Does relative thinking exist in real-world situations? A field experiment with bagels and cream cheese.
Azar, Ofer H.
I. INTRODUCTION
In almost every purchase decision, consumers face various
alternatives, which usually differ in their characteristics and prices.
Even at the same store one could usually find various types of bread,
soft drinks, toothpastes, TV sets, and so on, and when considering
alternative stores the number of alternatives is even larger. The same
applies to services--in most places there are many restaurants to choose
from and in each restaurant a variety of items on the menu, for example.
Because the choice between differentiated goods or services is so
common, it is very important to understand how consumers make these
choices.
When a consumer faces two differentiated goods and one is preferred
to the other but is also more expensive, utility maximization implies
that he should compare the extra utility from using the better good to
the utility he can derive from using the price difference to consume
other goods. (1) The relative price difference between the goods should
not matter; only the absolute price difference matters. For example,
suppose that there are two substitute goods, the price of the
less-preferred one is p, and the consumer tells us that he is exactly
indifferent between the two goods when the preferred good costs p + x.
Then, if the price of the less-preferred good changes to q, the consumer
should be indifferent between the two goods when the preferred good
costs q + x. (2) The reason is that the difference in utility between
the two goods is fixed, and so is the utility the consumer can derive by
using x dollars toward consumption of other goods.
To illustrate this idea more vividly, suppose that a consumer is
indifferent between two flights, where one costs $209 and leaves at 7
a.m. and the other costs $249 and leaves at 10 a.m. (the consumer has to
wake up a few hours before the flight in order to catch it, and is
willing to pay up to $40 to sleep three more hours). Now, suppose that
the consumer, a month later, has to choose again between two flights
that are identical except for their departure time, and that anything
else remains unchanged, except that the 7-a.m. flight's price is
$627. The consumer should be indifferent between the two flights if the
10-a.m. flight costs $667, because he is willing to pay up to $40 for
three more hours of sleep.
Product differentiation can come from many sources other than
departure time; one simple example is the location in which the goods
can be purchased. If one store is more conveniently located than another
and the consumer is indifferent between the two when a certain good
costs $20 in one store and $25 in the other, then he should also be
indifferent between the two stores when buying another good that costs
$270 and $275 in the two stores. (3)
While normatively, utility maximization and well-defined
preferences imply that consumers should exhibit this simple principle,
several experiments showed that people often deviate from it and exhibit
"relative thinking"--thinking about relative price differences
in addition to absolute differences (Azar 2004). (4) Tversky and
Kahneman (1981), for example, asked people whether they would drive 20
min to save $5 on a calculator when they were going to buy a calculator
and a jacket. When the calculator's price was $15 and the
jacket's price was $125, 68% of the subjects were willing to drive,
but when the calculator's price was $125 and the jacket's
price $15, only 29% wanted to drive 20 min to save $5 on the calculator.
This result was later replicated in several other studies. Mowen and
Mowen (1986) showed that the effect holds similarly for student subjects
and for business managers. Frisch (1993) showed that the effect holds
also when only a calculator is being purchased. Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi
(1993) varied the price of the second item (the jacket) and obtained
similar results, and Darke and Freedman (1993) found that both the
percentage discount and the absolute discount have an effect on consumer
choice.
Azar (forthcoming) showed that when subjects can choose to purchase
in a store they currently visit or in a remote store, the minimal price
difference for which they are willing to travel to the remote store is
an increasing function of the good's price. In an experiment that
included nine different price treatments, he quantified this effect and
found that people behave on average as if the value of their time is
approximately proportional to the square root of the good's price.
Azar (2004) showed that consumers' willingness to add for a
high-quality good (over the price of a low-quality good) is higher when
the good's price is higher. The quality difference was unrelated to
the good's price, and therefore, from a normative perspective, the
willingness to add for the higher quality should be independent of the
good's price. He conducted the experiment both with undergraduate
students and with participants in the 2003 North American Summer
Meetings of the Econometric Society and showed that economists also
exhibit this behavior. Azar (2006) argues that response of firms to
relative thinking of consumers can explain the findings of Pratt, Wise,
and Zeckhauser (1979), Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2001), Sorensen
(2000), and Aalto-Setala (2003) that price dispersion is positively
correlated with the average price (or cost), a finding that is otherwise
hard to explain from the perspective of search theory.
The experiments described above, however, were conducted without
financial incentives. (5) There are several possible reasons for this.
One reason is that many of the researchers cited above are
psychologists, and in psychology it is a common practice to conduct
experiments without financial incentives. (6) Another possible reason is
that the questions subjects faced were simple questions that did not
require a significant amount of effort to answer correctly. Therefore,
there is no apparent reason why introducing financial incentives should
make responses more accurate or change them in a systematic manner. A
third reason is that subjects were asked about their preferences, and
because these were unknown to the experimenter, he could not reward the
subjects based on how close their responses were to the correct answers
(their true preferences).
The issue of whether and how financial incentives affect behavior,
and in particular violations of rationality, is a controversial issue
among economists and psychologists. Tversky and Kahneman (1987, p. 90),
for example, argued that "experimental findings provide little
support" for the view that "observed failures of rational
models are attributable to the cost of thinking and will thus be
eliminated by proper incentives." Similarly, Thaler (1994, pp.
155-157, 190) wrote, "To see whether the addition of monetary
incentives would improve decision making, numerous researchers, both
psychologists and economists, have run parallel experiments with and
without incentives... the violations of rationality observed tend to be
somewhat stronger in the incentive condition..." Later, Thaler
added "Hypothetical questions appear to work well when subjects
have access to their intuitions and have no particular incentive to
lie," and afterwards he concluded, "... the assertion that
systematic mistakes will always disappear if the stakes are large enough
should be recognized for what it is--an assertion unsupported by any
data."
Others, however, oppose this view and suggest that financial
incentives are important in order to make experimental results reliable.
Textbooks that guide beginners how to conduct economics experiments, for
example, suggest " . motivate subjects by paying them in cash...
Most of the payment should be sensitively linked to subjects'
actions in the experiment" (Friedman and Sunder 1994), and argue
that "... what people say they would do in hypothetical situations
does not always reflect what they actually do" (Friedman and Cassar
2004).
Several review articles examined the issue of financial incentives,
with mixed findings (Camerer and Hogarth 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann 2003;
Jenkins et al. 1998): in some cases financial incentives affect behavior
and choices, while in other cases they do not. Camerer and Hogarth, for
example, considered 74 experiments and found cases in which the level of
incentives affected behavior, but nevertheless there was no case in
which higher incentives made rationality violations disappear.
Given the controversy and the mixed results about the effect of
financial incentives, and because the entire literature on relative
thinking is based on experiments without financial incentives, it seemed
important to test whether the bias of relative thinking exists also when
financial incentives are present, or even better, in real-world
situations, where decisions make a difference for the subject. Doing so
is the purpose of this article.
The article is organized as follows. Section II presents a field
experiment that creates a real-world situation where relative thinking
matters. People could buy a bagel or a bagel with cream cheese. The
bagel's price varied between treatments, but the extra cost of the
cream cheese was kept constant, thus creating the possibility of
detecting relative thinking. Section III describes a
hypothetical-scenario counterpart to the field experiment, which was
used to reinforce the conclusion about the effect of financial
incentives on relative thinking. Section IV addresses the issue of the
potential correlation between the willingness to pay (WTP) for the bagel
and for the cream cheese, and the last section discusses the
implications of the findings.
II. A FIELD EXPERIMENT WITH BAGELS AND CREAM CHEESE
The experimental evidence for relative thinking can be stated as
follows: when consumers have to choose between two differentiated goods,
they consider not only the absolute price difference, but also the
relative price difference, even when the latter should be irrelevant.
For example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the differentiation comes
from the different location of the two stores, and in Azar (2004) it
comes from the characteristics of the goods (e.g., the time departure of
the flight). The aim in this article was therefore to create a setting
that will allow subjects to choose between two differentiated products,
where the differentiation between the two goods is constant and does not
depend on the good's price. (7) The setting that was chosen for the
experiment was to sell bagels: the low-quality good was just a bagel,
and the high-quality good was a bagel with cream cheese. Fresh bagels
were obtained from a nearby grocery store, and the cream cheese offered
was a 1-oz individually packed serving of Kraft's Philadelphia
cream cheese.
The experiment was first conducted by selling bagels with and
without cream cheese in the main building of the Kellogg School of
Management (at the Evanston Campus of Northwestern University). A few
months later, in order to verify the robustness of the results, it was
replicated in the lobby of Tech building at Northwestern University. In
both places, there are often similar occasions in which students sell
various things, so the subjects did not find the bagels' offering
unnatural.
In each location, the experiment was conducted on two different
days. On one day, a bagel alone was sold for $0.30, and a bagel with
cream cheese was sold for $0.50. On the other day, bagels were offered
for $0.05 and bagels with cream cheese for $0.25. Cream cheese alone
could not be purchased. The bagels and cream cheese were presented on a
table, and the potential buyers could easily observe them before
deciding whether and what to purchase. In Kellogg's building the
experiment was conducted each day from 8:45 until 15:30, and in the Tech
building it was run between 8:45 and 14:00 on both days. Each customer
could buy only one bagel (either with or without cream cheese). In
total, on the 4 d, 171 bagels were sold, of them 124 with cream cheese.
Both buildings are among the biggest ones of Northwestern
University and each serves a very large number of students. Combined
with the fact that the experiment took place on different days of the
week, this implies that the chances that the same person purchased
bagels on both days are negligible and the experiment can therefore be
thought of as being very close to a between-subjects field experiment.
Let us consider one location, and compare what happens on the two
experiment days. The difference between the low-quality and the
high-quality good is constant (the cream cheese), and the price
difference between the goods is constant ($0.20). Some consumers may
prefer the bagel without cream cheese for dietary or other reasons.
Because it is also cheaper, they should purchase a bagel without cream
cheese. The proportion of these buyers to the total number of buyers is
independent of the bagel's price, so it should be similar on both
days. Those who like to have cream cheese on their bagels should compare
the gain in utility from having cream cheese to the gain in utility they
can get by using the $0.20 (that they save if they give up the cream
cheese) for other purposes. The percentage of people for whom the
utility from having additional $0.20 exceeds the utility from the cream
cheese is independent of the bagel's price, and should therefore be
similar on both days. Let us denote the number of people who buy a bagel
with cream cheese by C and the number of those who buy only the bagel by
B. If people do not exhibit relative thinking, it follows from the
explanation above that C/(B + C) should be similar on both days.
If people exhibit relative thinking, however, they also compare the
$0.20 required to add cream cheese to the price of the bagel (or to the
price of the bagel with cream cheese; this does not change the
prediction). Consequently, the $0.20 seems a larger amount when the
bagel is sold for $0.05 than when it is sold for $0.30. Therefore, if
people exhibit relative thinking, C/(B + C) should be lower when the
bagels are sold for $0.05, because the relative addition for cream
cheese is larger in this case. Did people exhibit relative thinking in
the experiment? The left columns in Table 1 show that they did not.
Not surprisingly, we can see that when prices were lower, more
people purchased bagels (with or without cream cheese). More important
and interesting, however, is the examination of the percentage of people
who add cream cheese. The results show that the percentage of buyers who
decided to add the cream cheese was in fact higher when the bagel's
price was lower--in the opposite direction to the prediction of relative
thinking. The percentage difference between the two treatments (67.4%
vs. 74.2% in the combined sample), however, is not statistically
significant at any conventional level of significance, as the p-values
reported in Table 1 indicate. Consequently, the null hypothesis that the
bagel's price has no effect on the decision whether to add the
cream cheese cannot be rejected. That is, consumer behavior in the
experiment is consistent with rational-choice theory. The experiment
failed to document a bias of relative thinking, despite the robustness
of this bias in experiments involving hypothetical questions.
Replicating the results in the two buildings, in addition to
increasing the sample size, has another advantage. The Tech building
serves undergraduate and graduate students in various disciplines. The
Kellogg building serves mostly MBA students. This implies that on
average the income of buyers in the Kellogg building is much higher than
that of buyers in the Tech building. The results in both places being
qualitatively similar suggest that they seem to be robust to income
level variation.
III. THE HYPOTHETICAL-SCENARIO COUNTERPART
While the experimental design was chosen in a way that mimics the
hypothetical scenarios used in previous studies in which relative
thinking was documented, it seemed a good idea to test for relative
thinking in a hypothetical scenario equivalent to the field experiment,
in order to reinforce the conclusion that the introduction of financial
incentives is the reason that relative thinking disappeared in the field
experiment. To do so, 378 undergraduate students at Northwestern
University answered one of two versions of the following question
(prices in brackets represent the second treatment):
You enter one of the buildings on campus one day and find a person
sitting at a table with bagels and cream cheese packs. You can buy there
one of the following two options (limited to one bagel per customer):
1. bagel for $0.30 [$0.05]
2. A bagel with cream cheese (a 1-oz individually packed serving of
Kraft's Philadelphia cream cheese) for $0.50 [$0.25]
Assuming that you must buy one of the two options, which one do you
prefer? (Please circle one option)
1. The bagel only for $0.30 [$0.05]
2. The bagel with the cream cheese for $0.50 [$0.25]
Would you purchase your preferred option if you had the choice
between buying it and not buying a bagel at all? (Please circle one
answer)
1. Yes
2. No
Among the 378 subjects, 214 indicated that they would purchase
their preferred option if they also had the choice not to buy at all.
Because the sample in the field experiment includes only people who
decided to make a purchase, only these 214 subjects are analyzed, in
order to make the results comparable to the field experiment. As the
right column in Table 1 reveals, in the high-price treatment 82.2% of
the subjects wanted to pay the extra $0.20 and add the cream cheese,
whereas in the low-price treatment only 72.6% wanted to do so. This
difference, which is statistically significant at the 5% level, is
consistent with the relative thinking bias found in other
hypothetical-scenario studies in the literature. Because the $0.20
addition for the cream cheese seems more significant in relative terms
when compared to $0.05 than when compared to $0.30, more subjects choose
to add the cream cheese when the bagel's price is $0.30. The
conclusion is that the non-existence of relative thinking bias in the
field experiment seems to be the result of the introduction of financial
incentives and not of the specific decision problem.
To further verify the robustness of this conclusion, three
regressions that include the data from both the hypothetical and the
field experiments were run. The dependent variable was CHEESE (1 if the
subject purchased also cream cheese, 0 if only a bagel) and the
independent variables were HIGH (1 in the high-price treatment, 0
otherwise), REAL (1 in the field experiment, 0 in the hypothetical
experiment), and REALHIGH (the value of REAL*HIGH). Because HIGH
captures relative thinking, the coefficient of the interaction term
REALHIGH indicates the difference in relative thinking between the field
and the hypothetical-scenario experiments. The coefficient of REALHIGH
is negative in all three regressions (suggesting more relative thinking
in the hypothetical experiment than in the field experiment), and its
one-tailed p-value is 0.045 in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression, 0.041 in the logit regression, and 0.042 in the probit regression. These results further support the conclusion that there is a
statistically significant difference in relative thinking behavior
between the field experiment and the hypothetical-scenario experiment.
This suggests that introducing financial incentives eliminates the
relative thinking behavior, at least in the context explored in this
experiment, of choosing between two differentiated goods.
IV. THE CORRELATION BETWEEN WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR THE BAGEL AND
FOR THE CREAM CHEESE
One issue that might affect the results is the sample selection in
the two price treatments. The average WTP (AWTP) for the bagel of people
who make a purchase when the bagel's price is $0.05 is lower than
the average WTP of purchasing customers when the bagel's price is
$0.30. This is because the purchase decision indicates that the WTP is
higher than the price, and a higher price then implies a higher average
WTP. The failure to detect relative thinking in the field experiment
could, theoretically, occur even if people do exhibit relative thinking,
if there is an opposite effect that comes from the correlation between
the WTP for the bagel and the WTP for the cream cheese. In particular,
if this correlation is negative, then buyers in the low-price treatment
(who have on average lower WTP for the bagel than buyers in the
high-price treatment as explained above) have a higher average WTP for
the cream cheese, and this should result in a larger tendency to add the
cream cheese in the low-price treatment--in opposite direction to the
relative thinking effect.
Fortunately, the data from the hypothetical-scenario question can
assist us in ruling out this possibility, using the responses to the
question "Would you purchase your preferred option if you had the
choice between buying it and not buying a bagel at all?" In total,
we have eight different possible outcomes, because there are three
variables, each with two possible values. A person could prefer a bagel
only (B) or a bagel with cream cheese (C); he could prefer purchasing
(P) or not (N) if he had the option; and he might be in the high-price
(H) or low-price (L) treatments.
Obviously, people in group C (i.e., those who added cream cheese)
have on average a higher WTP for the cream cheese than people in group
B, because a person should choose to add the cream cheese if and only if
his WTP for it is higher than $0.20, because the cost of adding the
cream cheese in all treatments is $0.20. Thus, the dummy variable CHEESE, which equals 1 if the subject added cream cheese, is a proxy for
the WTP for the cream cheese, because the two are positively correlated.
We can now turn to creating a proxy for the WTP for the bagel by using
the subject's decision of P versus N and his treatment (H vs. L).
The lowest average WTP belongs to those who did not want to make a
purchase even at the low price (N & L). The next lowest WTP is in
the group that did not purchase at the high price (N & H). Next we
have those who purchased at the low price (P & L), and the highest
average WTP belongs to those who purchased at the high price (P &
H).
For example, if we focus on those in group B and assume that the
WTP for a bagel is distributed uniformly over the range $0-$0.50, we get
(8): AWTP (N & L) = E(WTP | WTP < $0.05) = $0.025; AWTP (N &
H) = E(WTP | WTP < $0.30) = $0.15; AWTP (P & L) = E (WTP | WTP
> $0.05) = $0.275; and AWTP (P & H) = E(WTP | WTP > $0.30) =
$0.40. While obtaining these specific values depends on the assumption
about the distribution of the WTP, the ranking between the four groups
applies for any distribution of the WTP. Therefore we can define a proxy
variable AWTP, which equals 0 for (N & L), 1 for (N & H), 2 for
(P & L), and 3 for (P & H), and these ordinal values capture the
average level of the WTP for the bagel in the four groups.
What is left to be done is to examine whether there is a
statistically significant negative correlation between AWTP and CHEESE.
Regressing CHEESE on AWTP (and a constant) shows that the correlation is
in fact positive, and is not statistically significant (the p-value of
the coefficient of AWTP is between 0.298 and 0.302 in logit, probit, and
OLS estimations). Therefore, the hypothesis that in the field experiment
there exists relative thinking which is not evident because of a
counter-effect that results from negative correlation between the WTP
for bagels and the WTP for cream cheese is not supported by the data.
V. CONCLUSION
A very common consumer decision problem is the choice between
differentiated goods or services, making it important to understand how
consumers make these choices. The evidence on relative thinking suggests
that when consumers consider purchasing one of two differentiated goods,
both the absolute price difference and the relative price difference
affect their decision. Similarly, as Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and
others showed, when consumers consider whether to make a certain effort
to save a certain amount on a good they want to buy, they are affected
not only by the absolute savings but also by the savings relative to the
good's price, even though the latter should be irrelevant. Many
studies show this behavior, but all of them are based on hypothetical
questions and do not involve financial incentives to make correct
decisions.
To examine whether the relative thinking bias is robust to the
introduction of financial incentives, a field experiment was conducted.
Bagels served as a low-quality good, and bagels with cream cheese served
as a high-quality good. The extra amount needed in order to purchase the
high-quality good was kept constant, whereas the bagel's price
varied across treatments. According to the relative thinking behavior,
the percentage of customers who choose to buy bagels with cream cheese
should be lower when the bagel's price is lower (because the extra
cost of the cream cheese relative to the bagel's price is higher).
In two different replications of the experiment, however, the opposite
result was obtained: a higher percentage of buyers added the cream
cheese when the bagel's price was lower. The difference in the
proportion of buyers adding the cream cheese in the two treatments,
however, is not statistically significant. Consequently, the results in
the field experiment are consistent with the prediction of
rational-choice theory (which predicts that the percentage of consumers
who add the cream cheese should be similar in both treatments), but not
with the prediction of relative thinking.
To verify that the disappearance of relative thinking in the field
experiment is because of the financial incentives that were introduced
and not to other differences between the consumer decision and decisions
used in previous studies (which documented relative thinking in
hypothetical questions), (9) a hypothetical-scenario version of the
experiment was run. In that version, relative thinking was documented,
suggesting that indeed the introduction of financial incentives seems to
be the reason for the disappearance of relative thinking.
Do the results imply that relative thinking is a phenomenon that
only occurs with hypothetical questions, but disappears with financial
incentives? This is an intriguing question. It will be surprising to
find that this is the case, given that many experiments with
hypothetical questions found a significant behavior of relative
thinking, and given that Camerer and Hogarth (1999) concluded, based on
74 experiments, that "no replicated study has made rationality
violations disappear purely by raising incentives." The field
experiment reported above, however, seemed to make the rationality
violation of relative thinking disappear by introducing incentives. (10)
Moreover, the results were replicated in two different locations and the
hypothetical version showed that relative thinking does exist in this
decision problem without financial incentives. Nevertheless, it might be
too early to conclude that relative thinking disappears with the
introduction of financial incentives, because so far this is the only
study that tests for relative thinking when presenting financial
incentives. Possibly the small amounts of money involved in the purchase
decision or the very cheap price of the bagel in the low-price treatment
($0.05) affect decisions in a certain way, and somewhat different
results will be obtained in experiments involving larger amounts of
money. I hope that this article will encourage others to design
additional experiments that test for the effects of financial incentives
on relative thinking, and will thus promote our knowledge of these
effects further.
ABBREVIATIONS
AWTP: Average Willingness to Pay
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares
WTP: Willingness to Pay
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00285.x
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(1.) For simplicity I discuss on]y two alternative goods, but of
course the idea applies also when more alternatives exist.
(2.) This assumes that we can ignore wealth effects, an assumption
that can be justified for most goods, because the good's price is
negligible compared to the consumer's lifetime wealth.
(3.) The higher price is in the preferred store, obviously,
otherwise the consumer is not indifferent.
(4.) See Azar (2007) for a literature review, a theoretical
framework, and some further discussion of relative thinking, and Azar
(2008) for a discussion why "relative thinking" seems to be a
better terminology than "mental accounting," which was
sometimes used to describe the same behavior.
(5.) Financial incentives mean that the subject has monetary
rewards to answer correctly. Therefore, paying a constant show-up fee is
not considered financial incentives. One study that used financial
incentives and is worth mentioning is Hossain and Morgan (2006). While
their focus was on the perception of shipping charges versus the
good's price and not on the perception of price differences between
differentiated goods, their results are somewhat related to relative
thinking. They find that for higher-priced items, where the shipping fee
is a relatively small percentage of the total price, announcing a high
shipping fee in an auction results in higher total revenue than with a
low shipping fee. However, this no longer holds for lower-priced goods
for which the high shipping fee is a large percentage of the total
price. This finding suggests that the percentage of the shipping fee
from the total price affects behavior even though a fully rational
consumer should not be affected by this percentage.
(6.) Hertwig and Ortmann (2003), for example, report that in a
sample of 106 empirical studies on Bayesian reasoning published in
psychology journals, fewer than 3% provided financial incentives.
(7.) For example, the differentiation between a good with l-year
warranty and a good with 3-year warranty is not independent of the
good's price, because the value of the warranty is higher when the
good's price is higher. Then relative price differences are
relevant and it can no longer be argued that paying attention to them
expresses biased decision making.
(8.) E() means the expected value of the expression in parentheses.
The symbol r means "conditional on." The conditioning is a
straightforward result of the decision to purchase or not and the price
treatment.
(9.) In the field experiment reported in this article, the cream
cheese is a complementary good to the bagel, and a bagel with cream
cheese is superior (for most people) to a bagel without cream cheese. In
much of the earlier literature the relative thinking is documented when
the consumer has the option to save money on the purchase of a good by
going to a cheaper store. This is a different context. However, Azar
(2004) observes relative thinking also in consumer decisions involving
differentiated goods (as is the case here).
(10.) Because subjects purchase the bagel with real money, this
provides them incentives to make correct choices (choices that reflect
their true preferences); this is also the purpose of providing financial
incentives in lab experiments. One advantage of field experiments over
lab experiments, however, is the higher degree of external validity: it
is easier to make the case that the results carry over to natural
economic situations when the experiment is in such situations than when
it is in an artificial lab environment. On the other hand, in field
experiments it is harder to control the experimental conditions than it
is in the lab.
OFER H. AZAR *
* I thank Colin Camerer. James Dana, Stefano Della Vigna, Ernst
Fehr, Daniel Friedman, David Laibson, George Loewenstein, Ulrike
Malmendier, Robert Porter, William Rogerson, Adi Sagi, the anonymous
referees, and the Co-Editor David Reiley for helpful conversations and
comments. I am very grateful to Mateo Caronia, Lillian Kamal. Brandy Lipton, Mark Surdutovich, Mark Witte, and Martin Zelder for running the
hypothetical version of the experiment in their classes, and to Mark
Witte also for organizing this effort. Financial support from the
University Research Grants Committee at Northwestern University and from
The Phillipe Monaster Center for Economic Research at Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev is gratefully acknowledged.
Azar: Senior Lecturer, Department of Business Administration.
Guilford Glazer School of Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University
of the Negev, PO Box 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. Phone 972-8-6472675.
Fax 972-8-6477691, E-mail azar@som.bgu.ac.il
TABLE 1
Experimental Results
Field Experiment Experiment
Field (Kellogg) (Tech)
Low-price treatment
Bagel for $0.05 15 18
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.25 31 64
Percentage adding cream cheese 67.4% 78.0%
High-price treatment
Bagel for $0.30 7 7
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.50 9 20
Percentage adding cream cheese 56.3% 74.1%
Statistical tests for difference between the two price treatments
p-value (logit) 0.217 0.335
p-value (probit) 0.213 0.336
p-value (OLS) 0.216 0.337
Field Experiment Hypothetical
(Combined) Scenario
Low-price treatment
Bagel for $0.05 33 31
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.25 95 82
Percentage adding cream cheese 74.2% 72.6%
High-price treatment
Bagel for $0.30 14 18
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.50 29 83
Percentage adding cream cheese 67.4% 82.2%
Statistical tests for difference between the two price treatments
p-value (logit) 0.195 0.049
p-value (probit) 0.197 0.048
p-value (OLS) 0.196 0.048
Notes: The reported p-values are the one-tailed p-values of the
coefficient of HIGH (a dummy variable which equals I in the high-
price treatment) in a regression where the dummy variable CHEESE (1
if the subject purchased also cream cheese, 0 if only a bagel) is
regressed on HIGH and a constant.