Governance and pro-poor growth: evidence from Pakistan.
Haq, Rashida ; Zia, Uzma
1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of governance has gained importance over the last two
decades and became a key component of policies for economic development.
Good governance acts as a positive force to influence economic growth. A
growing amount of available evidence suggests that lack of quality
governance hinders growth and investment, and aggravates poverty and
inequality. In fact, governance problem foil every effort to improve
infrastructure, attract investment, and raise educational standard. As
the developing countries are characterised by weak institutions, low
growth, poverty and inequality all which translate into low levels of
human development. The multiplicative effects of these outcomes result
in poverty traps that are extremely difficult to break out. This state
of affairs has forced governments to embark on a wide range of reforms
in their institutions of governance and economies with the goal of
achieving economic growth.
Good governance can lead a country to achieve high and sustained
economic growth by establishing conducive environment for saving and
investment, risk taking, providing incentives to producers, creating
certainty in markets, increasing the size of markets by removing
barriers to international trade and improvements in competitiveness.
Does good governance constitute to pro-poor growth? The concept of
good governance has taken central stage in development thinking and
practice since the 1990s. It has been increasingly viewed as a key
ingredient for development; the decade also witnessed a renewed focus on
poverty reduction as the major goal of development. Several reasons
account for the increasing attention to governance and institutions by
the international development community, among them research findings
demonstrating the financial aid effectiveness depends on "a good
policy environment". The lacklustre performance of structural
adjustment programme initiated in 1988, political problem and
institutional weakness have contributed to the new focus on governance.
The emphasis on reforming economies to achieve high rates of
economic growth is largely motivated by the fact that economic growth
associates with lower poverty rates and improvements in the quality of
life. It is assumed that there is a strong link between economic growth
and poverty reduction but this relationship does not always hold. It is
observed that different episodes of growth could have substantially
different impact on poverty even in the same country. So the key policy
concern is to institute economic reforms that results in economic growth
associated with substantial gains to the poor, referred as pro-poor
growth. Promoting pro-poor growth has now become a major goal in the
strategies of international donor organisations.
Since both governance and pro-poor growth are high on the
development policy agenda, the question arises as to whether and how
they are related to each other. It is commonly assumed that good
governance promotes pro-poor growth, this analysis empirically test this
challenging assumption that links governance indicators with the joint
outcomes of growth, inequality and poverty reduction which together
underlie the concept of pro-poor growth. These linkages are also
discussed from the available cross-country literature.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 1 is introduction
providing importance and objectives of the study. Section 2 presents a
literature review, while Section 3 define and measure governance
dimensions and pro-poor growth. Section 4 presents empirical analysis to
show linkages between governance and pro-poor growth. Concluding remarks
are discussed in Section 5.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section discusses the cross-country studies examining the
interaction between the governance and pro-poor growth.
Ahmed (2001) analysed the political economy aspects of poverty
reduction in South Asia by developing a framework for measuring
governance performance and relating this performance to poverty trends.
He argued that governance appears to be a significant problem in South
Asia with associated adverse implication for poverty reduction.
Kaufmann and Aart (2002) suggested that per capita income and the
quality of governance are strongly positively correlated across
countries. They proposed an empirical strategy that allows separating
this correlation into two parts. First, a strong positive casual effect
running from better governance to higher per capita. The result
confirmed existing evidence on income; the importance of good governance
for economic development. Second, a weak even negative casual effect
running from in the opposite direction from per capita income to
governance. This resulted in the absence of "Virtuous Circles"
in which higher incomes lead to further improvement in governance.
Chatterjee, et al. (2006) aimed to address, "why is economic
growth in Bangladesh not pro-poor given the various shifts and changes
in the economy since 1990"? They concluded that weak political
institutions and the skewed distribution of economic resources as well
as political capital had resulted in relatively more de facto political
power in the hands of a few, which in turn is, hindering the process of
pro-poor growth.
Kimnenyi (2005) presented a general theory of pro-poor growth that
includes ten principles that should be incorporated in all economic
reforms that seek to generate pro-poor growth. These principles
highlighted the importance of understanding the poor, their economic
activities, capabilities and constraints that impede their participation
in markets and also an appreciation of linkages within sectors and
regions. He argued that pro-poor reforms cannot have the intended impact
unless there are significant changes in the institutions of governance.
He concluded that these principles under score the fact that pro-poor
growth policies cannot be sustained without workable partnerships
between markets and states in the ever changing and complex process of
social and economic development.
Resnick and Regina (2006) developed a conceptual framework that
specified the linkages between different aspects of governance and
pro-poor growth. Using this framework, the paper reviewed a range of
quantitative cross-country studies that include measures of governance
as independent variables and focuses on the dependent variable in at
least two of three dimensions of pro-poor growth: poverty, inequality
and growth. The review showed that governance indicators, such as
political stability and rule of law are associated with growth but
provide mixed results regarding poverty reduction. On the other hand,
governance indicators that refer to transparent political systems, such
as civil liberties and political freedom, tend to conduce for poverty
reduction, but the evidence is rather mixed and the relationship of
these variables with growth remains unclear.
Pasha (2000) identified nine elements of good economic governance
as achievement of growth with equity, fiscal discipline, institutional
capacity, credibility and consistency, protection of public interest,
ability to manage crisis, effective delivery of services, integrity and
sovereignty. He concluded that based on these measures of good economic
governance, Pakistan's economic performance was mixed one with
visible sign of deterioration in 90s. He suggested that if
Pakistan's economy has to emerge once again as a relatively high
growth performer the quality of economic governance will have to be of
the highest level.
Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (1999) illustrated that
South Asia had emerged by now as one of the most poorly governed regions
in the world, with exclusion of the voiceless majority, unstable
political regimes, and poor economic management. It also analysed that
the systems of governance have become unresponsive and irrelevant to the
need and concerns of people.
Dollar and Kraay (2002) found that the rule of law indicators is
positively and significantly correlated with growth in per capita
incomes of the poorest quintile. They concluded that greater rule of law
may be associated with a greater share of growth accruing to the lowest
20 percent of the population. This is predominantly due to the
indicator's influence through growth rather than through improving
distribution.
Chong and Gradstein (2004) discovered that the political stability
and rule of law all exhibit a negative and significant relation with
inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. In other words, better
governance indicators lead to a decrease in inequality. Moreover, the
impact of income distribution on political institutions is greater in
developing countries than in industrialised ones.
Lopez (2004) assessed whether policies that are pro growth are also
pro-poor. He found that policies might not be poverty-reducing in the
short run, but in the long run. However, he claims that political
economy constraints could prevent these policies from staying in place
long enough to reach that poverty-reduction level.
Christiansen, et al. (2003) found that poverty headcount decreased
in countries that also experienced an improvement in their macroeconomic policy scores. They also found that poverty decreased in those countries
that experienced an improvement in their political risk score. Those
countries that did not experience a reduction in poverty despite
improvements in governance indicators, other factors such as droughts
played a role.
White and Anderson (2001) examine sectoral patterns of growth. They
argued that the higher the initial Gini coefficient, the less the poor
benefit from growth and there are apparent trade-offs between growth and
distribution. More civil liberties tend to have a less pro-poor impact
while more political freedom tends to have a more pro-poor impact while
ethnic fragmentation appears to increase the poor's participation
in the growth process. Agricultural growth tends to be less pro-poor
while the opposite is true for growth in the services sector.
Kraay (2004) found that 60 percent to 95 percent of poverty changes
are due to growth in average income while changes in income distribution
are relatively more important in the short run. He also analysed that
rule of law and accountability are both positively correlated with
growth and distributional changes while openness to international trade
has a positive correlation with growth and correlated with
poverty-reducing shifts in incomes.
All these studies suggest that good governance is pro-poor in terms
of increasing incomes and reducing the poverty headcounts. Yet, they are
less clear about what the intervention mechanism is i.e., increased
growth, improved equity, or a combination of both that leads to such
outcomes.
3. DEFINING AND MEASURING GOVERNANCE AND PRO-POOR GROWTH
(a) Governance
The concept of governance as referred in the development literature
and discourse was originally used by specialists in Medieval English
society, which was characterised by cooperation between the different
sources of power i.e., church, nobility, merchants, peasant, etc. The
term has also been widely used in international development; there are
numerous interpretations of what the term actually describes.
Governance means process of decision-making and the process by
which decisions are implemented. The quality of governance is determined
by the impact of this exercise of power on the quality of life enjoyed
by the citizens. Governance can be used in several contexts such as
international governance, corporate governance, national governance and
local governance. Government is one of the actors in governance.
Asian Development Bank (1995) identified four basic elements of
good governance such as accountability, participation, predictability
and transparency.
McCawley (2005) categorises governance issues at the macro and
micro level. The macro level includes constitution, the overall rule of
size and resources of the government, and relationship between
legislators, the judiciary and the military, while micro issues of
governance or government departments includes commercial firms, social
institutions and civil society affairs.
United Nation Development Programme (1997) defines governance as
the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to
manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms,
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate
their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and
mediate their differences.
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) covering 140 countries from
1980 to the present analyses and forecast risk for international
investors. It includes 22 components that are grouped into three
categories of risk: political, financial and economic. The political
risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective analysis of the
available information, while the financial and economic risk assessments
are made solely on the basis of objective data. In determining the
component rating, political risk contributes 50 percent to the rating
while the other two categories contribute 25 percent each. The composite
scores, ranging from zero to 100, are then broken into categories from
Very Low Risk (80 to 100 points) to Very High Risk (zero to 49.5
points).
World Bank aggregate governance indicators dataset developed by
Kaufmann, et al. (2005) hereafter called the KK Datasets, is a set of
world wide measures of six composite dimensions of governance perception
indicators for 209 countries. These indicators are oriented so that
higher value correspond to better outcomes, on a scale refers to the
point estimates range from -2.5 to 2.5. These estimates are also
rescaled and ranked in percentile (0-100). The lower percentile is
ranked as worse off governance indicators whereas upper percentile is
ranked as best governance for any given country. These perceptions may
often be more meaningful than objective data, especially when it
measures public faith in institutions. These averages of governance
indicators are considered to capture institutional quality. These
dimensions can be classified into three clusters with two indicators in
each group is given as;
1. Political Governance
(i) Voice and accountability. (ii) Political instability and
violence.
The political governance indicator is intended to capture the
process by which government is selected, monitored and replaced. First
indicator 'voice and accountability' measures political, civil
and human rights and independence of the media. It includes a number of
indicators measuring various aspects of political process, civil
liberties and political rights. It measures the extent to which citizens
of a country are able to participate in the selection of government
while the 'political instability' indicator captures whether
the government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by possibly
unconstitutional or violent means, including military cop, terrorism
etc.
2. Economic Governance
(i) Government effectiveness. (ii) Regulatory quality.
These two indicators summarise various indicators that include the
government's capacity to effectively formulate and implement sound
policies. The thrust of this index is on the input required government
to be able to produce or implement good policies and quality delivery of
public good. The 'regulatory quality' governance indicator
includes measures of the incidence of market unfriendly policies such as
price control or inadequate bank supervision, as well as the perceptions
of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in area such as foreign
trade and business development.
3. Institutional Dimension of Governance
(i) Rule of law. (ii) Control of corruption.
The final dimensions of governance indicators are summarised in
broad terms as the respect of citizen and the state of institutions that
govern their interactions. Rule of law, summarises several indicators
that measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of the society. It measures the quality of contract
enforcement, the police and the courts as well as likelihood of crime
and violence. These indicators also measure a society's success in
developing environment in which fair and predictable rules form basis
for economic and social interactions. Control of corruption measures its
perceptions conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for
private gains. This aspect of corruption differs somewhat, ranging from
the occurrence of additional payment to get things done, to assess the
effect of corruption on business environment, to measure grand
corruption in political arena or in the tendency of elites to engage in
state capture. The presence of corruption is often a manifestation of a
lack of respect on the part of both the corruptor and the corrupted for
the rules that govern their interaction, thus represents a failure of
governance.
The above two datasets are most commonly-used datasets in the cross
country research on governance. Analysis on governance dimensions
encompasses positive analysis from theory as well as prepositions
concerning what government ought to be doing on the achievement of
development outcomes.
(b) Pro-poor Growth
A positive growth is important but it is not sufficient to assess
whether the poor indeed benefit or not. Thus, in assessing the impact of
growth on poor, information on the distribution of gains from growth is
necessary. That is, to determine whether growth is pro-poor, it is
necessary to evaluate how the benefits of growth are shared amongst the
different income groups.
Pro-poor growth is variously defined as follows:
* In its simplest interpretation, the concept of "pro-poor
growth" implies the type of growth that is good for the poor; a
reduction in the proportion of the poor in the population.
* Pro-poor growth is also defined as growth that results in an
increase in the income of the poor.
* Pro-poor growth is defined as one that associates with larger
proportionate increases in income of the poor than the rest of the
population.
* Pro-poor growth that benefits the poor and provides them with
opportunities to improve their economic situation.
For definition of pro-poor growth, the contribution of poverty
measure, growth and inequality is important. In this context, poverty
measure is based on distribution of real household incomes per capita or
real household expenditure per capita, depending on which of the welfare
indicator is used. Growth means an increase in the value of this welfare
indicator. Inequality is taken as deviation of income from perfect
equality measured by Gini coefficient. Pro-poor growth is concerned with
the interrelation between the three elements, growth, poverty and
inequality. The pro-poor growth literature assumes that the objective of
the policy is to maximise the rate at which absolute poverty is reduced.
There are many other definitions of pro-poor growth referred by
some authors; Klasen (2001) approach for capturing pro-poor growth is
measuring whether the per capita income growth rate of poor surpasses
the average income growth rate. White and Anderson (2001) suggest that
growth is pro-poor if poor's income grows more than the income of
the non poor. Ravallion (2004) defines as any growth that reduces
poverty is said to be pro-poor howsoever poor may receive only small
fraction of total benefits of growth. Kakawani and Pernia (2000), and
Son (2004) all suggest a measure of pro-poor growth that takes into
account both reductions in poverty as well as improvement in inequality.
Ravallion and Chen (2003) assume that growth is always pro-poor unless
the incomes of the poor decline or stagnate. Miculloch and Baulch (1999)
used poverty bias of growth measure by subtracting the real change in
the poverty headcount between two time periods from the predicted change
if there was an equal distribution of income. If poverty bias of growth
is positive, then pro-poor growth occurred. Organisation such as
Organisation of Economic Corporation and Development [OECD (2001) and
the UN (2000)] have employed a very broad definition by classifying it
as growth that benefits poor. [ADB (1999:6)] Growth is pro-poor when it
is labour absorbing, and accompanied by policies and programs that
mitigate inequalities and facilitate income and employment generation
for the poor, particularly women and other traditionally excluded
groups. There are many other definitions of pro-poor growth but the key
elements of these definitions are that ensuing growth not only benefits
the poor but they benefit disproportionately.
Finally, it is growth of the economic output that benefits the
poor. If the reduction in absolute poverty is accepted as the measure of
benefit for the poor, the greater the reduction in poverty incidence
that growth generates, the more pro-poor it is. Since economic growth
generally benefits the poor to some degree, the empirical question is
not whether poor growth is or is not pro-poor, but what influences the
extent to which it is pro-poor. The need is to find the kinds of
economic growth for which the rate of poverty reduction is greatest, as
well as to find the economic policy strategies that can produce growth
of this kind.
Governance in Pakistan
Our analysis is based on aggregate governance indicators developed
by Kaufmann, et al. (2005) hereafter called the KK Datasets, which is a
set of world wide measures of six composite dimensions of governance
covering the period from 1996 to 2005. These indicators measure
subjective perceptions regarding the quality of governance with scores
lie between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher scores corresponding to better
outcomes. Within each indicator, countries are ranked by their total
score and then allocated a number between 0 and 100.100 is associated
with a high rating and one is associated with lower rating.
The political governance dimension in Pakistan refers to a
country's voice and accountability and political stability. If
political governance deteriorates or reclaims at low level, it may be
reflected in whole disruptions, and a poor environment for protecting
the rights and freedom of the masses, thus resulted in chaos. Table 1
reports the indices of political governance from 1996 to 2005. The
performance of Pakistan political governance deteriorated after the
military took over the Nawaz regime. Although the military government
has adopted reforms agenda which is not as strong and far reaching as
was expected given the deep rooted structural problems of the economy.
The two indicators, voice and accountability and political stability
ranked in lower percentile and portray a dismal picture. The so called
democratically elected government in power is centralised in the hand of
military dictator. Local government is weak with little administrative
and financial authority. Organisation, such as Accountability Bureau
serves more as the agents of the government in power than autonomous,
non-partisan. The military had a tremendous influence on politics,
civilian decision-making and patronage. The civilian leaders took
cognizance of the military to get support on their side. Senior
positions in the government, public enterprise and public banks, and
allocations of urban land at the heavily subsidised rates are offered to
them [HDC (1999)].
The poor political governance has affected domestic resource
mobilisation. Pakistan has one of the lowest tax-GDP ratio that
summarises various indicators of government's ability to formulate
and implement sound policies.
Economic governance refers to a country's government
effectiveness and regulatory quality. The performance of economic
governance is better as compared to political governance in Pakistan.
The government effectiveness indicator ranked at thirtieth percentile
and has better estimates in all the years in consideration while ranking
of regulatory quality indicator fluctuate in the same period. The
quality of economic governance is critical to poverty reduction, Good
economic governance facilities participatory, pro-poor policies as well
as sound macroeconomic management. The economic governance in case of
Pakistan has performed relatively poor during 90s.
The institutional dimensions governance indicators which include
rule of law and control of corruptions established the primacy of
institutions for well-functioning market economy for Pakistan. Table 3
summarises the low score gained in the governance indicators hence
ranked at the lowest percentile in the world. Corruption hampers
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals by undermining the
economic growth and sustainable development that would free millions
from the poverty trap. Fighting corruption must be central plan to
increase resources to achieve the goals. A Transparency International survey of 163 countries based on perceived levels of corruption also saw
Pakistan slip down two places compared to its ranking of 145 last year,
suggesting a rise in corruption in 2006.
Pro-poor Growth in Pakistan
There are three dimensions of pro-poor growth: poverty, inequality
and growth. The concept of "pro-poor growth" very much
reflects the notion of "redistribution with growth". A better
quality of life for the poor calls for higher incomes. As income per
capita rise, several aspects of quality of life improves in varying
degrees but not all, not at the same rate and not inevitably.
Pro-poor growth occurs when economic growth disproportionately
benefits the poor. One approach for capturing pro-poor growth is
measuring whether the per capita income/expenditure growth rate of the
poor surpasses the average income/expenditure growth rate [Klasen
(2002)]. Table 4 gives the statistic of mean and growth rate of
consumption expenditure by quintile in two periods, 2000-01 to 2004-05.
The analyses shows that although the mean per capita consumption
expenditure increased in all quintiles but the real mean expenditure
growth in richest 20 percent population at 22 percent is nearly 2.5
times that &poorest 20 percent, hence show that growth is not
pro-poor.
Another concept is that the growth is always pro-poor unless the
incomes of the poor decline or stagnate [Ravallion and Chen (2003)].
According to this approach, growth becomes pro-poor because per adult
expenditure has increased overtime.
Table 5 compares the growth rate in per adult equivalent
consumption expenditure on commodity groups across two points in time.
The rate of growth in expenditure is greater for top 20 percent as
compared to bottom 20 percent population. White and Anderson (2001)
suggest that growth is pro-poor if poor's income grows more than
the incomes of the non poor.
Table 6 demonstrates the share in income and consumption
expenditure and Gini coefficient over time. It is observed that both
income and expenditure share for poorest 20 percent has decline while
the share of richest 20 percent has increased. The ratio of highest to
lowest income group has also increased between the two periods. In the
same way Gini coefficient for income and expenditure also increased over
time.
Dimensions of pro-poor growth in Table 7 indicate that poverty and
inequality have increased over time but in 2004-05 percentage of poor
population has decreased. Income share of bottom 20 percent decreased
after 1998-99. The picture emerged from this table that according to
Kakawani and Pernia (2000) definition growth is not pro-poor during this
period.
Table 8 shows inflation over time by food/non-food and by the
lowest and the highest income groups. In recent year food and non food
inflation has increased. Food inflation has increased more sharply than
non food inflation and lowest income group suffer more as compared to
upper income group. Household Income and Expenditure Survey data
indicates that expenditure share of poorest 20 percent population is
approximately 58 percent as compared to 40 percent of richest 20 percent
population which demonstrates that inflation effects disproportionately
more to poor than non poor population.
In Pakistan it has been realised that growth alone is not
sufficient for poverty reduction in development policy and practice.
During the last few years pro-poor expenditures were the most important
fiscal intervention to support the critical elements of the poverty
reduction strategy. The percentage share of social sector and poverty
related expenditure in Pakistan is reflected in Table 9. It is analysed
that the percentage share of expenditure of safety nets which is to
cater to the needs of the poor and vulnerable sections of the society
has decreased overtime.
It is concluded that in Pakistan, government knowingly or
unknowingly adopt policies that are biased in favour of the rich.
Consequently, the gap in well being between the 'haves' and
'haves not' tends to persist, if not widen, over time. So to
foster the overall well being of the society, government needs to pursue
policies that will reduce this gap.
4. ANALYSIS
This section examines the linkages between the governance and
pro-poor growth in Pakistan by using perception based data to measure
governance. The analysis focus on at least two of the three dimensions
of pro-poor growth: poverty, inequality and growth. Table 1 presents
results estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to estimate
econometrically whether voice of accountability, Political Stability,
Regularity quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption have an
impact on poverty.
The results show that political indicators which include voice and
accountability and political stability are negatively and significantly
correlated with poverty which concludes that while greater
accountability and political stability may be associated with reduction
in poverty. The economic indicator of governance shows that regulatory
quality has a negative and statistically significant impact on reducing
the percentage of the population below the poverty line. The
institutional dimensions of governance uncover a negative and
significant association between rule of law and poverty.
Inequality refers to the deviation of income from perfect equality
as measured by Gini Coefficient. It is not a final outcome of growth but
plays a central role in determining the rate and pattern of growth.
Table 11 suggests relationship between governance indicators and
inequality by applying simple OLS regressions. The analysis synthesised
that voice of accountability and political stability regularity quality
and rule of law indicators, all exhibit a negative and significant
relationship with inequality. In other words, better governance
indicators lead to a decrease in inequality.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this study is to explore linkages between governance and
pro-poor growth in Pakistan for the period 1996 to 2005. The analysis
shows that governance indicators which include voice and accountability,
political instability and violence, government effectiveness, regulatory
burden, rule of law and control of corruption have low scores and ranked
at the lowest percentile as compared to other countries. The dimensions
of pro-poor growth which include poverty, inequality and growth indicate
that poor does not benefit proportionately from the economic growth. It
is also analysed that incidence of poverty has increased, income
inequality has worsened and poor's share in income and expenditure
have also decreased. The econometric analysis of linkages between
governance and pro-poor growth suggest a negative and significant
relationship which leads to reduction in poverty and inequality. It is
concluded that greater voice and accountability, political instability,
regulatory burden, rule of law can control the corruption and pro-poor
policies which ultimately reduce poverty and inequality in the long run.
Finally, the results on the performance of Pakistan for governance
dimensions portray an unfavourable situation. Weak governance is not
conducive environment for entrepreneurs for long term investment. To
face challenge of good governance, Pakistan needs to formulate and
effectively implement its governance policies to improve governance
dimensions, taking account of higher growth and halving poverty by 2015.
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Letters 82, 307-314.
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Management and Governance Division, Bureau for Policy and Programme
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the Pattern of Growth Matter? Development Policy Review 19:3,267-289.
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Comments
The paper has addressed an important question: Does good governance
contribute to pro-poor growth'? It has used the governance
indicators developed by Kaufmann, et al. (2005) covering the period from
1996 to 2005. Governance indicators have three dimensions: political
(voice and accountability and political stability), economic (government
effectiveness and regulatory quality) and institutional (rule of law and
control of corruption). For the pro-poor growth the paper has used the
concept whether the per capita income/expenditure growth rate of the
poor surpasses the average income/expenditure growth rate although it
has also discussed some other concepts for the pro-poor growth. Most of
these concepts reveal that growth is not pro-poor in Pakistan between
2000-01 and 2004-05 period. Food inflation has increased more sharply
than non-food inflation and lowest income group has suffered more as
compared to upper income group. Despite an increase in expenditure in
the pro-poor sectors, including safety nets, the paper concluded that
the gap in well being between the 'have' and 'have
not' tends to persist, if not widen, over time. To establish the
relationship between governance and pro-poor growth, the paper estimated
the OLS whether voice of accountability, political stability, regularity
quality, rule of law and control of corruption have an impact on poverty
and inequality, and found a significant relationship between good
governance and reduction in both poverty and inequality.
The paper has contributed to knowledge in terms of understanding
the relationship between growth and governance indicators. However, it
has several flaws. It is based on a small number of observations; it is
thus difficult to generalise its findings. It ignores the role of other
macro and micro level factors on both poverty and inequality. Readers
would have been benefited more if the authors have discussed the
mechanism through which the governance indicators have influenced
poverty and inequality, particularly in Pakistan.
G. M. Arif
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.
Rashida Haq <rashida_haq@hotmail.com> and Uzma Zia
<uzia05@yahoo.com> are Research Economist and Staff Economist,
respectively, at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economies,
Islamabad.
Authors' Note: We are indebted to Ms Attiya Yasmin Javid,
Research Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,
Islamabad, for her insightful comments on carlier drafts of this paper.
Table 1
Country Snapshot of Political Governance Indicators
Voice and Accountability Political Stability
Percentile Percentile
Years Estimates Rank Estimates Rank
1996 -1.06 20.2 -1.41 9.0
1998 -0.68 30.4 -1.21 11.8
2000 -1.57 6.8 -0.88 19.3
2002 -1.12 17.4 -1.51 11.3
2003 -1.18 14.0 -1.58 8.0
2004 -1.31 11.6 -1.67 5.7
2005 -1.23 12.6 -1.68 5.7
Source: Kaufmann, et al. (1996, 2005) Estimates range from
(-2.5 to +2.5) Percentile ranked (0-100).
Table 2 Country Snapshot of Economic Governance Indicators
Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality
Percentile Estimates Percentile
Years Estimates Rank Rank
1996 -0.39 40.0 -0.54 25.5
1998 -0.74 22.0 -0.20 37.4
2000 -0.53 33.5 -0.81 18.7
2002 -0.57 33.0 -0.83 21.2
2003 -0.56 34.9 -0.78 20.7
2004 -0.52 37.3 -0.89 18.7
2005 -0.53 34.0 -0.68 27.7
Source: Kaufmann, et al. (1996, 2005) Estimates range from
(-2.5 to +2.5) Percentile ranked (0-100).
Table 3
Country Snapshot of Institutional Dimensions of Governance Indicators
Rule of Law Control of Corruption
Percentile Percentile
Years Estimates Rank Estimates Rank
1996 -0.49 35.9 -1.04 12.2
1998 -0.79 25.0 -0.82 18.6
2000 -0.75 26.4 -0.94 16.2
2002 -0.75 27.4 -0.85 23.5
2003 -0.69 28.8 -0.76 27.5
2004 -0.83 21.6 -1.06 11.3
2005 -0.81 24.2 -1.01 15.8
Source: Kaufmann, et at. (1996, 2005) Estimates range from
(-2.5 to +2.5) Percentile rank (0-100).
Table 4
Consumption Expenditure by Quintile at the Prices of 2001(Rs)
Quintile PIHS 2000-01 PSLM 2004-05 Growth (%)
Poorest 20% 508 555 9.25
Second 20% 690 775 12.32
Third 20% 845 961 13.73
Fourth 20% 1070 1238 15.70
Richest 20% 1908 2327 21.96
Average 1001 1171 16.63
Source: Pakistan, 2004-05.
Table 5
Growth in Monthly Real Consumption Expenditure by Commodity Groups
Poorest 20% Richest 20%
Commodity Groups (2000-01 to 2004-05) (2000-01 to 2004-05)
Food 11.6 19.0
Fuel and Lighting 5.7 20.0
Clothing -2.2 8.4
Housing 9.3 16.8
Health 14.6 -6.1
Education -13.7 11.9
Miscellaneous 15.4 54.4
Source: Pakistan, 2004-05.
Table 6
Share of Income and Consumption Expenditure by Quintile
2000-01 2004-05
Quintile Income Expenditure Income Expenditure
Poorest 20% 6.4 10.1 6.2 9.5
Richest 20% 49.6 38.0 50.4 39.4
Ratio of H/L 7.9 3.7 8.1 4.2
Gini Coefficient 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3
Source: (i) Pakistan, 2004-05. (ii) Anwer (2005).
Table 7
Dimensions of Pro-poor Growth
Growth
Poverty Inequality (Income
(% of Poor (Gini Share of
Years Households) Coefficient) Bottom 20%)
2000-01 27.61 0.41 6.42
2001-02 29.17 0.41 6.36
2002-03 30.90 0.42 6.30
2003-04 32.78 0.42 6.24
2004-05 29.3 * 0.42 6.20
Source: (i) Social Policy and Development Centre,
2005-06. (ii) Anwar (2006).
Table 8 Inflation in Pakistan
Food Non-food
Years Inflation Inflation Inflation
2000-01 4.4 3.6 5.1
2001-02 3.5 2.5 4.3
2002-03 3.1 2.9 3.2
2003-04 4.6 6.0 3.7
2004-05 9.3 12.5 7.1
Inflation for Inflation for
Lowest Highest
Income Income
Years Group Group
2000-01 4.5 4.7
2001-02 3.0 3.6
2002-03 2.9 3.1
2003-04 5.3 4.3
2004-05 10.2 8.9
Source: Pakistan, 2004-05.
Table 9
Governance, Social Sector and Poverty Related Expenditure
Sectors % Share 2001-02 % Share 2004-05 Growth (%)
Community Services 6.6 13.8 109.1
Human Development 54.2 49.2 -9.2
Rural Development 14.5 18.8 29.6
Safety Nets 4.9 2.7 -44.8
Governance 20.0 15.9 -20.5
Total (Rs Billion) 167.3 316.2 89.2
Source: Computation based on Pakistan, 2004-05.
Table 10
Linkages between Governance and Poverty
Standardised
Indicators of Coefficient
Governance ([beta]) T-Statistic R Square
Voice and -0.488 -1.581 *** 0.488
Accountability
Political Stability -0.628 -2.28 0.628
Govt. Effectiveness 0.080 0.228 0.080
Regulatory Quality -0.649 -2.41 ** 0.42
Rule of Law -0.613 -2.19 ** 0.376
Control of Corruption -0.035 -0.099 0.001
Note: The t-values significant at 5 percent and 10
percent levels are indicated by **,***.
Table 11
Link-axes between Governance and Income Inequality
Standardised
Coefficient
Indicators of Governance ([beta]) T-Statistic R Square
Voice and Accountability -0.550 -1.86 *** 0.30
Political Stability -0.546 -1.84 *** 0.29
Govt. Effectiveness 0.114 0.324 0.013
Regulatory Quality -0.748 -3.18 * 0.559
Rule of Law -0.549 -1.86 *** 0.30
Control of Corruption 0.036 -0.103 0.001
Note: The t-values significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10
percent levels are indicated by *, **, ***.