Exit discrimination in the NBA: a duration analysis of career length.
Groothuis, Peter A. ; Hill, J. Richard
I. INTRODUCTION
In the National Basketball Association (NBA), as in most
professional sports leagues, player turnover is high from season to
season due to declining skills as players age. In our analysis, we ask:
Are there any factors that determine the duration of players with any
consistency? Is the position in which a player was selected in the draft
a significant indicator of duration? Is there any exit discrimination in
the career duration where black players have shorter careers than white
players?
We examine the determinants of player duration using data covering
the 1989-99 period. The data include individual player performance
statistics on a season-to-season basis as well as biographical player
data on height, weight, race, and draft number. Our model differs from
the only previous study on duration in the NBA in that our estimation
technique allows for the use of a mixed stock and flow sample. Our time
period is also longer than the previous study.
Literature Review
Sports economics has provided a rich field of study for labor
economists to explore issues of discrimination. Professional baseball
has attracted much of the attention of researchers. Scully (1974) found
evidence of barriers to entry for black athletes in professional
baseball using data from 1960-71 and evidence of pay discrimination
using data from the late 1960s. Hill and Spellman (1984) found no
evidence of pay discrimination or barriers to entry using data from the
1976-77 period. Subsequent studies with later data confirmed the lack of
discrimination in baseball. Cymrot (1985) suggested that free agency was
responsible for this turn of events; according to Kahn (1991, 402) the
reasons for the reversal of outcomes are unclear.
Kahn and Sherer (1988) were the first to offer credible evidence of
salary discrimination against African American professional basketball
players. Despite 75% of the players in the league being black, data from
regressions using 1985-86 salaries suggested a 20% shortfall in
compensation for African American players, ceteris paribus. The results
of other researchers using data from the same time period confirmed the
conclusions. The source of the discrimination was found to be fans by
Kahn and Sherer (1988, 56-57), Burdekin and Idson (1991), and Brown et
al. (1991, 337). Again, however, just as in the case for baseball,
studies by Hamilton (1997), Dey (1997), and Gius and Johnson (1998) with
newer salary data failed to find evidence of salary discrimination in
the NBA. Despite these findings, Kanazawa and Funk (2001) still found
the existence of customer discrimination in the cable television Nielsen
ratings during the 1996-97 season.
In addition to salary discrimination, labor economists have focused
on both entry and exit discrimination. For instance, Kahn and Sherer
(1988, 53-55) found no evidence of hiring discrimination in the NBA, but
Brown et al. (1991, 33943) found only weak evidence that black players
had to outperform whites for entry into the league. In addition, Johnson
and Marple (1973) using data from 1970 and Hoang and Rascher (1999, 78)
using data from the 1980s, both find evidence that white players have a
lower probability of being cut from the league. Hoang and Rascher (1999,
87-88) find that the effect of "exit discrimination" on career
earnings in the NBA is larger than the effects of the previously
documented wage discrimination.
The problem with both of the previous studies on exit
discrimination is that neither has the ability to analyze long careers
in the NBA. For instance, the Johnson and Marple study only analyzed the
career of benchwarmers in the 1970 season. Hoang and Rascher use a panel
study of flow data that only allows for career length up to nine years,
the length of their panel. In our study, we analyze exit discrimination
by utilizing a combination of stock and flow sample data from the 1990s
that allows us to address both long and short careers.
Discrimination Theory
Minority workers may be discriminated against by being paid a lower
wage, having more difficulty finding a job, or having a lower
probability of retention than those of the majority workers for
comparable productivity. In the case of discrimination due to personal
prejudice, Becket (1971) notes that the source of personal prejudice is
an important determinant of whether the discrimination will last.
According to theory, wage differentials and workplace segregation
resulting from prejudice by employers and co-workers will dissipate over
time in a competitive environment. In sports, free agency, the presence
of sufficiently qualified minority workers, some nonprejudiced owners
and fellow players, and the desire to maximize profits and or win
championships should alleviate the discrimination arising from these
sources.
If the source of the personal prejudice is customers, however, the
existence of wage discrimination, exit discrimination, and/or
segregation may be more difficult to eradicate. Employers are responding
to profit motivation in the marketplace by discriminating in this
instance, and competition may not improve the situation. In sports,
researchers have long suspected that prejudice by fans is present.
Scully (1974) suggested that blacks were relegated to outfield positions
because they would be further away from the more expensive seats and the
focus of TV cameras. Kanazawa and Funk (2001), using Nielsen ratings
from the 1996-97 season, find that the presence of a white player on a
team increases TV ratings that translate into more advertising revenues.
Hoang and Rascher (1999, 74-75) postulate the desire of white fans
to see white players may mean the existence of exit discrimination.
According to their reasoning, as owners seek to satisfy the
discriminatory tastes of the majority white customers they reserve a
minimum number of roster spots for white players. They further suggest
that there is a dwindling supply of white rookies who can play at the
professional level. Thus fans' taste for white players and a
dwindling supply of white rookies suggests that an existing white player
will enjoy a longer career than their black counterpart with similar
performance levels.
To capture the essence of the customer discrimination model, we
suggest that exit can be modeled as a function of both talent and race.
Team owners in the pursuit of profits desire talent because fans follow
winning teams and team owners desire white players because white players
bring white fans.
II. THE MODEL
Our data include all individuals who participated in the NBA from
1989 through 1999 for an 11-year panel consisting of 1113 players. To
capture the overall length of players' NBA careers our data
consists of both stock and flow samples (see Figure 1). A stock sample
consists of all ongoing careers at the start of the panel in 1989. These
left-censored data are easily included because we know how many years
each player had played in the NBA prior to 1989. Our stock sample
consists of 295 players who had an average tenure of 6.01 years as they
entered the 1989 season. Including a stock sample captures information
on players whose careers are longer than the panel data set. For
instance, one player during the 1990s had a career length of 21 years.
Using only stock data, however, would underrepresent short-career
players, so we also include flow data.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
A flow sample includes all careers that start between 1989 and
1999. This sample captures many short careers in the NBA. For instance,
during the 1990s 134 players had one-year careers. Including only flow
data, however, would allow for no careers longer than 11 years, which is
the length of our panel. As with most panels, our data is also
right-censored, where many careers were ongoing when our sample ended in
1999. Our right-censored data include both stock and flow observations.
To estimate a duration model of stock and flow data, we use a technique
developed by Berger and Black (1999).
The variables in our data include both season-variant and
season-invariant data. We report the means in Table 1. Our
season-invariant data include the player's height, weight, race,
and draft number. We find that the average height in the NBA is six
feet, seven inches; average weight is 221 pounds; and 21% of the players
are white. Our season-variant data are performance data that include
games played per season as well as assists, rebounds, steals, turnovers,
blocked shots, and points all calculate per minute played over the
season. We report the means by the race of the player. We find that
white players are on average 2 inches taller and 14 pounds heavier.
White players also on average play five fewer games per season than
black players. The average career length as measured by all
non-right-censored data is 6 years for whites and 5.5 years for blacks.
To determine if exit discrimination exits in the NBA, we analyze the
data using both nonparametric and semiparametric techniques.
Nonparametric Estimates of Career Duration
To help understand career duration in the NBA, we calculate yearly
hazard functions as
(1) [h.sub.t] = [d.sub.t]/[n.sub.t],
where [d.sub.t] is the number of players who end their career in
year t, and [n.sub.t] is the number of players at risk of ending their
career in year t. The hazard rate can be interpreted as the percentage
of players who exited the NBA given they have survived up to some level
of tenure. In Table 2, we report the total hazard rate and the hazard
rate for both black and white players.
In Figure 2 we plot the hazard functions by race, where series one
is the hazard rate for black players and series two the hazard rate for
white players. Both plots show that the hazard rate gradually declines
for the first seven years of tenure in the NBA and then gradually climbs
for the remainder of the years. In addition both hazard plots follow an
interesting pattern that resembles a u shape. In the engineering
literature on useful life, this hazard function shape has become known
as the bath tub plot. In this literature, the initial downturn is
identified as infant mortality, the bottom of the tub due to random
failure, and the upturn due to wear-out (Bolla 2002). We suggest that
this pattern also explains an NBA career with the initial downturn
occurring as individuals are sorted from the league and the upturn due
to wear-out from the physical demands of playing basketball.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Comparing the two plots shows many crosses. The hazard plot
suggests that the hazard rates for both black and white players are
similar. Interpreting the differences in hazard rates as discrimination,
however, is misleading. The problem arises for the same reason using
differences in median wage is misleading in the wage literature: neither
method controls for differences due to productivity. In the next section
we analyze career duration using semiparametric techniques to control
for differences in productivity.
Semiparametric Estimates of Career Duration
We estimate semiparametric hazard functions following Berger and
Black (1999) and Berger et al. (2001). Because our data are at the
season level, we calculate our hazard model as a discrete random
variable. As with Black et al. (2001), we model the durations of a
single spell and assume a homogeneous environment so that the length of
the spell is uncorrelated with the calendar time in which the spell
begins. This assumption lets us treat all the players' tenure as
the same regardless of when it occurred in the panel study. For
instance, all fourth-year players are considered to have the same
baseline hazard regardless of calendar time, so a fourth-year player in
1990 has the same baseline hazard as a fourth-year player in 1997.
To understand how stock data influence a likelihood function, we
follow the notation of Berger et al. (2001). Suppose the probability
mass function (PMF) of durations is defined as
(2) f(t, x, [beta]),
where t is the duration of the career, x is a vector of performance
and personal characteristics, and [beta] is a vector of parameters. Now
denote F(t, x, [beta]) as the cumulative distribution function; then the
probability that a career lasts at least [t.sup.0] years is simply 1 -
F([t.sup.0], x, [beta]). If we define the hazard function as h(t, x,
[beta]) [equivalent to] f (t, x, [beta])/ S(t, x, [beta]) and apply the
definition of conditional probabilities, we may express the PM F as
(3) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
If we have a sample of n observations, {[t.sub.1], [t.sub.2], ...
[t.sub.n]}, the likelihood function of the sample is
(4) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Often it is not possible to observe all careers until they end,
hence careers are often right-censored. Let set A be the set of all
observations where the players' careers are completed and set B be
the set of all observations where the careers are right-censored. In
this case, A and B are disjoint sets whose union is exactly the set of
observation. For the set of right-censored observations, all we know is
that the actual length of the career is greater than [t.sub.i], the
observed length of the career up through the last year. Because we know
that the actual length of the career is longer than we observe then the
contribution of these observations to the likelihood function is just
the survivor function, S([t.sub.i], [x.sub.i], [beta]). Thus, we may
write the likelihood function as
(5) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Equation (5) exploits the property that S(t, x, [beta]) =
[[PI].sup.t-1.sub.i=1][1-h(i, x, [beta]]. Equation (5) is the likelihood
function for any flow sample of discrete durations.
To introduce stock sampling, let set C be the set of careers that
were in progress when data collection began. For these observations, we
know that the career i has lasted for r years before the panel begins,
so that the probability that the total career length will be t is simply
given by
(6) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
Because we are sampling careers that are already in progress, these
observations enter the sample only if the career is at least of length
r, hence we must adjust by the conditional probability of the career
having length r. With the addition of these observations, we may write
the likelihood function as
(7) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
The third term of the right-hand side of equation (7) reflects the
adjustment necessary for the stock sample that end during our panel.
Because stock-sampled observations, by definition, must have survived
until tenure r, that they survived until time r provides no information;
their survival is an artifact of the sampling strategy.
Of course, some stock-sampled observations may be
right-hand-censored. Let set D be the set of all stock-sampled
observations that are also right-hand-censored. An example of a career
that is both right- and left-censored would be a player that starts his
career prior to 1989 and ends his career after 1999. A stock-sampled
observation that is right-hand-censored at time t occurs with
probability
(8) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII],
so that the likelihood function becomes
(9) [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].
In equation (9), the contribution of censored, stock-sampled
observations to the likelihood function is strictly from the last two
terms; such observations simply provide information about the survivor
function between (r, t).
Thus we, like Berger et al. (200l), have expressed the likelihood
function as a function of the hazard functions. All that remains is to
specify the form of a hazard function and estimate by means of maximum
likelihood estimation. Because the hazard function is the conditional
probability of exiting the NBA given that the NBA career lasted until
the previous season, the hazard function must have a range from zero to
one. In principle, any mapping with a range from zero to one will work.
Cox (1972) recommends
(10) h(t, x, [beta]))/[1-h(t, x, [beta])] =
([h.sub.t]/1-[h.sub.t])[e.sup.x[beta]] = exp([[gamma].sup.t] + x[beta]),
which is simply the logit model with intercepts that differ by time
periods. The term [h.sub.t] is a baseline hazard function, which is
common to all. The x[beta] term, determined by the player's
personal and productivity characteristics, shifts the baseline hazard
function, but it affects it in exactly the same way each period. Berger
and Black (1999) consider other hazard functions and find that the
results are relatively robust across various specifications of the
hazard function. The logit model is available in many software packages,
so we follow Cox and use the logit model.
The intuition behind equation (10), when using the logit model for
the hazard function, is relatively simple. For each year during the
survey in which the player is in the NBA, the player either comes back
for another season or ends his career. If the career ends, the dependent
variable takes on a value of one; otherwise, the dependent variable is
zero. The player remains in the panel until he exits the NBA or the
panel ends. If the panel ends, we say the worker's spell is
right-hand-censored. Thus a player who begins his NBA career during the
panel and plays for six years will enter the data set six times: the
value of his dependent variable will be zero for the first five years
(tenure one through five) and be equal to one for the sixth year.
To illustrate a stock sample, consider another player who enters
the panel with seven years of NBA job tenure prior to 1989 the first
year of the panel, then plays for an additional three years for a
ten-year career. For this player, we ignore his first seven years of
tenure because he is left-hand-censored. As the equation of the
likelihood function with stock data indicates, the duration of a NBA
career prior to the beginning of the panel makes no contribution to the
value of the likelihood function. Therefore, only years eight through
ten will enter the data set with the dependent variable taking on the
value zero for year eight and nine, and in the tenth year it takes on a
value of one, with this player appearing in the data set a total of
three times. Note for all players who are right-hand-censored, we do not
know when their career ends, so their dependent variables are always
coded as zero.
Because the players in the panel have varying degrees of job tenure
prior to the beginning of the panel, we identify the hazard function for
both long and short careers. The disadvantage to this approach is that
the vector [[gamma].sub.t] of equation (10) can be very large. In our
study it would require 21 dummy variables. We also run into problems
with the Cox technique because we have too few players who have long
careers. To simplify the computation of the likelihood function and be
able to keep the long careers, we simply approximate the [[gamma].sub.t]
vector with a fourth-order polynomial of player's tenure, which
reduces the number of parameters to be estimated from 21 to 4. Thus, the
hazard function becomes
(11) h(t, x, [beta])/[1-h(t, x, [beta])] = [PHI](t)[[e.sup.x[beta]]
= exp([phi][t] + x[beta]),
where [phi](t) is a fourth-order polynomial in the worker's
tenure. Once again, we choose the Taylor series approximation technique
over using tenure dummies due to the small number of observations for
high tenures. This method provides a very flexible specification of the
baseline hazard but does impose more restrictions than Cox's model.
(1)
In Table 3, we report the estimates for equation (12) using three
different specifications. In model 1, the complete specification, we
find that the tenure polynomials are jointly significant. Second, we
find that weight is negative and significant, indicating that heavier
players have longer careers than smaller players do. We find that height
has an insignificant effect on career length. Height and weight,
however, are highly correlated with a correlation of 70%. In model 2, we
exclude weight and find that height becomes negative. (2) This suggests
that quickness and speed depreciate faster than size, showing that big
men are predicted to have longer careers in the NBA than small men.
In our model of exit, we suggest that performance should increase
career length. Owners will keep players who are productive. All our
specifications results support this prediction, where we find
performance measures are important in career duration. In particular the
number of games played in a season, the number of assists per minute,
blocks per minute, and points per minute all increase the likelihood of
remaining in the NBA for another season. We also find that draft number
determines career length; players with higher draft numbers have shorter
careers even after controlling for performance measures.
In our model of exit, we also suggest that race may play a role if
white customers have a preference to see white players and teams find it
difficult to replace white players. Our results, however, do not support
this claim. We find that our race dummy variable is not statistically
significant, indicating that no exit discrimination in the 1990s. To
convert the coefficient into a percentage and focus on the magnitude of
the effect we use 100[exp([beta]) - 1]. This conversion gives us the
percentage difference in hazard rates between whites and black. Using
this method we find that white players have an 8% higher hazard rate
than blacks in the league. This result suggests that white players are
more likely to be cut than black players, although the result is
statistically insignificant. This result is counter to exit
discrimination that was found in the 1980s by Hoang and Rascher (1999),
who find that whites have a 36% lower hazard rate. In the next section,
we explore why our results are counter to the Hoang and Rascher result.
Exit Discrimination in the NBA in the 1980s and 1990s
In this section of our research, we further investigate why Hoang
and Rascher (1999) find exit discrimination and we do not. We offer
three hypotheses that would account for the difference. First, we use a
technique that allows for a mixed stock and flow sample that allows for
longer tenure spells in the NBA. We suggest that maybe discrimination
exists for short careers but not long careers. Second, we include height
and weight variables, and they do not. We suggest that their race
variable may serve as a proxy for size differences that play a role in
career duration. Third, our study uses data from the 1990s, whereas
their data are from the 1980s. We suggest, as with other more recent
studies, that discrimination is no longer detected in professional
sports leagues.
Although we cannot explore why the difference exists using their
data set, we explore the differences using our data set. To test
hypothesis one, that discrimination exists for short careers, we
estimated our model using only the flow sample. The flow specification
is reported as model 4 in Table 3. In this specification the race
coefficient was positive and insignificant, indicating that even when
focusing only on short careers, we do not find discrimination. To test
hypothesis two, we estimated our model excluding both weight and height
variables. This specification is reported as model 3 in Table 3. Again,
we found the coefficient on the race dummy insignificant. This result
suggests that race does not serve as a proxy for player size. We
therefore suggest that the exit discrimination may have existed in the
1980s but did not exist for players in the 1990s.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS IN A GENERAL CONTEXT
Hoang and Rascher (1999) suggested that the effect on career
earnings of exit discrimination was over twice as large as the effect of
pay discrimination in the 1980s. The apparent disappearance of pay
discrimination from the NBA in the 1990s would not mean an end to
unequal career earnings if exit discrimination persisted. Our results
indicate that exit discrimination no longer exists in the NBA.
The importance of these results extends beyond the courts of the
NBA. Kahn (2000) discussed the use of research in the area of
professional sports as a laboratory for testing general labor market propositions. Various laws in this country have helped moderate the
level of racial pay discrimination in the labor market. In contrast to
the black economic progress portrayed by Smith and Welch (1989), more
recent research suggests that the progress enjoyed by minorities in
entry-level positions is not sustained throughout their careers. Sexton and Olsen (1994) find that blacks have acquired less on-the-job training
than their white counterparts and that the training they do acquire is
not likely to increase their pay. Bratsberg and Terrel; (1998) suggest
that returns to general experience for black employees trail those for
white employees. It is doubtful that legislative means can end such
labor market outcomes.
The area of professional sports provides an excellent setting to
study the effects of market competition on discrimination outlined by
Becker (1971). Most franchises have the stated or purported purpose to
win games and/or championships. This objective function may serve to
increase attendance and hopefully franchise profits or may satisfy the
needs of a sportsman entrepreneur or civic-minded owner seeking to
provide a winning team for his or her city. The competition to provide
winning teams should eliminate the existence of discrimination in
employment. Conflict may arise, however, if the source of discrimination
is fans. The results of Kanazawa and Funk (2001) suggest lingering fan
discrimination into the mid- to late 1990s. However, although ceteris
paribus results may indicate an improvement in attendance and/or TV
ratings for an increase in the number of white players on a franchise,
particularly in areas with a higher percentage of white population, the
management of the franchise must weigh this against the overwhelming
impact of winning on attendance.
The lack of exit discrimination found in our study indicates that
winning games supersedes even the tastes of fans' racial
preferences. These results seem to be a resounding affirmation of
Becket's theoretical implications. Outside the realm of
professional sports, where objective statistics of employee performance
and firm performance are not so readily available, the implications for
Becker's model of the findings of unequal promotional attainment
and on-the-job training by minorities is unclear. Our results, however,
suggest that if competition is present performance on the job may now
supersede race as the prime determinant of employee retention.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We use a panel study of annual NBA data to examine the exit
discrimination on career length in the NBA. We find that performance
variables are important determinants in career length where more
productive players have longer careers. This result suggests that team
owners in the pursuit of championships and profits keep talented
players. In our analysis, we also find that big men are predicted to
have longer careers than small men. We do not, however, find exit
discrimination in the NBA in the 1990s. This result is inconsistent with
results from data in the past that has found exit discrimination but is
consistent with more recent findings that have measured wage
discrimination in sports in the 1990s.
TABLE 1
NBA Panel Data: Means of Variables
Variables Means White Black
Tenure * (years) 5.72 5.92 5.47
White ** (%) 0.205 -- --
Height ** (inches) 79.08 80.68 78.48
Weight ** (pounds) 221 230 216
Field goals *** (%) 44.1 44.1 44.1
Free throws *** (%) 70.2 70.1 70.2
Games *** (number) 54.5 50.6 55.4
Assists *** (per min) 0.086 0.080 0.087
Rebounds *** (per min) 0.177 0.187 0.173
Steals *** (per min) 0.034 0.029 0.035
Turnovers *** (per min) 0.076 0.061 0.079
Blocked shots *** 0.021 0.022 0.021
(per min)
Points *** (per min) 0.381 0.362 0.385
Individuals 1113 219 824
Panel length 11 years
(89-99)
Observations 4476 918 3458
* Length of career for all non-right-censored data.
** Time-invariant data calculate using individual data.
*** Time-variant data calculate using observational data.
TABLE 2
NBA Hazard Rates
Tenure Total Black White
1 0.182 0.185 0.167
2 0.146 0.138 0.176
3 0.134 0.129 0.155
4 0.102 0.095 0.129
5 0.102 0.098 0.120
6 0.079 0.091 0.031
7 0.061 0.048 0.103
8 0.108 0.100 0.136
9 0.097 0.084 0.140
10 0.158 0.154 0.174
11 0.175 0.153 0.250
12 0.153 0.156 0.143
13 0.242 0.243 0.238
14 0.243 0.192 0.428
15 0.200 0.216 0.125
16 0.200 0.142 0.500
17 0.214 0.231 0
18 0.500 0.428 1.00
19 0.333 0.333 --
20 0 0 --
21 1 1 --
TABLE 3
NBA Career Duration Semiparametric Analysis
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0.794 (0.48) 2.88 (1.88)
Tenure * -0.029 (0.19) -0.046 (0.25)
Tenure squared * -0.0036 (0.09) 0.0024 (0.06)
Tenure cubed * 0.0015 (0.47) 0.0012 (0.38)
Tenure fourth power * -0.00006 (0.64) -0.00005 (0.56)
White 0.078 (0.64) 0.052 (0.43)
Height 0.032 (1.27) -0.028 (1.50)
Weight -0.012 (3.76) --
Games -0.046 (21.30) -0.047 (21.41
Draft number 0.0027 (3.09) 0.0029 (3.28)
Assists -2.72 (2.69) -2.01 (2.04)
Rebounds -0.64 (1.01) -1.15 (1.83)
Steals -2.65 (1.37) -2.31 (1.21)
Blocks -3.81 (1.80) -3.91 (1.80)
Points -0.592 (1.88) -0.569 (1.77)
Turnovers -0.0008 (0.61) -0.0007 (0.60)
Likelihood function -1353.04 -1360.36
Variable Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.646 (2.01) 1.93 (0.76)
Tenure * -0.054 (0.30) 1.01 (1.37)
Tenure squared * 0.0013 (0.03) -0.365 (1.24)
Tenure cubed * 0.0012 (0.37) 0.046 (1.05)
Tenure fourth power * -0.00005 (0.56) -0.00203 (0.92)
White 0.011 (0.09) 0.049 (0.28)
Height -- -0.020 (0.52)
Weight -- -0.003 (0.62)
Games -0.047 (21.41) -0.050 (15.35)
Draft number 0.0031 (3.49) 0.0036 (3.39)
Assists -1.30 (1.52) -2.89 (1.92)
Rebounds -1.49 (2.51) -0.28 (0.39)
Steals -2.00 (1.05) -2.56 (1.15)
Blocks -4.99 (2.24) -3.17 (1.42)
Points -0.576 (1.79) -0.718 (1.69)
Turnovers -0.0008 (0.57) -0.0127 (0.12)
Likelihood function -1361.45 -726.56
Notes: Model 1 full specification. Model 2 weight excluded
specification. Model 3 weight and height excluded specification.
Model 4 flow sample only specification.
* Jointly significant. First-through fourth-order tenure polynomials
included to provide for general functional form of baseline hazard.
The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios.
(1.) When higher-order polynomials of the fifth and sixth power are
included, results do not change, suggesting that a fourth-order
polynomial is flexible enough to capture the influence of the baseline
hazard.
(2.) In an additional specification when weight and height were
interacted the interaction term was significant. All specifications
suggest that size matters in career duration.
REFERENCES
Becket, G. The Economics of Discrimination, 2nd ed. Chicago:
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PETER A. GROOTHUIS and J. RICHARD HILL *
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2002
Midwest Economics Association Meetings in Chicago. We thank Mark Berger,
Dan Black, Bill Morrow, and anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.
Groothuis: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Walker
College of Business, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608.
Phone 1-828-262-6077, Fax 1-828-262-6105, E-mail
groothuispa@appstate.edu
Hill: Associate Professor, Department of Economics, 317 Sloan Hall,
Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, MI 48859. Phone
1-989-774-3706, Fax 1-989-774-2040, E-mail hilljr@cmich.edu