Curbside recycling in the presence of alternatives.
Beatty, Timothy K.M. ; Berck, Peter ; Shimshack, Jay P. 等
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans produce about 375 million tons of municipal solid waste
(MSW) annually, or 1.3 tons per capita. Twenty-five to 30% of this
material is recycled (Kaufman et al. 2004). These historically high
recycling rates have often been attributed to growth in residential
curbside access. Indeed, curbside programs have grown from 2,000 in 1990
to more than 9,700 in 2000, and more than 50% of the U.S. population now
has curbside access.
Systematic empirical evidence on the impact of curbside programs,
however, is rare. In this article, we measure the extent to which
curbside access affects recycled quantities. Importantly, we use novel
data to distinguish between new material and material diverted from
other recycling modes such as recycling centers. Failure to account for
cannibalization from other modes may substantially overestimate the
benefits of curbside programs.
The impact of curbside recycling access on quantities recycled has
important policy implications, as curbside programs are both costly and
controversial. Curbside collection, transportation, sorting, and
processing costs average approximately $2-$7 per household per month.
Costs can be considerably higher in suburban and rural areas. These
costs have generated debate in many municipalities, and the best
available evidence suggests that the number of curbside programs fell by
nearly 9% between 2000 and 2002 (Kaufman et al. 2004). (1)
We investigate the impact of curbside programs in the presence of
alternative recycling modes using a panel of aluminum, glass, and
plastic beverage container returns data from California's
Department of Conservation (DOC). These data offer several advantages
over the cross-sectional survey data found in most previous studies.
First, our data form the basis for payment disbursement to recyclers and
are extremely reliable. Second, we use material-specific quantity data.
While many studies have examined indirect recycling measures such as the
average stated propensity to recycle, our data directly measure the
quantities of aluminum, glass, and plastic recycled. Third, our data
cover a wide geographic region over a relatively long time period. The
resulting panel structure of the data provides a number of features
desirable for econometric identification. For example, curbside programs
were adopted locally and progressively introduced over time, so all
areas were not affected equally. We are also able to control for
unobservable heterogeneity while accounting for potential program
endogeneity.
We measure the impact of marginal changes in the level of curbside
on the quantity recycled using a fixed effects panel data approach. For
each material, we first examine the effect of curbside program expansion
on the quantity of beverage containers returned at the curb. Next, we
investigate the effects of curbside programs on the material-specific
total amount of beverage containers recycled. After noting clear
discrepancies between these first two effects, we consider the extent to
which curbside expansion cannibalizes from recycling centers. Finally,
we explore this diversion in more detail. In particular, we study the
effect of structural and demographic characteristics on the diversion
response.
We find four main results. First, the impact of expanding curbside
programs on total beverage containers recycled is small. Second, much of
this result obtains because curbside programs significantly cannibalize returns from recycling centers. Third, the degree of cannibalization
varies by material type. We find that diversion is strongest for heavier
and bulkier materials like glass. Fourth, the degree of cannibalization
is sensitive to structural and demographic characteristics. For example,
we find that diversion of glass is particularly pronounced when income
is high and unemployment is low.
Of the relatively small number of empirical articles that study
recycling, our research is perhaps most closely related to the important
analysis by Jenkins et al. (2003). Their article used household survey
data to demonstrate that the presence of a curbside program for a given
material increased the probability that more than 95% of an average
household's material would be recycled by between 25% and 50%.
Jenkins et al. (2003) further investigated the marginal effect of
replacing a recycling center with a curbside program on households'
propensity to recycle. Our article differs in that it investigates the
marginal effect of increasing curbside access on observed recycled
quantities, controls for program endogeneity, and explores the effect of
changes in curbside access on returns to existing recycling centers.
This latter distinction is important since curbside programs typically
supplement, rather than replace, recycling centers.
Our article also shares features with Ashenmiller (2006).
Ashenmiller (2006) used a unique individual-level data set from Santa
Barbara, California, to assess the impacts of income and education on
recycling behavior. The study found that cash recycling is an important
source of income for some poor households. Despite fundamentally
different economic questions, our article and Ashenmiller (2006) both
focus on recycling activities in the presence of a bottle bill.
Additionally, both studies consider returns by material.
Our research also builds upon a broader empirical literature that
examined the change in waste and recycling behavior as a function of
policy variables and socioeconomic characteristics. (2) Using
cross-sectional survey data, Hong, Adams, and Love (1993) and Hong and
Adams (1999) found that an increase in waste disposal fees increased
curbside recycling participation and quantities recycled but did not
generate large reductions in trash. Reschovsky and Stone (1994) used
similar data and found that curbside programs increased total recycling
rates if implemented in conjunction with mandatory recycling and
unit-based waste pricing. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) directly
measured household waste generation, and their results suggested that
garbage unit pricing increased curbside recycling, volumetric compacting, and illegal dumping significantly. Callan and Thomas (1997)
and Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) used geographically diverse,
cross-sectional, community-level data and further examined the effects
of unit pricing and recycling. An important contribution of Kinnaman and
Fullerton (2000) was illustrating the potential endogeneity of curbside
program implementation. Finally, Ando and Gosselin (2005) made clear the
importance of storage and distance to recycling facilities in a
household's recycling decision.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the
institutional context and describes our data from California's DOC.
Section III presents our conceptual framework and empirical methodology.
Section IV presents our key results and sensitivity analysis. We first
establish that incremental expansion of curbside access has a very small
effect on material-specific total beverage containers recycled. Next, we
demonstrate that this result largely obtains due to diversion from
existing recycling streams. We then explore how various structural
characteristics impact this diversion. Section V interprets our results
for economics and policy. We conclude with simple cost-effectiveness
comparisons that incorporate the article's empirical results.
Results suggest that saved household time costs would need to be large
for incremental expansion of curbside access to be cost-effective.
II. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND DATA
A. The Data Generating Process
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and its
amendments govern the federal management of waste. With few exceptions,
RCRA delegated household waste management regulations to state and local
governments. California, the setting for the empirical case study that
follows, primarily regulates MSW and recycling with its Integrated Waste
Management Act (AB939, SB1322). The Act's most critical provisions
were its diversion mandates. These directives required cities and
counties to redirect 25% of landfill material by 1995 and 50% by 2000
(relative to 1990 levels).
Like many other states and Canadian provinces, California achieves
part of its overall waste management goals with beverage container
legislation. (3) Beverage containers represent a significant portion of
MSW streams and recycling returns. For the United States as a whole,
beer and soft drink cans represent 78% of aluminum MSW and 95% of
aluminum recovery. Beer and soft drink bottles represent 52% of glass
MSW and 53% of glass recovery. Soft drink bottles represent
approximately 44% of polyethylene terephthalate plastics, but the
overall recovery of all plastics is small (~5%) (United States
Environmental Protection Agency 2002).
In California, the Beverage Container Recycling and Litter Reduction Act (AB2020) endeavored to achieve an 80% recycling rate for
all aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers covered by the Act.
Initially, eligible containers included beer, wine coolers, and soda
bottles and cans. In 2000, containers holding noncarbonated beverages
like water, fruit juice, coffee, and sports drinks were added to the
program. (4) To encourage recycling and to discourage litter, AB2020
established a deposit/ refund system to be managed by the state's
DOC. Under this system, distributors send redemption payments to the
state, pass these costs on to retailers and consumers, and consumers may
then redeem their California Redemption Value (CRV) (5) at a certified recycling center. (6)
The administration of the deposit/refund system of AB2020 generated
key portions of our unique data set. Most notably, we have aluminum,
glass, and plastic beverage container return quantities for each of the
state's recycling centers. Since these data were used to reimburse the centers for CRV redemption values paid to consumers, they are very
accurate. California's DOC Division of Recycling also tracks the
locations and characteristics of the recycling centers. AB2020 required
that a redemption center exist within half mile of any supermarket with
more than $2 million gross annual sales, and there are more than 2,000
operational drop-off recycling centers. (7) In our context, drop-off
recycling centers include both supermarket and nonsupermarket locations.
Since these centers are independent businesses, they vary in hours of
operation and other characteristics.
California's DOC also tracks curbside beverage container
program characteristics and quantities returned at the curb. Precise
beverage container curbside quantities are estimates based upon
extensive sampling by the DOC. (8) Curbside programs can vary
considerably. Some curbside programs only accept limited material types,
some require material sorting, and a small number are coupled with
mandatory recycling. Even for beverage containers, materials recycled at
the curb do not generate refund payments for households.
B. Our Sample
Our sample of California's DOC recycling data consists of
quarterly observations for the 6-yr period 1995-2000. Time series
variation in our data allows us to exploit panel techniques to control
for unobserved heterogeneity while accounting for potential program
endogeneity. This particular period is promising for exploration because
curbside programs were expanding, there were no major changes to the
bottle bill or its associated redemption values, and data were readily
available. For confidentiality purposes, all data are aggregated to the
county level.
We exclude the 14 California counties with incomplete data or no
curbside recycling during our sample period. The omitted counties are
considerably more rural than included counties. As a consequence, the
results of our analysis should be extrapolated to predominantly rural
areas with a degree of caution. (9) The resulting data set consists of
1,052 observations; we observe 44 counties over the 24 quarters between
1995(1) and 2000(4), with four missing data points.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. For each variable of
interest, we report the mean and standard deviation for the first sample
year, the last sample year, and the entire sample. The summary
statistics in Table 1 indicate that total sales of glass and plastic
beverage containers increased over the sample. Sales of aluminum
beverage containers fell. Curbside beverage container quantity returns
increased substantially for aluminum, glass, and plastic, but overall
material-specific beverage containers recycled increased only moderately
for glass and plastic and fell for aluminum. Returns to recycling
centers increased for both glass and plastic but fell for aluminum.
Aggregate changes in recycled quantities are unlikely attributable to
changes in recycling center characteristics, as these remained
relatively constant over the period.
Summary statistics in Table 1 also indicate that the availability
of curbside recycling increased over the sample period. In 1995, on
average, 28%, 22%, and 13% of the population of each county had access
to curbside recycling for aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage
containers, respectively. By 2000, the average percentage of the
population served by curbside had increased to 35%, 27%, and 16%,
respectively. Since the penetration of curbside programs is central to
the ensuing analysis, we explore curbside access in more detail in
Figure 1. The kernel density estimates in the figure, intuitively
speaking, are non-parametrically smoothed histograms of curbside
penetration for the first and last quarters of our sample. The key thing
to note is the rightward shift in each density, indicating that curbside
availability was notably higher in 2000(4) than in 1995(1). Figure 1
also shows that curbside programs were heterogeneously implemented
across time, county, and materials.
Observed variation in the materials collected by curbside programs
is consistent with evidence for the United States as a whole (United
States Environmental Protection Agency 1994). In particular, plastic
recycling is rare relative to aluminum and glass, as plastic has a high
volume-to-weight ratio (McCarthy 1993). In our sample, an average of
50.5% of the population of each county with access to curbside recycling
was able to return aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers at
the curb. Only 27.7% was able to curbside recycle only aluminum and
glass, 18.6% only aluminum, and 3.2% only aluminum and plastic.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Conceptual Framework
In this subsection, we construct a conceptual framework for
empirically analyzing disposal decisions in the presence of multiple
recycling modes. The purpose of this simple framework is to motivate
empirical specification and variable choice. The framework shares
features of the models in Kinnaman and Fullerton (2000) and Jenkins et
al. (2003) but differs by emphasizing choices between recycling modes.
Consider a representative consumer. In a first-stage allocation decision, the agent maximizes a weakly separable utility function over
the consumption of beverages, other goods, and material-specific waste
disposal services. Optimization is subject to a time/money budget
constraint. The solution to this first-stage problem yields waste
disposal service expenditures W and material-specific beverage container
expenditures [E.sub.i]. Assuming fixed prices, [E.sub.i] implies
beverage container quantities [B.sub.i].
Assume that [B.sub.i] and W are exogenous to a second-stage,
within-group optimization over the choice of disposal method. For each
material type i, total beverage quantities [B.sub.i] can be recycled at
the curb ([CS.sub.i]), recycled at drop-off recycling centers
([RC.sub.i]), or not recycled ([NR.sub.i]). The latter option
incorporates trash, illegal dumping, etc. Preferences among disposal
methods may depend upon household characteristics [alpha]. In this
framework, sub-utility is maximized over disposal methods subject to a
subgroup expenditure constraint and a quantity adding up constraint:
(1) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Solving the representative consumer's choice problem, Equation
(1), yields a system of estimable conditional demands for each material
i: (10)
2 [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
A reduced-form version of the system of equations in Equation (2)
serves as the basis for our empirical estimation. Since we do not have
data on nonrecycled beverage containers, we follow Kinnaman and
Fullerton (2000) and estimate each material-specific system as a series
of demand equations. Since the independent variables in each equation
are the same, there is no bias from estimating the system as separate
equations.
As noted in Section II, our data are collected at the county level.
As with all economic analyses not performed at an individual level,
aggregation consistent with economic theory implies restrictions on the
structure of preferences. In particular, individual utility must follow
the Gorman form and the marginal propensity to recycle must be
independent of income within a given county. (11)
B. Variables
To examine the impact of curbside recycling on quantities returned
at the curb, total recycling quantities, and recycling center
quantities, we construct variables consistent with the conceptual
framework developed above. Our key dependent variables are
material-specific per capita recycled quantities of beverage containers.
For example, we consider per capita pounds of aluminum beverage
containers recycled at the curb, recycled in total, and recycled at
drop-off recycling centers.
Important explanatory variables include those that represent the
time and money prices of recycling modes in Equation (2). In this vein,
the key explanatory variable is the percentage of a county's
population served by curbside programs. This serves as a proxy for the
price of curbside recycling. We also include recycling centers per
square mile and two measures of recycling center hours open as proxies
for the price of drop-off recycling centers. The CRV refund, while
naturally a large part of drop-off recycling center price, remains
constant across space and time and is therefore relegated to the
regression constant. (12)
Other independent variables include total quarterly per capita
consumption of each material at the state level since our conceptual
framework indicates that quantities recycled are a function of total
beverages consumed. County-level data are not available, so we augment statewide beverage sales with county-specific average temperature (a
well-known predictor of packaged beverage consumption). (13) We also
include quarterly dummies and year dummies to account for seasonality
and broad trends in the real price of beverages, beverage consumption,
and the propensity to recycle.
Finally, we exploit the panel structure of the data by including
fixed effects. This captures systematic differences across counties and
serves as a proxy for [alpha] in our conceptual framework. Fixed effects
may represent county-specific factors such as size, location, density,
and demographic characteristics like education and income.
C. Regression Model
We ask three questions. First, to what extent does increasing the
share of the population with access to curbside recycling increase the
quantity of beverage containers recycled at the curb? Second, to what
extent does increasing the share of the population served by curbside
programs increase the total quantity of beverage containers recycled?
Third, to what extent does increasing the share of the population served
by curbside programs cannibalize beverage container returns from other
recycling modes?
Operationally, we regress material-specific beverage container
returns on the share of the population served by curbside programs.
A natural concern is that our policy variables may be statistically
endogenous. For example, counties with curbside recycling programs that
on average succeed in bringing back large quantities of material may
seek to expand their use. Alternatively, perhaps counties with low total
recycling on average may be particularly motivated to expand curbside
access. However, the included county-level fixed effects prevent bias
from this type of statistical endogeneity. (14) An important implication
is that identification comes from within-county time variation rather
than variation between counties.
In short, the basic regression model for each material can be
written [y.sub.it] = [X.sub.it][beta] + [[alpha].sub.i] +
[[epsilon].sub.it], where i indexes the unit of observation (county) and
t indexes time (quarters). [[alpha].sub.i] captures time invariant county-level fixed effects and [[epsilon].sub.it] represents the usual
idiosyncratic error term. The columns of the matrix X include all the
explanatory variables in the preceding subsection. As previously noted,
the most important of these is the share of a county's population
served by curbside in that period.
The regression model has three noteworthy features. First, the
dependent variables are material specific. This is important because
materials vary considerably by weight and bulk, which affect the ease of
recycling. Further, policy decisions are frequently material specific,
as many curbside programs are limited to a subset of container types.
Second, the dependent variables measure beverage container recycling
quantities. The advantage of quantity data is that they match conceptual
conditional demand models more directly than often-cited measures such
as propensity to recycle. Third, the endogeneity controls afforded by
the fixed effects [[alpha].sub.i] are novel relative to the previously
cited literature.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. What is the Effect of Curbside Access on Curbside Returns?
We begin by considering the most immediate impact of curbside
access: to what extent does increasing curbside coverage increase the
quantity of material recycled at the curb? While the related theoretical
results are unambiguous, the empirical evidence on this question remains
surprisingly equivocal. For example, Reschovsky and Stone (1994) fail to
reject the hypothesis that curbside recycling programs alone do not
yield an increase in the propensity to recycle.
Results from fixed effects linear regressions of curbside beverage
container return quantities on the percentage of the population served
by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table 2.
Computed standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent and t-statistics
appear in parentheses.
Results in Table 2 indicate that the estimated impact of increasing
curbside access on curbside beverage container returns is positive and
statistically significant for all materials. For example, a 1% increase
in the percentage of a county's population served by curbside
results in a 0.0014, 0.0198, and 0.0028 pounds per capita increase in
the quantity of aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers,
respectively, collected at the curb. For aluminum, this coefficient translates into 1.77% of mean curbside quantity. In other words, a 1%
increase in the percentage of the population served by aluminum curbside
programs translates roughly into a 1.77% increase in returns of aluminum
beverage containers to the curb. For glass, a 1% increase in the
population served by glass curbside programs yields a 1.49% increase in
mean curbside quantity. For plastic, the coefficient translates into a
2.55% increase. It is important to note that all results should be
interpreted as changes on the margin, conditional on average
county-level institutions and covariates.
Increasing the number of recycling centers per area has a negative
and significant effect on curbside returns for both glass and plastic
beverage containers. This intuitive result provides some preliminary
evidence that curbside and recycling center programs may be substitutes.
Similarly, an increase in the variability of hours open is significantly
negatively associated with aluminum, glass, and plastic curbside
returns. However, an increase in the average number of drop-off center
hours open is positively associated with curbside returns for aluminum
and glass. Perhaps center hours induce spillover effects from increased
recycling awareness.
All other explanatory variables have the anticipated signs.
Increases in total beverage container sales are associated with
increased curbside quantities, and significantly so for aluminum.
Curbside returns are seasonal and tend to increase over time for all
materials, although nonlinearly.
B. What is' the Effect of Curbside Access on Total Recycling
Returns?
We now consider the impact of curbside access on total recycling
returns. Results of the preceding subsection indicated that on the
margin, increased curbside access is associated with increased beverage
container returns at the curb. However, for policymakers, a more
relevant question is whether curbside programs increase total beverage
container recycling.
Results from fixed effects linear regressions of total beverage
container return quantities on the percentage of the population served
by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table 3.
Again, computed standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent and
t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Results in Table 3 indicate that the estimated impact of increasing
curbside access on total beverage container returns is positive but
small. In fact, for aluminum and glass beverage containers, we cannot
reject a null hypothesis of no relationship between increased curbside
access and total returns. For plastic, the coefficient translates into
0.48% of mean total quantity. In other words, a 1% increase in the
percentage of the population served by plastic curbside programs
translates roughly into a 0.48% increase in total returns of plastic
beverage containers. While the aluminum and glass coefficients are not
statistically different from zero, we note that the coefficients
translate into 0.07% and 0.08% increases in total returns, respectively.
In contrast to the results for a marginal expansion of curbside,
Table 3 indicates that the effects of recycling center characteristics
on total recycling are substantial. For example, recycled quantities
increase significantly with the average number of open hours for both
glass and plastic beverage containers. Further, increasing the density
of recycling centers has a large and significant impact on aluminum and
glass returns.
C. What is the Effect of Curbside Access on Recycling Center
Returns?
Taken together, the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are
initially puzzling. Table 2 indicates that increases in curbside
availability are associated with increases in quantities recycled at the
curb. However, Table 3 indicates that increases in curbside availability
are not associated with increases in total recycling for aluminum and
glass. Further, marginal increases in total recycling for plastic are
modest relative to the marginal increases in curbside returns. If
greater curbside access increases returns at the curb, but not in total,
perhaps curbside programs are diverting recycling from other
alternatives on the margin.
Results from fixed effect linear regressions of recycling center
beverage container return quantities on the percentage of the population
served by curbside programs and other covariates are presented in Table
4. Computed standard errors are heteroskedastic consistent and
t-statistics appear in parentheses.
Results in Table 4 indicate that the estimated impact of expanding
curbside access on drop-off recycling center returns is negative for
glass and plastic beverage containers. Results are economically and
statistically significant for glass and perhaps economically significant
for plastic. For glass, the coefficient translates into 0.34% of total
recycling center return quantity. In other words, a 1% increase in the
percentage of the population served by glass curbside programs
translates roughly into a 0.34% decrease in returns of glass beverage
containers to recycling centers. For plastic, a 1% increase in the
percentage of the population with plastic curbside access translates
into a 0.17% decrease in plastic recycling center returns.
Note also that the collective outcomes of Tables 2-4 satisfy an
important adding-up identity. For each material, the marginal total
impact of expanded curbside access is equal to the marginal increase in
curbside returns less any marginal diversion from drop-off recycling
centers. For glass, the 0.0044 pounds per capita increase in total
recycling equals the 0.0198 pounds per capita increase at the curb less
the 0.0154 pounds per capita diversion from recycling centers.
Similarly, the 0.0022 pounds per capita increase in total plastic
recycling equals the 0.0028 pounds per capita increase at the curb less
the 0.0006 pounds per capita diversion from recycling centers. Finally,
the 0.0014 pounds per capita increase in total aluminum recycling equals
the 0.0014 pounds per capita increase at the curb since diversion from
recycling centers is approximately zero.
The adding-up conditions allow us to further interpret our
diversion results. Most notably, approximately 78% of incremental glass
curbside quantities are cannibalized from existing drop-off recycling
centers. Despite the fact that increasing curbside access for glass
recyclables does increase glass beverage container curbside returns, the
majority of incremental quantities come from materials previously
recycled at recycling centers. Net recycling gains are small. Further,
approximately 21% of incremental curbside plastic beverage containers
are cannibalized from existing recycling centers.
Table 4 also indicates that the effects of recycling center
characteristics on recycling center returns are substantial. For
example, drop-off returns of all materials increase significantly when
the density of recycling centers increases. Drop-off quantities of glass
and plastic also increase considerably when the average number of open
hours increases on the margin.
D. Sensitivity Analysis
The preceding section established that increasing curbside
recycling programs has a positive effect on the quantity of containers
collected at the curb but a small effect on total recycled containers.
For bulkier and heavier materials like glass and plastic, these small
incremental changes in total returns are at least partially attributable
to significant cannibalization from existing recycling streams. Below,
we provide evidence that these results are robust to the choice of
variable definition and model specification.
First, we consider the possibility that aluminum returns are
different from other materials because aluminum containers frequently
earn additional scrap value payments beyond the CRV. However, results
are robust to including the scrap value of aluminum as a regressor.
Magnitudes of the program variables of interest remain approximately
constant, and significance is unchanged.
Second, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to other
program variables. For example, the larger literature on MSW has often
emphasized the effects of garbage unit pricing
("pay-as-you-throw" programs) on household refuse and
recycling choices (see, e.g., Fullerton and Kinnaman 1996; Callan and
Thomas 1997). In our conceptual framework, the presence of unit pricing
programs may well proxy for the price of nonrecycling. In our analysis,
the fixed effects likely pick up most pay-as-you-throw impacts since
there was little variation in such programs at the county level for our
sample period. However, as a sensitivity experiment, we included a time
variant variable indicating the share of the county that had unit
pricing programs in place. Including such a variable did not
significantly change magnitudes or significance.
Third, we consider the possibility that characteristics of curbside
programs importantly affect our estimates. For example, a few California
communities have mandatory recycling, where households are penalized if
trash bins contain recyclable materials. Consistent with Jenkins et al.
(2003), we detect no significant impact of mandatory recycling on total
returns. Inclusion of a variable that measures the share of a
county's population subject to mandatory recycling also does not
substantially alter other variables' coefficients or significance.
Further, some curbside programs require presorting of materials. The
inclusion of a variable that measures the share of a county's
population that must presort materials, however, does not significantly
change our results. Point estimates and standard errors are similar to
those presented in Tables 2-4.
Fourth, we consider the possibility that recycling of one type of
material may depend on the availability of curbside recycling for other
materials. We therefore regress beverage container recycling quantities
on the percentage of the population served by commonly. (15) observed
curbside collection programs. Results from the augmented regressions are
similar to those presented in Tables 2-4. Increasing curbside access
generally increases beverage containers recycled at the curb. Diversion
is strongly present for glass, not present for aluminum, and may be
economically (but not statistically) significant for plastic.
Interestingly, we also find some evidence in support of the hypothesis
that the impact of curbside expansion may be stronger when all materials
are collected versus when only a subset is collected.
E. Further Exploration
The analyses of the preceding subsections presented evidence that
cannibalization between recycling modes is occurring, with economically
significant effects for glass and plastic. Here, we extend our analysis
to study the impact of structural and demographic characteristics on the
diversion response. This extension links to a previous literature that
explored the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and the
general propensity to recycle (see, e.g., Hong, Adams, and Love 1993;
Hong and Adams 1999).
To this end, we augment the diversion regressions (summarized in
Table 4) with time variant county-level socioeconomic variables, such as
the median family income, unemployment, and population density in a
given county. For each material, we include these regressors directly
and interacted with our curbside access variables. Results from fixed
effects linear regressions of recycling center beverage container return
quantities on the percentage of the population served by curbside
programs, socioeconomic interactions, and other covariates are presented
in Table 5. Note that identification still comes from county-specific
variation over time since we retain fixed effects. Computed standard
errors are heteroskedastic consistent and t-statistics appear in
parentheses.
We begin our interpretation of the results in Table 5 by
considering the coefficients on the uninteracted curbside access
variables. Holding median family income, unemployment, and population at
zero, the marginal effect of an increase in the percentage of the
population served by curbside on drop-off recycling center beverage
container returns is negative for every material. The results are
statistically significant for aluminum and plastic and similar in
magnitude to the significant results in Table 4 for glass. While too
much emphasis should not be placed on interpreting outcomes conditioned
on zeroed socioeconomic variables, results are at least suggestive that
economically significant cannibalization between recycling streams is
robust across specifications.
Results in Table 5 also show that the interaction between
population density and curbside access is significant for plastic. An
intuitive interpretation of the positive coefficient is that the
diversionary response becomes stronger (more negative) as density
decreases. In other words, consumers are more likely to forego
redemption payments in exchange for convenience, particularly for bulky items like plastic containers, when population density decreases.
Table 5 further indicates that the interaction between unemployment
and curbside access is significant for glass. An intuitive
interpretation of the positive coefficient here is that the diversionary
response becomes stronger (more negative) as employment increases. In
other words, consumers are more likely to forego redemption payments in
exchange for convenience, particularly for heavy items like glass
containers, when employment increases.
The results in Table 5 on the interaction between median family
income and curbside access are mixed. For glass, an intuitive
interpretation of the significant negative coefficient is that the
diversionary response becomes stronger (more negative) as median family
income increases. In other words, consumers are more likely to forego
redemption payments in exchange for convenience when income increases.
For aluminum, however, the interaction coefficient is significant and
positive. While this result is perhaps initially puzzling, there are at
least two plausible explanations. First, when income is relatively high,
there may be spillover effects from increased awareness of recycling
options. Thus, as curbside programs become more prominent, aluminum
returns to all recycling streams increase. Second, when median family
income is particularly high, increases in curbside access may lead to
disproportionately higher levels of scavenging. In this context,
scavenging refers to a situation in which materials originally left at
the curb are removed by third parties and returned to recycling centers
for their cash redemption value. Since scavenging is most likely to
occur for light, compactable materials such as aluminum, this
explanation seems plausible. For a complete analysis of this phenomenon,
see Ashenmiller (2006). (16)
V. INTERPRETATION AND POLICY DISCUSSION
This article uses a novel data set to investigate the extent to
which curbside access affects recycled quantities. Results suggest
marginal increases in curbside availability increase returns at the curb
but have small impacts on total recycled quantities of beverage
containers. Specifically, a 1% increase in the percentage of a
county's population served by curbside programs increases total
beverage container recycling returns by only 0.48% for plastic, 0.08%
for glass, and 0.07% for aluminum. Impacts for glass and aluminum are
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
A large reason for the small net gains from incrementally expanding
curbside programs is cannibalization from existing recycling streams,
particularly for heavier and bulkier materials. We detect no diversion
for aluminum, but nearly 21% of incremental plastic curbside quantities
are diverted from existing recycling center returns. For glass, a full
78% of incremental curbside quantities are diverted from recycling
centers.
Clear policy implications arise from our results. First, examining
only the impact of curbside programs on curbside quantities, as is often
done in policy discussions, may seriously overstate the returns to
marginal changes in curbside programs. Second, while curbside program
expansion may generate significant increases in total recycling over
some range, program expansion does not generate considerable recycling
increases over the observed range of variation in our data. In other
words, at least for beverage containers in California, expanding
curbside programs beyond recent levels generates very small increases in
total recycling. (17) Implications for strict benefit-cost analyses
follow directly.
A. Quantity Comparisons
To further put our results in perspective, we conduct some simple
quantity comparisons that incorporate our empirical results. We first
consider the efficacy of expanding curbside access relative to expanding
recycling center hours of operation. For glass, a 1% increase in the
percentage of the population served by curbside generates 12 times less
total recycled quantity than expanding recycling center hours by 1 h/wk.
In other words, the same increase in total glass beverage recycling is
obtained by increasing the percentage of the population with access to
curbside by 1% or by expanding recycling center hours of operation by as
little as 5 min/wk (60 min/12). Extensive diversion from recycling
centers simply implies that incremental changes in curbside programs do
not result in large incremental changes in total glass beverage
container recycling.
For plastic, a 1% increase in curbside access generates 2.3 times
less total recycled quantity than expanding recycling center hours by 1
h/ wk. In other words, the same increase in total plastic beverage
recycling is obtained by increasing the percentage of the population
with access to curbside by 1% or by expanding recycling center hours of
operation by approximately 30 min/wk (60 min/2). For aluminum, point
estimates suggest that a 1% increase in the percentage of the population
served by curbside generates 4.7 times more total recycled quantity than
opening recycling centers an additional 1 h/wk. Here, recycling centers
would have to expand hours of operation by approximately 300 min/wk in
order to bring in as much additional aluminum as increasing the
percentage of the population with curbside access by 1%.
We next compare the efficacy of expanding curbside access relative
to expanding the number of recycling centers. For glass, a 1% increase
in curbside access generates six times less total recycled quantity than
adding one recycling center per county. In other words, the same
increase in total glass is obtained by expanding the number of recycling
centers per county by one or by increasing the percentage of the
population with access to curbside by 6%. For aluminum, a 1% increase in
the percentage of the population served by curbside generates 2.2 times
less total recycled quantity than expanding the number of recycling
centers by one per county. For plastic, point estimates suggest a 1%
increase in the percentage of the population served by curbside
generates 7.3 times more total recycled quantity than an additional
center per county.
B. Cost-Effectiveness Comparisons
To further put our results in perspective, we also conduct some
simple cost-effectiveness comparisons that incorporate our empirical
results and the quantity comparisons above. These exercises take as
given a policy objective of returning a fixed number of beverage
containers of a given material type. (18) To conduct the comparisons, we
first discuss the costs associated with incremental curbside expansion
and incremental recycling center expansion.
Our average sample county contains 740,000 people, so a 1% increase
in the population served by curbside supplies approximately 7,400
people. We divide this number by the national mean of 2.57 individuals
per household to obtain an incremental increase of 2,880 households.
Conservative estimates suggest that operating expenses for California
curbside programs are approximately $2.40 per household per month
(Skumatz Economic Research Associates, Inc. 1999). Thus, on average, a
1% increase in the percentage of the population served by curbside
generates approximately $6,912 in incremental operating expenses per
county per month ($82,944 per county per year).
Our average sample county contains 44 recycling centers. Increasing
center hours by 1 h/wk then generates an additional 176 h per county per
month on average. We are unable to obtain precise numerical estimates
for recycling center operating costs, but expenses typically include
low-skilled labor costs, transportation costs to the sorting facility,
modest administration and overhead expenses, taxes, and capital costs
(United States Environmental Protection Agency 1994). In general, these
costs are quite low since convenience zone and other recycling centers
often simply consist of several material-specific bins, an operator,
some scales, and record-keeping materials.
Ideally, comparisons would identify all costs. For example, a
complete assessment would account for the relative differences in time
costs between expanded curbside programs and drop-off recycling center
expansion. Jakus, Tiller, and Park (1996, 1997) and Ando and Gosselin
(2005) found that factors that decrease time cost importantly impact
households' propensity to recycle. Consequently, given available
data, our cost-effectiveness analysis can be interpreted as providing a
sense of how large the nonmeasured costs of center expansion would have
to be to make incremental curbside cost-effective relative to
incremental recycling centers.
Table 6 presents our simplified cost-effectiveness comparisons.
Recall that calculations assume a fixed policy objective of recycling a
fixed number of beverage containers. We first summarize the quantity
comparisons from the preceding discussion. From these figures and the
observed costs discussed above, we then calculate break-even points for
recycling center operating costs. For example, consider the third column
of Row 1 in Table 6. First, we divide the $6,912 incremental increase
per county per month in curbside expenditures by 176 h per county per
month to obtain the hourly break-even center operating expenses if the
curbside increase and the recycling center increase generated the same
change in total incremental beverage containers recycled. We then
multiply this amount by the differential returns between the programs
(12) to obtain the final break-even operating expenses per recycling
center hour. (19)
All calculations in Table 6 based upon statistically significant
coefficients yield results with high break-even expenses. Abstracting
from unobserved costs, the break-even points can be interpreted as
follows. For glass, the annual operating expenses of a single recycling
center would have to exceed approximately $497,000 for a 1% increase in
the percentage of population served by curbside to be more
cost-effective than an additional recycling center per county. For
aluminum, the annual operating costs of a recycling center would have to
exceed roughly $182,000 for a 1% increase in the percentage of
population served by curbside to be cost-effective relative to an
additional recycling center per county. Similarly, glass and plastic
recycling center hourly operating expenses would have to surpass $471
and $90, respectively, for incremental curbside expansion to be more
cost-effective than an additional working hour per center. (20)
Of course, these comparisons do not identify all subtleties of a
complete analysis. For example, both recycling centers and curbside
programs can simultaneously accept multiple materials. In other words,
the material-specific cost-effectiveness comparisons may not be
independent of one another. Further, these calculations take a policy
objective as given that may not be socially optimal. For example, a full
benefit-cost analysis may find that curbside programs have sufficient
spillover effects to other materials (e.g., paper) to offset their
costs. This represents a promising area of future research.
CONCLUSIONS
Curbside recycling rarely exists in isolation. This article uses
novel and reliable data to analyze the impact of curbside recycling when
other recycling modes are present. We consider the impact of access to
curbside recycling on quantities returned to the curb, total quantities
returned, and quantities returned to drop-off recycling centers.
We find that the impact of incrementally expanding curbside
programs on total quantities of beverage containers recycled is small.
Much of this result obtains because curbside programs significantly
cannibalize returns from recycling centers. Since we focus on beverage
containers, we observe diversion even when the recycler must forgo a
cash payment in order to return materials to the curb. It seems
plausible that our direct diversion results for beverage containers
understate the direct diversion incentives for materials outside our
sample. In other words, if we had data on paper and other materials, we
would expect our key results to be stronger.
Finally, our calculations indicate that incremental curbside access
expansion may not be the least cost option for increasing beverage
container recycling returns. Recall that these are marginal results, and
curbside programs are already prominent in many areas. Specifically, our
results indicate that household time cost differences would need to be
large for the marginal costs of recycling center availability to
outweigh the marginal costs of curbside expansion.
ABBREVIATIONS
CRV: California Redemption Value
DOC: Department of Conservation
MSW: Municipal Solid Waste
RCRA: Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
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(1.) This is the most recent data available. There is no way to
conclusively determine whether these numbers represent fewer programs or
different data collection techniques. However, five states had very
significant reductions. At the very least, it is clear that the growth
of curbside programs has slowed dramatically in the recent past.
(2.) See Walls and Palmer (1997) and Palmer, Sigman, and Walls
(1997) for excellent examples of the related analytical literature. Choe
and Fraser (1998) provide a nice overview.
(3.) California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oregon, and Vermont currently have
beverage container legislation. Collectively, these states represent
approximately 30% of the U.S. population. Further, Arkansas, Illinois,
Tennessee, and Wyoming have bottle bill campaigns.
(4.) This expansion, SB332, was passed in 1999 but implemented in
2000.
(5.) CRV is based upon weight, but payments are calibrated to be
equivalent to payments based upon container counts. During our entire
sample period, the CRV amounted to 2.5 cents for smaller containers and
5 cents for larger containers. The CRV has since been increased to 4/8
cents.
(6.) For a more complete description of AB2020 and an analysis of
its impacts on recycling and the California economy, see Berck et al.
(2003). This study also examined the effect of CRV rates on recycling
returns.
(7.) Exemptions from this mandate are possible but relatively rare.
(8.) In the econometrics that follow, the inclusion of county-level
fixed effects prevents bias if the quality of t his estimation
systematically varies by county.
(9.) See Jakus, Tiller, and Park (1996, 1997) for a discussion of
recycling determinants in rural communities.
(10.) It is also possible that recycling of one material may depend
on the price of curbside for other materials. In this conceptual
framework, each material-specific equation would be augmented with
[p.sub.CS, j [not equal to] i. We explore this spillover effect in the
sensitivity analysis.
(11.) When income enters the econometrics that follow, it enters
linearly. This is consistent with a constant marginal propensity to
recycle. Here. aggregation also requires linearity in price.
(12.) The price of nonrecycling may be a function of unit pricing
for trash and/or penalties for illegal disposal. Where credible data
exist, we explore these issues in the sensitivity analysis section.
(13.) Climate data are from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Climatic Data Center.
(14.) It is also possible that there is statistical endogeneity in
a time variant fashion. However, this seems less plausible since it is
unlikely that counties observe returns and rapidly adjust curbside
access.
(15.) In our sample, we never observe glass and/or plastic
collection without aluminum collection. Forty-four percent of program
expansions or introductions simultaneously collected aluminum, glass,
and plastic beverage containers. Forty-one percent of program expansions
or introductions collected only aluminum beverage containers. Twelve
percent of program expansions or introductions collected only aluminum
and glass. Aluminum and plastic expansions or introductions were rare.
Therefore, specific variables include the percentage of population
served by aluminum-only curbside programs, aluminum- and glass-only
curbside programs, aluminum-and plastic curbside-only programs, and
aluminum, glass, and plastic curbside programs.
(16.) Note that scavenging does not impact the important total
recycled beverage container results in Table 3 and can only lead to a
conservative understatement of the key cannibalization results in Table
4.
(17.) Between 1995 and 2000, the average county in the average
month of our sample served 32% of its population with aluminum beverage
container curbside programs, 26% of its population with glass beverage
container curbside programs, and 15% of its population with plastic
beverage container curbside programs.
(18.) This objective loosely corresponds to stated policy
objectives. California's DOC states that its primary goal for this
program is "to achieve and maintain high recycling rates for each
beverage container type" and its long-term program goal is "to
achieve an 80% recycling rate for all aluminum, glass, plastic, and
bimetal beverage containers in California" (California Department
of Conservation 2006).
(19.) The last column of row 1 in Table 6 is similarly obtained. We
simply multiply the annual incremental increase per county in curbside
expenditures ($82,944) by the differential returns (6).
(20.) During our sample period, the state paid per container
"handling fees" to recycling centers in convenience zones. For
example, in 1999, the state paid fees of 1.7 cents per eligible
container over the CRV. However, if a recycling center redeemed more
than 500,000 containers in a given month, they were no longer eligible
to receive the handling fee. At the margin, this creates a clear
disincentive for some recycling centers to expand their accessibility.
Our results suggest that eliminating this disincentive may also be a
cost-effective means of increasing total recycled quantities.
* This research is supported by the California Department of
Conservation, Division of Recycling, Agreement 5000-009. T.K.M.B. thanks
the Canada Research Chair program and the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada. J.P.S.thanks Tufts University's Faculty
Research Awards Committee for generous financial assistance and the
Donald Bren School of Environmental Science and Management for space and
support. This article has benefited from numerous seminar
participants' comments. Special thanks are due to Brett Baden,
Steven Yamarik, and two anonymous referees. The data used in this
article were partially obtained under Contract No. 5000-009 with the
California Department of Conservation, Division of Recycling. The views
expressed in this document are solely those of the authors and do not
necessarily represent the policy of the California Department of
Conservation or an endorsement by the government of the State of
California.
Beatty: Assistant Professor, Food and Resource Economics,
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z4. Phone
1-604-822-1203, Fax 1-604822-2184, E-mail timothy.beatty@ubc.ca
Berck: S. J. Hall Professor, Department of Agricultural and
Resource Economics, University of California--Berkeley, Berkeley, CA
94720. Phone 1-510-642-7238, Fax 1-510-643-8911, E-mail
pberck@berkeley.edu
Shimshack: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Tufts
University, Medford, MA 02155. Phone 1-617-627-5947, Fax 1-617-627-3917,
E-mail jay.shimshack@ tufts.edu
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics
1995
Mean Standard
Deviation
Per capita Lbs. of beverage
containers sold
Statewide aluminum containers sold 2.5935 0.3305
Statewide glass containers sold 9.7454 0.9174
Statewide plastic containers sold 0.8610 0.1859
AL beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--curbside 0.0695 0.0754
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--total 2.3009 0.6343
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--drop-off 2.2314 0.6771
Glass beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--curbside 1.1985 1.3642
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--total 5.8295 2.5269
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--drop-off 4.6309 1.9670
Plastic beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--Curbside 0.0723 0.0706
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--total 0.3437 0.1403
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--drop-off 0.2714 0.1324
Curbside access
Percentage of population with
curbside access--AL 27.7986 26.5420
Percentage of population with
curbside access--glass 22.9945 23.3447
Percentage of population with
curbside access--plastic 13.0128 15.8300
Recycling center characteristics
Recycling centers per unit area 0.0303 0.0523
Recycling centers: Average number
of hours open 39.2975 6.5706
Recycling centers: standard
deviation of hours open 11.9717 8.5248
2000
Mean Standard
Deviation
Per capita Lbs. of beverage
containers sold
Statewide aluminum containers sold 2.3913 0.3130
Statewide glass containers sold 13.6305 1.6412
Statewide plastic containers sold 3.3211 0.5316
AL beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--curbside 0.1052 0.1017
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--total 2.0300 0.6150
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--drop-off 1.9248 0.6674
Glass beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--curbside 1.9189 2.0977
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--total 6.7788 3.0400
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--drop-off 4.8599 2.1111
Plastic beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--Curbside 0.2174 0.1971
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--total 0.6494 0.2705
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--drop-off 0.4320 0.2471
Curbside access
Percentage of population with
curbside access--AL 34.7741 28.3421
Percentage of population with
curbside access--glass 26.8972 25.3531
Percentage of population with
curbside access--plastic 16.1966 18.6621
Recycling center characteristics
Recycling centers per unit area 0.0279 0.0464
Recycling centers: Average number
of hours open 38.4767 5.5229
Recycling centers: standard
deviation of hours open 11.7373 7.5636
Entire Sample
Mean Standard
Deviation
Per capita Lbs. of beverage
containers sold
Statewide aluminum containers sold 2.4640 0.3312
Statewide glass containers sold 11.0834 1.8079
Statewide plastic containers sold 1.3788 0.9041
AL beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--curbside 0.0789 0.0839
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--total 2.1238 0.6151
Per capita Lbs. of AL returned--drop-off 2.0449 0.6567
Glass beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--curbside 1.3261 1.5291
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--total 5.8393 2.6526
Per capita Lbs. of glass
returned--drop-off 4.5132 1.9866
Plastic beverage container returns
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--Curbside 0.1099 0.1213
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--total 0.4626 0.2025
Per capita Lbs. of plastic
returned--drop-off 0.3527 0.1830
Curbside access
Percentage of population with
curbside access--AL 31.5966 27.6271
Percentage of population with
curbside access--glass 25.5091 24.5298
Percentage of population with
curbside access--plastic 14.9827 17.4929
Recycling center characteristics
Recycling centers per unit area 0.0292 0.0496
Recycling centers: Average number
of hours open 39.3006 5.9530
Recycling centers: standard
deviation of hours open 11.6598 7.9592
Note: AL, aluminium, Lbs., pounds.
TABLE 2 Regression Results: Quantity Recycled at the Curb
Variable Description Aluminum Glass
Percentage of
the population 0.0014 *** (3.72) 0.0198 *** (4.14)
served by curbside
Number of recycling -0.3975 (-1.13) -8.6955 *** (-3.13)
centers per area
County average 0.0014 ** (2.42) 0.0187 *** (3.21)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0007 ** (-2.01) -0.0084 ** (-2.23)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0001 (0.37) -0.0006 (1.33)
Second quarter dummy -0.0300 * (-1.87) 0.0856 (0.66)
Third quarter dummy -0.015 (-0.88) 0.181 (1.06)
Fourth quarter dummy -0.0029 (-0.57) -0.0054 (-0.06)
1996 year dummy -0.0041 (-1.29) -0.0626 (-1.22)
1997 year dummy 0.0018 (0.41) -0.1142 * (-1.78)
1998 year dummy 0.0035 (0.61) -0.1592 ** (-2.43)
1999 year dummy 0.0168 ** (2.23) -0.0093 (-0.11)
2000 year dummy 0.0342 *** (4.71) 0.5580 *** (2.81)
Per capita
total quantity
sold (statewide) 0.0431 ** (2.14) 0.0191 (0.39)
Constant -0.0862 (-1.22) 1.1723 * (1.94)
Fixed effects 43 county-specific
fixed effects
R-squared 0.73 0.93
Variable Description Plastic
Percentage of
the population 0.0028 *** (4.09)
served by curbside
Number of recycling -1.9540 *** (-4.02)
centers per area
County average 0.0003 (0.32)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0012 * (-1.87)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature -0.0002 *** (-2.65)
Second quarter dummy 0.0184 * (1.91)
Third quarter dummy 0.0522 *** (3.11)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0196 ** (2.48)
1996 year dummy -0.0032 (-0.57)
1997 year dummy 0.0044 (0.69)
1998 year dummy 0.0003 (0.05)
1999 year dummy 0.0212 *** (3.25)
2000 year dummy 0.0643 (1.26)
Per capita
total quantity
sold (statewide) 0.0269 (1.34)
Constant 0.2721 *** (4.2)
Fixed effects
R-squared 0.72
Notes: The dependent variables are the quantities returned to
curbside programs for the listed materials. The symbols
*****, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10%, levels of significance. Each county-level analysis
consists of 1,052 observations from 44 counties over the
24 sample quarters.
TABLE 3
Regression Results: Quantity Recycled in Total
Variable Description Aluminum
Percentage of the population 0.0014 (1.18)
served by curbside
Number of recycling 3.4053 *** (2.92)
centers per area
County average 0.0003 (0.06)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation 0.0039 (0.84)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0015 *** (6.65)
Second quarter dummy -0.1048 (-1.3)
Third quarter dummy 0.0716 (0.9)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0529 * (1.88)
1996 year dummy -0.1249 *** (-5.11)
1997 year dummy -0.1423 *** (-5.27)
1998 year dummy -0.1913 *** (-5.59)
1999 year dummy -0.1758 *** (-4.87)
2000 year dummy -0.2236 *** (-5.77)
Per capita 0.2021 ** (1.99)
total quantity sold (statewide)
Constant 0.0498 (0.17)
Fixed effects
R-squared 0.88
Variable Description Glass
Percentage of the population 0.0044 (0.89)
served by curbside
Number of recycling 29.2705 *** (5.33)
centers per area
County average 0.0527 *** (3.97)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0168 (-1.53)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature -0.0005 (-0.64)
Second quarter dummy 0.222 (0.99)
Third quarter dummy 0.7679 *** (2.86)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0553 (0.37)
1996 year dummy -0.2364 ** (-2.4)
1997 year dummy -0.3863 *** (-3.32)
1998 year dummy -0.5212 *** (-4.43)
1999 year dummy -0.2138 (-1.4)
2000 year dummy 0.6085 * (1.79)
Per capita 0.111 (1.43)
total quantity sold (statewide)
Constant 4.3294 *** (4.71)
Fixed effects 43 county-specific
fixed effects
R-squared 0.92
Variable Description Plastic
Percentage of the population 0.0022 *** (2.81)
served by curbside
Number of recycling 0.3243 (0.53)
centers per area
County average 0.0049 ** (2.25)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0017 (-0.94)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature -0.0001 (-0.85)
Second quarter dummy 0.0274 * (1.85)
Third quarter dummy 0.0933 *** (3.85)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0609 *** (5.45)
1996 year dummy 0.0448 *** (4.59)
1997 year dummy 0.0727 *** (7.26)
1998 year dummy 0.0726 *** (6.76)
1999 year dummy 0.1020 *** (9.32)
2000 year dummy -0.0264 (-0.39)
Per capita 0.1337 *** (5.18)
total quantity sold (statewide)
Constant 0.0569 (0.59)
Fixed effects
R-squared 0.76
Notes: The dependent variables are the total quantities
recycled for the listed materials. The symbols *****,
and indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels of significance. Each county-level
analysis consists of 1,052 observations from 44
counties over the 24 sample quarters.
TABLE 4 Regression Results: Quantity
Recycled at Recycling Centers
Variable Description Aluminum Glass
Percentage 0.0014 (1.18) -0.0154 *** (-3.3)
of the population
served by curbside
Number of recycling 3.8028 *** (3.37) 37.9660 *** (7.77)
centers per area
County average -0.0011 (-0.21) 0.0340 *** (2.87)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation 0.0046 (1.02) -0.0084 (-0.8)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0015 *** (6.89) 0.0001 (0.18)
Second quarter dummy -0.0748 (-0.96) 0.1364 (0.73)
Third quarter dummy 0.0865 0.5869 *** (2.63)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0558 ** (2.05) 0.0606 (0.49)
1996 year dummy -0.1208 *** (-4.98) -0.1738 ** (-2.17)
1997 year dummy -0.1442 *** (-5.42) -0.2720 *** (-2.84)
1998 year dummy -0.1947 *** (-5.81) -0.3620 *** (-3.73)
1999 year dummy -0.1927 *** (-5.5) -0.2045 (-1.65)
2000 year dummy -0.2579 *** (-6.85) 0.0504
Per capita 0.1589 (1.61) 0.0919
total quantity sold
(statewide)
Constant 0.136 (0.49) 3.1571 *** (3.97)
Fixed effects 43 county-specific
fixed effects
R-squared 0.90 0.90
Variable Description Plastic
Percentage -0.0006 (-1.01)
of the population
served by curbside
Number of recycling 2.2783 *** (4.06)
centers per area
County average 0.0047 ** (2.58)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0006 (-0.37)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0001 (1.17)
Second quarter dummy 0.009 (0.7)
Third quarter dummy 0.0411 ** (2.08)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0413 *** (4.59)
1996 year dummy 0.0480 *** (5.56)
1997 year dummy 0.0683 *** (7.79)
1998 year dummy 0.0723 *** (7.71)
1999 year dummy 0.0808 *** (8.49)
2000 year dummy -0.0906 * (-1.78)
Per capita 0.1068 *** (5.36)
total quantity sold
(statewide)
Constant -0.2151 *** (-2.63)
Fixed effects
R-squared 0.80
Notes: The dependent variables are the quantities returned
to recycling centers for the listed materials. The symbols
*****, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels of significance. Each county-level
analysis consists of 1,052 observations from 44 counties
over the 24 sample quarters.
TABLE 5
Socioeconomic Regressions Results: Drop-Off Center Quantities
Variable Description Aluminum Glass
Percentage -0.0148 ** (-2.26) -0.0132 (-1.56)
of the population
served by curbside
Density x percent -0.0012 (-1.00) 0.0066 (1.61)
served by curbside
Unemployment x percent 0.0001 (0.5) 0.0012 *** (2.81)
served by curbside
Mean family 0.0005 ** (2.4) -0.0005 ** (-2.13)
income x percent
served by curbside
Density 0.1167 (0.38) -0.8563 (-0.75)
Unemployment -0.0101 (-1.48) -0.0664 *** (-3.62)
Median family income -0.0277 (-1.54) -0.0137 (-0.5)
Number of recycling 5.1819 *** (2.84) 30.2655 *** (4.11)
centers per area
County average -0.0009 (-0.17) 0.0326 *** (2.69)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation 0.0048 (1.06) -0.0088 (-0.85)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0015 *** (6.76) 0.0001 (0.02)
Second quarter dummy -0.0757 (-0.97) 0.1356 (0.74)
Third quarter dummy 0.0885 (1.14) 0.5944 *** (2.69)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0489 * (1.72) 0.0382 (0.31)
1996 year dummy -0.1268 *** (-5.13) -0.1704 ** (-2.15)
1997 year dummy -0.1488 *** (-5.33) -0.2619 *** (-2.69)
1998 year dummy -0.1973 *** (-5.26) -0.3247 *** (-3.13)
1999 year dummy -0.1985 *** (-5.15) -0.1608 (-1.24)
2000 year dummy -0.2693 *** (-6.41) 0.0995
Per capita 0.1575 (1.58) 0.0895
total quantity
sold (statewide)
Constant 0.8189 (0.92) 6.1415 ** (2.38)
Fixed effects 43 county-specific
fixed effects
R-squared 0.90 0.90
Variable Description Plastic
Percentage -0.0025 ** (-2.3)
of the population
served by curbside
Density x percent 0.0021 *** (3.56)
served by curbside
Unemployment x percent 0.0001 (1.16)
served by curbside
Mean family 0.0001 (0.57)
income x percent
served by curbside
Density 0.3772 *** (2.89)
Unemployment -0.0043 * (-1.78)
Median family income -0.0061 * (-1.83)
Number of recycling 4.5511 *** (5.07)
centers per area
County average 0.0042 ** (2.31)
number of recycling
centers hours open
Standard deviation -0.0009 (-0.56)
of recycling centers
hours open
Average temperature 0.0001 (1.17)
Second quarter dummy 0.0058 (0.45)
Third quarter dummy 0.0367 * (1.88)
Fourth quarter dummy 0.0360 *** (3.96)
1996 year dummy 0.0460 *** (5.45)
1997 year dummy 0.0652 *** (7.41)
1998 year dummy 0.0713 *** (6.95)
1999 year dummy 0.0781 *** (7.63)
2000 year dummy -0.1019 ** (-2.04)
Per capita 0.1072 *** (5.51)
total quantity
sold (statewide)
Constant -0.8704 *** (-2.98)
Fixed effects
R-squared 0.80
Notes: The dependent variables are the quantities
returned to recycling centers for the listed materials.
The symbols *** **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance.
Each county-level analysis consists of 1,052 observations
from 44 counties over the 24 sample quarters.
TABLE 6 Simple Cost-Effectiveness Analyses
Total Recycling
Returns: Expanding
Curbside Access Break-Even
by 1%, versus Operating
Expanding Expenses
Recycling Center per Recycling
Material Hours by 1 b/wk Center Hour
Glass 12 times smaller * $471.27 *
Aluminum 4.7 times greater $8.36
Plastic 2.3 times smaller * $90.32 *
Total Recycling
Returns: Expanding
Curbside Access by
1% versus Expanding
Recycling Center Break-Even
Numbers by 1 Annual Costs per
Material Per County Recycling Center
Glass 6 times smaller * $497,664 *
Aluminum 2.2 times smaller * $182,477 *
Plastic 7.3 times greater $11,362
Notes: All calculations are based upon total recycled
quantity results in Table 3. The symbol * indicates a
calculation derived from a statistically significant
coefficient.