The monetarist versus the Neo-Keynesian Views on the acceleration of inflation: some evidence from South Asian countries (with Special Emphasis on Pakistan).
Hossain, Akhtar
This paper tests the monetarist versus the neo-Keynesian views on
the acceleration of inflation, using annual data for Bangladesh, India,
Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (mostly) for the period 1961-88, within
the framework of the theoretical model of Stein (1978, 1982). The
empirical results consistently support the monetarist view that changes
in real money balances contribute to an acceleration of inflation.
Another important finding is that except for Bangladesh, contrary to the
neo-Keynesian view, bond-financed government expenditure does not have
an independent significant effect on the acceleration of inflation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Monetarists and the neo-Keynesians (1) have in many ways
diametrically opposite views on the acceleration of inflation.
There are several variants of the monetarist proposition that
inflation is a monetary phenomenon. For example, monetarists claim that
inflation is primarily due to an excessive growth of money supply over
the growth of the economy [for details see Dornbusch and Fischer (1987),
Ch. 17]. The proposition that inflation is a monetary phenomenon means
that higher rates of inflation cannot continue over a long period of
time without higher rates of money growth. Indeed, a rise in the growth
rate of money supply over the rate of inflation may accelerate the rate
of inflation, even in the presence of a higher rate of unemployment [for
details see Brunner (1970); Friedman 0973)]. Similarly, an implication
of the monetarist proposition is that, given the growth rate of money
supply, a rise in inflation reduces real money balances and lowers
excess aggregate demand in the economy, which may decelerate the rate of
inflation [Stein (1982)].
Neo-Keynesians believe that the acceleration of inflation depends
on the state of the economy and, in particular, on the prevailing rate
of unemployment, rather than on the growth of money supply per se. For
example, Tobin (1975) and Modigliani and Papademos (1975)suggest that
the path of inflation--accelerating, stable, decelerating--depends on
the overall state of the economy; when the economy is below the critical
(or equilibrium) rate of unemployment, inflation will accelerate, and
when the economy is above the critical rate of unemployment, inflation
will decelerate. An implication of the neo-Keynesian proposition is that
a high growth of money supply is perfectly consistent with decelerating
inflation as long as the actual rate of unemployment is above the
critical rate of unemployment.
Keynesians also believe that bond-financed government expenditure
has an independent positive effect on the acceleration of inflation.
Accordingly, since the excess demand for goods and services can be
raised by bond-financed government expenditure, and hence may be the
driving force behind the rate of inflation, there need be no relation
between the rate of inflation and the rate of monetary expansion.
Contrary to this Keynesian position, monetarists believe that
bond-financed government expenditure raises real interest rate, which
may lower private investment. This is the crowding out effect, which,
according to monetarists, dominates the wealth effect (of bond increase)
in the consumption function. As a remit, the excess aggregate demand is
lowered by the rise in debt-money ratio arising from bond-financed
government expenditure. Therefore, monetarists do not believe that a
bond-financed government expenditure is inflationary after a year or so
[for details see Stein (1982)].
While the controversy over the effect of bond-financed government
expenditure on the acceleration of inflation is widespread in developed
countries, it is not so in developing countries. This is because, in the
absence of wall-developed financial and capital markets, in most
developing countries budget deficits are financed mostly by money
creation, rather than through bond selling. Indeed, household
sector's holdings of government bonds are very limited, and it is
mostly the financial institutions which hold government bonds. It is
therefore not known how any rise in bond holdings in the non-household
sector affects the aggregate demand. In the face of controlled interest
rates, it is also not known whether any bond-financed government
expenditure does have any effect on the interest rate. Indeed, if
interest rates do rise by an increase in bond-financed government
expenditure, it is quite uncertain whether higher interest rates do have
any significant effect on private investment. Given all these unknown
factors, in this paper the effect of bond-financed government
expenditure on the acceleration of inflation will be tested for South
Asian countries, albeit on an exploratory basis.
As expected, in recent years several empirical studies were devoted
to test most, if not all, of the propositions which separate monetarists
from the neo-Keynesians [for example, Stein (1974, 1976, 1978, 1982);
Zannoni and McKenna (1980); Rea (1983); Turnovsky and Wohar (1984);
Darrat (1985) and Tan and Semudran (1988)]. However, except Darrat
(1985)for Italy, and Tan and Semudran (I 9 88) for Malaysia, all other
studies were for the U.S. economy, Stein (1982) also estimated an
inflation equation, rather than an equation for the acceleration of
inflation, for Canada and the world as a whole.
With the exception of Modigliani and Papademos's (1975)
findings in support of the neo-Keynesian view, and except the
methodological criticisms of Zannoni and McKenna (1980) and Desai and
Blake (1982), all other studies have consistently found that the
unemployment rate does not have any significant effect on the
acceleration of inflation and that the major contributory factor to the
acceleration of inflation is the change in real money balances, a
finding consistent with the monetarist proposition.
Needless to say that empirical findings obtained in the above
studies are not adequate to draw firm conclusions on the conflicting
hypotheses about the acceleration of inflation. Indeed, in order to
generalize both Stein and Darrat's findings for other developed
countries and to generalize Tan and Semudran's findings for other
developing countries, further studies need to be conducted for as many
countries with different economic and institutional frameworks as
possible.
The aim of this paper is to test the competing monetarist and the
neo-Keynesian views on the acceleration of inflation for 5 South Asian
countries using consistent annual data (mostly) for the period 1961-88.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II specifies in
precise form the basic monetarist and the neo-Keynesian propositions on
the acceleration of inflation. Section III outlines the testing models.
Section IV reports and analyses the estimated results. Conclusions are
drawn in Section V.
II. THE MONETARIST VERSUS THE NEO-KEYNESIAN PROPOSITIONS
Stein (1974, 1976, 1978, 1982) describes in a very compact way the
monetarist and the neo-Keynesian positions on the acceleration of
inflation through the following propositions.
Let p denote the rate of inflation, U denote the unemployment rate,
m denote the growth rate of monetary expansion; Ue is the equilibrium
rate of unemployment, and D is the operator d/dt.
The neo-Keynesian position on the acceleration of inflation may be
described by the proposition in Equation (1)
Dp = [gamma] (U-Ue) ... ... ... ... (1)
where [gamma] is the acceleration coefficient.
Equation (1) suggests that the acceleration of inflation is
proportional to the unemployment gap (i.e., the discrepancy between the
actual and the equilibrium rate of unemployment). The following
restriction may also be imposed on the neo-Keynesian position, which
says that the acceleration of inflation is independent of the change in
the growth of money supply
[delta]p/[delta]m = 0 (at given U) ... ... ... ... (2)
Equations (1) and (2) simply state the nee-Keynesian position of
Tobin (1975) and Modigliani and Papademos (1975).
Monetarists suggest that the nee-Keynesian views on the
acceleration of inflation are not true and that, instead of Equations
(1)and (2), the following restrictions in Equations (3) and (4) do hold.
Equation (3)states that, given the unemployment rate, a rise in the
growth rate of monetary expansion accelerates the rate of inflation.
[delta]p/[delta]m > 0 (at given U) ... ... ... ... (3)
Equation (4) states that the acceleration of inflation is
independent of the unemployment rate
[delta]p/[delta]U = 0 ... ... ... ... (4)
The monetarist restriction that the acceleration of inflation is
independent of the change in unemployment rate has been elaborated by
Stein (1978). According to him, variations in the unemployment rate per
se have no significant effects on the aggregate demand and hence on the
rate of inflation. The reason why a rise in the unemployment rate does
not affect the rate of inflation is that a rise in the unemployment rate
on the one hand reduces the growth of labour costs, which tends to lower
the rate of price change, but on the other hand lowers savings by more
than investment, which raises the rate of price change; indeed, these
opposite effects cancel each other.
In addition to the restrictions in Equations (3) and (4), the
monetarist view on the acceleration of inflation may be expressed in a
more formal way.
Monetarists suggest that, as a general rule, the rate of inflation
would accelerate if there is an increase in the excess demand for goods
and services in the economy. Accordingly, changes in real money balances
change the excess demand in the economy, which in turn may change the
rate of inflation. The change in real money balances may originate either from the rise in the growth of money supply at a given inflation
rate or from the change in the rate of inflation at a given growth rate
of money supply. Hence, if the growth rate of monetary expansion exceeds
the rate of inflation (m > p), then real money balances would rise,
and if the rate of inflation exceeds the growth rate of monetary
expansion, the real money balances would fall. A rise in real money
balances shifts the aggregate demand schedule upwards, which at the
current level of output may raise the rate of inflation.
The monetarist proposition on the acceleration of inflation may
then be specified as proportional to the growth of money supply less the
current rate of inflation
Dp = [lambda] (m p) ... ... ... ... (5)
where [lambda] is the acceleration coefficient.
If the rate of monetary expansion remains constant at m, then the
rate of inflation is expected to converge monotonically to the rate of
monetary expansion, while the turning points in the rate of inflation
will be related to the sign of (m - p).
To summarize: the neo-Keynesians claim that the acceleration of
inflation is given by Equation (1), whereas the monetarists claim that
it is given by Equation (5).
III. THE TESTING MODELS
Stein (1976, 1978, 1982), in a series of theoretical and empirical
contributions, proposes the following dynamic relation for testing the
conflicting views on the acceleration of inflation which separate the
monetarists from the neo-Keynesians
pt - pt - 1 = [alpha]0 + [alpha]1 Ut - 1 - pt (mt - 1 - pt - 1) ...
... (6)
where t is the time subscript, and [alpha]'s are parameters to
be estimated.
Equation (6) relates the change in the rate of inflation to the
unemployment rate and to the change in real money balances. Monetarists
believe that in Equation (6) the significant variable is the change in
real money balances (i.e., [alpha]2 > 0 and significant, and [alpha]1
= 0), while the neo-Keynesian hypothesis is that the significant
variable is the unemployment rate (i.e., [alpha]1 < 0 and
significant, and [alpha]2 is insignificantly different from zero).
One problem for the estimation of Equation (6)is that data for the
unemployment rate of most developing countries (including South Asian
countries) are not readily available and, in cases where they are
available, are not reliable. To avoid data problems, researchers
sometimes focus on output rather than the unemployment to test the
conflicting views on the acceleration of inflation and the unemployment
rate because there is a correspondence between the two variables. A
well-known formulation of this relation is Okun's Law, which states
that the ratio of actual output to potential output is negatively
related to the deviation of the unemployment rate from its equilibrium
value. This relationship allows one to use real output as a proxy for
the unemployment rate, given that potential output and the equilibrium
rate of unemployment remain constant at least in the short run. For
estimation purposes, the following equation may be used, where the
coefficient of real output (y) is assumed to carry a positive sign.
pt - pt - 1 =[beta]0 + [beta]1 yt - 1 + [beta]2 (mt - 1 - pt - 1)
... ... (7)
where [beta]'s are parameters to be estimated.
In order to check whether a bond-financed government expenditure
has an independent effect on the acceleration of inflation, the
following equation will also be estimated, where the coefficient of the
ratio of interest-bearing debt to money (g), according to the
neo-Keynesians, is expected to carry a positive sign, while the
monetarists claim that this coefficient is not significantly different
from zero (Stein, 1978).
pt - pt - 1 = [beta]0 + [beta] yt - 1 + [beta]2 (mt -1 - pt - 1)+
[[beta].sub.3] gt - 1 ... (8)
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Estimation and Results
For estimation of Equations (7) and (8), inflation rate was defined
as the percentage change in the consumer price index, and growth of
money supply was defined as the percentage change in the narrowly
defined money stock, which includes currency plus demand deposits. Since
data for bond-financed government expenditure is not available, the
ratio of the net claims of the banking system to government to money was
used as proxy for the ratio of interest-bearing bonds to money. All
basic data used for estimation purposes were taken from the IFS Yearbook
1989. (The data are available from the author upon request).
Except for Bangladesh and Nepal, Equations (7)and (8)were estimated
for the complete sample period 1961-88 for all other countries. Given
the availability of data, the sample period for Bangladesh is 1974-87,
and for Nepal the sample period is 1966-88. In addition to the complete
sample period, the testing models were also estimated for the 1973-88
subperiod. This was necessary in order to examine the validity of each
of the testable hypotheses for the sample period 1973-88, as many
observers suggest that since the early 1970s, with the outbreak of
worldwide inflation, monetary factors have been playing a significant
role for the generation and acceleration of inflation, which could have
led to findings in support of the monetarist view.
An OLS estimator was used for the estimation of all equations,
except for those equation where autocorrelation was found significant;
the latter equations were estimated by the Beach and McKinnon maximum
likelihood estimator (ARI).
The estimates of coefficients of Equations (7) and (8) and their
associated t-ratios are reported, respectively, in Table 1 and in Table
2, in which the figures in parentheses adjacent to the coefficients are
absolute t-ratios; and DW represents the Durbin-Watson statistic, which
is used to test the first-order autocorrelation. Also reported is the
adjusted [R.sup.2] value, which is used to examine the overall
performance of the estimated model.
The results suggest that, in Bangladesh, both (m-p) and g
contribute to an acceleration of inflation.
In both Nepal and Sri Lanka, it is only real money balances that
are found to have a significant effect on the acceleration of inflation.
The coefficient of g is not statistically significant in any case.
In Pakistan, real money balances are found to contribute to an
acceleration of inflation, while the bond-financed government
expenditure is found to have a negative effect on the acceleration of
inflation for the period 1961-88. However, the negative sign of the
coefficient is not consistent with the Keynesian view, but it follows
the monetarist claim that government expenditures, if financed by
bond-selling, may reduce excess demand in the economy, which may lower
the rate of inflation within a year or so.
In India, real money balances are found to contribute to an
acceleration of inflation. The effect of bond-financed government
expenditure is not statistically significant.
The overall empirical results in Tables 1 and 2 consistently
support the monetarist view that changes in real money balances
contribute to an acceleration of inflation. Another important result is
that the coefficient on lagged real output is not statistically
different from zero. In order to check whether the statistical
insignificance of the coefficient of real output is due to
multicollinearity, for each country a correlation matrix was computed
using all the explanatory variables. In no case the value of the
correlation coefficient was found to exceed 0.15, which implies that
multicollinearity is not a problem in any of the estimated equations.
4.2 The Effect of Money Supply on the Price Level in Pakistan
It is particularly important to note that the results obtained here
for Pakistan, while they confirm the present author's (1986)
earlier findings, are in contrast to the findings of Naqvi et al. (1983)
and Jones and Khilji (1988). For example, [Jones and Khilji (1988), p.
56] used causality tests between money supply and prices and came to the
conclusion that "the results of the test showed a significant
causal relationship from both M1 [narrow money] and M2 [broad money] to
wholesale prices, but not to consumer prices". The regression
results of Tables 1 and 2 quite consistently suggest that changes in
real money balances accelerate the rate of inflation for Pakistan, where
the rate of inflation is defined as the percentage change in the
consumer price index. In Hossain (1986) it was found that a rise in real
money balances increases the price level in Pakistan. From all these
results it appears that real money balances are a prime contributor to
the generation and acceleration of inflation in Pakistan.
In Naqvi et al's PIDE model (1983, p. 90), it was reported
that ...
... money supply does not exert changes in the price level. The
very small size of the coefficient of the money supply variable and
its statistical insignificance contradict the simplistic notion
held by some people in Pakistan that inflation is a purely
monetarist [or monetary!] phenomenon.
The authors in the above study even went one step further to
suggest that since money supply in Pakistan is not statistically related
to budget deficits, the latter variable does not exercise an autonomous
expansionary effect on the price level. However, in a recent revised
version of the PIDE model, Naqvi and Ahmed (1986) re-specified their
price level equation, apparently to satisfy the monetarists, where
instead of current money supply, one-period lagged money supply was
used. In their re-specified equation, the coefficient of lagged money
supply was found to be statistically significant, but the value of the
coefficient was found to be very low; precisely 0.0008.
In order to find the reasons for this apparent conflicting finding
about the contribution of money supply on the rate of inflation in
Pakistan, Equations (7) and (8) were further estimated using the
wholesale price index and the GDP deflator to define the rate of
inflation. Data for these price indices were taken from the IFS Yearbook
1989. The results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
While the results reported in Table 3, obtained by using the
wholesale price index, are similar to the results obtained for Pakistan
in Tables 1 and 2, the results in Table 4, obtained by using the GDP
deflator, are completely different as far as the value of the
coefficient on real money balances is concerned. It appears that the
acceleration of the inflation rate (calculated from the GDP deflator) is
insensitive to changes in real money balances. However, it is
interesting to note that the correlation coefficient between the
wholesale price index and the GDP deflator for Pakistan is 0.91 for the
period 1961-88, which is a value that should give almost similar results
for the two price indices. Obviously, there is some problem in the data
for the GDP deflator: however, the results in no way undermine the
monetarist model; rather they show the deficiency of the GDP deflator as
a proxy for the price level in Pakistan. Indeed, except for developed
countries, in almost all empirical studies on inflation for developing
countries, either the consumer price index or the wholesale price index
is used to calculate the rate of inflation. It is not quite clear why
Naqvi and associates insisted on using the GDP deflator in the PIDE
model, when other price indices were available. It is not unreasonable
to expect that, in addition to the use of the GDP deflator, one should
use other price indices to check the validity of the results obtained
for a fundamental economic relation for a country like Pakistan before
arriving at any startling conclusion.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has tested the monetarist versus the neo-Keynesian views
on the acceleration of inflation, using annual data for Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (mostly) for the period 1961-88,
within the framework of Stein's (1978, 1982) theoretical model. The
empirical results consistently support the monetarist view that changes
in real money balances contribute to an acceleration of inflation.
Another important finding is that except for Bangladesh, contrary to the
neo-Keynesian view, bond-financed government expenditure does not have
an independent significant positive effect on the acceleration of
inflation. However, since appropriate data for bond-financed government
expenditure were not available, the results obtained by using a proxy
variable need to be treated with caution.
The empirical results obtained here for Pakistan are of special
importance because several authors studying inflation in Pakistan have
failed to find any significant effect of money supply on the price
level. While the results obtained here may convince many that monetary
growth indeed contributes to inflation in Pakistan, others may still
look for the reasons of low coefficient value of money supply when the
GDP deflator is used as a proxy for the price level. Whatever may be the
final outcome of such a search, a passing remark may be made that there
is some lack of seriousness in the analysis of inflation in Pakistan.
There is much scope for a study on inflation in Pakistan, in which the
inflation equation needs to be specified on the basis of a solid
theoretical foundation, rather than just using an ad hoc equation which
is difficult to justify as an analytical tool. For example, causality
tests hide more than what they reveal in determining the role of money
supply in the generation and acceleration of inflation. In addition, it
is probably more sensible to use a price change equation rather than a
price level equation. This is because the latter specification is
vulnerable to the multicollinearity and autocorrelation problem.
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Economic Review 64 : 867-887
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(ed.)Monetarism. Amsterdam: North-holland. 183-271.
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(1) Monetarists and the neo-Keynesians are not a homogeneous groups
of economists. The broad classification of the mainstream economists
into two neatly defined camps is just a very stylised picture of
reality. See Stein (1982) for some broad propositions which make
monetarists different from the neo-Keynesians.
AKHTAR HOSSAIN, The author is Lecturer in Economics, Newcastle
University, Australia. Author's Note: I wish to thank an anonymous
referee for his/her comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Table 1
Estimates of [beta]1 and [beta]2 of Equation (7)
[beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2)
Bangladesh ..... 0.63 (a) (4.59)
India -0.01 (0.71) 0.69 (b) (2.36)
India ..... 0.51 (a) (2.86)
Nepal ..... 0.59 (1.47)
Nepal ..... 0.86 (a) (3.12)
Pakistan -0.02 (1.07) 0.44 (a) (3.19)
Pakistan -0.01 (1.03) 0.41 (a) (3.96)
Sri Lanka ..... 0.44 (b) (2.32)
Sri Lanka ..... 0.39 (a) (3.00)
[R.sup.2] DW Period
Bangladesh 0.62 2.10 1974-87
India 0.15 2.07 1973-88
India 0.18 2.20 1961-88
Nepal 0.02 2.41 1973-88
Nepal 0.26 2.25 1966-88
Pakistan 0.36 2.04 1973-88
Pakistan 0.34 1.94 1961-88
Sri Lanka 0.19 2.45 1973-88
Sri Lanka 0.21 2.35 1961-88
Notes: ..... = coefficient value and t-ratio are close to zero;
a = significant at 1 percent level;
b = significant at 5 percent level; and
c = significant at 10 percent level.
Table 2
Estimates of [beta]1, [beta]2 and [beta]3 of Equation (8)
Country [beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2) [beta]3 (t3)
Bangladesh ..... 0.69 (a) (7.07) 0.43 (a) (5.43)
India -0.01 (0.71) 0.70 (b) (2.36) 1.41 (0.50)
India ..... 0.52 (a) (2.80) 3.03 (0.30)
Nepal ..... 0.58 (1.39) 0.88 (0.06)
Nepal ..... 0.90 (a) (3.13) -7.42 (0.60)
Pakistan -0.01 (0.67) 0.45 (a) (3.15) -18.42 (c) (0.72)
Pakistan 0.02 (0.19) 0.46 (b) (4.43) -32.50 (1.71)
Sri Lanka ..... 0.43 (c) (2.17) 1.09 (0.16)
Sri Lanka ..... 0.43 (a) (2.92) 2.42 (0.53)
[R.sup.2] DW Period
Bangladesh 0.91 2.61 1975-86
India 0.15 2.07 1973-88
India 0.15 2.11 1961-88
Nepal zero 2.42 1973-88
Nepal 0.24 2.26 1966-88
Pakistan 0.39 1.94 1973-88
Pakistan 0.38 2.06 1961-88
Sri Lanka 0.12 2.43 1973-88
Sri Lanka 0.18 2.33 1961-88
Notes: ..... coefficient value and t-ratio are close to zero;
(a) significant at 1 percent level;
(b) significant at 5 percent level; and
(c) = significant at 10 percent level.
Table 3
Estimates of [beta]1, and [beta]2 for Pakistan "(Wholesale Prices)"
[beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2) [R.sup.2] DW Period
-0.01 (0.85) 0.38 (b) (2.50) 0.22 1.72 1973-88
-0.01 (0.87) 0.38 (a) (3.29) 0.25 2.15 1961-88
[beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2) [beta]3 (t3) [R.sup.2]
..... 0.46 (a) (2.91) -37.78 (1.40) 0.27
..... 0.43 (b) (3.64) -29.34 (1.46) 0.28
DW Period
1.70 1973-88
2.16 1961-88
Notes: ..... = coefficient value and t-ratio re close to zero;
(a) = significant at 1 percent level; (b) = significant at 5
percent level; and (c) = significant at 10 percent level.
Table 4
Estimates of [beta]1, and [beta]2 for Pakistan "(GDP Deflator)"
[beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2) [R.sup.2] DW Period
..... 0.004 (a) (2.69) 0.27 1.83 1973-88
..... 0.004 (a) (3.22) 0.24 2.00 1961-88
[beta]1 (t1) [beta]2 (t2) [beta]3 (t3) [R.sup.2]
..... 0.005 (a) (3.17) -0.35 (2.22) 0.46
..... 0.005 (a) (3.45) -0.31 (2.02) 0.34
DW Period
1.42 1973-88
1.98 1961-88
Notes: ..... = coefficient value and t-ratio re close to zero;
(a) = significant at 1 percent level; (b) = significant at 5
percent level; and (c) = significant at 10 percent level.