Comparing the effectiveness of regulation and pro-social emotions to enhance cooperation: experimental evidence from fishing communities in Colombia.
Lopez, Maria Claudia ; Murphy, James J. ; Spraggon, John M. 等
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents the results from a series of framed field
experiments that were conducted in two fishing communities on two
islands along the Caribbean coast of Colombia. The experiments were
designed to compare the effectiveness in promoting efficient choices of
social emotions, particularly guilt and shame, vis-a-vis
externally-imposed regulatory controls. We are mainly interested in the
value of external regulatory pressure to promote efficiency in
environmental and natural resource settings in the developing world.
Our notions of guilt and shame come from similar definitions
employed by Bowles and Gintis (2003), Elster (1989, 1998), Hollander
(1990), and Kandel and Lazear (1992). We define guilt as an internal
penalty, or disutility, that one experiences when her non-cooperative
behavior is not known by others in a society, whereas shame occurs when
anonymity is removed and the individual's behavior is revealed to
others. (1) The key distinguishing feature between the two is that shame
depends on the public revelation of individual behavior, whereas guilt
does not. Of course, guilt and shame have positive opposites--an
individual may feel a sense of pride that comes from knowing that she
has been cooperative and that feeling may be accentuated when her
cooperative behavior is known to the rest of her community. These
emotions can enhance cooperative behavior because they produce either
internal sanctions for non-cooperative behavior or internal rewards for
cooperation. Such cooperation-enhancing emotions are often called
pro-social emotions (Bowles and Gintis 2003).
Our work is closely related to other experimental studies that
suggest that the desire to avoid social disapproval or gain social
approval can enhance cooperative behavior. Gachter and Fehr (1999) show
that avoiding social disapproval and peer pressure can induce
cooperation when combined with some familiarity among subjects. Masclet
et al. (2003) implemented a point system that individuals could use to
express a degree of disapproval. Use of this system did not entail costs
for those assigning points or receiving points. (2) This simple way of
communicating disapproval increased contributions to the public good.
Rege and Telle (2004) find that the simple identification of subjects
and their contributions to a public good, without giving other group
members the ability to express approval or disapproval, tends to
increase contributions in a one-shot public good game. (3) In contrast,
Noussair and Tucker (2007) suggest that the positive effects of publicly
revealing individuals' contributions may rapidly deteriorate over
time.
The traditional response to correcting externalities generated by
the divergence between individual and social well being is to impose
regulatory control to induce more efficient individual decisions. There
is a significant literature on the effectiveness and efficiency of
regulatory control--typically fixed quotas with some exogenous enforcement apparatus--on behavior in common property and public good
games. This literature suggests that regulatory controls may not be
effective at meeting the goal of increasing cooperative behavior.
Ostmann (1998) finds that external regulation and enforcement financed
by experiment participants only reduces harvests from a common pool by a
small amount relative to a regulation-free environment. Beckenkamp and
Ostmann (1999) report that high sanctions can cause overuse because
subjects may perceive the high sanction as unfair. Cardenas, Stranlund,
and Willis (2000) find that a quota supported by weak enforcement is
effective in initial rounds, but the effectiveness of the regulation
quickly erodes. Ostrom (2000) discusses how enforcement of
externally-imposed rules may crowd out endogenous cooperative behavior
because it may discourage the formation of social norms to solve the
dilemma and at the same time may encourage players to cheat the system.
Velez, Murphy, and Stranlund (2010) demonstrate that regulatory control
of a common-pool resource under which community members can communicate
with each other may be effective in some locations, but
counterproductive in others.
The basis of our experiments is a standard voluntary contribution
game with which we ask whether realistic regulatory pressure promotes
greater contributions to a public good than attempts to activate
pro-social emotions. As we are concerned with strategies to promote
cooperation among environmental and natural resource users in the
developing world, we conducted our experiments with fishermen and others
who are intimately connected to local fishing in San Andres and
Providencia, two islands off the Caribbean coast of Colombia. We framed
the experiments as a situation in which each fisherman decides whether
to help to clean the beaches and wharves. (4) This is a critical issue
for the fishermen of these islands because keeping the beaches and
wharves clean prevents the migration of lobster and other species upon
which the fishermen depend.
We conducted two external regulation treatments, each of which
required each individual to contribute all of one's tokens to the
group. This requirement was backed by an exogenous enforcement strategy.
After each round of play, individuals' contributions were audited
with a probability of 1/5 and a financial penalty was applied in cases
of noncompliance. The two regulation treatments differ with respect to
the size of the penalty. One treatment used a low penalty that, in
combination with the audit probability, would not be sufficient to
induce compliance by risk neutral players. The other penalty was high
enough to induce a risk neutral agent to fully comply with the
requirement to contribute all of her tokens.
In an attempt to induce guilt for noncooperative behavior, we
conducted another treatment in which individual choices were audited
with the same 1/5 probability as in our regulation treatments. An
audited individual received information from the monitor in private
about her contributions relative to the group's contributions,
particularly the loss the individual imposed on the rest of the group
because she did not contribute all her tokens. To induce shame, we
conducted another treatment that was the same except the information
about an audited individual's contribution decision was publicly
revealed to the entire group. (5) This treatment differs from others who
have examined the role of social disapproval. First, revelation of an
individual's choices was random, implying that any effects of shame
involved the threat of public disclosure instead of certain disclosure
as in the works of Bohnet and Frey (1999), Rege and Telle (2004),
Masclet et al. (2003), and Noussair and Tucker (2005, 2007). Second, we
did not allow group communication in any of our treatments. Thus, unlike
Barr (2001) and Masclet et al. (2003), we did not give group members the
ability to express disapproval. Thus, if shame had any effect on play in
our public goods game, it is because of the threat of public disclosure
of one's behavior rather than certain disclosure and the threat of
a public sanction.
Our results suggest several insights into the roles of emotions and
regulatory pressure in promoting more efficient provision of a public
good. The most important is that the threat of public disclosure of
individual contributions produced significantly higher contributions and
social welfare than regulatory pressure. Even regulatory pressure that
would normally be predicted to lead to efficient behavior produced lower
contributions than the threat of public disclosure. Moreover, payoffs in
the regulation treatments were much less than when individuals faced the
threat of public disclosure, not only because contributions were lower
but also because of the penalties that individuals paid for violating
the regulations. These results suggest a powerful conclusion about the
value of regulatory pressure in social dilemmas in the developing
world--communities in which there is some probability that individual
behavior can be observed by others may reach more efficient outcomes
than can be produced with regulatory pressure.
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experiments are based on a standard linear voluntary
contributions game with n homogenous members of a group with identical
monetary payoffs. Each individual, i, within a group received an initial
endowment of y tokens with which she decided how much to contribute to a
group project, [g.sub.i], and how much to keep for herself. The sum of
contributions to the group account is multiplied by a constant, a, and
then distributed equally among all the group members. The payoff
function for each participant is then
(1) [[pi].sub.i] = y - [g.sub.i] + (a/n) [n.summation over
(i=1)][g.sub.i].
We chose a such that a/n < 1 < a, which leads to a dominant
Nash strategy for each individual to contribute zero to the group
account ([g.sub.i] = 0), but the aggregate group payoff is maximized
when each person contributes all of her tokens to the group project
([g.sub.i] = y).
When a regulator enforces a requirement that all individuals
contribute all tokens to the group account, it applies a sanction of s(y
- [g.sub.i]) on individual i when it discovers [g.sub.i] < y. The
regulator can only observe an individual's contribution if it
conducts an audit, which it does with probability p. A risk neutral
individual's expected payoff is then
(2) [[pi].sub.i] = y - [g.sub.i] - ps(y - [g.sub.i]) + (a/n)
[n.summation over (i=1)] [g.sub.i].
As [partial derivative][[pi].sub.i]/[partial derivative][g.sub.i] =
- 1 + ps + a/n, an individual's Nash contribution is determined by
(3) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
The subjects in our experiments were placed in groups of n = 5, and
each group played 15 rounds under one of six treatments described below.
(6) The number of rounds was made known to the participants at the
beginning of each experiment. For all treatments each subject received
an initial endowment of y = 25 tokens and the multiplier was a = 2.
Thus, the marginal per capita return for contributing to the public good
was a/n = 0.4.
Once a group was gathered together, a monitor read the instructions
to the group. (7) Verbal communication among participants was not
permitted in any treatment. The monitor first explained that each
participant was going to be asked to make an economic decision and would
earn tokens based on those decisions, and that the tokens would be
converted to Colombian pesos at a rate of 25 pesos per token at the end
of the session. The monitor also made it clear that participation in the
experiments was completely voluntary, but that subjects would forfeit their payments if they quit before the end of the session. Participants
with reading and/or writing difficulties received assistance, but they
were required to make their contribution decisions on their own.
At the end of each session, earnings were converted to pesos and
paid in cash to the participants. Individuals' earnings ranged
between 10,290 and 21,395 pesos with an average of 15,543 pesos (about
U.S. $6.70). (8) A show-up payment was not provided, but transportation
expenses for the subjects were covered. A complimentary snack was
offered as well. Each experiment lasted about two hours.
A total of 36 sessions, evenly divided among the six treatments,
were conducted on the islands of San Andres and Providencia during
September of 2005. A total of 180 individuals participated in our
experiments, the majority of whom were men (84%) because fishing is a
male-dominated profession in Colombia. The average participant was a 36
year old male fisherman with nine years of formal schooling who had
lived in the region for 10 or more years.
Masclet et al. (2003) observe that the standard monetary sanction
treatments, such as those in the work of Fehr and Gachter (2000),
potentially confound a formal system of monetary fines with a vehicle to
express disapproval of others' decisions. In a similar vein,
studies with an external regulation treatment (e.g., Cardenas,
Stranlund, and Willis 2000) could potentially confound a public reminder
about socially efficient choices with the financial consequences of
noncompliance. The announcement of a regulatory standard provides a
signal of socially desirable choices that could serve as a coordination
device. The audit process requires a comparison, usually conducted in
private, of the individual's choice with the standard. If there is
a violation of the standard, then a preannounced exogenous financial
penalty is imposed. Hence, it is possible that a simple comparison of
external penalties with a standard regulation-free linear public goods
game confounds these three effects. To avoid this potential problem, our
experiments were designed in layers with each treatment building upon
the previous, as shown in Table 1 and described below.
* Baseline. This was a standard public goods experiment in which
each subject decided how to allocate her tokens between a private and a
group account. In addition, at the end of each round, all individual
contributions were posted on a board in random order with no information
that could link individuals to particular decisions. Hence, although all
the individual choices were known, unlike Rege and Telle (2004) and
Noussair and Tucker (2007), it was not possible to associate these
choices with the individual group members.
* Frame. In addition to the procedures for the Baseline treatment,
the Frame treatment included a script read aloud to the entire group
before each round that described the incentives of the game as follows:
"Before we begin playing for real money, I would like to point
something out: As you may have noticed, the earnings for the group are
the highest when everybody contributes 25 tokens to the group project.
If you decide to keep tokens for yourself you can increase your
individual earnings but you are reducing the earnings of the
group."
This script was included to be consistent with the two external
regulation treatments in which there is an evaluation of one's
decisions relative to the socially optimal choice imposed by a
regulation. The script is just cheap talk that should have no effect on
choices. The Frame treatment is really the baseline against which the
remaining four treatments should be compared because they all include
this group reminder about socially efficient choices and free-riding
incentives.
* Guilt (or Private Reminder). In addition to all the elements of
the Frame treatment, at the end of each round, one of the five subjects
was randomly selected to receive the following private message about her
choice in that round and how it affected the payoffs of the rest of the
group:
The earnings of the group are the highest when everybody
contributes all of his or her 25 tokens to the group
Tokens you contributed to the group project
Total tokens contributed to the project
Total tokens contributed to the project if
you had contributed your 25 tokens
Losses for the group because you did not
contribute all of your 25 tokens
If the person contributed all of her tokens, then she received a
note saying: "You contributed all your 25 tokens to the project,
which means you did all you could to make the earnings for the group the
highest." To guarantee that no one else in the group knew who
received this information about how their choices affected the payoffs
of the group, the other four group members received the same piece of
paper but the right column was blank.
* Shame (or Public Revelation). This treatment is essentially the
same as the Guilt treatment, except that the message about how the
randomly selected individual's contribution affected the payoff of
the group was read aloud for everyone in the group to hear. Thus, if
individual contributions under this treatment differ from the Guilt
treatment it is because of the threat of public revelation of one's
behavior and its consequences for the rest of the group.
* Low Penalty. As in the Guilt and Shame treatments, at the end of
each round one individual was randomly selected to be audited. This
treatment builds upon the Guilt treatment because the randomly selected
individual received the same private reminder about the consequences of
her choice. In addition, there was a requirement that each individual
fully contribute to the group project ([g.sub.i] = y). If the audited
person did not contribute all of her tokens to the group project, then
she was penalized one token (s = 1) for every token she did not
contribute to the group account (i.e., a one token fine for each token
in the private account). The audit results were kept private. The
expected marginal penalty under this treatment was ps = 1/5, while the
marginal value of violating the requirement to contribute all of
one's tokens is 1 - a/n = 3/5. From Equation (3), therefore, a risk
neutral subject's dominant Nash strategy under this treatment is
still to contribute zero tokens to the group account.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
* High Penalty. This treatment is the same as the Low Penalty
treatment, except that the marginal penalty for violating the
requirement to contribute all of one's tokens was four tokens (s =
4). As the expected marginal penalty under this treatment was ps = 4/5,
which exceeds the marginal value of violating the requirement of 1 - a/n
= 3/5. a risk neutral subject's dominant Nash strategy under this
treatment is to fully comply with the requirement and contribute all of
her tokens to the group account. Note that this is the only one of the
six treatments that a standard theory of risk-neutral, payoff-maximizing
behavior would predict would be efficient.
III. RESULTS
Figure 1 presents a time series of average individual contributions
to the group project by treatment, and Figure 2 shows average expected
individual earnings. (9) Averages for all rounds are shown in Table 2.
These charts suggest some interesting patterns in the data that we
investigate more rigorously shortly. For the first five rounds, average
contributions to the group project are roughly the same for the Shame,
Low Penalty, and High Penalty treatments, about 75-80% of the endowment.
However, in subsequent rounds, contributions in the Shame treatment are
consistently the highest. That average contributions to the group
project under the Shame treatment (20.2) tend to be higher than under
the Low and High Penalty treatments (18.2 and 18.5, respectively)
suggests that the threat of public disclosure may have a greater impact
on contributions than the threat of a monetary sanction, even with a
High Penalty that was structured to induce risk-neutral
payoff-maximizing individuals to contribute all of their tokens. As
average contributions are highest under the Shame treatment, average
expected earnings (45.2) are highest as well. Average expected earnings
under the High Penalty (38.3) treatment are lower than any other
treatment, including the Baseline. This is a bit surprising because this
is the only treatment in which, theoretically, every individual should
contribute all of their tokens to the group account and, therefore none
should be penalized. Although more participants were perfectly compliant
([g.sub.i] = 25) in the High Penalty treatment (176 of 450) than in any
other treatment, average expected earnings are lower because of the
heavy penalties paid by those who did not fully contribute. There is no
statistical difference in the rate of compliance for the Shame treatment
(165 of 450, p = .49 using Fisher's exact test), but the absence of
fines leads to higher earnings.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
To analyze our data more rigorously, Table 3 presents the results
from two random effects Tobit models of the form [y.sub.it] =
[x.sub.it][beta] + [[upsilon].sub.i] + [[epsilon].sub.it] in which
[x.sub.it] is a vector of fixed effects, [[upsilon].sub.i] N(0,
[[sigma].sup.2.sub.[upsilon]]) are the random effects, and
[[epsilon].sub.it] N(0, [[sigma].sup.2.sub.[epsilon]]). In the first
model in Table 3, the dependent variable, [y.sub.it], is individual
contributions, [g.sub.it] [member of] [0, 25]; the dependent variable in
the second model is individual earnings, [[pi].sub.it] [member of] [0,
65]. For these regressions we divided the 15 rounds of each experiment
into three intervals: the First interval included the first five rounds,
the Middle interval included rounds 6 through 10, and the Last interval
included the last five rounds. We interacted these time intervals with
each of the fixed effect treatment variables. The omitted treatment
variable is the Baseline. The results in Table 3 do not include the time
intervals interacted with the Baseline because a separate regression indicated that contributions and earnings were unchanged over time in
this treatment (this can also be observed in Figures 1 and 2). (10)
Eliminating the time interval interaction with Baseline greatly
simplifies the interpretation of the constant in these regressions: the
average contributions and average earnings over all rounds under the
Baseline treatment. All of the remaining coefficients in Table 3 are
interpreted as deviations from the Baseline. (11) Let us now turn to the
main results of our study.
Result 1 (Frame): Informing subjects that contributing all tokens
to the group project maximizes aggregate earnings did not affect average
contributions or earnings, but did alter the distribution of decisions.
The Frame treatment differs from our Baseline treatment only in that we
explicitly told subjects in the Frame experiments that their
group's payoff would be maximized if they contributed all of their
tokens to the group project. The regression results in Table 3 suggest
that this message had a small positive, but not statistically
significant, effect on contributions and earnings (i.e., none of the
Frame coefficients are significant). This suggests that simply telling
the subjects that the efficient outcome is reached when they all
contribute all of their tokens does not have an effect on average
outcomes. However, it would be incorrect to conclude that the Frame has
no impact on decisions. Figure 3 presents the distribution of
contribution decisions for each treatment. In the Frame treatment, there
is a pronounced increase in the frequency of "high"
contributions in the 20-25 token range compared to the Baseline.
Interestingly, there are also more noncompliant subjects in the Frame
treatment. It appears that the script essentially shifted contribution
decisions from the middle to the two extremes while preserving the mean.
A Komolgorov-Smirnov test confirms that the two distributions are
statistically different (p = .00).
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Result 2 (Guilt): The random private reminder of one's
contribution decision did not affect average contributions or earnings.
The Guilt treatment differs from the Frame treatment in one way: after
each round a single individual was randomly selected to receive a
private message about the negative consequence of her contribution on
the payoffs of the rest of the group. The results in Table 3 show that
individual contributions and earnings under the Guilt treatment were not
significantly different from the Baseline in the First and Middle time
intervals, but were significantly higher in the Last time interval. The
most relevant comparison, though, is with the results under the Frame
treatment. Contributions and earnings under the Guilt treatment were not
significantly different than the Frame treatment in the First interval
(p = .88 and .95 for contributions and earnings respectively), in the
Middle interval (p = .90 and .82), and in the Last interval (p = .23 and
.18).12 A Komolgorov-Smirnov test indicates that there is no difference
between the two distributions of contribution decisions (p = .34). It
therefore appears that adding a private reminder to randomly selected
individuals has little impact on outcomes relative to just a general
announcement to the group about efficient choices.
Result 3 (Shame): The random public revelation of one's
contribution decision yielded significantly higher average contributions
and earnings. The Shame treatment differs from the Guilt treatment in
that the message a randomly selected individual received about the
effects of her contributions on the rest of the group was read aloud,
rather than being kept private. Thus, the entire group knew which
individual was selected and how that individual's behavior affected
earnings. It is clear from the regressions in Table 3 that the simple
threat that one's choices and their consequences would be revealed
to the rest of the group had significantly positive impacts on both
contributions and individual earnings relative to the Baseline. Again,
however, the most relevant comparison is with the Frame treatment.
Individual contributions to the group project in the Shame treatment are
significantly higher than under the Frame treatment in all three time
intervals (p = .04, p = .00, p = .00 for First, Middle, Last,
respectively). As one would expect, the higher contributions in the
Shame treatment also led to higher individual earnings in all time
intervals (p = .03, p = .00, p = .00). Shame treatment contributions and
earnings are also consistently higher than the Guilt treatment.
Our results concerning the positive effects of the public
revelation of choices and consequences differ from recent work by
Noussair and Tucker (2007). They find that publicly revealing all
subjects' contributions increased contribution in early rounds, but
that contribution levels quickly fell over time. They also find this
effect with their Non-Monetary Punishment treatment in Noussair and
Tucker (2005). In contrast, average contributions and earnings in our
Shame experiments were slightly higher in the later rounds (also see
Figure 1). Several differences between our experiments and
Noussair's and Tucker's could explain the different results.
First, Noussair and Tucker revealed every individual's contribution
while we revealed the contribution of a single randomly chosen
individual. It may be that the threat of being singled out for scrutiny
is a more powerful and lasting motivator than being scrutinized along
with everyone else in your group. Second, while Noussair and Tucker only
revealed individual contributions, we also revealed how an
individual's contribution produced a loss for the rest of the group
if the individual did not contribute all of their tokens. This decidedly
negative spin on not contributing tokens to the group project, in
combination with the threat of being singled out, may have kept
contributions from deteriorating over time. Finally, Noussair and Tucker
conducted neutrally-framed experiments with college students, while our
experiments were mainly with fishermen and were framed to closely
resemble a problem they routinely encounter. Moreover, the villagers in
these communities typically interact and cooperate with each other on a
variety of other similar issues. Thus, the positive and sustained impact
of the threat of public revelation that we identify may be a
manifestation of the social pressure and behavioral norms that these
communities use to sustain cooperation in many areas of their daily
lives.
Result 4: There is no difference in average contributions between
the Low and High Penalty treatments. Recall that the expected marginal
penalty under the Low Penalty treatment (0.20 tokens per unit violation)
was not high enough to motivate a risk-neutral payoff-maximizing
individual to comply with the requirement to contribute all of her
tokens, but the expected marginal penalty under the High Penalty
treatment (0.80 tokens) was high enough to induce perfect compliance by
such an individual. Although the two regulation treatments have markedly
different theoretical outcomes, there is no statistically significant
difference in observed individual contributions in any of the three time
intervals (p =. 13, p = .28, p = .63). That contributions under the two
treatments were essentially the same implies that the higher penalty for
noncompliance played no role in increasing contributions despite the
fact that, from the perspective of standard theory, the High Penalty
regulation should have maximized contributions and earnings. Velez,
Murphy, and Stranlund (2010) had a different pool of Colombian fishermen
participate in a common-pool resource experiment. Their paper included a
pair of treatments in which the penalty varied, and in two of the three
communities they visited, there was no difference in compliance behavior
between the two penalty levels. Thus, the insensitivity of
subjects' behavior to penalty levels in our experiments is not
entirely unique.
With the same average contribution decisions, but substantially
greater fines in the High Penalty treatment, earnings are less than with
the Low Penalty in all three time intervals (p = .04, p = .01, p = .00).
In fact, as shown in Figure 2, the High Penalty treatment has the lowest
average earnings of any treatment, including the Baseline, even though
in theory it should yield the highest earnings. Earnings in the Low
Penalty treatment start out slightly higher than the Baseline, but this
benefit quickly decays leaving no difference in earnings between these
two treatments in the later rounds. Likewise, there is no difference in
earnings when comparing the Low Penalty and Frame treatments. Hence,
these results concerning average individual earnings indicate that
regulatory pressure did not make the groups better off.
Our results about the effects of random monetary sanctions for
violations of a requirement to contribute all of one's tokens
warrants some skepticism about the value of regulatory pressure to
improve the lot of small-scale resource users in the developing world.
One might argue that they improve social efficiency because they lead to
higher contributions, at least with respect to the Baseline treatment,
but it is clear that the increase in welfare that this produces is in
large part transferred from the group to the larger society via the
sanctions that noncompliant group members pay. Moreover, our final
result suggests that regulatory pressure is unequivocally worse than the
limited social pressure that arises from the Shame treatments.
Result 5 (Shame): The threat of public revelation of one's
choices led to significantly higher earnings than regulatory pressure.
The threat of public revelation ended up being significantly better at
enhancing group payoffs than any other treatment, including both
regulatory treatments. In the first time interval, average earnings in
the Shame treatment are statistically indistinguishable from those with
a Low Penalty (p = .25), but exceed High Penalty earnings (p = .00). In
the Middle and Last intervals, Shame treatment earnings are
significantly greater than both Low and High Penalty earnings (p = .00
for all comparisons). Both the lower level of contributions and the
fines for noncompliance in the two regulation treatments account for the
erosion in group welfare.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The primary message of this work is a negative one concerning the
performance of government interventions in small-scale resource
industries in the developing world. Although each of our regulation
treatments induced greater public good contributions relative to an
unregulated baseline, neither of them outperformed the random public
revelation of individual choices and their consequences for the rest of
the group. This is particularly interesting because one of the
regulation treatments was designed to maximize group payoffs. This
regulation was nowhere near efficient, and its performance was dominated
by the simple threat of public revelation. Therefore, in communities
where there are mechanisms for triggering social emotions akin to shame,
these emotions can support greater cooperation than regulatory pressure,
even when regulations are designed to be efficient. In these situations,
a regulator would be better advised to leave the management of the
natural resources to the community. Our results also point to an
interesting question for future work--does regulatory pressure
complement or crowd-out social emotions in the management of natural
resources?
We also claim contributions to the experimental literature on the
effects of publicly revealing individual choices on levels of
cooperation. One of the key elements of our design is that public
revelation was a random event while, to our knowledge, other researchers
reveal the choices of all individuals. Thus, the effects of public
revelation that we find are because of individuals' perceptions of
the threat of their behavior being revealed to the rest of their group,
rather than the certainty of revelation. In many settings, random
revelation is a more realistic way to approach this issue than revealing
every individual's choices all the time. In our lives we simply are
not perfectly informed of our neighbors' behavior as it concerns
our well being; we only observe their choices with some probability.
This is also true of the communities in the developing world that
motivate our research.
Finally, our choice to conduct framed experiments with the very
individuals that we are interested in is certainly important. Given our
interest in cooperative behavior in managing natural resources in the
developing world, it is appropriate that we traveled to communities in
the developing world and presented a social dilemma to individuals whose
livelihoods are tied to the resolution of closely related dilemmas. The
advantage of such framed field experiments is that subjects bring a
context from their daily lives that could influence their behavior in
the experiments, and that context is an important element of the
question that is being addressed. The positive effects of randomly
revealing individual choices, as well as the poor performance of our
regulation treatments, may be influenced by the informal norms and
sanctions that are important in the communities we visited, as well as
their view of the government regulations they operate under.
Disentangling these influences requires further research that combines
field experiments and detailed knowledge of the lives of the subjects.
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(1.) It is important to note that these notions of shame and guilt
are not universally accepted among social scientists. The definitions we
use tend to be accepted by economists, anthropologists, and political
scientists who consider shame as a more "public" emotion than
guilt. "Shame is seen as arising from public exposure and
disapproval of some shortcoming or transgression, whereas guilt is seen
as a more "private" experience arising from self-generated
pangs of conscience" (Tangney and Dearing 2002, p. 14). According
to some psychologists, however, this distinction is not clear cut,
because it is possible to experience solitary shame. Lewis (1971, p. 30)
makes the following distinction between guilt and shame: "'The
experience of shame is directly about the self. which is the focus of
evaluation. In guilt, the self is not central object of negative
evaluation, but rather the thing done or undone is the focus. In guilt,
the self is negatively evaluated in connection with something but is not
itself the focus of experience." However, in a study by Tangney et
al. (1996) that attempted to distinguish shame and guilt, they found
that subjects felt "'scrutinized" by others when they
felt shame. This is consistent with our distinction in which shame is
produced by social observation.
(2.) In a similar literature, sanctions within groups (as opposed
to external sanctions that would be imposed for violations of regulatory
controls) are costly both for individual punishers and for those being
punished (e.g. Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner 1992, Fehr
and Gaechter 2000, Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher 2001, Masclet et al.
2001). Noussair and Tucker (2005) find that the availability of monetary
and non-monetary sanctions leads to higher contributions and group
welfare than the availability of either alone.
(3.) Bohnet and Frey (1999) find a similar result in dictator and
prisoner's dilemma games.
(4.) We share the concerns of Levitt and List (2007) and others
that laboratory experiments with university students playing abstract
games may not produce outcomes that are valid predictors of real world
behavior in some contexts. Using the taxonomy of Harrison and List
(2004), our experiments are framed field experiments. Our experiment
closely mirrors the natural occurring dilemma that concerns us, and our
subject pool was drawn from populations in which small scale fishing
from a local fishery is the main economic activity.
(5.) To be clear, we only claim to have attempted to induce
feelings of guilt, shame, or related emotions. We do not know if the
subjects in our experiments actually experienced these emotions.
(6.) Assignment to groups was not completely random. Members of the
same household were not allowed in the same group and we tried to ensure
that other relatives were in separate groups.
(7.) The instructions were first written in English, and then
translated to Spanish. Another individual then translated the
instructions back to English to minimize translation errors.
(8.) In July of 2005, one U.S. dollar was equivalent to 2330
Colombian pesos. A day's wage in the fishery industry or in
agriculture on the islands of San Andres and Providencia was about
15,000 pesos.
(9.) For the two external regulation treatments, we use expected,
rather than actual, earnings because expected earnings are the
appropriate measure of the value of the participants' choices.
Actual earnings may not give an accurate picture of this value because
it depends on the realization of random audits.
(10.) We can compare our Baseline results to the results of other
standard public good games with similar parameters, group size and
marginal benefits of contributions (Ledyard 1995: Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Davis and Holt 1992). Average contributions in other experiments tend to
start at around 40-60% of the initial endowment and decline over time to
10-30%. In our results, average contributions are in the 50-60% range
over all rounds. Interestingly, the "endgame effect" in which
contributions fall considerably in the last period that is often
observed is not present in our Baseline experiments. As our Baseline
treatment is similar to many other voluntary contribution experiments,
we attribute our different results to the fact that we conducted framed
field experiments instead of an abstract public goods game with
university students.
(11.) We also tested regression models that included age, gender
and education. None of these variables have a statistically significant
effect on outcomes so they are not included in the regression results
presented.
(12.) Unless otherwise noted, statistical comparisons of regression
coefficients were conducted with Wald [chi square] tests.
Online Early publication December 16, 2010
MARIA CLAUDIA LOPEZ, JAMES J. MURPHY, JOHN M. SPRAGGON and JOHN K.
STRANLUND *
* We are particularly grateful to Maria Alejandra Velez for her
help with this research. In addition, the field research benefitted
greatly from the efforts of Aria Maria Roldan, Laura Estevez, Melisa
Arboleda, and Juan Carlos Rocha. The experiments would not have been
possible without the help of the fishermen associations of San Andres
and Providencia that helped the research team to develop credibility
with local community members. Additional credit is due the Secretaria de
Pesca del Departamento de San Andres. Thanks are due the members of the
School of Environmental and Rural Studies at Universidad Javeriana,
Colombia, for their ideas and support. Juan Camilo Cardenas provided
critical comments on the experimental design. We also received valuable
suggestions from James Boyce, Samuel Bowles and Elinor Ostrom. Wendy
Varner and Susanne Hale provided administrative support. Financial
support from the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is gratefully acknowledged. We
assume complete responsibility for the final contents of this paper.
Lopez: Assistant Professor, School of Environmental and Rural
Studies, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Bogota, Colombia; Visiting
Scholar, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana
University, Bloomington, IN 47408. Phone 571-3208320 ext. 4834, Fax
571-3208156, E-mail mlopez@javeriana.edu.co
Murphy: Rasmuson Chair of Economics, Department of Economics,
University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK99508; Adjunct Professor,
Department of Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst,
Amherst, MA 01003. Phone 1-907-786-1936, Fax 1-907-786-4415, E-mail
murphy@uaa.alaska.edu
Spraggon: Associate Professor, Department of Resource Economics,
University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003. Phone
1-413-545-6651, Fax 1-41 3-545-5853, E-mail john.spraggon@gmail.com
Stranlund: Professor, Department of Resource Economics, University
of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA 01003. Phone 1-413-545-6328, Fax
1-413-545-5853, E-mail stranlund@resecon.umass.edu
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00344.x
TABLE 1
Experimental Design
Treatment Description
Baseline Standard linear public
goods game
Frame Baseline + Public reminder about
benefits of cooperation
Guilt Baseline + Frame + 1/5 chance of receiving
private reminder of the
social losses resulting
from the individual's
non-cooperative behavior
Shame Baseline + Frame + Guilt + 1/5 chance of receiving
public announcement of
the social losses
resulting from the
individual's
non-cooperative behavior
Low Penalty Baseline + Frame + Guilt + 1/5 chance of incurring a
one token per unit
penalty for
non-cooperative behavior
High Penalty Baseline + Frame + Guilt + 1/5 chance of incurring a
four token per unit
penalty for
non-cooperative behavior
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
Average Average Expected
Treatment Contributions Earnings
Baseline 14.6 39.6
(6.3) (6.3)
Frame 16.2 41.2
(8.0) (8.0)
Guilt 16.9 41.9
(7.6) (7.6)
Shame 20.2 45.2
(6.7) (6.7)
Low 18.2 41.8
(7.7) (7.0)
High 18.5 38.3
(7.9) (7.1)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.
TABLE 3
Random Effects Tobit Models of Individual Contributions to Group
Project and Expected Earnings
Contributions
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant (Baseline) 14.90 *** 1.32
First x Frame 2.10 1.93
First x Guilt 2.46 1.93
First x Shame 6.32 *** 1.94
First x High Penalty 8.67 *** 1.97
First x Low Penalty 5.57 *** 1.93
Middle x Frame 2.40 1.93
Middle x Guilt 2.64 1.93
Middle x Shame 8.78 *** 1.95
Middle x High Penalty 7.03 *** 1.96
Middle x Low Penalty 4.83 *** 1.93
Last x Frame 2.42 1.93
Last x Guilt 4.84 *** 1.94
Last x Shame 8.87 *** 1.95
Last x High Penalty 5.59 *** 1.96
Last x Low Penalty 4.60 ** 1.93
Expected Earnings
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Constant (Baseline) 39.62 *** 0.85
First x Frame 1.67 1.26
First x Guilt 1.59 1.26
First x Shame 4.59 *** 1.26
First x High Penalty 0.34 1.26
First x Low Penalty 3.08 *** 1.26
Middle x Frame 1.57 1.26
Middle x Guilt 1.87 1.26
Middle x Shame 6.20 *** 1.26
Middle x High Penalty -1.26 1.26
Middle x Low Penalty 1.96 1.26
Last x Frame 1.37 1.26
Last x Guilt 3.26 *** 1.26
Last x Shame 5.99 *** 1.26
Last x High Penalty -2.93 *** 1.26
Last x Low Penalty 1.56 1.26
Notes: The constant is interpreted as average contributions or
earnings under the Baseline treatment. The individual random
effects are not reported and are available upon request.
* p<.10: ** p<.05; *** P<.01.