Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and urban unemployment.
Beladi, Hamid ; Chakrabarti, Avik ; Marjit, Sugata 等
I. INTRODUCTION
An extensive body of literature has looked at possible effects of
trade liberalization on the labor market in the North. The effects on
the labor market in the South have not drawn as much attention.
Conventional wisdom, associated with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,
predicts a gradual reduction of skilled-unskilled wage inequality in the
South. However, recent studies on Latin American countries exhibit
conflicting patterns. Wood (1997) summarizes the empirical findings
citing a series of articles by Robbins (1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) that
convincingly demonstrate that Latin America has experienced an
increasing wage gap between the skilled and the unskilled following a
more open trade and investment regime. While globalization-induced
changes in production patterns and the consequent increase in the demand
for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor has often been cited as
the root cause of wage inequality, there has been no general agreement
over the possible source of such increased demand for skilled labor. The
debate among economists on this has followed two broad paths, one
relying on technological changes and the other on trade and investment.
While technological change may have played a key role in the widening
wage gap in the industrialized countries, there is strong evidence
(Robbins 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b; Robbins and Zveglich
1995; Wood 1997) indicating the dominant influence of trade and
investment on wage inequality in the developing economies.
The implications of a more open trade and investment regime need to
be analyzed in terms of frameworks that explicitly take into account the
structural features of labor markets in the South. One of the key
structural differences between the North and the South is that the South
experiences a pronounced rural-urban migration in the presence of urban
unemployment (Basu 1997; Ray 1998). The goal of our paper was to capture
this feature within the structure of a simple general equilibrium model
in an effort to understand the effect of fragmentation on the
skilled-unskilled wage differential and employment in the South.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
places this paper in the context of the relevant literature. Section III
describes the general equilibrium model with the possibility of
fragmentation and unemployment. Section IV compares and contrasts the
impact of trade and endowment on the skilled-unskilled wage gap and
employment with and without fragmentation. Section V concludes.
II. CONTEXT
The motivation of this paper stems from our view that the southern
experience does not necessarily contradict conventional wisdom, as has
been claimed in Wood (1997), but points to the need for parsimonious yet
meaningful modifications of the structure of general equilibrium models,
from which the wisdom is derived, to properly reflect the salient
structural features of the South.
On the one hand, production fragmentation has become an important
facet of globalization in modern times. (1) Sharp declines in
transportation and communication costs have encouraged this process of
"slicing the value chain" that is evident in international
trade data. This has been sustained by various regional integration
agreements that have reduced the barriers to international trade and
investment as well as important technical innovations in
telecommunications and information technology that have facilitated the
coordination of international production networks. This advanced stage
in the international division of the chain of production has brought a
fundamental change in the nature of international trade as goods
increasingly cross multiple national borders while they are in process.
Several authors, such as Jones, Kierzkowski, and Lurong (2005), Wan
(2005), Long (2005), Jones and Kierzkowski (1998), Jones and Marjit
(2001), Arndt (1998), Feenstra (1998), Harris (1998), Hummels, Rapoport,
and Yi (1998), Feenstra and Hanson (1996b), and Dixit and Grossman
(1982) have analyzed the role of "fragmentation" in world
trade. Although the process of fragmentation is not new, it has appeared
more frequently in the recent literature on international trade since
rapid technological transformations have made international coordination
of fragmented production increasingly feasible. While the term
"fragmentation" was coined by Jones and Kierzkowski (1998),
several other terms have been used in the literature to highlight
specific features of the process of fragmentation including
"internationalization" (Grossman and Helpman 1999),
"disintegration" (Feenstra 1998), "intraproduct
specialization" (Arndt 1998), "vertical specialization"
(Hummels, Rapoport, and Yi 1998), "subcontracting" and
"outsourcing" (Feenstra and Hanson 1996b), and
"multistage production" (Dixit and Grossman 1982).
On the other hand, it is rather conspicuous that in the entire
debate on trade and wage inequality, but for a handful of studies by
Feenstra and Hanson (1996a), Marjit (1991, 2003), Marjit and Acharyya
(2003), and Kimura and Ando (2005), there has been a dearth of analyses
that specifically incorporate the structural features of the South. In
an elegant piece, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a) modeled the effect of an
increase in the capital stock in the South relative to the North or a
neutral technological progress in the South on the skilled-unskilled
wage dispersion. Marjit (2003) analyzed the consequences of liberal
economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with
formal-informal labor markets, wage differential, vertical linkage, and
restricted capital movement. Marjit and Acharyya (2003) direct our
attention to segmented labor markets of the third world in search of an
explanation of the rising wage inequality across trading nations. Kimura
and Ando (2005) have constructed a model of two-dimensional (in terms of
geographical distance and controllability of a firm for fragmented
production processes) fragmentation and empirically analyses the
international production/distribution networks.
All of these contributions focus on full-employment (2) models. One
of the most important structural differences between the North and the
South is the distribution of the population between rural and urban
areas. Urban population growth in the South is far more rapid than the
overall growth in population, and more than half of this urban growth is
accounted for by migrants from the rural areas. Moreover, while all
economies display some amount of unemployment, it is particularly
pronounced in the South where there exists rural-urban migration in the
presence of urban unemployment. During the last decade, high-income
developed countries exhibited an average annual growth of urban
population by 0.8% compared to the overall population growth of 0.6% per
year. The picture is quite the opposite in the South. For the 45
low-income countries covered by the World Bank, urban population growth
was nearly double that of overall population growth: the average rate of
urban population growth was 3.9% per year, while the average rate of
population growth was 2% per year for the same group of countries. For
the 63 countries classified as middle income by the Bank, the urban
population growth rate was 2.8% per year compared to the overall
population growth rate of 1.7% per year. This has been an outcome of
both a "push" from the rural agricultural base and the
perceived "pull" from the urban sectors. See Table 1 for
representative figures on Latin America. By capturing the feature of
rural-urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment (a la
Harris-Todaro), our paper complements the literature cited above in a
clearly distinctive way: it enriches the process of commodity market and
factor market interactions that resemble the southern experience. See
Table 1 for representative figures on Latin America.
The link between unemployment and rural-urban migration has
attracted enormous attention dating back to Todaro (1969) and Harris and
Todaro (1970). Theft work took the view that labor migrates wherever its
expected income is relatively high: hence, in equilibrium, expected
incomes--at least for relevant workers--must be equated between urban
and rural employment. Since urban wages are invariably higher than rural
wages, the equilibration of income occurs with the existence of
unemployed or underemployed urban labor. The predictions of the
Harris-Todaro model have been repeatedly validated in empirical tests
(see Barnum and Sabot 1975; Cole and Sanders 1983; Todaro 1976a, 1976b)
and has been widely applied to investigate various developmental issues
and to evaluate alternative policies (see Beladi and Marjit 1996; Beladi
and Ingene 1994; Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1974; Bhatia 1979; Corden and
Findlay 1975; Das 1982; Jha and Lachler 1981; Marjit 1991; Marjit and
Beladi 2003; Robertson and Wellisz 1977).
The present paper argues that a rise in the international price of
the skilled final product and acquisition of a cheaper intermediate from
the global market will have drastically different implications for the
unskilled (rural) wage. While fragmentation necessarily improves the
unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities
for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can
reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment.
III. MODEL
A major deficiency of most theories used to explain wage movements
in the South is that the pattern of trade and comparative advantage are
often much more complex than what the theories suggest. (3) To measure
an aggregate index of skill or capital content of exports to assert the
relative factor abundance hypothesis in its starkest form may not help
us to identify the reason behind and pattern of factor price movements
since it fails to capture the diverse trade pattern. For example, India
and China both are major exporters of primary products, as well as
software services. In fact, the software exports are the fastest-growing
exports in India. And, India with its vast land and unskilled population
continues to be a major agricultural nation. Historically, most Latin
American countries had engaged in an import substitution
industrialization strategy as a response to the collapse of the
international trading system during the Great Depression. During the
1930s and 1940s, industrial growth was led by few industries (e.g.,
beverages, oil derivatives, nonmetallic minerals, and textiles). Since
the early 1950s, a second phase of import substitution started with a
focus on industries including paper and printing, chemicals and rubber,
basic metals, and metal products. Currently, the major exporters in the
region (Table 2) export goods that are highly skill intensive including
computer equipment, medical equipment, optical instruments, medical
instruments, photographic equipment, optical fiber, telecommunication
equipment, electric power transmission equipment, electrical circuit
equipment, electrical distribution equipment, as well as goods that have
a relatively low skill content, for example, agricultural produce,
spices, tobacco, wood, pulp, chemicals, footwear, etc. It is also
interesting to note that India as well as the Latin American countries
import intermediate goods to be used along with skilled labor to produce
exportable goods. This is quite evident, for instance, in a recent paper
by Bender and Li (2001) where they have examined the patterns of trade
and comparative advantage for East Asian (Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea,
Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) and Latin
American (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Ecuador) economies.
To capture the idea that an economy can export skilled as well as
unskilled products, (4), (5) consider a small open economy producing
four goods: agricultural export good (X), importable good (Y), skilled
exportable good (Z), and a nontraded good (M), which is an
(intermediate) input used in the skilled export good sector. There are
four inputs: skilled labor (S), unskilled labor (L), land (T), and
capital (K), which are all in fixed supply.
The rural area produces the agricultural product with unskilled
labor (earning rural unskilled wage (w)) and land. The unskilled
manufacturing sector represents the import-competing segment of this
economy, which uses unskilled labor (earning a minimum wage [bar.w]) and
capital. The nontraded intermediate good uses skilled labor and capital.
The skilled exportable good uses skilled labor and the intermediate
input. The production functions exhibit constant returns to scale and
diminishing marginal productivities. Markets are perfectly competitive.
The following symbols are used in generating the equations used in the
system: [bar.w], urban minimum unskilled wage; [w.sub.s], skilled wage;
w, rural unskilled wage; (6) r, return to capital; R, rent on land;
[P.sub.i], price of the ith product i, x, m, y, z; [a.sub.ij] s are the
usual input-output coefficients.
Migration takes place from the flexible-wage rural sector to the
unskilled fixed-wage urban sector. The migration rule follows the
standard Harris-Todaro property. Rural workers cannot migrate to the
skilled sectors that have market-determined skilled wage [w.sub.s] >
[bar.w], the fixed urban unskilled wage.
Figure 1 captures the incentive for fragmentation, that is,
accessing the cheaper intermediate good from abroad. In the absence of
fragmentation, the intermediate input M is produced within the country
because the possibility of accessing the cheaper intermediate from
abroad is impeded by fixed costs (F): [P.sup.*.sub.m] < [P.sub.m]
where [P.sup.*.sub.m] is the price of the foreign intermediate good.
Given [P.sub.z], a fall in [P.sub.m] will raise [w.sub.s]. Let
[w.sup.*.sub.s] be the corresponding skilled wage when the price of the
input is [P.sup.*.sub.m]. Also, [w.sup.*.sub.s] and [P.sup.*.sub.m] are
negatively related. If ([w.sup.*.sub.s] - [w.sub.s])S < F, skilled
entrepreneurs do not have any incentive to use the foreign intermediate
good (Figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Without loss of generality, we choose good Y to be the numeraire:
[P.sub.y] = 1. Throughout the text a "^" denotes proportional
change.
Note that for [P.sup.*.sub.m] [member of] [[[bar.P].sup.*.sub.m],
[P.sub.m]] lower-priced intermediate will not be used. It is assumed
that the skilled labor sector as a whole decides on using the cheaper
intermediate good and decides on incurring the fixed cost, and if
[P.sup.*.sub.m] < [[bar.P].sup.*.sub.m], only then does import take
place. It is straightforward to argue that a lower F and/or higher S
will increase [[bar.P].sup.*.sub.m], the critical maximum price of the
foreign intermediate for which the local users will go for foreign
intermediate. Suppose a decline in F makes it possible for the producers
to pay [P.sup.*.sub.m] and this is what we define as
"fragmentation" in our framework.
Competitive equilibrium implies
(1) [wa.sub.lx] + [Ra.sub.tx] = [P.sub.x],
(2) [[bar.w]a.sub.ly] + [ra.sub.ly] = 1,
(3) [w.sub.s][a.sub.sz] + [P.sub.m][a.sub.mz] = [P.sub.z],
(4) [w.sub.s][a.sub.sm] + [ra.sub.km] = [P.sub.m].
Full employment of resources is ensured by
(5) [a.sub.sz]Z + [a.sub.sm]M = [bar.S],
(6) [a.sub.ky]Y + [a.sub.km]M = [bar.K],
(7) [a.sub.tx]X = [bar.Y].
The Harris-Todaro migration equilibrium yields
(8) [bar.w] [[a.sub.ly]Y/[bar.L] - [a.sub.lx]X] = w.
It may be noted that the full-employment condition with flexible
wage would be:
(8') [a.sub.lz]X + [a.sub.ly]Y = [bar.L].
Equilibrium in the market for the local intermediate good requires
(9) [a.sub.mz]Z = M.
We have nine equations to solve for w, R, r, [w.sub.s], [P.sub.m],
X, Y, Z, and M.
IV. FRAGMENTATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND WAGES
Initially [P.sub.m] is the local price of the nontraded good before
the process of fragmentation sets in. Let us first look at the impact of
a rise in [P.sub.z] in the global market at this stage. Figure 2 shows
the relationship between [w.sub.s] and [P.sub.m] (ZZ represents Equation
(3) and MM represents Equation (4)) given r (from Equation (2)) and
[P.sub.z].
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
A rise in [P.sub.z] moves the equilibrium from [E.sub.0] to
[E.sub.1] raising both [w.sub.s] and [P.sub.m]. First note, from
Equation (4), that [w.sub.s]/[P.sub.m] must rise as r is held fixed.
Therefore, the unit skilled labor requirement in the intermediate goods
sector as well as the skilled exportable sector ([a.sub.sm] and
[a.sub.sz], respectively) must fall and the unit intermediate
goods' requirement in the skilled exportable sector ([a.sub.mz])
must rise. Since S is given, and [a.sub.sm] and [a.sub.sz] are falling,
Z and/or M must rise. But [a.sub.mz] has gone up and so will M/Z. This
must imply that the output of the nontraded intermediate good (M) rises.
Now the unit capital requirement in the intermediate goods sector
([a.sub.km]) has gone up, M has gone up, but the unit capital as well as
unskilled labor requirement in the import-competing sector ([a.sub.ky]
and [al.sub.y], respectively) remain unchanged. Therefore, the output of
the importable (Y) must fall. This must imply a drop in urban
employment, a reverse migration to the agricultural sector (X), and a
drop in w. Hence, our first proposition follows. The anticipated
movement in the skilled-unskilled wage differential is consistent with
that in the flexible-wage (full-employment) equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1. Without fragmentation, an increase in the price of
the skilled exportable raises skilled wage and reduces the rural
unskilled wage, thus unambiguously increasing the skilled-unskilled wage
gap. This also raises unemployment.
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Proof See discussion above. [QED].
A rise in [P.sub.m] and M draws capital away from the unskilled
import-competing sector (Y) and penalizes the unskilled labor.
Consider now the effect that fragmentation has on the labor market.
Fragmentation reduces [P.sub.m] to [P.sup.*.sub.m], which is now
exogenously given to the small economy. In Figure 3, we now have the
equilibrium combination ([w.sup.*.sub.s], [P.sup.*.sub.m]), which makes
local production of M unprofitable.
All skilled labor will now produce Z by importing M at
[P.sup.*.sub.m] and all capital will leave sector M for Y. This
definitely implies that Y will increase, w will increase, and
unemployment will fall. The probability of being employed by members of
the unskilled urban workers is thus raised, drawing workers away from
the agricultural sector, thus raising their marginal product. Hence, the
following proposition. The anticipated movements in the absolute levels
of skilled wage and unskilled wage are consistent with that in the
flexible-wage (full-employment) equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2. Fragmentation raises skilled wage as well as the
rural unskilled wage and reduces unemployment.
Proof See discussion above. [QED].
Let us now turn to the effect of fragmentation on the
skilled-unskilled wage gap. Hereinafter, [[theta].sub.fi] represents the
unit cost shares of factor f in industry i. From Equation (3),
(10) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
From Equation (6),
(11) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
From Equations (7) and (8),
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
(12) -[bar.w][L.sub.y][??] = 0,
which boils down to
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
(13) -[bar.w][L.sub.y][[??].sub.M],
where [[sigma].sub.X] is the elasticity of substitution between
land and labor in the agricultural sector.
From Equation (1),
(14) -[bar.w][L.sub.y][??]
Substituting Equation (14) in Equation (13),
(15) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Note that the magnitude of the change in w depends on how much
capital is being released from M to Y as well as on the extent of
unemployment and the elasticity of substitution. From this follows our
next proposition. In contrast, the flexible-wage (full-employment)
equilibrium would anticipate that fragmentation raises the skilled wage
relative to the rural unskilled wage when the skilled export good is
less capital intensive relative to the importable good.
PROPOSITION 3. For very high degrees of substitution between land
and labor, fragmentation raises the skilled wage relative to the rural
unskilled wage but can lower the skilled wage relative to the rural
unskilled wage for very low degrees of substitution.
Proof From Equations (10) and (15), [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
Note that, as [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
[QED]
However, fragmentation definitely has the tendency to raise the
rural wage and increase urban employment by creating a more specialized
skilled labor.
Intuitively, for a given price of the skilled export good, the
decline in the price of the intermediate means that the price of skilled
labor must rise. The fact that all intermediates are now imported means
that capital is freed up to go to the manufacturing sector. This
necessarily raises output in that sector (note that because of the fixed
unskilled manufacturing wage, the rental rate is also fixed; this means
input-output coefficients in manufacturing are fixed as well) and
consequently unskilled employment rises as well. The increased demand
for unskilled labor drives up the unskilled agriculture wage. If the
unskilled agricultural wage were to remain constant, then urban
unemployment would have to rise, which could only happen if labor used
in agriculture fell. But this could only happen if agricultural output
fell. But with unchanged product and factor prices, production
techniques are not changing, and the full use-of-land condition would
mean that agricultural output could not fall; consequently, the
unskilled agriculture wage must change, that is, it rises. So,
fragmentation leads to an increase in both wages. Fragmentation also
leads to reduced unemployment (because it reduces the gap between the
fixed, unskilled urban wage and the unskilled agriculture wage). Because
both wages rise, the skill premium is ambiguous; under some conditions
it is possible for the skill wage to increase by more than the unskilled
wage.
Consider now the effect that a rise in [P.sub.z] in the global
market has on [w.sup.*.sub.s] at any given [P.sup.*.sub.m]. In Figure 4,
we have the equilibrium combination ([w.sup.1*.sub.s], [P.sup.*.sub.s]),
which renders local production of M unprofitable before and after the
improvement in the terms of trade. All skilled labor will continue to
produce Z by importing M at [P.sup.*.sub.m] and all capital will be
absorbed in Y. The output of the skilled exporting sector will increase
but the output of the unskilled import-competing sector will remain
unchanged since it is already absorbing all capital. As a result,
unskilled rural wage will remain the same and the skilled-unskilled wage
gap will unambiguously increase. Unemployment remains unchanged.
[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]
The following two propositions follow immediately.
In contrast, the flexible-wage (full-employment) equilibrium would
anticipate an increase in both the skilled and unskilled wages following
an improvement in the terms of trade when fragmentation is allowed and
any change in the skilled-unskilled wage differential would be directly
related to the relative capital intensity of the import-competing and
nontraded goods.
PROPOSITION 4. When fragmentation is allowed, an improvement in the
terms of trade raises the skilled-unskilled wage gap by raising skilled
wage without any effect on the rural unskilled wage and urban
unemployment.
Proof See discussion above. [QED].
PROPOSITION 5. Fragmentation magnifies the increase in the
skilled-unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of
trade for high degrees of substitution between land and labor.
Proof From Equation (15), as [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Hence, [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE
IN ASCII]
denotes the direct [[theta].sub.sz] plus indirect
[[theta].sub.sm][[theta].sub.mz] cost share for skilled labor in sector
Z. [QED].
Finally, let us look at the effect that a technical progress in M,
as an alternative to outsourcing, has on the labor market. Consider, for
simplicity, a uniform exogenous decline in the unit requirement of
skilled labor and capital for the production of M.
[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]
In Figure 5, the equilibrium moves from [E.sub.0] to [E.sub.1]
raising [w.sub.s] and lowering [P.sub.m]. Hence, [w.sub.s]/[P.sub.m]
must rise. As a result, the unit skilled labor requirement in the
skilled exportable sector ([a.sub.sz]) must fall and the unit
intermediate goods' requirement in the skilled exportable sector
([a.sub.mz]) must rise. Since S is given, and [a.sub.sm] and [a.sub.sz]
are falling, Z and/or M must rise. But [a.sub.mz] has gone up and so
will M/Z. This must imply that the output of the nontraded intermediate
good (M) rises and the output of the importable (Y) must fall. This must
imply a drop in urban employment, a reverse migration to the
agricultural sector (X), and a drop in w. In effect, M goes up and Y
goes down reducing w and increasing unemployment. Our final proposition
follows.
PROPOSITION 6. Without fragmentation, a technological progress in
the intermediate goods sector raises skilled wage and reduces the rural
unskilled wage, thus unambiguously increasing the skilled-unskilled wage
gap, and raises urban unemployment.
In contrast, fragmentation would remove the intermediate goods
sector (M) altogether and capital would be employed in the production of
the importable final good (Y). This also shows that if one sector
vanishes totally, it does not necessarily make the poor worse off after
all.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper offers a simple general equilibrium framework for
understanding the effect of trade liberalization and fragmentation on
employment and the skilled-unskilled wage differential in the third
world where rural-urban migration is a pervasive phenomenon in the
presence of urban unemployment. In all cases, the absolute wage of the
skilled labor does improve. It is shown that fragmentation unambiguously
reduces urban unemployment and can cause an increase in the wage of
skilled labor relative to unskilled labor if there is a high degree of
substitutability between land and labor. The effect of fragmentation,
ceteris paribus, on the skilled-unskilled wage gap depends on the
elasticity of (factor) substitution. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled-unskilled wage gap resulting from an
improvement in the terms of trade. When fragmentation is allowed, a rise
in the price of the skilled exports increases the skilled-unskilled wage
differential without affecting urban unemployment. Without
fragmentation, a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector
raises the skilled-unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. If
instead of outsourcing a better technology is employed to produce the
intermediate good, it affects the poor. Since capital stock is fixed, it
can get reallocated to the import-competing final goods sector. If
growth is weak in the developing economies, capital is not growing very
fast, sustained increase in the output of the intermediate goods sector
will hurt the import-competing final goods sector and employment.
However, if the import-competing final goods sector is initially
protected, then a decline in its output may be welfare improving.
It is our hope that future researchers will consider possible
extensions of our model as it centers around an issue that has been
relatively underresearched despite its importance, especially in the
less-developed countries. Some natural extensions of our model may
include imposing the structure of an overlapping generations model,
introducing diversification in household ownership of factors,
incorporating domestic distortions, and endogenizing product prices. It
would also be interesting to see the effect that fragmentation has on
the skilled labor formation in an extension of our model where
endogenous skill formation is tied to urban fixed or semifixed wage
distortion. Finally, allowing wages (as in efficiency wage or search
models) to be endogenously fixed (or semifixed) is also an extension
worth exploring.
doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00247.x
REFERENCES
Arndt, S. W. "Globalization and the Gains from Trade," in
Trade, Growth, and Economic Policy in Open Economies, edited by K. Koch
and K. Jaeger New York: Springer-Verlag, 1998, 3-12.
Barnum, H. N., and R. H. Sabot. Migration, Education and Urban
Surplus Labor. Paris, France: OECD Development Center, 1975.
Basu, K. Development Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
Beladi, H., and C. Ingene. "A General Equilibrium Analysis of
Rural-Urban Migration under Uncertainty." Journal of Regional
Science, 34, 1994, 91-103.
Beladi, H., and S. Marjit. "An Analysis of Rural-Urban
Migration and Protection." Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, 1996,
930-40.
Beladi, H., S. Chaudhuri, and S. Yabuuchi. "Can International
Factor Mobility Reduce Wage Inequality in a Dual Economy?" Review
of International Economics, 16, 2008, 893-903.
Bender, S., and K. Li. "Trade and Comparative Advantage of
Asia and Latin America Manufactured Exports." Working Paper, APEC
Study Center Consortium Conference, Tianjin, China, 2001.
Bhagwati, J. N., and T. N. Srinivasan. "On Re-Analyzing the
Harris-Todaro Model: Policy Rankings in the Case of Sector-Specific
Sticky Wages." American Economic Review, 1974, 502-08.
Bhatia, K. B. "Rural-Urban Migration and Surplus Labor."
Oxford Economic Papers, 31, 1979, 403-14.
Campa, J., and L. Goldberg. "The Evolving External Orientation
of Manufacturing: A Profile of Four Countries." Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 3, 1997, 53-81.
Cerrutti, M., and R. Bertoncello. Urbanization and Internal
Migration Patterns in Latin America. Johannesburg, Argentina: Centro de
Estudios de Poblacion, 2003.
Chaudhuri, S., and S. Yabuuchi. "Economic Liberalization and
Wage Inequality in the Presence of Labor Market Imperfection."
International Review of Economics and Finance, 16, 2007, 592-603.
Cole, W. E., and R. D. Sanders. "Interstate Migration in
Mexico: Variations on the Todaor Theme." Journal of Development
Economics, 12, 1983, 341-55.
Corden, W. M., and R. Findlay. "Urban Unemployment,
Intersectoral Capital Mobility and Development Policy." Economica,
42, 1975, 59-78.
Das, S. "Sector-Specific Minimum Wages, Economic Growth and
Some Policy Implications." Journal of Development Economics, 10,
1982, 127-31.
Dixit, A. K., and G. M. Grossman. "Trade and Protection with
Multistage Production." Review of Economic Studies, 59, 1982,
583-94.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Latin
America and the Caribbean in the Transition to a Knowledge-Based
Society: An Agenda for Public Policy (LC/L. 1383). Santiago, Chile:
Author, 2000.
Feenstra, R. C. "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of
Production in the Global Economy." Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12, 1998, 31-50.
Feenstra, R., and G. Hanson. "Foreign Investment, Outsourcing
and Relative Wages," in Political Economy of Trade Policies, Essays
in Honor of J. N. Bhagwati, edited by R. Feenstra, G. Grossman, and D.
Irwin. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996a,, 89-127.
--. "Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality."
American Economic Review, 86, 1996b, 240-45.
Harris, R. (1998), "A Communications Based Model of Global
Fragmentation." Mimeo, Simon Fraser University Press.
Harris, J. R., and M. P. Todaro. "Migration, Unemployment and
Development: A Two-Sector Analysis." American Economic Review, 60,
1970, 126-42.
Hummels, D., J. Ishii, and K. Yi. "The Nature and Growth of
Vertical Specialization in World Trade." Journal of International
Economics, 54, 2001, 75-96.
Hummels, D., D. Rapoport, and K. Yi. "Vertical Specialization
and the Changing Nature of World Trade." Federal Reserve Bank of
New York Economic Policy Review, 1998, 79-99.
Jha, R., and U. Lachler. "Optimum Taxation and Public
Production in a Dynamic Harris-Todaro World." Journal of
Development Economics, 9, 1981, 357-74.
Jones, R.W., H. Beladi, and S. Marjit. "Three Faces of Factor
Intensities." Journal of International Economics, 48, 1999, 413-20.
Jones, R. W., and H. Kierzkowski. "Globalization and the
Consequences of International Fragmentation," in Money, Factor
Mobility and Trade: The Festschrift in Honor of Robert A. Mundell,
edited by R. Dornbusch, G. Calvo, and M. Obstfeld. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998, 365-83.
Jones, R. W., H. Kierzkowski, and C. Lurong. "What Does
Evidence Tell Us about Fragmentation and Outsourcing?"
International Review of Economics and Finance, 14, 2005, 305-16.
Jones, R. W., and S. Marjit. "The Role of International
Fragmentation in the Development Process." American Economic
Review, 91, 2001, 363-66.
Kimura, F., and M. Ando. "Two-Dimensional Fragmentation in
East Asia: Conceptual Framework and Empirics." International Review
of Economics and Finance, 14, 2005, 317-48.
Long, N. V. "Outsourcing and Technology Spillovers."
International Review of Economics and Finance, 14, 2005, 297-304.
Marjit, S. "Agro-based Industry and Rural-Urban Migration: A
Case for an Urban Employment Subsidy." Journal of Development
Economics, 35, 1991, 393-98.
Marjit, S. "Economic Reform and Informal Wage: A General
Equilibrium Analysis." Journal of Development Economics, 72, 2003,
371-78.
Marjit, S., and R. Acharyya. International Trade, Wage Inequality
and the Developing Economy. New York: Physica-Verlag, 2003.
Marjit, S., and H. Beladi. "Possibility or Impossibility of
Paradoxes in the Small Country Harris-Todaro Framework: A Unifying
Analysis." Journal of Development Economics, 72, 2003, 379-85.
Marjit, S., H. Beladi, and A. Chakrabarti. "Trade and Wage
Inequality in Developing Countries." Economic Inquiry, 42, 2004,
295-303.
Ray, D. Development Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Robbins, D. Malaysian Wage Structure and Its Causes* Mimeo, Harvard
Institute for International Development, 1994a.
--. Philippine Wage and Employment Structure 1978-1983. Mimeo,
Harvard Institute for International Development, 1994b.
--. Earnings Dispersion in Chile After Trade Liberalization. Mimeo,
Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995a.
---. Trade, Trade Liberalization and Inequality in Latin America
and East Asia: Synthesis of Seven Country Studies. Mimeo, Harvard
Institute for International Development, 1995b.
--. Stolper-Samuelson Lost in the Topics -Trade Liberalization and
Wages in Columbia. Mimeo, Harvard Institute for International
Development, 1996a.
--. HOS Hits Facts: Facts Win: Evidence on Trade and Wages in
Developing World. Mimeo, Harvard Institute for International
Development, 1996b.
Robbins, D., and T. Zveglich. "Skill-bias in Recent Taiwanese
Growth." Mimeo, Harvard Institute for International Development,
1995.
Robertson, P., and S. Wellisz. "Steady-state Growth of an
Economy with Inter-Sectoral Migration." Oxford Economic Papers, 31,
1977, 370-88.
Todaro, M. P. "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Employment
in Less Developed Countries." American Economic Review, 59, 1969,
138-48.
--. Migration in Developing Countries: A Review of Theory,
Evidence, Methodology and Research Priorities. Geneva, Switzerland:
International Labour Organization, 1976a.
--. "Urban Job Expansion, Induced Migration and Rising
Unemployment: A Formulation and Simplified Empirical Test for
LDCs." Journal of Development Economics, 3, 1976b, 211-25.
Wan, H. "Fragmented Trade and Manufacturing Services: Examples
for a Non-Convex General Equilibrium." International Review of
Economics and Finance, 14, 2005, 273-95.
Wood, A. "Openness and Wage Inequality in Developing
Countries--The Latin American Challenge to East Asian Conventional
Wisdom." World Bank Research Observer, 1997, 33-57.
Yeats, A. "Just How Big Is Global Production Sharing?" in
Fragmentation: New Production Patterns in the World Economy, edited by
S. Arndt, and H. Kierzkowski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001
108-43.
(1.) Using more than two decades of industry data, Campa and
Goldberg (1997) profiled the external orientation of manufacturing
industries in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan.
Yeats (2001) provided estimates of the importance of global production
sharing in international trade. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) documented
the use of imported inputs in producing goods that are exported from ten
OECD economies and four emerging economies.
(2.) See Beladi, Chaudhuri, and Yabuuchi (2008).
(3.) See Marjit and Acharyya (2003) and Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi
(2007).
(4.) Since India, China, and the Latin American countries import
intermediate goods to be used along with skilled labor to produce the
exportable good, a rising wage inequality in these countries can be
linked to a change in their export pattern. For a discussion on the
theoretical aspect of such an interpretation, one may look at Jones,
Beladi, and Marjit (1999).
(5.) The reader may note that the model presented in the current
paper is distinct from that in Marjit, Beladi, and Chakrabarti (2003)
since the production structure in the current paper contains a
meaningful link between factor price determination and output
determination by allowing unemployment (a la Harris-Todaro) and, in
consequence, removes the otherwise analytically convenient dichotomy.
(6.) We consider the rural wage rate as the unskilled wage. It may
be noted that unskilled labor obtains a higher fixed-wage rate in the
urban area. As such, the expected wage rate for an unskilled worker is
[[lambda].sub.lx] w + [[lambda].sub.ly][bar.w] = [[lambda].sub.lx] w +
(1 - [[lambda].sub.lx]) w = w, where [[lambda].sub.ij] stands for the
fraction of the endowment of labor employed in sector j.
HAMID BELADI, AVIK CHAKRABARTI and SUGATA MARJIT *
* We wish to thank anonymous referee(s) for insightful comments and
suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer
applies.
Beladi: Professor, Department of Economics, College of Business,
University of Texas at San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX
78249-0633. Phone 210-458-7038, Fax 210-458-7040, E-mail hamid.beladi
@utsa.edu
Chakrabarti: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, College
of Letters and Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 816 Bolton
Hall, PO Box 413, Milwaukee, WI 53201. Phone 414-229-4680, Fax
414229-3860, E-mail chakra@uwm.edu
Marjit: Professor, Department of Economics, Centre for Studies in
Social Sciences, R-1 Baishnabghata Patuli Township, Calcutta 700-094,
West Bengal, India. Phone 852-2788-7745, Fax 852-2788-8806, E-mail
smarjit@hotmail.com
TABLE 1
Trade Liberalization, Wage Inequality, Urban Unemployment, and
Rural-Urban Migration in Five Latin American Economies
Changes in
Trade Skilled-Unskilled
Country Regime (a) Wage Gap (a)
1967-1982 Barrier reduction with Widened
appreciation
1989-1993 Barrier reduction with Narrowed
appreciation
Chile (Santiago)
1974-1979 Barrier reduction with Widened
devaluation
1984-1992 Devaluation Fluctuated
Colombia (seven cities)
1985-1994 Devaluation till Widened
1989, barrier
reduction in
1990-1992
Costa Rica
1985-1993 Barrier reduction Widened
and devaluation except in
1988-1990
Uruguay (Montevideo)
1990-1995 Barrier reduction Widened
Urban
Unemployment
Country Rate (b)
1967-1982 2.6% (1980)
1989-1993 17.4% (2001)
Chile (Santiago)
1974-1979 10.4%
1984-1992 9.1%
Colombia (seven cities)
1985-1994 10%
(before liberalization)
8.6%-19.4%
(after liberalization)
Costa Rica
1985-1993 6%
(before liberalization)
4%-6.6%
(after liberalization)
Uruguay (Montevideo)
1990-1995 7.4%
(before liberalization)
8.3%-15.3%
(after liberalization)
Rural-Urban (Net)
Migration (as a
Proportion of
Country Urban Growth) (c)
1967-1982 51%
(before liberalization)
1989-1993 27.6%-31.1%
(after liberalization)
Chile (Santiago)
1974-1979 33.6%
1984-1992 11.8
Colombia (seven cities)
1985-1994 36.6%-50.5%
(before liberalization)
30.8%
(after liberalization)
Costa Rica
1985-1993 23.3%-35.1%
(before liberalization)
42.9% (after liberalization)
Uruguay (Montevideo)
1990-1995 24.2%
(before liberalization)
25.9%-27.8%
(after liberalization)
(a) Source: Wood (1997).
(b) Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (2000).
(c) Source: Cerrutti and Bertoncello (2003).
TABLE 2
Skill-Intensive Exports from Top Ten Latin American Exporting
Countries (by Product Group)
Product Group 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Computer equipment 2,926 4,026 4,679 6,741 8,511
Medical equipment 94 178 234 243 253
Optical instruments 8 13 13 21 34
Medical instruments 679 893 1,004 1,151 1,552
Photographic equipment 128 171 248 298 403
Optical fibers 98 123 155 161 204
Telecommunication equipment 3,540 4,725 5,776 7,566 12,643
Electric power transmission
equipment 1,453 1,757 2,091 2,388 2,876
Electric circuit equipment 2,718 3,072 3,415 3,869 5,504
Electrical distribution
equipment 4,690 5,240 5,523 6,289 7,189
Note: Values are given in US$ million.
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Database.