaining citizen-centred governance, in which citizens are the
ultimate sovereigns and various orders of governments serve as agents in
the supply of public governance. This view is also relevant for carving
and sustaining a competitive edge in international economic relations as
demonstrated by the recent experience of China.
Empowering local governments and strengthening their role in local
economic development ushered China in an era of sustained economic
growth and lifting billions out of the poverty trap.
Box 2
China is Shining on the World Economic Stage--Thanks to Its
Unshackling of Its Local Governments
China is an economic powerhouse poised to assume world economic
leadership in tile coming decades. It had a sustained record of
economic growth (average annual growth rate in real per capita GDP
of 10 percent over the past three decades resulting in nearly
tripling of per capita income from 1978 to 2010) and prosperity.
Its record in alleviating poverty is unparalleled in the economic
history of the world--reducing poverty headcount rate from 31
percent in 1978 to less than 2 percent in 2008. These facts are
well known. But what is less well known is that this came about
because Deng Shao Peng in 1979 unshackled local governments and
unleashed their innovative spirits and energies in pursuit of
economic growth and local economic development. China has one of
the most empowered local governments serving their residents from
cradle to grave. Local Government command 89 percent share of
public sector employment and 51 percent share of consolidated
public expenditures. Other than defense, debt and foreign affairs
that are the exclusive domain of the Centre, all other functions
including education, health, and social insurance are the
responsibility of local governments. There is no uniform model and
all local governments pursue their own unique approach to service
delivery and local economic development. Contracting out service
delivery to autonomous service units is practiced widely.
Provincial role is largely limited to agriculture and providing
coordination and oversight of local governments on behalf of the
centre. Thus China while having a unitary constitution beats
affinity to an hour glass model of federalism. There is strict
government accountability to citizens at all orders through
directly elected people's congress at each level. In addition, the
Communist Party oversight committees at each level monitor citizen
satisfaction as well as dissatisfaction (number of protests).
Higher level oversight of local governments is based on objective
results based criteria that incorporates: (a) local economic
development performance; (b) local service delivery performance;
and (c) citizen satisfaction. Local government success is rewarded
by greater local autonomy and sustained failure is punished by
reduced autonomy and intrusive oversight and controls by higher
order governments.
Source: Qiao and Shah (2006).
4. EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ALTERNATE MODELS OF DIVISION OF POWERS
AMONG PROVINCES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR GOOD
GOVERNANCE AND GROWTH
Earlier sections presented normative, institutional and historical
perspectives on the newer roles of provincial and local governments. It
argued for leaner role of the provinces and an expansive role of local
governments to comply with the new world economic order. This section
attempts to supplement the analytical perspectives presented in earlier
sections with empirical evidence on the implications of alternate roles
for good governance and growth. Using a worldwide sample of countries,
this section attempts to compare economic performance with different
strengths of state and local governments. The conjecture is that for
good governance and growth, decentralisation of government authority to
local government is more important than decentralisation to intermediate
tiers i.e. provinces or states.
For our analysis we group countries according to the roles assumed
by state and local governments. State governments are classified as
strong or weak depending upon expansive or limited range of functions
assigned to them. Local governments on the other hand are ranked on a
scale of. weak, fair and strong governance based upon their share of
national expenditure adjusted for the degree of political,
administrative and fiscal autonomy they enjoy [for methodological
details, see Ivanyna and Shah (forthcoming)]. With a few notable
exceptions, data shows that strong and fair local governance is usually
associated with weak state governments (see Annex Table 1) and strong
state governments typically imply weak local governments.
Once classified in this way, group averages are then calculated on
11 good governance and growth indicators for the period 1999-2008. These
indicators include: GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth rate, central
government debt as a percent of GDP, human development index, perceived
corruption, incidence of internal conflicts, citizen centric indexes of
responsive governance (government delivers services consistent with
people preferences), fair governance (protects minority and
disadvantaged groups), responsible governance (costs less) and
accountable governance (accountable to citizens) and durability of
political system. In 10 out of these eleven indicators, countries with
strong local governments and weak state governments do better than
countries with strong state governments. The only exception is fair
governance--a higher order task best assigned to central government (see
Figures in the Annex).
Econometric Analysis
We explored further the relationship of alternate roles of state
and local governments using regression analysis. Such an analysis allows
control for many other factors affecting a country's economic and
governance performance and isolate the impact of alternate models of
division of powers. The results of these analyses are presented in Annex
Tables 2 and 3. The results reconfirm our qualitative and simple
quantitative analysis findings. Strong local governments have positive
association with economic performance and quality of governance
indicators in 9 out of 12 performance indicators though not all of the
relationships are statistically significant. Having strong state
government helps only in 1 out of 12 cases while it hurts in four cases.
Thus while the data limitations prevent us from more thorough empirical
analysis of these choices, the results presented here provide tentative
support to the basic hypothesis of this paper that strong local
governments accompanied by leaner provincial/state governments are
needed to improve economic and social outcomes for citizens.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS: ADAPTING TO A CHANGING WORLD
This paper has reflected on the unfinished agenda for the reform of
multi-order governance. Broad contours of the reform include freeing
local governments from shackles of centralised and provincialised
control so as to enable them to assume a leadership role in improving
economic and social outcomes for local residents. This leadership role
requires local governments to assume a catalyst's role in directing
and coordinating governmental (including central government) and
non-governmental agencies and networks to local economic development.
Local governments would be in a position to play this role if their
responsibilities are determined by home rule and community governance
principles and they have adequate access to revenues from own sources or
they can piggyback on central tax bases. In addition to strengthen their
accountability to local residents not only finance should follow
function but intergovernmental finance should be structured so as to
strengthen local autonomy while enhancing results based accountability.
Thus there is a need to move away from manna from heaven transfers
(general revenue sharing schemes) to output-based (performance oriented)
grants that respect local autonomy while creating incentives for service
delivery performance accountability [see Shah (2010)]. There is also
need for reform of the budgetary institutions so that all orders of
government are bound by a common framework of fiscal responsibility,
integrity, fiscal discipline and fiscal sustainability. There should
also be a framework to ensure that local government performance is
measured and monitored for compliance with the principles of responsive
and fair, responsible and accountable governance.
Intermediate order governments have limited economic relevance in
this framework but can usefully play a coordinating role for inter-local
services. The paper has also argued that while there is a strong case
for directly elected central and local governments, in the interest of
restraining government expenditures, provincial councils (assemblies)
can be constituted simply from elected heads of local governments and
provincial chief executives can either be directly elected by people or
appointed by the Centre subject to confirmation by the provincial
council. The provincial council determines policies on inter-local
functions and also provides oversight on the provincial executive headed
by the provincial governor that implements these mandates. Such a
framework minimises costs of intergovernmental coordination while
reducing transactions costs for citizens to hold governments to account.
Analytical, institutional and empirical analysis presented in this paper
further shows that such a framework of multi-order governance is
conducive to minimising internal conflicts while promoting good
governance and growth. The paper has, however, recognised that such a
reform agenda may not be feasible in some countries with dual federalism
where provinces (states) have strong political clout and are governed by
elites. This is because of the unlikelihood of overcoming path
dependency--a tall order for existing institutions and vested interests to wither away--makes such reform infeasible. Under such circumstances,
there is unlikely to be political will to undertake such bold reforms.
In these countries, citizen activism would be required to build
consensus for such fundamental reforms. Such activism is, however,
unlikely to materialise in the absence of educated and enlightened
citizenry. Therefore, such radical reforms would not be in the cards in
the foreseeable future.
Our survey of the literature also suggests that local governance
even in most industrial countries does not fully correspond to the
governance principles enunciated here or even to the needs of economic
success in this information age. There are only few exceptions and these
are found mostly in Nordic countries and in East Asia (China, South
Korea and Japan). Other countries would be well advised to follow the
lead of these countries in adapting multi-order governance especially
local governance to the needs of the 21st century.
Appendices
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
Table 1
Countries Grouped by Strength of Local and State Governments
Strong SG ETH, NPL, MYS, AUT, DEU, BRA USA, CAN
MEX, VEN, IND,
AUS, ARG, BIH,
PAK, BEL, SDN
Weak SG Rest of the World TZA BOL ECU KOS LTU, NLD, LVA POL
KGZ EST BGR ALB UKR NGA GBR HUN
PHL URY NZL SRM BUS CUB GEO FRA
TJK LUX TWA PER IDN COL CHE JPN
PRT KAZ SVK ZAF ITA KOR ISL NOR
BLR IRL CZE ESP FIN SWE CHN DNK
MNG ROM UZB LTU
Weak LG Fair LG Strong LG
Note: Abbreviations: SG--state government, LG--local government.
Division by strength of SG: based on opinion of WB experts. Division
by strength of LG: strong LG--share of own local expenditures is
more than 10 percent of government expenditures, fair LG--the share
is between 5 percent and 10 percent, weak LG--the share is less than
5 percent.
Table 2
State vs. Local Governments: Regressions
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dep. Variable Gdp-cap Gdp-growth Debt
Own LG Exp. 3.47 *** 8.05 * -114.11 **
(1.16) (4.35) (49.36)
1=SG is Strong 0.39 0.27 -7.66
(0.26) (0.60) (14.57)
Product 6.99 * 6.99 195.53
(3.86) (10.27) (155.84)
Observations 110 116 37
R-squared 0.707 0.244 0.623
(iv) (v) (vi)
Dep. Variable Hdi Corr Conf
Own LG Exp. 0.48 ** -0.17 6.63
(0.19) (0.16) (4.42)
1=SG is Strong 0.06 * 0.00 2.83
(0.03) (0.03) (1.84)
Product 1.01 * -0.86 ** -35.59
(0 (0.42) (33.04)
Observations 116 116 116
R-squared 0.673 0.741 0.249
Note: * significant at 10 percent level, **--significant at 5
percent level, ***--significant at 1 percent level, Years analysed
in all regression--1999-2008. Dependent variables: gdp--cap-GDP per
capita, gdp_growth--GDP per capital growth, debt-central government
debt, hdi-Human Development Index, corr--perceived corruption,
confl-number of internal conflicts. See previous Section for
definitions of dependent variables. Righ hand side variables--own LG
expenditures, SG strength-both defined in the previous Section-and
their product. Other variables included as controls in all
regressions: UK legal origin, number of tiers of sub-national
government, government consumption, openness, number of procedures
needed to open business, number of days needed to enforce contract,
Freedom House index of political and civil rights, ethnical and
religious fractionalisation. Estimation method in all regressions:
OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
Table 3
State vs. Local Governments: Regressions
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dep. Variable Cgi r-ve gov Fair gov
Own LG Exp. 0.14 -0.08 0.28
(0.21) (0.26) (0.49)
1=SG is Strong 0.00 -0.02 0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
Product -0.26 -0.02 -0.17
(0.73) (0.86) (1.25)
Observations 41 41 41
R-squared 0.318 0.395 0.202
(iv) (v) (vi)
Dep. Variable r-le gov acc-tov Dur
Own LG Exp. 0.24 -0.18 55.04
(0.26) (0.25) (40.81)
1=SG is Strong -0.07 -0.10 * 8.98
(0.06) (0.05) (11.30)
Product -0.68 0.09 562.57 **
(0.85) (0.71) (236.40)
Observations 41 41 115
R-squared 0.405 0.473 0.560
Note: * significant at 10 percent level, **--significant at 5
percent level, ***--significant at 1 percent level, Years analysed
in all regression--1999-2008. Dependent variables: cgi--Citizen-
centric Governance Indicator, r-ve gov--Responsible Governance, fair
gov--Fair Governance. r-le gave--Responsible Governance, acc_gov--
Accountable Governance, dur--durability of political regimes. See
previous Section for definitions of dependent variables. Righ hand
side variables--own LG expenditures, SG strength--both defined in
die previous Section--and their product. Other variables included as
controls in all regressions: UK legal origin, number of tiers of
sub-national government, government consumption, openness, number of
procedures needed to open business. number of days needed to enforce
contract, Freedom House index of political and civil rights.
ethnical and religious fractionalisation. Estimation method in all
regressions: OLS. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
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Comments
It is indeed an honour for me to be a discussant on the Gustav
Ranis Lecture organised by PIDE. Gustav Ranis has played an important
role in the initial phase of development of Pakistan Institute of
Development Economics (PIDE) as research institution. The Gustav Ranis
lecture by Dr Anwar Shah is a philosophical thought provoking lecture.
To be a discussant on this important lecture, I have tried to study all
these philosophies. I congratulate Dr Shah for making this valuable
contribution. As a student of development economics, my concerns are as
follows:
The paper is providing an extensive review of literature on whether
the multi-facet governments are functioning well or not? Whether you
want to reduce the tiers of government? What is the role of provincial
level governments? If we retain this tier of government what role it can
play to get desired economic outcomes? The historical perspective
presented in the paper informs us that initially small governments,
small states prevailed. The greed for holding control of more and more
countries and more and more space, led to wars and resulted in big
governments and countries. Now we have to go back to the old localised
system of governance. My concern here is: Was greed the only reason? How
successful were these small governments? What were the weaknesses of the
local level governments leading to their failure? Currently what is the
experience of different countries opting for the local level governance?
How far we can learn from these examples? This discussion is missing in
the paper.
My second concern is: What is the role of level of economic
development for the success of Iocalised system of governance? It may be
the case that If a country achieves certain level of economic growth and
prosperity then involving more and more citizens in the decision making
process may be more effective as compared to in the initial stages of
economic development. What I would like to know from Dr Shah, because he
is an authority in this area, that whether the initial economic
conditions are important for the success of devolution of economic power
or not.
Thirdly, what are the prerequisites like the capabilities and
capacities of those who will be the decision makers so that we do not
face the failure in this new experiment'? What will be required in
terms of resource base at the local level to translate power into
actions? Unless there is financial backing the new form of governance
will not be able to deliver. If you look into different districts of
Pakistan, in terms of resources, in terms of income inequality, in terms
of incidence of poverty, wide disparities exist. In some cases these
disparities have been persistent over time. South Punjab has been the
poorest of regions in Pakistan. Now what it will take to bring back
those districts out of poverty; whether making them locally empowered
will be sufficient or whether a resource transfer will be needed from
somewhere, whether it is from the provincial level or directly from the
federal level to empower them, to give them initial support to make the
decisions so that they can come out of this persistent poverty
situation. The most important and effective local governments have been
in terms of provision of education and health services. In addition,
local governments have been effective wherever the capacity and the
capability of the local decision makers is ensured. In Pakistan, the
capacity and capability is critically lacking affecting the performance
of local governments.
Next issue is what type and quality of institutions. Which
institutions are critical for the success of experiment? This dimension
is missing in this paper. Dr Shah is saying that the central system is
not working and it is basically the failure of management. How we can
improve this management system/management practices so that we do not
have the failure of another system? This is important as the change from
the centralised system to the local government will involve, initially,
huge transactions costs. Who will bear that cost and how you can
minimise it? These issues become critically important when you want to
translate this idea, of moving away from the central government to the
local government, into action.
Dr Shah has given the example of China. China has been studied and
quoted widely these days. Chinese economic growth is not just that what
is the form of government, a number of other factors or primary factors
and implementation of incentive systems of production also played a
critical role. Can we replicate it? In terms of econometric results, I
think, Dr Shah himself has some reservations. The data used are not
explained. Given the methodology, it can not be claimed that Dr
Shah's philosophy is supported. There are a number of insignificant
coefficients. The estimation technique is also not appropriate.
Next issue is that the local governments can be very effective in
some cases, and in some areas, and Dr Shah is focusing on control on
expenditure. What about the revenue generation? What is the share of
different level of local governments in terms of revenue generation and
how much transfer would be required to improve performance economically
and socially? That is an important issue.
Lastly, the local governments may be effective in terms of
delivering some services but the role of the central government or the
provincial government is also important in some areas. For example, in
this era when the world is facing threats of climate change requiring
global actions, how far the local governments will be effective in terms
of generating incentives and to control disadvantage or disasters of
climate change. It needs global action which require support from the
central and provincial governments.
In the end, I would congratulate, Dr Shah for presenting this paper
for Gustav Ranis Lecture and thank PIDE for giving me this opportunity.
Rehana Siddiqui
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Comments
This is a provocative and thought provoking paper. It is also
particularly useful for those of us who mostly dwell on issues related
to Pakistan's and do not focus on the big picture and new
developments that are taking place elsewhere. I will first talk a little
bit about some of the interesting concepts that have been presenled in
the paper and then relate it to the situation prevalent in Pakistan.
'Glocalisation': Relevance and Contradictions Within
The first important issue that the paper raises is from a stream of
literature referred as 'glocalisation'--integration of the
local economy with the global. The impulse created by the information
revolution and liberalisation of markets at the global level have come
together in some parts of the world with sub-regional economies to
create a new and dynamic developmental impulse. The possibility of
reaping benefits at the local level of global opportunity would be
directly proportional to the level of human capital and knowledge base
that exists at whatever the level of disaggregation we wish to refer as
'local'.
Now let us see the relevance of this particular model in our
context. Obviously, the human capital base at the local level by and
large is extremely weak. Thus the possibilities that exist in small town
Germany or even in most South American countries are rarely prevalent,
not only in Pakistan, but in the South Asian context in general.
Secondly, in many ways Pakistan as a whole has not reaped the benefits
of globalisation even at the aggregate level. FDI flows and trade
integration in the region or beyond for Pakistan are below par when
compared to other mainstream globalisers. This is in no way a critique
of the concept, only an attempt to place ourselves in the larger scheme.
It is also pertinent to mention skepticism about some processes of
globalisation itself; especially about the impact of global financial
markets. The big picture at this point in time it is not very
encouraging. A house is mortgaged in small town Kentucky or Louisiana in
the US and a small Housing and Loans bank goes bust. A trillion dollars
have to be injected by the central government to bail out that economy
but even then the ripples of this catastrophe are felt across the global
economy for years to come. Dr Shah refers to the present financial
crisis as an aberration in the relentless march towards globalisation.
The other view is that these are recurring crisis and not aberrations
with huge, economic as well as social costs, particularly for the poor.
Human Capital or Resource Based Development?
Returning to the theme of glocalisation and the Pakistani context,
it appears that Pakistan may be some nothches behind the post modern
glocalisation formulation mentioned in the paper. In fact one very
interesting and important point is made in Table 1 in the paper that
provincial competition actually happens on resource based extractive industries. Now that is a phase Pakistan is just beginning to enter
after the passage of the 18th Amendment to the Constitution. In fact,
some have argued that the economic aspect of the turmoil in Balochistan
is based on the contest on the natural resource rents that the province
is bestowed with. Moreover, globalisation has enhanced the rents to be
reaped from these resources and all protagonists are aware of the
possibilities. So rather than the human capital based resource, it is
actually the extractive based resource which is something on which
present day contentions of Pakistan are happening. These contentions
will further intensify if Thar coal develops to its full potential in
another province. The larger picture thus is that inter-provincial
competition will have to be resolved through institutionalising
mechanisms for resolving federal-provincial and interprovincial
contentions. As such, 'glocalisation' and its benefits seem
distant from us.
Reduction in Transaction Costs vs. Reaping Economies of Scale
The development model in this paper is in favour of sub-provincial
or local government for the obvious reason that local governments reduce
transaction costs so far as service delivery is concerned. At first
glance, this is a truism as monitoring costs reduce at the local level
and priorities for resource allocation are also best developed at that
level. But as Dr Rehana Siddiqui rightly wonders what the institutional
arrangements for this purpose will look like. True, the province is too
large and entity and away from the people, so to speak, but the size of
the districts in Pakistan are fairly large also. I happened to be
travelling in Ms Hina Rabbani Khar's (Chair of this
session)district, Muzzafargarh, a couple of months ago and to travel
from one end of the district to the other takes more than four hours on
fairly decent roads. If one travels that distance in Europe, one will
cross two countries in that time. So the question I ask is what is the
level of disaggregation where the 'local' begins for us'?
Is it the sub-district level or even further to the deh or Manza level?
Or create a level of government somewhere in between? Already we have
three tiers within local government in Pakistan and we have done a lot
of experimentation without reaping any spectacular developmental
outcomes.
At the conceptual level, there is clearly a trade-off between is
not only transaction cost reducing institutions and arrangements that
allow the benefits economies of scale and scope to be reaped. There are
two small points that have been made in the paper. One is a reference to
state capture at the provincial level by the feudal military or
industrial elite. We have seen in the last ten years that such captures
are most prominent at the national or federal levels and also at the
local level. Also, once capture at the local level occurs, it is very
difficult to redress if there is local level 'autonomy'. At
the provincial level there is a very different dynamic at play and many
more stakeholders who tend to create some semblance of a balance.
One useful illustration of different tiers pitching in with their
respective advantages in a developmental effort is of India's Rural
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). NREGA has a three tier model of both
financing as well as execution as well as verification across the
federal government, the state government and the local government. And
so far it has worked well in India, where social and institutional
structures are more similar to us than elsewhere. Now are such
arrangements possible in our institutional milieu? We need to explore
but to take out one tier, i.e. the provincial, is neither useful nor
perhaps desirable.
Province or District: Historical Trajectory of Federalism in
Pakistan
Another very interesting and important point that the paper raises
is that provinces in a federal set up have a holding together function.
This could not be truer in Pakistan today given the 18th Amendment and
the NFC Award than it ever was. In fact by going
'federal-local' during the martial law regimes, we may have
had some reduction in economic transaction costs but it increased
political transaction costs to the point that the country was tearing at
it seems. So another question that we need to ask is how far can we
divert from historical trajectories? It is easy to say that we move from
one model of governance to another but in many ways we are structurally
bound by our political history--which is that provinces are important
middle level tiers so far as the ethnic and linguistic conception of
identities are concerned.
On the whole, this is a very useful paper and I enjoyed reading it
and has prompted me to ask and share a number of questions.
Asad Sayeed
Collective for Social Science Research, Karachi.
Anwar Shah <shah.anwar@gmail.com> is Director, Centre for
Public Economics, Chengdu, China, and also at the World Bank,
Washington, DC, USA.
The author is grateful to Dr Rashid Amjad, Dr Rehana Siddiqui, and
Dr Asad Sayecd for helpful comments on earlier version of this paper.
Table 1
Governance Structure: 20th versus 21st Century
20th Century 21st Century
Centralised or provincialised Globalised and localised
Centre that manages Centre that leads
Citizens as agents, subjects, Citizens as governors and
clients and consumers principals
Bureaucratic Participatory
Command and control Responsive and accountable
Internally dependent Competitive
Closed and slow Open and quick
Intolerance of risk Freedom to fail or succeed
Focus on government Focus on governance with
interactive direct democracy
Competitive edge for resource Competitive edge for human
based economies capital based economies
Federalism as a tool for coming Global collaborative
together or holding together federalism with a focus on
network governance and
reaching out
Residuality principle, ultra vires, Community governance
"Dillon's rule" principle, subsidiarity
principle, home-or self-rule
and shared rule
Limited but expanding role of Wider role of global regimes
global regimes with democracy and networks with improved
deficits governance and accountability
Emerging federal prominence in Leaner but caring federal
shared rule government with an enhanced
role in education, training,
and social protection
Strong state (province) role Ever-diminishing economic
relevance of states
(provinces) and tugs-of-war to
retain relevance
Diminishing role of local Pivotal role of local
government government as the engine of
economic growth, primary agent
of citizens, gatekeeper of
shared rule, facilitator of
network governance; wider role
of "beyond government"
entities
Tax and expenditure centralisation Tax and expenditure
with revenue sharing and input decentralisation with fiscal
based conditional grants to finance capacity equalisation and
subnational expenditures output-based national minimum
standards grants
Sources: Boadway and Shah (2009).
Table 2
The Role of a Local Government under the New Vision of Local
Governance
Old View: 20th century New View: 21st century
Is based on residuality and Is based on subsidiarity and
local governments as wards of home rule
the state
Is based on principle of ultra Is based on community
vires governance
Is focused on government Is focused on citizen-centred
local governance
Is agent of the central Is the primary agent for the
government citizens and leader and
gatekeeper for shared rule
Is responsive and accountable Is responsive and accountable
to higher-level governments to local voters; assumes
leadership role in improveing
local governance
Is direct provider of local Is purchaser of local services
services
Is focused on in-house Is facilitator of network
provision mechanisms of local
governance, coordinator of
government providers and
entities beyond government,
mediator of conflicts, and
developer of social capital
Is focused on secrecy Is focused on letting the
sunshine in; practices
transparent governance
Has input controls Recognises that results matter
Is internally dependent Is externally focused and
competitive; is ardent
practitioner of alternative
service delivery framework
Is closed and slow Is open, quick, and flexible
Has intolerance for risk Is innovative; is risk taker
within limits
Depends on central directives Is autonomous in taxing,
spending, regulatory, and
administrative decisions
Is rules driven Has managerial flexibility and
account ability for results
Is bureaucratic and Is participatory; works to
technocratic strengthen citizen voice and
exit options through direct
democracy provisions,
citizens' charters, and
performance budgeting
Is coercive Is focused on earning trust,
creating space for civic
dialogue, serving the
citizens, and improving social
outcomes
Is fiscally irresponsible Is fiscally prudent; works
better and costs less
Is exclusive with elite Is inclusive and participatory
capture
Overcomes market failures Overcomes market and government
failures
Is boxed in a centralised Is connected in a globalised
system and localised world
Source: Shah and Shah (2006, 2007).