External financial resource management by listed Pakistani firms.
Javid, Attiya Y. ; Iqbal, Robina
The purpose of this study is to assess the ability of firms to
raise external finance through equity, when the firms have different
characteristics, have adopted different levels of corporate governance,
and are doing business in a weak legal environment. Our empirical
analyses also identify the determinants of corporate governance practice
and corporate valuation. To investigate these issues, we use firm-level
data of 50 corporations listed on Karachi Stock Exchange for the period
2002 to 2007. The results reveal that the firms that need more equity
financing practise good governance. The firm-specific factors (size,
investment opportunities) matter more in influencing the need of
external financing when the legal environment is less investor-friendly.
Good investment opportunities and large size provide greater incentive
to improve governance practices among firms in Pakistan. The positive
association of the corporate governance index and disclosure scores with
firm performance suggests that even the firms with poor legal
environment can enjoy high valuation if they adopt good governance and
disclosure practices. Ownership concentration appeared to be a more
important tool to resolve agency conflict between controlling and
minority shareholders in the case of Pakistan, where investor protection
is weak. These findings suggest that pro-growth policies generate more
profitable investment opportunities and stimulate the external financing
needs of the corporations.
JEL classification: E50, G21, G24, G32
Keywords: External Finance, Corporate Governance, Disclosure and
Transparency, Ownership Concentration, Tobin Q, Firm Size, Leverage,
Rule of Law, Investment Opportunities
1. INTRODUCTION
Enterprises need finance for investment and acquire it either by
internally generated finance or externally generated finance, which are
closely related to the ownership structure, financial market development
and enforcement of law of a country. In underdeveloped companies with
foreign owners have an advantage in their access to external finance as
compare to domestically owned companies because their financial
resources coming from abroad.
Access to external finance is a key determinant of a firm's
ability to develop, operate, and expand. Economic researchers have
studied how various macroeconomic and microeconomic factors influence
such access; for example, it has been shown that the need of external
finance to depend on the macroeconomic environment, since economic
downturns tend to limit firms' ability to borrow and banks'
willingness to lend. This "credit channel" research argues
that corporate access to credit is the principal mechanism linking
monetary policy and the real economy. At the micro level, research has
shown that characteristics specific to a firm influence the degree to
which macroeconomic changes affect its access to external financing;
specifically, firms that are more vulnerable financially--such as
smaller, younger, riskier, and more indebted firms--are found to be more
affected by tighter monetary policy.
This is conformed by empirical evidence that firms with high
dependence on external finance grow faster in countries where external
finance is readily available. Corporations with limited access to
external resources may still operate in the informal sector and at a
reduced scale in under developed countries [Rajan and Zingler (1998);
Livine and Zervos (1998)]. The question remained unanswered what
determines the cross-firm differences in investor access to finance for
investment especially in emerging markets like Pakistan.
"When laws are protective of outside investors and well
enforced, investors are willing to finance firms, and financial markets
are both broader and more valuable. In contrast, where laws are
un-protective of investors, the development of financial markets is
stunted. When their rights are better protected by the law, outside
investors are willing to pay more for financial assets such as equity
and debt. In turn, this enables entrepreneurs to finance their
investments externally, leading to the expansion of financial
markets" [La Porta, et al. (1999)].
Many studies show that to promote economic growth attention has
shifted to the capital markets due to the limited conventional sources
of raising finance. In capital markets, corporate governance plays
important role in determining external financing sources provided by
outside investors. Corporate governance institutions appear to be weaker
in developing than in developed countries and thus provide less of a
check on managers in developing countries who wish to issue equity to
finance low return investments. Managers who wish to undertake low
return investments in countries with strong corporate governance systems
accordingly prefer to rely on internal cash flows to finance these
investments, managers making similar investments in countries with weak
corporate governance systems are freer to use the equity market as a
source of finance. Thus, differences in corporate governance structures
will be seen to explain both differences in the sources of finance for
investment across countries and differences in the returns on investment
[Gompers, et al. (2003)]. Corporate governance has recently received
much attention for this purpose we also investigate the impact of
ownership concentration, and investment opportunities on corporate
governance practices and show how important is the firm level corporate
governance practices for corporate valuation and access to external
finance.
Our empirical analyses identify not only the determinants of
external finance resources, but also shows how law influence external
financing, corporate governance practice and corporate valuation. To
investigate all we use firm level data of 50 corporations listed on
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). We use Tobin's Q to measure corporate
valuation. To establish the empirical framework on the basis of theory
that better legal environment of a country is associated with higher
valuation of corporate assets, good corporate governance practice, and
financial development, we use the rule of law as indicator of
enforcement of law in Pakistan. To understand the effects of ownership,
we focus only on the concentration of ownership in the hand of top three
shareholders because our this restriction is in line with the previous
literature that reveal the fact that in countries with poor legal
environment, it" is efficient for the corporations to retain
control of their firms in hand of few investors. (1)
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 of
the paper presents review of the literature. Section 3 describes the
data and Methodology. Section 4 presents empirical finding. Section 5
concludes.
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Evidence from the previous literature shows that financial market
underdevelopment and limited availability of bank credit is serious
barrier for the establishment of new enterprises and constraint to
economics growth. (2) Recent literature on law and finance shows that
investor protection plays an important role in shaping the financial
structure of an economy, by affecting the relative importance of equity
and debt financing.
Gonzalez, Lopez, and Saurina (2007) examine access by Spanish firms
to external financing from bank and non-bank sources over the period
from 1992 to 2002 and their results provide insights into the
determinants of firms' borrowing efforts in Spain and more broadly.
For example, they find that Spanish firms are quite dependent on
short-term, non-bank financing, which is less sensitive to firm
characteristics than bank financing. Yet, short-term bank financing is
accessed more frequently during economic expansions, suggesting that
firms substitute away from more expensive forms of non-bank financing as
their conditions improve. The authors confirm that smaller, younger,
riskier, and more indebted firms rely more on external credit than on
internal financing, such as retained earnings and other equity, and they
expand these results by showing that the nature of firms' banking
relationships, such as the number of banks borrowed from and whether
collateral is required for the loans, also influences access to external
finance.
In Hyytinen and Pajarinen (2005) study the relation between
firm-level disclosure quality and the availability of external finance
to Finnish firms. They estimate excess growth is made possible by
external finance and the excess growth is associated with the quality of
disclosure which seems to be strongest for financially constrained firms. Their empirical analysis identify the firms in need for external
finance voluntarily look for good disclosure quality, because it reduces
barriers to external finance.
Durnev and Kim (2003) in their paper using firm-level governance
and transparency data on 859 firms in 27 countries, find that firms with
greater growth opportunities, greater needs for external financing, and
more concentrated cash flow rights practice higher-quality governance
and disclose more. Moreover, firms that score higher in governance and
transparency rankings are valued higher in the stock market. Equally
important, all these relations are stronger in countries that are less
investor friendly, demonstrating that firms do adapt to poor legal
environments to establish efficient governance practices.
The findings of La Porta, et al. (1997, 1998) show that weak
investor protection limits excess to external finance. While De Soto (2000) suggests that poor legal enforcement of corporate laws and
unclear property rights limit individuals' ability to commit
contracts and thus their excess to external resources. Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) argue that better transparency and disclosure of
information to the shareholders, and the enforcement of laws that
protect their rights, reduce the costs of external finance. Perotti and
Volpin (2007) provide evidence that better investor protection not only
favor competition and entry into the financial developed sector, it is
also better for the politically accountable countries. The study also
suggests that improving formal investor protection laws while ignoring
its enforcement may not improve access to finance.
In view of Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) financial
liberalisations are most successful in countries with good political
institutions. Bebchuk and Neeman (2006) provide evidence that
block-holders by using corporate resources protect their control
benefits and may undermine good corporate governance. La Porta, et al.
(1997, 1998a) in their study conclude that differences in the structure
of laws and quality of their enforcement, such as legal origin of their
laws, play important role for the differences in financial development
among different countries. Empirical results of Beck and Levins (2005)
also show that legal origin (3) has very significant impact on
firm's abilities to raise to external finance. Their data indicate
that firms in French Legal Countries face higher obstacles in
contracting for external finance than firms in other countries. Firms in
countries with common law face lower financial obstacle than firms in
civil law countries. Moreover their result also indicate that
foreign-owned firms and large firms face lower financing obstacles than
domestic, or small firm, whereas family owned firms particularly face
high obstacle in raising external finance. Countries with high GDP face
lower obstacle in raising external finance than countries with lower
GDP.
This paper is one of the first attempts to study that firms with
greater growth opportunities, greater needs for external financing
practice higher-quality governance and disclose more. Moreover, firms
that score higher in governance and transparency rankings are valued
higher in the stock market.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
3.1. Data
To asses determinant of external recourses, corporate governance
and firm valuation at firm level, we use data of 50 firms listed at
Karachi Stock Exchange. (4) The data set is obtained from the annual
reports of these firms for the year 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. (5)
Data on rule of law has been taken from World Bank governance
indicators. The ranking of rule of law as ranging from 0 to 1 for
Pakistan is 0.34 as average of five years. That indicates very poor
legal environment for Pakistan in term of enforcement of law. (6)
We do not have any direct measure of external finance. Followed by
La Porta, et al. (1998) we used ratio of the stock market capitalisation held by minorities to sales in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 for all
50 non-financial firms. Firm X stock market capitalisation held by
minorities is computed as the product of the stock market capitalisation
of firm X and the average percentage of common shares not owned by the
top three shareholders of firm X.
The corporate governance index and disclosure and transparency
index are used which are developed by the authors kin their study [Javid
and Robina (2006)]. In order to construct corporate governance index for
the firms listed on KSE, a broad, multifactor corporate governance
rating is done which is based on the data obtained from the annual
reports of the firms submitted to SECP. The index construction is as
follows: for every firm, there are 22 governance proxies or indicators
are selected, these indicators are categorised into three main themes.
The three categories or sub-indices consist of: eight factors for the
Board, seven for ownership, shareholdings and seven for transparency,
disclosure and audit.
The weighting is in the construction of index is based on
subjective judgments. The assigned priorities amongst and within each
category is guided by empirical literature and financial experts in this
area. The maximum score is 100, then, a score of 100 is assigned if
factor is observed, 80 if largely observed, 50 for partially observed
and 0 if it is not observed. The average is taken out and we arrive at
the rating of one sub-index. (7) By taking the average of three
sub-indices we obtain CGI for a particular firm.
3.2. Methodological Framework
The purpose is to assess the ability of firms to raise external
finance through equity, when they have different characteristics (size,
investment opportunities, ownership concentration), having adopted
different level of corporate governance and doing business in poor legal
environment. (8) We examine whether variation in firm-specific need of
external finance is associated with level of corporate governance and
legal environment is associated with differences in firm value across
the firms. For a given level of profitable investment opportunities,
firms with greater need of external financing practice high quality
governance [Durnev and Kim (2003); Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The
contrary evidence comes from the study by Demirgue-Kunt and Maksimovie
(1998) which argues that profitable firms have more internally generated
funds and hence rely less on internal financing. To analyse that firm
with more need of external financing practice better governance, we used
scores of Corporate Governance Index and scores of disclosure and
transparency as independent variable. It is expected that there is
positive relation between external financing needs and quality of
corporate governance. Further, in countries with weak legal regimes
firms have difficulty in raising external finance due to investors'
lack of trust in legal protection of their rights [La Porta, et al.
(1998)]. In this study we analyse the significance of rule of law as
determinant of external financing. Since we are assessing influence of
legal environment across the firm, therefore we introduced this variable
in interaction terms.
To deal with problem that firm specific factors can jointly affect
the need of external finance, corporate governance quality of the firm
and firm performance and thus induce spurious correlation between them.
Therefore we introduce set of control variables: investment
opportunities by the firm, firm size, leverage and concentration of
ownership. Therefore first we test the following hypothesis:
HI: Firms which are in need of greater external finance practice
higher level of corporate governance.
To test this hypothesis we form the following model following La
Porta, et al. (1997) and Pistor, et al. (2000):
[EF.sub.i] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][CGI.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.2][Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.3]Size +
[[beta].sub.4][Lw.sub.i] x [CGI.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.it] (1)
Where [Ef.sub.t] is external finance that is calculated by
multiplying market capitalisation of each firm with percentage of shares
that are not taken by the top five shareholders of each firm,
[CGI.sub.i] is a vector of corporate governance index measured by Javid
and Robina (2006), [Inv.sub.i] is investment opportunities measured by
the past growth in sales, [Lw.sub.i] is rule of law that is used for the
proxy of enforcement of law, and [Size.sub.i] is measured by the log of
total asset. [[epsilon].sub.i] is random error term.
H2: Firms with good corporate governance are valued higher.
[Q.sub.i] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][CGI.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.2][Exf.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.3][Own.sub.t] +
[[beta].sub.4][Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][Size.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.6][L.sub.wi] x CGI + [[epsilon].sub.it] (2)
Where [Q.sub.i] is Tobin's Q measured by market value of
common equity plus book value of long term debt divided by book value of
total assets and other variables are same as defined for model (1). It
is expected that firms with better investment opportunities, better
corporate governance practices should have higher valuation.
H3: The quality of corporate governance is positively related to
growth in investment opportunities, and negatively to concentration of
ownership.
Our empirical model takes the following form following Dunev and
Kim (2003) and others:
[CGI.sub.i] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][Exf.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.2][Own.sub.t] + [[beta].sub.4][Sizw.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.4][Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][Lev.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.6][L.sub.wi] x [Own.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][Lw.sub.i] *
[Exf.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.it]
The variables used in model (3) are same as we defined for model
(1). In estimating model (1), (2) and (3) an important issue is
endogenity [Black, et al. (2003) and Durnev and Kim (2003)]. A growing
firm with large need of external financing has more incentive to adopt
better governance practices in an attempt to lower cost of capital
[Klapper and Love (2002) and Gompers, et al. (2003)]. These growth
opportunities are reflected in the valuation of the firm, implying a
positive association between governance and firm performance. The firms
with more need of external finance would be more likely to choose better
governance structure because firm's insiders believe that better
governance structure will further raise firm value they adopt good
governance to signal that insider behave well and they can easily excess
to external finances. This endogenity problem in estimation is resolved
by applying Generalised Method of Moments as estimation technique.
In model (1), we regress external finance on CGI scores and control
variables (investment opportunities and size) and interaction of rule of
law with CGI scores 3and with growth of investment opportunities.
[Durnev and Kim (2003)]. We have estimated in model (2) that how the
firm's performance estimated by Tobin Q is influenced by need of
external finance, corporate governance indices and other control
variables [Kaplan and Zingales' (1997); Black, et al. (2002) and
Klein, et al. (2005)]. The model (3) develops the linkage between
corporate governance and ownership concentration, quality of enforcement
of law and other firm specific variables and interaction terms [Durnev
and Kim (2003)]. In the set of control variables which include size
(natural logarithm of assets) and investment opportunities (average sale
growth) are used in estimation. Firm size and growth control for
potential advantages of scale and scope, market power and market
opportunities. The leverage (long term debt/total assets) controls for
different risk characteristics of firm. Ownership concentration is
expected to improve investor protection. In some firms the entrepreneur founders who used their own resources and retained earning to finance
their firms and have significant ownership stakes in the listed firms,
we address this issue by using ownership concentration by top five
largest shareholders.
Our models are estimated on the data of 50 firms for the year 2002
to 2007 using panel data estimation technique. This estimation technique
is adopted to cope with presence of endogeniety in governance variables
[Black, et al. 2002) and Durnev and Kim (2003)]. A firm with foreign
investment is assumed to be adopting good governance practice and has
likely to have more access to external finance. In the same way the
block holding firm (9) is associated with more monitoring and more
familiar with good governance practices and have easier to get external
finance. The longer the period of listing, the more chances of investors
to familiar with investment strategy of firm and less likely chances of
information asymmetry and this limit the ability of firm to impose poor
practice and more likely chances of getting cheap finance. The
difference in profit earning opportunities is associated with difference
in value of the firms, more profit earning firms need access to capital
markets to raise new capital and find it optimal to improve their
governance practices.
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
To investigate whether differences in the quality of firm level
corporate governance also help to explain firm level financial needs in
a cross-section of companies we regress external financing need on index
of corporate governance (CGI) and control variables. The results
indicate that there is positive association between need of equity
financing and quality of corporate governance taken as aggregate
corporate governance index and also with board composition and
transparency and disclosure scores of these firms. This suggests that
firms which need more equity financing practice good governance and they
are more transparent. The sub-index shareholdings and ownership is
negatively associated with need of external financing indicating that
the firms which have more concentrated shareholdings they depend less on
external financing Thus with good corporate governance standards in
place, it is ultimately the financial market which rewards good
governance practices and punishes bad governance. The interaction term
of law with corporate governance have no significant impact. The
investment opportunities are positively related to external finance and
suggest that firms with high growth are in more need of external
finance. Its interaction term with law has also positive influence on
external financing requirements across firms. These results suggest
legal environment matters in case when they firms rely more on external
financing sources. The firm specific factors matters more in influencing
the need of external financing when the legal environment is less
investor friendly.
To investigate the relation between firm value and corporate
governance, Tobin's Q is regressed on corporate governance and firm
attributes: investment opportunities, size, and concentration of
ownership and need of external finance. Due to multicolinearity in the
variables: need of external financing and ownership concentration we run
two separate regressions using these two variables as explanatory variables. Positive and significant coefficient of CGI reveals the fact
that firms with higher-quality corporate governance are valued higher.
When we regress Tobin's Q on sub-indices of corporate governance,
we find positive and significant results for Board and Disclosure but
positive and insignificant for Shareholder Rights. In general the
ownership and shareholders rights that align the managers and
shareholders interest are significantly valued by investors. This is
also true for board composition and independence index. Both sub-indices
board and disclosures have positive association with firm performance.
These results are consistent with agency theory which focuses on
monitoring of managers whose interests are assumed to diverge from those
of other share holders.
However the assumptions of agency theory are not applied to block
holder owned firms. Most of the firms listed on KSE are family owned or
institution owned. In these firms the alignment of ownership and control
is tight and thus suggesting the need of outside directors on the board.
Interaction term for need of external finance with law has the expected
positive sign for Pakistan with poor legal environment. This result is
consisted with notion that positive relationship between need of
external finance and the firm valuation is stronger in weak legal
regime. The study by Dernev and Kim (2003) also conclude that high class
corporate governance is valued higher in case of US market. The
concentration of ownership has positive impact on the firm performance.
The interaction term of rule of law with ownership concentration is
negative and significant suggesting that with less legal protection
investor chose to invest out of internal sources and results in more
concentration of ownership. This results validated La Porta (2002)
hypothesis the concentration of ownership is response of weak legal
environment.
Investment opportunities have positive and significant impact on
corporate valuation measured by the Tobin's Q all specifications.
Our results confirm our predictions that firms with better investment
opportunities have higher valuation. The coefficient of size is positive
and significant in most of the cases. This shows that the listed firms
that are likely to grow faster usually have more intangible assets and
they adopt better corporate governance practices. The result of
interaction term of rule of law with corporate governance does not have
any significant impact on the valuation of the firm. These results
indicate that legal framework is not providing relevant information
regarding firm valuation in case of Pakistan.
However, these findings are consistent to some extent with the
notion that positive relationship is between governance and valuation is
stronger in weak legal regimes [La Porta, et al. (1997)]. This explains
the reason of mixed relation between firm valuation and corporate
governance in US firms which are subject to strongest legal framework
worldwide. [La Porta, et al. (1998) and Dunev and Kim (2003)].
We regress individual firm corporate governance score on need of
external finance, ownership concentration, capital structure investment
opportunities, size and interaction term of rule of law with need of
external finance and ownership concentration. The need of external
finance by the firms have positive impact both CGI and Disclosure
scores. This confirms the theoretical notion that firms which rely more
on external equity sources for their expansion they perform better
corporate governance practices and disclose more. The interaction terms
of legal regime with external finance show negative and significant
relationship with CGI and Disclosure scores which suggests that in legal
environment which is less investor friendly pushes the firms to adopt
better corporate governance practices and become more transparent.
Ownership structure shows negative and significant relationship
with CGI and Disclosure scores. When an interaction term of ownership
concentration with rule of law is included we also find negative and
significant impact of legal environment. This suggests that weakness of
investment protection and absence of corporate control firms rely on
governance structure that is dominated by high concentration of
ownership.
The firm with concentrated ownership there is no reason to expect
firms to disclose more. The inclusion of disclosure and transparency
scores and other attributes are included in CGI scores also and they are
not directly related to agency problem. In addition, this result
indicates that positive relationship between corporate governance and
ownership concentration is strong with weak legal regime. The Dunev and
Kim (2003) have come up with same finding in case of US market.
The coefficient of leverage is positive and significant, which is
consistent with the prediction of standard theory of capital structure
which says that high levered firm adopt better practices and the higher
leverage increase firm's value [Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The
positive sign of the coefficient of size shows that large firms show
better governance. Investment opportunities have positive impact both
CGI and Disclosure scores. This confirms the theoretical notion that
firms with better investment opportunities perform better corporate
governance practices and are transparent.
5. CONCLUSION
Economic researchers have studied how various microeconomic and
macroeconomic factors influence access to external finance widely for
the developed markets but very little work has been done on how factors
effect access to external finance in case of emerging markets. In this
study we fill this gap by analysing an important issue of our times that
firms that practice good governance and better disclosures are one who
raise external finance and are growing faster for the Karachi Stock
Market. To address this issue empirically we estimated three models.
First, we investigate that the firms with greater needs for external
financing practice higher-quality governance and disclose more. Second,
firms that score higher in governance and transparency rankings are
valued higher in the stock market. Third, the quality of corporate
governance is positively related to growth in investment opportunities,
and negatively concentration of ownership. Our sample firm consists of
50 firms which are active, representative of all non-financial sectors
and comprises more than 80 percent of market capitalisation at Karachi
stock market. The period covered is 2002 to 2007 because SECP has
announced the Corporate Governance Ordinance 2002 and panel data
estimation technique is used for analysis.
In this study, we presented a simple model of determinants of
external finance. Our result shows that the strength of corporate
governance systems affects the external financing needs of corporations.
This suggests that firms which need more equity financing practice good
governance. Thus with good corporate governance standards in place, it
is ultimately the financial market which rewards good governance
practices and punishes bad governance. The results show that firms with
high growth and large in size are in more need of external finance. Our
results also generally confirm the crucial prediction of the theory that
positive relationship between corporate governance and valuation is
strong in weak legal regime countries like Pakistan. Thus legal
protection is essential for effective corporate governance. One
implication that comes out from these findings that pro-growth polices
generate more profitable investment opportunities and stimulate the
external financing needs of the corporations Our results adds an
important link to the explanation of the consequences weak legal
environment for financial market development, external financing,
corporate valuation and corporate governance.
Authors' Note: The authors wish to thank Dr Zafar Iqbal and Mr
Tariq Mahmood for their valuable comments. Any remaining errors and
omissions are the authors' own responsibility.
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(1) See Jensen-Meckling (1976), Zingales (1995) and Bebchuk (1999).
(2) Rajan and Zingales (1998), Levine, Ross (1999), Cetorelli and
Philip (2006), De Soto (2000), Beck, Levine, and Loyaza (2000), Black
and Strahan (2002), Beck, Demirguk-Kunt, and Levine (1999).
(3) La Porta, et al. (1998) identify mainly two legal families
around the world, common law origin and civil law origin.
(4) List of companies is provided in Appendix Table A 1.
(5) The list of variable and set of instruments is given in
Appendix Table A2.
(6) Although as Pakistan belongs to common law countries legal
origin. In view of La Porta, et al. (1997) common law countries provide
strong investor protection in term of law on books. The ranking of rule
of law indicate the fact that enforcement of law is very low against
high ranking on law on books.
(7) Sub-Index include (i) Board composition index, (ii) The
ownership and shareholdings Index, (iii) Disclosure and Transparency.
(8) As indicated by the ranking of rule of law by World Bank.
(9) Block holder is defined by any investors having shareholdings
of more than 10 percent.
Attiya Y. Javid <attiyajavid@gmail.com> is Senior Research
Economist at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Robina Iqbal <robinaiqbal@gmail.com> is a freelance researcher
based in London, UK.
Table 1
Evidence on Determinants of External Financing
Dependent Variable is EXF
Independent
Variables 1 2 3 4
CGI 0.38 *
(12.91)
Disc 0.62 *
(3.87)
Board 0.25 *
(7.63)
Shareholders
Rights -0.12
(-7.11)
Inv 0.004 * 0.01 ** 0.001 * 0.001
(6.00) (5.51) (5.41) (13.38)
Size -1.76 * -4.68 * -4.18 * -2.82 *
(4.29) (-3.89) (-9.61) (-30.64)
Lw*CGI 0.63 0.08 * 0.58 * 0.85
(8.14) (0.17) (5.95) (16.24)
Constant -4.84 16.89 5.84 31.88
(-4.71) (8.62) (5.00) (17.61)
[R.sup.2] 0.68 0.31 0.31 0.44
The table reports the determinants of external finance
estimated by Generalised Method of Moment:
[EF.sub.i] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][CGI.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.2]
[Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.3]Size + [[beta].sub.4][Lw.sub.i] x
[CGI.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.it]
[EF.sub.i] is external finance that is calculated by multiplying
market capitalisation of each firm with percentage of shares that
are not taken by the top three shareholders of each firm.
[CGI.sub.i] is corporate governance index measured by Javid and Robina
(2006), [Inv.sub.i] is investment opportunities measured by the past
growth in sales, [lw.sub.i] is rule of law that is used for the proxy
of enforcement of law, and [Size.sub.i] is measured by the log of
total asset.
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent,
5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values in parenthesis
are t-statistics.
Table 2
Evidence on Firm Performance and Corporate Governance
Dependent Variable is Tobin Q
Independent Variables
CGI 0.005 *
(6.54)
Board 0.005 *
(4.71)
SR 0.01 *
(7.53)
DIS 0.01 *
(2.41)
EXF 0.004 * 0.004 0.001 * 0.001
(8.76) (10.81) (3.15) (3.10)
Own
INV 0.001 0.33 * 0.36 * 0.22 *
(O.16) (5.83) (4.43) (3.10)
SIZE 0.07 * 0.03 * 0.05 * 0.03 *
(4.86) -4.08 (3.11) (3.69)
LAW x CGI 0.002 -0.001 0.01 0.001
(0.10) (-0.11) (0.06) (0.68)
Constant 0.90 0.62 0.43 0.44
(6.04) -6.24 (9.96) (9.96)
[R.sup.2] 0.59 0.61 0.47 0.45
Independent
Variables
CGI 0.00 *
(5.43)
Board 0.01 *
(4.71)
SR 0.003 *
(6.47)
DIS 0.01 **
(3.66)
EXF
Own -0.20 * -0.09 * -0.23 * -0.02 *
(-3.67) (-6.43) (-2.57) (12.45)
INV 0.001 0.002 * 0.01 0.001 *
(0.30) (2.26) (0.64) (2.67)
SIZE 0.06 * 0.04 * 0.05 ** 0.05 *
(5.84) (3.15) (5.68) (3.87)
LAW x CGI 0.002 -0.02 * 0.001 0.003
(0.13) (-2.55) (O.14) (0.34)
Constant 1.87 1.32 2.21 0.53
(7.12) -4.87 (2.39) (5.89)
[R.sup.2] 0.59 0.61 0.47 0.45
The table reports the results of relationship between firm
valuation and corporate governance estimated by Generalised
Method of Moment:
[Q.sub.1] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][CGI.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.2][Exf.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.3][Own.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.4][Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][Size.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.6][Lw.sub.i] x CGI + [[epsilon].sub.it]
[Q.sub.1]; is Tobins'Q measured by market value of common
equity plus book value of long term debt divided by book
value of total assets.
[CGI.sub.i] is corporate governance index,
[Own.sub.1] is ownership concentration with top five
shareholders
[Inv.sub.1] is investment opportunities as measured by the
past growth in sale,
[Lw.sub.1] is rule of law,
[Size.sub.1] is measured by the log of total asset, and Lev
is leverage measured by book value of long term debt divided
by book value of total asset.
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1
percent, 5 percent 10 percent respectively. Values percent,
5 percent, and in parenthesis are t-statistics.
Table 3
Evidence on Determinants of Corporate Governance
Dependent Variables is Disclosures
Exf 0.12 *
(4.29)
Own -3.53 * -3.43 *
(-3.32) (-2.27)
Inv 0.001 ** 0.002 * 0.001
(1.50) (2.48) (0.63)
SIZE 0.92 * 0.94 * 0.29 **
(3.14) (3.16) (1.92)
Lev 0.40 *
(19.70)
LAW x Exf -0.10 ***
(-1.22)
LAW x Own 0.14 0.57 *
(0.52) (2.72)
Constant 5.93 0.48 7.49
(2.58) (1.27) (7.79)
R2 0.47 0.31 0.47
Dependent Variable is CGI
Exf 0.10 *
(2.15)
Own -3.32 * -3.52 *
(-4.52) (-3.93)
Inv 0.37 * 0.001 * 0.001 *
(3.11) (2.47) (2.06)
SIZE 0.20 * 0.10 * 0.05 *
(2.93) (2.46) (7.79)
Lev 0.02 *
(2.48)
LAW x Exf -0.04
(-2.58)
LAW x Own -1.02 * -0.48 **
(-4.76) (-1.85)
Constant 5.79 7.45 7.43
(6.30) (2.29) (7.14)
R2 0.27 0.3 0.27
The table reports the relationship between corporate governance,
ownership concentration and investment opportunities estimated by
Generalised Method of Moment:
[CGI.sub.i] = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1][Exf.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.2][Own.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.3][Size.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.4][Inv.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.5][Lev.sub.i] +
[[beta].sub.6][Lw.sub.i] x [Own.sub.i] + [[beta].sub.7][Lw.sub.i] +
[Exf.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.it]
[CGI.sub.i] is a vector of governance index.
[Exf.sub.i] is external finance that is calculated by multiplying
market capitalisation of each firm with percentage of shares that are
not taken by the top three shareholders of each firm.
[Lw.sub.i] is defined as rule of law capturing the enforcement quality
of legal regime.
[Inv.sub.i] is investment opportunities measured by the past growth in
sale.
[Size.sub.i] is measured by the log of total asset, and Lev is
leverage measured by book value of long term debt divided by book
value of total asset
[Own.sub.i] is ownership concentration by the firms and calculated as
percentage shareholdings by top three shareholders. Size is measured
by the log of total asset.
[Lev.sub.i] is leverage defined as book value of long term debt
divided by book value of total assets
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1 percent,
5 percent, and 10 percent respectively. Values in parenthesis are
t-statistics
Table A1
List of Companies
Companies Symbols
(1) Aruj Garments ARUJG
(2) Honda Atlas HONDAA
(3) Engro Chemical ENGRO
(4) Unilever Pakistan UNIP
(5) Pakistan Gum and Chemicals Ltd PAKGUM
(6) Abbot Pakistan ABBOT
(7) Sakrand Sugar Mills SAKSM
(8) Pakistan Hotel Development Ltd PAKH
(9) Bata Pakistan BATA
(10) Pakistan Petroleum Ltd PPL
(11) Oil and Gas development Corp Ltd OGDC
(12) Agriauto Industries Ltd AGRI
(13) Pakistan PVC Ltd PAKPVC
(14) Pakistan Papaersack Corporation PAKPAPC
(15) Mandviwalla Mauser MANDM
(16) Shahtaj Sugar Mills SHAHT
(17) S.G. Fibre Ltd SGFL
(18) Mirza Sugar Mills MIRGAS
(19) Emco Industries Ltd EMCOI
(20) Metropolitan Steel METRO
(21) Moonlite (Pak) MOONLITE
(22) Merit Packing Ltd MERITP
(23) Pakistan Services PAKS
(24) ICI Pakistan ICIPAK
(25) Suzuki Motorcycles SUZM
(26) Mohammad Farooq Textiles MOHFT
(27) Paramount Spinning Mills PSM
(28) Azam Textiles AZAM
(29) Dar Es Salaam DARES
(30) Sindh Abadgars SINDHA
(31) Ellcot Spinning Mills ELLCOTS
(32) Ayesha Textile AYSHAT
(33) Brother Textiles Ltd BROTHERT
(34) Mitchell's Fruit MITCH
(35) Indus Polyester Company INDUSP
(36) Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills MIRS
(37) Nestle Pakistan NESTLE
(38) Din Motors DINM
(39) Indus Motors INDUSM
(40) Maple Leaf Cement MAPLEL
(41) National Refinery NATR
(42) Pakistan Tobacco PAKTAB
(43) Dawood Hercules DAWOODH
(44) Sui Northern SUIN
(45) Fuji Fertiliser FFC
(46) Fuji Bin Quasim FBQ
(47) PTCL PTCL
(48) Ferozsons Ltd FERL
(49) Southern Electric SOUTE
(50) Japan Powers JAPP
Table A2
Description of Variables
Variable Symbol Definition
External Equity EXF Market capitalisation of each firm
Finance multiply with percentage of shares that
are not taken by the top five
shareholders. Source: Market
capitalisation from Business Recorder's
website (www.brccorder.com.pk),
percentage of shares are not held by top
five shareholders is obtained from
annual reports of corporation.
Firm Value Q Tobin Q defined as sum of the book value
of long term debt and market value of
the equity divided by the book value of
the total asset. Source: Annual Reports
of Corporations.
Investment Inv Average Sales Growth. Source: Annual
Opportunities Reports of Corporations
Corporate CGI Score of Corporate Governance Index.
Governance Source: Javid and Robina (2006).
Disclosure Dis Disclosure and Transparency Scores.
Source: Javid and Robina (2006).
Ownership Own Percentage of share ownership of first
Concentration five largest shareholders. Source:
Annual Reports of Corporations.
Size of the Firm Size Ln(Assets). Source: Annual Reports of
Corporations.
Law Lw Rule of law. Source World Bank.
Leverage Lev Book value of Long term Debt/Book value
of total asset. Source: Annual Reports
of Corporations.