Gender and public spending on education in Pakistan: a case study of disaggregated benefit incidence.
Sabir, Muhammad
To what extent has government education spending in Pakistan been
effective in reducing gender gaps in enrolments? To answer this
question, this article reviews the benefit incidence of government
education spending. It finds that government subsidies directed towards
primary education are pro-poor in all four provinces of Pakistan, but
females are at a disadvantage in terms of access to primary education.
Government subsidies directed towards higher education are poorly
targeted, and the poorest income group receives less than the rich
income group; indeed the policies favour those who are better off.
Similarly, gender disparity in terms of access to public subsidy is
higher at the tertiary level, and the lowest at the primary level, which
also reflects poor targeting. Improving access of the poor as well as
better female participation involve not simply rearranging the public
subsidies but also addressing the constraints that prevent the poor and
females from accessing these services.
1. INTRODUCTION
It is generally believed that education is one of the basic rights
of every human being, irrespective of sex, age, creed, religion, etc.
Moreover, the target of universal primary education cannot be achieved
without female access to educational opportunities, which contains
several external benefits. In addition, access to educational
opportunities assumes prime importance for empowerment of women.
However, inequalities in access to education between males and females
can be found in many countries across the world including Pakistan.
According to conventional wisdom, a combination of cultural, social, and
economic factors are responsible for placing young girls and women at a
serious disadvantage vis-a-vis access to school and the prospect of
completing their education. This disadvantage can be altered through
public policies including gender sensitive public spending on education.
The above assertion about the role of public policy is based on the
theory of public finance, (1) which demonstrates that public expenditure
on education can affect the population in a number of ways, which has
significant gender dimensions. For example, government spending on
primary education is likely to generate more income for women than
spending on universities, for the simple reason that there are
relatively more women primary school teachers than women university
lecturers. Moreover, these expenditures provide subsidised educational
services, which is a form of "in kind transfers". These
"in-kind transfers" improve the current well-being of the
recipients, and enhance their longer-run income-earning potential. They
can be considered as both current and capital transfers to the
recipients, and therefore can be termed as the "benefit
incidence" of public spending.
The main concern of this paper is to assess the gender dimension of
the "benefit incidence". The study has two basic objectives.
First and foremost, it aims to investigate which income group actually
benefits from the government's subsidised education services?
Second, how are these benefits distributed between males and females? In
other words, this article is an attempt to capture the gender dimension
of public spending on education in Pakistan through benefit incidence
analysis, which may help to better understand the root causes of gender
inequality in Pakistan and provide a guideline for developing a gender
sensitised education policy.
There are three reasons for analysing gender inequality in public
spending on education in Pakistan. First, it is one of the most
important services that could empower the Pakistani women of today.
Second, education spending, especially at the primary level, is
considered to produce positive external benefits, and therefore, a
strong case can be made for the continued involvement of the government
for gender equitable public spending on education. Finally, in 1990s the
government of Pakistan initiated a project named Pakistan Integrated
Household Surveys (PIHS), which consisted of four round running through
1995-96 to 1998-99 under Social Action Plan (SAP). The objective of
PIHS, a national sample survey, was to provide household and community
level data, which could be used to monitor, evaluate, and assess the
impact of SAP. The PIHS data provides information on the income of
households and gender disaggregated enrolments in public and private
schools, colleges and universities, which offer an opportunity to
estimate the distribution of government subsidies in the education
sector at provincial levels.
The paper begins, in Section 2, with a brief review of the benefit
incidence approach and establishes how gender dis-aggregations can be
readily incorporated in the analysis. Section 3 presents the result of
Benefit Incidence of educational spending in Pakistan at provincial
level. Section 4 highlights the regional gender inequality by using data
from Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 1998-99. Section 5
makes some concluding observations and offers some policy implications.
2. THE 'BENEFIT INCIDENCE' OF PUBLIC SPENDING
The technique employed in this paper to assess gender differentials
in public service provision is 'benefit incidence analysis'.
This has become an established approach in estimating the distribution
of public expenditures since the path-breaking work on Malaysia by
Meerman (1979) and on Colombia by Selowsky (1979). (2) There has been a
recent resurgence of interest and incorporation of gender dimension in
the approach, reviewed in Van de Walle and Nead (1995); Van de Walle
(1998) and Demery (2000).
The technique usually involves a three-step methodology. First,
estimates are obtained on the unit cost of providing a particular
service. These are usually based on officially reported public spending
on the service in question. Second, these unit costs are then imputed to
households, which are identified (usually through a household
expenditure survey) as users of the service. Households, which use a
subsidised public service in effect, gain an in-kind transfer, which
depends on the unit subsidy involved (say the subsidy per primary school
enrollment) and the number of units consumed by the household (the
number of children currently enrolled in a public primary school).
Finally, aggregated estimates of benefit incidence are obtained in
groups ordered by income. In brief, benefit incidence analysis measures
the distribution of in kind transfers across the households.
Expenditure incidence analysis therefore brings together two
sources of information. First, data on the government subsidy (estimated
as the unit cost of providing the service less any cost recovery back to
the government) allocated to the education. Second, information on the
use of public education services by individuals and households, which is
usually obtained from household surveys.
The disaggregated benefit incidence analysis by gender based on the
assumption that government provide in-kind subsidy by providing
subsidised schools, colleges and universities and to gain the subsidy,
households must enroll children at publicly subsidised educational
institutions. If households typically send more boys than girls to these
publicly-funded schools, there will be a gender difference in benefit
incidence, simply because more of the government subsidy will be utilise
boys than girls.
As earlier mention, the three steps for disaggregated benefit
analysis can easily be transformed mathematically by considering the
group-specific benefit incidence of government spending on education:
[X.sub.j] [equivalent to] [3.summation over (i = 1)] [E.sub.ij]
[S.sub.i]/[E.sub.i] [equivalent to] [3.summation over (i = 1)]
[E.sub.ij]/[E.sub.i] [S.sub.i] .... .... .... ... ... (1)
[X.sub.j] is the value of the total education subsidy imputed to
group j. [E.sub.ij] represents the number of school enrolments of group
j at education level i, and [E.sub.i] the total number of enrolments
(across all groups) at that level. [S.sub.i] is government net spending
on education level i (with fees and other cost recovery netted out), and
i (=1,..,3) denotes the level of education (primary, secondary, and
tertiary). The share of the total education subsidy (S) accruing to the
female ([x.sub.j]) is given by:
[X.sub.j] [equivalent to] [3.summation over (i = 1)]
[E.sub.ij]/[E.sub.i]([S.sub.i]/S) [equivalent to] [3.summation over (i =
1)] [e.sub.ij][s.sub.i] .... .... .... ... ... (2)
Clearly, this share is determined by two factors: the share of the
gender in total enrolments at each level of education ([e.sub.ij]), and
the share of each level of education in total education spending (s;).
[e.sub.ij] is determined by household enrolment decisions, whereas
[s.sub.i] reflects government spending allocations.
3. EDUCATION SUBSIDIES IN PAKISTAN
Under the constitution of Pakistan, education is a provincial
subject. Consequently, provincial governments are primarily responsible
for financing the provision of educational services. However, federal
government plays an important role in the financing of higher education.
This financing is administrated by University Grants Commission (UGC),
(3) which provides financial support to general and technical
universities, colleges and institutes. As a result, calculation of unit
subsides for higher education contains both provincial and federal
public expenditure.
3.1. Public Education System in Pakistan
The structure of Pakistan's public education system has the
following main characteristics described as follows: first, there is the
basic education. The basic education system consists of early childhood
education (or pre-primary schooling), which is optional for children 3
to 5 years old and called kachi Pehli. After that primary education
where the official entry age is 5 year and ideally should be completed
in 5 years at the age of 9 years. The next level, following primary
education, is secondary level education, consists five years of
education after primary education started from the age 10 years and
ideally ended at the age of 14 years.
Subsequently level of education after secondary education is
tertiary level with two options available to students who may choose
polytechnic Institutes and colleges for technical education, and general
colleges/schools for higher secondary education. Finally, after
completion of two-year higher secondary education next level of
education encompasses three lines of study: a system of
technological/engineering colleges and universities, medical colleges
and universities, and general colleges and universities.
However, from the perspective of public finance there are four
broad categories, which generally reported in budget documents of
provincial and federal governments. These are primary, secondary,
general colleges and universities, and finally technical and
professional institutes, colleges and universities. In this report, we
used all four categories for the analysis of incidence of public
spending in education and named than primary, secondary, tertiary
(included general colleges and universities) and professional education
(included technical institutes, professional colleges and universities).
3.2. Source of Data
The information on the income of households and enrolments in
public schools, colleges and universities at various levels of education
is taken from the micro data of Pakistan Integrated Household Survey
(PIHS) Round 3: 1998-99. PIHS is a national survey conducted by Federal
Bureau of Statistics, which provides household and community level data
on various indicators related to education, health, water sanitation and
population welfare. The data on public spending on education is taken
from the federal and provincial demand for grants and appropriation 1999-2000. Finally the data on cost recovery is taken from Estimates of
Receipts 1999-2000 for each respective province.
3.3. Unit Subsidies in Education
Table 1 presents the result of province-wise estimates of unit
subsidies in education. Second column of Table 1 represents the gross
unit subsidy--current cost to the governments of a student study in a
particular level in a public institution. It is calculated as total
recurrent spending of provincial and federal governments on a specific
level of public education divided by total number of students of same
level in' the province. Third column corresponds to any revenue
from cost recovery from a specific level divided by number of students
of same level. Finally, the last column represents the net subsidy for
all levels and for all provinces, which is simply the difference of
Column 2 and 3.
Table 1 reveals the regional disparities in the unit subsidies in
education, which also varies with level of education. For instance, in
case of primary education, the amount of unit subsidies is highest in
Sindh, following Punjab and NWFP, lowest in Balochistan. However, this
does not imply that Sindh spends the highest amount among the four
provinces, because, it is the combination of two factors: demand of
public education and total public expenditures on a particular levels.
Unit cost estimates reported in Table 1 are limited in several
respects. First, due to unavailability of actual public spending on
education, estimates of unit subsidies are based on provincial and
federal revised estimates of public spending on education. According to
the historical trend in public finances of the country, actual spending
on education may appear less than revised estimates. As a result, these
reported estimates of subsidies may contain an upward bias and overly
stated amount of subsidies. Second, in the absence of disaggregated
data, unit subsidies were obtained as provincial averages, ignoring
gender and urban rural variations. It may lead to over or under
estimation of regional and gender unit subsidies. Furthermore, number of
students for the estimation of subsidies have taken from PIHS data after
multiplying with blow up factor and may contain sampling or non sampling
errors which over or under estimates the amount unit subsidies.
4. GENDER DISPARITY IN EDUCATION
There are several ways to measure gender differentials in
education. Gross and net enrolment rates often reveal gender
differences, especially when reported by income quartiles, similarly
completion and drop out rates are another way to highlight gender
disparities in education. However, gross enrolment is the widely used
basic indicator, which highlights gender disparity at the first stage of
the education and indicates lake of access to educational facilities for
women. Therefore, as a first step, gender disparity in education is
highlighted by gross enrolment ratio and subsequently gender
disaggregated estimates of benefit incidence are presented.
4.1. Gender Disparity in Gross Enrolment Ratio
Table 2 presents the province-wise gross enrolment rates (4)
divided into three broad categories; primary, secondary and tertiary,
and by income quartiles, and gender. The gross enrolment rates show
typical biases in enrolment behaviour, with males being more likely to
be enrolled in school, and with the bias becoming more noticeable with
higher levels of schooling. Another interesting point, which emerges
from Table 2 is provincial variation in gender specific enrolments.
Gender disparity in education is higher in Balochistan and NWFP as
compared to Sindh and Punjab.
4.2. Gender Disaggregated Benefit Incidence Estimates
By combining the unit cost of the public education system with the
use of public schooling facilities by household, we can estimate the
benefit incidence of government spending on education. The province-wise
results of this exercise (based on the subsidy schedule of Table 1)
are reported in Table 3A, 3B, 3C and 3D respectively. Three types of
disaggregation are reported: first, the subsidy is distributed across
the four income quartiles starting from the richest 25 percent to the
poorest 25 percent of the population; second, the benefit incidence
estimates are disaggregated by education level; and finally, it is
reported by gender.
(a) Punjab
Three clear messages emerge from the estimates of benefit incidence
(see Table 3A). The first message is that education spending is
reasonably progressive at the primary level; the subsidy to the poorest
quartile forms a higher share than the subsidy to the richest quartile.
This progressiveness is particularly striking in relative terms; the
poorest 25 percent population of Punjab received more than 35 percent of
the subsidy. While, the richest 25 percent receive only 13 percent of
the subsidy at the primary level (see the last column of Table 3A).
However, in the case of subsidy at the secondary level the main
beneficiaries are lower and middle-income groups, which indicates that
subsidy is less progressive. In contrast, educational subsidy at
tertiary level is regressive and the highest share received by the
richest 25 percent, which receive more than 50 percent of the subsidy at
the tertiary level.
The second message is that the progressiveness at the primary level
is illusionary because the share in subsidy it is not adjusted by the
group wise population. The per capita estimates of level-wise subsidy
presents a real picture of the incidence. According to this indicator
the lowest per capita subsidy received by the poorest 25 percent of the
population in all three educational categories. However, this picture
varies with the level of education, it is relatively better at the
primary level and worse at the tertiary level.
Finally, the gender disparity persists at all educational levels
and in all income classes. It clearly emerges, that the pattern of
subsidy is biased towards females, for instance, at the primary level 45
percent, at the secondary level 39 percent and at the tertiary level 45
percent share of the subsidy spent on females and rest on males. This
result is also consistent with the per-capita estimates and in all cases
per-capita estimates are lower for females and higher for males. In
addition, females belonging to the poorest 25 percent population receive
the lowest share in education subsidy at all levels of education and it
is lowest at the tertiary level.
(b) Sindh
Similar to Punjab, estimates of benefit incidence portray the same
picture in Sindh (see Table 3B). Education spending is reasonably
progressive at the primary level; the subsidy to the poorest quartile
amounts to a higher share than the subsidy to other income groups and
the share of, the subsidy decreases gradually with increase in income.
The poorest 25 percent population of Sindh receives more than 35 percent
of the subsidy. In contrast, the richest 25 percent receives only 11
percent of the subsidy at the primary level (see the last column of
Table 3B). A similar pattern exists at secondary level with a slight
change in magnitude ranging from 31 percent to the poorest income group
and 14 percent to the richest income group. However, this pattern
reverts at the tertiary level, the main beneficiaries are the richest
income group, which receives 35 percent of the subsidy. The subsidy at
the tertiary level of education is regressive in nature and share of the
subsidy decreases with decline in income level and the lowest share in
the subsidy at tertiary level received by the poorest income group,
which is-only 16 percent.
Similar to Punjab, per-capita estimates of the subsidy is not
consistent with the share-wise benefit incidence and lowest per-capita
subsidy at all educational levels is received by the poorest income
group. However, the highest per capita subsidy is received by the
poorest 25 percent of population at the primary level and lowest at the
tertiary level of education.
The relative disadvantage of females with respect to access to
education follows a steady pattern in Sindh. It is lowest at the primary
level, where they receive 41 percent of the total subsidy for primary
education; this disadvantage gradually increases with the level of
education and is greatest at the tertiary level, where they receive only
21 percent of the total subsidy at tertiary level education. This
pattern confirms the hypothesis that relative disadvantage increases
with the level of education. Similarly, in per capita terms, females
receive lower subsidy in each income group at all educational levels.
(e) NWFP
In contrast to Punjab and Sindh, estimates of benefit incidence
demonstrate a different pattern in the NWFP (see Table 3C). Education
spending is not reasonably progressive at any level of education.
Moreover, except primary education, poorest population receives the
lowest share in educational subsidies; particularly at the tertiary
level the poorest income group receives only 8 percent of the subsidy. A
similar pattern exists also at the secondary level with a slight change
in magnitudes ranging from 22 percent to the poorest income group and 28
percent to the upper middle-income group. However, the pattern of
subsidy distribution is slightly different at the primary level, where
the main beneficiaries are the low middle-income group, which receives
33 percent of the subsidy, and 28 percent is received by the poorest
income group, and 24 percent is received by the upper middle income and
15 percent is received by the richest income group.
As in the case of the other provinces, per-capita estimates of the
subsidy are inconsistent with the share of subsidy and the lowest
per-capita subsidy at all levels of education receive by to the poorest
income group. However, the highest per capita subsidy is received by the
poorest 25 percent of population at the primary level and lowest at the
tertiary level of education.
The relative disadvantage to females was lowest at the primary
level, where they receive 37 percent of the total primary subsidy and
the greatest at the tertiary level, where they receive only 29 percent
of the total subsidy for the tertiary level. It is also interesting to
note that the relative disadvantage of females is inversely correlated with level of income. For instance, females in the poorest quartile of
income receive only one-third of the primary education subsidy received
by the poorest 25 percent and males receive remaining two-third. In
contrast, females in the richest quartile of income receive almost half
of the primary education subsidy received by the richest 25 percent and
males receive remaining half. This disadvantage further increases with
the level of education--females in the poorest quartile receive only 5
percent of the secondary education subsidy and almost zero percent at
tertiary level.
(d) Balochistan
as in the case of NWFP, estimates of benefit incidence demonstrate
that education spending is not reasonably progressive at any level of
education in Balochistan (see Table 3D). Moreover, except primary
education, poorest population receives the lowest share in educational
subsidies; particularly at the tertiary level of education; the poorest
income group receives only 8 percent of the subsidy. A similar pattern
exists at the secondary level with slight change in magnitudes ranging
from 21 percent to the poorest income group and 33 percent to the upper
middle-income group. However, this pattern differs at the primary level,
where the main beneficiaries are low middle-income group, which receive
30 percent of the subsidy, and 26 percent is received by the upper
middle income group, and 23 percent receive by the poorest income group,
and 21 percent by the richest income group.
Similar to other provinces, per-capita estimates of the subsidy are
not consistent with the share and lowest per-capita subsidy at all
levels of education and the lowest per capita subsidies are received by
the poorest income group. Moreover, this picture varies with the level
of education, relatively better at primary level and worse at the
tertiary level.
In Balochistan, the pattern of relative disadvantage to females
with respect to access to education is similar to that in other
provinces. However, magnitudes of subsidies present a bleaker picture.
It is the lowest at the tertiary level, where they receive only 11
percent of the total subsidy for professional education and the greatest
at the primary level, where they receive 34 percent of the total primary
subsidy. Similarly females receive lowest per capita subsidies in each
income group at all levels.
5. REGIONAL GENDER DISPARITY
Gender disaggregated benefit incidence results can be used to
provide a comparative picture of regional gender disparity. To grasp the
comparative picture of regional gender disparity, we computed
female-male ratio of benefit incidence of public spending by region. The
result of this exercise is presented in Figure 1. It is clear from
Figure 1, that the relative disadvantage of females to access public
education was higher in rural areas as compare to urban areas. All rural
areas and urban Sindh and Balochistan follow the same pattern of
disadvantage--higher disadvantage with higher level of education.
The disadvantage is the greatest in rural Balochistan and Sindh.
This observation is compatible with the expectation that female
enrolment rates decrease with the level of education. In contrast, it
emerges from Figure 1, that there is relative disadvantage to males with
respect to access to public education in urban Punjab at the primary and
the tertiary levels, and urban NWFP at tertiary level.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
6. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Gender disaggregated benefit analysis of public spending on
education can be used to describe why the poorest income quartile has
less access to public education specially at the higher level of
education. The answer is to be found, in part, in the greater gender
enrolment bias among the poorest sections of the society. For example in
Balochistan, males in the poorest quartile receive 14 percent and 17
percent of the subsidy at primary and secondary level, while females in
the poorest quartile receive 9 and 4 percent of the subsidy at the
primary and secondary level respectively. However, females in the
richest income group receive 9 and 8 percent of the subsidy at the
primary and secondary level respectively, which is share-wise equal at
primary level and higher at secondary level with compare to females of
the poorest segment of the society. This trend also persists in the
secondary education subsidy of other provinces excluding Sindh and
tertiary and professional level subsidies of all provinces where females
of poorest gain less than rich groups. The gender inequality, therefore,
is a critical component of overall inequality in the benefit incidence
of education spending.
These results powerfully demonstrate how public spending on
education benefit males more than females in Pakistan in 1998-99, and
this in turn influences the overall inequality of education spending in
the country. It does so for a combination of reasons: first, households
choose to enrol males more than females at all levels of schooling (see
Table 2), therefore, a gender bias would be present in the benefit
incidence of public spending on education; second, public spending is
not properly targeted to the regions of higher gender disparities and as
a result, public spending is not sufficiently contributing in the
reduction of gender disparity.
Based on the benefit incidence analysis three sets of policies can
be recommended to improve gender equality in the society. First, the
poorest segment of the society receives the lowest per capita subsidy;
therefore, public policies related to public spending on education
should be targeted towards the region with higher level of poverty.
Second, in the presence of higher regional gender inequality, region
specific education policy may be helpful for the gender equality,
specially public spending in rural areas on female education will play a
vital role as compare to urban areas. Finally province-wise policies
related to gender equality in education at various level works better
than the national policies. For instance, in Balochistan, a reasonable
proportion of the government budget is devoted to schooling services
which females tended not to use--tertiary education institutions. A
shift of spending towards primary and secondary schooling would lead to
an improvement in the share of the total budget going to females (as
well as to poorer groups in the community). In contrast, such policy is
not helpful for the other regions particularly in Punjab and NWFP where
female enrolments were higher at tertiary public institutions.
Therefore, a shift of spending towards tertiary level would lead to an
improvement in the share of the total budget going to females. However,
such decisions should not rest on benefit incidence estimates alone.
They should also be based on a sound understanding of how household
behaviour would be affected by such expenditure switches.
REFERENCES
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Demery, Lionel (1996) Gender and Public Social Spending:
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Meerman, Jacob (1979) Public Expenditures in Malaysia: Who Benefits
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Comments
The case study on gender and public spending on education in
Pakistan will be a timely and much-needed addition to the growing body
of documentation on this vital issue. It becomes all the more important
in view of two recent publications, and a third publication due to be
launched tomorrow. The two reports in hand are the Pakistan Human
Condition Report (2002, CRPRID, Planning Commission), and the Pakistan
Poverty Assessment Report (2002, World Bank). The forthcoming document
is the Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre's annual Human
Development Report for South Asia.
While the findings of the study under review do not come as a major
surprise to anyone working on either education or gender issues, it is
necessary to have the evidence at hand, to be able to convince both the
policy-makers and the donors. To that end, this study will be useful.
But therein lies one of its constraints--it does not go the extra
mile to translate its findings into policy-level recommendations--or
even strategic observations and conclusions. It just states the
findings, and leaves it at that. One must draw one's own
conclusions as well as any policy prescriptions.
The assessment of gender inequality through "benefit
incidence" analysis of public expenditure on education is a useful
mechanism, but the introductory rationale for promoting female education
is still the same old utilitarian and functionalist approach to
women's empowerment issues--once again ignoring the rights-based
approach, despite the token first sentence.
On the data source, just a brief comment--the Government,
especially the Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs and Planning
and Development, have recently been very critical of the PIHS,
particularly in the context of the World Bank's poverty assessment
exercise. Thus, the author may perhaps wish to review his data source,
or look for more acceptable alternative sources.
In a more equal world, we would not see the assertion on p. 1,
whereby we note the ghettoisation of women in low-income employment such
as primary school teachers vs. university professors, where the author
appears to be promoting the former as an income generating activity for
women. While we commend the promotion of primary education and its
gender dimension, we also note with dismay that the author does not
refer to female "employment", but instead to "income
generation" for women. This is, once again, a reflection of the
traditional marginalisation of women's work vis-a-vis that of men
in male perception.
In the explanation on unit subsidies in education (p. 6) it is
stated that because education is a provincial subject, the provincial
governments are responsible for financing educational services. The
author omitted mentioning the fact that tertiary (university) education
is federally financed--through the former University Grants Commission
(UGC), recently renamed the Higher Education Commission (HEC). Hence,
provincial expenditure statements do not provide a complete picture of
public expenditures on education at all levels.
On pp. 8-9, gender differentials are discussed only in regard to
enrolment rates. However, as we are all aware, enrolment rates are just
one indicator it is necessary to also provide gender- and
urban/rural-disaggregated data pertaining to the primary level
completion and dropout rates. We know that the dropout rates are much
higher for girls, especially in the rural areas--being as high as 90+
percent in some parts of Balochistan and NWFP. More analysis is required
on this unconscionable aspect of gender disparities in education,
particularly at the primary level.
The findings on the contradictory aspects of increasing subsidies
on female primary education vs. continuing gender disparities in
enrolment--at all educational and income levels--needed some discussion,
analysis and recommendations. This is a major omission in the paper.
Also missing is any mention of the availability of educational
institutions in the non-government (NGOs) and private (for-profit)
sectors. While this may not appear to be relevant to the discussion on
government expenditures or subsidies on education in the formal public
sector, it does have an impact on national gross enrolment rates at all
levels--primary, secondary and tertiary--both in the general and
technical/professional streams, especially in the urban areas. The
existence of the NGOs and the private sector cannot be ignored. The
issue of quality---or the lack thereof--has not been introduced in the
discussion, despite its importance.
Whether by commission or omission, the paper received for comments
four days before the conference, is incomplete, as per the outline given
on p. 3 (incidentally, it would be helpful for discussants if the pages
were to be numbered). Only Punjab data is provided, and the paper ends
abruptly at the start of the discussion on Sindh, while NWFP and
Balochistan are missing altogether, as are the promised observations and
policy implications. The triple-spaced 11-page paper comprises
introductory statements, definitions and three tables on school
enrolments and subsidies. Thus, it emerges that the author's basic
question in the abstract: "To what extent has government education
spending in Pakistan been effective in reducing gender gaps in
enrolments?" has not been answered in the current form of the
paper.
Tahira Abdullah
Islamabad.
Author's Note: The author gratefully acknowledges comments and
suggestions by Hafiz A. Pasha, Director, Regional Bureau for Asia and
Pacific, UNDP, Haroon Jamal, Principal Economist, SPDC, and the
conference participants, specialty Tahira Abduilah and Khadija Haq.
(1) See Demery (2000).
(2) See Van de Walle (1998).
(3) Recently, University Grants Commission was renamed as the
Higher Education Commission.
(4) Both public and private enrolments are included.
Muhammad Sabir is an Economist based at Social Policy and
Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi.
Table 1
Education Unit Subsidies in 1998-99
(Rs/Anum)
Education Unit Subsidies
(Per Student)
Cost
Gross Recovery Net
Primary Education
Punjab 2,686 30.20 2,656
Sindh 3,100 1.62 3,098
NWFP 2,201 0.11 2,200
Balochistan 1,555 -- 1,555
Secondary Education
Punjab 1,445 79.07 1,366
Sindh 2,093 63.23 2,029
NWFP 2,915 71.79 2,843
Balochistan 2,605 2.44 2,603
General and Professional Colleges/
Universities/Institutes
Punjab 5,538 562 4,976
Sindh 3,655 299 3,356
NWFP 9,172 200 8,972
Balochistan 7,126 53 7,073
Source: Author's estimates based on Provincial and Federal Demand for
Grants 1999-2000, Estimates of Receipts 1999-2000, and PIHS 1998-99.
Table 2
Gross Enrolment Ratio by Gender, Quartile, and Province (1998-99)
Primary Secondary
Income Level /Province Males Females Males Females
Punjab
Rich 101% 81% 89% 74%
Upper Middle 92% 86% 78% 62%
Lower Middle 82% 72% 59% 45%
Poor 65% 53% 39% 25%
All Group 80% 68% 62% 46%
Sindh
Rich 87% 73% 105% 59%
Upper Middle 80% 55% 82% 51%
Lower Middle 66% 47% 61% 38%
Poor 49% 35% 47% 29%
All Group 64% 46% 65% 40%
NWFP
Rich 105% 80% 106% 56%
Upper Middle 88% 55% 79% 36%
Lower Middle 80% 56% 61% 24%
Poor 67% 31% 53% 11%
All Group 81% 50% 70% 28%
Balochistan
Rich 80% 67% 76% 47%
Upper Middle 78% 33% 76% 26%
Lower Middle 68% 43% 50% 14%
Poor 54% 36% 51% 13%
All Group 69% 43% 62% 22%
Tertiary
Income Level /Province Males Females
Punjab
Rich 16% 12%
Upper Middle 8% 5%
Lower Middle 3% 3%
Poor 2% 1%
All Group 7% 5%
Sindh
Rich 25% 10%
Upper Middle 16% 6%
Lower Middle 12% 4%
Poor 9% 4%
All Group 15% 6%
NWFP
Rich 17% 10%
Upper Middle 11% 5%
Lower Middle 7% 1%
Poor 3% 0%
All Group 9% 4%
Balochistan
Rich 22% 4%
Upper Middle 12% 2%
Lower Middle 5% 1%
Poor 4% 0%
All Group 11% 2%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99.
Table 3A
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education-Punjab
Male
Per Capita Share Per Capita
Income Level (Rs) (%) (Rs)
Primary Level
Rich 1,544 8% 1,012
Upper Middle 1,536 11% 1,419
Lower Middle 1,593 16% 1,448
Poor 1,341 20% 1,065
All Group 1,475 55% 1,233
Secondary Level
Rich 824 14% 681
Upper Middle 852 17% 594
Lower Middle 680 16% 497
Poor 468 15% 249
All Group 670 61% 455
Tertiary Level
Rich 529 28% 435
Upper Middle 261 17% 183
Lower Middle 84 5% 94
Poor 74 4% 45
All Group 229 55% 179
Female
Total
Share Per Capita Share
Income Level (%) (Rs) (%)
Primary Level
Rich 5% 1,292 13%
Upper Middle 10% 1,478 21%
Lower Middle 15% 1,521 30%
Poor 15% 1,206 35%
All Group 45% 1,356 100%
Secondary Level
Rich 9% 760 22%
Upper Middle 11% 729 27%
Lower Middle 12% 590 28%
Poor 8% 359 22%
All Group 39% 566 100%
Tertiary Level
Rich 24% 482 53%
Upper Middle 12% 222 29%
Lower Middle 6% 89 12%
Poor 3% 59 7%
All Group 45% 203 100%
Source: Estimates based on PINS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for
Grants 1999-2000.
Table 3B
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education-Sindh
Male Female Total
Per Per Per
Capita Share Capita Share Capita Share
Income Level (Rs) (%) (Rs) (%) (Rs) (%)
Primary Level
Rich 1,410 6% 1,133 5% 1,276 11%
Upper Middle 1,658 13% 1,162 9% 1,413 22%
Lower Middle 1,537 18% 1,015 12% 1,273 31%
Poor 1,236 21% 907 15% 1,075 36%
All Group 1,422 59% 1,011 41% 1,218 100%
Secondary Level
Rich 1,294 9% 664 5% 972 14%
Upper Middle 1,263 17% 766 10% 1,025 27%
Lower Middle 1,028 18% 638 10% 839 28%
Poor 830 20% 523 11% 684 31%
All Group 1,034 64% 626 36% 837 100%
Tertiary Level
Rich 682 29% 177 6% 452 35%
Upper Middle 393 22% 135 6% 276 28%
Lower Middle 284 16% 84 4% 192 20%
Poor 201 11% 87 5% 145 16%
All Group 371 79% 115 21% 252 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for
Grants 1999-2000.
Table 3C
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education-NWFP
Male Female Total
Per Per Per
Capita Share Capita Share Capita Share
Income Level (Rs) (%) (Rs) (%) (Rs) (%)
Primary Level
Rich 1,436 8% 1,223 7% 1,325 15%
Upper Middle 1,578 15% 1,039 10% 1,318 24%
Lower Middle 1,629 22% 1,128 12% 1,410 33%
Poor 1,329 19% 646 9% 983 28%
All Group 1,492 63% 945 37% 1,228 100%
Secondary Level
Rich 2,129 14% 1,129 8% 1,600 23%
Upper Middle 1,882 19% 917 9% 1,420 28%
Lower Middle 1,602 19% 675 8% 1,139 27%
Poor 1,398 18% 303 5% 805 22%
All Group 1,694 70% 679 30% 1,173 100%
Tertiary Level
Rich 934 29% 616 19% 773 48%
Upper Middle 732 23% 223 8% 470 31%
Lower Middle 333 11% 54 2% 184 13%
Poor 214 8% 5 0% 111 8%
All Group 536 71% 209 29% 368 100%
Source: Estimates based on PIHS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for
Grants 1999-2000.
Table 3D
Benefit Incidence of Public Spending on Tertiary Education--Balochistan
Male Female Total
Per Per Per
Income Level Capita Share Capita Share Capita Share
(Rs) (%) (Rs) (%) (Rs) (%)
Primary Level
Rich 1,091 12% 972 9% 1,038 21%
Upper Middle 1,158 20% 477 6% 858 26%
Lower Middle 1,028 20% 667 11% 865 30%
Poor 820 14% 551 9% 690 23%
All Group 1,019 66% 636 34% 844 100%
Secondary Level
Rich 1,774 16% 1,021 8% 1,416 24%
Upper Middle 1,939 28% 636 5% 1,450 33%
Lower Middle 1,266 17% 363 5% 824 22%
Poor 1,311 17% 348 4% 831 21%
All Group 1,563 77% 539 23% 1,091 100%
Tertiary Level
Rich 1453 44% 199 6% 851 50%
Upper Middle 576 25% 78 3% 337 28%
Lower Middle 369 12% 78 2% 232 15%
Poor 223 8% 6 0% 119 8%
All Group 631 89% 87 11% 372 100%
Source: Estimates based on PINS 1998-99 and Provincial Demand for
Grants 1999-2000.