The slowdown in first-response times of economics journals: can it be beneficial?
Azar, Ofer H.
I. INTRODUCTION
Academic publishing has been the subject of several studies
recently. Some studies considered the pricing of academic journals, for
example, Bergstrom (2001) and McCabe (2002), while others focused on
various aspects of the review process. Blank (1991), for example,
studies the use of single-blind versus double-blind review. Chang and
Lai (2001) and Engers and Gans (1998) examine the issue of payment to
referees. Laband (1990) discusses the value added from the review
process, and Azar (2006) considers how the review process can be
improved. Finally, Azar (forthcoming) presents a model of social norm
evolution and uses it to analyze changes in the norm about how quickly
referees should write their reports. Indeed, research on the academic
review process is not only interesting for most academics but also very
important because of the insights it might suggest about how the review
process can be improved, enhancing the productivity of economists and
scholars in other disciplines.
Two of the main criticisms about the review process are the long
time that it takes overall and the long time that it takes to get a
first response on a submitted manuscript (first-response time,
henceforth FRT). The overall review time is often measured by the
submit-accept time, the time from first submission of the article to the
journal that eventually publishes it until its acceptance. The overall
review time has received some attention recently: Ellison (2002a)
documents a slowdown in submit-accept times in economics over the last
three decades and Ellison (2002b) suggests that several additional
disciplines also experienced a similar slowdown. The major cause of this
slowdown is that authors are required to revise their papers more times
and more extensively than in the past. Earlier studies of the
publication delay include Trivedi (1993) and Yohe (1980).
As opposed to the submit-accept time, however, the FRT has not
received any systematic analysis recently. The FRT is particularly
important because it often delays the publication of an article more
than once (as opposed to other parts of the submit-accept time) when the
paper is rejected from one or more journals prior to being accepted in a
different journal. Azar (2004), for example, estimates that papers are
submitted on average three to six times prior to publication. In what
follows, I discuss the FRT in economics, and in particular, I address
three questions: what is the FRT in economics today, how has it changed
over the last few decades, and can the change be beneficial?
II. THE SLOWDOWN IN THE FRT OF ECONOMICS JOURNALS
FRTs Today
While many economics journals publish with each article its
acceptance date or the dates in which the initial and final versions
were received, no economics journal I encountered publishes information
about the FRT of each article published. Going over dozens of journals,
however, I found several journals that publish aggregate FRT statistics;
Ellison (2002a) and Web sites of various journals provided me some more
data. Table 1 presents the FRT in various journals. The table includes
also FRT in journals in accounting and finance; the difference in the
FRT between these fields and economics is puzzling, and explaining why
it exists is an intriguing topic for future research. (1)
A few interesting outliers in the table are the journals of the
Berkeley Electronic Press. Those are electronic journals that were
established in recent years with the purpose "to address the
inefficiencies that characterize the current scholarly publishing
model." (2) If we look at the more established print journals in
the table, however, we can see that the FRT in economics journals is
generally between 3 and 6 months. From the author's perspective,
the FRT is a little longer (for snail mail submissions) because the FRT
reported by the journal does not include the mailing time from the
author to the journal and back.
FRTs Circa 1960
Forty years ago, journals did not publish FRT data on a regular
basis, but nevertheless, there is some evidence for the FRT at that
time. Marshall (1959), for example, sent questionnaires to editors of 30
economics journals and received usable answers from 26 journals. Out of
these 26 journals, Marshall reports that "Twenty-three editors
reported that they gave notification one way or the other within 1 to 2
months, and only 2 editors reported a time-lag of as much as 4 months or
more." Coe and Weinstock (1967) report the results of a survey in
which the mean review time is 76 days for domestic journals (U.S. +
Canadian) and 70 days for foreign journals. (3) It seems that the review
time they report refers to the time from submission to acceptance, which
is longer than the FRT (although in the 1960s the difference between the
FRT and the submit-accept time was much smaller than it is today because
revise and resubmit was not common in that period, see Ellison 2002a).
While editors' reports did not include turnaround statistics
on a regular basis, occasionally these reports include some indication
for the FRT in that period. In the first issue of The Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science (which changed its name to Bell Journal
of Economics in 1974 and to RAND Journal of Economics in 1984), the
editor states "The Editorial Board undertakes to furnish the author
of a submitted article with a decision on publication within a month of
receiving the manuscript" (MacAvoy 1970).
The editors of The Economic Journal describe the review process in
the journal in the early 1970s (Champernowne, Deane, and Reddaway 1973):
The article is then considered by one of the two editors
dealing with articles, who normally sends it to
a referee with a stock letter which expresses the
hope that he will report within three weeks if at
all possible. We have a good system for "chasing"
referees with reminders, but in the main they give
us remarkably good service. As a check on this
general impression, we analyzed our records for
the period from I January 1971 to 13 June 1972,
and reported the following result to the 1972 meeting
of the Editorial Board:
Time to Receive Report Number of Reports
Under 3 weeks 158
3 weeks-2 months 101
Over 2 months 27
286
The people in the third category were dropped
from our list of referees, unless there was a good
reason for the delay.
The editor of Econometrica, in his report dated 30 June 1975,
states "'The time between submission and editorial decision
continues to remain roughly stable with the median time for papers in
process about two months" (Fisher 1976). Finally, Table 2 presents
data about the FRT in the Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) in the
years 1940-1980 for accepted and rejected manuscripts. (4) The FRT for
all manuscripts is obviously closer to the number for rejected papers
than that for accepted papers due to the small acceptance rate in the
QJE. In 1960, the FRT was around 2 months.
III. CAN THE SLOWDOWN IN THE FRT BE BENEFICIAL?
The discussion above suggests that the FRT grew from about 2 months
circa 1960 to about 3-6 months today. At first, the change seems as a
bad outcome. Slower FRT means that new research is disseminated to the
academic community less promptly, which is a bad thing. Nevertheless, I
argue that this slowdown is in fact in the same direction as the change
in the optimal FRT. To understand why, I explain below first why the
optimal FRT is not zero and then why the optimal FRT has increased over
the last 40 years.
Why Is the Optimal FRT Positive?
What is the optimal FRT? At first, it seems that as long as we do
not reduce the quality of the review process, we would like the delay it
causes to be minimal. This will allow research to be disseminated as
fast as possible, which is particularly important since new research
often uses previous results. We would like the referee to read the paper
and write a report about it the same day he receives the paper, not 4
months later. Nevertheless, I claim that the optimal FRT is not zero.
What good does a longer FRT yield if the quality of the review
process is unchanged? The answer is that it reduces the costs of the
refereeing process because a longer FRT reduces the number of
submissions o flow-quality papers to good journals. With zero FRT, and
given the low submission fees in economics, the cost for an author of
submitting an existing paper to a top journal is so small compared to
the potential benefits (if the paper is eventually accepted there) that
it is worthwhile to do so even when acceptance chances are very low. By
submitting the paper, however, the author creates a social cost:
referees and editors have to dedicate their scarce time to evaluate the
paper. The problem is that the author faces a private submission cost
that is much lower than the social cost of submission. For example, the
author may pay $50 as a submission fee, but this is much lower than the
value of several hours of work of two referees. (5)
Increasing the FRT can alleviate this problem since higher FRT
increases the submission cost for the author. The FRT delays the
publication of the paper and thus creates a cost for untenured authors
who want to have publications before their tenure decision. The FRT also
creates a cost for tenured authors because promotion and salary depend
on publications. (6) The delay created by the FRT causes the author to
think twice before submitting his paper to journals where he has very
low acceptance chances and thus decreases the number of submissions of
low-quality papers to good journals and reduces the costs of the
refereeing system by saving the scarce resources of editors and
referees.
For concreteness, consider the case of a mediocre paper and the top
journals. The QJE and Review of Economic Studies do not charge
submission fees at all, Econometrica does not charge submission fees
from society members, Journal of Political Economy charges $75 for
subscribers, and American Economic Review (AER) charges $100 for members
of the American Economic Association. Since every paper has some merits,
and referees occasionally make mistakes, even mediocre papers have
positive acceptance chances even in the top journals. (7) Even if the
paper, in fact, has zero chances to be accepted, the author may
overestimate its chances (on biases of authors regarding the quality of
their papers, see also Ellison 2002b). Given the enormous benefits of a
publication in a top journal (better chances to get tenure, higher
lifetime earnings, prestige, better chances that the research will be
read, etc.), with a zero FRT, the optimal submission strategy (even of
mediocre papers) is to submit to each of the top journals
(sequentially). Hundreds of mediocre papers that today are not submitted
to top journals will be submitted, increasing significantly the costs of
the refereeing process. The same idea applies when we compare two
positive values of the FRT: higher FRT increases the submission cost
(for the author) and therefore reduces the number of redundant
submissions (those where even the author knows his acceptance chances
are very low). (8) It follows that the cost of the review process (which
is mainly the time cost of referees and editors) is a decreasing
function of the FRT. The trade-off between lower cost of the review
process and slower dissemination of research determines the optimal FRT.
(9)
Why Has the Optimal FRT Increased over the Years?
Two major changes in the environment caused the optimal FRT to
increase over the last few decades. One change is that articles today
are longer and more mathematical than in the past (see Ellison 2002a;
2002b). Even though referees also became more familiar with mathematical
techniques than in the past, it still takes more hours to read,
understand, evaluate, and write a referee report on a mathematical paper
than on a qualitative paper. In addition, it takes more hours to referee
papers today than in the past because the papers are longer.
Consequently, the social costs of reviewing a submitted manuscript
increased, and it became more important to deter submissions of mediocre
papers to good journals. This increases the optimal FRT.
The second change is the increasing availability of working papers.
Today, working papers are far more available than they were 40 years ago
because individuals and institutions post their working papers on the
Internet. Consequently, people often know about research in their field
before it is published in a journal. Forty years ago, it was much harder
to know about a new article before its journal publication. As a result,
the importance of quick publication of research in journals (from the
society's perspective, not the author's) has been reduced. In
the trade-off that determines the optimal FRT, the cost of a longer FRT
(slow publication) has been reduced, increasing the optimal FRT.
A possible objection to this conclusion is that the availability of
working papers prior to publication is irrelevant because people do not
read working papers. There are so many working papers, the argument
goes, that people cannot afford to spend time reading them all just to
find some of high quality. They prefer to wait until the high-quality
papers are accepted in good journals and then read only them.
There are several reasons why this may not be true, and people do
read working papers. First, the quality of working papers is not
completely unknown. The authors are known, and often, the identity of
the author can give a good idea about the quality of the paper. Many
papers are presented in seminars, so potential readers have an idea
about the quality of these working papers. Researchers also talk about
papers they read, so once one person obtains information about the
quality of a working paper (from seeing it presented in a seminar,
reading it, and so on), others may receive this information from
him/her. Often a short overview of a paper suggests whether it is of
high quality or not, especially to readers who are familiar with the
topic (and usually potential readers are familiar with the topic), so it
is possible to review quickly many working papers and read thoroughly
just the high-quality ones.
Moreover, while the number of working papers in general is high, if
one is interested in a particular topic, the number of working papers
available need not be so high as to exclude the possibility to read them
all. Thus, when one is researching a certain topic, he can often afford
to read the working papers that are closely related even before they are
published. Electronic databases (e.g., Econlit, IDEAS, and SSRN) make
the task of finding relevant working papers relatively easy.
To support the claim that working papers are being read and are
more important today than in the past, I examined empirically whether
working papers are being cited in published articles. I categorized each
citation in the May 2002 issue of Econometrica and the March 2002 issue
of the AER (1109 citations in total) as a working paper, journal
article, book, chapter in an edited volume, forthcoming article, or
others (including sources such as governmental published statistics, PhD
dissertations, and newspapers). For comparison, I did the same analysis
for the first two 1960 issues of Econometrica (January and April) and
AER (March and June), with 420 citations in total.
Table 3 presents the distribution of citations. First, it is easy
to see that the importance of working papers increased significantly
over the years. Working papers accounted for less than 3% of citations
in 1960 but account for about 14% of citations today. Second, we can see
that working papers are being read, and therefore, their increased
availability today is important. A cited working paper indicates that
the author who cited it was familiar with its contents. If no one reads
working papers prior to publication, we should expect to see no
citations of working papers. The results show that while journals
account for the majority of citations today- more than a half of the
total citations the importance of working papers is without doubt.
Working papers are the second largest source of citations in both
Econometrica and the AER. The high frequency of working paper citations
is especially astounding given that most working papers cited are from
the last few years, while citations of journals and books can date
decades ago. Moreover, citations of working papers underestimate the
importance of working papers because authors update references as they
go. A paper the author originally knew about and read when it was a
working paper might have become a journal article by the time the author
submits the final version to publication. The citation is then to a
journal article, but the true source was the previous working paper.
The conclusion is that working papers are read, at least by
researchers for whom they are relevant. This implies that the role of
journals in disseminating new research has been eroded and therefore
that quick publication of research in journals is less important today
than it was in the past. Thus, the optimal FRT increased because of two
separate reasons: the benefit of a longer FRT is higher today because it
is more important to deter frivolous submissions (due to a higher cost
of refereeing a paper) and the cost of a longer FRT is lower nowadays
because the importance of quick publication (from social perspective)
has been reduced. The increase in the FRT in practice is therefore in
the same direction as the change in the optimal FRT.
A Formal Model of the Changes in the Optimal FRT
To see more formally why an increased cost of handling manuscripts
and the availability of working papers raise the optimal FRT, I
introduce below a simple model of how the optimal FRT is determined.
Denote the FRT by d (for delay), where d [greater than or equal to] 0,
and the number of submissions by n(d). As was explained above, a longer
FRT changes the optimal behavior of authors in a way that reduces the
number of submissions, implying that n' < 0. The total cost of
the refereeing process is equal to a cost per submission, c, times the
number of submissions, n(d).
Denote the social value of the benefits of peer-reviewed journals
as V(d; s), where s [member of] [0, 1] is a measure of the spillover of
information prior to publication in a journal, s = 0 corresponds to the
case where no one knows about the research done by others before the
research is published in a journal, s = 1 corresponds to the case in
which everyone knows about all the research that takes place and journal
publication does not add any new information, including information
about the quality of the article, s is determined exogenously by the
technology and the environment: working paper series, e-mail, and
Internet, for example, increase the spillover of information prior to
publication and increase the value of s. For simplicity, I assume that
the functions V and n are continuously differentiable.
An increase in the FRT delays the dissemination of research, both
to the general public and to other scholars who want to use the new
knowledge as a basis for additional research, and therefore reduces V(d;
s); formally, [V.sub.d] < 0. The marginal cost of an increase in the
FRT is smaller when the spillover of information is higher: when
publication adds only little information, it is less crucial how quickly
publication occurs. In the extreme case of s = 1, for example, since
publication in a journal adds nothing, the marginal cost of an increased
FRT is zero. This implies that [V.sub.d] is smaller in absolute value
when s is higher; since [V.sub.d] < 0, it follows that [V.sub.d] is
higher when s is higher, implying [V.sub.ds] > 0.
Welfare is equal to the benefits from peer-review journals minus
the cost of the peer-review process:
W(d; s, c) = V(d; s) - cn(d).
The optimal FRT is obtained by maximizing W(d; s, c) with respect
to d. For simplicity, I assume that for given values of s and c, there
is a unique value of d that maximizes W, denoted by [d.sup.*]. Based on
the empirical analysis in Azar (2005), I also assume that [d.sup.*] is
strictly positive for all s [member of] [0,1]. The first result is that
an increase in the spillover of information raises the optimal FRT.
PROPOSITION 1. [d.sup.*] is strictly increasing in s.
Proof Because W has increasing differences in (d; s), a basic
theorem on monotone comparative statics (see, e.g., Milgrom and Shannon
1994, Theorem 5) implies that [d.sup.*] is nondecreasing in s. To show
that [d.sup.*] is strictly increasing in s, consider [s.sub.1] >
[s.sub.0] and denote the corresponding optimal FRTs by [d.sup.*.sub.1]
and [d.sup.*.sub.0]. It suffices to show that [d.sup.*.sub.0] is no
longer optimal with [s.sub.1].[d.sup.*.sub.0] being the global maximizer
with [s.sub.0] implies that [W.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0]; [s.sub.0], c) =
[V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0]; [s.sub.0]) - cn ([d.sup.*.sub.0]) = 0.
Because [V.sub.ds], > 0, we have [V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];
[s.sub.1]) > [V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];[s.sub.0]), and therefore
[W.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];[s.sub.1],c) =
[V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];[s.sub.1]) - cn' ([d.sup.*.sub.0]) >0.
This implies that values of d slightly above [d.sup.*.sub.0] achieve
higher welfare than [d.sup.*.sub.0] does when s = [s.sub.1] and
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
The second result is that an increase in the cost of handling a
manuscript raises the optimal FRT.
PROPOSITION 2. [d.sup.*] is strictly increasing in c.
Proof The proof follows a similar logic to the one in the previous
proposition. Because n' < 0, W has increasing differences in (d;
c), implying that [d.sup.*] is nondecreasing in s. To show that
[d.sup.*] is strictly increasing in c, consider [c.sub.1] >
[c.sub.0], with the corresponding optimal FRTs denoted by
[d.sup.*.sub.0] and [d.sup.*.sub.l]. [d.sup.*.sub.0] being the global
maximizer with [c.sub.0] implies that
[W.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];s,[c.sub.0]) = [V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];s) -
[c.sub.0]n'([d.sup.*.sub.0]) = 0. Since n' < 0, we get
[W.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0]; s, [c.sub.1])= [V.sub.d] ([d.sup.*.sub.0];s)
- [c.sub.1]n' ([d.sup.*.sub.0]) > [V.sub.d]([d.sup.*.sub.0];s) -
[c.sub.0]n'([d.sup.*.sub.0]) = 0, implying that values of d
slightly above [d.sup.*.sub.0] achieve higher welfare than
[d.sup.*.sub.0] does when c = [c.sub.1]. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Propositions 1 and 2 show formally that the higher spillover of
information prior to publication today and the higher cost of handling
manuscripts have increased the optimal FRT. Thus, the change in the
actual FRT over the last 40 years, which was discussed above, is in the
same direction as the change in the optimal FRT.
IV. CONCLUSION
The academic review process is an important research topic since
understanding it better and knowing more about it can help us improve
the process and increase the productivity of economists and other
scholars. Yet, this topic has received relatively little attention in
the literature. One of the most criticized aspects of the review process
is the long time it takes. The FRT is a particularly important topic
because it may delay the paper several times (if the paper is rejected
from several journals prior to being accepted in another journal).
An examination of the FRT today and in the past shows a significant
slowdown--the FRT increased from about 2 months 40 years ago to about
3-6 months today. The optimal FRT, however, is not zero, and it
increased over the years due to the increasing costs of refereeing a
paper and the decreasing importance of quick publication in a journal
(from a social perspective). The observation that the actual and optimal
FRT both increased is intriguing; whether the increased optimal FRT is
the reason for the actual increase in the FRT is an interesting question
that is left for future research. It is possible that referees today,
for example, feel less guilty when they delay the publication of an
article, knowing that others who might be interested in it can read the
working paper. Consequently, they handle papers less quickly than their
past colleagues who felt more guilty when they delayed the publication
process. Thus, indirectly, the same reasons that changed the optimal FRT
could also change the behavior of referees and the actual FRT.
The insight that quick publication is less important today than in
the past also has implications for the question how many revisions (and
how significant) should articles go through prior to publication. The
benefit of more revisions is better articles; one of the costs is the
delayed publication of new ideas. If quick publication becomes less
important because the research is now available as working papers prior
to publication, the optimal number of revisions increases. Empirical
evidence suggests that indeed the number of revisions and their extent
required today are much higher than in the past in various economics
journals (see Ellison 2002a; 2002b). It is again possible that the
behavior of referees and editors was affected by the reduced importance
of quick publication, and this caused the changes in the optimal and the
actual number of revisions to be in the same direction; a more careful
examination of this idea is left for future research.
ABBREVIATIONS
AER: American Economic Review
FRT: First-Response Time
QJE: Quarterly Journal of Economics
doi: 10.1093/ei/cb1016
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(1.) An anonymous referee pointed out that also in the natural
sciences the FRT is much shorter than in economics, even in top-notch
journals without submission tees, such as Science and Nature, and even
though the number of referee reports is usually two to three in the
natural sciences compared to one to two in economics. Identifying the
reasons for the differences between the disciplines is beyond the scope
of the current article but is a worthwhile project for future research.
(2.) Quoted from the mission statement of the Berkeley Electronic
Press, available online at http://www.bepress.com/aboutbepress.html.
(3.) Coe and Weinstock report 75 and 73 days in Table 3. but direct
computation based on the detailed data they provide in Table 1 suggests
that the correct numbers are 76 and 70 days for domestic and foreign
journals.
(4.) I thank Glenn Ellison for the raw data used to compute the
numbers in the table and for helpful advice. The procedure he used to
collect the sample ensures that this is a random sample with respect to
the FRT.
(5.) Another way to cause the author to internalize the social
costs of the refereeing process is to increase the submission fee
significantly (say to a few hundred dollars). This will create other
problems, however, such as discrimination between authors with different
financial abilities. Moreover, for some authors the submission fees are
paid by their institution, by a grant, or from a nonbinding research
budget: in these cases, an increase in submission lees might be
ineffective. Interestingly, submission fees in finance and accounting
(where the FRT is much shorter than in economics) are higher than in
economics. Another interesting point is that the Berkeley Electronic
Press journals (that have the shortest FRT in economics) require that
the author referee two papers for each submitted manuscript (in addition
to a submission tee), thus causing the author to internalize the social
cost of refereeing that his submission creates.
(6.) Moore, Newman, and Turnbull (2001), for example, found in a
sample of U.S. economics professors that a publication in the top ten
journals in economics increases salary by 2.9% on average and a
publication in journals ranked 11 55 increases salary by 1.7%. On the
returns to publications, see also Sauer (1988) and Price and Razzolini
(2002).
(7.) Laband, Tollison, and Karahan (2002), for example, show that
even in the A ER and the Journal of Political Economy some papers do not
receive any citations in the 5 years following their publication,
suggesting that these papers are not important and that their acceptance
was a mistake.
(8.) As an anonymous referee pointed out, some submissions of good
papers to top journals might also be deterred when the FRT increases.
Consequently, some good papers might be submitted to journals that are
of lower quality than the paper. While the research will still be
published, the sorting function of the journals will be harmed, with
these good papers possibly receiving less attention than they should.
Because of the huge awards for publication in top journals, however,
most papers with good chances of acceptance will be submitted to top
journals even with an increased FRT, and therefore, this potential
problem is outweighed by the reduction in submissions of low-quality
papers to top journals.
(9.) It is important to stress that the advantage of a longer FRT
applies only to new manuscripts and not to revised and resubmitted ones.
The benefit of preventing excessive submissions is irrelevant for papers
that were good enough that a revised version was requested, while the
cost of delaying the dissemination of research still exists. Therefore,
the delay of resubmissions should be as short as possible (given a
constant review quality).
OFER H. AZAR *
* I thank Gadi Barlevy, Jacques Cremer, Eddie Dekel, Ricky Lam,
Nisan Langberg, Nadav Levy, Robert Porter, William Rogerson, Michael
Whinston, Asher Wolinsky, and especially James Dana, Glenn Ellison, two
anonymous referees, and the Editor Dennis W. Jansen for helpful
discussions and comments. I am also grateful for their comments to the
participants in the seminars given in Bar-Ilan University, University of
Haifa, and Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and the participants in
the 2003 European Economic Association meetings in Stockholm. I thank
Glenn Ellison also for data on FRTs in the QJE over the period 1940
1980. Financial support from The Center for the Study of Industrial
Organization at Northwestern University is gratefully acknowledged.
Azar: Lecturer, Department of Business Administration, School of
Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, POB 653, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel. Phone +972-8-6472675, Fax +972-8-6477691, E-mail
azar@som.bgu.ac.il
TABLE 1
FRTs in Various Journals (in days)
Median Mean
FRT FRT Period
Economics Journals
American Economic Review 132 154 July 2001 to
June 2002
B.E. Journals in Economic 51 NA
Analysis and Policy
B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics 66 NA
B.E. Journals in 61 NA
Theoretical Economics
Canadian Journal of Economics NA 109 December 2002 to
November 2003
Econometrica 118 107 2002
77 95
112 105
Economic Inquiry NA 149 2002
Economic Journal 127 131 2001
118 124
214 174
European Economic Review 101 131 2001
Journal of Economic History 85 86 July 2001 to
June 2002
91 91
Journal of Political Economics NA 167 2000
Quarterly Journal of Economics NA 82 1997
NA 47
NA 114
RAND Journal of Economics 162 172 July 2001 to
June 2002
Review of Economic Studies NA 129 September 2001 to
August 2002
NA 158
NA 88
NA 48
Southern Economic Journal 76 90 2002
Accounting Journals
The Accounting Review 57 58 June 2002 to
May 2003
Journal of Accounting and 46 50 June 2002 to
Economics May 2003
Finance Journals
Journal of Financial Economics 34 42 October 2002 to
September 2003
The Journal of Finance 40 44 1 March 2000 to
31 May 2003
Source/
Journal
Issue Comments
Economics Journals
American Economic Review May 2003 Rejected papers
only
B.E. Journals in Economic Web site
Analysis anti Policy
B.E. Journals in Macroeconomics Web site
B.E. Journals in Web site
Theoretical Economics
Canadian Journal of Economics Web site
Econometrica January 2004 New submissions
only
Revisions only
All papers
Economic Inquiry October 2003
Economic Journal Editor's report All papers
2002 (online)
Rejected papers
Letters inviting
revision
European Economic Review Online
Journal of Economic History March 2003 Including
resubmissions
Excluding
resubmissions
Journal of Political Economics Ellison (2002a)
Quarterly Journal of Economics Ellison (2002a) Papers sent to
referees
All papers
Accepted papers
only
RAND Journal of Economics Autumn 2003
Review of Economic Studies Web site New submissions
only
First revision
Second revision
Third revision
Southern Economic Journal October 2003 New submissions
only
Accounting Journals
The Accounting Review October 2003 Including
resubmissions
Journal of Accounting and August 2003
Economics
Finance Journals
Journal of Financial Economics Web site
The Journal of Finance Web site Including
resubmissions
Notes: In those journals in which l calculated the mean FRT
based on a distribution provided by the journal, the mean
FRT is probably a little higher than the figure in the table
because 1 had to exclude papers that were still in the review
process from the computation (since they do not have an FRT yet),
and these papers have a higher FRT on average. In addition, I
treated all papers in the highest category (e.g., 10+ months)
as having an FRT of the lower bound of that category (10 months
in this example; since the journals do not report the upper bound
of the highest category, I had to make an arbitrary assumption
such as this). This also leads to some underestimation of the mean
FRT. The median FRT might also be slightly underestimated because
of the first issue but is not affected by the second. The percentage
of papers in the highest FRT category and those that were still
in process was such that the bias is small. Additional details
about the computations performed (in those cases that the journals
publish the distribution rather than the mean or median) can be
obtained from the author upon request. NA = not available.
TABLE 2 FRTs in the QJE (in days)
Accepted Papers
Number of Average Median
Observations FRT FRT
1940 29 79 46
1950 16 65 64
1960 28 69 67
1970 27 140 137
1980
Rejected Papers
Number of Average Median
Observations FRT FRT
1940 14 40 35
1950 24 81 73
1960 32 67 41
1970 28 99 68
1980 33 131 95
TABLE 3
Distribution of Current and Past References in the Leading Journals
Working
Journal and Issues Paper Journal Book
Econometrica 1-4/1960 10 (4.5%) 99 (44.8%) 78 (35.3%)
AER 3-6/1960 2 (1.0%) 77 (38.7%) 68 (34.2%)
Fconometrica 5/2002 64 (15.5%) 248 (60.2%) 60 (14.6%)
AER 3/2002 91 (13.1%) 397 (57.0%) 78 (11.2%)
Chapter in an Forthcoming
Journal and Issues Edited Volume in a Journal
Econometrica 1-4/1960 16 (7.2%) 2 (0.9%)
AER 3-6/1960 11 (5.5%) 1 (0.5%)
Fconometrica 5/2002 24 (5.8%) 3 (0.7%)
AER 3/2002 55 (7.9%) 4 (0.6%)
Journal and Issues Others Total
Econometrica 1-4/1960 16 (7.2%) 221 (100%)
AER 3-6/1960 40 (20.1%) 199 (100%)
Fconometrica 5/2002 13 (3.2%) 412 (100%)
AER 3/2002 72 (10.3%) 697 (100%)
Notes: The table presents the breakdown of the references included in
the articles that appeared in the journal and issue on the left,
according to the type of publication cited.