Inter-governmental funds flows in Pakistan: are they reducing poverty?
Ahmed, Qazi Masood ; Lodhi, Akhtar
The purpose of this paper is to see whether any link can be found
between the inter-governmental fiscal transfers and the deprivation
index in the districts of Pakistan. The data for the study was collected
from 98 districts of four provinces of Pakistan for the year 2003 and
2007. The results of the study shows the transfers have reduced
deprivation across the board but unable to solve disparity issue. In
fact the results show the extreme inequality (ratio of maximum to
minimum) has increased over time but average disparity (coefficient of
variation) gives mixed results.
Keywords: Fiscal Federalism, Horizontal Inequity, Vertical
Inequity, Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfer.
1. INTRODUCTION
Pakistan is a constituent of four federating units--Punjab, Sindh,
Khyber Paktunkhwa and Balochistan. There is a huge difference in the
extent and quality of public services provision among these provinces.
The variation in public service provision, that was mainly the result of
intergovernmental fiscal transfers has created vertical and horizontal
imbalances among the provinces, which were further translated into the
districts of each province.
In Pakistan, like other developing countries, well defined and
constitutionally protected intergovernmental fiscal transfer systems are
operational. The National Finance Commission is a prime arrangement for
the distribution of funds among the federal and provincial governments.
Whereas the Provincial Finance Commission is responsible for the
distribution of funds among the provincial, districts and sub-district
governments. In Pakistan the prime responsibility of tax collection lies
with the federal government, whereas, the responsibilities of the
provision of social, economic and community services lies with the
provincial and districts government. The purpose of the transfers in
Pakistan from higher to lower level governments is to bridge the gap
between the revenue and expenditures and to promote the equitable
growth. This will also help reducing poverty among the districts.
The new system of devolution implemented in 2001 has brought
several changes in the intergovernmental fiscal relationship among the
provinces and districts. After devolution 2001 the provision of social
services and few economic services were transferred to the district
governments. This entails and envisages a new and comprehensive fiscal
relationship between the Province and the Districts. The Provincial
Finance Commission (PFC), a special feature of the 2001 devolution,
announces a three year horizon and formula for the distribution of
resources which predicts the flow of funds to the districts from the
province.
The intergovernmental transfer systems have various objectives.
However, the fiscal equalisation and redistribution of funds among the
different tiers of government are the prime objectives of the fiscal
transfer. The PFC gives a formula based allocation of funds among the
districts to minimise the deprivation among the districts. The PFC deals
with both vertical inequity--the inequity between the provincial
government and districts governments--and horizontal
inequity--inequities among the districts.
Since 2001 in each province the two PFC awards have been announced
so far, first in 2001 and second in 2007. Similarly, attempts were also
made to construct district wise deprivation index in each province like
Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) in 1998 and in 2005. The
Deprivation Index indicates in each district of each province the number
of people who do not access to basic needs of education, health, clean
water and housing. Haroon (2007) constructed deprivation index for each
district in Pakistan. The selection of indicators is based on the theory
and district-wise data availability. These include literacy rate and out
of School children, housing quality and congestion, residential housing
services and employment status. The gender disparity is incorporated
taking these measures separately for male and female population.
The purpose of this paper is to see whether any link can be
ascertained between the PFC transfer and the deprivation index. The link
between the funds transfer and deprivation index will indicate whether
the funds transfer is pro-poor districts and fiscal equaliser or not.
The paper is organised as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature
on the theatrical and applied issues of fiscal equalisation. Section 3
gives data collection, methodology and results and Section 4 gives the
conclusion and policy implication.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
There is a rich literature on fiscal federalism both on theoretical
and applied aspects. Bhal, Boex and Vazquez (2002) discuss the issues of
designing of intergovernmental fiscal transfer. This study mentions the
generally accepted reasons for intergovernmental fiscal transfer
are--improving vertical fiscal imbalances, improving the horizontal
fiscal balances, compensating for externalities and funding for merits
goods. Boex (2002) develop allocation formula for Decentralised
Financing and Development Programme in Nepal. Boex (2002) included
relative weight of rural population, relative weight of fiscal need and
relative weight of development in the distributional formula. The paper
highlight when there is suspect of measurement errors the Human
Development Index should not be used as it will not be fiscal equaliser.
Qiao, et al. (2002) using panel data between 1985 and 1998 in China
find that there is positive relationship exists between the growth and
inequality, which implies higher growth will lead more inequality.
Hofman and Guerra (2002) explain causes and consequences of fiscal
inequities among sub-national government in East Asia. This study using
the data of five countries China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and
Viet Nam reveals that endowment and fiscal capacities among sub-national
entities are large and reason for larger inequities before equalisation
efforts. The study concludes that current system of equalisation in East
Asia is mildly equaliser and even after such efforts the disparity is
still large. Yan (2003) concludes that fiscal reforms of 1985 and 1994
failed to bring any fiscal equalisation. Ahmad and other (2000) conclude
that the fiscal reforms have increased income distribution.
3. DATA, METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
In this section we will discuss the results which will show whether
the transfers are reducing poverty and deprivation at districts level of
not? The results also touched upon the fiscal equalisation or income
inequality among the districts. The "equalisation" or
"fiscal equalisation" means "the capability of
sub-national government to deliver similar level of services at similar
levels of taxes," [Searle (2002) and Hofman and Guerra (2002)].
The data fox" the study is collected from different sources of
Provincial and local budget documents. The Provincial development
Statistics are used for the data on transfers, population and other
provincial and districts variables. The government of Pakistan website
www.gov.pk is also used. The data for 98 districts of Pakistan ate
collected -34 from Punjab, 16 from Sindh, 24 from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
24 for Balochistan. The deprivation indexes are constructed by SPDC in
1998 and 2005 based on District Census Report 1998 and Pakistan Standard
of Living Measurement Survey 2004 www.spdc-pak.com.
The purpose of the paper is seeing whether the transfer from the
provincial government to the districts government is fiscal equalisers
of not. To answer this question this paper uses different statistical
results, which we discuss one by one.
The Table 1 (detailed relevant tables are given in the Appendix)
gives the Rank Correlation between the first ranking on the basis of
district deprivation index and the second ranking on the basis of per
capita transfers to the districts. Table 1 gives two Rank Correlations
one for 2003 and second for 2007 that indicate inter-temporal changes in
the nature of transfers. The rank correlation for 2003 are based on the
SPDC deprivation index 1998 and transfer on the basis of 2001 Provincial
Finance Commission award. Where as the Rank Correlation of 2007 are
based on the deprivation index 2005 and transfer on the basis of
Provincial Finance Commission award 2007. In the deprivation index the
most deprived district get rank 1 and least deprived district (most
developed) gets last rank, where as the per capita transfer ranking is
arranged on ascending order i.e. the district get maximum per capita
transfer gets rank 1 and the district which get minimum per capita
transfer gets last rank. The value of rank correlation indicates to what
extent the per capita transfers from provincial government to districts
government ate based on the district deprivation index. If the rank
correlation is one it means the transfers are completely based on
deprivation index and it is most desirable distribution system and minus
one means most undesirable distribution system.
Table 1 gives rank correlation for the districts of Punjab
province, which is the most developed and populated province of
Pakistan. The first rank correlation for 2003 was 0.1804 which increased
to 0, 4132 in 2007. This shows new PFC of Punjab government 2007 is more
pro poor districts. This implies the per capita transfer has increased
for those districts which are more deprived in terms of social and
community services. Similar trend prevail for North West Frontier
Province (Table 1) where the rank correlation which was -.06512 for 2003
increased to 0.4286 for 2007. This implies even in this province the new
PFC is more pro-poor districts. The province Sindh which is the second
largest province in terms of population shows both rank correlations has
very little values implies insignificant link between the per capita
transfer and deprivation level exist. The forth province Balochistan
which is the largest province in terms of area but smallest in term of
population the value of the rank correlation was -0.2626 in 2003 and
further worsen -0.3626 in 2007. This implies that in this province the
transfer are not based on deprivation level of districts and rich
province gets higher transfers. This analysis shows in Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa over time the fiscal transfers are pro poor districts,
whereas in Balochistan the transfers over time become less pro-poor
districts and in Sindh it remained neutral.
This paper also tests the significance of regression coefficient of
deprivation indices of 2005 and 1998. To test this significance the
dependent variable is new deprivation index of 2005 and independent
variable is deprivation index of 1998 and an intercept. The results of
five regressions correspond to Pakistan, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan shows very high and significant regression
coefficient (Table 2). These results show the coefficients between new
and old deprivation indices are 0.905, 0.790 and 0.864 for Pakistan,
Punjab and Sindh respectively, whereas 0.779 and 0.856 for Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan respectively. The variables in all these
equations are significant at 95 percent level and shows at-least little
changes are observed between two indices which imply that fiscal
transfers have made little effects on deprivation rankings.
Table 3 gives province wise district wise summary of per capita
transfer and deprivation profile for 2003 and 2007. This Table gives
value of maximum, minimum and average deprived level of districts, the
ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation and its coefficient of
variation. This Table also gives value of maximum, minimum and average
per capita transfers to each district, the ratio of maximum to minimum
per capita transfer and its coefficient of variation. Table 3 indicate
inter provincial and intra provincial (inter district) deprivation and
disparity profile and per capita transfers and help us to evaluate
whether the fiscal transfer in last few years have reduced deprivation
and disparity both at inter provincial and intra provincial level.
This Table 3 shows at overall Pakistan level for 2003 the average
per capita transfer level among district was 855.9 and increased to
1349.4 in 2007 which implies the per capita transfer, on average, have
increased in the districts. The level of maximum value of transfer was
4476.36 increased to 5694.92 whereas the minimum value of transfer
decreased from 425.3 to 389.4. The ratio of maximum to minimum transfer
has increased from 10.51 to 14.62 and coefficient of variation of
transfer increased from 0.2989 to 0.3277.
This Table 3 also shows at overall Pakistan level for 2003 the
average deprived level among district was 64.51 but reduced to 58.45 in
2007 which implies the per capita transfer, on average, have reduced
deprivation in the districts. This Table further shows the level of
maximum deprived district which had value of 89.06 reduced to 82.76
whereas the minimum value of deprivation reduced from 24.59 to 20.59.
However, the Table 3 shows that these fiscal transfers fail to reduce
deprivation disparity, in fact, it has worsened it. The ratio of maximum
to minimum deprivation has increased from 3.62 to 3.95 and coefficient
of variation of deprivation increased from 0.123 to 0.131.
The analysis of per capita transfers and deprivation index for
overall Pakistan show very clear trends. The per capita transfer has
increased and average deprivation has decreased. The figures also show
the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer increased and consequently the
ratio of maximum to minimum deprivation has also increased. The figures
also indicate the movement in the coefficient of variations in the
transfers and the deprivation indices are in the same direction and
increasing.
As for as the province wise changes in the per capita transfer and
the deprivation levels are concerned, all four provinces also gives
similar trends. In Punjab which is the largest populated province, the
average deprivation level declined from 58.41 to 52.53 as a result of
increase in average per capita transfer from 635.65 to 1098.92. The
Punjab results show the extreme inequality in deprivation increases as
indicated by the increase in the ratio of maximum to minimum transfer
and maximum to minimum deprivation. However, the coefficient of
variation of both per capita transfer and deprivation has decreased over
time. This explains the inequality at average level has decreased over
time.
The least populated but area wise largest province, Balochistan,
show the average level deprivation has decreased from 73.16 to 69.20 as
a result of average increase in per capita transfer from 1275.21 to
1532.92. The results also show the reduction in deprivation inequality
but this can partially be explained by the ratio of maximum to minimum
transfers.
The average decline in deprivation in other two provinces Sindh and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from 62.03 to 54.95 and 66.17 to 58.43 respectively
can be explained by the average increase in transfers both in Sindh and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The extreme deprivation inequality in Sindh has
increased overtime and can be explained both by the increasing ratio of
maximum to minimum transfer. However, the inequality in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa did not change despite a very high increase in the ratio of
maximum to minimum transfer and coefficient of variation in the
transfers.
4. CONCLUSIONS
There are several results of the study based on several statistical
analyses. First, the analysis based on rank correlation shows in Punjab
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa over time the fiscal transfers are pro poor
districts, whereas in Balochistan the transfers over time become less
pro-poor districts and in Sindh it remained neutral. Second, there is
significant increase in per capita transfers in all districts of
Pakistan. These increases are due to increase in economic growth more
than 6 per cent GDP growth for the last few years and special
recognition of the devolution phenomenon in last several years. Third,
deprivation has decreased almost in all districts in last few years
because of significant increase in per capita transfers.
Fourth, the results of the study shows the deprivation inequalities
have not reduced as a result of increase in fiscal transfers. In fact,
in most of the cases, the deprivation inequalities have been increased.
One, because the per capita increase to the least deprived districts
equivalently the developed districts are much more than the per capita
increase to more deprived districts. Two, per unit cost of service
delivery is much higher in those districts which are very large in area
and in those districts where infrastructure is weak and perhaps these
aspects are ignored in the designing of transfers. Three, the own
revenues as percentage of transfers are much less in most deprived
districts compare to least deprived districts and the capability of
using available funds is also more in least deprived districts. Four,
the least deprived districts which are rich districts are also
politically very strong districts. They can also in position to attract
parallel funding from the higher level government and borrowing from the
foreign donors. Fifth, reason that can be given why the deprivation has
decreased but disparity did not, is the deliberate effort and perception
of the government to take steps to improve deprivation situation first
and then income distribution aspect will be taken into consideration.
Appendices
Table A1
Rank Correlation Data for Punjab
Rank Per Capita Rank
Transfers Deprivation
Districts 2003 2003
Attock 12 26
Bahawalnagar 5 11
Bahwalpur 25 9
Bhakkar 3 6
Chakwal 1 21
D.G. Khan 14 3
Faisalabad 33 30
Gujranwala 26 31
Gujrat 20 29
Hafizabad 2 20
Jhang 18 10
Jhelum 6 28
Kasur 28 19
Khanewal 22 12
Khushab 4 16
Lahore 34 34
Layyah 9 4
Lodhran 32 5
M.B.Din 21 23
Mianwali 11 13
Multan 31 22
Muzaffargarh 30 2
Narowal 8 24
Okara 24 15
Pakpattan 29 7
R.Y. Khan 10 8
Rajanpur 13 1
Rawalpindi 23 32
Sahiwal 15 17
Sargodha 16 18
Sheikhpura 27 25
Sialkot 19 33
T. T. Singh 17 27
Vehari 7 14
Rank Per Capita Rank
Transfers Deprivation
Districts 2007 2007
Attock 7 25
Bahawalnagar 10 15
Bahwalpur 23 8
Bhakkar 2 14
Chakwal 3 27
D.G. Khan 9 5
Faisalabad 29 29
Gujranwala 30 33
Gujrat 28 30
Hafizabad 16 19
Jhang 20 10
Jhelum 11 26
Kasur 25 21
Khanewal 19 11
Khushab 4 13
Lahore 32 34
Layyah 6 4
Lodhran 14 1
M.B.Din 22 23
Mianwali 5 16
Multan 27 20
Muzaffargarh 24 2
Narowal 8 22
Okara 1 12
Pakpattan 17 6
R.Y. Khan 26 7
Rajanpur 13 3
Rawalpindi 33 31
Sahiwal 18 18
Sargodha 12 17
Sheikhpura 34 28
Sialkot 31 32
T. T. Singh 15 24
Vehari 21 9
Table A2
Rank Correlation Data for Sindh
Rank Rank
Per Capita Rank Per Capita Rank
Transfers Deprivation Transfers Deprivation
Districts 2003 2003 2007 2007
Badin 9 3 12 5
Dadu 8 9 7 3
Ghotki 13 5 14 11
Hyderabad 10 15 4 14
Jacobabad 15 4 1 6
Karachi City 16 16 16 16
Khairpur 4 10 10 8
Larkana 12 13 11 4
Mirpurkhas 11 6 15 10
Nausheroferoze 6 12 3 12
Nawabshah 7 11 13 9
Sanghar 5 7 9 7
Shikarpur 2 8 6 13
Sukkur 1 14 2 15
Thar At Mithi 14 1 5 2
Thatta 3 2 8 1
Table A3
Rank Correlation Data for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Rank Rank
Per Capita Rank Per Capita Rank
Transfers Deprivation Transfers Deprivation
Districts 2003 2003 2007 2007
Abbottabad 6 22 22 10
Bannu 12 18 20 12
Battagram 10 3 2 13
Buner 19 5 6 15
Charsadda 23 14 11 14
Chitral 1 7 3 5
D.I.Khan 4 9 15 11
Hangu 15 6 9 3
Haripur 3 23 23 18
Karak 2 13 8 4
Kohat 5 19 16 21
Kohistan 16 l 1 8
Lakki Marwat 9 17 14 7
Lower Dir 11 10 17 22
Malakand Agency 8 15 12 9
Mansehra 13 12 10 20
Mardan 22 20 18 16
Nowshehra 14 21 21 6
Peshawar 24 24 24 23
Shangla 17 2 5 2
Swabi 20 16 19 24
Swat 18 11 13 17
Tank 7 8 7 1
Upper Dir 21 4 4 19
Table A4
Rank Correlation Data for Balochistan
Districts Rank Rank
Per Capita Rank Per capita Rank
Transfers Deprivation Transfers Deprivation
2003 2003 2007 2007
Awaran 9 3 9 2
Barkhan 5 8 5 11
Bolan 17 12 18 13
Chagai 24 14 24 10
Gwadar 16 20 16 18
Jafarabad 19 16 20 22
Jhal Magsi 6 5 6 7
Kalat 13 18 11 20
Kech(Turbat) 12 19 12 12
Kharan 7 2 22 3
Khuzdar 15 7 14 9
Killa Abdullah 23 11 23 8
Killa Saifullah 10 10 10 5
Lasbela 18 15 15 16
Loralai 8 17 8 17
Mastung 4 13 4 14
Musa Khail 20 1 17 1
Nasirabad 22 9 21 15
Panjgur 21 6 19 6
Pishin 3 22 3 23
Quetta 11 24 7 24
Sibi 2 21 2 19
Zhob 14 4 13 4
Ziarat 1 23 1 21
Comments
The authors have made a good attempt to examine whether there is
any link between the inter-governmental fiscal transfers and the
deprivation index in the districts of Pakistan. The authors have used
the data for this study which was collected from 98 districts of four
provinces of Pakistan for 2003 and 2007.
Although text is very well written but there are some repetitions.
At some place authors merely replaced the variable and used the same
sentence while presenting results of the next variable.
Secondly, I would like to comment that while presenting disparities
using different measures for deprivation and fiscal transfers in Table
3, authors have got contradictory results. For example, in Punjab
according to ratio of maximum/minimum, disparities in deprivation and
fiscal transfers have increased while according to coefficient of
variation disparity has declined. Similar is the case with Sindh and
Balochistan where both of these indicators gave contradictory results.
This is mainly because of the fact that coefficient of variation do
not satisfy the transfer-sensitivity property. The Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfer requires that whenever a unit of income is
transferred from a richer person to a poorer person and such a does not
reverse the ranking of two individuals, the inequality index should
decline. The Coefficient of Variation is more sensitive to upper part
than other part of the distribution and therefore it may give misleading
results. The well know Gini coefficient satisfy the principle of
transfer, sensitivity. It is, therefore, important to use Gini
coefficient to resolve this issue to some extent.
Thirdly, the authors results that the transfers have reduced
deprivation across the board but unable to solve disparity issue are in
line with the trends in reducing deprivation in term of absolute poverty
but increasing inequality. Finally, while authors have summarised the
result in conclusions, some policy recommendations should be given in
discussion.
Talat Anwar
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Programme Support
Unit,
Islamabad.
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Qazi Masood Ahmed <qmasood@iba.edu.pk> is Director Research,
Institute of Business Administration, Karachi. Akhtar Lodhi
<akhtar.lodhi@aerc.edu.pk> is Research Economist. Applied
Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi, Karachi.
Table 1
Rank Correlation between Deprivation Index and per Capita Grants
Rank Correlation
2003 2007
Punjab 0.1804 0.4133
Sindh -0.0882 0.0382
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa -0.0652 0.4287
Balochistan -0.2626 -0.36261
Table 2
Regression Equation Analysing the Stability of Deprivation Index
Punjab Sindh Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan
Constant 6.3592 1.34660 6.8723 6.5587
t-Values 2.6867 0.23243 1.4253 1.2761
BETA 0.7905 0.86409 0.7792 0.8562
t-Values 19.7614 9.39948 10.7573 12.2657
R-Squire 0.9243 0.86321 0.8403 0.8724
Observations 34 16 24 24
Pakistan
Constant 0.0232
t-Values 0.0112
BETA 0.9057
t-Values 28.6506
R-Squire 0.8953
Observations 98
Table 3
Disparities in Province-wise Deprivation and Fiscal Transfers
Deprivation Deprivation
Index Index
Province 2003 2007
Punjab Max 74.78 64.91
Min 34.34 29.22
Ave 58.41 52.53
Std. dev. 9.62 7.91
Ratio max/min 2.18 2.22
Coeff. of Variation 0.16 0.15
Sindh Max 75.44 65.34
Min 24.59 20.94
Ave 62.03 54.95
Std. dev. 11.51 10.71
Ratio Max/Min 3.07 3.12
Coeff. of Variation 0.19 0.19
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Max 82.96 71.72
Min 50.78 44.24
Ave 66.17 58.43
Std. dev. 7.38 6.27
Ratio max/min 1.63 1.62
Coeff. of Variation 0.11 0.11
Balochistan Max 89.06 82.76
Min 46.00 45.99
Ave 73.16 69.20
Std. dev. 8.52 7.81
Ratio Max/Min 1.94 1.80
Coeff. of Variation 0.12 0.11
Pakistan Max 89.06 82.76
(Overall) Min 24.59 20.94
Ave 64.51 58.45
Std. Dev. 7.95 7.66
Ratio Max/Min 3.62 3.95
Coeff. of Variation 0.12 0.13
Per Capita Per Capita
Transfers Transfers
Province 2003 2007
Punjab Max 966.71 1653.29
Min 425.87 638.85
Ave 635.65 1098.92
Std. dev. 130.12 189.21
Ratio max/min 2.27 2.59
Coeff. of Variation 0.20 0.17
Sindh Max 1060.88 1728.83
Min 459.90 669.43
Ave 772.04 1390.12
Std. dev. 146.40 260.30
Ratio Max/Min 2.31 2.58
Coeff. of Variation 0.19 0.19
Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Max 1227.56 5431.50
Min 619.94 389.44
Ave 796.72 1493.76
Std. dev. 151.88 1232.37
Ratio max/min 1.98 13.95
Coeff. of Variation 0.19 0.83
Balochistan Max 4476.36 5694.92
Min 444.66 634.87
Ave 1275.21 1532.92
Std. dev. 798.41 1012.41
Ratio Max/Min 10.07 8.97
Coeff. of Variation 0.63 0.66
Pakistan Max 4476.36 5694.92
(Overall) Min 425.87 389.44
Ave 853.99 1349.44
Std. Dev. 255.27 442.25
Ratio Max/Min 10.51 14.62
Coeff. of Variation 0.30 0.33
