Veena Kukreja. Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India.
Haque, Ziaul
Veena Kukreja. Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan,
Bangladesh and India. New Delhi: Sage Publications. 1991. 257 pp.
Bibliography + Index. Price: Rs 260 (Hardbound).
A quite large number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America, which are today characterised by chronic
underdevelopment, general social retardation, slow social mobility, and
political instability became highly prone to military interventions in
politics in their initial phases of decolonization soon after World War
II. These military interventions in the fragile civil polities and
stagnant economies, termed by some scholars as the coup zone, are
justified and legitimised on various pretexts of modernisation,
democratisation, and reform; which means that the military seeks to fill
the institutional vacuum when the overall civil administration of the
country breaks down as a consequence of the rivalry for pelf and power
between various ruling classes. Thus, the military has emerged as the
most powerful institution in these countries. Some social revolutions of
modern times, in China in 1949, for example, and in Cuba in 1959, were
caused by endemic military interventions in the civil society.
Why does the military capture political power in some developing
countries, while in others it has to operate under the control of civil
institutions? Secondly, how does this military intervention influence
the configuration of an internal relationship between the armed forces
and the larger civil society within the perspective of institutional
restructuring of the country, on the one hand, and the external
relationship between this country and the world at large, on the other?
Thirdly, after the take-over of civil institutions, how does the
military justify and legitimise the use of coercive authority over the
social, economic, and political institutions of the country? These are
some of the broad questions which the book under review raises in
relation to the case-studies of three South Asian countries, namely,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India, which, according to the author, reflect
the underlying uniformities in their society, history, and overall
culture in spite of some inherent differences.
A revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation
submitted to the University of Delhi in 1987, the book develops a
theoretical and conceptual model of civil-military relations based on
the assumptions, hypotheses, and theories of some Western scholars of
comparative politics (such as Amos Perlmutter, S. E. Finer, Morris
Janowitz, Samuel P. Huntington, Stephen P. Cohen, and others) and then
tests these hypotheses in South Asia from an interdisciplinary
standpoint.
The main thesis of the book is that the Pakistani case of military
intervention is typically that of a praetorian model in which, by
definition, the cause of military intervention in politics does not
necessarily lie in the nature of the military organization itself. It is
rather due to the larger phenomenon in an underdeveloped polity and
economy, weak institutionalisation, and lack of stability, autonomy, and
adaptability of the existing social institutions. That is, in this
praetorian model, the military tends to become a ruling political elite
in competition and collusion with other social elites like bureaucrats,
feudal lords, capitalists, technocrats, and professionals.
In this praetorian model of Pakistan, the political, social,
economic, and legal institutions have always remained weak and,
therefore, the Pakistan army has had to intervene. These interventions
in 1958, 1969, and 1977 were bloodless, however.
On the contrary, as described in the second chapter, in Bangladesh
the military interventions since 1975 have been characteristically
bloody coups, countercoups, and mutinies, involving the brutal
assassination of two heads of state and the execution of a large number
of political leaders and army officers. The author, therefore, terms
Bangladesh as a model of militarism which emerged in the country soon
after the war of 1971, when Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League failed
to develop a strong political organisation.
In the case of India (Chapter 6), the author argues that a planned
and sustained economic development, rapid industrialization, stable
political conditions, and democratic processes and social mobilisation
have diminished the probability of a military intervention in India.
Thus, in India, civilian control over the armed forces has been well
established.
The study correctly suggests that the only solution to eliminate
permanently the cycle of military coups in Pakistan and Bangladesh lies
in the development of stable civilian institutions which could function
independently.
The author's characterization of the civil-military relations
in Pakistan as praetorian, in Bangladesh as militarism, and in India as
purely democratic, is simplistic and appears utterly biased. Nothing in
the world is all white or all black. Civil-military relations in South
Asia are a highly complex matter, which cannot be correctly understood
in the emotionally charged environment of the Subcontinent where two
modern armies have clashed three times over Kashmir. The mere size of
the Indian military establishment has, since independence in 1947,
aggravated the problems of security, survival, and defence of Pakistan,
which is both militarily and economically disadvantaged vis-a-vis India.
Why did Pakistan seek the help of Western defence pacts in the early
1950s? The author does not explain. The dismemberment of Pakistan in
1971 by the Indian military proved that India was even more militaristic
than Pakistan and had hegemonic aims in South Asia. The Indian
army's unjustified take-over of Kashmir, Hyderabad, and Junagadh
soon after Partition was naked militarism which has caused the
civil-military relations in Pakistan to be pulverised ever since. The
survival of societies usually takes precedence over political or
economic restructuring or any other social change. The overdeveloped
military and bureaucratic apparatus which gradually came to dominate the
civil society in Pakistan was the direct result of the immediate problem
of security and defence of the new nation of Pakistan when civil
institutions were weak in their early formative phase.
As for organization of the book, the first chapter develops the
conceptual model for analysing civil-military relations in the three
cases under observation, taking them as the dependent variable to be
explained by four independent variables, viz.,
(1) the level of institutionalization of civilian political
procedures;
(2) the level of military institutionalization;
(3) the domestic socio-economic environment and the international
environment; and
(4) the nature of boundaries between the military establishment and
its socio-political environment.
The next five chapters of the book analyse the case-histories of
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India in the light of these variables, and the
last chapter (seventh) concludes the discussion.
The selection of the above four independent variables, only to be
tested in the three South Asian cases, has been justified by the
perceived uniformities of history, society, and culture of the three
countries--despite some differences. However, the addition of some more
variables, such as the periphery-metropolis relationship (which binds
highly industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America and
the dependent economies of Pakistan and Bangladesh); the level of elite
formation in the respective countries and the nature of the gap between
the rich elites and the poor masses; the level of general education,
scientific progress, and intellectual maturity; and the level of
industrialization-urbanization in the three countries would have made
the discussion more comprehensive and relevant, indeed closer to the
reality.
It may also be mentioned that the nature and character of these
independent variables, on which the respective experiences of Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and India have been tested and explained, are themselves
dependent for their correct evaluation and interpretation on some other,
higher independent variables, such as the larger world capitalist system
in which are now integrated the polities and economies, societies and
cultures of these three South Asian countries. Because of its vast
resources and a higher level of industrialization, India can take an
independent stand against the powerful Western countries, whereas
Pakistan and Bangladesh are more dependent on Western capitalism.
Nevertheless, the author's dexterous management of the four
variables chosen and his masterly marshalling of the evidence in the
spectrum of civil-military relations in vast geographical areas of the
size of South Asia do lead to a better understanding of an extremely
complex issue. This is in spite of some politically and culturally
conditioned biases of the author. Her real contribution lies in her
cogent analysis of the process through which the military consolidates
its power over civil institutions.
Despite the social diversities and political differences in the
developing countries prone to military intervention, the author thinks
that there are similarities in the political culture and socio-economic
conditions of the states which are subjected to military interventions.
"These countries suffer from poverty, lack of consensus on
constitutional procedures and experience with government by discussion,
and represent mutual distrust and a precarious feeling of national
identity manifested in horizontal (reflecting linguistic, ethnic, and
regional diversities) and vertical (reflecting a wide gap between the
westernized elites and the poor) cleavages in the social structure"
(p. 251).
The last (seventh) chapter recapitulates discussion of the six
chapters and presents the summary and conclusions. About the military
regimes in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the
author concludes that four strategies have been evolved for the survival
and legitimisation of military interventions: (1) a collusion with the
bureaucracy, which has resulted in an over-developed bureaucratic
apparatus; (2) a systematic and ruthless elimination of political
opponents--for example, constant persecution of the Pakistan
People's Party by the late General Ziaul Haq after the execution of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the elected prime minister of Pakistan; (3)
populistic policies, such as 'Islamization' of the economy and
introduction by the military regime of Zakat (poor-dues) in Pakistan;
and (4) constitutional legitimisation and democratisation--for example,
the scheme of Basic Democracies undertaken by General Ayub Khan and his
framing of a new constitution for Pakistan in 1962.
Another finding of the author is that the military elites develop
their own vested interests. Therefore, they oppose the demands of the
lower social classes for economic and political rights (p. 254).
According to the author, the military rulers in South Asia (in Pakistan
and Bangladesh) have also failed to build new institutions, a fact which
has further aggravated the political, social, and economic problems of
these countries. The reason partly may be that they have concentrated,
instead, on creating a military elite.
In sum, the book is an important addition to our knowledge of a
complex problem, in an area where detailed studies have not been made of
the phenomenon. Dr Kukreja's detailed study of the problem does not
limit itself to finding the reasons or antecedents of military
interventions but goes further; it investigates the
political-ideological and economic processes in which the military seeks
to build the bases of its legitimisation and survival. The book will be
of immense help to those students and scholars who specialize in
comparative politics, sociology, development economics, defence studies,
and history of South Asia--India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, in
particular.
Ziaul Haque
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.