Tax policy and income inequality in the united states, 1979-2007.
Bargain, Olivier ; Dolls, Mathias ; Immervoll, Herwig 等
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decades, incomes have become more unequally
distributed in most Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries and especially in the United States (OECD
2011). In particular, the increase of the top 1%'s income share has
received considerable attention (e.g., Piketty and Saez 2003) resulting
in numerous calls for higher taxes on the rich (e.g.. Diamond and Saez
2011; Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva 2014). Yet, very little is known
about the actual impact of past tax policy changes on inequality. The
reason is that the usual evaluation approach--comparing income
inequality measures before and after taxes (see, e.g., Gottschalk and
Smeeding 1997 or Heathcote, Perri, and Violante 2010)--is not able to
isolate the pure policy effect because tax burdens are determined by
both tax policy and pretax income distribution. For instance, a given
progressive income tax schedule redistributes more when the distribution
of taxable incomes becomes more dispersed, and not at all if everybody
earns the same (Dardanoni and Lambert 2002; Musgrave and Thin 1948).
Hence, it is unclear how much of an observed change in tax liabilities
(and resulting inequality) is due to policy reforms and what part is due
to other factors, notably the change in the underlying pretax income
distribution.
This paper is the first to isolate and quantify the pure tax policy
effect on inequality in the United States for an extended time period
spanning almost three decades (1979-2007). It can be seen as a natural
follow-up of the study by Piketty and Saez (2007) who analyze changes in
the progressivity of the federal income tax over time but cannot
disentangle policy changes from other factors. We also use tax return
micro-data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) division of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) (1) and the NBER's TAXSIM calculator for our
analysis. In a first step, we perform a series of detailed
counterfactual simulations by applying current and next year tax policy
rules to current and next year incomes, respectively. The resulting
decomposition shows how the distribution of posttax income would have
looked like if either tax policy (federal and state level income and
payroll taxes) or the distribution of pretax incomes had remained
unchanged between two given years. This allows us to quantify the direct
tax policy effect on inequality and to provide (descriptive) evidence on
the extent to which the increase in inequality, particularly the surge
in top income shares, is market driven or related to major U.S. tax
reforms during the past three decades. (2) In addition, we extend the
baseline decomposition by using estimates of the elasticity of taxable
income (ETI, see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012 for a survey) in order
to account for indirect policy effects due to behavioral responses (such
as labor supply, income shifting, or migration).
The main findings are as follows. The baseline decomposition shows
that the size of the policy effect corresponds to 11%-29% of the total
change in income shares of different income groups. The simulated impact
of tax policy is largest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentile of
the income distribution, but smallest for those in the top 1%. This
suggests that tax policy had a non-negligible effect on changes in
inequality, but explains only a small fraction of the sharp increase of
the top 1%'s income share, where other forces played a much more
important role. Extending the baseline decomposition and accounting for
indirect policy effects (i.e., behavioral responses) do not affect our
results qualitatively, but yields a larger overall policy effect on
inequality (up to 41% of the total change). We also find that reforms in
the 1980s and early 2000s exacerbated trends of growing inequality,
those in the early 1990s benefited lower-income taxpayers. Taken
together, the cumulative policy effect over the entire period
contributed to the increasing income share of taxpayers in the top
quintile (and especially the top decile) at the cost of middle-class
taxpayers. Hence, without any tax policy changes, inequality levels in
the mid-late 2000s would likely have been significantly lower than those
that were actually observed.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
Rising income inequality in the United States has stimulated a
large body of research examining the underlying driving factors. In this
literature, several strands have emerged which focus on different types
of inequality. While the focus of this paper is on redistribution and
the impact of tax policy on trends in posttax income inequality, this
cannot be comprehensively assessed without taking into account trends in
pretax inequality.
The existing evidence on pretax inequality in the United States
points to a widening gap in the last 30 years, in particular at the top
of the distribution. In a seminal contribution, Piketty and Saez (2003)
(updated 2012) build a series of pretax income shares based on tax
return data from the IRS. They find that inequality grew relatively
smoothly in the time period considered here. Further studies relying on
IRS tax return data are, among others, Slemrod (1992), Feenberg and
Poterba (1993), Bakija, Cole, and Heim (2012), and DeBacker et al.
(2013). Similar trends are found in analyses using CPS data. (3) A
general conclusion from these studies is that total income inequality,
i.e., inequality in pretax, post-transfer income rose sharply in the
1980s, and that this growth continued at a reduced pace in the 1990s and
early 2000s. Burkhauser et al. (2012a) seek to reconcile findings from
IRS SOI and CPS data. They use internal CPS data which are--compared
with public-use CPS--much less affected by topcoding (although a number
of other measurement and conceptual differences remain) and apply
similar income definitions as Piketty and Saez (2003) do, namely
pre-transfer, tax-unit income. They conclude that the rise in inequality
from 1993 onwards is mainly due to gains made by the top 1% of the
income distribution. A related strand of the literature examines how
pretax or taxable income is affected by behavioral responses to tax
policy changes. For instance, it has been shown that the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) reforms had a substantial impact on participation
rates of married couples and single mothers (cf. Eissa and Hoynes 2006
and Eissa, Kleven, and Rreiner 2008, among others). In addition to
adjustments in participation or hours worked, tax reforms may affect
other margins such as tax evasion or the timing of capital gains
realizations with the latter two of particular relevance at the period
around the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 (Auerbach 1988; Auerbach and
Slemrod 1997; Feenberg and Poterba 1993; Slemrod 1996). More disputed is
the question to what extent the increase in inequality, especially at
the top of the distribution, is due to responses such as income shifting
from corporate to personal income, that is, if the documented increase
is real or caused by behavioral responses (see in particular Saez 2004
and Reynolds 2007). The recognition of the importance of these responses
has led to the growing tax responsiveness literature focusing on the ETI
which shall capture all these behavioral responses (see Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz 2012 for a survey).
We contribute to the literature which examines the impact of tax
policy on posttax income inequality. By extracting the direct policy
effect through counterfactual simulations, we complement the analyses
conducted by Piketty and Saez (2007) or the Congressional Budget Office
(2010). In these studies, shares of posttax income and average federal
tax rates are calculated for various income groups and similar time
periods. However, their estimates do not isolate the direct policy
effect since they reflect both legislative changes as well as other
factors that influence income and tax rates. Some studies have conducted
so-called "what if' calculations (Poterba 2007), but to the
best of our knowledge, none of these papers have sought to identify a
policy effect on a year-by-year basis over a long time period. We are
aware of two early contributions which explicitly consider--via
counterfactual simulations--the impact of tax policy on the posttax
income distribution. Lindsey (1987) applies this methodology to estimate
taxable income elasticities in response to the Reagan tax reform in the
early 1980s. Gramlich, Kasten, and Sammartino (1993) apply tax and
transfer policies of 1980 and 1985 to the pretax income distribution of
1990. They report that 16% of the increase in the Gini coefficient from
1980 to 1990 is due to changes in taxes and transfers. More recently,
Poterba (2007) conducts conceptually similar policy swaps by applying
2004 effective tax rates to the 2000 pretax income distribution and vice
versa and examines the resulting effects on the share of posttax (but
before payroll tax) income accruing to various income groups. A key
finding from his analysis is that the impact of changes in the pretax
income distribution is approximately four times as large as the policy
effect of changes in effective tax rates. (4)
III. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
A. Decomposition Methodology
In order to decompose inequality changes into the effect of tax
policy and all other factors, we follow and extend the approach
suggested by Bargain and Callan (2010). It is important to note that, by
construction, in the baseline decomposition the "tax policy
effect" measures only the direct effect of tax policy on the
(given) income distribution abstracting from any behavioral responses
(such as changes in labor supply or income shifting) or general
equilibrium effects as a consequence of tax policy changes (e.g., due to
differential growth or changes in labor demand or immigration). (5)
These are captured by the "other effect" which additionally
includes all exogenous changes to the income distribution which occur
independent of tax policy. In an extension of our baseline
decomposition, we try to additionally quantify the endogenous indirect
tax policy effects.
Consider a data matrix y containing information on
individuals' pretax income from different sources as well as
various individual and household characteristics which are relevant for
the calculation of income and payroll taxes. The tax function d
represents the rules and structure of the tax system (e.g., marginal tax
and contribution rates), while vector p accounts for all the monetary
parameters (e.g., tax brackets). The distribution of posttax income is
represented by [d.sub.i] ([P.sup.i], [y.sup.l]) for tax rules of year i,
tax parameters of year j, and nominal incomes (and characteristics) of
year l. For counterfactual simulations, it is necessary to nominally
adjust income levels by an uprating factor a accounting for nominal
changes (e.g., inflation) between base and end year.
For the decomposition, two different approaches are possible: it
can be conducted either on base year or on end year incomes while
applying tax policy of the respective other year. The two approaches
usually lead to identical results. If they differ, this is an indication
of (1) general equilibrium effects of tax policy, (2) changes to the tax
base (with some items available only pre- or posttax base change), or
(3) income shifting from other income sources to personal income, as
discussed below. In the first approach, the counterfactual situation
[d.sub.t+1] ([p.sup.t+1], [[alpha].sup.t+1] + [y.sup.t]) represents
post-tax incomes obtained by applying tax rules and parameters of year t
+ 1 on year t data nominally adjusted to year t + 1. Here the policy of
end year t + 1 is applied while holding the pretax incomes of year t
constant. In the second approach, the initial policy from year t is
applied to the pretax income distribution in t + 1. For this, we need to
construct a counterfactual [d.sub.t][[p.sup.t], ([y.sup.t+1]/
[[alpha].sup.t+1])], where pretax incomes are adjusted with the same
factor [[alpha].sup.t+1] used to scale up the distribution of pretax
income between period t and t + 1. (6) As further explained below,
policy changes usually combine changes in policy structure d and changes
in parameters p (the "uprating policy").
In the empirical part, we are interested in distributional measures
M, computed as a function M[[d.sub.i] -([p.sup.i], [y.sub.l])] of the
simulated distribution of posttax income. The advantage of the present
approach is that we can use any measure and not only those with specific
properties (i.e., decomposable inequality indices). More generally, it
is possible to decompose any scalar M such as inequality indices, (top)
income shares, average and marginal tax rates, or measures of
redistribution. Characterize the total change [DELTA]M in measure M
between initial and final period as
(1)
[DELTA] M = M [[d.sub.t+l] ([p.sup.t+1], [y.sup.t+1])] - M
[[d.sub.t] ([p.sup.t], [y.sup.t])]
and notice that the last term can also be written M[[d.sub.t]
([[alpha].sup.t+1], [p.sup.t], [[alpha].sup.t+1] [y.sup.t] since
function d is linearly homogenous in p and y. (7) Then, the total change
between periods t and t + 1 can be decomposed into a change in tax
policy and a change in the pretax income distribution. We refer to the
last change as the "other effect." The "policy
effect" can be assessed on base-year data followed by a change in
the underlying data conditional on the new policy. Decomposition I can
thus be
written as
(2) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Here, the end-period tax system is evaluated on nominally adjusted
base period data [[alpha].sup.t + 1] [y.sup.t]. Symmetrically, the
decomposition can be written as a policy effect assessed on end-period
data [y.sup.t+1], and in this case, the other effect is assessed on the
base period tax system, yielding decomposition II:
(3) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Other effect II
In this case, base period tax parameters are applied to end-period
data [y.sup.t+1] after nominal adjustment, that is, [y.sup.t + 1] /
[[alpha].sup.t + 1].
Note again that, by construction and in line with Piketty and Saez
(2007), both policy effects in the baseline decompositions capture only
the direct effect of tax policy on the income distribution. Behavioral
responses to tax policy changes are attributed to the other effect
(together with exogenous changes to the income distribution). In Section
IV.C, we further decompose the other effect into an indirect policy
effect and a residual effect.
As the decompositions are path-dependent, we suggest to simply
average both policy and other effect over the decompositions I and D.
This corresponds to Shorrocks's (1999) reinterpretation of the
Shapley value procedure. In the empirical part, we verify that results
based on decompositions I and II usually do not differ (much).
Exceptions indicate that significant (behavioral or conceptual) changes
between base and end year occurred, which were not captured in one
year's data but present in the other years' data (such as
income shifting between the corporate and private sector in anticipation
of TRA86 or realizations of capital gains, as discussed below).
Notice that policy and other effect are affected by the choice of
the uprating parameter a. The way tax brackets are uprated by
governments can have important implications for the income distribution
in the long run. Usually there are three options: (1) no uprating, (2)
uprating according to the level of price inflation, and (3) uprating
according to the level of earnings growth. With non-indexation of tax
brackets in progressive systems, or price indexation when incomes rise
faster than prices, the total number of taxpayers (and the number of
higher-rate taxpayers) increases. This phenomenon of bracket creep is
likely to affect the final distribution of post-tax income. In our
empirical application, we use changes in the consumer price index (8) to
adjust pretax incomes in the counterfactuals which is equivalent to an
indexation of tax brackets. This reference situation is extensively used
in policy analyses of tax reforms (compare discussion in the study by
Clark and Leicester 2004). In a robustness check, we rely on a more
conservative approach based on nominal wage growth, that is, a
distributionally neutral scenario (Bargain and Callan 2010).
B. Data
Several data sources have been used in studies on the impact of
taxation on income inequality, in particular, tax return data (e.g.,
Piketty and Saez 2007) and household surveys such as the CPS (e.g., Aim,
Lee, and Wallace 2005). It is well known that there are advantages and
disadvantages for both types of data (Poterba 2007). In brief, tax
return data allow to precisely calculate top income shares, but do not
contain information about non-filing households (typically at the bottom
of the distribution) and lack certain (not tax-relevant) components of
household income. In this study, we use large public-use files of tax
return micro-data from the SOI division of the IRS. (9) Annual
cross-sectional micro-data are available from the SOI since 1960, but
given that TAXSIM is able to simulate state level income
taxes only from 1979 onwards, we start our analysis in 1979. (10)
We follow Piketty and Saez (2007) in terms of sample selection and
include both filing and non-filing tax units so that income groups such
as quintiles or top percentiles are based on the total population.
Non-filing tax units are imputed following Piketty and Saez (2007),
assuming that they earn 20% of the average income of filing units.
Because of this imputation, we usually do not report the decomposition
results for the bottom quintile (P0-20) which consists of households
with low market incomes including nonfiling tax units (their share
varies between 4% and 8% of all taxpayers). (11)
Throughout this paper, we focus on pre- and posttax income
inequality. Tax units are ranked based on pretax incomes excluding
capital gains as they are not a regular stream of income. For all
subsequent calculations, capital gains are added back to pre--and
posttax incomes. Pretax income includes all sources of market income
which are reported on tax returns, that is, wages and salaries; bonuses
and exercised stock-options; employer and private pensions;
self-employment income; business income; dividends, interest, and rents;
and realized capital gains. Posttax income is defined as pretax income
minus the simulated components of the income tax system including
federal and state level income taxes, employee social insurance
contributions (payroll taxes), and tax credits (e.g., EITC). As is
common in the literature, we thus assume that the burden of the taxes is
borne by those who remit them and is not shifted elsewhere through
adjustments in pretax wages and prices. Our measures of income do not
include imputed corporate or federal estate and gift taxes. It is
important to note that the policy effect, which is the focus of this
study, is not affected by (omitting) these taxes given that we simulate
them neither in the baseline nor in the counterfactual scenarios. (12)
In order to calculate (federal and state) income and payroll taxes,
we use NBER's simulation model TAXSIM. (13) We use simulated taxes
for all computation of taxes and post-tax incomes--including the
observed case of current year income and current year tax policy. A
comparison of tax liabilities observed in the income tax return data
with the simulated TAXSIM output leads to a perfect match in more than
99% of all cases for each year with no systematic differences across the
income distribution. The simulation approach allows us to conduct
controlled experiments by changing the parameters of interest while
holding everything else constant. When assessing the isolated role of
tax policy on income inequality (i.e., the policy effect), we are thus
able to account for changes in federal and state level income taxes as
well as payroll taxes and tax credits. Importantly, the estimated policy
effect is solely affected by the changes in these taxes. However, it
should be noted that this approach can identify causal effects of tax
policy on inequality only under the assumption of an exogenous pretax
income distribution. Owing to (potential) changes in the distribution of
market income through indirect effects of tax policy, our results should
be interpreted as association rather than causation. We address this
issue in Section IV.C when we discuss indirect policy effects.
C. U.S. Tax History
In this section, we briefly outline the major changes in the U.S.
income tax system from 1979 to 2007 which are also summarized in Table
S2 in the Supporting Information. We concentrate on large legislative
changes which drive the tax policy effect. Reforms of interest are the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA81), the TRA of 1986 (TRA86), the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 and 1993 (OBRA90 and OBRA93),
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA01), and the Jobs and Growth
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA03).
ERTA81 introduced the indexation of individual income tax
parameters which became effective in 1985. Tax cuts were phased in over
the years 1982-1984, with a reduction of top marginal tax rates from 70%
to 50% in 1982 and of other tax rates by 23% in three annual steps.
Further, the income threshold for the top rate substantially increased
from $85,600 in 1982 to $109,400 (1983) and $162,400 (1984) for married
couples filing jointly. Similarly, thresholds were increased for couples
filing separately and for singles. The reduction in tax revenue amounted
to 2.89% of GDP (4-year average, cf. Tempalski 2006 for estimates of
revenue effects mentioned in this section). Key aspects of TRA86 were
the broadening of the tax base and reductions in marginal tax rates.
Overall, the reform was almost revenue neutral. (14) TRA86 further
lowered the top marginal rate to 38.5% in 1987 and to 28% in 1988,
reduced the number of tax brackets from 15 in 1986 to four in 1988, and
also substantially expanded the EITC with financial benefits for
low-income households.
OBRA90 contained increases in income taxes as well as expansions of
the EITC and other low-income credits. Furthermore, payroll taxes were
increased by lifting the taxable maximum for Medicare which was finally
abolished in 1994. OBRA93 then led to the largest single expansion of
the EITC (cf. Eissa and Hoynes 2011), and further increases in income
tax rates were implemented, for example, the top rate rose from 31% to
39.6% in 1993. The EITC became much more generous in 1994 with higher
maximum credits and an expansion to single workers with no children. The
EITC was further expanded in the following years. The revenue effect of
OBRA90 and OBRA93 was--again evaluated on a 4-year average--positive and
amounted to 0.5% and 0.63% of GDP, respectively. TRA97 lowered capital
gains tax rates and introduced additional tax credits (child and
education tax credits).
EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 were characterized by reductions in marginal
tax rates, both for low- and high-income families, expansions of the
child tax credits, and reductions in taxes on dividends. In 2003, JGTRRA
accelerated those provisions of EGTRRA which were not set to become
effective until 2006. Both reforms had a revenue-decreasing effect
(-0.71% and -0.57% of GDP, 4-year average).
IV. DECOMPOSITION RESULTS
A. Major Tax Reforms
We start our analysis by illustrating the decomposition procedure
for each major tax reform in our sample period. In Tables 1-4, we
compare average tax rates (including federal and state level income as
well as payroll taxes) and posttax income shares for various income
groups before the start of the reform and after it was fully phased-in
(base and end year). We decompose the total change into two components
as explained in Section III. The first is due to tax reforms (policy
effect) while the second is due to changes in the pretax income
distribution (other effect) which may include indirect policy effects.
The left part of the table reports the different components of the
decomposition, including base and end-period baselines (columns (1) and
(4), respectively), the two relevant counterfactuals as well as the
total change. Columns (2) and (3) show the counterfactuals with average
tax rates and income shares given end-period pretax incomes and base
period tax legislation (column (2)), and base period pretax incomes and
end-period tax legislation (column (3)). The right part of Tables 1 -4
reports both the policy and the other effect for decompositions I, II,
and the Shapley value (i.e., the mean of the two decompositions). As
they yield almost identical results in most cases, we will focus on the
Shapley value. An exception is TRA86 (see Table 2) where the difference
between decompositions I and II does matter which is discussed below.
Reassuringly, the policy effect is (close to) zero in years without
(major) tax changes and the observed change equals the other effect.
Policy versus Other Effect. The policy effect reveals how average
tax rates and income shares would have changed under constant pretax
incomes but changing policy. It is based on a counterfactual scenario in
which the composition of pretax incomes remains constant, and pretax
incomes grow in accordance with the inflation rate which is used for
parameter adjustments in the counterfactuals. (15) Adding the policy
effect to the baseline values yields counterfactual values of average
tax rates and income shares under "constant pretax incomes,"
but changing policy parameters. A positive (negative) value of the other
effect implies that the average tax rate of a given income group would
have increased (decreased) in the absence of direct policy changes. This
can either be due to pretax income growth above (below) the inflation
rate or due to changes in the composition of pretax incomes or tax
units. (16) In the case of posttax income shares, the interpretation
slightly differs as an increase in the income share of one group
automatically implies that the share of at least one other group must
have decreased. Here, the other effect shows how income shares would
have changed in the absence of direct policy changes.
From 1981 to 1984, the period around ERTA81 (see Table 1), average
tax rates decreased for all income groups. Starting with the other
effect, we observe that changes in pretax incomes have pushed average
tax rates up only for the top 0.1% of the population. For all other
income groups, average tax rate would have decreased even in the absence
of the tax reform due to the recessionary period in the early 1980s or
due to indirect policy effects. Results for the policy effect show that
with the exception of the second quintile, legislative changes led to
reductions in average tax rates which were largest for the upper part of
the income distribution. As an example, the cumulative policy effect
from 1981 to 1984 reduced the average tax rate for those in the top
0.01% by 5.6 points, while the negative policy effect for the third and
fourth quintiles (-0.1 and -0.7, respectively) was only marginal. With
regard to the absolute size of policy and other effect, the reduction in
average tax rates due to changes in pretax incomes and indirect policy
effects was larger than the reduction caused by the direct policy effect
for taxpayers up to the fourth quintile. For those in the ninth decile
and above, the absolute size of the policy effect was larger than the
other effect. Moving to the effect of ERTA81 on inequality, we find that
income shares for those below (above) the 80th percentile would have
decreased (increased) in the absence of any (direct) policy changes. The
direct policy effect strengthened this effect. We conclude that ERTA81
exacerbated the increase in inequality such that posttax income shares
were more unequal in 1984 compared with a counterfactual of no policy
changes.
Contrary to ERTA81, TRA86 (see Table 2) contained both
inequality-increasing (reduction in top marginal tax rates) and
inequality-decreasing elements (expansion of EITC, tax base broadening).
Table 2 reveals that it was mainly the top 1 % which experienced
substantial reductions in average tax rates and increases in their
income shares. Furthermore, our decomposition for TRA86 shows that it
makes a difference if the policy and other effect are evaluated on base
or end-period data. This can be explained by behavioral reactions, in
particular, income shifting and timing responses. Capital gains
realizations peaked in 1986 in anticipation of the increase in the
marginal tax rate on realized long-term capital gains from 20% to 28% in
1987. Furthermore, taxpayers shifted income from the corporate to the
individual sector as a response to the reduction of the top marginal
rate which fell from 1986 to 1988 in two steps from 50% to 28% and thus
below the basic corporation income tax rate (see, e.g., Auerbach 1988;
Feenberg and Poterba 1993; and Slemrod 1996). (17) For taxpayers in the
top 1%, the hypothetical average tax rate with 1988 policy parameters,
but 1986 pretax incomes (column (3)) would have been much higher than
the observed average tax rate in 1988 (column (4)) due to the fact that
a substantially larger share of their income in 1986 consisted of
long-term capital gains which were taxed at a higher rate in 1988.
Conversely, the hypothetical average tax rate with 1988 pretax incomes,
but 1986 policy parameters (column (2)) picks up the effect of a larger
share of wage and entrepreneurial income reported by affluent taxpayers
in 1988. Differences between decompositions I and II are thus driven by
behavioral responses of taxpayers which caused a dramatic change in
their income composition around TRA86. (18)
OBRA90 and OBRA93 (see Table 3) counteracted the growing inequality
at that time--at least to some extent. The other effect on post-tax
income shares was negative for those below the 80th percentile implying
that their income share would have declined substantially. Owing to
expansions of the EITC the policy effect led to a considerable reduction
in average tax rates of those in the lower half of the distribution, in
particular, in the second quintile, while increases in marginal rates
caused average tax rates to rise in the upper half of the distribution.
This effect was strongest at the top of the distribution where the
policy effect increased average tax rates, for instance, for those in
the top 0.01% by more than 11 percentage points. Unsurprisingly, the
cumulative policy effect of OBRA90 and OBRA93 on the income share of the
top 1% was negative, while it was positive for the rest of the
population and again largest for those in the second quintile.
Decomposition results for EGTRRA01 and JGTRRA03 (see Table 4) show
that, similar to previous periods, the other effect pushed average tax
rates up only for the top 1%. The tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003,
however, led to substantial reductions in average tax rates across the
distribution, with strongest policy effects--in absolute terms--at the
top of the distribution. The positive policy effect on the income share
of those at the top underlines the inequality-increasing effect of the
Bush tax cuts.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
B. Cumulative Effects over Time
In this section, we focus on the cumulative effect of changes in
policy and pretax incomes on average tax rates and income shares over
the entire period. (19) An extension of our baseline decomposition which
additionally includes indirect policy effects resulting from behavioral
responses to tax changes is presented in Section IV.C.
Average Tax Rates. We first turn to the results for average tax
rates. Figure 1 shows how the total average tax rate developed from 1979
to 2007 (black diamond). Additionally, we consider two counterfactual
scenarios. These counterfactuals reveal how the average tax rate would
have changed if either policy parameters or pretax incomes would have
remained as observed in the base year 1979. Over the entire period, the
policy effect (other effect) pushed the average tax rate down (up) as
can be seen by the hollow (black) triangles. In particular, policy
changes implemented in the 1980s and early 2000s had a dampening impact
on the total average tax rate, while the reforms in the early 1990s to
some extent reversed the Reagan tax cuts. If policy parameters had
remained constant on their 1979 level, the total average tax rate would
have almost constantly grown from 1982 until 2000. This is due to the
fact that total income grew faster than the inflation rate which is used
to adjust pretax incomes in the counterfactuals.
Clearly, any diverging trends across income groups are hidden
behind this aggregate average tax rate. Therefore, in Figures 2 and 3,
we plot changes in average tax rates for income quintiles and fractiles
of the top 1% comparing the actual change (left panel) with the
counterfactual scenario of constant pretax incomes (right panel),
respectively. Hence, the right panel shows how average tax rates would
have developed if the pretax income distribution had remained on its
1979 level and only policy parameters had changed over our sample
period. Importantly, the difference between these two series is given by
the other effect capturing the impact of changes in pretax incomes on
the average tax rate conditional on constant policy parameters.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
We start with the income shares reported in Figure 2. Several
important findings stand out. First, in absolute terms, the dampening
policy effect on average tax rates was smallest for the third (P40-60)
and fourth (P60-80) quintiles and largest for the second (P20-40) and
fifth (P80-100) quintiles. Hence, it is the middle and upper middle
class which benefited least from changes in tax policy. Second,
taxpayers in the top quintile benefited more from tax policy than is
visible in the left panel due to the fact that the other effect pushed
their average tax rate up. The opposite is true for all other taxpayers
for whom the other effect had a dampening effect on the average tax
rate. Third, the right panel gives an indication of how the political
cycle might have affected average tax rates at different parts of the
income distribution. In short, the tax burden on high-income taxpayers
(fourth and fifth quintiles) was reduced under the Republican
administrations in the 1980s and early 2000s, whereas lowincome
taxpayers (second quintile) faced largest reductions under the
Democratic administrations in the 1990s. (20) The picture for the third
quintile is different as their tax burden first rose under Republican
administrations in the 1980s, but was subsequently reduced to a similar
extent under Democratic (1990s) and Republican (early 2000s)
administrations.
Figure 3 shows that policy changes affecting the top 1% of
taxpayers had a much stronger impact on average tax rates than for the
rest of the population. Even within this group, taxpayers were affected
rather differently. Policy changes reduced the average tax rate of
taxpayers located within the 99-99.5 fractile by roughly three
percentage points, but by more than 12 points for those in the top 0.01%
between 1979 and 2007. Observed changes in average tax rates were mainly
driven by the policy effect. In contrast to the results for taxpayers in
the top quintile (Figure 2), the other effect did not push up average
tax rates of the richest taxpayers despite the tremendous income growth
this group experienced over the sample period. As discussed above, the
negative other effect on average tax rates for those in the top 1 % was
largely due to the changing composition of their pretax incomes, partly
caused by behavioral reactions around TRA86.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Income Shares. Now we turn to the effect of tax policy on
inequality. The left panel of Figure 4 shows how posttax income shares
of taxpayers in the second to fifth quintiles have changed relative to
the base year pretax income share, while the policy effect on posttax
income shares is shown in the right panel. We find a stark contrast
between the observed change in income shares and the policy effect. The
income share of those in the top quintile increased by roughly 24% over
the whole sample period, whereas all other groups saw their income
shares declining, with cumulative losses ranging from 22% (fourth
quintile) to 28% (second quintile). Tax policy contributed to the
increase (decrease) in the income share of those in the top (third and
fourth) quintiles with an overall direct policy effect of roughly 1%
(minus 2%). Remarkably, the cumulative policy effect on the income share
of those in the second quintile almost canceled out over time. The
direct tax policy effect was equalizing in some periods and
disequalizing in others which is in line with the results for the policy
effect on average tax rates. Again, the different sub-periods broadly
coincide with the political cycle.
Figure 5 shows results for taxpayers in the top 1%. As for average
tax rates (Figure 3), observed changes in income shares as well as the
policy effect were much larger at the top of the distribution than for
any other income group. For instance, from 1979 to 2007 the income share
of those in the top 0.01% has risen by 350% with the direct policy
effect contributing 18% to the increase. Interestingly, the highly
disequalizing direct policy effect in the 1980s was almost completely
reversed after OBRA93, but the tax cuts in the early 2000s reinforced
the overall increase in inequality.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
Relative Importance. The difference in scale of the left- and
right-hand-side panels in Figures 4 and 5 suggests that changes in
pretax incomes (the other effect) were the main driver of the total
change in inequality. While this finding clearly confirms general
perceptions about the roots of increasing inequality, it does not
account for the fact, however, that the direct policy effect was
equalizing in some periods and disequalizing in others and that these
differential effects to some extent canceled out over the period of
analysis. Calculating the mean of the absolute values of the policy
effect and the total change, respectively, and expressing the former as
a fraction of the latter, we find a non-trivial impact of policy
changes. This is shown in Table 5 for average tax rates and income
shares. Columns (1) and (3) present baseline results for the direct
policy effect without behavioral reactions (see Section IV.C for the
total policy effect including indirect policy effects). Unsurprisingly,
column (1) reveals that policy changes matter more for average tax rates
than changes in pretax incomes with the policy effect as a fraction of
the total change ranging from 51% to 99% depending on the income group.
Interestingly, the importance of the policy effect relative to the other
effect is highest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentiles. The
corresponding value for those in the top 1% is much smaller (77.5%). The
reason is that the other effect was larger for the top 1% than for those
in the 95th to 99th percentiles due to the tremendous income growth
experienced by the richest taxpayers.
For income shares the mean (absolute) policy effect expressed
relative to the mean (absolute) total change is lower, but still
substantial and ranges between 11% and 29%. Here, among all taxpayers,
the relative importance of the policy effect is smallest for those in
the top 1% which again reflects the fact that pretax income growth was
the main driver of their rising post-tax income shares. These findings
are in line with Poterba (2007) who shows that the effect of changes in
pretax incomes on the posttax income distribution was four times as
large as tax policy changes in the early 2000s.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
C. Indirect Policy Effects
The baseline decomposition presented above singled out the direct
policy effect, thereby ruling out potential behavioral responses to tax
policy changes. These were captured by the other effect together with
non-tax-related changes to the income distribution. However, behavioral
responses to tax policy are potentially large. In order to additionally
identify indirect policy effects in our decomposition framework, it is
necessary to make assumptions about potential behavioral changes of
taxpayers after policy changes as we are lacking a tractable full
general equilibrium model. We proceed as follows. We extend our
(mechanical) baseline decomposition and retrieve hypothetical pretax
incomes for each income group in both counterfactuals under the
assumption that all behavioral responses to taxation are captured by the
ETI. If this is the case, the ETI is a sufficient statistic for welfare
anlaysis (Feldstein 1995, 1999) and hence it is appropriate to use
estimates of the ETI to assess the potential behavioral responses to tax
policy changes.
Following Giertz (2009), who studies how tax revenues could be
affected by behavioral responses after an expiration of the Bush tax
cuts, we use stylized values of the ETI of 0.2, 0.5, and 1.0 (which are
in the middle-low, middlehigh, and very high range of existing estimates
for the United States--see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz 2012 who report a
preferred value of 0.25) in order to consider a reasonable range of
values for the indirect policy effect. Note that our baseline
decomposition can be considered as a lower bound as it is implicitly
based on the assumption of a zero ETI. For the sake of simplicity and
due to missing estimates, in a first step we follow Giertz (2009) and
assume the ETI to be constant across income groups and over time. In a
second step, we allow for different ETIs across the income distribution.
We are thus able to quantify what fraction of the total change in pretax
income from period t to t + 1 is due to behavioral responses and other
factors, respectively. The indirect policy effect is derived such that
it precisely corresponds to that fraction of the other effect (see the
Appendix for a formal derivation). It is important to note that the
decomposition of the other effect into an indirect policy effect and a
residual effect rests upon the assumption that the ETI captures all
indirect policy effects such as behavioral responses and general
equilibrium effects. (21) If this is not the case, the residual effect
still contains further indirect policy effects. Under the strong and
arguably implausible assumption that there are no exogenous changes to
the income distribution, the total change in inequality would be due to
tax policy changes.
Tables A1-A4 show decomposition results for all major tax reforms
in our sample period including indirect policy effects. Columns (1)-(5)
correspond to the baseline decomposition (Tables 1-4), while columns
(6)-(11) report results for indirect and residual effects. Note that the
direct policy effect from our baseline (column (4)) is not affected by
the extension as it mechanically captures changes in policy parameters,
but no behavioral responses. On average, for an ETI of 0.2, indirect
policy effects are much smaller than direct policy effects. They become
larger if we assume an ETI of 0.5 and are often as important as direct
policy effects for an ETI of 1.
In Figure 6, we relate the direct policy effect (equivalent to the
right-hand-side graph in Figure 4) to the upper bound estimate of the
total policy effect which is given as the sum of direct and indirect
policy effects. Results based on an underlying ETI of 0.2 and 0.5 are
presented in Figures S1 and S2 in the Supporting Information.
Importantly, our baseline results are quantitatively affected, but not
qualitatively. (22) Over the whole time period, taxpayers in the top
quintile benefited most from tax policy and this effect is larger the
higher the underlying ETI. The opposite effect can be observed for
taxpayers in the second to fourth quintiles.
In columns (2) and (4) of Table 5, the upper bound estimate for the
total policy effect (ETI = 1) is expressed in relation to the total
change in average tax rates and income shares. While the fraction
becomes smaller for average tax rates when indirect policy effects are
accounted for (column (2) vs. (1)), the overall impact of tax policy on
inequality becomes larger which amplifies the direct effect. It now
ranges between 18% and 41%.
As it is plausible to assume that the ETI is higher for higher
income groups who have more of a scope for avoidance and evasion
opportunities, in the next step, we allow for different ETIs across the
income distribution. In particular, we assume an ETI of 0.2 for
taxpayers in the second quintile, an ETI of 0.5 for those in the third
and fourth quintiles, and an ETI of 1 for those in the fifth quintile.
The assumption of differential ETIs across the income distribution
slightly reduces the disequalizing (total) effect of tax policy compared
with the baseline of a uniform ETI of 1 (Figure S3).
[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]
D. Sensitivity Checks
In this section, we check the sensitivity of our results with
respect to several choices made.
Choice of the Uprating Factor. As a first sensitivity check, we
replicate the analysis with mean nominal wage growth as uprating factor
(a in formulae (2) and (3)) in order to answer the question to what
extent our results depend on the choice of the uprating factor. Over the
whole sample period, mean nominal wages grew faster than the inflation
rate which implies that taxpayers might move into higher/lower tax
brackets when adjusting pretax incomes in our counterfactuals. (23)
Figure S4 shows that the results do not change much with nominal wage
indexation. The overall effect of tax policy is slightly more
disequalizing than in our baseline. Cumulative policy effects on income
shares are more beneficial for taxpayers in the fourth and fifth
quintiles relative to those in the second and third quintiles.
Ranking of Tax Units. In our baseline, we follow the approach of
Piketty and Saez (2007) and rank tax units based on their pretax incomes
excluding capital gains given that realized capital gains are not a
regular stream of income. Capital gains are added back to pre- and
posttax incomes for the calculation of average tax rates and income
shares. This might affect our results in particular for those periods in
which significant changes in the amount of realized capital gains
occurred, as can be observed around TRA86. Table S1 shows decomposition
results for TRA86 when tax units are ranked based on pretax incomes
including capital gains. For the base year 1986, average tax rates
appear to be substantially higher for taxpayers at the top 0.1% of the
distribution than in our baseline (Table 1), whereas for 1988 average
tax rates for the richest tax units are similar to those in our
baseline. These differences can be explained by the fact that
realizations of long-term capital gains peaked in 1986, in particular,
among affluent taxpayers, in anticipation of the tax increase in 1987.
[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]
The ranking of tax units also affects our decomposition results.
This is especially evident when hypothetical average tax rates with 1986
pretax incomes and 1988 policy rules are compared (column (3) in Tables
1 and SI). The counterfactual average tax rate for taxpayers at the top
0.1% is substantially higher when taxpayers are ranked based on pretax
incomes including capital gains. As a consequence, the beneficial effect
of TRA86 for the richest taxpayers (top 1 %) appears to be much stronger
in our baseline, while results for the bottom 99% do not critically
depend on the way tax units are ranked. Decomposition results for all
other tax reforms in our sample period are not affected by the way tax
units are ranked.
SOI IRS versus CPS Data. In a previous version of this paper, we
have performed the decomposition analysis using data from the CPS.
Results are not directly comparable owing to various data issues such as
the need to impute itemized deductions and top-coding of high incomes in
the CPS. As a consequence, we have relied on percentile ratios such as
the P90/P10, P90/P50, or P50/P10 and the Gini rather than (top) income
shares for the calculation of the policy effect. Nevertheless, overall
conclusions are the same. The policy effect is non-marginal, but smaller
than the other effect. Tax policy was equalizing in the early 1990s, but
highly disequalizing in the 1980s and early 2000s. A comparison of
policy effects on the Gini coefficient based on these two data sources
is shown in Figure S5. For most years of our sample, the policy effects
are of similar size.
Imputation of Non-Filers. In our baseline analysis, we imputed
non-filers (and their income) to our analysis. If we do not impute
non-filers to our data, our results refer to the group of filers rather
than to the full population of all taxpayers. In a further sensitivity
check, we exclude the imputed non-filers. As shown in Figure 7, this
only marginally changes the cumulative policy effect for the different
income groups which is not surprising given that the share of non-filers
is small varying between 4% and 8% of tax units.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have analyzed how tax policy has affected posttax
income inequality in the United States from 1979 to 2007 based on
counterfactual simulations. The decomposition analysis isolates and
quantifies the direct effect of tax policy on the posttax income
distribution. A main finding is that, over the whole sample period, tax
policy aggravated the trend of growing inequality in pretax incomes: tax
policy had a positive (negative) effect on the income share of taxpayers
above (below) the 80th percentile. Hence, without any tax policy
changes, observed inequality today is predicted to be lower. A second
key result is that the policy effect corresponds to 11%-29% of the total
change in income shares of different income groups. The effect was
largest for taxpayers in the 95th to 99th percentiles but smallest for
those in the top 1%. Thus, even though the surge in top incomes in the
last three decades was to a large extent market driven, tax policy
explains a substantial part of this trend. In addition, accounting for
indirect policy effects due to behavioral responses does not change our
results qualitatively, but raises the relative importance of the policy
effect on inequality: the upper bound estimate for the total policy
effect is 18%-41% (depending on the inequality measure) of the total
change. The analysis also suggests that tax reforms in the 1980s and
early 2000s exacerbated trends of growing inequality while those in the
early 1990s benefited low-income taxpayers.
These results should be interpreted in the light of the following
qualifications. First, our analysis is purely positive. Throughout this
paper, we have abstracted from normative welfare considerations
regarding the optimal amount of redistribution. Second, the calculation
of indirect policy effects is based on stylized assumptions about
behavioral responses to tax changes. However, we have used a range of
plausible parameter values for the ETI and found qualitatively similar
results. Third, we have focused the analysis on the United States. In
future research, it would be interesting to replicate our analysis for
other countries in order to investigate if tax policy affects inequality
differently across different institutional settings.
ABBREVIATIONS
CPS: Current Population Survey
EITC: Earned Income Tax Credit
ETI: Elasticity of Taxable Income
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
NBER: National Bureau of Economic Research
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
SOI: Statistics of Income
TRA: Tax Reform Act
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12172
APPENDIX: DECOMPOSITION INCLUDING INDIRECT POLICY EFFECT
We extend decompositions I and II as follows: Decomposition I:
(A1) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Decomposition II:
(A2) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Residual effect II
with [[??].sup.t] and [[??].sup.t + 1] as vectors of hypothetical
pretax incomes after behavioral responses. The ETI-formula reads:
[epsilon] = ([[DELTA].sub.y]/[DELTA] (1 - T)) x (1 - T/y).
The behavioral response is calculated for decompositions I and II:
[DELTA][y.sup.t] = [epsilon] x [DELTA] (1 - T) x ([y.sup.t] (1 -
T)) (decomposition I)
[DELTA] [y.sup.II] = [epsilon] x [DELTA] (1 - T) x ([y.sup.t+1]
/[(1 - T).sub.t+1]) (decomposition II)
with [epsilon] = 0.2, 0.5 or 1, [DELTA] (1 - T) given by the policy
effect on average tax rates, T average tax rates and
[y.sup.t]/[y.sup.t+1] observed pretax incomes in t and t + 1. Averaging
over both decompositions yields the Shapley value:
[DELTA][y.sup.S] = [DELTA][y.sup.1] + [DELTA][y.sup.II]/2.
For each income group, the indirect policy effect is calculated as
a fraction of the total change in reported income from period t to t +
1:
(A3) IPE = ([DELTA][y.sup.S]/([y.sup.t+1] - [y.sup.t])) x OE
TABLE A1
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms
Including Indirect Policy Effects: ERTA81
Data Year 1981 1984 Total
Policy Year 1981 1984 Change
(1) (2) (3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 15.1 14.9 -0.3
P40-60 22.3 21.2 -1.2
P60-80 26.9 25.5 -1.4
P80-90 29.4 27.9 -1.5
P90-95 30.6 28.9 -1.7
P95-99 32.5 30.0 -2.5
P99-99.5 36.0 32.4 -3.7
P99.5-99.9 39.8 35.9 -3.9
P99.9-99.99 44.5 42.2 -2.3
P99.99-100 46.9 44.5 -2.4
Top 20% 32.2 30.4 -1.8
Top 10% 33.7 31.6 -2.1
Top 5% 35.5 33.0 -2.4
Top 1% 40.1 37.2 -2.9
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 8.6 8.0 -0.6
P40-60 15.7 15.1 -0.7
P60-80 25.4 24.9 -0.4
P80-90 18.0 18.1 0.2
P90-95 11.3 11.6 0.3
P95-99 12.1 12.8 0.6
P99-99.5 2.3 2.5 0.2
P99.5-99.9 2.7 3.0 0.4
P99.9-99.99 1.2 1.6 0.3
P99.99-100 0.5 0.8 0.3
Top 20% 48.1 50.4 2.3
Top 10% 30.1 32.3 2.2
Top 5% 18.8 20.7 1.9
Top 1% 6.7 7.9 1.2
Data Year ETI = 0 ETI = 0.2
Policy Year PE OE IPE RE
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 1.1 -1.3 -0.2 -1.1
P40-60 -0.1 -1.1 0.1 -1.2
P60-80 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 -0.8
P80-90 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 -0.6
P90-95 -1.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.6
P95-99 -1.8 -0.7 0.1 -0.8
P99-99.5 -2.8 -0.9 0.1 -1.0
P99.5-99.9 -3.3 -0.5 0.0 -0.6
P99.9-99.99 -3.9 1.6 0.1 1.5
P99.99-100 -5.6 3.1 0.2 2.9
Top 20% -1.6 -0.2 0.0 -0.3
Top 10% -2.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
Top 5% -2.4 0.0 0.0 -0.0
Top 1% -3.5 0.6 0.0 0.6
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3
P40-60 -0.2 -0.5 -0.0 -0.4
P60-80 -0.1 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3
P80-90 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P90-95 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
P95-99 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4
P99-99.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
P99.9-99.99 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
P99.99-100 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
Top 20% 0.5 1.8 0.1 1.7
Top 10% 0.5 1.7 0.1 1.6
Top 5% 0.5 1.4 0.1 1.3
Top 1% 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.9
Data Year ETI = 0.5 ETI = 1.0
Policy Year IPE RE IPE RE
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -0.5 -0.8 -0.9 -0.4
P40-60 0.1 -1.2 0.3 -1.4
P60-80 0.1 -0.8 0.2 -0.9
P80-90 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7
P90-95 0.2 -0.7 0.3 -0.9
P95-99 0.2 -0.9 0.4 -1.1
P99-99.5 0.2 -1.1 0.4 -1.3
P99.5-99.9 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.8
P99.9-99.99 0.3 1.4 0.5 1.1
P99.99-100 0.6 2.5 1.2 2.0
Top 20% 0.1 -0.3 0.2 -0.5
Top 10% 0.1 -0.3 0.3 -0.4
Top 5% 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2
Top 1% 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1
P40-60 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.3
P60-80 -0.0 -0.3 -0.0 -0.3
P80-90 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P90-95 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P95-99 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3
P99-99.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P99.9-99.99 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P99.99-100 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
Top 20% 0.2 1.6 0.4 1.4
Top 10% 0.2 1.5 0.4 1.3
Top 5% 0.2 1.2 0.3 1.1
Top 1% 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7
Notes'. Results for ETI = 0 correspond to the baseline
results. If ETI = 0, total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0, PE
is equal to (4). Total change = PE + IPE + RE. Average tax
rates include federal and state level income and payroll
taxes. Uprating according to the level of price inflation.
PE, policy effect: IPE, indirect policy effect; OE, other
effect; RE, residual effect; ETI, elasticity of taxable
income.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE A2
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms Including
Indirect Policy Effects: TRA86
Data Year 1986 1988 Total
Policy Year 1986 1988 Change
(1) (2) (3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 14.7 14.3 -0.4
P40-60 21.3 21.2 -0.1
P60-80 25.9 25.6 -0.2
P80-90 28.2 27.9 -0.4
P90-95 29.5 29.3 -0.2
P95-99 31.0 30.1 -0.9
P99-99.5 33.7 30.5 -3.2
P99.5-99.9 38.1 30.5 -7.5
P99.9-99.99 43.4 30.1 -13.4
P99.99-100 45.8 29.2 -16.6
Top 20% 31.3 29.3 -2.1
Top 10% 32.9 29.9 -3.0
Top 5% 34.5 30.1 -4.4
Top 1% 39.0 30.2 -8.8
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.8 7.5 -0.2
P40-60 14.8 13.9 -0.9
P60-80 24.6 23.0 -1.6
P80-90 18.0 17.0 -1.0
P90-95 11.6 11.1 -0.5
P95-99 13.1 13.1 -0.0
P99-99.5 2.6 3.1 0.4
P99.5-99.9 3.4 4.7 1.2
P99.9-99.99 1.7 3.3 1.6
P99.99-100 1.0 2.2 1.2
Top 20% 51.5 54.3 2.8
Top 10% 33.5 37.3 3.9
Top 5% 21.8 26.2 4.4
Top 1% 8.8 13.2 4.4
Data Year ETI = 0 ETI = 0.2
Policy Year PE OE IPE RE
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2
P40-60 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2
P60-80 -0.5 0.2 0.0 0.2
P80-90 -1.5 1.1 0.1 1.0
P90-95 -2.2 2.1 0.3 1.7
P95-99 -2.9 2.0 0.2 1.7
P99-99.5 -3.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1
P99.5-99.9 -5.2 -2.3 0.4 -2.7
P99.9-99.99 -9.4 -4.0 0.2 -4.2
P99.99-100 -10.1 -6.5 0.7 -7.2
Top 20% -3.2 1.1 0.1 1.0
Top 10% -3.9 0.9 0.1 0.9
Top 5% -4.6 0.2 0.1 0.2
Top 1% -6.4 -2.4 0.3 -2.7
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
P40-60 -0.3 -0.6 -0.0 -0.6
P60-80 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 -1.1
P80-90 -0.1 -1.0 -0.0 -1.0
P90-95 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.6
P95-99 0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99-99.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3
P99.5-99.9 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.9
P99.9-99.99 0.3 1.3 0.1 1.3
P99.99-100 0.2 1.0 0.1 0.9
Top 20% 1.0 1.9 0.1 1.8
Top 10% 1.1 2.8 0.1 2.7
Top 5% 1.0 3.4 0.2 3.2
Top 1% 0.8 3.6 0.2 3.5
Data Year ETI = 0.5 ETI = 1.0
Policy Year IPE RE PE RE
(8) (9) (10) (ID
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
P40-60 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
P60-80 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
P80-90 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.6
P90-95 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8
P95-99 0.6 1.4 1.0 1.0
P99-99.5 0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.4
P99.5-99.9 0.9 -3.2 1.7 -4.1
P99.9-99.99 0.6 -4.6 1.2 -5.2
P99.99-100 1.8 -8.3 3.6 -10.0
Top 20% 0.2 0.9 0.4 0.7
Top 10% 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.6
Top 5% 0.1 0.1 0.3 -0.1
Top 1% 0.7 -3.1 1.4 -3.8
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.0 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
P40-60 -0.0 -0.5 -0.1 -0.5
P60-80 -0.2 -1.0 -0.3 -0.9
P80-90 -0.1 -0.9 -0.1 -0.9
P90-95 0.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.8
P95-99 0.1 -0.3 0.1 -0.3
P99-99.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P99.5-99.9 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8
P99.9-99.99 0.2 1.2 0.3 1.0
P99.99-100 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.8
Top 20% 0.2 1.7 0.4 1.5
Top 10% 0.4 2.5 0.7 2.1
Top 5% 0.5 2.9 1.0 2.5
Top 1% 0.5 3.2 0.7 2.9
Notes: Results for ETI = 0 correspond to the baseline
results. If ETI = 0, total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0, PE
is equal to (4). Total change = PE + IPE + RE. Average tax
rates include federal and state level income and payroll
taxes. Uprating according to the level of price inflation.
PE, policy effect; IPE, indirect policy effect; OE, other
effect; RE, residual effect; ETI, elasticity of taxable
income.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE A3
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms Including
Indirect Policy Effects: OBRA90/OBRA93
Data Year 1989 1994 Total
Policy Year 1989 1994 Change
(1) (2) (3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 14.4 9.8 -4.5
P40-60 21.3 19.9 -1.4
P60-80 25.7 26.1 0.5
P80-90 27.9 28.6 0.7
P90-95 29.6 30.5 1.0
P95-99 30.1 31.9 1.8
P99-99.5 30.3 33.9 3.6
P99.5-99.9 30.3 37.3 7.0
P99.9-99.99 29.8 40.0 10.2
P99.99-100 29.3 39.8 10.5
Top 20% 29.3 31.9 2.6
Top 10% 29.9 33.4 3.5
Top 5% 30.1 34.6 4.5
Top 1% 30.0 37.4 7.4
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.6 7.5 -0.1
P40-60 13.9 13.7 -0.1
P60-80 23.1 22.8 -0.2
P80-90 17.1 17.5 0.4
P90-95 11.2 11.6 0.3
P95-99 13.3 13.8 0.5
P99-99.5 3.1 3.1 0.0
P99.5-99.9 4.5 4.2 -0.3
P99.9-99.99 3.0 2.5 -0.5
P99.99-100 1.9 1.5 -0.4
Top 20% 54.1 54.1 0.0
Top 10% 37.0 36.7 -0.3
Top 5% 25.8 25.1 -0.6
Top 1% 12.5 11.4 -1.1
Data Year ETI = 0 ETI = 0.2
Policy Year PE OE IPE RE
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -3.4 -1.1 0.6 -1.7
P40-60 -0.6 -0.8 0.2 -1.1
P60-80 0.3 0.2 -0.0 0.2
P80-90 0.3 0.4 -0.0 0.4
P90-95 0.5 0.4 -0.0 0.4
P95-99 1.0 0.8 -0.0 0.8
P99-99.5 2.6 1.0 -0.2 1.1
P99.5-99.9 6.2 0.8 -0.2 0.9
P99.9-99.99 10.0 0.2 -0.3 0.5
P99.99-100 11.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.3
Top 20% 2.1 0.5 -0.0 0.5
Top 10% 2.9 0.5 -0.1 0.6
Top 5% 3.9 0.6 -0.1 0.7
Top 1% 7.0 0.4 -0.2 0.6
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
P40-60 0.2 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P60-80 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P80-90 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
P90-95 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.1
P99.9-99.99 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
P99.99-100 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0
Top 20% -0.8 0.9 -0.0 0.9
Top 10% -0.9 0.6 -0.3 0.9
Top 5% -1.0 0.4 -0.4 0.7
Top 1% -1.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.2
Data Year ETI = 0.5 ETI = 1.0
Policy Year IPE RE IPE RE
(8) (9) (10) (id
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 0.9 -2.0 1.2 -2.3
P40-60 0.4 -1.2 0.5 -1.3
P60-80 -0.0 0.2 -0.0 0.2
P80-90 -0.0 0.4 -0.0 0.4
P90-95 -0.0 0.4 -0.1 0.5
P95-99 -0.0 0.8 -0.0 0.8
P99-99.5 -0.3 1.3 -0.5 1.4
P99.5-99.9 -0.3 1.1 -0.4 1.2
P99.9-99.99 -0.5 0.7 -0.7 0.9
P99.99-100 -0.9 0.3 -1.3 0.6
Top 20% -0.1 0.6 -0.1 0.6
Top 10% -0.1 0.7 -0.2 0.7
Top 5% -0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.9
Top 1% -0.3 0.8 -0.5 1.0
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
P40-60 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P60-80 0.0 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P80-90 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
P90-95 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 -0.0 0.1 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3
P99.9-99.99 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.2
P99.99-100 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1
Top 20% -0.1 1.0 -0.1 1.0
Top 10% -0.4 1.0 -0.5 1.1
Top 5% -0.6 0.9 -0.7 1.0
Top 1% -0.5 0.4 -0.8 0.7
Notes: Results for ETI = 0 correspond to the baseline
results. If ETI = 0. total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0, PE
is equal to (4). Total change = PE + IPE + RE. Average tax
rates include federal and state level income and payroll
taxes. Uprating according to the level of price inflation.
PE. policy effect; IPE, indirect policy effect; OE, other
effect; RE, residual effect; ETI, elasticity of taxable
income.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE A4
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms Including
Indirect Policy Effects: EGTRRA01/JGTRRA03
Data Year 2000 2004 Total
Policy Year 2000 2004 Change
(1) (2) (3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 10.5 2.3 -8.2
P40-60 20.9 16.7 -4.2
P60-80 25.9 23.2 -2.7
P80-90 28.5 25.6 -2.9
P90-95 30.6 27.7 -2.9
P95-99 31.9 29.2 -2.7
P99-99.5 33.9 31.8 -2.1
P99.5-99.9 35.8 32.6 -3.2
P99.9-99.99 36.6 32.9 -3.7
P99.99-100 37.2 31.8 -5.5
Top 20% 32.1 28.9 -3.2
Top 10% 33.3 30.1 -3.2
Top 5% 34.2 30.9 -3.2
Top 1% 35.9 32.3 -3.5
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.3 7.1 -0.2
P40-60 12.4 12.4 -0.0
P60-80 20.5 20.9 0.3
P80-90 15.8 16.4 0.6
P90-95 10.9 11.2 0.4
P95-99 14.2 14.2 0.0
P99-99.5 3.6 3.4 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 5.6 5.2 -0.3
P99.9-99.99 4.5 3.9 -0.5
P99.99-100 2.8 2.8 -0.0
Top 20% 57.4 57.2 -0.2
Top 10% 41.5 40.8 -0.7
Top 5% 30.7 29.6 -1.1
Top 1% 16.5 15.4 -1.1
Data Year ETI = 0 ETI = 0.2
Policy Year PE OE IPE RE
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -2.0 -6.2 0.2 -6.4
P40-60 -2.5 -1.7 0.5 -2.3
P60-80 -2.1 -0.7 0.4 -1.0
P80-90 -2.3 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
P90-95 -2.5 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
P95-99 -2.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
P99-99.5 -2.3 0.2 0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 -3.4 0.2 0.0 0.1
P99.9-99.99 -4.3 0.6 0.1 0.5
P99.99-100 -4.8 -0.7 0.1 -0.7
Top 20% -2.7 -0.5 0.0 -0.5
Top 10% -2.8 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
Top 5% -2.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.3
Top 1% -3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.1 -0.1 -0.0 -0.1
P40-60 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1
P60-80 -0.1 0.5 -0.1 0.5
P80-90 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6
P90-95 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.0
P99-99.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 0.1 -0.4 0.0 -0.4
P99.9-99.99 0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.7
P99.99-100 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.2
Top 20% 0.3 -0.4 0.0 -0.5
Top 10% 0.3 -1.0 0.1 -1.1
Top 5% 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.5
Top 1% 0.3 -1.4 0.1 -1.5
Data Year ETI = 0.5 ETI = 1.0
Policy Year IPE RE IPE RE
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 0.4 -6.6 0.7 -7.0
P40-60 0.8 -2.5 1.0 -2.7
P60-80 0.4 -1.1 0.5 -1.1
P80-90 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.7
P90-95 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
P95-99 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
P99-99.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
P99.5-99.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 -0.0
P99.9-99.99 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.4
P99.99-100 0.2 -0.9 0.4 -1.1
Top 20% 0.0 -0.5 0.1 -0.6
Top 10% 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.5
Top 5% 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
Top 1% 0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0 -0.0
P40-60 -0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.1
P60-80 -0.1 0.6 -0.2 0.6
P80-90 -0.0 0.6 -0.0 0.6
P90-95 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 -0.0 0.0 -0.0
P99-99.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.5
P99.9-99.99 0.1 -0.7 0.1 -0.7
P99.99-100 0.1 -0.2 0.1 -0.3
Top 20% 0.1 -0.5 0.1 -0.5
Top 10% 0.2 -1.2 0.2 -1.2
Top 5% 0.2 -1.6 0.3 -1.6
Top 1% 0.2 -1.6 0.3 -1.7
Notes: Results for ETI = 0 correspond to the baseline
results. If ETI = 0, total change = PE + OE. If ETI > 0, PE
is equal to (4). Total change = PE + IPE + RE. Average tax
rates include federal and state level income and payroll
taxes. Uprating according to the level of price inflation.
PE, policy effect; IPE, indirect policy effect; OE, other
effect; RE, residual effect. ETI, elasticity of taxable
income.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
REFERENCES
Aim, J., F. Lee, and S. Wallace. "How Fair? Changes in Federal
Income Taxation and the Distribution of Income, 1978 to 1998."
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 24(1), 2005, 5-22.
Auerbach, A. "Capital Gains Taxation in the United
States." Brookings Papers on Economics Activity, 19(2), 1988,
595-638.
Auerbach, A., and J. Slemrod. "The Economic Effects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986." Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 1997,
589-632.
Bakija, J., A. Cole, and B. Heim. "Jobs and Income Growth of
Top Earners and the Causes of Changing Income Inequality: Evidence from
U.S. Tax Return Data." Working Paper No. 2010-22, Williams College,
2012.
Bargain, O., and T. Callan. "Analysing the Effects of
Tax-Benefit Reforms on Income Distribution: A Decomposition
Approach." Journal of Economic Inequality, 8(1), 2010, 1-21.
Burkhauser, R., S. Feng, S. Jenkins, and J. Larrimore. "Trends
in United States Income Inequality Using the March Current Population
Survey: The Importance of Controlling for Censoring." Journal of
Economic Inequality, 9(3), 2011, 393-415.
--. "Recent Trends in Top Income Shares in the USA:
Reconciling Estimates from March CPS and IRS Tax Return Data."
Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(2), 2012a, 371-88.
Burkhauser, R., J. Larrimore, and K. Simon. "A 'Second
Opinion' on the Economic Health of the American Middle Class."
National Tax Journal, 65(1), 2012b, 7-32.
Clark, T., and A. Leicester. "Inequality and Two Decades of
British Tax and Benefit Reform." Fiscal Studies, 25(2), 2004,
129-58.
Congressional Budget Office. "Average Federal Tax Rates and
Income, by Income Category, 1979-2007." 2010. Accessed July 1,
2013. http://www.cbo.gov/publications/collections/collections.cfm?collect=13. Dardanoni, V., and P. Lambert. "Progressivity
Comparisons." Journal of Public Economics, 86, 2002, 99-122.
DeBacker, J., B. Heim, V. Panousi, S. Ramnath, and I. Vidangos.
"Rising Inequality: Transitory or Permanent? New Evidene from a
Panel of U.S. Tax Returns." Brookings Papers on Economics Activity,
Spring, 2013, 67-142.
Diamond, P., and E. Saez. "The Case for a Progressive Tax:
From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations." Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 25(4), 2011, 165-90.
Eissa, N., and H. Hoynes. "Behavioral Responses to Taxes:
Lessons from the EITC and Labor Supply," in Tax Policy and the
Economy, Vol. 20, edited by J. M. Poterba. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2006, 74-110.
--. "Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: The Earned Income
Tax Credit." National Tax Journal, 64(2), 2011, 689-730.
Eissa, N., H. Eleven, and C. T. Kreiner. "Evaluation of Four
tax Reforms in the Unites States: Labor Supply and Welfare Effects for
Single Mothers." Jounal of Public Economics, 92, 2008, 795-816.
Feenberg, D. R., and E. Coutts. "An Introduction to the TAXSIM
Model." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 12(1), 1993,
189-94.
Feenberg, D., and J. Poterba. "Income Inequality and the
Incomes of Very High-Income Taxpayers: Evidence from Tax Returns, "
in Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 7, edited by J. M. Poterba.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, 145-77.
Feldstein, M. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable
Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act." Journal of
Political Economy, 103(3), 1995, 551-72.
--. "Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income
Tax." Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(4), 1999, 674-80.
Giertz, S. "The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Influences on
Economic Efficiency and Tax Revenues, and Implications for Tax
Policy," in Tax Policy Lessons from the 2000s, edited by A. Viard.
Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2009, 101-36.
Gottschalk, P., and S. Danziger. "Inequality of Wage Rates,
Earnings and Family Income in the United States, 1975-2002." Review
of Income and Wealth, 51(2), 2005, 231-54.
Gottschalk, P., and T. Smeeding. "Cross-National Comparisons
of Earnings and Income Inequality." Journal of Economic Literature,
35, 1997, 633-87.
Gramlich, E., R. Kasten, and F. Sammartino. "Growing
Inequality in the 1980s: The Role of Federal Taxes and Cash
Transfers," in Uneven Tides: Rising Inequality in America, edited
by S. Danziger and P. Gottschalk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation,
1993, 225-49.
Heathcote, J., F. Perri, and G. Violante. "Unequal We Stand:
An Empirical Analysis of Economic Inequality in the United States,
1967-2006." Review of Economic Dynamics, 13(1), 2010, 15-51.
Kasten, R., F. Sammartino, and E. Toder. "Trends in Federal
Tax Progressivity, 1980-93," in Tax Progressivity and Income
Inequality, edited by J. Slemrod. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994, 9-50.
Lambert, R, and T. Thoresen. "Base Independence in the
Analysis of Tax Policy Effects: With an Application to Norway
1992-2004." International Tax and Public Finance, 16, 2009, 219-52.
Leigh, A. "Do Redistributive State Taxes Reduce
Inequality?" National Tax Journal, 61(1), 2008, 81-104.
Lindsey, L. "Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts:
1982-1984. With Implications for the Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate."
Jounal of Public Economics, 33, 1987, 173-206.
Meyer, B. "The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and
Recent Reforms," in Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 24, edited by
J. Brown. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, 153-180.
Mitrusi, A., and J. Poterba. "The Distribution of Payroll and
Income Tax Burdens, 1979-99." National Tax Journal, 53(3), 2000,
765-794.
Musgrave, R" and T. Thin. "Income Tax Progression,
1929-1948." Journal of Political Economy, 56. 1948, 498-514.
OECD. Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. Paris: OECD
Publishing, 2011.
Piketty, T., and E. Saez. "Income Inequality in the United
States. 1913-1998." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 2003,
1-39.
--. "How Progressive Is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A
Historical and International Perspective." Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 21(1), 2007, 3-24.
Piketty, T., E. Saez, and S. Stantcheva. "Optimal Taxation of
Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities." American Economic
Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 2014, 230-71.
Poterba, J. "Income Inequality and Income Taxation."
Journal of Policy Modeling, 29, 2007, 623-33.
Reynolds, A. "Has U.S. Income Inequality Really Increased?
Policy Analysis." Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 586, 2007.
Saez, E. "The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel
Study of 'Bracket Creep'." Journal of Public Economics,
87, 2003, 1231-58.
--. "Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates, 1960-2000:
Evidence and Policy Implications," in Tax Policy and the Economy,
Vol. 18, edited by J. Poterba. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004, 117-73.
Saez, E., J. Slemrod, and S. Giertz. "The Elasticity of
Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical
Review." Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1), 2012, 3-50.
Shorrocks, A. "Decomposition Procedures for Distributional
Analysis: A Unified Framework Based on the Shapley Value."
University of Essex and Institute for Fiscal Studies, Wivenhoe Park,
1999.
Slemrod, J. "Taxation and Inequality: A Time-Exposure
Perspective," in Tax Policy and the Economy, Vol. 6, edited by P.
James. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992, 105-27.
--. "High-Income Families and the Tax Changes of the 1980s:
The Anatomy of Behavioral Response," in Empirical Foundations of
Household Taxation, edited by M. Feldstein and J. Poterba. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996, 169-92.
Tempalski, J. 2006. "Revenue Effects of Major Tax Bills."
Office of Tax Analysis Working Paper No. 81.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online
version of this article:
Appendix S1. Additional results: Tables S1-S2, Figures S1-S5.
(1.) Note that as a robustness check, we perform the decomposition
analysis on the Current Population Survey (CPS) and show that results
are in line with those based on tax return data. This comparison of how
the policy effect on inequality differs between IRS SOI tax return and
CPS data complements the analysis by Burkhauser et al. (2012a) who
reconcile estimates on top income shares between these two data sources.
(2.) Our approach formalizes analyses of policy effects as
performed, for instance, by Clark and Leicester (2004) for the United
Kingdom. See also Bargain and Callan (2010) for France and Ireland. A
related concept for the comparison of tax regimes with respect to
progressivity--the transplant-and-compare procedure (Dardanoni and
Lambert 2002)--is applied by Lambert and Thoresen (2009) for Norway.
They isolate the tax policy effect by comparing pretax income
distributions that have been adjusted to a common base.
(3.) See for example, Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), Heathcote et
al. (2010), and Burkhauser et al. (2011). Differences between these
studies exist with regard to the definition of the income unit (family
vs. household), sample selection (full population vs. working-age
population), and whether topcoding in the public-use CPS is accounted
for. Burkhauser et al. (2012b) show that differences in inequality
trends based on income tax return data and the CPS can be explained by
different income measures and sharing units. Most notably, median income
growth is shown to be significantly higher with a broader income measure
including cash and in-kind transfers and with economies of scale in
household consumption taken into account.
(4.) Further studies examining the degree of redistribution of the
U.S. income tax system by means of policy swaps are Kasten et al.
(1994), Mitrusi and Poterba (2000), Aim et al. (2005), Leigh (2008), and
Meyer (2010). However, these studies do not quantify how much of an
observed change in posttax income inequality is due to policy changes.
Instead, the focus of these contributions is on the changing importance
of income and payroll taxes over time (Mitrusi and Poterba 2000), on the
progressivity of the income tax (Aim et al. 2005; Kasten et al. 1994),
the redistributiveness of state taxes (Leigh 2008), and the
distributional effect of the EITC reform enacted through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Meyer 2010).
(5.) This approach is supported by Piketty and Saez (2007) who
argue that given the controversy about behavioral responses to taxation
[... ] considering the basic case with no behavioral response is a
useful starting place (p. 9).
(6.) A measure [d.sub.t] ([p.sub.t], [y.sup.t+1]) would not be
consistent since base-period parameters would be artificially applied to
endperiod income levels. For instance, previous tax band thresholds
would be applied to new and possibly higher income levels, thereby
generating artificial "fiscal drag" or "bracket
creep" (Saez 2003).
(7.) Converting tax parameters and income from dollars into Euros
does not change the relative location of households in the distribution
of posttax income.
(8.) Following Piketty and Saez (2007), we use the CPIU-RS
(http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpirsdc.htm) which is the commonly used CPI
measure for comparisons over time.
(9.) The number of observations varies between 90,000 and 200,000.
(10.) In a previous version of this paper, we have performed our
calculations with data from IPUMS-CPS (Integrated Public Use Microdata
Series, CPS) which is a rich micro-data set of U.S. households and a
primary data source for investigating income distribution trends.
However, it does not contain information about itemized deductions and
capital gains which are important in any analysis on top incomes.
Further, for confidentiality reasons, the U.S. Census Bureau "top
codes" all income sources, with differences in methods between some
years. This can cause a downward bias of income inequality estimates
(cf. Burkhauser et al. 2011). We compare the result from SOI to those
obtained from CPS data in Section IV.D.
(11.) We use the information from the study by Piketty and Saez
(2003) on the total number of tax units in each year and are thus able
to impute those who do not file (number of non-filer = total number tax
units - number of tax returns observed in the data). Income of
non-filers is imputed as 20% of average income. Groups are defined
relative to all tax units (filers and non-filers). The total number of
tax units in the United States ranges from 97.5 million in 1979 to
almost 150 million in 2007. Over the sample period, the share of tax
units that file a tax return is roughly between 92% and 96% (see online
appendix of Piketty and Saez 2003, updated to 2010).
(12.) Some of the caveats discussed by Piketty and Saez (2007)
apply to our study as well. In particular, we ignore the redistributive
effect of government transfers and untaxed income such as in-kind
benefits (except tax credits such as the EITC). Furthermore, our data
are repeated cross sections and we therefore abstract from any lifecycle
perspective.
(13.) For more information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993)
or visit http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
(14.) As part of the tax burden was effectively shifted from the
individual to the corporate sector which is not part of our analysis,
TRA86 constitutes a tax cut in the context of this paper.
(15.) Results are robust when the adjustment of pretax incomes in
the counterfactuals is based on mean nominal wage growth instead of the
inflation rate (see Section IV.D).
(16.) A shift in the income composition to sources that are taxed
by a lower rate ceteris paribus leads to a negative other effect.
(17.) For those in the top 1%, entrepreneurial income made up 11.1%
of their total income (excluding capital gains) in 1986, but 21.2% in
1988. Conversely, capital gains made up 38.8% of their total income
(including capital gains) in 1986, but only 14.6% in 1988 (see updated
tables to Piketty and Saez 2003, accessible at
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/).
(18.) Note that the way we rank tax units, that is, based on their
pretax incomes excluding capital gains which are added back for the
calculation of average tax rates and income shares, might critically
affect our decomposition results when significant changes in the amount
of realized capital gains occur from one period to the other. In Section
IV.D, we show how results change for TRA86 when tax units are ranked
based on pretax incomes including capital gains, which provides
additional evidence for the impact of behavioral changes around TRA86 on
our decomposition results.
(19.) This can be done in two ways. First, one can look at several
year-by-year changes (e.g., from 1979 to 1980 and then from 1980 to
1981) and then add them up. Second, one can hold a base-year constant
(e.g., 1979) and look at the changes to various end years (e.g., 1980,
1981, ...). In addition, various combinations are possible (e.g., adding
up 3-year- or 5-year changes). This can lead to an almost infinite
number of potential results. In our empirical analysis, it turned out
that the different approaches led to very similar results (both in terms
of magnitude of the effects and trends). Hence, we decided to focus on
the first approach.
(20.) It should be noted, though, that having a Republican or
Democratic administration in power does not mean that the initiative for
a tax reform comes from this administration. For instance, TRA86 was
started as a bi-partisan initiative.
(21.) By assuming a value for the ETI, it is clear that we cannot
separate real responses from timing or income shifting responses. In
addition, the ETI is not supposed to capture general equilibrium
effects. Yet, an ETI of unity seems very high. Hence, one may argue that
this serves as an upper bound potentially capturing also (some) general
equilibrium effects. Furthermore, some of those effects might actually
work in the other direction dampening the effect of tax policy on
inequality.
(22.) An exception is the upper bound estimate on the total policy
effect for taxpayers in the second quintile which turns out to be more
negative than for taxpayers in the third quintile (Figure 6). For the
total policy effect, it is important to note that a substantial part of
the behavioral responses, in particular around TRA86, consisted of
avoidance and timing responses which do not imply any additional income.
(23.) We choose the National Average Wage Index according to which
the taxable maximum for Social Security is automatically adjusted. See
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ COLA/AWI.html for further information. If the
consumer price index (CPI-U-RS) and the National Average Wage Index are
normalized to 1 for the base year 1979, their 2007 values are 2.66 and
3.52, respectively.
OLIVIER BARGAIN, MATHIAS DOLLS, HERWIG IMMERVOLL, DIRK NEUMANN,
ANDREAS PEICHL, NICO PESTEL and SEBASTIAN SIEGLOCH *
(a) This paper uses TAXSIM v9. TAXSIM is continually being improved
and updated and the results presented here represent the best available
at the time of writing. Our version of TAXSIM is based on IRS SOI tax
return data. We would like to thank Daniel Feenberg for granting us
access to NBER's TAXSIM and helping us with our simulations. We are
grateful to James Ziliak, the editor, an anonymous referee as well as
Alberto Alesina, James Aim, Felix Bierbrauer, Denvil Duncan, Clemens
Fuest, Carl Klarner, Wojciech Kopczuk, Jeff Larrimore, Erzo F.R Luttmer,
Jim Poterba, Ronald L. Oaxaca, Andrew Oswald, Torsten Persson, Emmanuel
Saez, James Sullivan, Tim Smeeding, as well as seminar and conference
participants in Bari (ECINEQ), Bonn (IZA), Buch (ESSLE), Cambridge (NBER
SI), Canazei (IT8), Chicago (SOLE), Dublin (IMA, ESRI), Gottingen (VfS),
Oslo, Providence (NTA), and Zurich (EPCS) for helpful comments and
suggestions. Peichl is grateful for financial support by Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (PE1675). Any errors as well as the views
presented in this paper are the responsibility of the authors alone. In
particular, the views do not represent the official positions of
organizations to which the authors are affiliated.
Bargain: Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS EHESS, France;
IZA, Germany. Phone +33 4 91 14 07 70, Fax +33 4 91 90 02 27, E-mail
Olivier.BARGAIN@ univmed.fr
Dolls: ZEW and IZA, Germany. Phone +49 621 1235-395, Fax +49 621
1235-4220, E-mail dolls@zew.de
Immervoll: OECD, France; IZA, Germany. Phone +33 4524 9214, E-mail
immervoll@oecd.org
Neumann: CORE (Universit catholique de Louvain), Belgium; ZEW and
IZA, Germany. E-mail dirk.neumann@ uclouvain.be
Peichl: ZEW, University of Mannheim, IZA and CESifo, Germany. Phone
+49 621 1235-389, Fax +49 621 12354389, E-mail peichl@zew.de
Pestel: IZA and ZEW, Germany. Phone +49 228 38 94 160, Fax +49 228
38 94 180. E-mail pestel@iza.org
Siegloch: University of Mannheim, IZA and ZEW, Germany. Phone
+49-621-181-1818, E-mail siegloch@uni-mann heim.de
TABLE 1
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms: ERTA81
Data Year 1981 1984 1981 1984
Adjusted to 1981 1984 Total
Policy Year 1981 1981 1984 1984 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 15.1 13.8 16.2 14.9 -0.3
P40-60 22.3 21.2 22.2 21.2 -1.2
P60-80 26.9 26.1 26.2 25.5 -1.4
P80-90 29.4 28.7 28.5 27.9 -1.5
P90-95 30.6 30.0 29.4 28.9 -1.7
P95-99 32.5 31.7 30.7 30.0 -2.5
P99-99.5 36.0 35.0 33.1 32.4 -3.7
P99.5-99.9 39.8 39.0 36.2 35.9 -3.9
P99.9-99.99 44.5 46.0 40.5 42.2 -2.3
P99.99-100 46.9 50.3 41.6 44.5 -2.4
Top 20% 32.2 31.9 30.5 30.4 -1.8
Top 10% 33.7 33.6 31.7 31.6 -2.1
Top 5% 35.5 35.4 33.0 33.0 -2.4
Top 1% 40.1 40.6 36.6 37.2 -2.9
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 8.6 8.2 8.3 8.0 -0.6
P40-60 15.7 15.2 15.5 15.1 -0.7
P60-80 25.4 25.0 25.2 24.9 -0.4
P80-90 18.0 18.1 18.0 18.1 0.2
P90-95 11.3 11.6 11.4 11.6 0.3
P95-99 12.1 12.6 12.3 12.8 0.6
P99-99.5 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.5 0.2
P99.5-99.9 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.0 0.4
P99.9-99.99 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.6 0.3
P99.99-100 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.3
Top 20% 48.1 49.9 48.7 50.4 2.3
Top 10% 30.1 31.8 30.7 32.3 2.2
Top 5% 18.8 20.2 19.3 20.7 1.9
Top 1% 6.7 7.6 7.0 7.9 1.2
Data Year Decomposition I Decomposition II
Adjusted to PE OE PE OE
Policy Year
(3)-(1) (4)-(3) (4)-(2) (2)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 1.1 -1.3 1.1 -1.3
P40-60 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 -1.1
P60-80 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.8
P80-90 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8 -0.7
P90-95 -1.2 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6
P95-99 -1.8 -0.7 -1.7 -0.7
P99-99.5 -2.9 -0.8 -2.6 -1.0
P99.5-99.9 -3.5 -0.3 -3.1 -0.8
P99.9-99.99 -4.0 1.7 -3.9 1.6
P99.99-100 -5.3 2.9 -5.8 3.4
Top 20% -1.6 -0.2 -1.6 -0.3
Top 10% -2.0 -0.1 -1.9 -0.2
Top 5% -2.5 0.1 -2.4 -0.0
Top 1% -3.5 0.6 -3.4 0.5
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4
P40-60 -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.5
P60-80 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3
P80-90 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
P90-95 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2
P95-99 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5
P99-99.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
P99.5-99.9 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
P99.9-99.99 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3
P99.99-100 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3
Top 20% 0.5 1.8 0.6 1.8
Top 10% 0.5 1.7 0.5 1.7
Top 5% 0.5 1.4 0.5 1.4
Top 1% 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.9
Data Year Shapley-December
Adjusted to PE OE
Policy Year Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 1.1 -1.3
P40-60 -0.1 -i.i
P60-80 -0.7 -0.8
P80-90 -0.9 -0.6
P90-95 -1.1 -0.6
P95-99 -1.8 -0.7
P99-99.5 -2.8 -0.9
P99.5-99.9 -3.3 -0.5
P99.9-99.99 -3.9 1.6
P99.99-100 -5.6 3.1
Top 20% -1.6 -0.2
Top 10% -2.0 -0.1
Top 5% -2.4 0.0
Top 1% -3.5 0.6
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.2 -0.4
P40-60 -0.2 -0.5
P60-80 -0.1 -0.3
P80-90 0.0 0.1
P90-95 0.1 0.2
P95-99 0.2 0.5
P99-99.5 0.1 0.1
P99.5-99.9 0.1 0.3
P99.9-99.99 0.1 0.3
P99.99-100 0.0 0.3
Top 20% 0.5 1.8
Top 10% 0.5 1.7
Top 5% 0.5 1.4
Top 1% 0.3 0.9
Notes: Average tax rates (%) include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of
price inflation. PE, policy effect; OE, other effect.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE 2
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms: TRA86
Data Year 1986 1988 1986 1988
Adjusted to 1986 1988 Total
Policy Year 1986 1986 1988 1988 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 14.7 15.0 14.3 14.3 -0.4
P40-60 21.3 22.0 21.5 21.2 -0.1
P60-80 25.9 26.7 26.0 25.6 -0.2
P80-90 28.2 30.6 27.9 27.9 -0.4
P90-95 29.5 33.8 29.5 29.3 -0.2
P95-99 31.0 35.8 31.0 30.1 -0.9
P99-99.5 33.7 36.5 33.4 30.5 -3.2
P99.5-99.9 38.1 39.3 36.4 30.5 -7.5
P99.9-99.99 43.4 42.7 37.3 30.1 -13.4
P99.99-100 45.8 43.4 39.8 29.2 -16.6
Top 20% 31.3 34.9 30.6 29.3 -2.1
Top 10% 32.9 36.8 32.0 29.9 -3.0
Top 5% 34.5 38.0 33.2 30.1 -4.4
Top 1% 39.0 40.0 36.1 30.2 -8.8
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.5 -0.2
P40-60 14.8 14.4 14.7 13.9 -0.9
P60-80 24.6 23.7 24.5 23.0 -1.6
P80-90 18.0 17.1 18.1 17.0 -1.0
P90-95 11.6 10.9 11.6 11.1 -0.5
P95-99 13.1 12.6 13.0 13.1 -0.0
P99-99.5 2.6 2.9 2.6 3.1 0.4
P99.5-99.9 3.4 4.3 3.5 4.7 1.2
P99.9-99.99 1.7 2.9 1.9 3.3 1.6
P99.99-100 1.0 1.9 1.1 2.2 1.2
Top 20% 51.5 52.7 51.8 54.3 2.8
Top 10% 33.5 35.5 33.8 37.3 3.9
Top 5% 21.8 24.6 22.2 26.2 4.4
Top 1% 8.8 12.0 9.1 13.2 4.4
Data Year Decomposition I Decomposition II
Adjusted to PE OE PE OE
Policy Year
(3)-(1) (4)-(3) (4)-(2) (2)-(l)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -0.4 0.0 -0.7 0.3
P40-60 0.1 -0.3 -0.8 0.7
P60-80 0.2 -0.4 -1.1 0.9
P80-90 -0.3 -0.1 -2.7 2.4
P90-95 0.1 -0.2 -4.5 4.3
P95-99 0.0 -0.9 -5.8 4.9
P99-99.5 -0.2 -3.0 -6.0 2.8
P99.5-99.9 -1.7 -5.8 -8.7 1.2
P99.9-99.99 -6.1 -7.2 -12.6 -0.7
P99.99-100 -6.0 -10.6 -14.3 -2.4
Top 20% -0.7 -1.4 -5.6 3.6
Top 10% -0.9 -2.1 -6.9 3.9
Top 5% -1.3 -3.1 -7.9 3.5
Top 1% -2.9 -5.9 -9.9 1.0
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.0
P40-60 -0.1 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3
P60-80 -0.1 -1.5 -0.7 -0.9
P80-90 0.0 -1.1 -0.2 -0.9
P90-95 -0.0 -0.5 0.2 -0.7
P95-99 -0.1 0.0 0.4 -0.5
P99-99.5 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.3
P99.5-99.9 0.1 1.1 0.4 0.9
P99.9-99.99 0.2 1.4 0.4 1.2
P99.99-100 0.1 1.1 0.3 0.9
Top 20% 0.3 2.5 1.6 1.2
Top 10% 0.3 3.6 1.8 2.1
Top 5% 0.3 4.1 1.6 2.8
Top 1% 0.4 4.0 1.2 3.3
Data Year Shapley-December
Adjusted to PE OE
Policy Year Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -0.5 0.2
P40-60 -0.3 0.2
P60-80 -0.5 0.2
P80-90 -1.5 1.1
P90-95 -2.2 2.1
P95-99 -2.9 2.0
P99-99.5 -3.1 -0.1
P99.5-99.9 -5.2 -2.3
P99.9-99.99 -9.4 -4.0
P99.99-100 -10.1 -6.5
Top 20% -3.2 l.l
Top 10% -3.9 0.9
Top 5% -4.6 0.2
Top 1% -6.4 -2.4
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.1 -0.1
P40-60 -0.3 -0.6
P60-80 -0.4 -1.2
P80-90 -0.1 -1.0
P90-95 0.1 -0.6
P95-99 0.2 -0.2
P99-99.5 0.1 0.4
P99.5-99.9 0.2 1.0
P99.9-99.99 0.3 1.3
P99.99-100 0.2 1.0
Top 20% 1.0 1.9
Top 10% 1.1 2.8
Top 5% 1.0 3.4
Top 1% 0.8 3.6
Notes: Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of
price inflation. PE, policy effect; OE, other effect.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE 3
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms: OBRA90/OBRA93
Data Year 1989 1994 1989 1994
Adjusted to 1989 1994 Total
Policy Year 1989 1989 1994 1994 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 14.4 13.3 10.9 9.8 -4.5
P40-60 21.3 20.5 20.7 19.9 -1.4
P60-80 25.7 25.9 25.9 26.1 0.5
P80-90 27.9 28.3 28.2 28.6 0.7
P90-95 29.6 30.0 30.1 30.5 1.0
P95-99 30.1 30.9 31.2 31.9 1.8
P99-99.5 30.3 31.3 33.0 33.9 3.6
P99.5-99.9 30.3 31.3 36.7 37.3 7.0
P99.9-99.99 29.8 30.2 40.0 40.0 10.2
P99.99-100 29.3 28.9 40.8 39.8 10.5
Top 20% 29.3 29.9 31.5 31.9 2.6
Top 10% 29.9 30.6 33.0 33.4 3.5
Top 5% 30.1 30.8 34.1 34.6 4.5
Top 1% 30.0 30.7 37.2 37.4 7.4
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.6 7.2 8.0 7.5 -0.1
P40-60 13.9 13.5 14.1 13.7 -0.1
P60-80 23.1 22.7 23.2 22.8 -0.2
P80-90 17.1 17.4 17.3 17.5 0.4
P90-95 11.2 11.5 11.3 11.6 0.3
P95-99 13.3 13.8 13.3 13.8 0.5
P99-99.5 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.1 0.0
P99.5-99.9 4.5 4.5 4.1 4.2 -0.3
P99.9-99.99 3.0 2.9 2.6 2.5 -0.5
P99.99-100 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 -0.4
Top 20% 54.1 54.9 53.3 54.1 0.0
Top 10% 37.0 37.5 36.0 36.7 -0.3
Top 5% 25.8 26.1 24.7 25.1 -0.6
Top 1% 12.5 12.3 11.4 11.4 -1.1
Data Year Decomposition I Decomposition II
Adjusted to PE OE PE OE
Policy Year
(3)-(1) (4)-(3) (4)-(2) (2)-(l)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -3.4 -1.1 -3.4 -1.1
P40-60 -0.5 -0.9 -0.6 -0.8
P60-80 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2
P80-90 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
P90-95 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4
P95-99 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.8
P99-99.5 2.6 1.0 2.6 1.0
P99.5-99.9 6.4 0.6 6.1 0.9
P99.9-99.99 10.2 -0.0 9.8 0.5
P99.99-100 11.5 -1.0 10.8 -0.3
Top 20% 2.2 0.4 2.0 0.6
Top 10% 3.0 0.4 2.8 0.6
Top 5% 4.1 0.4 3.8 0.7
Top 1% 7.2 0.2 6.7 0.7
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4
P40-60 0.2 -0.4 0.2 -0.4
P60-80 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.3
P80-90 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
P90-95 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 -0.1 0.1 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0
P99.9-99.99 -0.4 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1
P99.99-100 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Top 20% -0.9 0.9 -0.8 0.8
Top 10% -1.0 0.6 -0.9 0.5
Top 5% -1.0 0.4 -1.0 0.3
Top 1% -1.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.2
Data Year Shapley-December
Adjusted to PE OE
Policy Year Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(3)-(1) (4)-(3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -3.4 -1.1
P40-60 -0.6 -0.8
P60-80 0.3 0.2
P80-90 0.3 0.4
P90-95 0.5 0.4
P95-99 1.0 0.8
P99-99.5 2.6 1.0
P99.5-99.9 6.2 0.8
P99.9-99.99 10.0 0.2
P99.99-100 11.2 -0.7
Top 20% 2.1 0.5
Top 10% 2.9 0.5
Top 5% 3.9 0.6
Top 1% 7.0 0.4
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 0.3 -0.4
P40-60 0.2 -0.4
P60-80 0.1 -0.4
P80-90 0.1 0.2
P90-95 0.1 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.5
P99-99.5 -0.0 0.1
P99.5-99.9 -0.3 0.0
P99.9-99.99 -0.4 -0.1
P99.99-100 -0.3 -0.1
Top 20% -0.8 0.9
Top 10% -0.9 0.6
Top 5% -1.0 0.4
Top 1% -1.0 -0.1
Notes: Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of
price inflation. PE: policy effect; OE, other effect.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE 4
Decomposition Results for Major Tax Reforms: EGTRRA01/JGTRRA03
Data Year 2000 2004 2000 2004
Adjusted to 2000 2004 Total
Policy Year 2000 2000 2004 2004 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 10.5 4.4 8.7 2.3 -8.2
P40-60 20.9 19.3 18.6 16.7 -4.2
P60-80 25.9 25.3 23.9 23.2 -2.7
P80-90 28.5 28.0 26.2 25.6 -2.9
P90-95 30.6 30.3 28.2 27.7 -2.9
P95-99 31.9 31.6 29.8 29.2 -2.7
P99-99.5 33.9 34.1 31.7 31.8 -2.1
P99.5-99.9 35.8 36.1 32.6 32.6 -3.2
P99.9-99.99 36.6 37.4 32.5 32.9 -3.7
P99.99-100 37.2 37.0 32.8 31.8 -5.5
Top 20% 32.1 31.7 29.5 28.9 -3.2
Top 10% 33.3 33.1 30.6 30.1 -3.2
Top 5% 34.2 34.0 31.4 30.9 -3.2
Top 1% 35.9 36.2 32.5 32.3 -3.5
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.1 -0.2
P40-60 12.4 12.5 12.4 12.4 -0.0
P60-80 20.5 21.0 20.4 20.9 0.3
P80-90 15.8 16.5 15.8 16.4 0.6
P90-95 10.9 11.2 10.9 11.2 0.4
P95-99 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 0.0
P99-99.5 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.4 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 5.6 5.1 5.7 5.2 -0.3
P99.9-99.99 4.5 3.8 4.6 3.9 -0.5
P99.99-100 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.8 -0.0
Top 20% 57.4 56.9 57.7 57.2 -0.2
Top 10% 41.5 40.5 41.8 40.8 -0.7
Top 5% 30.7 29.3 30.9 29.6 -1.1
Top 1% 16.5 15.1 16.8 15.4 -1.1
Data Year Decomposition I Decomposition II
Adjusted to PE OE PE OE
Policy Year
(3)-(1) (4)-(3) (4)-(2) (2)-(1)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -1.8 -6.4 -2.1 -6.1
P40-60 -2.3 -1.8 -2.6 -1.6
P60-80 -2.0 -0.7 -2.1 -0.6
P80-90 -2.3 -0.6 -2.4 -0.5
P90-95 -2.4 -0.5 -2.6 -0.3
P95-99 -2.2 -0.5 -2.3 -0.4
P99-99.5 -2.2 0.1 -2.4 0.3
P99.5-99.9 -3.2 -0.0 -3.5 0.3
P99.9-99.99 -4.0 0.3 -4.6 0.9
P99.99-100 -4.4 -1.0 -5.2 -0.3
Top 20% -2.5 -0.6 -2.8 -0.4
Top 10% -2.7 -0.5 -3.0 -0.2
Top 5% -2.8 -0.4 -3.1 -0.1
Top 1% -3.4 -0.2 -3.8 0.3
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
P40-60 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0
P60-80 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.5
P80-90 -0.0 0.6 -0.1 0.6
P90-95 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 -0.0 -0.0 0.0
P99-99.5 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 0.1 -0.4 0.1 -0.4
P99.9-99.99 0.1 -0.6 0.1 -0.7
P99.99-100 0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.2
Top 20% 0.3 -0.4 0.3 -0.4
Top 10% 0.3 -1.0 0.3 -1.1
Top 5% 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4
Top 1% 0.3 -1.4 0.3 -1.4
Data Year Shapley-December
Adjusted to PE OE
Policy Year Mean Mean
(4)-(2) (2)-(1)
(3)-(I) (4)-(3)
Average Tax Rates
P20-40 -2.0 -6.2
P40-60 -2.5 -1.7
P60-80 -2.1 -0.7
P80-90 -2.3 -0.5
P90-95 -2.5 -0.4
P95-99 -2.3 -0.4
P99-99.5 -2.3 0.2
P99.5-99.9 -3.4 0.2
P99.9-99.99 -4.3 0.6
P99.99-100 -4.8 -0.7
Top 20% -2.7 -0.5
Top 10% -2.8 -0.4
Top 5% -2.9 -0.3
Top 1% -3.6 0.1
Posttax Income Shares
P20-40 -0.1 -0.1
P40-60 -0.1 0.0
P60-80 -0.1 0.5
P80-90 -0.0 0.6
P90-95 0.0 0.3
P95-99 0.0 0.0
P99-99.5 0.0 -0.2
P99.5-99.9 0.1 -0.4
P99.9-99.99 0.1 -0.6
P99.99-100 0.1 -0.1
Top 20% 0.3 -0.4
Top 10% 0.3 -1.0
Top 5% 0.3 -1.4
Top 1% 0.3 -1.4
Notes--. Average tax rates include federal and state level
income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the level of
price inflation. PE, policy effect; OE, other effect.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax return
data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.
TABLE 5
Relative Importance of Policy Effect
ETI = 0 ETI = 1 ETI = 0 ETI = 1
Average Tax Rates Income Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P20-40 50.8 41.9 21.4 32.2
P40-60 77.9 62.5 17.4 29.4
P60-80 87.0 78.2 15.8 26.1
P80-90 96.2 87.6 12.4 20.9
P90-95 98.3 83.6 20.4 33.5
P95-99 99.0 85.1 29.3 40.5
P99-99.5 80.4 71.6 11.9 18.1
P99.5-99.9 73.4 64.5 13.9 23.1
P99.9-99.99 75.5 68.2 12.1 21.6
P99.99-100 69.3 57.3 10.9 20.8
Top 20% 94.6 87.9 19.2 28.3
Top 10% 92.1 85.8 15.9 26.0
Top 5% 89.0 83.0 14.2 24.8
Top 1% 77.5 69.4 12.5 22.4
Notes'. The mean of the absolute values of the policy effect
is expressed in % of the mean of the absolute values of the
total effect. Average tax rates (%) include federal and state
level income and payroll taxes. Uprating according to the
level of price inflation. Ranking based on pretax income excl.
capital gains. ETI, elasticity of taxable income.
Sources: Own calculations based on SOI IRS income tax
return data and NBER TAXSIM calculator.