Federalism reform imperatives, restructuring principles and lessons for Pakistan.
Shah, Anwar
In spite of several decades of sustained growth, Pakistan remains
in the company of "failed" states on account of its quality of
governance. This paper presents an institutional framework for improving
the quality of governance in Pakistan. This framework suggests that a
major challenge facing the public sector in Pakistan is to harmonise its
authorising environment and operational capacity with its mission and
values. It provides a broad outline of how such a difficult task can be
accomplished. The paper provides an analysis of the fiscal federalism dimensions of the authorising environment and presents directions for
reform. The paper recognises various political, bureaucratic and
institutional impediments that stand in the way of such reform. Finally,
the paper distils lessons on institutional reform of relevance to
Pakistan and other non-industrialised countries.
**********
Over the past several decades Pakistan's economic performance,
as measured by its rate of growth of real per capita GDP, has been
better than most countries in the region. It doubled its per capita
income over the past two decades [see Malik et al. (1994)]. Yet this
growth performance did not translate into improved public sector
performance in delivery of public services. Instead, Pakistan today
represents a classic case of decay in the public sector's enabling
environment and operational capacity. This is borne out by the index of
governance quality developed by Huther and Shah (1996). These authors
rank governance quality in Pakistan as "poor" and comparable
to those of the so-called "failed" or "predatory"
states in Sub-Sahara Africa. On several of the individual subcomponents
of the governance quality index such as citizen participation
(comprising political freedom and political stability), government
orientation (a composite measure of judicial efficiency, bureaucratic
efficiency, absence of corruption), social development (consisting of
human development and distributive justice), and economic management
(measured by central bank independence, debt management and outward
orientation), Pakistan consistently ranks amongst the worst performers
among a sample of 80 nations studied by the same authors.
Pakistan's record in public services delivery in general is quite
dismal and appears to show little improvement over time (see Figure 1).
The source of this malaise has not received any serious attention by
academics and policy-makers in Pakistan and elsewhere. Pakistan and the
development assistance community instead has continued to focus their
attention on policies to raise revenues and reduce the deficit and
Pakistan continues to take half a step forward, two steps backwards and
several steps sideways to skirt the issue and retain eligibility for
external financing to try yet one more time to support unsustainable
policies of its successive governments. This paper argues that as
Pakistan aspires to earn its place among nations with a strong record of
serving their citizens, it must focus its attention to reforming its
institutions (including political and bureaucratic cultures) of
governance. In the following a framework for improving public sector
performance in a federal system is presented and its implications for
reform imperatives in Pakistan are drawn.
A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM
The starting point for this framework is to develop a deeper
understanding of three contextual dimensions of public sector
organisation in any country. These are:
(a) Public Sector Mission and Values: Societal values and norms as
embodied in the constitution and more specifically reflected in annual
budget policy statements serve as the formal points of reference for
public sector mandates and its values in delivering these mandates.
Unwritten societal norms that are widely shared or acknowledged should
also be taken into consideration. In industrialised countries, public
sector mission and values are realistically spelled out in terms of a
medium term policy framework. For example, there is a formal requirement
in New Zealand that such a policy statement must be tabled in the
parliament by March 31 (about 2-3 months in advance of the budget
statement). Pakistan's constitution specified reasonably precise
but ambitious goals in certain areas such as attainment of adult
literacy by 1966 but the accomplishment of such goals has not been
seriously attempted. Similarly central planning made lofty promises that
were never fulfilled. Public sector values in Pakistan have never been
addressed. This is because the public sector orientation remains on
"command and control" rather than serving its citizenry. For
an official trained in 'command and control', need to develop
a code of conduct of client orientation, may appear quite futile.
(b) Authorising Environment: Formal (budgetary processes and
institutions) and informal institutions of participation and
accountability are of interest here. Do these institutions and processes
work as intended in providing an enabling environment for the public
sector to meet its goals? Do various levels of government act in the
spirit of the constitution in exercising their responsibilities? What
are the checks and balances against deviant behaviour? Is independence
of central bank, judiciary, and auditor general guaranteed? Is the
central bank focused solely on price stability or is it expected to
pursue multiple objectives? Are there formal rules to ensure fiscal
discipline? Is the design of transfers consistent with their objectives?
Are their private agencies that rate various levels of government for
their credit worthiness? Is public sector borrowing subject to financial
market discipline? How is the government performance measured? Are
output and outcome indicators for public services monitored by any one?
In industrialised countries, institutional norms are strictly
adhered to and there are severe moral, legal voter and market sanctions
against noncompliance. Pakistan's constitution with a few
exceptions such as central bank independence, provides an excellent
blueprint for a sound authorising environment for the public sector but
regrettably the practice in Pakistan almost completely negates the
constitutional intentions.
(c) Operational capacity and constraints: What is authorised is not
necessarily what may get done as the operational capacity may not be
consistent with the task at hand. Some key questions to a better
understanding of the operational capacity include: Do the agencies with
responsibility lot various tasks have the capacity to undertake them? Do
they have the right skills mix and also have the incentive to doing the
right things and doing them right'? Is the bureaucratic culture
consistent with the attainment of societal objectives? Are their binding
contracts on public managers for output performance? Does participation
by civil society helps alleviate some of these constraints? To what
extent these constraints can be overcome by government reorganisation and reform? Whereas, in industrial countries, answers to most of the
above questions are expected to be in affirmative it is not true in the
case of Pakistan.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
The challenge of public sector reform in any country is to
harmonise public sector mission and values, its authorising environment
and its operational capacity so that there is close if not perfect
correspondence among these three aspects of governance (see Figure 2).
Such a task is daunting for any developing country. It is probably a
less daunting but nevertheless quite a complex task in Pakistan. This is
because while most of the fundamental institutions are already in place
yet a political and bureaucratic will to restore these institutions
their due role may not be forthcoming.
Scope of the Paper: The framework outlined above suggests that in
Pakistan there is an urgent need to start a process of institutional
renewal and reform. Addressing such a large agenda is beyond the scope
of this paper. Instead, the remainder of the paper simply addresses a
subset of those issues dealing with federalism dimensions of the
authorising environment only. The paper is organised as follows. First,
an introductory overview of the federal system is presented. This is
following by an analysis of taxing and spending responsibilities of
various levels of government. Subsequently an evaluation of fiscal
transfers is carried out. The two concluding sections discuss the
impediments to reform efforts in Pakistan and draws lessons from
Pakistan's experience for other developing countries.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT
IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan is a federation of four provinces, Punjab (56 percent of
total population), Sindh (23 percent of total population), Northwest
Frontier Province (13 percent of total population) and Balochistan (5
percent of total population). In addition to the four provinces, parts
of Kashmir which acceded to Pakistan are organised as the State of Azad
Kashmir and enjoy self-government. Federally administered northern areas
include the administrative district of Daiamir, Ghanche, Ghizer, Gilgit
and Skardu. There are also seven self-governing federally administered
tribal areas where the laws of Pakistan do not apply consistent with the
tradition fostered under the British Empire. For administrative
purposes, the provinces are subdivided into divisions and each division
is divided into districts and each district is subdivided into tehsils.
At the district and tehsil levels, elected councils and provincial civil
administration have overlapping administrative responsibilities.
Local governments in Pakistan do not have any distinct
constitutional status; they are established by provincial governments
and powers are determined by provincial statutes (see Table 1 for an
impressionistic review of the fiscal system in Pakistan). At the present
time, there are 5195 local government units in Pakistan of which only
512 units are in urban areas. For local government purposes, urban areas
are organised by population size class into metropolitan corporations,
municipal corporations, municipal committees, town committees and
cantonment boards. Metropolitan corporations have some deconcentration of metro functions by zonal offices. Karachi metropolitan corporation has in the past experimented with a zonal lower tier of local government
called municipal committees. Land development and water and sewerage functions in large urban areas are assumed by provincial agencies called
Development Authorities (DAs) and Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs)
respectively, and for smaller municipalities, development expenditures
are undertaken directly by provincial line departments. Karachi
Metropolitan Corporation represents the exception in water and sewerage
with its own Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB). Rural areas are
organised into a two tier local government structure with the lower tier
union council representing several villages and a larger rural area
called a district having a district council comprising several union
councils. Provincial statutes regarding local government organisation
are fairly uniform and provide for elected local councils to have broad
powers over a wide range of local public services. In practice however,
for reasons to be discussed later, the existing system of local
government has become dysfunctional.
In terms of programme spending, the federal government dominates in
defense, debt servicing, general administration, fuel and power,
transportation and communications, industrial development, population
planning, manpower management, water supply, and sanitation and
subsidies. Provincial government spending dominates in law and order,
food and agriculture, rural development, education, and health. Local
government spending is pre-eminent in social welfare, parks and
recreation, and animal care. Overall, federal government spending
accounted for 67.2 percent of consolidated programme spending, with the
provincial government spending share at 28.8 percent, and local
government spending representing, only 4.1 percent of total in 1994-95.
It is also interesting to note that federal and provincial governments
accounted for 73.3 percent of total spending on local public services in
the same year. At the same time, the federal government collects 90.7
percent of the total tax revenue, with the remaining 9.3 pelvent
collected in roughly equal proportions by the provinces and local
governments.
The 1973 Constitution delineates the responsibilities of federal
government (Federal Legislative List) and the areas of shared
responsibilities (Concurrent Legislative List). All residual functions
are the domain of provincial governments. Local governments functions
are defined under provincial laws through the use of Local Government
Ordinances. The federal government is responsible for such key areas as
defense, foreign affairs, international trade, macroeconomic management
and industrial development, among others. The provinces share with the
federal government responsibility for population planning, curriculum
and syllabus planning, and social welfare, and are solely responsible
for roads, highways, police protection and justice, agriculture and
post-primary education. Local governments are given responsibility for
local public services as basic education and health, fire protection,
parks and recreation, and water and sewerage.
Despite the extent of decentralisation of legislative
responsibilities as set out in the constitution and provincial statutes,
the actual assumption of responsibilities is more centralised. For
example, though education is a sub-national responsibility in Pakistan,
the federal government nevertheless takes responsibility in national
policy formulation, planning, curriculum, and managing centres of
excellence. Similarly, although health care in Pakistan is a
sub-national responsibility and much of it assigned to the local level,
in practice, it is more centralised. The federal government is
responsible for drug regulation and quality control, regulating the
standard of professional education, undertaking measures for containing
communicable disease, and interacting with external organisations.
Implications of the Existing Structure
A quick review of the federal structure in Pakistan suggests that
the legislative division of powers in Pakistan as set out by the
constitution and provincial statutes compares favourably to the
assignment based on fiscal federalism principles especially the
subsidiary principle i.e. assignment should be at the lowest level of
government unless a convincing case can be made against such an
assignment based upon efficiency, equity or economic union arguments see
Shah (1994), for an overview of the fiscal federalism principles. See
Appendix Tables AI and A2 for a stylised assignment of
responsibilities). However, the actual assumption of responsibilities by
various levels of government during the past two decades have
consistently departed from the de jure assignment. Higher level
governments have increasingly encroached not only upon lower level
government responsibilities, but also upon traditional private sector
functions. There appears to be a trend towards centralisation of
responsibilities with the federal government assuming either an
exclusive role (e.g., population planning, electricity, curriculum
development, syllabus planning, centres of excellence) or a dominant
role (e.g., social welfare, vocational/technical training, employment
exchanges, historical sites and museums) for some of the functions on
the concurrent list, and even for some specified to be purely
provincial. It should be noted that while majority of social welfare
expenditures (87.7 percent in 1994-95) are carried out by local
governments/religious institutions/community groups, these entities
simply administer federally defined and financed programmes. Similarly,
provincial governments have gradually assumed a large number of
functions previously carried out, and intended to be carried out, by
local governments (e.g., curative health, land development, primary
education, farm-to-market roads, rural development, preventive health,
water supply, drainage and sewerage) and/or the private sector. Superior
institutional capacity at higher levels of government and the attendant
efficiency in service delivery was cited by the federal and provincial
governments as main reasons for this centralisation of responsibility
for public services. And, market failures have been cited as the reason
for higher level governments in Pakistan to increasingly have assumed
responsibility for direct provision of private goods and services. Such
an involvement is quite widespread, and encompasses such key economic
areas as manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, banking and financial
intermediation functions.
In general, wider interpretations of their constitutional mandates
by federal and provincial governments have had the following
implications for public sector" management in Pakistan.
(i) Aggregate fiscal discipline is lacking inspite of centralised
controls. This arises from a lack of appropriate institutional
environment to force governments at all levels to face financial
consequences of their decisions. Such an institutional environment
requires (a) an independent central bank entrusted with the sole task of
price stability alone; (b) arms length relationship between the
financial sector and governments; (c) fiscal rules and gate-keeper
committees for self-discipline; and (d) no bailouts of any levels of
government by the central bank or by higher" level governments see
Shah (1997) for a detailed overview of experiences with macroeconomic
management under centralised and decentralised fiscal systems).
Regrettably, Pakistan continues to follow failed policies of fiscal
discipline through centralised controls.
(ii) The private sector is crowded out. Federal and provincial
governments during the 1970s acted aggressively to curtail private
sector participation in education and health services and in industry,
banking and finance resulting in limiting citizens' choices and
lowering the quality and quantity of private and quasi-private goods and
services. It is useful to note here that recent survey results indicate
that the public sector in Pakistan is less efficient than the private
sector in the provision of education and health services [see Hassan
(1995)].
(iii) Decision-making is highly centralised. In areas of concurrent
responsibility, the higher level of government has often adopted a
dominant position. Decisions on most large capital projects require
federal approval. And, as most local functions are being assumed by the
provincial government, local participation in major" public policy
decisions that affect them is by and large non-existent.
(iv) Efficiency and equity in public service provision are
undermined. Since the decision-making is significantly divorced from the
people on whose behalf decisions are being made, there is a greater
likelihood of imperfect matching of local public services with local
preferences, and of inadequate levels of response to local needs. These
problems are particularly acute in primary education and basic health.
In primary education, enrolment rates are low (42 percent), dropout rates are high (50 percent between grades 1 and 2) and female literacy
rates are low (22 percent). In rural areas, fewer than 15 percent of
girls complete 5 years of education, and only 1 percent of girls remain
in school by age 14. Absenteeism by teachers goes unreported. Teachers
are not accountable to local communities or parents or even to school
heads, but are transferable at will by the Provincial Department of
Education. Centralisation of primary education has also worked to create
"ghost" schools which either exist on paper but could not be
located or have a presence in the form of school buildings but cannot
find students. In basic health, performance under provincial
administration is no better. Most health centres lack medicines and
supplies and in many instances proper sanitary conditions. In rural
areas, health centres often lack both medical personnel and supplies.
Medical personnel are frequently transferred against their will. There
are no channels for local participation and input in the provision of
health care. While no welfare cost estimates associated with
centralisation are available for Pakistan, for industrialised countries
such losses on account of simply misjudging preferences are expected to
range 9-20 percent of expenditures. Once one considers the lack of local
accountability, participation and delinking of benefits and costs,
welfare losses are expected to be of much greater magnitude.
(v) Public sector accountability is impaired. Separation of taxing
and spending decisions at the provincial and local level compromises
accountability as citizens do not know with any precision who is
responsible for what services. The level of government raising most of
the revenues, i.e. the federal government, may be blamed for
provincial-local service delivery problems. Accountability is also
impaired because of a lack of clarity regarding the roles of various
levels of government in areas of shared responsibility.
(vi) The local public sector is weakened. Pakistan started out with
a well thought out and well developed local government organisation
structure. During the 1950s and 1960s, local governments were a vibrant
part of the public sector and delivered most of the local public
services. During the 1970s and 1980s, some of the more important local
functions, such as primary education and basic health, were shifted
upwards to provincial governments. Provincial and the federal
governments currently dominate the provision of local public services.
As an example, consider water and sewer where the federal and provincial
governments together account for 95 percent of total public sector
expenditures. This centralisation of local service responsibilities has
led to deterioration in service quality, as accountability is
significantly impaired.
The implication of this is that the current degree of
centralisation of expenditure responsibilities have not served the
country well and may not be sustainable in the long run.
Reorienting Government Functions to Strengthen Accountability and
to Improve Service Delivery
To overcome above-mentioned problems, a number of options may be
worthy of consideration by Pakistan. These include:
(a) Fostering enabling environment for aggregate fiscal discipline.
Critical elements for such an enabling environment would be: (a)
granting independence to the State Bank of Pakistan but having the Bank
governor under contract to ensure price stability with an independent
oversight board to review performance under this contract; (b)
prohibiting ownership and preferential access to financial markets by
any level of government; (c) establishing golden rules for borrowing
(i.e. borrowing permitted for long term capital projects only) and
guidelines on the permissible levels of deficit and debt as a percent of
GDP and having gatekeeper federal-provincial committees to enforce
compliance; and (d) strengthening private sector oversight of all
governments through requirements for credit ratings and private
financial audits.
(b) Disengaging federal and provincial governments from provision
of private goods and services and from production of public goods and
services that can be delivered more efficiently by the private sector.
This process has been underway at a snail's pace. The successful
experience of the Czech Republic and not-so-successful experience of
Romania demonstrates that the success critically depends upon the
rapidity of pace at which reforms are executed. Deregulation of economic
activities started seriously in Pakistan only in the early 1990s. The
redistributive role of the public sector requires that the provision of
basic social services due to their positive redistributive impacts
should be a fundamental public sector responsibility. Nevertheless, the
scope for greater private sector involvement to assist the public sector
in the delivery of social services is substantial. This would conserve
scarce public resources and improve the quantity and quality of
services.
(c) Restoring federal budgetary flexibility to ensure fulfilment of
its mandates in macroeconomic stabilisation, regional and personal
equity, and preservation of internal common market. It entails focusing
federal government role primarily to its constitutional mandate. This
requires retrenchment of direct federal roles in private and local
public goods. It also requires rethinking current system of revenue
sharing and discretionary transfers and replacing these by fiscal
equalisation and conditional (per capita block transfers) conditional on
standards of services to be achieved as opposed to current conditions on
spending levels. This will allow the federal governments to use its
spending power (through fiscal transfers) to influence subnational
governments priorities in meeting national standards in education and
health and basic infrastructure as well as ensuring comparable levels of
basic services at comparable levels of taxation across the country.
(d) Clarifying and coordinating roles of federal and provincial
governments. One option is to eliminate or at least curtail the federal
role in a number of areas that are either provincial oz" local
responsibility such as education or where central functions can impede progress in seeking innovative solutions e.g. central planning. Such
candidates for curtailment include: central planning and development,
irrigation, tourism, justice, transport and communications, population
control, curriculum development, syllabus planning, and establishing
centres of excellence. Such a retrenchment would have welcome effects on
federal budgetary flexibility and is expected to cut federal deficit in
halt'. In social services, the federal government's main
interest would be to ensure that norms of national equity are satisfied.
As such, it would mainly be concerned with setting national minimum
standards and providing financing to the provinces conditional on their
complying with these standards.
(e) Clarifying provincial-local responsibilities and strengthening
local governments. Provincial governments have increasingly adopted an
intrusive and unhelpful role in local governance. Local governments are
being denied an opportunity to succeed and instead their roles are being
subsumed by provincial governments. Arresting this trend could restore
public confidence in the public sector. Provincial governments simply do
not have the capacity to oversee, monitor, and manage the performance of
a vast institutional network of basic services like primary education
and basic health. It would therefore be desirable to curtail provincial
role in land development, urban and rural water supply and drainage,
primary and secondary education, basic health, preventive care and local
roads. For all these services, however, the provincial oversight role
and assistance for technical and financial matters needs to be
strengthened.
The provincial role in financing primary and secondary schools and
basic health could be large if not complete. Management of schools and
health centres including staff recruitment, however, should be a local
responsibility. In general, all local public services could be devolved
to local governments in an asymmetric fashion depending upon the
population and area served and local fiscal capacity. Large metropolitan
areas with population in excess of one million could be given broad
local powers. These may be subdivided into municipal committees
(responsible for neighbourhood services) of say 500,000 residents each
with regional/metropolitan functions (water and sewer trunk lines,
intermunicipal roads, regional planning, land use planning etc.)
assigned to a metropolitan corporation comprising of nominated members
(possibly chairpersons) from member municipalities.
Finally, consideration may be given to amending local government
ordinances to introduce safeguards against unwarranted provincial
interference in local affairs and to strengthen provincial financial
oversight by requiring municipalities to submit commercially audited
financial statements to the provincial government in a timely fashion.
Private commercial auditing of federal and provincial governments would
further strengthen government accountability. Further, mechanisms may be
developed to streamline provincial technical assistance to
municipalities. Provincial officials at the local level may be required
to submit an annual review of municipal governance issues and a strategy
for provincial financial and technical assistance in their jurisdiction
to be shared with the province as well as with local government
officials. Alternate means to strengthen the supportive role of
provincial officials to local government institutions may also be
explored. Consideration may be given to eliminating the dual
administrative structure at the local level by withdrawing the
federal/provincial role in direct administration at local levels [see
Government of Pakistan (1994)]. This can be accomplished as part of the
civil service reform. It is interesting to note that local governments
in India faced similar circumstances prior to 1993 as state governments
often either encroached upon their responsibilities or simply disbanded
elected councils as is the current common practice in Pakistan. To
rectify this situation, Indian Parliament passed two constitutional
amendments--the Seventy-third (The Panchayats) and the Seventy-fourth
(The Municipalities) Amendments to the Constitution Act, 1992. By these
amendments, local governments in India have acquired a constitutional
status and their powers and relationships with states have been
clarified [see Bakshi (1994)]. In addition, these amendments require
states to establish a State Finance Commission for distribution of state
fiscal transfers to local governments and establishment of Metropolitan
Planning Committee for planning and coordination of development
activities comprising of at least two-thirds of the elected members from
member urban and rural municipalities in proportion to their population
and the appointment of remaining members may be specified by the state
legislature. The responsibilities of rural (Panchayats) and urban
municipalities are specified in the Eleventh Schedule (Article 243G) and
the Twelfth Schedule (Article 243W) of the Indian Constitution Act 1992
(see Table A2.10).
Special Issues for Administration of Rural Municipalities
Local administration of rural areas is heavily concentrated at the
district level with union council having negligible or minimal
responsibilities. The district level, however, is typically unsuited as
a local government unit because of the size of the area and population
to be served. For Pakistan as a whole, a district averages 883,000
persons. Comparable figures for Sindh and Punjab are about one and 1.3
million people. These are very large populations being under one
government by any standards especially when the union council have
minimal or negligible responsibilities. In western Canada, rural
districts typically serve only 20,000 people. Not only that, the
district areas in Pakistan are very large. They average 100 km by 100 km
for the nation as a whole and almost that size in the densely populated province of Punjab. Given their large size and clientele they are not
suitable for delivery of basic services. Instead, their role could be of
a regional government that would take care of planning, coordinating,
and of supplying services that encompass areas covering many union
councils. They could be responsible for major link roads, sewerage
connectors, waste treatment plants and disposal sites, water supply
(i.e. mains and not intra-community distribution systems), a second tier
of health facilities and perhaps secondary schooling. Rural property
assessments (using a provincial base) could also be suitably assigned to
them. A potentially useful role for the districts would be providing
technical and other support tot union and tehsil councils such as (often
occasional demands for road, water, sanitation) engineering advice and
the training to develop accounting and management skills of union and
tehsil council employees.
The size of the union councils (averaging 16,000 persons and 191
sq. km) compares favourably with that of the local governments that are
responsible for the bulk of local services and functions in most
countries. In almost all of the developed countries surveyed in McMillan
(1995), the size of local governments fell into the 10,000 to 30,000
population range. Although there are wide variations within countries
around these numbers, yet this range says a lot about a size of basic
local unit thin can be effective in providing the broad range of local
services and effective in a political representation sense also. These
authorities could certainly play a much larger role. In communities this
large, there is ample decision-making capacity and these are the people
best aware of local needs, conditions and preferences. Decisions
demanding technical skills often do not demand continuous input but
rather good advice when a decision is to be made; e.g., road, water or
sewer line construction and the supervision of such work when done. This
is regularly handled in smaller municipalities throughout the world by
hiring that expertise when needed. Local decision-makers are best able,
given well defined alternatives, to select the facilities and allocate
the resources to best meet local needs and utilise the available
resources. Advisory services might come from the district level, but
with the development of demands by union council governments, private
and competitive expertise would soon emerge.
The magnitude of the district governments and the very reasonable
size but minimal responsibilities of the union councils is an anomaly
suggesting that the roles of the district and union councils require a
careful review. Given the size of the rural district councils, they
could assume responsibility for functions like those of the larger urban
municipalities and even some of the upper tier metropolitan government.
Indeed, it would not be surprising if the tehsil council (combinations
of union governments possibly at the tehsil level) might not be more
effective at some of those functions than the district councils which
may be too large (geographically) for some of these activities.
THE FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL ALLOCATION OF TAXING POWERS
The allocation of taxing powers to various levels of government has
an important bearing on the character of federalism and on
accountability. For example, if the ability of sub-national
jurisdictions to raise their own tax revenues is restricted, this can
impose significant constraints on the ability of these jurisdictions to
fulfil their proper expenditure responsibilities, and can therefore
compromise the potential benefits to be had from decentralisation. The
allocation of taxing powers is determined jointly by the constitutional
assignment of tax sources by level of government as well as by the
extent to which each level, especially the federal has chosen to exploit
the major tax bases. The higher the tax rates chosen by the federal
government, the less room there will be for raising revenues by
sub-national levels, and the more dependent will the latter be on the
federal government for their revenues.
The fiscal federalism literature advances the following principles
for tax assignment [see Shah (1994) for further discussion].
Efficiency of the Internal Common Market. For free mobility of
factors and goods and services, taxes on mobile factors of production or
tradable goods and services should either be assigned to the federal
government or harmonised and coordinated among subnational governments.
National Equity. Progressive redistributive taxes should be
assigned to the level having primary responsibility for redistribution.
Administration Cost. To minimise collection, administration and
compliance costs, a tax should be assigned to the level likely to be
best informed about its base.
Fiscal Need. To ensure accountability revenue means should be
matched as closely as possible with expenditure needs.
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan specifies the following as areas
of taxing responsibility for the federal government:
* customs duties including export duties;
* excise duties including duties on salt, but excluding duties on
alcoholic liquors, opium and other narcotics:
* duties in respect to succession of property;
* estate duty in respect of property;
* income taxes other than on agricultural income;
* corporation tax;
* tax on sales and purchase of goods imported, exported, produced,
manufactured or consumed;
* taxes on the capital value of assets, not including taxes on
capital gains on immovable property;
* taxes on mineral oil, natural gas and minerals for use in
generation of nuclear energy;
* taxes and duties on production capacity of any plant, machinery,
undertaking, establishment or installation in lieu of any or more of
them; and
* terminal taxes on goods and passengers carried by railway, sea or
air and taxes on their fares and freights.
All other forms of taxation not specified in the above list fall
under the purview of provincial governments. The provincial governments
then allocate some of these to local governments on the basis of local
government ordinances. The major sources of revenue for provincial
governments are in fact transfers from the federal government in the
form of revenue sharing. The major own sources of provincial revenues
are stamp duties, motor vehicle registration taxes and entertainment
taxes. Local governments rely heavily on provincially administered real
property and motor vehicle registration taxes and on self-administered
import/export (octori/export) taxes. The use of these assigned taxing
powers by the various levels of government in Pakistan results in actual
revenue raising to be heavily concentrated at the federal level, much
more so than is required to finance its expenditure responsibilities.
The federal government collects 90.7 percent of consolidated current
revenues and retains only 59.3 percent lot own use. It is also
interesting to note that while the federal government collects resource
taxes and royalties primarily for transfers to provincial governments,
the latter governments also reciprocate by collecting taxes on capital
values and for the religious taxes, zakat and ushr, at rates determined
by the federal government, and turning the proceeds over to the federal
government. Such an arrangement whereby revenues are passed upwards is
unusual in federations, the notable exceptions being China (a unitary country) and Russia where for historical and institutional reasons the
major revenues are collected by sub-national governments and shares are
transferred to the central government. In Pakistan, these are relatively
minor revenue sources, and the reason for provincial administration, at
least for the zakat and ushr (1) owes to the religious nature of them.
One important and distinguishing feature of the constitutional
assignment of taxing powers to the federal government and the provinces
in Pakistan is the tendency to assign major tax bases exclusively to one
level of government or the other. Moreover, those bases that are often
the largest revenues sources, such as sales and excise taxes and income
taxes, are assigned to the federal government. In many federations, such
taxes are co-occupied by the two levels of government so both are able
to obtain revenues from them independently, though preferably in a
harmonised fashion. This tendency to exclusive assignment has been a
factor leading to the highly centralised revenue raising system observed
in Pakistan, as well possibly to the fact that revenue sharing is
resorted to as a means of transferring funds to the provinces. As we
note later, revenue sharing has the disadvantage of not fostering
accountability at the provincial level. This feature of exclusive
assignment is not present at the provincial/local level. Entertainment
taxes and taxes on cinemas, hotels and professions are co-occupied by
provincial and local governments usually with independent collection.
Tax assignment in Pakistan emphasises efficiency in tax
administration and uniformity of the tax regime across the nation to the
neglect of provincial and local fiscal autonomy and fiscal needs and
accountability considerations. Thus provincial governments are almost
completely dependent upon revenue transfers from higher levels of
government to finance their own expenditures. This degree of separation
of taxing and spending responsibilities may not be in the interest of
either the federal or the provincial level of government. Provincial
governments have no control over their major sources of revenue, and may
not have any incentives for cost efficiency or for raising revenues from
own sources as additional efforts may not be worth the political costs.
A possible option for reform would have the federal government
retain exclusive responsibility for taxation of international trade,
corporate income and for value-added taxation of sales of goods and
services. The federal government would maintain primary responsibility
for taxing personal income, though with the ability of the provinces to
piggyback at flat rates. The current practice of the federal government
levying excises on production and royalties on natural resource
exploitation and turning over the proceeds to the provinces could be
reviewed. This is anomalous for three reasons. First if these are
provincial revenue sources, it is not clear that the federal government
should be involved in their administration. Accountability would be
enhanced by allowing the provinces to act as their own tax authorities.
Second, given that crude oil and natural gas are distributed unevenly
across provinces, the practice of returning them to the province of
origin leads to differences in fiscal capacity across provinces. And
third, fiscal federalism principles suggest that major resource revenues
should be retained as federal revenues. Provinces could have control
over most excise taxes, taxes on agricultural land, and over wage
(payroll) taxes, and could levy a broad-based single sales tax in
parallel with the federal VAT with its base harmonised with the Federal
VAT at retail level. Local governments may be given a role in setting
property tax rates, and access to electricity duties, school lees, water
and sewer rates and taxes on cinemas, hotels and entertainment services.
Taxes on interprovincial and intermunicipal trade should be considered
for elimination. This tax assignment would be consistent with the fixed
constitutional arrangements for sharing fiscal powers.
It is interesting to note that in Pakistan in 1994-95, over 90
percent of all taxes were realised through withholding and voluntary
payments, and 100 major corporations account for 75 percent of income,
80 percent of excises and 60 percent of sales taxes. Further, the record
of federal tax administration bureaucracy in tax enforcement is not
enviable. Surveys of businesses have indicated that the tax collection
machinery appears to be more zealous in collecting bribes than taxes
[see Stone (1995)]. Therefore, institutional capacity for tax
administration should not be considered to be a serious impediment to
any changes in tax assignment
These suggestions in aggregate would lead to a significant change
in own revenues generated at various levels of government in Pakistan
and would result in greater conformity of revenue means with expenditure
needs for these governments.
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL TRANSFERS
Matching revenue means as closely as possible to expenditure needs
of various levels of government serves to strengthen accountability in a
federal system. Stronger tax performance and better cost recovery
policies at the sub-national level will help in this task. It is
however, desirable in federal systems for higher level governments to
have access to more revenues than those dictated by their direct
programme responsibilities alone. These additional revenues can be used
to further national or provincial economic objectives such as setting
national standards, securing economic union and ensuring interregional and intermunicipal fiscal equity. The design of these transfers, however
is critical to achieving the objectives sought (see Table 2). The issues
pertaining to the design of these transfers are the subject of focus in
the following paragraphs.
Federal fiscal transfers to the provinces are the dominant source
of financing operating expenditures for provincial governments in
Pakistan, accounting for 87.5 percent of their operating expenditures in
1994-95. They financed nearly 99 percent of operating expenditure for
the two smaller provinces. The design of these transfers have important
implications for the fiscal behaviour of provincial governments and for
the efficiency and equity of public service provision in Pakistan.
Provincial transfers to local governments on the other hand are of minor
significance in local finances as the provinces have provincialised
major local public services such as basic health, education and water
and sanitation. In the following, the existing structure of
federal-provincial transfers is first described and then evaluated for
consistency of its design with the objectives sought.
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL FISCAL TRANSFERS: CURRENT STRUCTURE
Federal government transfers to the provinces consist of both
unconditional and conditional components. These are briefly discussed
below.
A. Unconditional Transfers: These transfers are advised by an
intergovernmental body, the National Finance Commission (NFC), that is
appointed every five years to conduct a review of federal transfers.
Federal and provincial finance ministers, federal finance secretary and
one additional member from each of the provinces are represented on the
Commission. This Commission has a chequered history, with many instances
of either not meeting, or meeting and not achieving a consensus view.
During the past two decades, only the 1991 and 1997 NFC recommendations
were made public and implemented. As a result of 1997 Award, the
following federal unconditional transfers are currently available to the
provinces.
(i) Constitutionally Mandated Revenue Sharing: The constitutionally
mandated revenue sharing programme consists of three elements
(a) Revenue Sharing by Origin--1997-98 (22 billion rupees)
Revenues shared on the basis of collection 14.2 percent
Excise duty and royalty on gas 3.6 percent
Surcharge on gas 4.3 percent
Royalty on crude oil 1.0 percent
Profits on hydroelectricity 5.5 percent
(b) Revenue Sharing by Population--1997-98 (171.4 billion rupees)
For this element, the NFC has defined a divisible pool that is
shared on 62.5:37.5 basis among federal and provincial governments. The
divisible pool consists of the following taxes: Taxes on income
including corporation tax, but not including taxes on income consisting
of remuneration paid out of Federal Consolidated fund: wealth tax:
capital value tax: taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported,
exported, manufactured or consumed: export duties on cotton; customs
duties; federal excise duties, excluding the excise duty on gas charged
at well head: any other tax by the Federal Government. With the 1997
Award, the following is the contribution of individual taxes to this
divisible pool.
Revenue Sources Shared on the Basis of Population 81.5 percent
Income Taxes 21.1 percent
Other Direct taxes 00.8 percent
Import duties 26.8 percent
Excise duties 13.2 percent
Sales tax 19.5 percent
(c) Special grants: The 1997 NFC Award recommended the following
transfers:
* To NWFP Province: Rs 3.3 billion in 1997-98 escalated by changes
in the Consumer Price Index (projected annual rate of 11 percent) for a
period of five years.
* To Balochistan Province: Rs 4.1 billion in 1997-98 escalated by
changes in the Consumer Price Index (projected annual rate of 11
percent) for a period of five years.
B. Conditional Transfers: These transfers are of lesser
significance in relative magnitudes but nevertheless about a dozen large
grant programmes have been in vogue in recent years.
Closed-end Matching Grants for Provincial Resource Mobilisation. As
part of the 1997 NFC Award, this programme provides federal matching
assistance at a 50 percent rate, upto a limit, for provincial revenue
effort in excess of the historical average growth rate of 14.2 percent.
The limits on these grants are Rs 500 million each in case of Punjab and
Sindh and Rs 100 million each for NWFP and Balochistan. The programme
recognises fiscal effort only on account of increases in tax rates,
withdrawal of exemptions, imposition of new taxes, and revision in rates
of user charges.
Development Grants. These grants are based on approval of
provincial annual development plans (ADPs) by the Federal Government.
Federal Contribution for Social Action Programme. The federal
Government provides matching transfers on a 75:25 basis to finance
provincial development expenditures in education, health, water supply
and sanitation associated with the Social Action Programme.
Flood and Disaster Relief. These grants are by their very nature ad
hoc in character, and are usually given to the Provinces for emergency
relief and repair and renovations to basic infrastructure as a result of
damages arising from natural disasters.
Physical Planning and Housing Project Assistance. These transfers
finance federally approved provincial projects to upgrade urban
infrastructure and housing projects. Federal assistance is given in the
form of conditional non-matching grants.
Tameer-e-Watan Programme. This programme provides block funds
allocations to federal legislators (in 1994-95, Rupees 6 million each
for members of the National Assembly and Rupees 5 million each for
senators) to be used for development project of their choice through
Provincial Ministries of Local Government and Rural Development.
Tameer-e-Sindh Programme. This programme provides federal financing
on an ad hoc non-matching basis tot rural development initiatives in the
Province of Sindh.
Other Federal Initiatives. Federal line ministries also fund
various provincial projects usually in the areas of social welfare,
population planning, health, irrigation and drainage.
Prime Minister's Discretionary Funding. The Prime Minister
occasionally uses discretionary allocation to provide provincial/local
governments with funds to finance special programmes.
Federal Transfers to Universities. While higher education in
Pakistan is a provincial responsibility, the Federal Government through
the University Grants Commission has traditionally provided financing
for university education. The funding mechanism used by the UGC is ad
hoc and is primarily guided by budgetary needs for salary expenditures.
Almost all of these conditional grants programmes are discretionary
in nature rather being than formula-driven. This has the disadvantage of
requiring that the grants be allocated by administrative decision, which
can be both costly and detract from of provincial decision-making
autonomy. As well, funds available may be unpredictable thereby
hampering long-term planning.
AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF FEDERAL TRANSFERS IN PAKISTAN
Revenue Sharing and Unconditional Transfers
The revenue sharing programme suggested by the 1997 NFC Award
allocates selected revenue sources on the basis of collection whereas
others are distributed to the provinces on the basis of population. In
addition, special lumpsum transfers are provided to the two smaller
provinces. These three components of the current programme are reviewed
in the following.
(a) Revenue Sharing by Origin: This component, which distributes
roughly 14 percent of total revenues, returns resource revenues (oil,
gas excises and royalties and hydro profits) by point of collection.
Hydroelectricity profits of federal public enterprises are also returned
to the province where such plant may be located. The formula used for a
determination of these profits makes no provision for capital
consumption allowances. The existing programme of resource revenue
sharing by origin seems difficult to justify as the federal government
collects revenues at centrally determined rates and then returns them to
provinces on the basis of point of collection. The reason for doing so
may be motivated in part to give resource rich provinces feelings of
entitlement and in part political accommodation needed to maintain
national unity. To be sure, this treatment remains contentious as the
largest province is now seeking the same treatment for federal
royalties/excises on cotton (see The Dawn. Pakistan, Internet Edition,
January 12, 1997). There seems neither to be an efficiency nor an equity
argument for doing so unlike population or needs-based revenue sharing.
Thus asymmetric treatment of resource based revenues is difficult to
justify and therefore, they could also be considered for inclusion in a
general revenue sharing pool to be distributed on a per capita and/or
need basis or better still such revenues go to the federal general
revenues pool for financing fiscal equalisation transfers to the
provinces. Furthermore, the assignment of hydroelectric profits to the
province of location of the facilities could be reassessed as it
undermines the financial ability and autonomy of the national power
enterprise (WAPDA).
(b) Revenue Sharing by Population: About 85 percent of revenue
sharing funds are distributed by population. This programme is to be
commended for its simplicity, objectivity and transferring a large pool
of resources in a predictable fashion to bridge vertical fiscal
imbalances. Moreover, the use of population implies that the funds are
distributed in an equalising manner. Although population is used as the
sole criterion to achieve regional equity, it is a rough indicator of
the need for funds since many provincial expenditures escalate in rough
proportion to population. Overall, the transfers are strongly equalising
with respect to own tax collections (rank correlation -1.0), and mildly
redistributive with respect to provincial GDP (rank correlation. =
-0.4). The programme, nevertheless, is subject to a number of
limitations which are discussed below.
Limitations of the Existing Revenue Sharing by Population
(i) Accountability Concerns: Large transfers to reduce vertical
fiscal gaps have the potential of introducing unintended adverse
incentives (Table 3). It is desirable to examine first the possible
sources for this imbalance, and alternative means of dealing with these
issues before agreeing on the best system of inter-governmental
transfers. Vertical fiscal imbalance in Pakistan can be traced to a
number of reasons.
* Mismatch of Revenue Means and Expenditure Needs. As we [lave
seen, this indeed is an important source of the problem, especially the
over-centralisation of taxing responsibility. We earlier noted that
centralisation of expenditures has been used as a response to correct
fiscal imbalances arising at the subnational levels. Tax
decentralisation on the other hand has remained an unexplored option.
Such an option needs to be seriously examined to deal with this issue.
* Provincial Tax Bases' are Limited. While significant
untapped potential exists that could raise provincial revenues from own
sources, these efforts may not alone be sufficient for meeting
provincial expenditure needs given the set of tax bases currently
assigned to the provinces. Therefore, both tax decentralisation (say,
excises) and joint occupancy of some tax fields (e.g., personal income
taxation) could be looked at to reduce provincial fiscal imbalances.
* Even the Existing Tax Assignments are Inadequately Used. This is
partly due to excessive dependence on Federal transfers, which reduces
collection incentives, and encourages weak tax administration. An
explicit manifestation of these incentives is the non-exploitation of
tax on agricultural lands by the provinces.
Thus, in dealing with vertical fiscal imbalances, reassignment of
some responsibilities, tax decentralisation, tax base sharing and tax
abatement are options which could take precedence over unconditional
grants or general revenue sharing. The latter options, by separating
taxing and spending responsibilities, impair accountability and should
be relied on only to the extent that decentralisation of fiscal
responsibility is not appropriate. This is clearly not the case in
Pakistan. Here, there has been a trend to centralise both taxing and
expenditure responsibilities and then rely on revenue sharing to deal
with fiscal gap. These revenue sharing transfers finance up to 95
percent of provincial expenditures. Such an overwhelming dependence of
provincial governments on federal transfers has tended to undermine
federal budgetary flexibility as well as impairing sub-national public
sector accountability. Furthermore, these transfers may discourage the
provinces in realising the full potential of own tax bases. Citizens do
not see a link between taxes paid to a particular level of government
and public services offered by the same level of government.
(ii) Regional Fiscal Equity: The programme ignores fiscal capacity
in addressing regional equity issues. In doing so, it lacks an explicit
equalisation standard against which programme achievements can be
measured. Adoption of a formal fiscal capacity equalisation programme,
on the other hand, has the potential of determination of total amounts
of transfers, and their allocation among provinces by a formula that
sets a specific standard of equalisation to be achieved.
(c) Special Fiscal Need Grants: These transfers are intended to
compensate the two fiscally disadvantaged provinces for their weak
fiscal capacities but higher expenditure needs. In the absence of
significant tax decentralisation and having a formal equalisation
programme, it represents a pragmatic approach to deal with expenditure
need differentials.
CONDITIONAL TRANSFERS: AN EVALUATION
Conditional transfers to sub-national governments are advocated to
ensure certain minimum standards of services across jurisdictions
(conditional block grants): to pursue higher level government objectives
(could be conditional matching or non-matching); or to address
inter-jurisdictional spillovers of benefits (conditional matching
transfers). With the exception of a selected few programmes discussed
below, in general federal-provincial specific purpose transfers in
Pakistan are ad hoc and primarily used for agency functions or to
advance political objectives. Moreover, they are awarded on a
discretionary basis rather than being determined by objective formulas.
The programme of matching transfers for resource mobilisation is
not well conceived. It rewards provinces for higher tax effort due to
any changes in structure and rates of taxation but provides no
incentives for revenue increases due to improvement in efficiency in tax
collection and administration. By doing so, it potentially opens up the
possibility of a province to shift a significant burden of its taxation
to non-residents by going lax on collection of existing taxes but
introducing newer (possibly nuisance) taxes. The programme also shows
the federal government's lack of concern with additional burden of
taxation and deteriorating quality and quantity of provincial public
services. This is particularly worrisome as the effective burden of the
public sector (taxation inclusive of bribes) in Pakistan is considered
very high and the net benefit (benefits of public spending minus burden
of taxation) of the public sector as a whole may be negative. The closed
ended commitment of this programme is to be welcome as it will put a
limit to any potential abuses and also restore the credibility of
federal commitment tarnished by the unfilled open-ended commitment of a
similar programme under the 1991 NFC Award.
Box 2. A Summary of Options on Federal-Provincial-Local Transfers
Discontinue all discretionary federal transfers including those to
MNA and senators and consider the following design of federal
transfers.
Dealing with vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalances
Short run (in the absence of tax decentralisation): Per capita
transfers
Long run (with tax decentralisation). Fiscal capacity equalisation
programme. This programme could be funded out of federal consolidated
fund revenues and could upgrade provincial per capita fiscal
capacities to a national norm.
Setting National Standards through Conditional Block Transfers:
* School grant. Per capita transfers using school-age population
(age 5-17) for primary and secondary education intended for local
governments (other than metropolitan areas) to pass-through the
provinces. Provinces provide grants to educational institutions based
upon the number of graduating students. Federal government makes
direct transfers to metropolitan areas based upon school age
population. Metropolitan governments provide grants to public and
not-for-profit private schools based upon graduations.
* University education grant. Per capita transfer to the provinces.
Provincial distribution to post-secondary institutions (public and
not-for-profit private) based upon graduation by programme type.
Higher weights for engineering and medicine, lower for sciences and
social sciences and still lower for language and literature.
* Health grant. Per capita transfers for basic health based upon
weighted population with higher weights for population aged 0-5 and
65 and over. Provincial distribution to local governments based upon
the same criteria. Direct federal transfers to metropolitan areas
using the same criteria.
* Link Roads grant. Per lane mile grant based upon the requirements
for provincial-connector roads for access to federal highways.
The federal programmes of matching ratio for transfers for the
Social Action Programme could be reassessed. Consideration may be given
to instituting conditional block (per capita) transfers for primary
education and basic health, whose magnitudes are determined by formula
(e.g., equal per capital rather than by discretion. These transfers may
be made directly from the federal government to metropolitan
corporations. For other local governments, these grants would pass
through provincial governments. The primary school grant could be made
conditional on provinces meeting targets on decentralisation of primary
education and basic health, ensuring private sector financing on par
with the public sector (based on number of graduating students) and
overall targets on access to such education.
The basic health grant could be linked to standards of access to
such services. Similarly, federal transfers to universities through the
University Grants Commission could be eliminated and instead substituted
by per capita transfers for post-secondary education to provinces.
Provinces in turn may be encouraged to substitute own transfer
programmes to both public and private universities and colleges
utilising graduation by programme type as criterion. Various programmes
could be weighted differently but financing of public and private
education would be on an equal footing.
The use of development grants could be restricted and must ensure
maintenance funds. Ill this regard, grants given to MNAs, Senators and
MPAs could be eliminated as such grants could undermine local and
provincial government priorities.
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO CAPITAL MARKETS
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan (Article 167) allows unfettered
capital market access to provincial governments guaranteed by Provincial
Consolidated Fund Revenues (which includes federal transfers) and
subject only to any limits imposed by the provincial assembly provided
that provinces do not owe any debt to the federal government. All the
provinces are heavily indebted to the federal government, so access to
capital markets for financing provincial-local capital project is not
available to sub-national governments in Pakistan. In 1994-95, debt
charges accounted for 23 percent of provincial current expenditures.
This amounts to 165.8 percent of own source revenues. Most of this debt
arises from capital investment in social sectors and, therefore,
accumulation of assets results in little increase in debt carrying
capacity. Currently, the federal government does not encourage any
additional borrowing power by sub-national governments until they have
stabilised their budgets. It is important to ensure, however, that the
federal government does not: (1) supply debt; (2) subsidise debt; (3)
guarantee debt; and (4) bails out defaulting government. Beyond this,
credit market discipline is the key to responsible subnational
borrowing.
The 1997 NFC provision which allows provincial borrowing from
financial markets or Ways and Means Advances from the State Bank of
Pakistan to finance operating deficits could inadvertently encourage
fiscal mismanagement. Sub-national borrowing to finance current
expenditures should be prohibited. On the other hand, if the provinces
and quite possibly large metropolitan area governments meet quantitative
guidelines on fiscal discipline and are also rated as credit worthy by
the private sector. could be permitted in the long run to have access to
private capital markets at their own risk with clear understanding that
the federal government will not backstop such debt. To ensure that the
provinces do face market discipline and that their borrowing strategies
do not run counter to the federal government macro-economic
stabilisation objectives, the federal government may use the National
Economic Council or another intergovernmental forum as an
intergovernmental consultative panel on macroeconomic policy
coordination and more importantly to disseminate information on
provincial and metropolitan finances and capital spending strategies to
the private sector. This body could also serve as a catalyst in
encouraging the private sector in developing credit ratings of federal,
provincial and metropolitan governments to facilitate bond and loan
finance. Needless to say, unless credit worthiness of provincial
governments are substantially enhanced with a strong own resource
mobilisation effort, provincial access to capital markets would remain
largely closed. Therefore, strengthening provincial-local revenue
sources should receive priority attention. Access to private capital
finance by smaller municipalities does not appear feasible in the near
future. For such governments, provincially directed access either
through municipal finance corporations run on commercial principles or
special arrangements like the FINDETER experiment in Colombia might be
examined.
Why the Road to Reform Remains a Field of Dreams?
We noted that the fiscal systems in Pakistan requires significant
restructuring. In the past, such reform efforts have not made much
headway. A number of factors impede the progress of reform.
Political Factors
In Pakistan, political instability and feudal interests have
contributed to setting aside constitutional dictums and introducing a
system of centralised governance. Pakistan has been under military rule
for a major part of its existence and past military regimes did not
accommodate decentralised decision-making. During the periods, political
activities have been permitted, feudal influences have dominated the
political system and these influences favour either a centralisation or
provincialisation of authority. This is because, while Pakistan has
experienced heightened urbanisation in recent years with over forty
percent of the total population as urbanised, electoral system still
recognises 1981 basis of population distribution (17 percent urban). In
rural areas of Sindh and Balochistan, and to a more limited extent in
rural areas of Punjab and NWFP provinces, feudal lords do not allow
effective political participation. The use of antiquated basis of
population allows feudal lords to dominate politics at the federal and
provincial levels. A centralised system allows these lords to have
greater effective control than would be possible under a decentralised
system where the urban sector would have a more significant voice. To
further entrench feudal powers, local governments were disbanded in all
metropolitan areas even though the courts found this practice to be in
contravention of the law. Grants to members of national and provincial
legislatures for development projects also work against the development
of local governments as these members enjoy a greater degree of autonomy
in project execution in the absence of a well functioning system of
local government.
Bureaucratic Factors
The British during their colonial rule instituted a system of
bureaucratic control to achieve with maximum efficiency colonial
objectives of a predatory state. The system created a core of civil
service elite which was highly educated and highly dedicated to serving
the colonial rulers. Their loyalty to rulers and detachment from the
common man was duly rewarded by allowing them preferential access to all
public services through elite institutions and by ensuring them
financial security through a system of cash rewards and land grants.
Thus Pakistan inherited a civil service regime that was highly
centralised, efficient, accountable, professional yet completely
detached from local population.
After independence, the civil service retained its
"professional" orientation for a while benefiting from an
increasing array of perks such as almost costless acquisition of prime
real estate, free membership in sports and entertainment complexes
financed by public funds, privileged access to elite educational
institutions for children etc. Political purges of the civil service in
late sixties and early seventies set the civil service on a road to
administrative decline [see Haque (1996)]. With insecurity regarding the
lack of tenure, areas of public intervention expanded beyond limits and
perks and bribes mushroomed. Corruption enabled officials to insure
their careers against political risks. Thus the system became a highly
centralised yet dysfunctional system of administration. A key feature of
this system has a special bearing on local governance. Key positions on
provincial (provincial secretary) and district governance (divisional
and district commissioners) are held on assignment by officers of elite
"Central Superior Services--Civil Service of Pakistan". While
performing these duties at subnational levels, they remain primarily
accountable to the federal government only. This system negates
federalism and re-enforces federal control over local decision-making.
For local governments, an especially worrisome aspect of this system of
governance is that if the local governments function well, district
commissioner's powers are considerably curtailed. On the other
hand, if the local government is not operative, the district
commissioner becomes the sole discharger of judicial and executive
functions at the district level. No wonder, one sees that local
governments are not allowed to succeed in Pakistan.
Institutional Factors
Institutional factors also impede effective decentralisation.
Traditional institutions and mechanism of governance and accountability
over time have withered away but these have not been replaced by newer
institutions. Instead, all pervasive role of the state have retarded critical look at public policies and institutions. There is almost
complete monopoly of the government on institutions of critical thought
and media in both countries. Any critical review of government policies
and programmes invites a government backlash. In Pakistan, rural
sell-government worked well in earlier days of its independence. This
system was abandoned in favour of a more centralised system which has
resulted in denial of access to basic services by rural population.
While lack of institutional capacity was cited as a reason for
disbandment of the participatory system, the newer system left a
majority of citizen with no voice and participation and no access to
basic public services.
External Participants
External participants may also unwittingly impede development of a
decentralised public sector in developing countries. A multitude of
factors contribute to this development. First, a centralised system
lowers transaction costs for external assistance and enlarges the
comfort zone for external participants in terms of monitoring the
utilisation of their funds for intended purposes. Second, some external
participants have concerned themselves primarily with the revenue
performance of developing countries. Such concerns may lead to larger
centralised bureaucracies that pay little attention to efficient
delivery of public services. For example in Pakistan, improved revenue
performance of governments have been accompanied by ever deteriorating
quality and quantity of public services. Third, centralised systems are
more prone to a lack of internal policy agenda due to a lack of citizen
participation and more dependent on external advice on policy reform.
Typically this leads to quick policy fixes with little sustained reform.
For example, in Pakistan, while the 1956 Constitution stated achievement
of universal literacy as a goal for the next decade. Forty years later,
there has been little change in literacy rates. In population planning,
with US assistance, Pakistan established a goal to reduce population
growth rate to 2 percent by 1975. Twenty years later, growth rate has
increased to 3.5 percent. Similarly public deficit reduction has been an
elusive goal for the past several decades. External assistance, contrary
to its intentions, may have helped the country avoid facing difficult
choices in reducing public sector interventions in marketplace.
Availability of generous external assistance might have played a part in
motivating the federal government in assuming some provincial
responsibilities and the provincial governments in overtaking local
government mandates.
SOME LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The following important lessons for reform of fiscal systems in
developing countries can be distilled from a review of Pakistan's
past experiences.
* To ensure fiscal discipline, governments at all levels must be
made to face financial consequences of' their decisions. This is
possible if the central government does not backstop provincial and
local debt and the central bank does not act as a lender of last resort to the central government. A central bank that is independent of all
levels of government and solely concerned with price stability is more
likely to support such a discipline. The integrity and independence of
the financial sector also contributes to fiscal prudence in the public
sector. To ensure such an integrity and independence, ownership and
preferential access to the financial sector, as continues to be the case
in Pakistan should not be available to any level of government. In such
an environment capital markets and bond rating agencies would provide an
effective fiscal policy discipline. Finally, fiscal rules accompanied by
"gate keeper" intergovernmental councils/committees provide a
useful framework for fiscal discipline and fiscal policy coordination.
In this context, one can draw upon industrial countries'
experiences with 'golden rules', Maastricht type guidelines
and "common budget directives' to develop country specific
guidelines. To ensure voluntary compliance with the guidelines,
appropriate institutional framework must be developed. Transparency of
the budgetary processes and institutions, accountability to electorate
and general availability of comparative data on fiscal positions of all
levels of government further strengthens fiscal discipline.
Pakistan's experience demonstrates that unless institutional
arrangements for imposing such discipline on governments as discussed
above are established, sustained fiscal discipline is not possible as
centralised controls simply do not work.
* Societal norms and consensus on roles of various levels of
governments and limits to their authority are vital for the success of
decentralised decisionmaking. In the absence of such norms and
consensus, direct central controls do not work and intergovernmental
gaming leads to dysfunctional constitutions.
* Tax decentralisation is a pre-requisite for sub-national credit
market access. In countries with highly centralised tax bases such as is
the case in Pakistan, unrestrained credit market access by subnational
governments poses a risk for macro stabilisation policies of the
national government as the private sector anticipates a higher level
government bailout in the event of default and does not discount the
risks of such lending properly. However, without significant tax
decentralisation, higher" level institutional assistance may be
needed for financing local capital projects. This assistance can take
the form of establishing municipal finance corporations run on
commercial principles to lower the cost of borrowing by using the
superior" credit rating of the higher level government and
municipal rating agencies to determine credit worthiness.
* An internal common market is best preserved by constitutional
guarantees. The Federal government in Pakistan has failed in this role.
* Periodic review of jurisdictional assignments is essential to
realign responsibilities with changing economic and political realities.
With globalisation and localisation, national government's direct
role in stabilisation and macroeconomic control is likely to diminish
over time but its role in coordination and oversight is expected to
increase as regimes and subnational governments assume enhanced roles in
these areas. Constitutional and legal systems and institutions must be
amenable to timely adjustments to adapt to changing circumstances.
* Enabling Environment for Decentralisation i.e., Institutions of
citizen participation and accountability must be addressed in arty
serious reform of fiscal systems. Even in primitive societies such as
pre-British India, systems of local governance worked effectively to
deliver local services and collect local charges due to well understood
mechanisms of citizen participation and accountability. More modern
systems of local governance such as those run by elite Pakistani
bureaucrats with training in management including financial management
have failed due to a lack of citizen voice and accountability checks.
The reform effort must embody appropriate provisions of recall of
elected officials for negligence or misconduct. Independence of
judiciary and a free media can play an important part in political and
bureaucratic accountability. These elements have not been addressed in
the Pakistani reform efforts.
* Civil Service reform is critical to the success of a
decentralisation programme. Bureaucratic ownership of a reform programme
is critical but such ownership would not be forthcoming in most
developing countries where decentralisation is seen as an attempt to
weaken the powers of central bureaucracy. To overcome this, the reform
of fiscal systems must embody reform of central bureaucracies. Such a
reform must ensure that the Centre has no direct say in the recruitment
and promotions of civil servants, other than overseeing that standards
of transparency and fairness are met, at the subnational levels and that
remunerations of subnational services must be competitive with the
central government. Further, civil service incentive structure should
reward service orientation and performance and discourage command and
control and rent seeking. This can be accomplished through performance
contracts, stay with it culture, recognition of specialised skills and
evaluation systems that link performance, rewards and budgeting.
* Evaluation capacity development is of fundamental importance in
public sector reform in developing countries. Formal ex-post evaluation
nurtures a climate of listening, learning and accountability in the
public sector. This is of greater importance in the context of
developing countries where "government failures" have been
spectacular but resulted in little afterthought on appropriateness of
development objectives and strategies as institutions for accountability
are weak or non-existent. In such an environment, evaluation can nurture
a "bottom-line" or "development effectiveness
culture" as Picciotto (1995) has argued that "evaluation is to
the public sector what accounting is to the private sector". It is
interesting to note that the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa has imposed stringent monitoring and evaluation requirements on
higher level governments to ensure proper monitoring and oversight of
local governments.
* Traditional administrative capacity, matters but should not be
considered as an impediment to decentralisation. Administrative capacity
to develop and maintain modern organisational practices such as
budgeting, auditing and accounting systems is no doubt important but
should not be considered as a barrier to decentralisation provided
citizen participation and transparency in decision-making is ensured.
This is because technical capacity can be borrowed from supportive
higher level governments and elsewhere
* Asymmetric Decentralisation as provided under the Provincial
Local Government Ordinances in Pakistan offers a thoughtful approach to
Decentralisation. Regardless of the availability of help from higher
level governments, lack of institutional capacity should never be
considered as an excuse not to decentralise. Instead, an objective
programme of decentralisation which recognises the nature and type of
local government, its Clientele and its fiscal capacity can be developed
and various local governments can be assigned differential powers by
taking into account the above mentioned factors as was done in Pakistan
in the past and more systematically being done in Indonesia by rating
each local government.
Improperly designed intergovernmental transfers can undermine
fiscal discipline and accountability while building transfer
dependencies that cause a slow economic strangulation of fiscally
disadvantaged regions. Properly designed intergovernmental transfers on
the other hand can enhance competition for the supply of public goods,
fiscal harmonisation, subnational government accountability and regional
equity. In Pakistan, federal revenue sharing transfers finance upto 99
percent of expenditures in some provinces. This delinking of taxing and
spending responsibilities have led to accountability problems at the
provincial levels. In the event of such de-linking, role of conditional
(conditional on standards of services and access to such services and
not on expenditures) block transfers is worth examining to enhance
accountability and private sector participation.
* The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the
supply of public goods should not be overlooked. For example, transfers
for basic health and primary education could be made available to both
public and not-for-profit private sector on equal basis using as
criteria, the demographics of the population served, school age
population and student enrolments etc. This would promote competition
and innovation as both public and private institutions would compete for
public funding. Chile permits Catholic schools access to public
education financing. Canadian provinces allows individual residents to
choose among public and private schools for the receipt of their
property tax dollars. Such an option has introduced strong incentives
for public and private schools to improve their performances and be
competitive. Such financing options are especially attractive for
providing greater access to public services in rural areas of Pakistan.
* Finally, contrary to a common misconception, a developing country
institutional environment calls for a greater degree of decentralisation
than needed for an industrialised country. For an efficient working of a
centralised bureaucracy, advanced information gathering and transmittal
networks, an efficient and dedicated civil service, and well developed
institutions of citizen participation and accountability are needed.
This is possible in the setting of an industrialised country
environment. A more primitive public sector environment is more suited
to a decentralised form of governance. This is because information
requirements and transaction costs are minimised by moving the
decision-making closer to people who are affected by those decisions.
Closeness also serves to enhance better participation, preference
matching for public services, transparency and greater accountability.
The experience of Pakistan demonstrates that public sector performance
is significantly improved by decentralised decision-making even when
enabling environment is quite weak.
Appendix Table 1
A Representative Assignment of Expenditure Responsibilities
Policy,
Standards Provision/ Production/
Function and Oversight Administration Distribution
Interregional and
International U U N,P
Conflicts Resolution
External trade U U,N,S P
Telecommunications U, N P P
Financial Transactions U,N P P
Environment U,N,S,L U,N,S,L N,S,L,P
Foreign Direct
Investment N,L L P
Defense N N N,P
Foreign Affairs N N N
Monetary Policy,
Currency, U, ICB ICB ICB, P
Banking
Interstate Commerce Constitution, N P
N
Immigration U,N N N
Transfer payments N N N
Criminal and Civil Law N N N
Industrial Policy N N P
Regulation N N,S,L N,S,L,P
Fiscal Policy N N,S,L N,S,L,P
Natural Resources N N,S,L N,S,L,P
Education, Health and
Social N,S,L S,L S,L,P
Welfare
Highways N,S,L N,S,L S,L,P
Parks and Recreation N,S,L N,S,L N,S,L,P
Police S, L S,L S,L
Water, Sewer, Refuse,
Fire L L L,P
Protection
Function Comments
Interregional and
International Benefits & costs international in scope.
Conflicts Resolution
External trade ...
Telecommunications National regulation not feasible.
Financial Transactions ...
Environment Externalities of global, national,
state and local scope.
Foreign Direct
Investment Local infrastructure is critical.
Defense Benefits and costs national in scope.
Foreign Affairs ...
Monetary Policy, Independence from all levels essential.
Currency, Banking some international role for common
discipline.
Interstate Commerce Constitutional safeguards important
for factors and goods mobility.
Immigration U due to forced exit.
Transfer payments Redistribution.
Criminal and Civil Law Rule of law, a national concern.
Industrial Policy To avoid beggar-thy neighbour policies.
Regulation Internal common market.
Fiscal Policy Coordination is possible.
Natural Resources Promotes regional equity and internal
common market.
Education, Health and
Social Transfers in kind.
Welfare
Highways Benefits and costs of various roads
vary in scope.
Parks and Recreation ...
Police Primarily local benefits.
Water, Sewer, Refuse, ...
Fire Protection
Note: U is supranational responsibility. ICB is independent
central bank, N is national government, S is state/provincial
government, L is local Government and P is non-government
sectors/civil society.
Appendix Table 2
Conceptual Basis of Tax Assignment
Determination Collection
Types of Tax of Base and Rate Administration
Customs F F F
Corporate Income F, U F,U F,U
Resource Taxes
Resource Rent
(Profits/Income) Tax F F F
Royalties, Fees,
Charges: Severance
Taxes: Production,
Output, and Property
Taxes S,L S,L S,L
Conservation Charges S,L S,L S,L
Personal Income F F,S,L F
Wealth Taxes (Taxes
on Capital, Wealth,
Wealth Transfers,
Inheritances, and
Bequests) F F,S F
Payroll F,S F,S F,S
Multi-stage Sales Taxes
(Value-added Tax,
[VAT]) F F F
Single Stage Sales Taxes
(Manufacturer/
Wholesale/Retail)
Option A S S,L S,L
Option B F S F
"Sin" Taxes
Excises on Alcohol
and Tobacco F,S F,S F,S
Betting, Gambling S,L S,L S,L
Lotteries S,L S,L S,L
Race Tracks S,L S,L S,L
Taxation of "Bads"
Carbon F F F
BTU Taxes F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
Motor Fuels F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
Effluent Charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
Congestion Tolls F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
Parking Fees L L L
Motor Vehicles
Registration, transfer
Taxes, and Annual
fees S S S
Driver's Licenses
and Fees S S S
Business Taxes S S S
Excises S,L S,L S,L
Property S L L
Land S L L
Frontage, Betterment S,L L L
Poll F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
User Charges F,S,L F,S,L F,S,L
Types of Tax Comments
Customs International trade taxes.
Corporate Income Mobile factor, stabilisation tool.
Resource Taxes
Resource Rent Highly unequally distributed tax
(Profits/Income) Tax bases.
Royalties, Fees,
Charges: Severance
Taxes: Production,
Output, and Property Benefit taxes/charges for state-local
Taxes services.
Conservation Charges To preserve local environment.
Personal Income Redistributive, mobile factor.
stabilisation tool.
Wealth Taxes (Taxes
on Capital, Wealth,
Wealth Transfers,
Inheritances, and
Bequests) Redistributive.
Payroll Benefit charge, e.g., social security
coverage.
Multi-stage Sales Taxes Border tax adjustments possible
(Value-added Tax, under federal Assignment: potential
[VAT]) stabilisation tool.
Single Stage Sales Taxes
(Manufacturer/
Wholesale/Retail)
Option A Higher compliance cost.
Option B Harmonised, lower compliance
cost.
"Sin" Taxes
Excises on Alcohol
and Tobacco Health care a shared Responsibility.
Betting, Gambling State and local responsibility.
Lotteries State and local responsibility.
Race Tracks State and local responsibility.
Taxation of "Bads"
Carbon To combat -local/national
pollution.
BTU Taxes Pollution impact may be
national, regional or local.
Motor Fuels Tolls on federal/provincial/local
roads.
Effluent Charges To deal with interstate.
intermunicipal or local pollution
issues.
Congestion Tolls Tolls on federal/provincial/local
roads.
Parking Fees To control local congestion.
Motor Vehicles
Registration, transfer
Taxes, and Annual
fees State responsibility.
Driver's Licenses
and Fees State responsibility.
Business Taxes Benefit tax.
Excises Residence-based taxes.
Property Completely immobile factor,
benefit tax.
Land Completely immobile factor,
benefit tax.
Frontage, Betterment Cost recovery.
Poll Payment for local services.
User Charges Payment for services received.
Source: Shah (1994).
Note: U is supranational agency, F is federal. S is state or
province, L is municipal or local.
Appendix Table 3
Principles and Better Practices in Grant Design
Grant Objective Grant Design Better Practices
To bridge fiscal * Reassign Tax abatement in
gap responsibilities Canada and tax base
* Tax abatement sharing in Canada, and
* Tax base sharing Brazil
To reduce regional General Non-matching Fiscal equalisation
fiscal disparities Fiscal capacity programmes of
equalisation Australia, Canada and
transfers Germany
To compensate for Open-ended matching RSA grant for teaching
benefit spillovers transfers with hospitals
matching rate
consistent with
spillout of benefits
Setting national Conditional non- Indonesia roads and
minimum standards matching block primary education
transfers with grants Colombia, Chile
conditions on and South Africa
standards of service education transfers
and access
Influencing local Open-ended matching Matching transfers for
priorities in areas transfers (with social assistance as in
of high national preferably matching Canada
but low local rate to vary
priority inversely with fiscal
capacity)
Stabilisation Capital grants Limit use of capital
provided maintenance grants and encourage
possible private sector
participation by
providing political and
policy risk guarantee
Grant Objective Practices to Avoid
To bridge fiscal Deficit grants
gap Tax by tax sharing as in
India and Pakistan (till
1996 only)
To reduce regional General revenue sharing
fiscal disparities with multiple factors
To compensate for
benefit spillovers
Setting national Conditional transfers with
minimum standards conditions on spending
alone ad hoc grants
Influencing local ad hoc grants
priorities in areas
of high national
but low local
priority
Stabilisation Stabilisation grants with no
future upkeep requirements
Source: Shah (199a).
Author's Note: The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author alone and should not be attributed to the World Bank Group.
The author is grateful to Drs Sadiq Ahmed, Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, and
Sarfraz Qureshi, and Professors Robin Boadway, Melville McMillan and
Richard Bird for helpful discussions.
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Picciotto, Robert (1995) Putting Institutional Economics to Work.
Washington, D.C. (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 304.)
Shah, Anwar (1994) The Reform of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations
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Shah, Anwar (1997) Fiscal Federalism and Macroeconomic Governance:
For Better or For Worse? In Kiichiro Fukasaku (ed) Decentralisation,
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations, and Macroeconomic Governance. OECD,
Paris. (Forthcoming.)
Shah, Anwar, et al. (1995) Supporting Fiscal Decentralisation in
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Development Department. Washington, D. C. (Report).
(1) Islamic Welfare Tax which is not deposited into the
Consolidated Fund and does not form part of the budget.
Anwar Shah works for the World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Table 1
An Impressionistic Review of Selected Aspects of the Fiscal
System in Pakistan
Selected Indicators Pakistan
Population (end-1997) 140 million
Area 0.8 million square kilometers
Per capita GDP (1997) US$ 540
Fiscal constitution (de-jure) Decentralised federation
Fiscal constitution (de facto) Multi-tiered centralised
federation
Sub-national governments 4 provinces, 15 municipal
corporations, 156 municipal
committees, 301 town
committees, 40 cantonment
boards, 118 district
councils, 4565 union councils
Provincial government constitutional
status strong
Local government constitutional status weak
Institutions of federal-provincial
coordination strong
Institutions of critical thought numerous but ineffective
Financial market discipline on
public sector non-existent
Fiscal rules for aggregate fiscal
discipline non-existent
Public sector interference in
financial markets extensive and unconstrained
Actual provincial control of local
governments strong
Range of local government
responsibilities limited
Citizen participation low (rural) to moderate
(urban)
Bureaucratic orientation command and control
Political and bureaucratic corruption high and growing
Red tape high and growing
Central bank independence weak
Output performance contracts for
civil service none
Private provision of public services extensive
Provincial fiscal autonomy strong
Local fiscal autonomy weak
Local administrative autonomy weak
Federal-provincial role in local
public services provision extensive and unconstrained
Local government role in local
public services provision constrained
Transparency and predictability of
the system of central-provincial
transfers excellent
federal-provincial conditional block
transfers to set national minimum
standards non-existent
Fiscal capacity equalisation to
a standard non-existent
Provincial-local transfers non-existent
Quality and quantity of public
services poor/unreliable
Overall quality of governance poor
Table 2
Federal Transfers to Provinces 1994-95--Summary Indicators
Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan All
Operating Transfers
(as percent of Gross
Operating Expenditure) 82 84 99 99 87
Capital Transfers
(as percent of Gross
Capital Expenditure) 15 12 9 8 12
Total Transfers
(as percent of Total
Expenditure) 71 72 75 72 72
Development Loans
(as percent of Gross
Capital Expenditure) 31 26 18 17 25
Source: Shah et al. (1995).
Table 3
Vertical Imbalances in Pakistan, 1994-95 (Percent)
Revenue Expenditure
Share Share Surplus/Deficit
Tax Collection
National 90.2 67.1 23.2
Sub-national 9.7 32.9 -23.2
Provincial 4.9 28.8 -23.6
Local 4.8 4.1 0.7
All Levels 100.0 100.0 0.0