Flip-flopping: ideological adjustment costs in the United States Senate.
Debacker, Jason Matthew
I. INTRODUCTION
Models of electoral competition often follow Downs (1957) and allow
candidates to freely adjust their positions in the issue space to
capture the majority of voters. The result, in a two-candidate election
with a single dimensional policy space and single-peaked preferences, is
both candidates adopting the position of the median voter. Such
convergence is rarely observed and is potentially at odds with the party
polarization cited by the media and academics (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal
1991). A possible source of the non-convergence of positions is
candidate reputation (see, e.g., Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985; Enelow
and Munger 1993; Kartik and McAfee 2007). That is, candidates may find
it costly to change positions in the issue space because doing so
affects the voter's perceptions of the candidate's credibility
or character. Indeed, if media reports can be believed, recent
presidential hopefuls John Kerry and Mitt Romney can attest to the
electoral costs of changing positions to attract voters. Despite the
large amount of press given to flip-flopping candidates, there have been
few empirical tests of the electoral costs candidates face when changing
position. Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) study voter perceptions of
changes in candidate positions and find that voters dislike such changes
both because of the uncertainty they introduce into perceptions of
future policy positions and because of an intrinsic negative reaction to
the change. Still, no researchers focus on the nature of these costs and
the resulting effects on electoral equilibria. For example, do
candidates face large fixed costs to changing position that would imply
flip-flopping is an important behavior?
The following study analyzes the nature of the electoral costs
senators face when adjusting their ideological position. Using over 50
years of roll call voting scores from the U.S. Senate, I estimate the
deep parameters of a dynamic, structural model of candidate positioning.
The dynamics are important in this context because voter's utility
depends upon both current and past positions of candidates, creating a
dynamic linkage in the candidates' optimization problem. Using a
simulated method of moments (SMM) methodology, I identify the nature of
ideological adjustment costs in the U.S. Senate. That is, I find the
primitive parameters describing the objective functions of voters and
candidates by matching moments characterizing the ideological positions
of senators and election outcomes to the same moments from model
simulations.
Understanding the electoral cost associated with a candidate's
change in position is important for a number of reasons. First, by
finding large costs to adjusting position, one calls into question the
empirical validity of the median voter model and the policy predictions
based upon it. This is because costs to changing position will pose a
barrier to policy convergence in political equilibria. Second, knowing
the nature of these costs is important for understanding the role of
candidate credibility and reputation in electoral outcomes. For example,
if a large part of the costs senators face are fixed costs, we would
expect to see more "flip-flopping" senators, that is, senators
who hold a position for long periods of time, but who make relatively
large changes in position to move back toward the median voter when they
do make a change. On the other hand, if the costs senators face are
increasing with the size of their change in position (e.g., quadratic),
we would expect to see more "wishy-washy" senators. These
senators would change position more often when they deviate from the
preferences of the median voter, but with only small moves. Knowing the
nature of the costs to changing position is important for predicting
electoral equilibria and will shed light on which theoretical models of
electoral competition are most appealing on empirical grounds. The size
and nature of these electoral costs will tell us whether the cost to
flip-flopping is fixed or a function of the distance the candidate moves
in the issue space. It will also show whether several small changes or
one larger change is the better strategy for a candidate who wishes to
change his platform.
The results suggest economically and statistically significant
costs of changing position. Further, models that best fit the data are
those with both convex and non-convex costs to changing position. That
is, the data show senators who are not "flip-floppers" (which
would imply a model with only fixed costs), but who change positions
slowly. The standard Downsian model and the convergence property of many
median voter models of political equilibrium are found to be
inconsistent with the data on the ideological positioning of U.S.
senators. The theoretical models found to be most consistent with the
data are those where voters have both uncertainty about the future
positions of candidates (as in Enelow and Munger 1993) and care about
candidate character (as in Kartik and McAfee 2007). The implication is
that voters penalize any change in position, but that electoral
penalties are increasing in the size of the change.
A. Previous Literature and Motivation
Models predicting non-convergence of policy platforms in
two-candidate elections with a single policy dimension come in several
flavors. Alesina (1988) presents a model where politicians care about
policy in addition to the rents from office and cannot commit to policy
platforms. This creates a principal agent problem between the
representatives and the voters. While the candidate would like to
promise the median voter's preferred position to win the election,
such a promise may not be credible and therefore candidate platforms
will not converge. A second type of model in which the equilibrium may
have non-convergence relies upon uncertainty by the voters about the
policy to be implemented when the candidate takes office. The policy in
office may differ from the announced policy because of the preferences
of the politician (as in Alesina 1988), because of future events, or
because the candidate is unsure about his own preferred position. Enelow
and Munger (1993), Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985), Ingberman (1989), and
Banks (1990) all describe models with such uncertainty and derive the
equilibrium conditions of electoral competition. Models of Kartik and
McAfee (2007), Callander (2008), and Callander and Wilkie (2007) adopt a
combination of the previous two types of models. Some candidates are
policy motivated and others are purely office motivated. However, voters
are uncertain about the type of the candidates. Candidates may also have
some attribute such as "character" that is valuable to the
voters, beyond the policy choice of the candidates. The uncertainty
about type of the candidate causes announced positions to become signals
of a politician type, leading to non-convergence of platforms. Most
closely related to this work is the model of candidate flip-flopping
between primary and general elections in Hummel (2010). This model
proposes that voters prefer the valence properties of candidates who do
not flip-flop (similar to that in Kartik and McAfee 2007). The resulting
equilibrium then includes cases where candidates in a general election
do not fully converge in their policy platforms.
Each model of non-convergence implies something about the
adjustment costs faced by candidates, that is, about the electoral costs
associated with changes in position. For example, Enelow and Munger
(1993) derive the expected utility of the voters when electing a
particular candidate and show that the expected utility is decreasing in
the size of the change in the candidates' policy platforms.
Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Ingberman (1989) find similar results
using slightly different assumptions. The models of Banks (1990),
Callander (2008), Callander and Wilkie (2007), and Kartik and McAfee
(2007) do not include past position as a state variable, but are only
focused on positioning in a one-shot election where candidates may face
a personal cost to misrepresenting their position. However, in a dynamic
framework, signaling of one's motivation is done both through
one's current choice of position and through the dynamics of
one's position. Whether the costs to adjusting position in dynamic
versions of these models are convex, as in Enelow and Munger (1993), or
non-convex (as might result from separating equilibria in a signaling
game), depends upon the form of the personal costs to candidates for
misrepresenting their position. The goal of this study is to empirically
identify the form of the electoral costs candidates actually face.
Empirical models of candidate positioning related to the analysis
in the following sections include the work of Glazer and Robbins (1993),
Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001), Levitt (1996), Bronars and
Lott (1997), Poole (2007), and Poole and Rosenthal (1997). The evidence
that politicians make large movements in position due to changes in
voter preferences is mixed. Glazer and Robbins (1993) find the
ideological preferences of voters have a substantial effect on the
ideological positions of their Representatives. Using the Conservative
Coalition interest group's scores to identify the ideological
position of Congressman, they find the voters exert much control over
the position of their Congressman and deviations from the voter's
position are small, even for senior Congressman. Ansolabehere, Snyder,
and Stewart (2001) use the National Political Awareness test to identify
the positions of both incumbents and challengers in over 100 years of
House elections. They find much of a candidate's ideology is
explained by his party, and in contrast to Glazer and Robbins (1993),
find little of a candidate's ideological position is determined by
local conditions. Levitt (1996) finds senators place the most weight on
their own ideological preferences, with the remainder of their
ideological stance being approximately equally determined by the
preferences of their constituents and their party. However, changes in
the alignment between voter preferences and senatorial voting records
over a senator's career are not explicitly examined by Levitt
(1996). Poole (2007) finds little variation in a Congressman's
position over his career when using his Nominate scores to define
ideological positions. This paper will extend these analyses by further
documenting how candidate positions change with changes in the
preferences of the voters and estimating the impact of these changes in
position on electoral outcomes.
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find the vast majority of the variation
in roll call voting records can be accounted for by a single dimension,
the liberal-conservative spectrum. Lor example, how one votes on
school-vouchers correlates very highly with how one votes on tax reform
and welfare programs. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have found this single
dimension is able to explain the majority of roll call voting patterns,
especially after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In fact,
they find over 90% of roll call vote choice can now be explained by the
single dimension, liberal-conservative spectrum. These results and the
theoretical models described above motivate my use of such a single
dimension in the empirical analysis done here.
To the best of my knowledge, no empirical work presents an
explicit, dynamic model of candidate positioning. The construction of a
quantitative, dynamic model of candidate positioning is one of the major
contributions of this work. However, the model and estimation used here
owes much to work in dynamic economics, such as work by Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006). Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) study the nature of
costs to manufacturing plants when adjusting their stock of physical
capital. The analysis here draws heavily on their methods and
characterization of adjustment costs. One can see a similarity between a
plant's choice of physical capital for next period based on current
and expected productivity shocks and a candidate's choice of
position, which is based on the current and expected preferences of the
voters. Lurther, one can see how the nature of adjustment costs shape
behavior in a similar manner in both contexts. Lixed costs associated
with the investment of physical capital can generate the well-documented
patterns of lumpy investment. In the same way, non-convexities in the
electoral costs to changes in position can lead to candidates who make
large jumps in position (i.e., flip-flop). Thus, many of the modeling
and identification tools of dynamic economics can be applied to
questions in dynamic political economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
outlines the theoretical model of candidate positioning in a dynamic
environment. Section III describes the data and Section IV discusses the
reduced form evidence for a model in which senators face costs to
changing position. Section V presents the econometric methodology and
discusses identification. Section VI presents the baseline results and
Section VII presents extensions of the baseline models. Section VIII
concludes.
II. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF CANDIDATE POSITIONING
The model of candidate positioning, which I describe formally
below, has the following basic elements. Voters have single-peaked
preferences over policy outcomes in a one-dimensional space. Voters may
also penalize candidates for changes in position in this one-dimensional
space. These penalties may be because of signals of character derived
from these changes or because of increases in uncertainty over future
positions the candidate will take if elected. Both voters and candidates
are forward looking and candidates make decisions with an infinite
horizon. Finally, voters derive utility from a time-varying candidate
characteristic orthogonal to the candidate's ideology.
Each election features two candidates. As in Downs (1957),
candidates only care about the rents from holding office and not policy
positions per se. Thus, they choose their positions to maximize the
probability of obtaining office. Given the voter's preferences,
however, candidates must take into account their past positions when
choosing their current platform.
A. Model of Voters
Let a voter's preferred position and identity be [theta].
Candidates and voters have common knowledge of [theta], a point in a
one-dimensional policy space. Call this space ideology.
Voters select the candidate in the current election to maximize
their expected utility, a function of the policy the candidate puts into
place once in office. Further, assume the demographics of the district
change over time. That is, the distribution of [theta], and in
particular the median [theta], [[theta].sup.m], will evolve. Thus
[[theta].sup.m.sub.t] may not equal [[theta].sup.m.sub.t+1]. Note, while
the distribution of [theta] changes, this does not mean each of the
voters' preferred points change, only that there are changes in the
composition of individuals that make up the senators'
constituencies.
Assume the voter's utility is quadratic so the expected
utility of [theta] voting for candidate i, who takes position [x.sub.i]
in the one-dimensional policy space is: (1)
Eu (i, [theta]) = E (- [([x'.sub.i] - [theta]).sup.2]) - C
([[x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) + [[xi].sub.i],
where a prime denotes a one period ahead variable and the subscript
- 1 denotes the value from one period prior. The variable [[xi].sub.i]
is a random component to the voters' utility, which is distributed
i.i.d. and is unobserved by the candidates at the time of their platform
choices. This can represent some surge of popularity during the election
that is orthogonal to the popularity of the platform and is often called
"valence" in the political science literature.
The function C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) is the "cost of
adjustment." In a sense, it is a punishment by the voters for a
candidate's change in position. (1) One may parameterize this
function in several ways, according to the model of electoral
competition one believes to be correct. I discuss the specification of
this function and the corresponding models of electoral competition in
the following subsection.
The state variables for the voter's problem are the
voter's preferred point, [theta], the current positions of the
candidates, [x.sub.i], the past positions of the candidates,
[x.sub.i,-1], and the transitory shock to the candidates' electoral
chances, [[xi].sub.i].
B. Ideological Adjustment Costs
The adjustment cost function that politicians face is represented
by a penalty function in the voter's utility. The shape of this
reduced form function depends upon the theoretical model of voter
preferences and electoral competition assumed. I outline three general
cases below, relating each to the relevant political economy models and
discussing their implications for the behavior of candidates.
Zero Costs of Adjustment. If changing position has no effect on a
candidate's electoral prospects, then we are in the stylized
Downsian world. In this case, the cost to any candidate i of moving from
position [x.sub.i,-1] in the prior period to [x.sub.i] in the current
period is given by C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,1]) = 0. Under this
parameterization, candidates will always align themselves with the
current position of the median voter, regardless of their past position.
Convex Costs of Adjustment. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985),
Ingberman (1989), and Enelow and Munger (1993) derive equilibria of
electoral competition when voters are uncertain about the policies of
candidates. The voters may be unsure that the candidate will deliver on
their campaign promises for a number of reasons. Writing the expected
utility of voting for candidate i:
(2) Eu(i, [theta]) = E(-[([x'.sub.i] - [theta]).sup.2]) +
[[xi].sub.i],
one can pass through the expectations operator, perform some
algebraic manipulation and find:
(3) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII],
where costs to changing position result from increasing uncertainty
regarding future positions. These costs are given by [MATHEMATICAL
EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the variance in the expected
future positions of candidates. Given risk averse voters, as uncertainty
about the future policies of the candidates increases, expected utility
decreases. It is natural for voters to use the past record of candidates
when updating their expectations about the candidate. In Enelow and
Munger (1993), a change in position by the politician increases the
uncertainty of the voters and does so in a quadratic manner. Uncertainty
increases at a rate proportional to the squared difference between the
politicians past and current positions. This result is captured in the
following specification of adjustment costs:
(4) [[sigma].sup.2.sub.x] = C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) =
[gamma]/2[([x.sub.i] - [x.sub.i,-1]).sup.2].
Facing the convex adjustment costs of Equation (4), senators will
not be especially responsive to changes in the preferences of their
constituents. While candidates will want to align themselves with the
voters, the costs of changing position increase quickly as one makes
larger moves. Such costs force senators to change position only in small
increments. Senators will be "wishy-washy," making slight
moves in any direction as the voters' preferred points in the
ideological space change, but rarely making large jumps in their
ideological position.
In addition to the quadratic case, I also consider a model where
the costs of adjustment are linear. Such costs are consistent with the
models of Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Ingberman (1989), who allow
the uncertainty of voters to be any function that is increasing the size
of the deviations of candidates from their past record. These costs take
the following form:
(5) [[sigma].sup.2.sub.x] = C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) = [kappa]
([[absolute value of [x.sub.i] - [x.sub.i,-1]]).
Non-convex Costs of Adjustment. Still other models of candidate
positioning assume the costs of adjusting one's position are
related to the signaling of character. That is, voters derive utility
from both the ideological stance of the politician and from the
character of the politician. Kartik and McAfee (2007) and Callander and
Wilkie (2007) describe models with just such a mechanism. In a dynamic
version of these models, there may be a non-linear relationship between
the size of one's change in position and the penalty one pays for
the change. If one either has character or does not (as in Kartik and
McAfee 2007) holding one's ground signals good character and any
change in position signals one has no character. In a separating
equilibrium, no character types will reveal themselves by changing
position. Because character is valuable, these candidates will face a
lower probability of election than candidates who have the same
platform, but signal having character. I model the dynamic signaling of
character with a fixed cost to adjusting position. The adjustment cost
function for candidate i is thus:
(6) [C.sup.NC] ([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) = 0,
where [C.sup.NC] is the cost function when one does not change
position ([x.sub.i] = [x.sub.i,-1]). And:
(7) [C.sup.C] ([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) = F,
where [C.sup.C] is the cost function when one changes position and
F is the fixed cost to changing position. Candidates facing fixed costs
to changing position will change positions only when they are further
away from the voters than a certain threshold, as determined by F.
Senators facing fixed costs to adjustment will hold positions for a long
period of time, but make larger changes than those in the convex models
when they do change. In other words, these candidates flip-flop.
C. Candidates and Electoral Competition: Static Model
To illustrate the nature of political competition in the presence
of adjustment costs, let me begin with a one-period version of the
model. The one-period model unfolds in the following order. Challengers
are drawn from a population of potential challengers. The incumbent and
challenger simultaneously determine their platforms, [x.sub.i]. The
candidates' records from the previous period [x.sub.i,-1] and their
current platform choices influence the voters' expectations about
the candidates' positions in the following term E
([x'.sub.i]), and determine the cost of adjustment associated with
any changes in position C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]). After current
positions have been determined, the election is held and the winner
realized.
Politicians care only about the rents from office and not their
policy positions per se. Therefore, they chose a position to maximize
the utility of the median voter and thereby maximize the probability of
getting elected.
Given this structure, consider the case of elections where there is
no stochastic term in the voter's utility so that:
(8) Eu(i, [theta]) = E(-[([x'.sub.i] - [theta]).sup.2]) -
C([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]).
In this case, one can solve for the position of the candidate that
maximizes each voter's utility. Call this [x.sup.*.sub.i]
([x.sub.i,-1], [theta]), where i identifies the candidate (incumbent or
challenger) and [theta] identifies the voter. Using the first-order
condition of the voter's utility function, one can solve the
optimal ideology for each candidate i and voter [theta]. (2) This
ideology will solve the following equation:
(9) 2E [[partial derivative][x'.sub.i] / [partial
derivative][x.sup.*.sub.i] - [theta])] = -[partial
derivative]C([x.sup.*.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) / [[partial
derivative][x.sup.*.sub.i]
The second derivative of Equation (8) is given by:
(10) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Note that for the zero cost, quadratic cost, and linear cost
functions proposed above [[partial derivative].sup.2. C
([x.sup.*.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1]) / [[partial derivative].sup.2]
[x.sup.*.sub.i] [greater than or equal to] 0. Under the assumption that
[x'.sub.i] is not decreasing in [x.sub.i] and the assumptions that
[[partial derivative].sup.2] [x'.sub.i] / [[partial
derivative].sup.2] [x.sup.*.sub.i] [less than or equal to] 0 if [theta]
> [x.sub.i] and [[partial derivative].sup.2] [x'.sub.i] /
[[partial derivative].sup.2] [x.sup.*.sub.i] [greater than or equal to]
0 if [theta] < [x.sub.i], then this second derivative is negative.
(3) Therefore, preferences of the voters are convex and single peaked.
With single-peaked preferences, deterministic voting, majority
rule, and two candidates, the optimal position for candidate i is given
by median ([x.sup.*.sub.i] ([x.sub.i,-1], [theta])). From Equation (9),
it is clear that [x.sup.*.sub.i] ([x.sub.i,-1], [theta]) is an
increasing function of [theta]. Thus, median ([x.sup.*.sub.i]]
([x.sub.i,-1], [theta])) = [x.sup.*.sub.i] ([x.sub.i,-1],
[[theta].sup.m]), where [[theta].sup.m] is the preferred point of the
median voter. In the case of no adjustment costs, expectations might
take the form E ([x'.sub.i]) = [x.sub.i] and thus the optimal
position is to locate at the median. For models with costs to adjusting
position, the optimal location for candidate i will be a function of
both the median voter's preferred point and their past position and
parameterization of the cost of adjustment function. As [x.sub.i,-1] is
further from [theta], the right-hand side of Equation (9) becomes more
negative. For equality to hold, the expected distance (a function of the
candidate's current position) on the left-hand side must increase.
In deterministic elections, with a cost of adjusting position, the
outcome is predetermined so long as the expectations function for future
positions, E ([x'.sub.i]), is the same for both candidates. That
is, both candidates move toward the median, but may not converge on the
median because of the costs to changing position. In this case, it is
the candidate whose past position was closest to the voters who wins the
election.
As Equation (1) highlights, voters' utility may also be a
function of a valence term that affects voter utility, but is unobserved
by the econometrician. Under the assumption that valence is distributed
i.i.d., is additively separable in the voters' utility function,
and is unobserved by the candidate when choosing his current platform,
then the optimal location of a candidate will still remain a function of
the ideal point of the median voter and the candidate's own past
position. However, the election outcome will not be predetermined, but
will be stochastic. Thus, the candidate will position himself to
maximize the probability of winning the election, which, given the
assumptions on the valence term, is a function of his location relative
to the median voter and the size of his position change to get there. In
particular, assuming [[xi].sub.i] is distributed i.i.d.. Type 1 Extreme
Value and is additively separable in the utility function, the
politician's expected probability of victory can be written using
the logit formula:
(11) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
The probability that candidate i wins is thus decreasing in his
distance from the median voter (as median voter utility decreases with
this distance) and decreasing in the size of the change in position (as
voter utility falls as the size of this change increases).
D. Candidates and Electoral Competition: Dynamic Model
Extending the static model into a dynamic context, it is easiest to
formulate the problem recursively. As before, candidates care only about
the rents to office, and not policy. Candidates are forward looking into
an infinite time horizon. Therefore, candidate i, who has tenure t,
chooses x, to maximize:
(12) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
The value of rents, given by R, is unimportant other than they must
be positive to motivate candidates to run. The continuation value of
winning the election is discounted by the probability of winning P(*),
the candidates' rate of time preference [beta], and the probability
of retirement [[delta].sub.t].
The formulation of the senator's problem will differ under
non-convex costs of adjusting position. Recall that with the fixed cost
of adjustment function, the cost to the candidate in the case of no
adjustment was [C.sup.NC] and the cost incurred in the case of any
adjustment was [C.sup.C]. Call the associated probabilities of
re-election [P.sup.NC]([x.sub.i,-1], [x.sub.j], [x.sub.j,-1],
[[theta].sup.m]) and [P.sup.C] ([x.sub.i], [x.sub.i,-1], [x.sub.j],
[x.sub.j,-1], [[theta].sup.m]), respectively. In the case of such
non-convex costs of adjustment, one can write the dynamic programming
problem (DPP) of the senator as:
(13) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
where
(14) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
and
(15) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Candidates choose a position to maximize the probability of getting
elected and obtaining rents from office. The probability of winning is
highest if they get as close to possible (bearing in mind the costs of
adjustment) to the median voter in each period. Let the optimal decision
rule for the candidate's choice of ideological position be given by
the function g([[x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j,-1], [[theta].sup.m]). The
model thus unfolds in the following order:
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
with candidate i choosing position [x.sub.i] given knowledge of the
other candidate's current and past positions and the position of
the median voter in the election at time t = 1. The candidates'
current and past positions, [x.sub.i], [x.sub.j], [x.sub.i,-1], and
[x.sup.j,-1] enter into the voter's expected utility function for
the election at t = 1.
E. Rational Expectations Equilibrium
DEFINITION 1. A rational expectations recursive political
equilibrium consists of functions V([x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j],
[x.sub.j,-1], [[theta].sup.m]), and g([x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j],
[x.sub.j,-1], [[theta].sup.m]) such that for all i:
* Given [x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j], [x.sub.j,-1], and
[[theta].sup.m], V([x.sub.i,-1), t, [x.sub.j], [x.sub.j,-1]), and
g([x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j], [x.sub.j,-1], [[theta].sup.m]) solve the
candidate's problem.
* Given g([x.sub.i,-1], t, [x.sub.j], [x.sub.j,-1],
[[theta].sup.m]), the voters choose the candidate who maximizes their
expected utility.
* Voters have rational expectations: [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
The above are standard conditions for the equilibrium of a
repeated, two-candidate electoral game. The value functions and policy
functions are such that they solve the candidates' problems. The
voters select the candidate that maximizes their expected utility and
hold beliefs about the candidates' policy functions that are
consistent with the actions of these candidates.
III. DATA
Estimation of the model of candidate positioning requires data on
the ideological positions of senators and their constituents,
observations of senators' retirement decisions, and data on
election outcomes. The data on Senate retirements and election outcomes
is straight forward to collect. These data come from Stewart and Woon
(2006) (retirements), the ICPSR Congressional Biography Data Series
(retirements), and the Federal Election Commission (election results). I
omit a detailed discussion of these data sources. The data on ideology
require a more thorough description.
Data on the ideological position of senators and voters come from
the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) interest group ratings of roll
call votes. Each year, the ADA selects a subset (20 votes) of the
year's roll call votes and rates each Congressman on a scale of
0-100. A score of 0 means the Congressman voted against the ADA's
position on every roll call vote and 100 means the Congressman voted for
the ADA's position on every roll call vote. Thus a score of 0
indicates the Congressman is very conservative and a score of 100
indicates the Congressman is very liberal, as defined by the ADA. The
sample period is 1947-2006. (4)
Adjustments are made to these scores to allow them to be comparable
across time and chambers. These adjustments are described in Groseclose,
Levitt, and Snyder (1999). Such adjustments to the raw ADA scores are
necessary because the issues voted on vary over time and across chambers
and so the raw scores are not directly comparable. The adjustments are
used to allow the ADA scores to shift and stretch across time and
chambers. Thus converting raw scores to adjusted scores is similar to
converting temperature from Fahrenheit to Celsius. The adjusted scores
are not bounded between 0 and 100. Table 1 presents summary statistics
for the adjusted and nominal ADA scores, separating out the scores for
each major party. These data are available for the entire 1947-2007
period from Anderson and Habel (2008).
There are several advantages to ADA scores over other measures of
ideology, such as the Nominate scores of Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal. First, ADA scores have a clear definition (i.e., position on
the liberal-conservative spectrum, as defined by the ADA). Second, due
to the work of Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999), they are
comparable over time and across chambers. (5) Third, they are reported
at a higher frequency. (6)
The mean of the ADA scores of the state's House delegation are
used as a proxy for the ideological position of each state's
voters. This follows the work of Levitt (1996), who uses the same proxy
for the preferences of each state's voters. (7) If House members
face adjustment costs similar to those faced by senators then this proxy
variable will bias the estimates of the adjustment costs faced by
senators. The result will be a downward bias on the size of the
adjustment costs estimated. The reasoning is as follows: If House
members face positive adjustment costs, then their positions (and thus
my proxy for voter preferences) will move less than one point for each
one point change in the preferences of the median voters. Senators will
respond to the true voter preferences. Thus by using the positions of
House members as a proxy for voter preferences, it will look as those
senators move closer to the positions of voters than they in fact do.
Because the model is in part identified through the assumption that
adjustment costs are the frictions preventing senators from moving close
to the positions of the median voter, the result will be downward biased
adjustment cost parameter estimates.
Because the ADA scores are based on such a small number of votes,
there may be much year-to-year variation due to the votes the ADA
considers each year. To mitigate this noise, I define a model period as
a term in the Senate and average the scores across the period. I do not
calculate scores for senators who did not receive a score in two or more
years of the 6-year term, ensuring the ideological position of each
senator is based on at least 80 votes. This leaves me with 960
senator-term observations over the sample period of 1947-2006. Included
in this sample are 400 different senators. Of these 137 serve only one
term, 104 serve two terms, 77 serve three terms, 48 serve four terms,
and 34 serve five or more terms during the sample period. From the
sample, I am able to observe 557 potential changes in position.
Summary statistics for the ADA data are presented in Table 2.
Figure 1 displays a histogram of the distribution of ideological changes
(x - [x.sub.-1]) and shows a distribution with a mass toward zero. This
figure is important for thinking about whether those costs are convex or
non-convex. Convex costs would suggest most movements would be small and
there would be a positive correlation between the movements. Indeed, the
mass toward zero supports this. Over 11% of the changes are less than
one point on the ADA scale and over 20% are less than two points on the
scale. Non-convex costs would suggest a long right tail (i.e., many
senators making big jumps), which is not evident from Figure 1. Of all
changes in position, the moves larger than 20 points on the ADA scale
account for about 7% of the total change in position. These
"jumps" constitute 2.5% of the observations.
If costs were zero, then one would expect a high correlation
between changes in voter ideology and changes in senator ideology and
also a high correlation between the observed ideology of senators and
voters. The correlation of changes in Table 2 is low, at 0.06 and the
correlation of observed ideologies is 0.551. With zero cost of adjusting
position both of these correlations would be 1.00.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
IV. EVIDENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT COSTS
A. Non-parametric Evidence
The distance between the position of the senators and the voters as
measured by the ADA scores has a clear effect on electoral outcomes. As
a measure of electoral outcomes, I employ incumbent re-election rates.
These are analogous to the electoral probabilities for incumbents
derived from the model. Note that the theoretical model predicts that,
on average, the candidates who position themselves closer to the median
voter will fare better, but not necessarily win the election, given the
stochastic valence term. The unconditional correlation between a
senator's re-election rate and his distance from the voters is
-0.119. Figure 2 plots how incumbent re-election rates decline as the
distance from the voter increases. This relationship is negative, as one
might expect.
Changing position also negatively affects one's electoral
prospects. The unconditional correlation between the incumbent
re-election rates and the absolute value of his change in position is
-0.115. Figure 3 shows how incumbent re-election rates decline as
changes in position become larger.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Finally, Figure 4 plots incumbent electoral outcomes over changes
and distance. Solid dots are incumbent victories and the open circles
are defeats. Incumbents win the vast majority of elections, but those
that they lose are disproportionately those where the incumbent is
positioned far from the voter's preferences or makes a large change
in position.
B. Reduced-Form Evidence
The unconditional correlation between incumbent re-election rates
and the size of a candidate's change in position may be biased
downward because those who change position are likely to be those whose
ideological position is far from the voters' preferred point. To
correct for this, I estimate a logit model of incumbent re-election
rates and control for ideological distance, changes in ideology, changes
in state economic conditions, candidate seniority, and national and
state trends in party popularity. Tufte (1975) and Erikson (1990) find
support for the role of economic conditions in the outcomes of
Congressional elections and prompt me to control for changes in state
income. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989) find controlling for national sways
in opinion are important, therefore I included fixed effects for the
interaction of the candidate's party and the year of the election.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Table 3 reports the results of the logit model estimation.
Ideological distance is defined as the square of the distance between
the voters and the senator [([[theta].sup.m] - x).sup.2]. Changes in
ideology are measured in two ways. First, by the absolute value of the
change [absolute value of [[x.sub.i] - [x.sub.i,-1]]. Second, by the
square of the change in position [([x.sub.i] - [x.sub.i,-1]).sup.2]. The
coefficients on distance from the voters and changes in positions have
the expected (negative) sign in all specifications. Changes in state
income are positively related to a candidate's electoral prospects,
which is anticipated, as all candidates included in the regressions are
incumbents. In fact, they are all incumbents with at least two terms of
tenure, which is needed to calculate changes in position. The effect of
seniority is positive, but statistically insignificant at standard
significance levels. However, Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and Moro (2008)
and others show that after the "sophomore surge," the returns
to being an incumbent are small.
While the coefficients on a change in ideology are of only marginal
statistical significance, the signs are consistent with the theoretical
model--changes in position negatively affect the incumbent's
success in any model. When evaluated at the sample means, a ten-point
change in ideology results in a decrease incumbent re-election rates of
between 1.5% and 3.7% points, which is economically meaningful. In fact,
in model (1), a change in position of 6.22 ADA points (the average size
of a change in position) is equivalent to a candidate being about 20 ADA
points further away from the voters, in terms of the effects on
incumbent re-election rates. To put this in perspective, the difference
between the average positions of senators Al Gore, Jr. and Ted Kennedy,
moderate and very liberal senators, respectively, is about 18 points on
the ADA scale.
There is potential for bias in the coefficients on ideological
distance and changes in position. This bias comes from two sources.
First, if running in an election is costly, those who run are likely to
be those who anticipate winning. Thus, those with a past voting record
closer to the ideal position of the voters and who do not have to make
large changes in position will run for office, while those who are far
from the voters and would have to make large changes do not run. Not
controlling for the endogenous selection of candidates into re-election
bids biases the estimated relationship between changing position and
electoral success in a downward direction. Second, among those who run,
those changing position are going to be those who are more likely to
lose the election; those with a voting record far from the voters and
who face a strong challenger. Evidence of such behavior can be found in
Somer-Topcu (2009), who documents parties changing position in response
to weak election outcomes. The effect of failing to account for the
endogenous relationship between changes in position and re-election
rates results in a upward bias of the estimated relationship between the
two variables.
To control for selection and the endogeneity of changes in
position, I estimate a model of candidate positioning in a more direct
fashion. This has the further advantage of controlling for the position
of challengers. By not controlling for the position of challengers, I am
biasing the estimates of the effects of changing position. For example,
imagine a case where the challenger takes a position very near the
median voter and has a record that is close to the median as well. In
such a case, the incumbent will likely have to move close to the median
also, but he will face a low probability of winning given the proximity
of the challenger to the position of the median voter. In this case,
large changes in position come in cases when the incumbent has a
relatively low probability of victory. Thus the estimates of the
electoral costs to changing position may be biased upward. Estimating a
structural model allows me to control for these sources of endogeneity
by explicitly including them in the optimization problems of the agents.
That is, when the model is simulated these endogenous relationships are
a part of the simulated behavior, allowing for unbiased estimates of the
deep parameters of the model. In the next section, I discuss the
structural estimation of a model of candidate positioning when changing
position is costly.
V. STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
A. Estimable Model
In order to estimate the dynamic model described in Section II, one
needs data on the past records of both candidates, the current positions
taken by both candidates, and the preferred position of the median
voter. I use ADA scores to proxy for the current and past positions of
those who have served in the Senate. A candidate's voting record
during his term in office serves as his platform for the election at the
end of that term. No available data allow me to observe the past
positions of first term senators or the past or the current position
taken by those who have never served in the Senate. Because of this
limitation. I assume a distribution for the positions of challengers and
the costs of adjustment associated with these positions. The model of
challengers is reduced form, but consistent with both an incumbency
advantage (as in Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985) and with the model of
candidate positioning described above. This simplification captures much
of the richness of the model from Section II, while allowing one to
estimate the underlying parameters of the model in the absence of data
on challenger positions. (8)
Specifically, the challenger's current position [x.sub.C] and
the costs associated with this position [C.sub.C] are drawn from a
bivariate normal distribution with mean p and covariance
[[summation].sub.C]. These assumptions imply the expected utility of
electing a challenger is:
(16) Eu(C,[theta]) = - [(E ([x.sub.'C]) -
[[theta].sup.m]).sup.2] - [C.sub.C] + [[xi].sub.C].
The function E([x'.sub.C]) is a function of the current
position of the challenger [x.sub.C], in which the econometrician cannot
observe because there is no available voting record for the challenger.
Therefore, I model the challenger's current position as a random
draw with [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. In
addition, because I do not want to assume challengers and incumbents
face the same costs to changing position, the costs of adjustment, Cc,
associated with the challenger and his position are also stochastic
[C.sub.C] ~ N([[mu].sub.C], [[sigma].sub.C]). (9) Allowing for a
correlation between one's current position and the costs of
changing position is natural, as one might expect there to be more
uncertainty if a candidate adopts a more centrist position because he
may be playing to the voters (see Enelow and Hinich 1981; Kartik and
McAfee 2007). Let [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] be
the correlation between the challenger's current position and the
costs associated with that position.
Alternatively, one could assume the challengers' cost of
adjustment function. Knowing the form of this cost of adjustment
function, one need only draw the past position of the challenger. Given
the cost function and the position of the incumbent, the
challenger's equilibrium decision rule will omit his optimal
ideological position. However, one is not able to identify both the
parameters of the cost function for challengers and the distribution of
their past positions. Thus, I assume a parameterization of the
stochastic processes summarizing the best response function of the
challengers and their costs of adjusting position. These can be
summarized through the draw of their current position and the challenger
cost function, which represents the cost to moving to their current
position (a function of their current and past positions, neither of
them observable in the data).
Following Enelow and Munger (1993), voter expectations about future
candidate positions take a specific functional form, although in this
case voter expectations are assumed to be forward-looking. These
expectations take the following form: [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], where [lambda] [member of] [0,1], That is, the
expected position of the candidate next period is assumed to be between
where he positions himself today and where the median voter will be one
period hence. The expectations function is consistent with the
theoretical model in Section II in that it is increasing in [x.sub.i].
It also models voters as having expectations consistent with the fact
that candidates change position to move closer to voters, but may not
fully adjust in the presence of adjustment costs. In the results which
follow, I fix [lambda] at 0.5. (10) Positing a functional form for voter
expectations of future candidate positions helps to pin down the
voters' beliefs.
The utility and expectations of voters, the stochastic valence of
candidates, the motivation of candidates, and the exogenous processes
describing challengers put structure on the model. The parameters of
this model are estimated using data on the positions taken by senators
on the liberal-conservative spectrum defined by the ADA. The expected
value of a candidate's policy next period is determined by
expectations about the evolution of the median voter and decision rules
of the candidates.
B. Estimating Voter Preferences and Non-electoral Exit
Probabilities
The decisions of the senators depend importantly upon retirement
probabilities and the expectations of the future positions of voters.
Retirement probabilities depend upon the tenure of the senator and
help to define how future elections are discounted. On average, just
under 10% of senators retire each term. The probability of retirement,
[[delta].sub.t], is found by calculating the empirical probability that
a senator with a given level of tenure retires. That is, retirement
decisions are not modeled as strategic choices, as in Merlo, Diermeier,
and Keane (2005). The assumption of exogenous probabilities of
nonelectoral exit is consistent with the evidence of Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2004) who find no evidence that candidates for statewide office
retire strategically. Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and Moro (2008) also
propose that senators' retirement probabilities are non-strategic.
(11)
Understanding the persistence and variability in the preferences of
the voters are key components to the solution of the senators' DPR
The bliss point of the decisive voter is unaffected by the positions of
the senators and is assumed to follow and AR(1) process:
(17) [[theta].sup.m.sub.t] = (1 - [rho]) [mu] +
[rho][[theta].sup.m.sub.t-1] + [[epsilon].sub.t]
I assume [epsilon] ~ N(0, [[sigma].sub.[epsilon]) and use the mean
ADA score of the House delegation from the senator's state as a
proxy for the preferences of the decisive voter, as done in Levitt
(1996). The AR(1) process is estimated using a least squares approach
where the mean of the auto-regressive process is allowed to vary across
states. I assume both [rho] and [[sigma].sub.[epsilon]] are constant
across states and find them to be 0.567 and 10.380. respectively. The
AR(1) process is then approximated by a first-order Markov process
following the method of Tauchen (1986) to determine the transitions of
the voters in the discretized state space of the computational model.
Because the preferences of voters are exogenous to the choice of
position by senators, it is not necessary to estimate the distribution
of voter preferences within the structural model. Parameters calibrated
or estimated outside the structural estimation are shown in Table 4.
In addition to the exit probabilities and the law of motion for the
median voter, I also set the values of several model parameters before
the structural estimation stage. As noted by Rust (1987), it is
difficult to estimate the rate of time preference in discrete choice
DPPs. Therefore, I set the value of [beta] to an annual value of 0.96,
consistent with a 4% risk free interest rate. (12) The decision rules of
senators depend upon the differences in ideology between the candidates
and the median voter. Therefore, I assume the mean of the distribution
of challenger ideology, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII], is the same as the mean from the distribution of the median
voters' preferred points. For the following analysis, I also assume
the correlation between the ideology of challengers and the adjustment
costs of challengers, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII], is zero. (13)
C. Estimating Ideological Adjustment Costs
Using an indirect inference method, I estimate the following model
parameters: [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], and the
parameters describing the costs of adjustment function C([x.sub.i],
[x.sub.i-1]). These remaining parameters underlying the model of
candidate positioning, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII], are identified through a SMM estimation procedure as described
in McFadden (1989). Table 5 describes these parameters. The SMM
methodology has several advantages over alternative methods of
estimation such as maximum likelihood. First, SMM is transparent. The
moments I choose to match are well measured, clearly defined, and easily
interpreted. Second, given the nonconvex costs of adjustment, if one
were to use MLE, the data would have to be measured very precisely in
order to identify a "no change" in position. The data used
here do not satisfy such a strict requirement.
The SMM procedure has the following algorithm. For a given vector
of parameters, [theta], the DPP of the senator is solved. The solution
to the DPP is a set of policy functions determining the senator's
optimal choice of ideological position given his past position, the
position of the challenger, the adjustment cost associated with the
challenger's position, the current position of the voters, and the
electoral shock [xi]. These policy functions are used to simulate a
panel of policy choices and electoral outcomes. A set of moments is
calculated from the simulated panel. Call the vector of simulated
moments [[PSI].sup.s]([theta]).
The estimate [??] is the vector of parameters that minimizes the
weighted distance between [[PSI].sup.s] ([theta]) and the vector of
moments from the data [[PSI].sup.d]. Formally, [??] solves:
(18) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
where W is the optimal weighting matrix, calculated as the inverse
of the variance covariance matrix of the data moments, as described in
Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993). This weighting matrix is
calculated by bootstrapping the data. Using the SMM procedure with the
optimal weighting matrix ensures consistent and efficient estimates of
[theta].
In the minimization routine, the vector [theta] is updated using a
simulated annealing algorithm (Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers 1994). Such an
algorithm is very effective at finding the global minimum in cases where
the objective function is non-linear in its parameters, as in this case.
D. Moments and Identification
To estimate [theta], I choose to match the following moments: the
fraction of jumps in position (a change in position of at least 20
points on the ADA scale), the serial correlation of changes in position,
the re-election rate of incumbents, the correlation between re-election
rates and the distance between a senator and voter's position, the
correlation between the ideology of senators and voters, the correlation
between the ideology of senators and voters for first term senators, and
the standard deviation of positions for first term senators. (14) Table
6 summarizes the moments. While each of the moments is affected by all
the parameters to some extent, I discuss next which moments contribute
most to the identification of each parameter.
The fraction of jumps and the serial correlation in changes of
position are most informative about the size and nature of the costs of
adjustment. In the quadratic adjustment costs model, a larger value of y
implies fewer jumps. The fixed-cost model has more jumps than the
quadratic model, and the number of jumps increases as F decreases (for
certain ranges of F).
The serial correlation is also informative about the nature of the
costs of adjustment. With quadratic costs of adjustment, one will find a
relatively high degree of serial correlation. This is because senators
will not make large changes in position because the costs to changing
position are increasing with the size of the change. With linear costs
of adjustment, the marginal cost of a change in position does not depend
upon the size of the change, so the changes will be larger and the
serial correlation lower. When costs are independent of the size of one
change, as in the fixed cost case, the serial correlation will be
lowest. Facing fixed costs of adjustment, candidates will only change
position when they are beyond a certain threshold from the voters and
will make large changes in position in one term, with little activity at
other times.
Re-election rates are determined by a number of the parameters, but
they most directly help to pin down the mean adjustment costs faced by
challengers [[micro].sub.C]. Higher adjustment costs for challengers
leads to a larger incumbency advantage and thus higher incumbency
re-election rates.
The correlation of senator and voter ideology is significantly
affected by the size of the costs of adjustment and the standard
deviation in the positions of challengers [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. To separate the standard deviation in the
positions of challengers from the size of the costs of adjustment for
incumbents, I include as a moment the correlation of senator and voter
ideology for first term senators only. Holding adjustment costs
constant, an increase in [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII] will result in a lower correlation between the positions of
senators and the median voter. This will be stronger for more junior
senators, who do not have a long period of time to adjust their
positions.
Finally, the standard deviation of challenger adjustment costs,
[[sigma].sub.C], is identified by matching re-election rate of freshman
senators. Freshman re-election rates provide identification of
[[sigma].sub.C] because increases (decreases) in [[sigma].sub.C]
decrease (increase) the correlation between the ideology of the median
voter and the winning challenger's ideology. Because adjustment
costs prevent freshman senators from moving far from the positions they
had as challengers, the position they first campaigned on will directly
impact their chances of re-election. A larger (smaller) [[sigma].sub.C]
will result in lower (higher) re-election rates for freshman senators.
VI. RESULTS OF STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION
The structural model is estimated using ADA data from 1947 to 2006.
Table 7 presents the results of estimation, reporting the parameters of
the cost function (with standard errors in parentheses), the values of
the moments, and the minimum statistic. I estimate a baseline case with
no adjustment costs as well as models with quadratic, linear, and fixed
costs to adjustment and a combination model. The combination model
combines the quadratic and fixed costs of adjustment. Such a model
allows for both the role of uncertainty (as in Enelow and Munger 1993)
and character (as in Kartik and McAfee 2007).
Using the minimum statistic as the criteria, the model with both
quadratic and fixed costs to adjusting position does the best at
capturing the relevant moments. It is able to come very close to five of
the moments, and, in particular, does a much better job than other
models in matching both the serial correlation of changes in position
and the correlations between voter and senator ideology. The model with
no costs of adjustment is clearly rejected by the data, with simulations
showing senators being much too responsive to changes in voter ideology.
As in the reduced form estimation, one finds significant effects of
changing position in the structural models. Any model with some cost of
adjustment does much better at matching the relevant moments than does
the model with no costs of adjustment. In the best fitting model, with
both quadratic and fixed costs of adjustment, a change of 6.22 ADA
points (an average size change) lessens a candidate's chances of
victory by the same probability as being about five points further away
from the voter along the ideological spectrum. (15) Five ADA points is
about the average distance between senators John McCain and Bob Dole or
between senators Joe Biden and Al Gore; which is to say that it is a
noticeable, but slight difference in position. The relative electoral
cost of a change in position resulting from structural estimation is
smaller than the quantitative significance found in the reduced form
models and may suggest that there is upward bias in the estimates of
adjustment costs in the reduced form models. That is, because the
reduced form models do not control for the endogeneity of changes in
position to the competitiveness of the election they overestimate the
size of adjustment costs as larger adjustments more often came in more
competitive elections (i.e., those with lower incumbent re-election
rates).
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
The numerical example above is illustrative about the relative
magnitude of the electoral effects of distance versus costs of changing
position. But such an example does not tell us much about the optimal
position of a candidate or convergence of policy positions in electoral
equilibria. To further understand the effects of changes in position on
electoral outcomes, consider Figure 5. This figure plots the
incumbent's re-election probability as a function of the size of
his change in position for three models: no cost, quadratic cost, and
the model with fixed and quadratic costs. In this numerical example, the
incumbent's past position is assumed to be 25 points away from the
median voter (recall that the mean distance is 24.5). Thus a change of
25 points means that the incumbent aligns his position with that of the
median voter. In addition, it is assumed that the challenger's
position ([X.sub.C]) is 20 points away from the voter and that the
challenger's cost ([C.sub.C]) is [[micro].sub.C]. (16) Without
adjustment costs, the electoral probability is a strictly increasing
function of the change; as the candidate moves closer to the median
voter, this probability of election increases. Thus, the optimal
position is to locate at the median voter's preferred point. With
quadratic costs, there is a range of changes for which changing position
increases electoral success. In particular, incumbent re-election rates
are increasing for changes between 0 and 4.2 ADA points. This shows the
non-convergence of platforms in a model with adjustment costs. When
choosing to maximize their chances of obtaining office, candidates must
weigh the benefits of positioning themselves close to the voter with the
electoral costs of changing position. In this case, a candidate whose
past position is 25 points from the voter would optimally locate 20.8
points from the voter when faced with quadratic adjustment costs of the
size estimated. The quadratic and fixed costs model has a similar
curvature, but incurs the fixed cost for any change. Thus, there is an
immediate drop for any change in position. Following this, the
re-election probability increases to its maximum at a change of 3.5 ADA
points before declining. Thus, in this case, and with a past position 25
points from the median voter, the candidate's optimal position is
one that is 21.5 points from the median voter.
Of the models with positive costs to adjustment, the worst fitting
model is the model which posits only a fixed cost to adjusting position.
In this model, any change in position, regardless of the size, is
punished by voters and negatively affects a candidate's electoral
prospects. Because of the large cost for any size change in position
(any change incurs a cost equivalent to being about 20 points further
way from the voters--more than the average distance between senators Al
Gore and Ted Kennedy), the serial correlation of position changes and
the correlation between the ideologies of senators and voters is much
lower than in the data.
Still, any model with a positive cost to adjusting one's
position fits the data much better than the zero cost model. Senators
move toward the voters, but because of costs of adjustment, do not align
themselves perfectly with the voters. Models where costs to changing
position increase with the size of the change are the most consistent
with the data. The best fitting model has both variable cost and fixed
cost components, suggesting signaling through persistent ideological
stances is an important empirical phenomena. This result is consistent
with the survey evidence of Tomz and Van Houweling (2009), who show
voters dislike changes in position both because of the change itself and
because of the increased uncertainty this provides regarding future
positions of the candidate. Such preferences map well into the fixed and
variable cost models I present above, and it is these models that best
fit the data on electoral outcomes.
VII. EXTENSIONS
I now discuss several relevant extensions to the baseline models
and estimation in order to show the robustness of the results. In
particular, I consider variations in the cost function, the voter's
utility over policy positions, the measurement of ideology, and sample
selection, in that order.
A. Voter Threshold for Position Changes
It may be the case that voters are not well informed about the
present and/or past positions of the candidate and thus cannot
accurately identify small changes in position. Or voters may simply not
penalize small changes. Alternatively, there may be noise in the data
that prevent the econometrician from accurately identifying small
changes. Thus, it is of interest to consider a model where costs are
incurred only for changes above a certain threshold. To determine what a
reasonable threshold is, I turn to the data, and in particular the
correlation between the size of the incumbent's change in position
and his re-election probability. For all changes, this correlation is
-0.11. For changes smaller than five points on the ADA scale, the
correlation is 0.01. For those smaller than ten points it is -0.07. And
it is -0.12 for changes larger than ten points on the ADA scale. Thus, a
threshold of five ADA points is a reasonable threshold, as a simple
correlation suggests there may be little electoral cost to such small
changes.
To see if a threshold model does a better job at describing the
data, I estimate a model with fixed and quadratic adjustment costs, but
with no electoral cost incurred for changes smaller than the threshold
of five ADA points. The model is estimated using the same moments and
methodology as in Section VI. The minimum statistic found through
estimation is 18.285. The model fits the data well, but not quite as
well as the model where costs are incurred on all changes. Estimates of
both the quadratic cost and fixed cost parameters are larger than in the
baseline model, with [gamma] = 11.236 and F = 34.833. What this means is
that while changes of smaller than five ADA points incur no electoral
cost, larger changes are found to omit larger costs than in the baseline
model. For example, a change of mean size (6.22 points) results in a
decrease in electoral probability equal to the candidate having a
position 15 points further from the median voter. (17)
B. Distance from the Voter
As with any discrete choice DPP, the model is non-parametrically
unidentified (see Magnac and Thesmar 2002). That is, given the
subjective discount factor [beta], there is an equivalence class
containing infinitely many utility functions that can all rationalize
any particular decision rule. Because only differences in voters'
utility between different candidates affect the election probabilities,
the overall scale of the utility function is irrelevant and
unidentified. However, changes other than those to the scale of the
utility function may matter. The previous subsection discussed an
extension to the cost of adjustment function. Here, I consider a
variation in the measure of distance between the voter and candidate. In
particular, I use the absolute value of the distance between the
candidate and the voter (as opposed to the square of the distance).
Changing the distance measure only affects the calculation of one
moment, the correlation between winning and distance. In fact, this
moment remains the same (-0.119) under both parameterizations. The
estimation yields a slightly worse fit than under the square of the
distance parameterization (a minimum statistic of 38.848 vs. 14.732).
Because of the change in distance measure, one cannot tell much by
directly comparing the parameter estimates of the cost function to those
from the baseline estimation. Instead, I again draw upon the comparison
between the effects of a mean-sized change in position and an increase
in distance from the voter on the electoral probabilities to give a
sense of how important changes in position are relative to distance. In
the linear distance model, a change of 6.22 ADA points results in a
decrease in electoral probability equal to the candidate positioning
himself nine points further from the median voter. (18) In the linear
distance model, the marginal cost of positioning further from the voter
is not increasing. Thus, the relative importance of adjustment costs
decreases. That is, if voter utility is linear, and not quadratic, in
the distance between the candidate's position and the voter's
preferred point, candidates are going to be less likely to incur the
adjustment cost to move closer to the voter.
C. Scaling ADA Scores
As a further robustness check, let us consider a change in the
scale of the ADA scores themselves. In particular, I use the natural
logarithm of the ADA scores so that distances and changes will be
measured in percentage terms. Such an interpretation of the ADA scores
may make sense if the ADA seeks to use their scores to highlight
differences among the more liberal members of Congress. Recall that an
ADA score of 100 represents someone who agreed with the ADA on each roll
call vote. If the role call votes are selected in a way that highlights
differences among the more liberal members of Congress (those scoring
closer to 100), then a distance of ten points near the top of the scale
(say the difference between an ADA score of 80 and 90) may not represent
the same difference in ideology as a distance of ten points near the
bottom of the scale (say the difference between an ADA score of 10 and
20) when viewed by the voter. In particular, if the ADA is trying to
highlight the difference between liberal members of Congress, then the
difference between scores of 80 and 90 might be small by the point of
the view of the voter, while the difference between 10 and 20 would be
large. Using the natural log will help to correct this, as differences
near the bottom of the scale will be larger in percentage terms than
differences near the top of the scale. Indeed, Brunell et al. (1999)
find evidence of just such a pattern in interest group rating scores.
Brunell et al. (1999) find that liberal groups like the ADA focus more
on differentiating liberal members, while lumping conservatives together
at the bottom, despite significant variation in their ideologies.
Therefore, it is important to see how robust the results are to an
alternative scaling of the ADA scores.
Table 8 shows the moments from the data using the logarithm of ADA
scores. The model is able to fit the data well; the minimum statistic is
almost as low as in the baseline case. The parameter estimates for the
cost function are not directly comparable to the baseline case, but a
numerical example will highlight the relative magnitude of the effect of
changing position in this model. I evaluate the model where the
incumbent and challenger take positions the mean distance from the voter
and where the challenger draws the mean challenger cost, the median
voter has a position of 50, and the challenger is positioned to the
right (ADA score below) the median voter. In this case, a change of 6.22
ADA points affects the incumbent's re-election probability by the
same amount as if the incumbent were nine points further from the voter
and made no change in position. If the candidate is positioned the mean
distance to the right of the voter (ADA score above the voter's),
then a 6.22 change in position affects the probability of re-election by
the same amount as a 25-point increase in the distance between the voter
and the senator. Because of the log scale, a single ADA point change
when ideology is more conservative is more costly than a single point
change when ideology is more liberal.
D. Close Elections
One might suppose that electoral costs vary between states that
strongly favor a particular party and those that are swing states. For
example, it may be the case that flip-flopping is punished more in more
partisan states since a candidate's biggest hurdle to re-election
is the party primary and the median voter who is relevant is further
from the center. To test this, I calculate the data moments used to
estimate the models in the previous section, but do so only for
elections where the winning candidate has between 45% and 55% of the
vote share. I then estimate the model with quadratic and fixed costs
using the methodology described above to find the parameters that best
match the model moments to those from the data. The data and model
moments as well as minimum statistic are presented in Table 9. (19) The
model fits the data very well. What is important to note is that the
serial correlation is much lower in close elections than in the sample
of all elections. The correlation between voter and senator ideologies
is also lower, as are incumbent re-election rates. The lower correlation
between voter and senator ideology suggests that adjustment costs are
actually higher in close elections, although this result could also be
due to selection effects. That is, candidates in close elections are in
close elections because they happened to win office despite being
positioned far from the median voter. However, two other moments
highlight the importance of adjustment costs in these close elections.
First, close elections have lower correlation between distance and the
incumbent's re-election rate. The correlation may be lower because
adjustment costs are relatively more important in these elections.
Second, the low serial correlation in position changes suggests that
incumbents face large costs to changing position. And, in particular, it
suggests that they face larger fixed costs to changing position. It is
such fixed costs that result in a low serial correlation of position
changes as candidates find it optimal to make larger position changes at
one time rather than small position changes each term. This implies that
candidates in close elections will be more likely to be flip-floppers
than to be wishy--washy candidates. This is consistent with the
observation that close elections are those where a candidate's
record is highlighted in the media and where any position change
receives more scrutiny.
Close elections are those in which, on average, incumbents are
positioned further from voters (28.7 versus 24.5 ADA points) and make
larger changes in position (6.92 vs. 6.22). To give an idea of the
magnitude of the ideological adjustment costs candidates in close
elections face, I evaluate the effect of a change of mean size on
incumbent re-election probabilities and then find the change in distance
between the incumbent and voter that has an equivalent effect on the
re-election rate. Given the cost estimates, a change of 6.92 ADA points
is equivalent to the incumbent positioning himself 13 points further
from the voter. Note that fixed costs are very important in this model,
as a large fixed cost is necessary to fit the low serial correlation of
position changes and relatively low correlations between incumbent and
voter ideology. Thus, even a change much smaller than the mean will have
significant effects on a candidate's re-election prospects. In
general, and holding the challenger's position and cost fixed, it
will be optimal for candidates to change position only when they are
sufficiently far from the voter.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is to provide an understanding of the
nature of flip-flopping among U.S. senators. Using a large panel on the
ideological positions of senators and various empirical approaches, the
results suggest several important conclusions regarding the costs
senators face when changing position.
First, I document electoral costs to changing position. These costs
are economically significant, with changes in position resulting in
electoral costs of similar magnitude to those seen from a divergence
between the ideology of the voters and senators. Furthermore, I show
that models which include adjustment costs fit the data much better than
models with no costs to changing position. A model with both fixed and
quadratic costs to adjusting position was found to fit the data best.
That is, senators face costs to deviating from their past records that
increase with the distance they move and also face a significant
punishment for small deviations (measured by the fixed cost associated
with changes). A model with fixed and quadratic adjustment costs
supports both the character models of Kartik and McAfee (2007),
Callander and Wilkie (2007), and Callander (2008) (where fixed costs are
important) and the models of uncertainty in future candidate positions
such as Enelow and Munger (1993).
Overall, the results provide more evidence against the stylized
version of Downs' model and the convergence property of the Median
Voter Theorem as a description of a representative democracy.
Flip-flopping is indeed punished; any changes in position senators wish
to take is best done in small moves. While multiple models of electoral
competition may be consistent with such a cost function, it is
nonetheless important to understand such costs and their implications
for electoral equilibrium such as non-convergence of candidate
platforms. Understanding which model of adjustment costs fits the data
best will help in the development of more realistic models of political
competition.
A drawback of the model of electoral competition presented here is
that it does not fully specify the dynamic models that result in the
costs to adjusting position. The adjustment costs in this paper are
reduced form approximations of complicated games of signaling and
asymmetric information. Developing an estimable model that allows for
these rich features is left as a worthwhile goal for future research.
ABBREVIATIONS
ADA: Americans for Democratic Action
DPP: Dynamic Programming Problem
SMM: Simulated Method of Moments
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12114
Online Early publication June 25, 2014
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(1.) In general, a candidate's current record may be compared
to all prior positions. For parsimony, I assume that only the change in
position from one period to the next affects voters' utility. This
assumption is consistent with positions in the more distant past being
less salient to voters.
(2.) Of course, the first-order condition is the necessary
condition for optimization only in the cases where the cost function is
differentiable.
(3.) The first of these three assumptions says that increases in
ideology in the current period are not expected to lower ideology when
in office. The second and third have to do with how the expected
ideology when in office changes as the current period's position
changes. Specifically, that movements toward the voter in the current
prior have diminishing effects on the expected position next period and
that movements away from the voter in the current period have increasing
effects on the expected position next period.
(4.) Data from 1947-1959, 1962, and 1964 are constructed by Tim
Groseclose based on the ADA's methodology and list of key votes for
1947-1959. The ADA did not publish scores for these years.
(5.) D-Nominate scores are comparable over time, but not across
chambers. They are also constructed in such a way as to constrain the
ideological position of a Congressman to change in a linear fashion.
(6.) ADA scores are reported annually, whereas Nominate scores are
reported only for each Congress.
(7.) The median ideological position of the House delegation gives
similar results.
(8.) An alternative model, which would obviate the need for data on
challenger positions, is one in which the incumbent chooses a position
prior to knowing the position of the challenger. In this case, the
incumbent would use the expected position of the challenger when
considering his own choice of position. The only difference between the
alternative and the estimable model presented here would be the
interpretation of the challenger position; it would no longer be the
actual position, but the expected value of the challenger position. Such
a model would result in similar estimates of adjustment costs, but would
further abstract from the electoral game.
(9.) The incumbency advantage can thus be built into this general
cost parameter.
(10.) Local variation in X does not significantly affect the
relative magnitudes of the effects of changing position versus changing
distance from the voter on electoral outcomes.
(11.) Note that the probability of winning is not a function of
tenure, while retirement is. The evidence supports these assumptions.
Dawes and Bacot (1998) and DeBacker (2011) find that the incumbency
advantage is flat over tenure. Gowrisankaran, Mitchell, and Moro (2008)
even find evidence that tenure is disadvantageous in U.S. Senate
election outcomes.
(12.) Note that an increase in [beta] results in candidates more
heavily weighting the current election relative to future elections.
This means that candidates are more likely to make larger moves,
regardless of the form of adjustment costs. This is because candidates
who are less patient place lower value on being closer to the voter (and
paying less adjustment costs) in future elections.
(13.) Without data on the positions of challengers, it is not
possible to estimate this correlation. As a robustness check of the
results, I estimate the model under alternative assumptions for the
correlation between the distance between the position of the challenger
and the median voter and the adjustment costs those challengers face.
Changes to this assumption have very little impact on the fit of the
model and result in no change to the model which best fits the data (a
model with fixed and quadratic costs).
(14.) Changing the value that defines a jump has little effect on
the parameter estimates. A higher (lower) value for the definition only
decreases (increases) the moment that is the fraction of jumps.
(15.) This comparison was done using the model evaluated where the
incumbent and challenger took positions the mean distance from the
voters (24.5 ADA points) and where the challenger drew the mean
challenger cost.
(16.) [[mu].sub.C] was estimated 248.087 in the model with
quadratic and fixed costs of adjustment.
(17.) This comparison was done using the model evaluated where the
incumbent and challenger took positions the mean distance from the
voters (24.5 ADA points) and where the challenger drew the mean
challenger cost.
(18.) This comparison was done using the model evaluated where the
incumbent and challenger took positions the mean distance from the
voters (24.5 ADA points) and where the challenger drew the mean
challenger cost.
(19.) The estimate for the quadratic cost parameter is 0.461 and
the fixed cost parameter is 200.97.
JASON MATTHEW DEBACKER *
* Thanks to Rob Williams, Russell Cooper, and two anonymous
referees for helpful comments and to Tim Groseclose and Sarah Anderson
for assistance with the data. DeBacker: Department of Economics and
Finance, Middle
Tennessee State University, PO Box 27, Murfreesboro, TN 37132.
Phone 615-898-2528, Fax 615-898-5596,
E-mail jason.debacker@gmail.com.
TABLE 1
ADA Scores
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Adjusted ADA score 37.774 31.605
Democrats, adjusted ADA score 56.535 26.337
Republican, adjusted ADA score 15.463 21.108
Nominal ADA score 46.238 34.458
Democrats, nominal ADA score 67.011 28.446
Republicans, nominal ADA score 21.535 22.666
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Variable
Mean years observe senator 10.387
Mean size of change 0.219
Mean of absolute value of change 6.215
Serial correlation of changes -0.098
Serial correlation of absolute value of changes 0.263
Correlation of changes in voter and senator 0.056
Correlation of voter ideology and senator ideology 0.551
Fraction of jumps ([greater than or equal to] 20 point change) 0.025
TABLE 3
Effects of Changes in Ideology on Incumbent
Re-election Rates, Logit Model
Variable: (1) (2) (3)
Ideological distance -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Absolute (change in ideology) -0.078 * -0.085
(0.038) (0.122)
Square of change in ideology -0.004 * 0.000
(0.002) (0.006)
Seniority 0.204 0.201 0.205
(0.187) (0.182) (0.188)
% Change in state income 2.931 2.829 2.939
(3.154) (3.188) (3.151)
Year * party effects Yes Yes Yes
Model [chi square] 51.568 53.116 51.724
Obs 262 262 262
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below parameter
estimates.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
TABLE 4
Parameters
Parameter Value Source
[beta] 0.960 4% Risk free rate
[delta] 0.08-0.28 Empirical prob retire
[rho] 0.567 Estimated persistence of median
voter position
[[sigma].sub.e] 10.380 Estimated SD of shock to median
position
TABLE 5
Parameters
Parameter Definition
[[mu].sub.C] Mean of challenger adjustment costs
[[sigma].sub.C] SD of challenger adjustment costs
[MATHEMATICAL SD of challenger position
EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII]
[kappa] Coefficient in linear costs of changing position
[gamma] Coefficient in quadratic costs of changing
position
F Fixed cost of changing position
TABLE 6
Moments Used for Estimation
Moment
Fraction of jumps ([greater than or equal to] 0.025
20 point change)
Serial correlation of changes 0.263
Incumbent re-election rate 0.843
Correlation (win, distance) -0.119
Correlation of voter and senator ideology 0.551
Correlation of voter and first term senator ideology 0.462
Freshman re-election rate 0.829
TABLE 7
Results of Structural Estimation
Fixed
Model: No Cost Linear Quadratic Cost
Parameters
[gamma] 0.000 0.000 3.049 0.000
-- -- (1.269) --
[kappa] 0.000 13.945 0.000 0.000
-- (0.894) -- --
F 0.000 0.000 0.000 349.374
-- -- -- (51.030)
Moments Frac jumps 0.091 0.003 0.000 0.042
Serial correlation -0.222 0.103 0.363 -0.026
Re-elect rate 0.852 0.842 0.847 0.831
Corr ideo 1.000 0.546 0.570 0.448
Corr win/dist 0.000 -0.116 -0.117 -0.074
Corr ideo, freshman 1.000 0.502 0.416 0.418
Re-elect rate, freshman 0.852 0.832 0.832 0.832
([theta])[pounds sterling] 524.322 18.170 20.932 42.496
Fixed
Model: and Quad Data
Parameters
[gamma] 2.760
(0.791) --
[kappa] 0.000 --
-- --
F 17.871 --
(4.912) --
Moments Frac jumps 0.000 0.025
Serial correlation 0.259 0.263
Re-elect rate 0.842 0.843
Corr ideo 0.554 0.551
Corr win/dist -0.085 -0.119
Corr ideo, freshman 0.436 0.462
Re-elect rate, freshman 0.833 0.829
([theta])[pounds sterling] 14.732 --
Note: Standard errors in parentheses below parameter estimates.
TABLE 8
Log ADA Scale, Data and Model Moments
Data Model
Frac jumps 0.025 0.000
Serial correlation 0.442 0.398
Re-elect rate 0.843 0.836
Corr ideo 0.459 0.413
Corr win/dist -0.067 0.001
Corr ideo, freshman 0.357 0.266
Re-elect rate, freshman 0.829 0.836
([theta])[pounds sterling] -- 16.698
TABLE 9
Close Elections, Data and Model Moments
Data Model
Frac jumps 0.026 0.023
Serial correlation -0.002 -0.006
Re-elect rate 0.707 0.706
Corr ideo 0.415 0.426
Corr win/dist -0.077 -0.083
Corr ideo, freshman 0.396 0.393
Re-elect rate, freshman 0.694 0.702
(theta)[pounds sterling] -- 0.966