Allocating infection: the political economy of the swine flu (H1N1) vaccine.
Ryan, Matt E.
I. INTRODUCTION
Public choice theory provides a fertile ground to analyze
government activity. Traditional economic theory modeled public
officials as pure optimizers of public welfare, even at the expense of
their private well-being. By allowing actors in the public sector the
opportunity to respond to incentives, public choice theory allows
behavior that was once difficult to describe in the context of
traditional economic models to become logical and rational. If public
choice theory is correct, one would expect to see government officials
acting in a manner such that individual self-interest could displace the
"public good." The distribution of the H1N1, or swine flu,
vaccine provides exactly such a forum for testing.
II. BACKGROUND: CONGRESSIONAL DOMINANCE AND THE H1N1 VIRUS
Previous research has focused on the ability of Congress to impose
its preferences upon bureaus--a scenario known as congressional
dominance. Weingast and Moran (1983) provide the theoretical framework
by which a "congressional incentive system" emerges:
First, in the budgetary process each agency competes with a host of
others for budgetary favors. Congressmen pursuing their own electoral
goals favor those agencies that provide the best clientele service ...
Second, oversight plays an important role in sanctioning errant
agencies. This includes new legislation, specific prohibitions on
activities, and other means that serve to embarrass agency heads, hurt
future career opportunities, and foil pet projects. Finally, and perhaps
the most effective means of influence, Congress controls who gets
appointed and reappointed. (Weingast and Moran 1983)
The result is a political structure whereby Congress wields
substantial influence over the behavior of bureaus not only through
direct means (i.e., legislation, appointments), but also by creating the
incentive for bureaus to serve the Congress--and more specifically, the
appropriate oversight committees pertaining to each individual bureau.
Congressional dominance outlines one scenario in which legislators
utilize their political advantage to secure personal benefits. In
addition to the "congressional incentive system," there exists
a geographic nature to both the bureaucratic allocation of federal funds
and political representation within Congress. The result of these
institutional structures is a bureaucracy seeking to appease the members
of its congressional oversight committee by providing a disproportionate
share of public benefits to its constituents.
Empirical evidence supporting the claims of congressional dominance
theories initially focused on the activities of the Federal Trade
Commission; in addition to the above study, see Calvert and Weingast
(1984), Faith, Leavens, and Tollison (1982), Katzmann (1984), and Moran
and Weingast (1982), among others. More recent research focuses on the
impact that Congress has on a wider range of bureaus. Young, Reksulak,
and Shughart (2001) show that IRS audit rates are lower in the
Congressional districts of members on key oversight committees of the
IRS. Garrett and Sobel (2003) note that Congressional oversight
committees play a large role in determining the fiscal nature of FEMA
disaster payments. Drury, Olson, and Belle (2005) show that the Office
of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance responds to the preferences of
Congress when allocating humanitarian aid. Garrett, Marsh, and Marshall
(2006) find a similar Congressional influence concerning agricultural
disaster relief.
Sitting on a Congressional committee has long been viewed as
advantageous to the constituents of committee members (see Arnold 1979;
Ferejohn 1974; Ritt 1976, among many others). However, identifying
causality can prove difficult (see, for example, Ray 1980; Rundquist and
Griffith 1976), as self-selection could lead members of Congress to be
placed on committees the services of which their constituencies are
particularly in need. For example, a representative from an area with a
heavy military presence could be placed on the appropriate committee for
military spending oversight. Such possibilities obfuscate any causal
effects that can be gleaned from a straightforward statistical analysis.
The political scenario surrounding the emergence of the H1N1 virus,
however, touches on a unique subset of congressional dynamics. Weingast
and Marshall (1988) note that the organizational structure of Congress
leads to legislators populating committees which deal with issues of
particular importance to the legislator's constituency. This facet
of congressional dominance implies a degree of foresight about upcoming
legislation or, in the absence of knowledge of the specifics of upcoming
legislation, a degree of foresight about the issues with which upcoming
legislation will deal. Due to the unanticipated spread of the H1N1 virus
beginning in the late spring of 2009 (see below), the distribution of
the Congressional members populating the oversight committees relevant
for allocating vaccines was unrelated to the need for vaccine, thus
getting around the key endogeneity problem in evaluating this theory. As
such, this analysis focuses on a unique instance of exogenous variation
by which to isolate the impact of self-interested politicians in the
legislative allocation process.
The allocation of the H1N1 vaccine fell under the guidance of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Political oversight of
the HHS as it pertained to the distribution of the swine flu vaccine in
the House of Representatives fell to the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and in the Senate fell to the Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions. Section II provides more specific information as to
the makeup of each committee.
In early 2009, the H1N1 virus began to spread throughout the United
States. By June, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) provided a
candidate vaccine and identified a manufacturer to produce the first
batches of the swine flu vaccine. On August 18, the Department of Health
and Human Services reported that 45 million doses of vaccine would be
available by October 15, with an additional 20 million doses weekly
throughout the rest of the year, totaling 195 million doses. On October
14, approximately 5.5 million doses had been distributed to the 50
states and the District of Columbia, and the total amount of vaccine
distributed by the end of December was nearly 100 million doses,
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The empirical framework analyzes the total doses shipped per state
as opposed to total doses per state as a percentage of population. While
population is ultimately a factor in the number of units distributed to
a state and is thus controlled for in all of the regression analyses
members of Congress from all states are competing over the same fixed
pool of resources, namely the available weekly units of H1N1 vaccine. To
say that an additional 10,000 units for Alaska should be weighted much
more heavily (as a result of calculating units as a percentage of state
population) than an additional 10,000 units for California makes sense
when viewing the vaccine's ultimate medical impact upon the
population of the two states, but does not make economic sense when
analyzing the competition to secure these fixed-amount units in the
first place. (1)
The analysis utilizes ordinary least squares with robust standard
errors to investigate two separate questions. First, did the nature of
the allocation of H1N1 vaccine doses change over the first 9 weeks of
the program? More specifically, have political influences had a constant
or changing impact over time? Second, can the initial allocations be
characterized by the directives of the CDC, as production shortcomings
generated a situation of distinct dose shortage?
A. Evolution of Vaccine Allocation
To investigate the evolution of the distribution of the swine flu
vaccine, nine separate regression models are calculated using the
following equation:
(1) Total [Doses.sub.i] = [alpha] + [phi][Y.sub.i] +
[gamma][Z.sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.i].
The dependent variable is the total number of swine flu vaccine
doses shipped to state i. To analyze the impact of different factors
over the course of the first 9 weeks of vaccine allocation, the analysis
is performed weekly on aggregate totals for the first 9 weeks of the
vaccine distribution. The analysis allows a full picture to emerge
Concerning the role of different independent factors in determining the
ultimate allocation of vaccines throughout the 9-week distribution
process. Y is the matrix of political variables, and [phi] is the vector
of coefficients estimated for Y. The political variables are the number
of members from each committee and each political party from state i.
This classification yields four separate variables. Z is the matrix of
nonpolitical control variables, and y is the vector of coefficients
estimated for Z. For this portion of the analysis, these variables
include the population of the state i, the number of doctors and nurses
per capita, the percentage of the state i's population under the
age of 24, and the weekly mortality rate due to H1N1 infection in state
i. These control variables account for allocation recommendations made
by the CDC (see Section III), which dictate that vaccine units should be
directed toward higher-risk groups. In addition, the weekly mortality
rate from H1N1 infection attempts to capture the latent need for vaccine
at the state level--an ex post-type breakdown of where the H1N1 virus
actually had a large impact as compared to the ex ante-type breakdown of
which states had more high-risk individuals. The subsequent model, while
further investigating the first week's allocation of swine flu
vaccine doses, also provides a robustness check on incorporating
different variables to capture the CDC's suggestions. Robust
standard errors are utilized in the model.
B. Initial Allocation Period
Owing to significant public interest in receiving the swine flu
vaccine as soon as possible, the high levels of anticipation for the
distribution of the first units, and the production shortage that
limited supply of vaccine doses, the initial allocation of swine flu
vaccine deserves separate analysis. The regression model is similar to
Equation (1). The dependent variable is the total number of doses
shipped to state i by October 14, which covers the first week of swine
flu vaccine distribution. The political variables (see Section III)
remain the same. To explore more fully the recommendations of the CDC as
to who should receive vaccine doses first, the following additional
variables are considered. To capture the "first responders"
effect, the number of doctors per capita is incorporated as well as the
number of nurses per capita, in addition to analyzing the number of
nurses and doctors per capita, as is used above. Furthermore, to capture
the possibility of first responders beyond nurses and doctors, the
number of hospital beds per capita is analyzed as well. A range of age
cohort figures are also used. In addition to considering the percentage
of the population under the age of 24, the analysis also includes the
percentage of the population under the age of 5, from age 5 to age 13,
and from age 14 to age 17, as well as the 2009 birth rate. To
additionally control for the latent "need" of swine flu
vaccine in state i beyond the weekly mortality rate, a set of dummy
variables is created to capture different state-reported levels of
influenza propagation, as discussed in Section HI, covering the time
period of October 1 to October 10, the most pertinent period to the
allocation decisions made by October 14. States fall into one of three
mutually exclusive categories: widespread influenza activity, regional
influenza activity, and local influenza activity.
IV. DATA
A. H1N1 Vaccine Doses Shipped
The dependent variable in this analysis is the total number of H1N1
vaccine doses shipped to each state and the District of Columbia by the
appropriate weekly date during the final quarter of 2009, Initially, the
CDC reported the total number of doses shipped on a weekly basis.
Subsequently, the CDC reported not only doses shipped, but also doses
allocated and ordered, as well as reporting the figures on a bi- or
tri-weekly schedule. (2) To maintain consistency in the data, only doses
shipped are utilized on a weekly basis. The first set of weekly data on
state shipments measures doses shipped during the week ending on October
14, and the last set of weekly data measures shipments during the week
ending on December 9. Summary statistics for vaccine doses, along with
all other variables, can be found in Table 2,
B. Congressional Oversight Committees
To isolate evidence of congressional dominance in the distribution
of the H1N1 vaccine, committee membership information is included in the
statistical analysis. Oversight of the distribution of the swine flu
vaccine fell to two committees, one within each chamber of Congress.
Both committees verified their role. In the House of Representatives,
the Committee on Energy and Commerce provided Congressional oversight of
the Department of Health and Human Services as it pertains to the
distribution of the swine flu vaccine. The committee has 57 members from
31 states, 35 of which are Democrats and 22 are Republicans. In the
Senate, the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions has
oversight responsibility for the Department of Health and Human Services
as it pertains to the distribution of swine flu vaccine doses.
Twenty-three members from 22 states hold positions on the committee, 12
of which are Democrats, 10 are Republicans, and 1 is Independent.
For a discussion of the importance of committee membership in
shaping bureaucratic behavior, see Section II.
C. H1N1 Target Groups
The CDC advises the following concerning prioritization of the
swine flu vaccine doses:
CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
(ACIP) recommends that certain groups of the
population receive the 2009 H1N1 flu vaccine first.
These target groups include pregnant women, people
who live with or care for infants younger than
6 months of age, healthcare and emergency medical
services personnel with direct patient contact, infants
6 months through young adults 24 years of age (especially
children younger than 5 years of age), and
adults 25 through 64 years of age who are at high
risk for 2009 H I N1 complications because of chronic
health disorders or compromised immune systems:
Concerning the above directive, the following variables are used to
capture high-risk groups--those who arguably have the highest
"need" for vaccination. The Census Bureau provides population
projections by state and by age group, based on the 2000 Census, for
2005. The age groups incorporated into this study are under 5 years, 5
years to 13 years, 14 years to 17 years, 18 years to 24 years, and over
65 years, The figures utilized in this analysis are percentage of state
population that falls within the particular age group. These variables
directly capture the CDC's suggestion that more vaccine should be
directed toward younger individuals. In addition, states with higher
percentages of young children are likely to have more pregnant women. As
another measure of controlling for factors related to infants, birth
rates by state are included for 2009.3 This measure captures well the
incidence of children below the age of 1, as well as proxies for the
incidence of individuals in contact with children below the age of 1.
The author knows of no adequate process by which to specifically control
for adults 25 to 64 years of age who are at high risk for H1N1
complications, and thereby assumes that these individuals are
proportional to the population of the state and, as a percentage of
their state's populations, are evenly distributed across states.
Including overall state population not only controls for the clear
relationship between larger states receiving more vaccine doses, but
also captures this final risk group as well.
To control for the number of first responders within a state, data
on nurses and doctors per 1,000 residents are included. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics provides information on the number of registered nurses
by state, and the American Medical Association provides information on
the total number of doctors by state. (4) In addition, to capture a
state that may perform more medical services utilizing health personnel
who are not identified as doctors or nurses, the number of hospital beds
per 1,000 residents is included.
D. H1N1-Prone Areas
Holding all else constant, one could argue that more vaccine doses
can be expected to be sent to areas most heavily hit by swine flu. For
example, a state with no reported cases of swine flu may receive less
doses, ceteris paribus, than a state where the flu is rapidly spreading
or expected to spread. To control for this latent "need" of
vaccine doses, the CDC reports influenza activity by category across
states on a weekly basis. (5) The categories of influenza activity are
widespread, regional, local, and sporadic.
There are several shortcomings of using this classification system.
First, the categories are broad measures of flu propagation--both the
traditional and H1N1 influenza virus. Further, the CDC reports that
inclusion in one category or another "does not measure the severity
of influenza activity." Instead, the categories simply measure the
geographic spread of both seasonal flu and H1N1. Second, it is difficult
to provide a theoretical foundation for how exactly to incorporate this
information into the analysis. For example, would states repeatedly
classified as having widespread influenza receive more vaccine doses
than states newly classified? Would states geographically near other
states that have widespread influenza activity receive more vaccine
doses? Despite the flaws inherent in utilizing the data, one of the two
empirical models includes these classifications as an attempt to control
for the "need" of vaccine.
Another possibility that could capture the "need" for
vaccine is the number of doses ordered by each state. Despite the
considerable amount of resources devoted to the H1N1 vaccination effort,
accurately assessing the need for vaccine within each state remained a
difficult, if not impossible, task at the federal level. Indeed, the
information needed to make an accurate, objective decision concerning
each state's "need" simply did not exist. As a result,
states may have been in a better position to determine their status with
regards to the H1N1 virus and, as a result, the number of doses ordered
may better reflect each state's need. (6) Unfortunately, the CDC
only provides information on the number of doses ordered for the final 3
weeks of the analysis. Furthermore, utilizing even this modicum of
information is statistically untenable due to the fact that the orders
were largely filled during the last 3 weeks of distribution--the
correlation between doses ordered and doses shipped is nearly linear (r
= 0.9981) and the mean fulfillment rate over these 3 weeks is over 95%.
Though also imperfect, the best-available measure to control for
the "need" for vaccine is deaths due to the H1N1 virus. While
particular circumstances may cause a deviation between those areas that
are most risky and the ultimate mortality rate--and, in fact, the
correlation between the above, mentioned risk factors and the weekly
death rates is not strong--the weekly death rate does capture which
states ultimately have been hit hardest by the H1N1 virus. As the H1N1
virus spread through interaction with infected individuals, it is
natural to conclude that those states with higher death rates are
subject to more instances of H1N1 infection and, as such, require more
doses of vaccine. Weekly death figures were obtained by state, and then
transformed into a weekly H1N1 mortality rate (per million state
residents).
Yet another possibility for identifying a H1Nl-prone area--and
hence the latent need for vaccine--is a state's proximity to
Mexico. During the initial emergence of the H1N1 virus, Mexico was
thought particularly worthy of attention in order to help mitigate the
spread of the virus.7 As a communicable disease, the belief that Mexico
presented a discernible threat to the United States in terms of H1N1
transmission implies that states with a closer proximity to Mexico would
therefore have a greater need for vaccine units. To control for this
aspect of the H1N1 virus, a variable is included in a range of
specifications that captures whether a state shares a border with
Mexico.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
There are a number of intriguing results in categorizing the
determinants of swine flu vaccine allocation. The discussion is split
into two broad areas: (1)political factors, which consider the evidence
of congressional dominance and its implications, and (2) risk factors,
which consider the range of H1N1 target groups and H1Nl-prone areas.
A. Political Factors
First, different political factors play differing roles in
determining which states receive more or less vaccine. The clearest
influence is the role of Democratic committee members from the House of
Representatives. Table 1 a shows how the allocation process evolved over
the first 9 weeks of the distribution program. In the first 3 weeks,
states with Democratic committee members on the Committee on Energy and
Commerce received, in total, significantly more swine flu vaccine than
states without committee representation. For every Democratic committee
member, the home state had received roughly 60,000 additional doses of
swine flu vaccine after the first week and after the second week, and
nearly 100,000 more doses after the third week. (8) As the average state
received approximately 109,000 units of vaccine during the first week,
and approximately 310,000 by the end of the third week, these political
effects are considerable. Table lb provides a robustness check by
analyzing the distribution of vaccine using only political measures; the
results confirm the main specification.
Should vaccine doses be allocated according to where they would
have the highest medical impact, congressional factors should play no
role in determining distribution patterns. However, any deviation from
the null hypothesis of no statistical impact suggests congressional
dominance. The particular nature of this influence is both specific in
nature to political party and chamber within the U.S. Congress. Given
the political advantage held by the Democratic party during the
distribution of the H1N1 vaccine, both at the federal level as a whole
and within the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, it is natural to
witness the majority party utilizing its position to secure additional
doses of vaccine. That the House committee appears dominant in this
analysis contributes to the line of research showing the relative
dominance of House committees relative to Senate committees (see, for
example, Shepsle 1978).
Besides, the existence of congressional dominance does not
necessitate political influence on all margins by all players; indeed,
of the four possible Representative/Senator, Democrat/ Republican
combinations tested in this analysis, only one of them carries
statistical significance in any of the range of specifications. Given
the complexity of the collective decision-making processes of the U.S.
Congress, a blanket rule of all members on all committees generating
personal benefits with every decision is extremely unlikely to ever be
witnessed. This reality, however, does not mean that congressional
dominance does not exist. Congress is a dynamic body where
committee-based influence along party lines could oscillate among dozens
(if not hundreds) of issues and across chambers. Nevertheless, this
analysis tested for congressional dominance exhibited only in the
distribution of the H1N1 vaccine and found that Democratic committee
members in the House of Representatives benefitted from their position.
Further, this study is not a proclamation of the existence of
congressional dominance only in the distribution of the H1N1 vaccine;
similar analyses of other legislative action could yield Republican
and/or Senatorial influence as well. These hypothetical results, too,
would not invalidate the theory of congressional dominance but rather
provide insight into its particular nature as it pertained to the
specific issues and legislation at hand.
Further, the role of constituency size is worth discussing as well.
Members of the U.S. Senate serve entire states while most members of the
U.S. House of Representatives serve smaller constituencies at the
sub-state level. As units of H1NI vaccine were allocated at the state
level, the interests of Representatives' constituents, at face
value, may not be well aligned with the distribution abilities of the
CDC--in the least, not as well aligned as those interests of Senators.
Representative interests, however, are still aligned with securing more
vaccine units. Should Representatives look to serve their constituents,
securing units of vaccine for their respective states is a necessary
condition for doing so (along with, perhaps, other within-state
political activities). But because state allocation is not itself a
sufficient condition for Representatives--as it is for Senators--does
not mean that Representatives are indifferent toward the process.
After the third week, state-level allocative preference due to
congressional dominance dissipates. There are two important aspects of
this finding. First, this result provides evidence on the
substitutability between directing vaccine doses in a manner that
maximizes public well-being and directing vaccine doses in a manner that
secures a legislator private benefits from favoring their constituency.
Should an allocative advantage persist in a well-represented state over
many weeks, committee members may face the increasing possibility of
public contempt and accusations of political manipulation. While
politicians are generally popular within their constituencies for
favorable treatment, it is conceivable to imagine an indirect effect of
being labeled a political insider who uses his advantage at the expense
of others. (9) The overall political effect of receiving more federal
spending at the expense of others is, admittedly, very likely to be
positive; however, with the larger issue of public health at stake, the
overall effect may be difficult for the legislators to anticipate, and
could well be negative. In the strictest sense of equilibrium,
politicians engage in legislation that provides personal benefits until
the marginal cost of action equals the marginal benefit. To this end,
Democratic committee members may have performed a delicate balancing
act--and quite well.
One alternative possibility that could provide similar results is
that committee members come from states that are deemed to be in the
greatest need of vaccine. As such, there would be a high correlation
between the assorted risk factors presented in this analysis and
committee membership. Table A3 provides pairwise correlations between
committee membership and the risk factors. Only one of the four
political groups--Republican Senate committee members--shows any
semblance of correlation with risk factors. This result would imply that
any additional allocation directed toward states represented by
Republican Senate committee members could be misconstrued as political.
However, the results do not dictate that Republican Senate committee
members gained a political advantage. Democratic house members are shown
to have the strongest political impact and, per the pairwise
correlations, this result is not a function of their being from
particularly high-risk areas.
Moreover, a variable to capture a state bordering Mexico was
included in some of the specifications as well (specifically, Tables la,
1c, and 3). It conceivably could be the case that the political
variables are capturing the circumstance that committee members happened
to be representing areas of naturally high risk--i.e., bordering Mexico.
Two important results come from this variable. First, while all
estimates for this variable are positive, only two specifications
exhibit any degree of statistical significance--and both are at the
marginal level of 10%. Thus, while Mexico was thought to be a threat for
the transmission of the H1N1 virus, there is little solid evidence to
show that states which bordered Mexico received more units of vaccine
because of their geographic proximity. Second, the political variables
remain unchanged with the inclusion of the Mexico variable. As such,
there is no reason to believe that there is any interplay between the
observed political influence presented in this analysis and the latent
"need" or riskiness of a particular state.
Second, the periods of political influence over the allocation of
the swine flu vaccine coincide with the scarcity of vaccine doses.
Figure 1 shows the weekly increase in the total number of vaccine doses
shipped. Relatively large increases in the availability of swine flu
vaccine did not occur until Week 4--the precise time when committee
membership ceased being a significant determinant of which states
received more doses of H1N1 vaccine. The timing of these two factors
suggests an inverse relationship between the marginal benefit of
political influence over the vaccine distribution process and the
availability of units of vaccine. Given the substitutability between
public well-being and private benefits, the consequences of consistently
resorting to the political process in vaccine allocation, and the timing
of the relative scarcity of units of H1N1 vaccine, political factors
played a large role only through the first 3 weeks of the swine flu
vaccine distribution process. (10) Indeed, when vaccine allocations
across all weeks are pooled into one specification (Table 3), the effect
of political influence only under marked scarcity goes away. Politics
mattered most when vaccine was in shortest supply.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
B. Risk Factors
While committee members utilizing their political position to
secure more vaccine is evidence of a failure to pursue the "public
good,"
So, too, is failing to provide vaccine doses where they could have
the largest impact. As mentioned earlier, there are a number of factors
considered most important when deciding where to allocate units of
vaccine, per the directives of the CDC, none of which play a role in
describing allocation patterns.
The CDC recommended that pregnant women, all individuals under 24
years of age, and especially children younger than 5 years of age
receive vaccine doses first. Table 4 shows the breakdown of age groups
in determining preferential treatment in swine flu vaccine allocation.
States with higher percentages of children aged 5 years or younger
received no additional vaccine; in fact, the estimate, while
statistically insignificant, is negative, implying that states with
higher concentrations of children received less vaccine. The same can be
said for the age groups 5 years to 13 years, as well as 14 years to 17
years and the birth rate. States with higher percentages of individuals
aged 18 years to 24 years received an amount of vaccine significantly
less than those states with lower percentages of this age group, though
that result is only significant to the 10% level. When looking at the
combination of all age groups less than 24 years, there is weak evidence
to say that it was those states that had a smaller share of individuals
in at-risk age groups that received more vaccine. In any case, no
evidence exists that doses of swine flu vaccine were directed toward
areas with higher shares of at-risk age groups. (11) On the basis of the
advice and directives of the CDC, these results indicate that the
political allocation was not consistent with the "public
good."
A note of clarification is in order. The vast majority of
specifications show that the degree of at-risk individuals within a
state played no role in determining the pattern; however, during the
first week of vaccine distribution, there appears to be evidence that
states with a larger share of at-risk individuals received fewer units
of vaccine. There are two important aspects to consider. First, that
states with higher levels of at-risk individuals received fewer units of
vaccine does not necessarily mean that any particular at-risk individual
within any given state did not receive a unit of vaccine. States
ultimately determined exactly how they distributed their allocated
vaccine doses; nonetheless, the directive of the CDC implies that states
with higher shares of at-risk individuals should receive more vaccine.
They did not. Again, the vast majority of specifications dictate no
statistical difference from zero when considering a state's at-risk
population. Second, that states with higher levels of at-risk
individuals received less vaccine during the initial first week
distribution does not reveal a misguided desire by the CDC to deprive
at-risk individuals access to units of vaccine. Instead, it sheds light
upon the nature of competing interests. Given an abundance of vaccine
units, all interested parties could be satisfied, be it at-risk groups,
politically favored constituents, or any other group; nonetheless,
scarcity of vaccine units was an issue for committee members to deal
with, especially early in the allocation process. That politically
connected states received more vaccine units than at-risk states sheds
light on the relative importance of the two interests--clearly, politics
won out over a sense of "need."
In addition to targeting at-risk age groups, the CDC advises
directing more vaccine toward at-risk occupations. First responders and
healthcare industry workers with direct patient contact are the main
focus. Table 5 provides an analysis of assorted measures of first
responders by state. Similar to the findings with regard to at-risk age
groups, there is no evidence to show that states with higher
concentrations of first responders receive higher levels of vaccine.
States with more nurses per capita and more medical doctors per capita
receive fewer vaccine doses, though the results are statistically
insignificant. Further, there is weak evidence to say that states with
more medical activity--proxied by hospital beds per capita--receive less
swine flu vaccine as well. Again, if directing vaccine toward larger
concentrations of high-risk groups is done in pursuit of the
"'public good," there is no evidence that such an action
took place.
Moreover, despite difficulties in capturing the "need" of
vaccine due to the spread of swine flu, there is no evidence that the
degree of influenza propagation played a role in the initial Week 1
allocation of swine flu vaccine. States deemed to have higher levels of
influenza activity did not receive additional units of H1NI vaccine.
Furthermore, the mortality rate due to H1N1 infection also did not play
any statistically significant role in determining the allocation of
additional vaccine doses in any of the specifications. (The mortality
rate is negative and significant at the 5% level in the final pooled
specification; see Table 3, regression 4.) Insofar that providing a
higher degree of protection from the H1N1 virus involves directing
additional doses of vaccine toward areas with higher levels of influenza
propagation, allocation patterns did not pursue the "public
good."
Finally, proximity to Mexico, despite its role as a perceived
threat to the health of American citizens, also played no role in the
distribution pattern of H1N1 vaccine units. The variable exhibits
significance only in the final pooled specification of Table 3 and in
Week 2 of Table 1 a, and even then only at the 10% level. (12) Insofar
that Mexico threatened the United States through the transmission of the
H1N1 virus, vaccine units were not allocated accordingly.
VI. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented here outlines the nature of the allocation
process of the H1N1, or swine flu, vaccine. By highlighting the role of
Congressional dominance in bureaucratic activity, the models isolate the
particular impact of politically relevant committee members.
Vaccine allocation failed to address the "public good" on
two primary margins. First, Democratic representatives generated an over
60,000-dose increase of swine flu vaccine per committee member during
the initial distribution period; this advantage grew to nearly 100,000
doses by the third week. In a world of political actors concerned only
with public welfare at large, this result should not occur. Second, the
states with larger shares of at-risk groups, such as all age cohorts
below 24 years and first responders, did not receive more units of
vaccine, and if anything actually received less. Distribution aimed at
maximizing the "public good" would consider these factors when
determining which areas get more doses. In addition, despite imperfect
measures, the initial "need" for swine flu vaccine appeared
not to play a role as well.
This analysis sheds light on the role of incentives within the
political system. The current structure of the federal government places
political actors with state and local level interests in a position in
which they are to pursue welfare at the national level. Insofar that
federal legislators continue to hold positions tasked with confronting
issues at the national level while being subject to the preferences of
lower-than-national constituencies, political distortions like those
witnessed in the distribution of the H1N1 vaccine are likely to persist.
ABBREVIATIONS
CDC: Centers for Disease Control
HHS: Health and Human Services
doi: 10.1111/ecin.12023
Online Early publication June 7, 2013
APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Evolution of Swine Flu Vaccine Allocation
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped per
1000 residents
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5
House committee
members
Democrat 0.79 0.01 0.28 -1.07 1.29
(0.50) (0.46) (0.61) (0.69) (1.19)
Republican -3.29 ** 0.51 -0.57 1.03 -1.71
(1.42) (1.50) (2.26) (3.04) (4.11)
Senate committee
members
Democrat -1.52 1.86 0.79 -1.38 2.19
(2.43) (2.69) (3.70) (5.15) (6.85)
Republican 6.01 ** 3.14 -0.63 -5.21 3.07
(2.25) (1.93) (4.06) (5.58) (5.61)
N 51 51 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.20 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped per
1000 residents
Week 6 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9
House committee
members
Democrat -1.74 0.16 -1.30 1.22
(1.28) (1.68) (2.17) (2.70)
Republican 2.40 -0.75 3.68 1.26
(4.09) (0.56) (6.22) (6.91)
Senate committee
members
Democrat 2.27 5.98 13.91 3.57
(6.71) (9.19) (9.63) (10.30)
Republican -0.27 3.70 10.97 12.58 **
(4.92) (7.11) (6.74) (7.13)
N 51 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.03
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level;
* significant at 10% level (estimations weighted by population).
TABLE A2
Evolution of Swine Flu Vaccine Allocation
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
House committee members
Democrat 26475.0 * 35528.4 * 70760.5 ***
(15286.1) (18907.3) (20765.9)
Republican 110.8 49082.2 53478.8
(15411.79) (29564.1) (37819.9)
Chair, House 329033.0 *** 223992.7 292772.0
committee (74144.7) (150399.8) (193784.4)
Senate committee members
Democrat 2730.6 14929.1 8796.1
(14252.4) (17138.2) (23738.4)
Republican (16546.3) -891.0 -22964.3
(10998.1) (17229.8)
Chair, Senate -30205.0 ** -4054.2 -59237.2 ***
Committee (14394.4) (17031.4) (17331.4)
Population 8.71 *** 21.75 *** 33.02 ***
(thousands) (2.67) (5.44) (6.90)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.87 0.96 0.96
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
House committee members
Democrat 42570.1 43491.4 17634.1
(29179.2) (41829.8) (38777.9)
Republican 63743.7 55041.8 107285.2
(68263.5) (86337.6) (89592.2)
Chair, House 173800.8 735030.5 428324.2
committee (346251.2) (447173.3) (456655.5)
Senate committee members
Democrat -4966.7 30853.6 27135.9
(36920.4) (49095.2) (50506.4)
Republican -44017.3 -10952.4 -31947.8
(27702.4) (28679.4) (27527.2)
Chair, Senate -20630.8 -75510.1 21359.1
Committee (33036.4) (48806.8) (46568.3)
Population 65.76 *** 89.46 *** 116.11 ***
(thousands) (13.07) (17.22) (17.22)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.96 0.97 0.98
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 7 Week 8 Week 9
House committee members
Democrat 74659.8 29577.5 6830.7
(46875.8) (61447.5) (60404.0)
Republican 117551.6 179898.4 158110.1
(113290.9) (137212.3) (143232.9)
Chair, House 889209.8 927572.1 1025735.1
committee (583318.7) (708957.7) (736750.1)
Senate committee members
Democrat 60460.1 115263.8 59492.4
(66620.7) (79292.2) (78547.2)
Republican -25015.1 1120.6 1120.4
(38194.8) (44810.1) (45633.7)
Chair, Senate -91732.2 -37767.3 15686.1
Committee (61604.5) (74108.5) (69437.5)
Population 125.60 *** 154.48 *** 195.36 ***
(thousands) (21.35) (26.88) (26.79)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.98 0.97 0.98
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10% level.
TABLE A3
Pairwise Correlations Between Political and Risk Factors
House Committee Members
Democrat Republican
Birth rate -0.0096 0.0987
(.9465) (.4906)
Percentage of population 0.1378 0.2518 *
under 5 years of age (.3351) (.0747)
Percentage of population 0.2035 0.1994
from 5 to 13 years of age (.1521) (.1606)
Percentage of population 0.1565 0.0335
from 14 to 17 years of age (.2728) (.8157)
Percentage of population 0.0196 0.0009
from 18 to 24 years of age (.8916) (.9949)
Percentage of population 0.1552 0.1680
under 24 years of age (.2768) (.2387)
Percentage of population -0.1851 -0.0969
over 65 years of age (.1936) (.4987)
Nurses per capita -0.2037 -0.2031
(.1517) (.1529)
Doctors per capita 0.0750 -0.1540
(.6009) (.2807)
Nurses and Doctors per -0.1114 -0.2025
capita (.4365) (.1541)
Hospital beds per capita -0.2871 ** -0.0927
(.0410) (.5175)
H1N1 mortality rate
Week 1 -0.0003 0.2168
(.9983) (.1264)
Week 2 -0.0248 0.0167
(.8627) (.9074)
Week 3 -0.2358 * -0.0178
(.0958) (.9011)
Week 4 -0.2179 -0.1317
(.1245) (.3570)
Week 5 -0.1628 -0.0802
(.2536) (.5756)
Week 6 -0.1156 -0.0516
(.4192) (.7194)
Week 7 -0.1922 -0.1835
(.1767) (.1973)
Week 8 -0.0957 -0.1135
(.5039) (.4278)
Week 9 -0.1453 -0.0975
(.3088) (.4963)
Senate Committee Members
Democrat Republican
Birth rate -0.2169 0.3151 **
(.1263) (.0243)
Percentage of population -0.1789 0.3321 **
under 5 years of age (.2090) (.0173)
Percentage of population -0.0515 0.2982 **
from 5 to 13 years of age (.7194) (.0336)
Percentage of population -0.0381 0.2930 **
from 14 to 17 years of age (.7909) (.0369)
Percentage of population -0.0778 0.2893 **
from 18 to 24 years of age (.5875) (.0395)
Percentage of population -0.1101 0.3624 ***
under 24 years of age (.4419) (.0090)
Percentage of population 0.0410 -0.3619 ***
over 65 years of age (.7752) (.0091)
Nurses per capita 0.0814 -0.2504 *
(.5700) (.0764)
Doctors per capita 0.1522 -0.2535 *
(.2862) (.0727)
Nurses and Doctors per 0.1174 -0.2752 *
capita (.4120) (.0507)
Hospital beds per capita -0.2908 ** -0.0901
(.0384) (.5294)
H1N1 mortality rate
Week 1 -0.2478 * 0.1880
(.0796) (.1865)
Week 2 0.0502 0.2749 *
(.7265) (.0509)
Week 3 0.0312 0.0489
(.8280) (.7334)
Week 4 -0.0194 0.1369
(.8924) (.3380)
Week 5 0.0911 0.1250
(.5248) (.3820)
Week 6 0.0835 0.1286
(.5601) (.3684)
Week 7 0.2571 * 0.1343
(.0685) (.3476)
Week 8 -0.1606 -0.1182
(.2602) (.4086)
Week 9 0.3211 ** 0.0166
(.0216) (.9080)
Notes: p values in parentheses.
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(1.) A per-capita analysis--most closely replicating Table 1b--is
included in the Appendix. As predicted, and due to the factors described
above, no consistent political impact can be drawn from such a model.
(2.) Information concerning the number of doses allocated and the
number of doses ordered are only available for the final three weeks of
the analysis, As such, they cannot be uniformly utilized in the
forthcoming empirical framework. For a discussion pertaining
specifically to the issues of incorporating the number of doses ordered
by state per week, see the subsection "H1Nl-prone areas"
below.
(3.) Monthly birth rates by state were not available from the CDC
at the time of composition. Utilizing monthly birth rates by state would
provide different results only under the assumption that monthly birth
rates exhibit significant variance from the annual rate, and in a manner
that would correlate with H1N1 vaccine distribution. While conceivable,
the author finds no reason to expect this scenario to be the case.
Further, those in a position to act upon such knowledge would require
such real-time, pointed information pertaining to live
births--information not available over 1 year after the fact.
(4.) The number of doctors by state is the total number of
nonfederal physicians, or physicians not employed by the federal
government. The number includes allopathic physicians (MDs) and
osteopathic physicians (DOs). Nonfederal physicians represent 98% of
total physicians.
(5.) The clearest measure of "need" would be to track the
cases of swine flu by state; however, the CDC ceased collecting said
data at the state level in July. 2009 as states stopped aggregating
information on swine flu cases.
(6.) This measure, too, is not perfect. States may receive
guidelines from the federal government concerning intervals within which
they may request vaccine doses, and thus the amount ordered is not a
pure figure derived solely by the state. Further, states may
artificially inflate orders so as to better their chances of receiving
more vaccine units.
(7.) Janet Napolitano, Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security during the spring of 2009, noted in a statement before Congress
on April 29, 2009 that both the Centers for Disease Control and the
State Department had advised against non-essential travel to Mexico.
Further, border patrol agents were provided with personal protection
equipment and anti-viral drugs as "viruses do not respect
borders."
(8.) Given the aggregated nature of the total figures, the
estimates for Democratic House committee members implies an advantage in
the initial allocation in Week 1, a slight disadvantage in the
allocation in Week 2 which does not erode the overall advantage after 2
weeks, and a distinct advantage in the third week which gives an even
larger overall advantage after 3 weeks.
(9.) In fact, Nebraska citizens in late 2009 responded negatively
to one of their own Congressmen, Senator Ben Nelson, legislating in a
manner that placed Nebraska at an advantage over other states concerning
Medicaid payments.
(10.) Interestingly, the only other statistically significant
finding in the evolution of the swine flu vaccine allocation
process--and a statistically marginal (90%) finding at that--was in Week
7, coinciding with the dip in Figure 1 at the same point, pointing again
to the importance of scarcity as a determinant of the existence of
political factors in vaccine allocation.
(11.) For robustness, Table 1c considers only the risk factors
identified in the main specification as a determinant in vaccine
allocation, and they carry no significance in these specifications.
(12.) An alternative form of the Mexico variable included not only
states with a direct border with Mexico, but states that bordered states
with a direct border with Mexico. The results of these specifications do
not differ from those presented herein.
MATT E. RYAN *
The author would like to thank Peter Leeson, David Skarbek, Russell
Sobel, two anonymous referees and the associate editor for comments, and
Lee Albert and Tracy Winters for data assistance, The usual disclaimer
applies. Ryan: Department of Economics, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh,
PA 15221. Phone (412) 396-2216, Fax (412) 396-4764, E-mail
ryanm5@duq.edu
TABLE 1
Evolution of Swine Flu Vaccine Allocation
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 1 Week 2 Week 3
(a)
House committee members
Democrat 63136.1 *** 62196.3 ** 99538.2 ***
(23083.0) (25883.8) (34011.4)
Republican -15336.5 36998.9 39234.1
(21444.9) (26826.4) (34963.5)
Senate committee members
Democrat -11682.5 6307.4 -8384.1
(16237.9) (13759.9) (21684.4)
Republican 32360.6 3064.8 -15827.8
(20391.3) (9446.9) (16759.6)
Percentage of population -6869.4 ** -1368.8 -3181.8
under 24 years of age (3369.2) (2108.8) (4027.9)
First responders -1907.3 -2192.1 -853.9
(2386.6) (2617.1) (3032.9)
Weekly HINT mortality rate 7494.2 -14993.5 -6520.5
(9191.0) (9513.6) (6818.5)
Borders Mexico 39702.6 83551.8 * 79537.3
(45121.7) (42393.6) (52724.6)
Population (thousands) 8.69 ** 20.17 *** 32.47 ***
(3.87) (6.63) (8.74)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.83 0.96 0.96
(b) Only political factors
House committee members
Democrat 54526.1 ** 55415.6 ** 94169.3 ***
(21495.2) (24167.2) (30285.1)
Republican -15814.6 38291.8 39208.5
(21697.3) (28486.2) (35575.6)
Senate committee members
Democrat -10978.1 6849.3 -5857.2
(14377.6) (12438.9) (19921.6)
Republican 25341.2 3963.7 -16038.0
(18212.5) (11373.0) (16873.7)
Population (thousands) 10.51 *** 22.86 *** 34.88 ***
(3.69) (5.80) (7.41)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.82 0.95 0.96
(c) Only risk factors
Percentage of population -1599.9 2925.7 2873.9
under 24 years of age (3287.3) (2388.7) (3696.3)
First responders -539.1 -1699.1 1763.2
(2560.0) (2078.5) (3243.0)
Weekly H 1 N 1 5768.9 -7945.4 -12071.9 *
mortality rate (8740.4) (11272.5) (7160.4)
Borders Mexico 16865.0 67311.0 59248.3
(62065.2) (50394.9) (67311.2)
Population (thousands) 16.19 *** 30.64 *** 47.97 ***
(3.20) (3.26) (4.65)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.76 0.94 0.94
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 4 Week 5 Week 6
(a)
House committee members
Democrat 62218.4 124937.1 65882.2
(50585.3) ('78092.1) (71249.2)
Republican 53102.2 21264.4 84995.8
(57556.2) (77028.5) (73869.3)
Senate committee members
Democrat -16981.4 -7893.0 8607.3
(27254.6) (39733.2) (37224.3)
Republican -36815.2 20590.8 -23790.0
(29083.8) (27422.3) (29987.3)
Percentage of population -2314.2 -12560.6 * -3027.2
under 24 years of age (5565.6) (7301.2) (7382.8)
First responders 1273.8 -1234.2 820.6
(5604.1) (6631.1) (6533.5)
Weekly HINT mortality rate -6056.6 -3590.4 -951.9
(5621.3) (9683.2) (6097.7)
Borders Mexico 106002.7 160234.1 142981.1
(95890.4) (146662.4) (136590.1)
Population (thousands) 63.97 *** 88.05 *** 114.18 ***
(14.32) (21.31) (19.59)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.96 0.96 0.98
(b) Only political factors
House committee members
Democrat 57163.1 105770.0 57058.2
(44052.4) (69152.9) (61993.5)
Republican 55317.2 19441.2 86741.5
(55710.2) (79922.5) (77001.0)
Senate committee members
Democrat -12562.6 -380.0 13894.3
(26177.5) (35337.1) (34925.6)
Republican -40062.1 5648.3 -22977.9
(25417.6) (27183.3) (23347.9)
Population (thousands) 66.75 *** 93.56 *** 117.99 ***
(11.81) (17.50) (16.31)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.96 0.96 0.98
(c) Only risk factors
Percentage of population 1079.2 -3479.9 1660.3
under 24 years of age (3387.8) (4132.0) (4561.9)
First responders 3336.1 2321.9 2706.3
(4986.6) (5698.8) (5359.6)
Weekly H 1 N 1 -9110.2 -2706.5 -3303.3
mortality rate (7482.8) (7605.0) (5102.7)
Borders Mexico 100018.3 125080.8 140079.9
(106235.9) (147954.5) (145857.6)
Population (thousands) 75.30 *** 106.00 *** 127.63 ***
(6.20) (9.56) (8.14)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.96 0.96 0.97
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
Week 7 Week 8 Week 9
(a)
House committee members
Democrat 169938.1 134114.9 177974.7
(98087.5) (114344.6) (128888.9)
Republican 70365.8 133087.1 79942.5
(96011.8) (115434.1) (131188.4)
Senate committee members
Democrat 27080.0 78042.0 -173.0
(59739.5) (62370.7) (76126.6)
Republican 7.0 23334.5 36972.3
(36910.9) (47275.3) (51058.8)
Percentage of population -8319.1 -15001.9 -1446.9
under 24 years of age (9813.6) (11373.2) (1288.3)
First responders -3413.9 -3712.4 -1957.8
(9257.0) (10300.0) (11200.0)
Weekly HINT mortality rate -16825.1 -23720.6 -19735.3
(17385.7) (19681.5) (48677.2)
Borders Mexico 229949.0 251302.1 405547.1
(187440.4) (224619.8) (276492.3)
Population (thousands) 122.85 *** 151.09 *** 190.74 ***
(27.24) (32.03) (34.90)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.97 0.97 0.98
(b) Only political factors
House committee members
Democrat 149983.6 * 110926.9 147197.2
(84512.9) (101667.5) (120696.5)
Republican 74482.2 135149.9 83226.8
(103495.3) (122047.7) (142248.9)
Senate committee members
Democrat 22645.9 80213.1 6647.4
(48504.3) (53513.5) (56856.0)
Republican -4928.2 21450.4 34399.9
(34472.0) (38288.3) (42178.8)
Population (thousands) 130.56 *** 159.21 *** 202.69
(21.96) (26.50) (29.65)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.97 0.97 0.97
(c) Only risk factors
Percentage of population 3389.2 -3758.2 133.1
under 24 years of age (3792.6) (5570.5) (5899.0)
First responders 3034.3 -134.5 2350.1
(7267.4) (7819.0) (8751.1)
Weekly H 1 N 1 -7806.8 -22497.8 -14523.1
mortality rate (14768.3) (18229.0) (30791.4)
Borders Mexico 187450.6 241255.2 361804.9
(192462.3) (291853.8) (275805.3)
Population (thousands) 150.14 *** 175.77 *** 218.82
(12.64) (14.16) (16.36)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.97 0.97 0.97
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significance at 10% level.
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Variable For the Following Variables,
N = 51
Mean SD Min Max
Population (in millions) 5.96 6.72 0.53 36.76
House committee members
Democrat 0.69 1.01 0 6
Republican 0.43 0.70 0 3
Senate committee members
Democrat 0.24 0.43 0 1
Republican 0.20 0.40 0 1
Percentage of population under 34.57% 2.30% 30.21% 44.31%
24 years of age
Percentage of population from 18 9.93% 0.73% 8.53% 12.40%
to 24 years of age
Percentage of population from 14 5.81% 0.33% 5.08% 7.08%
to 17 years of age
Percentage of population from 5 12.03% 0.91% 8.75% 15.21%
to 13 years of age
Percentage of population under 5 6.80% 0.77% 5.10% 9.61%
years of age
Percentage of population over 65 12.57% 1.74% 6.66% 17.23%
years of age
Birth rate 13.42 1.68 9.80 19.40
Nurses per 1,000 residents 8.90 1.81 5.81 15.61
Doctors per 1,000 residents 3.21 1.04 2.07 8.57
Beds per 1,000 residents 2.92 0.96 1.70 5.80
Borders Mexico 0.08 0.27 0 1
Influenza activity
Widespread 0.80 0.40 0 1
Regional 0.16 0.37 0 1
HIN1 mortality rate
Week 1 0.35 0.56 0.00 2.41
Week 2 0.31 0.51 0.00 2.02
Week 3 0.64 0.81 0.00 3.10
Week 4 0.99 1.50 0.00 8.70
Week 5 1.03 1.13 0.00 5.17
Week 6 0.83 1.16 0.00 6.22
Week 7 1.35 1.20 0.00 5.54
Week 8 0.70 1.12 0.00 6.20
Week 9 0.51 0.61 0.00 2.11
TABLE 3
Swine Flu Vaccine Allocation, Pooled Analysis
Dependent Variable: Total Doses of
Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped per Week
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House committee
members
Democrat 16355.2 19738.2 19669.6 16319.6
(17662.7) (19141.6) (17699.1) (18119.9)
Republican 9247.4 8893.6 8697.9 10705.4
(14181.5) (13646.3) (12387.6) (11007.1)
Senate committee
members
Democrat 738.6 -898.8 30.9 2366.4
(9513.9) (10119.0) (9525.6) (10616.9)
Republican 3822.2 3927.9 4314.2 5682.7
(9020.4) (11086.8) (10262.2) (12637.2)
Percentage of -1499.7 -1524.8 -1729.4
population under (1985.5) (1893.5) (2387.0)
24 years of age
First responders -193.1 -405.6 2234.3
(1185.7) (1267.0) (1924.8)
Weekly H1N1 -458.8 -4536.8 ** 5280.4 **
mortality rate (1769.9) (2148.0) (2164.0)
Borders Mexico 43987.6 47264.8 72754.9 *
(33234.4) (30393.4) (42059.1)
Population 22.52 *** 21.24 *** 21.09 *** 21.39
(thousands) (2.52) (2.59) (2.33) (2.35)
N 459 459 459 459
[R.sup.2] 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.77
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10% level.
TABLE 4
Initial Distribution of Swine Flu Vaccine--Age Factors
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political factors
House committee
members
Democrat 57441.7 ** 63356.7 ** 63759.7 ** 60454.4 **
(23820.4) (25116.3) (24765.1) (24954.9)
Republican -16332.4 -140_56.5 -14977.2 -16093.0
(22123.7) (21196.2) (21499.0) (22473.0)
Senate committee
members Democrat -12761.1 -10738.9 -11003.9 9646.8
(17610.0) (16875.3) (17042.0) (17260.9)
Republican (20857.9) ('20844.9) (20034.1) (20751.6)
27465.8 30892.9 31135.9 28185.5
CDC control factors
Ace factors
Birth rate -7662.6
(6397.5)
Percentage of -6585.0 *
population under (3645.3)
24 years of age
Percentage of -20996.2 *
population from (10935.4)
18 to 24 years
of age
Percentage of -24439.0
population from (20198.5)
14 to 17 years
of age
Percentage of
population from
5 to 13 years of
age
Percentage of
population under
5 years of age
Percentage of
population over
65 years of age
First responders -2062.7 -2659.4 -943.0 -905.0
(2744.9) (2835.1) (2663.1) (2631.3)
Prevalence of flu
Weekly HIM 6800.4 5879.2 4027.2 5385.9
mortality rate (10211.0) (10456.2) (10703.3) (10540.6)
Widespread -19196.8 -4715.9 -15618.9 601.6
(22546.5) (21473.2) (21530.2) (21086.5)
Regional -36511.2 -17109.1 -33034.1 -3282.2
(33450.2) (25250.8) (27857.9) (22453.2)
Population 10.05 ** 9.28 ** 9.04 ** 9.70 **
(thousands) (4.07) (4.20) (4.22) (4.21)
N 51 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
(5) (6) (7)
Political factors
House committee
members
Democrat 63061.7 ** 57509.8 ** 59989.1 **
(25306.3) (23875.13) (25484.2)
Republican -14091.4 -14913.3 -16043.6
(21221.4) (21582.0) (21948.3)
Senate committee
members Democrat -9784.5 -10352.8 -8708.1
(16854.8) (16773.6) (16920.4)
Republican (20132.6) (21123.7) (23590.6)
27297.4 28097.2 29493.4
CDC control factors
Ace factors
Birth rate
Percentage of
population under
24 years of age
Percentage of
population from
18 to 24 years
of age
Percentage of
population from
14 to 17 years
of age
Percentage of -17554.9
population from (11650.7)
5 to 13 years of
age
Percentage of -15107.5
population under (13210.0)
5 years of age
Percentage of 4774.6
population over (5331.7)
65 years of age
First responders -3353.0 -2380.0 -12994
(3258.0) (3000.4) (2651.9)
Prevalence of flu
Weekly HIM 7219.7 7478.4 5239.8
mortality rate (10516.5) (10040.2) (10734.7)
Widespread 21941.9 -19948.8 -8560.6
(26913.3) (24417.9) (21645.5)
Regional 14767.5 -30482.6 -14321.2
(28063.8) (32324.9) (25344.6)
Population 9.28 ** 10.25 ** 9.86 **
(thousands) (4.23) (4.01) (4.21)
N 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.83 0.83 0.83
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 1090 level.
TABLE 5
Initial Distribution of Swine Flu Vaccine--First Responders
Dependent Variable: Total Doses
of Swine Flu Vaccine Shipped
(8) (9) (10) (11)
Political factors
House committee
members
Democrat 63356.7 ** 63056.5 ** 63250.3 ** 62547.5 **
(25116.3) (25022.6) (25221.0) (24761.7)
Republican -14056.5 -13773.7 -15023.0 -12824.5
(21196.2) (21306.2) (20677.7) (21005.0)
Senate committee
members
Democrat -10738.9 -11680.7 -8960.5 -21496.3
(16875.3) (16799.1) (17856.9) (18921.9)
Republican 30892.9 30381.9 32748.6 26563.3
(20844.9) (20705.2) (21229.4) (20897.5)
CDC control factors
Percentage of -6585.0 * -6402.8 * -6455.1 * -7028.1 *
population under (3645.3) (3660.1) (3586.8) (3776.1)
24 years of age
First responders
Nurses and doctors -2659.4
per capita (2835.1)
Nurses per capita -3112.1
(3556.7)
Doctors per capita -7884.5
(10700.0)
Beds per capita -13500.0 *
(7697.8)
Prevalence of flu
Weekly H1N1 5879.2 6456.4 5373.7 8699.7
mortality rate (10456.2) (10498.4) (10399.7) (9977.1)
Widespread -4715.9 3029.7 -16903.1 2633.9
(21473.2) (16083.2) (40132.5) (18690.1)
Regional -17109.1 -11285.5 -25923.3 -24160.9
(25250.8) (20341.4) (38204.6) (24014.1)
Population 9.28 ** 9.21 ** 9.63 ** 8.87 **
(thousands) (4.20) (4.23) (4.01) (4.20)
N 51 51 51 51
[R.sup.2] 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10% level.