Moonlighting over the business cycle.
Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina ; Kimmel, Jean
I. INTRODUCTION
During economic downturns, employment levels fall, unemployment
rates increase, and real wages drop. As such, real wages are considered
somewhat procyclical. Yet, very little is known about the cyclicality of
multiple-job holding. From a graphical analysis of national time-series
moonlighting data during the 1960s and 1970s, Stinson (1987) finds
evidence of large increases in moonlighting during expansionary periods.
Likewise, Partridge's (2002) findings support the possibility of
procyclical multiple-job holding. Yet, the popular media and employment
think tanks discuss moonlighting as a by-product of financial pressures.
(1) Furthermore, the idea that individuals may hold multiple jobs during
an economic downturn in order to supplement family income is consistent
with the so-called "added worker effect" in the labor
economics literature.
Why should we care about the cyclicality of multiple-job holding in
the economy? There are numerous reasons. First, moonlighting has played,
and can be expected to continue to play, a visible role in the U.S.
workforce. The moonlighting rate was 5.2% as of 1970, with 7.0% of male
workers and 2.2% of female workers holding multiple jobs. This
moonlighting rate remained practically unchanged over the course of the
next 30 yr. Yet, its gender incidence did fluctuate. In particular, the
female moonlighting rate grew over the past several decades from the
above listed 2.2% in 1970, to 3.8% in 1980 and to 5.9% in 1991, and
exceeded the male rate for the first time in 1995 (6.5% vs. 6.3%). In
May 2007, the moonlighting rate was still similar to the moonlighting
rate in 1970 (i.e., 5.3%), although now females are much more likely to
moonlight than men, with rates of 4.9% vs. 5.7%. (2) Considered over the
course of an entire year (vs. at a point in time), an even larger
percent age of workers hold second jobs. In this regard, Paxson and
Sicherman (1996, p. 357) note that approximately 20% of male workers and
12.2% of female workers hold second jobs in any given year. (3) As these
numbers suggest, moonlighting is a substantively important labor market phenomenon; however, it is much understudied. In fact, our review of the
literature to follow will show that only a handful of research papers
have studied this phenomenon. Thus, our primary motivation for writing
the paper is to shed light on a poorly understood, yet numerically
important, feature of the labor market.
A second reason for examining the cyclicality of multiple-job
holding is the potential importance of moonlighting in facilitating
labor supply adjustments during temporary economic downturns or upturns.
(4) Through a description of moonlighters, our analysis will shed light
on how workers respond to fluctuations in job opportunities across the
business cycle. Macroeconomists and labor micro-economists have long
studied employment cyclicality in an attempt to improve the explanations
of the changing composition of the labor force over business cycles, for
example, the added and discouraged worker effects. (5)
Third, as one part of the broader picture of economic cyclicality,
our study fits nicely into the ongoing debate concerning the cyclicality
of real wages. (6) Considerable research effort has been devoted to
understanding the nature of real-wage fluctuations across business
cycles, yet these studies are muddied by a glossing lack of distinction
between workers' average real wages across all jobs and their wages
in the primary job alone. Understanding the role that moonlighting may
play in employment cyclicality may inform the debate concerning the
measurement of real wages when studying real-wage cyclicality.
A final and policy-relevant motivation for this research refers to
the structure of employment taxes affecting secondary jobs. As explained
by Anderson and Meyer (2003), unemployment insurance (UI) payroll taxes
are highly regressive, in large part because benefits are structured in
the same way. (7) However, due to the UI payroll tax's low taxable
wage base, moonlighters working few hours in the second job are still
subject to the full UI tax despite likely lacking eligibility for
benefits in the event of a layoff. Considering the important role that
multiple-job holding can play in the economy by responding to
firms' "just-in-time" labor needs, a better understanding
of the cyclical nature of moonlighting can help inform the debate on how
to best structure the UI tax. (8)
Given the magnitude of moonlighting and the policy implications
that its cyclicality may have for the functioning of the labor market,
we examine the responsiveness of male and female multiple-job holding to
business cycles. We first review the existing descriptive evidence
regarding this question. Subsequently, we describe our data and
methodology, concluding with a discussion of our findings.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE CYCLICALITY OF MOONLIGHTING
There is often the presumption that moonlighting is
countercyclical. In this vein, Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999) of
the Employment Policy Institute asserted that "The benefits of
persistent low unemployment are reflected in many labor market
indicators. Multiple job holding, for instance, has fallen over the last
year...." Nonetheless, from a theoretical standpoint, moonlighting
rates can be procyclical or countercyclical. Focusing on economic
downturns, from a demand side, moonlighting opportunities may be limited
during a recession as the total number of jobs falls. On the other hand,
from a supply side, workers may choose to moonlight in an effort to
stabilize family income during an economic downturn when unemployment
rates are higher and real wages lower.
Partridge (2002) examines moonlighting during the periods 1994 and
1998 using state-level data. While his focus is on the nature of
second-job holding during a period of strong economic growth, his paper
offers insight into the potential cyclical pattern of moonlighting. If
moonlighters face a relatively high likelihood of being laid off during
periods of high unemployment, or if moonlighting rises during periods of
rapid economic growth and labor shortages, then moonlighting might be
procyclical (p. 426).
Conway and Kimmel (1998) propose a model that leads to a more
rigorous prediction regarding the cyclicality of moonlighting. According
to their theoretical framework, hours on the primary job and hours on
the secondary job (along with leisure hours) enter the utility function
separately. Their model explicitly allows for two distinct reasons for
moonlighting: primary-job constraints (e.g., underemployment) and job
heterogeneity (i.e., the second job might provide nonwage remuneration or affect utility differentially from the primary job). From their
model, it follows that an increase in nonwage income leads to a decline
in moonlighting. As such, moonlighting might be countercyclical. Via the
estimation of a fixed-effects logit model of the likelihood of holding
multiple jobs, Heineck and Schwarze (2004) find support for this notion.
(9) However, Conway and Kimmel (1998) estimate a positive second-job
labor supply elasticity for men, suggesting that moonlighting might move
cyclically with the business cycle since wages have been found to be
slightly procyclical. (10)
Renna's (2006) cross-country comparative research on
moonlighting and overtime work provides interesting insight into our
question regarding the cyclicality of moonlighting. Renna finds that the
incidence of moonlighting increases in the face of increased primary-job
constraints imposed by declining standard hours of work. In other words,
as workers have found it more difficult to accommodate desires for extra
work hours in their primary jobs, they are more likely to take second
jobs. This implies that for workers seeking to increase their total work
hours, moonlighting could serve as an alternative to overtime work.
Thus, his finding that overtime work is procyclical suggests that
moonlighting may also be procyclical as both employment options are
responses to the similar desire for increased work hours.
Two other possible motivations for moonlighting may be
individuals' responses to negative financial shocks and to
primary-job insecurity. Boheim and Taylor (2004) examine these
moonlighting reasons, both closely related to business cycle
fluctuations, and find mixed evidence of multiple-job holding in
response to financial shocks and weak support for the job insecurity
motivation.
Yet, other studies in the literature refer to expectations about
future income as another motive for moonlighting. In this vein, Bell,
Hart, and Wright (1997a, 1997b) investigate the possibility that workers
might take second jobs as a hedge against future unemployment. That is,
as expectations regarding a future economic downturn rise, moonlighting
rates might increase. However, their study, which uses British data from
1991 to 1998, fails to yield support for this hypothesis. (11)
In sum, there are sufficient reasons and evidence to suggest that
moonlighting rates may respond in some systematic fashion to cyclical
labor market fluctuations, but there is no clear indication of whether
multiple-job holding is pro- or countercyclical. As such, we also lack a
definite prediction regarding gender differences in moonlighting
cyclicality. Given that men and women exhibit different labor market
trajectories and different degrees of employment cyclicality, their
moonlighting choices and cyclicality may vary. (12) Indeed,
historically, women were more likely to moonlight for financial reasons
as described by Kimmel and Powell (1999) due to primary-job constraints
as described by Averett (2001) or to meet family responsibilities as
described by Allen (1998). These gender differences in moonlighting may
have diminished over time as female moonlighting rates have come to
mirror those of men (and exceed male rates in recent years). Yet,
moonlighting women are still much more likely to work in a full-time
primary job and a part-time secondary job, while moonlighting men are
more likely to hold two full-time jobs.
Why should we expect the cyclicality of moonlighting to differ
between men and women? One could cite various reasons. First, gender
differences in moonlighting cyclicality could be due to differences in
the demographics of male and female moonlighters. For instance, male
moonlighters are more likely to be married or have children, while the
opposite is true for women. Second, gender differences in moonlighting
cyclicality could stem from occupational segregation by sex and/or from
industry seasonality. In this vein, Goodman (2001) examines the
cyclicality of service jobs and notes that service jobs do not suffer
much during recessions (although their growth does wane). To the extent
that women are more likely to work in the service sector, they may
exhibit less cyclicality in their moonlighting behavior than men.
However, Hotchkiss and Robertson (2006) show that lesser educated
workers, many of whom are employed in the service industry, are more
responsive to business cycle fluctuations. Finally, Stinson (1990) shows
that men moonlight for long periods of time and women are more likely to
moonlight on a temporary basis to meet financial needs. This feature may
have some implications for gender differences in moonlighting
cyclicality as well.
Much of the above-described gender differences in moonlighting,
because they are explained by observable demographic differences, will
be eliminated when standard regression procedures are implemented. Thus,
the question arises that, once observable factors are controlled in a
regression framework, would we expect any remaining gender differences
in moonlighting? First, to the extent that we cannot measure precisely
an individual's reservation wage, we might expect such gender
differences to persist. But, what if regression methodologies are used
that adjust, in some sense, for unobservable differences across
individuals? Then, we might expect some portion of expected gender
differences in moonlighting patterns to disappear.
III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
We use data drawn from the Geo-coded 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth File (NLSY79 Geo-coded file). (13) This is a nationally
representative sample of 12,686 civilian young men and women aged 14-21
yr as of December 31, 1978. This cohort was initially interviewed
annually from 1979 through 1994. Starting in 1994, the interviews were
conducted biennially through the year 2002.
We have chosen the NLSY79 survey because its questionnaire is best
suited for analyzing our research question. (14) Specifically, the
survey instrument permits individuals to report up to six distinct jobs
held within each calendar year and includes job details, such as job
start and end dates. This permits us to construct precise measures of
multiple-job holding. Other data sets, such as the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics, may result in an overstatement of moonlighting, as it is
difficult to distinguish multiple-job holders from job changers. The one
drawback with the NLSY79 is that the data are representative of a
specific-age cohort. However, focusing on this prime-aged sub-sample
allows us to derive useful information regarding moonlighting
cyclicality and partially alleviates heterogeneity concerns.
We work with separate unbalanced panels of men and women from the
20 rounds of the NLSY79. (15) In 2002, a total of 8,033 civilian and
military respondents were interviewed. We restrict our sample to
person-year observations for which information is available regarding
employment, earnings, race, gender, age, education, marital status,
fertility, work limitations due to health-related reasons, and other
location-specific variables. We use the week-by-week longitudinal work
records on each respondent from January 1978 to the year 2002 to
construct variables indicative of the respondent's sector of
employment, occupation, tenure, weekly hours worked, and hourly rate of
pay at the primary job. (16) Similarly, we create a dummy variable indicative of whether the respondent moonlighted, which we define as
holding more than one job simultaneously for longer than 1 wk. (17)
Preliminary employment and moonlighting rates for men and women
over the past two decades are shown in Table 1. We compare employment
and moonlighting rates for three time periods centered around 1980,
1990, and 2000. (18) In part due to the aging nature of the NLSY79
cohort, employment and moonlighting rates increased between the 1980 and
the 1990 time period and then declined between the two time periods
centered around 1990 and the year 2000. In particular, while
moonlighting rates averaged 7% for both men and women over the period
under consideration, moonlighting rates showed some fluctuations,
peaking around 1990 for both men and women. Note that this now
prime-aged sample exhibits a moonlighting rate somewhat above the
national average of 5.3% for all workers.
Table 2 Panels A and B inform on some of the personal
characteristics of single- and multiple-job holders for the same periods
displayed in Table 1. An increasingly larger fraction of multiple-job
holders are black, with the percentage of moonlighters in our NLSY79
sample who are black rising from 14% in the time period centered around
1980 to 32% around 2000. Additionally, moonlighters appear to be more
highly educated than non-moonlighters, although the education gap
narrows over time. Looking at family characteristics, married men and
women are less likely to hold more than one job, although the difference
is quite small, and male single-job holders seem to have more children
than their moonlighting counterparts in earlier decades, Finally, a
higher fraction of moonlighters reside in urban areas relative to
single-job holders.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our purpose is to examine the cyclicality of male and female
moonlighting during the 1980s and 1990s up to the year 2002. Underlying
our empirical analyses is a standard individual utility-maximizing
model, (19) according to which working men and women decide whether to
moonlight and, if so, the number of hours they will work in more than
one job. Note, however, that a nonnegligible number of working men and
women do not moonlight. Therefore, the distribution that applies to the
sample data is a mixture of discrete and continuous distributions,
rendering the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) inappropriate.
Consequently, a Tobit model would seem more appropriate as it would take
into account the censored nature of the distribution of working men and
women's moonlighting hours by modeling the likelihood of
moonlighting and the hours moonlighted as a function of the same
covariates.
A potential disadvantage of the Tobit model is that a change in any
regressor will have the same overall effect (i.e., the same sign) on
both the probability of moonlighting and the number of hours
moonlighted. Hence, a two-part model could improve on the estimation by
allowing for the possibility that variables affecting the decision to
moonlight may impact the hours moonlighted differently. Nonetheless,
recognizing (a) the difficulty of conceiving appropriate identifiers
that affect the decision to moonlight without influencing the hours
moonlighted and (b) the sensitivity of the findings to the choice of
identifiers inherent in the estimation of two-part selection models, we
view the estimation via a Tobit model as preferable. (20)
As such, we estimate the following random-effects Tobit model. (21)
The random-effects specification allows us to adjust standard errors for
the group-wise heteroskedasticity arising from the fact that the growth
rate of nonfarm employment only varies across states, while the
remaining variables in our model vary across individuals, while also
taking into account some of the individual heterogeneity shaping male
and female moonlighting rates. We follow the correction methodology
outlined by Moulton (1986). Thus, we model the likelihood and the number
of hours moonlighted by men and women as follows:
[y.sup.*.sub.it] = [[alpha].sub.i] + [X.sub.it] [beta] +
[[epsilon].sub.it],
where [y.sub.it] = max (0, [y.sup.*.sub.it])
and [[epsilon].sub.it] | [X.sub.it], [[alpha].sub.i] ~ N (0,
[[sigma].sup.2.sub.e]).
The vector [X.sub.it] controls for a variety of personal, family,
regional, and time-related factors and specific primary-job
characteristics known to affect male and female employment patterns. In
particular, among the personal and family characteristics, we include
two dummies for race (black and other race), a continuous measure of
age, the highest grade completed by the respondent, a dummy variable for
marital status (married), and two measures of parental status (a dummy
variable for the presence of young children in the household plus a
continuous count of the total number of children in the household). One
might expect that individuals with greater demands on their nonmarket
time (i.e., higher reservations wages) might, in addition to the
standard conclusion of being less likely to seek paid employment, also
be less likely to moonlight. As we described earlier, we expect that
these demographic controls will eliminate some of the observed gender
differences in moonlighting.
We also include a variety of primary-job characteristics possibly
affecting the moonlighting decision and the hours moonlighted, such as
the real primary-job hourly wage, tenure, occupation, and whether the
job is in the private or public sector. Likewise, we incorporate a
number of regional and time-related factors in our regression analysis.
For instance, to control the fact that wealthier states might exhibit
systematically different moonlighting patterns than less wealthy states,
we include the state's per capita income. Additionally, we include
a dummy variable for residing in an urban area and three regional
dummies to address other macroeconomic differences in job markets.
Regarding time, we include a continuous time trend measure plus three
time period dummies for the periods of time: 1979-1985, 1986-1992, and
1993-1999, with the period 2000-2004 as the excluded period. (22) We
structure our four time periods in this way so as to reflect distinct
economic circumstances. The first and second periods wrap around a
recession and, thus, include the buildup to the recession, the recession
itself, and the recovery. The third period is unique as it reflects a
7-yr period of substantial economic growth. Finally, the fourth period
is the shortest of the four and captures a slight economic downturn
following the rapid economic growth of the mid- to late 1990s. We would
expect period differences in moonlighting; therefore, structuring our
periods in this way will maximize our efforts to reveal these
differences.
Finally, our business cycle measure is the state's growth rate
in nonfarm employment. The bulk of the literature examining the
cyclicality of real wages relies on national unemployment rate measures,
insufficient for our needs due to the existence of regional disparities
in industrial composition and moonlighting rates (see, e.g., Partridge
2002). Additionally, state unemployment rates may be subject to greater
measurement error due to the smaller sample sizes from which the data
are drawn. Finally, as described by Blanchard and Katz (1992), reliance
on a static measure of economic activity at the state level may be
problematic because states vary in their equilibrium unemployment rates.
Thus, we rely on the more accurately measured nonfarm employment and
construct its growth rate. Additionally, to better capture potential
differences in moonlighting cyclicality over the time period under
examination, we interact the time period dummies with the growth rate in
nonfarm employment.
V. MOONLIGHTING OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Results from our random-effects Tobit models are displayed in Table
3 Panels A and B. Male and female blacks moonlight more than whites.
Married men, men with greater family responsibilities, and men and women
residing in states with higher per capita incomes moonlight less than
single men, men with fewer children, or men and women residing in poorer
states, respectively. In contrast, more educated men and women seem more
likely to moonlight, perhaps due in part to their access to part-time
consulting opportunities.
Primary-job characteristics play an important role in the decision
to moonlight, particularly among women. For instance, both men and women
appear more likely to hold a second job, the longer their tenures in
their primary jobs. Perhaps workers with longer job tenures are more
reluctant to change jobs entirely when new opportunities arise,
resulting in higher multiple-job holding. Additionally, men and women
working in higher skilled occupations seem less likely to moonlight than
their counterparts in service-related jobs (the category of reference).
It is also worth noting that, while male moonlighting does not seem to
be shaped by primary-job wages, female moonlighting is responsive to
wage changes. A $10 increase in women's primary-job wages would
reduce their moonlighting likelihood by 1 percentage point and hours
moonlighted by approximately 0.2 h. This is consistent with the finding
of Conway and Kimmel (1998). In addition to wages, women working in the
public sector are about 6 percentage points more likely to moonlight
and, once they moonlight, work two more hours in their secondary jobs
than their counterparts in the private sector.
Of particular interest are the differences in moonlighting over the
various periods of time. Male and female moonlighting were more
prominent during each of the three time periods spanning between 1979
and 1999 relative to the 2000-2002 period used as reference.
Specifically, during the 1979-1985 period, men and women were about 12
and 21 percentage points more likely to moonlight, respectively. (23) If
they held multiple jobs, moonlighting men and women worked an average of
four and eight more hours per week than their counterparts during the
more recent reference period of 2000-2002. These estimates dropped
between 1986 and 1992 to 10 percentage points and 3 h among men and to
15 percentage points and 5 h among women. Finally, between 1993 and
1999, men and women were only 7 and 6 percentage points, respectively,
more likely to moonlight than their counterparts in 2000-2002.
Additionally, their hours moonlighted dropped to just two more hours per
week.
What can we say about the cyclicality of moonlighting?
Period-specific moonlighting cyclicality results for men and women are
presented in Table 4. There is no evidence of any moonlighting
cyclicality for men. However, female moonlighting is countercyclical
during the 1980s and early 1990s and then turns procyclical by the
beginning of the twentieth century. Specifically, a 2% increase in the
growth rate of nonfarm employment (the average in our sample is close to
2%--see Appendix Table A1) would lower the probability of moonlighting
among women by approximately 0.8 percentage points in 1979 1985 and by
1.4 percentage points during 1986-1992. However, the same increase in
the growth rate of nonfarm employment would increase the likelihood of
moonlighting and the weekly hours moonlighted by women by approximately
3 percentage points and 58 min, respectively, during the reference time
period of 2000-2002. These results help explain the apparently
contradictory views of moonlighting as a by-product of economic distress
stressed by advocacy groups with the view of moonlighting as the
response of just-in-time labor to an increasing labor demand following
periods of economic growth.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We examine male and female moonlighting cyclicality over the 1980s,
1990s, and early twentieth century. We find that, despite diminishing
over time, both men and women were more likely to moonlight and
moonlighted longer hours during the 1980s and 1990s than during the
2000-2002 period. Additionally, while male moonlighting does not seem to
respond to business cycles, female moonlighting does. Specifically,
consistent with the popular media, female moonlighting appeared
countercyclical during the 1980s and early 1990s. These are time periods
that wrapped up around a recession, and as such, our finding suggests
that moonlighting during these times may have been a by-product of
economic distress. This finding is also consistent with the lower
incidence of moonlighting in higher per capita income states. Yet, this
countercyclical behavior disappears during the 19931999 perio--a period
of rapid economic growth to become procyclical by the early twentieth
century. The recent procyclicality of female moonlighting, which follows
the economics growth of the 1993-1999 period, supports the idea that
female workers respond to a need for just-in-time employment
characteristic of economic upturns. While the analyses differ in their
focus and usage of state-level data, the recent procyclicality of female
moon lighting supports the findings by Partridge (2002) and Renna
(2006). Partridge (2002) argues that short-run moonlighting appears to
be procyclical and states that "moonlighting appears to be a
regional labor market shock absorber" (p. 438). Similarly, Renna
(2006) finds that, like overtime work, moonlighting is procyclical and
is used by workers as a means to increase their work hours.
Overall, the analysis provides us with a better understanding of
the variability and business cyclicality of male and female moonlighting
over the past decades, which can prove useful in anticipating the
adjustment of men and women to fluctuations in job opportunities over
the business cycle. Additionally, our findings are relevant for the
literature on real-wage cyclicality. To the extent that the incidence of
moonlighting is procyclical during recent years and primary-job wages
exceed secondary-job wages, (24) average hourly real wages across all
jobs should be more procyclical than primary-job wages due to the
incidence of secondary jobs. Further research examining real-wage
cyclicality separately by gender across all jobs held concurrently may
help assess the role of moonlighting cyclicality in explaining overall
real-wage cyclicality. Finally, a better understanding of the
cyclicality of male and female moonlighting can prove useful in
informing the debate on how to structure UI taxes.
ABBREVIATIONS
NLSY79: 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth OLS: Ordinary
Least Squares
UI: Unemployment Insurance
doi: 10.111l/j.1465-7295.2008.00140.x
APPENDIX TABLE A1
Means and Standard Deviations (SD)
Women
One Job Moonlighting
Variables Mean SD
White 0.69 0.46
Black 0.25 0.43
Other race 0.05 0.22
Age 27.49 6.58
Highest grade 12.80 2.18
Married 0.46 0.50
Separated 0.05 0.21
Divorced 0.09 0.29
Widowed 0.00 0.07
Never married 0.40 0.49
Young children 0.32 0.47
No. of children 0.94 1.12
Health limitations 0.05 0.22
Previous year's nonlabor income 17,190.75 40,122.81
Urban 0.80 0.41
Northeast 0.17 0.38
North central 0.23 0.42
South 0.40 0.49
West 0.19 0.39
Time period 1979-1985 0.38 0.48
Time period 1986-1992 0.37 0.48
Time period 1993-1999 0.18 0.38
Time period 2000-2002 0.08 0.27
State per capita income 17,759.55 6,326.97
Growth nonfarm employment 1.90 2.02
Real hourly wage 5.98 10.88
Public sector job 0.14 0.34
Professional, technical, clerical 0.54 0.50
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers 0.13 0.34
Sales and services 0.30 0.46
Tenure 33.38 34.74
Hours in nonprimary job -- --
Women
One Job Moonlighting
Variables Mean SD
White 0.71 0.45
Black 0.24 0.43
Other race 0.05 0.21
Age 28.42 6.46
Highest grade 13.02 2.33
Married 0.41 0.49
Separated 0.03 0.17
Divorced 0.07 0.26
Widowed 0.00 0.03
Never married 0.48 0.50
Young children 0.24 0.43
No. of children 0.67 1.07
Health limitations 0.03 0.18
Previous year's nonlabor income 13,476.70 40,006.20
Urban 0.80 0.41
Northeast 0.19 0.39
North central 0.27 0.45
South 0.33 0.47
West 0.20 0.40
Time period 1979-1985 0.30 0.46
Time period 1986-1992 0.39 0.49
Time period 1993-1999 0.22 0.41
Time period 2000-2002 0.10 0.30
State per capita income 18,900.42 6,209.25
Growth nonfarm employment 1.89 1.95
Real hourly wage 7.92 13.72
Public sector job 0.15 0.36
Professional, technical, clerical 0.35 0.48
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers 0.40 0.49
Sales and services 0.22 0.41
Tenure 56.57 83.19
Hours in nonprimary job 30.49 25.32
Men
One Job Moonlighting
Variables Mean SD
White 0.69 0.46
Black 0.25 0.44
Other race 0.05 0.23
Age 27.35 6.54
Highest grade 12.41 2.37
Married 0.40 0.49
Separated 0.03 0.18
Divorced 0.06 0.24
Widowed 0.00 0.04
Never married 0.51 0.50
Young children 0.24 0.43
No. of children 0.63 1.04
Health limitations 0.03 0.18
Previous year's nonlabor income 13,009.20 37,993.54
Urban 0.79 0.41
Northeast 0.18 0.38
North central 0.24 0.42
South 0.38 0.48
West 0.20 0.40
Time period 1979-1985 0.38 0.49
Time period 1986-1992 0.36 0.48
Time period 1993-1999 0.18 0.38
Time period 2000-2002 0.08 0.27
State per capita income 17,795.71 6,300.73
Growth nonfarm employment 1.90 2.04
Real hourly wage 11.57 280.72
Public sector job 0.08 0.27
Professional, technical, clerical 0.25 0.43
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers 0.53 0.50
Sales and services 0.19 0.40
Tenure 33.93 62.79
Hours in nonprimary job -- --
Men
One Job Moonlighting
Variables Mean SD
White 0.72 0.45
Black 0.23 0.42
Other race 0.04 0.20
Age 28.63 6.73
Highest grade 13.52 2.18
Married 0.39 0.49
Separated 0.04 0.20
Divorced 0.11 0.32
Widowed 0.01 0.08
Never married 0.45 0.50
Young children 0.22 0.41
No. of children 0.84 1.14
Health limitations 0.05 0.22
Previous year's nonlabor income 16,995.04 38,280.87
Urban 0.81 0.40
Northeast 0.20 0.40
North central 0.26 0.44
South 0.36 0.48
West 0.18 0.38
Time period 1979-1985 0.31 0.46
Time period 1986-1992 0.37 0.48
Time period 1993-1999 0.22 0.41
Time period 2000-2002 0.11 0.31
State per capita income 18,902.96 6,395.50
Growth nonfarm employment 1.86 1.94
Real hourly wage 6.82 13.94
Public sector job 0.18 0.38
Professional, technical, clerical 0.60 0.49
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers 0.11 0.31
Sales and services 0.26 0.44
Tenure 55.27 65.89
Hours in nonprimary job 25.67 22.08
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(1.) See, for example, The State of Working America, 2002-2003.
(2.) These data were compiled from the Current Population Survey by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(3.) These figures may be somewhat overstated as some job changers
may be mistakenly categorized as moonlighters (p. 359).
(4.) Conway and Kimmel (1998) argue that if labor supply elasticity
estimates were adjusted to reflect this additional labor supply
adjustment, labor supply elasticities would be increased, although the
magnitude of this increase would be small. In other words, labor supply
is more elastic than current empirical estimates suggest.
(5.) For explanation of these two effects and recent evidence, see
Mincer (1966) and Spletzer (1997), respectively.
(6.) Examples of research on this topic include Devereux (2001),
Hart (2006), and Keane, Moffitt, and Runkle (1988).
(7.) The authors find that workers in the lowest earnings decile assign 3% of their earnings to UI payroll taxes, whereas for their
counterparts in the highest earnings decile, only 0.5% of their earnings
go to paying for such taxes.
(8.) On the topic of UI and moonlighting, see Vroman and
Nightingale (1996).
(9.) Heineck and Schwarze (2004) compare secondary-job holding in
Germany and the United Kingdom. This cross-country comparison allows
them to draw some conclusions regarding the role that institutions might
play in moonlighting outcomes. They conclude that while institutions
matter, they are not a substantial factor in explaining moonlighting
rates.
(10.) Renna and Oaxaca (2006) focus on moonlighting workers who
report no primary-job hours constraints and whose multiple-job holding
choice reflects a "personal preference for job
differentiation" (p. 1). Their job portfolio model confirms Conway
and Kimmel's (1998) finding of a stronger wage elasticity of labor
supply on the second job.
(11.) British moonlighting differs from U.S. moonlighting in three
important ways: Brits have a higher moonlighting rate, they display
greater moonlighting persistence over time, and their average
secondary-job wages are much higher than their average primary-job
wages.
(12.) Hotchkiss and Robertson (2006) show that female labor force
participation exhibits a much stronger procyclicality than that of
males, which they explain is due to the females' higher reservation
wage. In fact, controlling for education, men are half as responsive to
labor market conditions so that, even if they become unemployed during
an economic downturn, they are half as likely to leave the labor force.
(13.) The NLSY Geo-coded data file and documentation are available
at http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsgeo97.htm. The geo-coded file was obtained
under contract agreement no. 03-77.
(14.) Park and Shin (2005) and Tremblay (1990) use these data to
examine the cyclicality of real wages by gender.
(15.) Robust standard errors are computed to correct for the
heteroskedasticity that may affect our estimates.
(16.) We deflate hourly wages using the consumer price index for
all urban consumers, not seasonally adjusted, with base period 1982
1984, which was retrieved from hnp://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm.
(17.) In this manner, we avoid counting as moonlighting job
transitions during which the former and new jobs overlap briefly.
(18.) We use 5-yr averages. For the year 1980, we use data from
1979 to 1983 (the survey started in 1979; hence, data for 1978 are
unavailable). For 1990, we average data from 1988 to 1992, and for the
year 2000, averages from the 1998-2002 period are computed. In this last
period, we include 3 yr instead of 5 yr because the NLSY79 survey
switched from an annual to a biennial survey at that time.
(19.) Conway and Kimmel (1998) provide a detailed derivation of
this theoretical framework.
(20.) A second potential disadvantage of the Tobit and two-part
selection models is their reliance on normality and homoskedasticity in
the latent variables. However, as noted by Wooldridge (2008), neither
conditional normality nor heteroskedasticity affect the unbiasedness or
consistency of the OLS estimates, and as a result, for reasonable
deviations from these assumptions, the Tobit model still provides good
estimates.
(21.) It should be noted that a fixed-effects Tobit model is not
estimated as we lack a sufficient statistic to condition the fixed
effects out of the likelihood function.
(22.) We opted not to include year dummies because, to the extent
that our data come from a single cohort of individuals, the population
is not likely to have a different distribution over time, and as such,
the year dummies would likely be picking up much of the cyclical
variation that is the focus of our research.
(23.) These estimates (as well as the ones corresponding to the
number of hours moonlighted) are computed adding up the marginal effects
corresponding to the time period dummy and its interaction term
evaluated at the mean growth rate of nonfarm employment in Appendix
Table A 1.
(24.) Kimmel and Conway (2001) compare primary-and secondary-job
wages across age and education categories, primary- and secondary-job
occupations, as well as family income status and consistently find that
on average, primary-job wages exceed secondary-job wages. Relevant to
this question is the recent work by Hart (2006), who examines the
real-wage cyclicality of full- versus part-time workers.
CATALINA AMUEDO-DORANTES and JEAN KIMMEL *
* We are grateful for comments received at the Society for Labor
Economists meetings as well as the feedback from anonymous referees.
Amuedo-Dorantes: Professor, Department of Economics, San Diego
State University, San Diego, CA 92182. Phone 1-(619)-594-1663, Fax
1-(619)-594-5062, E-mail camuedod@mail.sdsu.edu; and IZA, Bonn, Germany.
Kimmel: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Western
Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008. Phone (269) 387-5541, Fax
(269) 387-5637, E-mail jean.kimmel@wmich.edu; and IZA, Bonn, Germany.
TABLE 1
Working and Moonlighting Rates by Gender
1980 1990
Variables Working Moonlighting Working Moonlighting
Men 0.72 0.05 0.81 0.08
Women 0.79 0.05 0.91 0.09
2000
Variables Working Moonlighting
Men 0.82 0.07
Women 0.91 0.07
Notes: Authors' tabulations using the NLSY79.
TABLE 2
Single- versus Dual-Job Holders (Only Includes Workers)
1980
Variables One Job Moonlighting
(A) Male
Percent white 0.73 0.81
Percent black 0.21 0.15
Highest grade completed 11.86 12.82
Married 0.21 0.14
No. of children 0.24 0.09
Urban 0.79 0.82
(B) Female
Percent white 0.71 0.81
Percent black 0.24 0.14
Highest grade completed 11.49 12.05
Married 0.12 0.11
No. of children 0.10 0.10
Urban 0.78 0.82
1990
Variables One Job Moonlighting
(A) Male
Percent white 0.69 0.71
Percent black 0.24 0.25
Highest grade completed 13.02 13.64
Married 0.56 0.46
No. of children 1.22 0.99
Urban 0.79 0.81
(B) Female
Percent white 0.69 0.70
Percent black 0.25 0.25
Highest grade completed 12.66 13.12
Married 0.50 0.49
No. of children 0.79 0.85
Urban 0.79 0.80
2000
Variables One Job Moonlighting
(A) Male
Percent white 0.63 0.64
Percent black 0.30 0.30
Highest grade completed 13.31 13.73
Married 0.58 0.54
No. of children 1.55 1.67
Urban 0.76 0.77
(B) Female
Percent white 0.67 0.64
Percent black 0.27 0.32
Highest grade completed 13.07 13.27
Married 0.61 0.57
No. of children 1.27 1.18
Urban 0.74 0.76
Notes: Authors' tabulations using the NLSY79.
TABLE 3
Random-Effects Tobit Model of Moonlighting
Standard
Variables Coefficient Error
(A) Male
Personal and family characteristics
Black 2.355 *** 0.927
Other race 1.828 1.776
Age 0.083 0.154
Highest grade 1.307 *** 0.177
Married -3.012 *** 0.784
Young children -4.602 *** 0.973
No. of children 0.753 * 0.428
Health limitations 0.264 1.511
Past nonlabor income -3.05E-06 8.57E-06
Primary-job characteristics
Real hourly wage -0.005 0.025
Public sector job 1.107 0.929
Professional, technical, clerical -2.132 *** 0.787
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers -1.838 1.200
Tenure 0.278 *** 0.012
Tenure squared -5.21E-05 *** 2.46E-06
Regional and time-related factors
Urban 1.179 0.940
Northeast -29.059 * 15.682
South -12.886 11.897
West 12.973 17.457
Time period 1979-1985 10.968 *** 3.788
Time period 1986-1992 8.720 *** 2.506
Time period 1993-1999 8.520 *** 2.528
Growth nonfarm employment 0.476 0.699
Period 1979-1985 x Growth NFE -0.780 0.740
Period 1986-1992 x Growth NFE -0.366 0.757
Period 1993-1999 x Growth NFE -1.584 0.981
State per capita income -0.001 *** 3.02E-04
Regression fit statistics
Observations 11,391
Groups 3,907
Wald [chi square](78) 944.22
Log likelihood -32,470.957
(B) Female
Personal and family characteristics
Black 3.419 *** 1.043
Other race -1.518 1.875
Age -0.040 0.177
Highest grade 1.123 *** 0.192
Married -0.777 1.018
Young children -0.470 1.236
No. of children 0.495 0.540
Health limitations 0.125 2.150
Past nonlabor income 5.22E-06 1.04E-05
Primary-job characteristics
Real hourly wage -0.054 ** 0.027
Public sector job 5.809 *** 1.159
Professional, technical, clerical -2.707 *** 1.072
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers -6.116 *** 0.992
Tenure 0.325 *** 0.013
Tenure squared -6.01E-05 *** 2.48E-06
Regional and time-related factors
Urban -0.495 1.041
Northeast -14.457 14.246
South 12.848 14.969
West 15.476 20.581
Time period 1979-1985 25.013 *** 4.388
Time period 1986-1992 19.311 *** 2.950
Time period 1993-1999 9.738 *** 2.944
Growth nonfarm employment 1.435 * 0.820
Period 1979-1985 x Growth NFE -2.090 ** 0.865
Period 1986-1992 x Growth NFE -2.184 *** 0.884
Period 1993-1999 x Growth NFE -1.820 * 1.101
State per capita income -0.002 *** 3.50E-04
Regression fit statistics
Observations 13.7448
Groups 4,424
Wald [chi square](78) 1,114.97
Log likelihood -36,825.782
ME on Prob ME on
Variables (Y > 0) E(Y|Y > 0)
(A) Male
Personal and family characteristics
Black 0.030 0.867
Other race 0.023 0.675
Age 0.001 0.030
Highest grade 0.017 0.475
Married -0.038 -1.088
Young children -0.058 -1.635
No. of children 0.010 0.274
Health limitations 0.003 0.096
Past nonlabor income -3.88E-08 -1.11E-06
Primary-job characteristics
Real hourly wage -6.00E-OS -0.002
Public sector job 0.014 0.405
Professional, technical, clerical -0.027 -0.777
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers -0.023 -0.659
Tenure 0.004 0.101
Tenure squared -6.60E-07 -1.89E-05
Regional and time-related factors
Urban 0.015 0.429
Northeast -0.342 -8.949
South -0.162 -4.556
West 0.162 5.095
Time period 1979-1985 0.138 4.142
Time period 1986-1992 0.110 3.232
Time period 1993-1999 0.107 3.264
Growth nonfarm employment 0.006 0.173
Period 1979-1985 x Growth NFE -0.010 -0.284
Period 1986-1992 x Growth NFE -0.005 -0.133
Period 1993-1999 x Growth NFE -0.020 -0.576
State per capita income -1.34E-05 -3.85E-04
Regression fit statistics
Observations
Groups
Wald [chi square](78)
Log likelihood
(B) Female
Personal and family characteristics
Black 0.035 1.167
Other race -0.015 -0.505
Age -4.10E-04 -0.013
Highest grade 0.011 0.378
Married -0.008 -0.261
Young children -0.005 -0.158
No. of children 0.005 0.166
Health limitations 0.001 0.042
Past nonlabor income 5.33E-08 1.76E-06
Primary-job characteristics
Real hourly wage -0.001 -0.018
Public sector job 0.060 2.022
Professional, technical, clerical -0.028 -0.903
Craftsmen, operatives, laborers -0.062 -2.050
Tenure 0.003 0.109
Tenure squared -6.14E-07 -2.02E-05
Regional and time-related factors
Urban -0.005 -0.166
Northeast -0.144 -4.529
South 0.131 4.446
West 0.158 5.592
Time period 1979-1985 0.253 9.027
Time period 1986-1992 0.196 6.733
Time period 1993-1999 0.100 3.440
Growth nonfarm employment 0.015 0.483
Period 1979-1985 x Growth NFE -0.021 -0.703
Period 1986-1992 x Growth NFE -0.022 -0.734
Period 1993-1999 x Growth NFE -0.019 -0.612
State per capita income -1.85E-05 -0.001
Regression fit statistics
Observations
Groups
Wald [chi square](78)
Log likelihood
Notes: All regressions include a constant term, state dummies, and a
time trend. Sales and services are used as reference categories for
the primary-job occupation. ME, marginal effects; NFE, nonfarm
employment. ***, **, and * signify statistically different from zero
at the l%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4
Tobit Estimates of Moonlighting Cyclicality
among Working Men and Women
Men
Group Computation p h (min)
Cyclicality in [meg.sub.grnfe] + -0.004 -0.111 (-7)
1979-1985 [me.sub.grnfe x
period1979-1985]
Cyclicality in [meg.sub.grnfe] + 0.001 0.04 (2)
1986-1992 [me.sub.grnfe x
period1986-1992]
Cyclicality in [meg.sub.grnfe] + -0.14 -0.403 (-24)
1993-1999 [me.sub.grnfe x
period1993-1999]
Cyclicality in [meg.sub.grnfe] 0.006 0.173 (10)
2000-2002
Women
Group p h (min)
Cyclicality in -0.004 ** -0.22 (13)
1979-1985
Cyclicality in -0.007 ** -0.251 (15)
1986-1992
Cyclicality in -0.006 -0.129 (8)
1993-1999
Cyclicality in 0.015 * 0.0483 * (29)
2000-2002
Notes: For the first three time periods in the table,
the significance levels correspond to those from a
joint significance [chi square](2) test.
** and * signify statistically different from zero
at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.