Durable-goods monopoly with privately known impatience: a theoretical and experimental study.
Guth, Werner ; Kroger, Sabine ; Normann, Hans-Theo 等
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Plato's Republic, (1) people seem to be aware that
they may suffer from rational anticipation of own future behavior. (2) A
very prominent intrapersonal decision conflict is one faced by the
durable-goods monopolist introduced by Coase (1972). In a market with a
durable good, a monopolistic seller could easily collect the monopoly
profit by excluding any future price cut. Buyers will, however,
anticipate that future prices are opportunistically chosen by the
monopolist; in particular, that the good will be sold cheaper in later
periods. For this reason, themonopolistlosesmarket power. (3) Coase
conjectured that this can even lead to competitive and thus efficient
market results.
Much of the literature on durable-goods monopoly has focused on the
question under which conditions the Coase conjecture proves to hold and
when it does not hold. For example, Stokey (1981) and Gul et al. (1986)
show that there is an equilibrium in which the price is (arbitrarily)
close to marginal cost if the number of successive sales periods is
infinitely high. Others have shown that product durability does not
necessarily reduce the monopolist's market power (see Ausubel and
Deneckere 1989; Bagnoli et al. 1989). Guth and Ritzberger (1998) show
that a durable-goods monopolist may even increase profits when the model
allows for a difference between the discount factor of the monopolist
and that of the potential buyers. Under this assumption, Guth and
Ritzberger (1998) show that even over a finite number of periods, the
monopolist may significantly increase market power, provided the buyer
has a lower discount factor. This is the so-called Pacman conjecture,
termed by Bagnoli et al. (1989). If the seller has a lower discount
factor, he loses profits compared to a one-period monopolist.
In this article, we follow Guth and Ritzberger (1998) in that we
allow for a difference in discount factors. The usual assumption is that
players have identical discount factors. However, there is ample
evidence that discount factors may be highly idiosyncratic in social
environments. (4) In addition, we assume that discount factors are
privately known. Commonly known impatience of players seems unlikely--at
least, it requires further justification. How eager sellers and buyers
are to obtain monetary rewards over time is presumably difficult to
observe for others. So the assumption of privately known discount
factors seems less restrictive. More specifically, we assume that
discount factors can be either high or low for both the monopolist and
the buyer. Which state is realized is private information. For this
scenario, we analyze a two-period game with one seller and one buyer
whose valuation is also private knowledge and derive the solution play
in closed form.
In addition, we provide experimental evidence. Experimental data
may reveal to what extent subjects' behavior conforms to (rational
expectations) theory, but it may also show that bounded rationality limits the predictive power of standard theory in durable-goods games.
The theory has a number of interesting implications in our market. Will
sellers with a high discount factor charge higher prices, as predicted?
Similarly, will buyers with a high discount factor refuse to purchase in
period one more often? Considering bounded rationality, two kinds of
behavior may be important. First, buyer subjects may withhold demand,
that is, they may reject profitable purchases because of fairness
reasons. Such behavior may soften the monopolist's pricing behavior
and may generally limit the predictive power of standard theory in
durable-goods games. Second, it seems possible that seller subjects
might feel committed by mere intentions about their future
behavior--even when there is no formal commitment device. This again
could limit the predictive power of the theory. The conflict of a
durable-goods monopolist between avoiding the effects of intrapersonal
price competition and reacting opportunistically, and how this enters
the price expectations of the buyer, seems an exciting topic of
experimental analysis.
Previous experimental papers on durable-goods monopoly include
Cason and Sharma (2001), Guth et al. (1995), and Reynolds (2000).
Supporting the predictions, there is strong evidence that monopolists
indeed lose monopoly power when selling a durable good. However, a large
number of observations have been made that indicate that subjects'
behavior is inconsistent with the predictions. Reynolds (2000) observed
that initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in
single-period monopoly experiments. In all experiments, there is more
demand withholding than theory predicts. For example, Cason and Sharma
(2001) observed more trading periods than predicted due to higher demand
withholding. Finally, durable-goods experiments seem to require a number
of repetitions due to their complexity. In Guth et al. (1995), there was
no opportunity for learning. Prices failed to conform to comparative
statics predictions and were often higher than the theoretical
benchmark. With experienced subjects, observed prices were closer to the
prediction, but participants still had serious difficulties
understanding the crucial aspects of such dynamic markets.
In view of these previous experiments and their results, it seems
important to limit attention to the simple case of markets with two
periods. We also have provided ample opportunities for learning by
letting participants play the same market repeatedly in our computerized
experiment. This allows us to incorporate a further complexity, namely,
that relative impatience is private information.
In sections II and III, we present the model and derive the
game-theoretic solution play for two-period markets. Section IV explains
the design of the experiment whose results are described and
statistically analyzed in section V. We conclude in section VI.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
The monopolistic seller has an indivisible commodity which he or
she evaluates by zero, whereas the only buyer evaluates the commodity by
v [member of] [0, 1]. The value v is, however, the buyer's private
information. The distribution of v is uniform over the unit interval [0,
1], and this is commonly known.
We consider two successive sales periods. The discount factor
[zeta] [member of] (0, 1) represents the seller's weight for future
(period t = 2) versus present (period t = 1) profit. Similarly, 5
reflects the buyer's impatience where [delta] [member of] (0, 1).
(5) We denote by [p.sub.1] the price in period t = 1 and by [p.sub.2]
the price in period t = 2.
The decision process is as follows:
1. Period t = 1:
* The seller chooses the sales price [p.sub.1] [member of] [0, 1]
for this period.
* Knowing [p.sub.1] and her value v, the buyer decides whether to
buy. If she does, this ends the interaction; otherwise period t = 2
follows.
2. Period t = 2:
* The seller chooses the sales price [p.sub.2] [member of] [0, 1]
for this period.
* Knowing [p.sub.2] and her value v, the buyer decides whether to
buy. This ends the interaction.
The profit of the seller is [p.sub.1] if there is trade in period t
= 1, it is [zeta][p.sub.2] if trade occurs in period t = 2, and it is 0
if there is no trade. For the buyer, the payoff is v - [p.sub.1] for
trade in period t = 1, it is [delta](v - [p.sub.2]) for trade in period
t = 2, and it is 0 in the case of no trade.
If both discount factors are commonly known, and if the seller is
risk-neutral, the solution prices [p.sup.*.sub.1] and [p.sup.*.sub.2]
depend on the discount factor [[zeta].sub.6] of the seller and [delta]
of the buyer as follows: (6)
(1) [p.sup.*.sub.1] = [(2 - [delta]).sup.2]/(2[4 - 2[delta] -
[zeta]]),
(2) [p.sup.*.sub.2] = (2 - [delta])/(2[4 - 2[delta] - [zeta]]).
Note that, with just one trading period, the monopoly price would
be [p.sup.*] = 1/2, (7) implying a profit of 1/4. The polar cases of
relative impatience correspond to
* [zeta] [??] 0 and [delta] [??] 1 with lim [p.sup.*.sub.1] = 1/4 =
lim [p.sup.*.sub.2]: as only buyers with v [greater than or equal to]
1/2 buy in period t = 1, the seller earns only half of what he would
earn as a usual monopolist, namely 1/4 x 1/2 = 1/8 in period t = 1
(revenues in period t = 2 are neglected because [zeta] [??] 0).
* [zeta] [??] 1 and [delta] [??] 0 with lim [p.sup.*.sub.1] = 2/3
and lim [p.sup.*.sub.2] = 1/3: the (extremely patient) seller engages in
price discrimination over time by collecting [p.sup.*.sub.1] = 2/3
whenever v is in the interval 1 [greater than or equal to] v [greater
than or equal to] 2/3 and [p.sup.*.sub.2] = 1/3 when 2/3> v [greater
than or equal to] 1/3. This yields an expected profit of (2/3 + 1/3) x
1/3 = 1/3, more than the static monopoly profit.
We assume that discount factors are private knowledge. In addition
to information about their discount factors, players observe the
following. In period t = 1, the buyer is informed about his valuation
and the seller's price offer. If there is trade in period t = 1,
the seller learns that there is trade. If there is no trade in period t
= 1, the buyer additionally observes the price [p.sub.2], and the seller
learns whether or not she sold the commodity in period t = 2. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the discount factors of buyers and
sellers can adopt only two values, low or high. That is, we assume
(3) 0 < [[delta].bar] < [bar.[delta]] < 1 and 0 <
[[zeta].bar] < [bar].[zeta]] < 1
where the probability for [bar.[delta]] is w [member of] (0, 1) and
that for [bar.[zeta]] is [omega] [member of] (0, 1). To allow for a
clear-cut benchmark solution, (8) we assume that all the parameters
[[delta].bar], [bar.[delta]], [[zeta].bar], [bar.[zeta]], w, and [omega]
are commonly known.
III. THE SOLUTION PLAY
Our first point is obvious but useful to note. Whenever [p.sub.2]
[greater than or equal to] [p.sub.1] the buyer would not buy in period t
= 2 because [delta] < 1. We therefore obtain
PROPOSITION 1. The solution play of the two-period game involves a
price decrease, that is, [p.sub.1] > [p.sub.2].
Given the buyer's discount factor [delta] [member of]
{[[delta].bar], [bar.[delta]]}, when will she buy the commodity?
Consider the decision to buy in period t = 1 or t = 2. If a type v
[member of] [0, 1] has not bought in period t = 1 at price [p.sub.1],
she will buy in period t = 2 at price [p.sub.2] whenever v [greater than
or equal to] [p.sub.2]. Assume now a type v [greater than or equal to]
[p.sub.2] who anticipates the actual solution prices [p.sub.1] and
[p.sub.2]. Because buying in period t = 1 yields v - [p.sub.1], whereas
delaying it yields [delta](v - [p.sub.2]), type v prefers to buy early
if
(4) v - [p.sub.1] [greater than or equal to] [delta](v - [p.sub.2])
or v [greater than or equal to] ([p.sub.1] - [delta][p.sub.2])/(1 -
[delta]).
This establishes
PROPOSITION 2. If the solution play involves prices [p.sub.1] and
[p.sub.2],
(i) sale occurs in period t = 1 if
[MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]
(5)
and sale occurs in period t = 2 if
(6) [v.bar] > v [greater than or equal to] [p.sub.2] for [delta]
= [[delta].bar] [bar.v] > v [greater than or equal to] [p.sub.2] for
[delta] = [bar.[delta]],
whereas
(ii) v < [p.sub.2] implies no sales at all.
Note that Proposition 1 implies that the two thresholds [v.bar] and
[bar.v] in Proposition 2 satisfy [v.bar] < [bar.v].
Next, we discard the possibility that the seller serves only the
[bar.[delta]]-buyer types in period t = 2. Assume, by contrast, that
this is true. Then the [[delta].bar]-buyer would only switch between
buying at price [p.sub.1] in period t = 1 and not buying at all,
implying that only [[delta].bar]-buyers with v [greater than or equal
to] [p.sub.1] buy in period t = 1. But because [p.sub.1] > [p.sub.2],
[[delta].bar]-buyer types v with [p.sub.1] > v [greater than or equal
to] [p.sub.2] would like to buy in period t = 2, contradicting the
assumption that only [bar.[delta]]-buyer types are served in period t =
2. Thus we have proved
PROPOSITION 3. Trade in period t = 2 involves both buyer types
[delta] [member of] {[[delta].bar], [bar.[delta]]} with positive
probability, that is, [v.bar] > [p.sub.2].
We can now proceed to derive the full solution play of the game. We
start by solving the last period. Note that in period t = 2, the seller
knows that the [[delta].bar]([bar.[delta]])-buyer has no value v
[greater than or equal to] [v.bar]([bar.v]). Thus, his posterior
probability of trade in period t = 2 at price [p.sub.2] is
(7) D([p.sub.2]) = [(1 - w)([v.bar] - [p.sub.2]) + w([bar.v] -
[p.sub.2])] /[(1 - w)[v.bar] + w[bar.v]],
where, in view of Proposition 3, both terms of the numerator on the
right-hand side are positive. Maximization of [p.sub.2]D([p.sub.2])
yields
(8) [p.sub.2] = [p.sub.2]([v.bar],[bar.v]) = ((1 - w)[v.bar] +
w[bar.v])/2.
Substituting [p.sub.2] in (5), the equations for [v.bar] and
[bar.v], yields a system of two equations with two unknowns
(9) [v.bar] = (2[p.sub.1] - [[delta].bar]w[bar.v])/(2 -
[[delta].bar] [1 + w]),
(10) [bar].v] = (2[p.sub.1] - [bar.[delta]][1 - w][v.bar])/ (2 -
[bar.[delta]][2 - w]).
This system can readily be solved as
(11) [v.bar] = [p.sub.1][(2 - [[delta].bar]w - [bar.[delta]][2 -
w]) /[(2 - [[delta].bar][1 + w] - [bar.[delta]][2 - w] + [[delta].bar]
[bar.[delta]])]],
(12) [bar.v] = [p.sub.1][(2 - [[delta].bar][1 + w] - [bar.[delta]]
[1 - w]) /[(2 - [[delta].bar][1 + w] - [bar.[delta]][2 - w] +
[[delta].bar] [bar.[delta]])]].
Because the optimal price [p.sub.2] = ([1- w][v.bar] + w[bar.v])/2
depends on [v.bar] and [bar.v], it can be expressed as a function of
[p.sub.1] only:
(13) [p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]) = [p.sub.1]([1 - [delta.bar]w -
[bar.[delta] [(1 - w)] /[2 - [[delta].bar](1 + w) - [bar.[delta]](2 - w)
+ [[delta].bar] [bar.[delta]])
We will use [gamma] =(1 - [[delta].bar]w - [bar.[delta]][1 - w])
and [epsilon] = (1 - [[delta].bar] - [bar.[delta]] +
[[delta].bar][bar.[delta]]) to simplify the notation. Then we have
[v.bar] = [p.sub.1]([gamma] + 1 - [bar.[delta]])/([gamma] + [epsilon]),
[bar.v] = [p.sub.1]([gamma] + 1 - [[delta].bar])/([gamma] + [epsilon]),
[p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]) = [p.sub.1][gamma]/([gamma] + [epsilon]).
With the help of these derivations, the expected profit from trade
over the two sales periods can be defined as a function of [p.sub.1],
the price of period t = 1, namely,
(14) [p.sub.1][(1 - w)(1 - [v.bar][[p.sub.1]]) + w(1 - [bar.v]
[[p.sub.1]])] + [zeta][p.sub.2]([p.sub.1])[(1 - w)([v.bar] [[p.sub.1]] -
[p.sub.2][[p.sub.1]]) + w([bar.v][[p.sub.1]] - [p.sub.2][[p.sub.1]])],
where, [zeta] [member of] {[[zeta].bar],[bar.[zeta]]}. Maximizing
this function with respect to [p.sub.1] yields
(15) [p.sub.1]([zeta]) = [([gamma] + [epsilon]).sup.2]/(2[gamma]
[2([gamma] + [epsilon]) - [zeta][gamma]])
and thus
(16) [v.bar]([zeta]) = ([[gamma] + [epsilon]][[gamma] + 1 -
[bar.[delta]]) /(2[gamma][2([gamma] + [epsilon) - [zeta[gamma]]),
(17) [bar.v]([zeta]) = ([[gamma] + [epsilon]][[gamma] + 1 -
[[delta].bar]]) /(2[gamma][2([gamma] + [epsilon]) - [zeta][gamma]]),
(18) [p.sub.2]([zeta]) = ([gamma] + [epsilon])/(2[2([gamma] +
[epsilon]) - [zeta][gamma]]).
Hence, we have derived the solution (9) play described by
PROPOSITION 4. For [zeta] [member of] {[[zeta].bar],[bar.[zeta]]},
the solution play of the two-period game is as follows:
* In period t = 1, the price is [p.sub.1] ([zeta]), which reduces
all buyers with v [greater than or equal to] [bar.v]([zeta]), and
[delta] = [bar.[delta]] and those with v [greater than or equal to]
[v.bar]([zeta]) and [delta] = [[delta].bar] to buy.
* In period t = 2, all buyers with [bar.v]([zeta]) > v [greater
than or equal to] [p.sub.2]([zeta]) and [delta] = [bar.[delta]] and
those with [v.bar] ([zeta]) > v [greater than or equal to]
[p.sub.2]([zeta]) and [delta] = [[delta].bar] buy, whereas
* All remaining buyer types abstain from trading.
According to [p.sub.1] ([zeta]), the seller with time preference
[zeta] [member of] {[[zeta].bar], [bar.[zeta]} reveals his impatience by
his first-period price [p.sub.1]. (10) Therefore, the buyer can
rationally anticipate [p.sub.2] ([delta]) after observing [p.sub.1]. The
seller in turn only learns after the first sales period whether the
buyer has bought in this period. Thus, his demand expectations for the
second sales period are as expressed by D([p.sub.2]).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Our experimental design exactly matches the above setup of the
durable-goods monopoly with privately known impatience. We employ the
parameters [[delta].bar] = [[zeta].bar] = 0.3, [bar.[delta]] =
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7, w = [omega] = 0.5. These parameters imply the values
in Table 1. If the buyers' valuations are drawn from the unit
interval, as assumed in the theory section, the two columns on the left
apply. In the experiment, we took buyers' valuations from the
interval [50, 150]. Therefore, the absolute price prediction is
according to the two right columns of Table 1. For the sake of
plausibility of the frame, we introduced a production cost of 50, which
was charged if demand was positive. Sellers could choose prices from the
interval [0, 200].
We ran six sessions, each consisting of two matching groups, giving
us 12 entirely independent observations. Each round was conducted
exactly as follows: (see Appendix B for the instructions). One group
consisted of three sellers and three buyers. Within the groups, sellers
and buyers were randomly rematched after each round. (11) Subjects
learned their role, seller or buyer, only after they had read the
instructions (see Appendix B), and they did not switch roles during the
experiment. To allow for learning, we decided to run the experiment over
40 rounds. (12)
Sellers learned their discount factor, then they had to choose
their price. Knowing their discount factor and value, buyers had to
decide whether or not to buy at the period-one price [p.sub.1]. If they
decide not to, period two commences, and so forth. At the end of each
round, subjects were informed about their private earnings in the
previous round as well as their cumulative earnings up to this round.
The computerized experiments were conducted at Humboldt University,
Berlin, in December 2001 and January 2002, using the software z-tree
(Fischbacher 1999). The 72 participants were mainly business and
economics students who were recruited via e-mail and telephone. Payments
were 16 euros on average, including a show-up fee of 2.5 euros. Sessions
lasted roughly 90 minutes.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Let us first check whether buying and pricing behavior is
consistent with a few qualitative theoretical implications. It seems
worth emphasizing that consistency even with very basic principles
cannot be taken for granted in a complex durable-goods setting. For
example, Guth et al. (1995) report a surprising amount of inconsistency in a durable-goods experiment. Similarly, Reynolds (2000) emphasizes the
necessity of experience with the trading environment. Therefore, we find
it useful to check consistency first.
Consider the buyers. Basic understanding of the situation implies
that buyers would never purchase at a price above their valuation. It
seems impossible that some argument based on repeated games or bounded
rationality could plausibly support such loss-inducing purchases. Out of
1,440 possible sales, we observed 1,037 actual purchases. In all but six
purchases, buyers had valuations above the prices. That is, there are
virtually no such loss-making purchases, and we can conclude that basic
buyer behavior was consistent in this sense. (13)
Buyers knew that profits from sales made in period t = 2 are
discounted. Thus, [bar.[delta]]-buyers should reject a profitable
purchase in period t = 1 more often than a [[delta].bar]-buyer. Given
any path of (expected) seller prices {[p.sub.1],[p.sub.2]}, the
impatient buyer has to purchase early more often because her
second-period opportunities are less attractive. Even if we take
repeated-game effects like demand withholding into account, it seems
implausible for the more impatient buyer to reject more often because it
is more costly for her to reject. Confirming this, the data show that in
period t = 1, the [bar].[delta]]-buyers reject profitable offers (i.e.,
offers with [p.sub.1] [less than or equal to] v) significantly more
often than [[delta].bar]-buyers. Because of possible dependence of
observations within the groups of six subjects, we count group averages
including all periods as one observation. Unless otherwise mentioned,
all tests reported herein are therefore based on matching group
averages. See Appendix A for summary statistics of all matching groups.
Relative acceptance rates are lower with [bar.[delta]] for all groups,
the according nonparametric test is highly significant (one-sided
Wilcoxon, p = 0.0002). We conclude that buyers do understand the basic
impact of discounting.
Now consider the sellers. Did they understand the implication of
discounting? If so, sellers with a high discount factor should charge a
higher price in both periods than sellers with a low discount factor. As
shown in Table 1, this is the prediction. Even if subjects do not behave
according to the solution play, it should be apparent to them that a
high discount factor makes it relatively more attractive to charge a
high price in period t = 1 because there is still another profitable
opportunity to come. As both types of sellers should (and indeed did)
reduce their price in t = 2, a higher period t = 1 price for high
discount factor types also implies higher period t = 2 prices. By
contrast, the impatient seller has to make his sales early and therefore
charges lower prices. The data show that average prices of [bar.[zeta]]
sellers (91 and 81 in t = 1 and t = 2, respectively) were higher than
those of [[zeta].bar] sellers (84 and 78, respectively) prices in
all-groups and in both periods. Accordingly, the test is highly
significant (one-sided Wilcoxon, p = 0.006). It appears that sellers
understood the impact of their discount factor.
Proposition 1 states that sellers should charge lower prices in
period t = 2 compared to period t = 1. The intuition is that a
discounting buyer has no incentive to buy at a higher price in period t
= 2. If sellers want to exploit the opportunity to sell in period t = 2,
they should lower the price. However, the prediction of a price decrease
over the two periods is not the only plausible behavior. Boundedly
rational sellers may refuse to charge a lower period t = 2 price in an
attempt to solve the commitment problem.
In 750 cases, there is no trade in period t = 1, and therefore a
period t = 2 price is observed. In the vast majority of these cases,
sellers actually charged a lower price in period t = 2. In total, only
33 out of 750 period t = 2 prices were strictly higher than [p.sub.1],
and this figure gets even smaller over time. Over the last 10 rounds,
only 3 out of 155 period t = 2 prices were strictly higher than
[p.sub.1]. In many of those cases (13 out of 33 and 3 out of 3 cases,
respectively), the maximum price of 200 is chosen in period t = 2, and
all but 1 of these 13 observations were caused by a single seller. (14)
In these cases, the higher price does not appear to be a mistake but a
signal. In addition, there are another 33 observations (7 over the last
10 rounds) in which the price was constant over the two periods. The
vast majority of these cases can be attributed to only a few sellers.
(15) We never observed a seller who regularly behaved as a one-period
monopolist in the sense of [p.sub.1] = [p.sub.2] = 100. To summarize, we
find only few violations of Proposition 1. A few subjects occasionally
charged [p.sub.2] = [p.sub.1] or [p.sub.2] = 200 > [p.sub.1]. This
may be interpreted as attempts to solve the durable-goods
monopolist's commitment problem. The remaining number of
inconsistencies is small and scattered over time and subjects.
Result 1: Subjects' behavior is consistent with several
qualitative predictions. Buyers virtually never make unprofitable
purchases. Almost all sellers systematically lowered prices in period t
= 2. Patient buyers reject profitable purchases in period t = 1 more
often. Patient sellers charge higher prices in both periods.
Let us now compare the data to the exact predictions of [p.sub.1],
[p.sub.2], [v.bar] and [bar.v]. Consider buyer behavior first. Buyers
withhold demand whenever an offer v > p is rejected. The prediction
is that any price offer smaller than v (in period t = 2) or smaller than
[bar.v] or [v.bar] (in period t = 1) should be accepted independently of
the history of the game. There can be rational and boundedly rational
(or irrational) demand withholding. In period t = 1, when v >
[p.sub.1] but v < [bar.v] or v < [v.bar], respectively, a
rejection is rational. In period t = 2, there is no rational demand
withholding. Although demand withholding as part of boundedly rational
strategy has been frequently observed (see, e.g., Ruffle 2000), in this
experiment, demand withholding to establish a reputation for aggressive
buyer behavior is particularly difficult. First, there is random
rematching, and the design does not allow identifing buyers. Moreover,
sellers do not know whether their offer was rejected because of demand
withholding or because it was not profitable. By contrast, in many
posted-offer experiments, buyers' evaluations are known, and demand
withholding can much better serve as a signal.
Buyer behavior in period t = 2 is simple to analyze because there
are no future effects to consider. Buyers' period t = 2 behavior is
also independent of [delta]. Any [p.sub.2] [less than or equal to] v
should be accepted by all buyers. Table 2 reports the numbers of
observed price offers, their acceptance conditional on the relation of
price offer and threshold [bar.v] and [v.bar] for both negotiation
periods. In the data, we find that 68 out of 413 offers (16.5%) with
[p.sub.2] [less than or equal to] v were rejected (see the column
[p.sub.2] [less than or equal to] v in Table 2). These rejected offers
typically left only a small profit margin for the buyers. This margin
was (v - [p.sub.2])/v = 0.0693 on average across rejected offers.
Two-thirds of all rejections involved a margin of less than 8%.
Regarding accepted offers, buyers often were willing to accept even low
margins and, in four cases, buyers accepted a period t = 2 price at
which they just broke even. Two-thirds of all accepted prices gave them
a less than 26% profit margin. Buyers never rejected margins of more
than 25%. Figure 1 illustrates the acceptance and rejection averages of
(v - [p.sub.2])/v for the 12 groups (provided v - [p.sub.2] [greater
than or equal to] 0). Over all groups, offers that left on average at
least 13% of the buyers' valuation were accepted. As the acceptance
and rejection average margins are not overlapping, there seems to exist
a quite robust acceptance threshold margin interval of [11%, 13%] below
and above which offers are rejected and accepted, respectively. Recall
that buyers knew the production cost of the seller (50). Therefore,
besides the impact of the discount factor, they were able to identify
the seller's profit and compare it to their own. Take buyers'
reaction to the median period t = 2 price, [p.sub.2] = 75, as an
example. Buyers with v < 100 knew that the seller would get a larger
profit from the sale, but they rejected only in 9 out of 38 cases
(taking only buyers with v [greater than or equal to] [p.sub.2] = 75
into account). Thus, it seems that aversion against disadvantageous inequality played only a little role here. (16) Nevertheless, there is
demand withholding in period t = 2.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
We turn to buyer behavior in period t = 1. The prediction is that,
after observing the solution price [p.sub.1] ([zeta]), buyers with v
> [bar.v] > [p.sub.1] and v > [v.bar] > [p.sub.1] should
accept. For out-of-equilibrium prices [p.sub.1], buyers with v [greater
than or equal to] [v.bar]([p.sub.1]) > [p.sub.1] and v [greater than
or equal to] [bar.v] ([p.sub.1]) > [p.sub.1] should accept. The
corresponding numbers are listed in Table 2. (Henceforth, we will refer
to [bar.v.bar] whenever we want make a statement about [v.bar] or
[bar.v].) First, consider buyers with [bar.v.bar] > v > [p.sub.1],
which are predicted to reject (these are cases of rational demand
withholding). Out of 206 cases (see column [p.sub.1] [less than or equal
to] v < [bar.v.bar]), buyers rejected in 174 cases (84.5%). That is,
to a large extent, buyers' behavior was in accordance with the
theory. There are, however, some inconsistencies, namely, the 32
accepted offers, yielding a profit margin of (v - [p.sub.1])/v = 0.159.
These buyers did not realize that a lower period t = 2 price should have
given them a higher discounted margin. Second, did buyers with v
[greater than or equal to] [bar.v.bar] accept? If (v - [bar.v.bar])/v is
positive, 90% of all offers were accepted. If (v -
[bar.v.bar])/v>0.1, even 96% of all offers were accepted. The average
rejected margin was (v - [p.sub.1])/v = 0.115. Note that this margin is
larger than the one in period t = 2, so there is more demand withholding
in period 1. These are cases of irrational (or boundedly rational)
demand withholding.
Result 2: Buyers' behavior is to a large extent consistent
with the prediction. Buyers usually accepted profitable offers in period
t = 2, whereas, in period t = 1, they accepted only if the offer gave
them a more than positive profit margin. Both in period t = 1 and t = 2,
there is some irrational (or boundedly rational) demand withholding,
that is, buyers sometimes reject margins higher than those predicted.
Now consider seller behavior. We report deviations from the
(conditional) predictions rather than absolute values because the
optimal prices [p.sub.2] depend on the realization of [p.sub.1], and
[p.sub.1] is often different from the predictions
[p.sub.1]([[zeta].bar]) = 90 and [p.sub.1]([bar.[zeta]]) = 97.
Accordingly, we refer to [p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]) rather than
[p.sub.2]([[zeta].bar]) and [p.sub.2]([bar.[zeta]]), and we define
[DELTA][p.sub.1]([zeta]) = [p.sub.1] - [p.sub.1]([zeta]),
[DELTA][p.sub.2] = [p.sub.2] - [p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]). Note that
[DELTA][p.sub.2] does only depend on [p.sub.1] but not on the
realization of [zeta]. We find that [DELTA][p.sub.1]([[zeta].bar]) =
-4.73, [DELTA][p.sub.1]([bar.[zeta]]) = -6.46, and [DELTA][p.sub.2] =
+0.89. (17) We find that both [DELTA][p.sub.1]([zeta]) are significantly
different from zero (two-sided Wilcoxon, p = 0.006), and
[DELTA][p.sub.2] is not. In absolute terms, the average prices charged
are [p.sub.1]([[zeta].bar]) = 84 and [p.sub.1]([bar.[zeta]]) = 91.
Given that buyers charged prices in period t = 1 partly far away
from the prediction, it is more difficult to analyze period t = 2
pricing behavior. If we interpret the [p.sub.1] [not member of] {90, 97}
as decision errors, and if we assume that both buyers and sellers behave
fully rationally in the continuation game, then the appropriate period t
= 2 price is [p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]) as in equation (13). As mentioned, we
report the difference between actual prices in t = 2 and this
prediction: [DELTA][p.sub.2] = [p.sub.2] - [p.sub.2]([p.sub.1]). Now,
[DELTA][p.sub.2] = 0.89 is surprisingly small, what we interpret as
support of the rationality hypothesis when the situation is simple (in t
= 2, sellers do not have to anticipate own future choices any longer).
But there is much variability in individual decisions. Regrading group
averages, Figure 2 shows that all except one group have a rather small
[DELTA][p.sub.2], whereas the [DELTA][p.sub.1] observations are more
dispersed and clearly negative. We do not distinguish between the two
[zeta] values because the picture is roughly the same. The fact that
[DELTA][p.sub.2] average is slightly positive does not mean that pricing
behavior in period t = 2 changes qualitatively from that in period t =
1. Sellers start with a lower price, reducing it by the proportion
predicted. Hence, whatever accounts for the lower prices in period t =
1, this behavior carries over to period t = 2.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Result 3: Sellers charge prices lower than predicted, both in
period t = 1 and period t = 2. The reduction of period t = 2 prices is
consistent with (conditional) rationality.
To conclude the analysis of seller behavior, the only significant
deviation from the prediction are the lower period t = 1 prices. This is
a robust finding in that it is very similar for both discount rates
[[zeta].bar] and [bar.[zeta]]. One explanation might lie in the specific
design of the experiment. Instead of a continuous demand function, we
have assumed a single buyer whose value is private information. The
density of the value plays the role of the continuous demand function.
Theoretically, this does not matter much for the outcome, but it may
matter behaviorally because in such bilateral encounters fairness
concerns may become stronger, and this could account for low
first-period prices (which would imply more balanced distributions of
surplus from trade). Alternatively, risk considerations (an attitude of
sellers to ensure trade) may explain the result. We did not control for
fairness concerns nor for risk aversion of sellers. Because the
buyer's valuation is private knowledge, sellers only know the
expected buyer profit. Though it is possible for buyers to make
interpersonal profit comparisons, it is quite difficult to do so, and
regarding profits made in the second period, there is uncertainty about
the discount factor. Therefore, compared to pure bargaining experiments,
it seems less likely that fairness matters, suggesting that the lower
period t = 1 prices rather reflect the risk attitude of sellers.
We finally analyze the impact of the distribution of the discount
factors. It is a central feature of our model that the discount factor
of the seller, as compared to the buyer's, determines whether the
seller suffers from intrapersonal competition or gains by price
discrimination. In this sense, a higher discount factor implies higher
"power," affecting both acceptance rates and profits. We
already reported the impact of discount factors separately for buyers
and sellers. Here, we compare acceptance rates and profits for all
([zeta], [delta]) seller-buyer combinations.
We start with the percentage of accepted offers. Let [a.sub.t]
([zeta], [delta]) denote the rate of acceptance for some ([zeta],
[delta]) seller-buyer combination in period t (see Appendix A for the
data of the matching groups). Theory predicts that sellers with a high
discount factor charge higher prices both in period t = 1 and period t =
2, and that buyers with a high discount factor reject profitable
purchases in period t = 1 more often. This immediately implies that in
period t = 1, [a.sub.1] ([bar.[zeta]], [bar.[delta]]) should have the
smallest and [a.sub.1] ([[zeta].bar], [[delta].bar]) the highest
acceptance rate, whereas [a.sub.1] ([[zeta].bar], [bar.[delta]]) and
[a.sub.1] ([bar.[zeta]],[[delta].bar]) should be intermediate. Deducing
acceptances rates from Table 1, the prediction is [a.sub.1]
([[zeta].bar], [bar.[delta]]) < [a.sub.1] ([bar.[zeta]],
[[delta].bar]). This turns out to hold in our data (see Table 3). The
acceptance rates for the four combinations are [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION
NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with corresponding significance level of the
one-sided Wilcoxon tests above the inequality signs. Intuitively, the
acceptance rates in period t = 2 must exhibit the opposite inequality
signs: If there are fewer acceptances in period t = 1 more buyers are
left to accept in period t = 2. In accordance with this intuition, one
can deduce [a.sub.2]([bar.[zeta]], [bar.[delta]]) > [a.sub.2]
([[zeta].bar], [bar.[delta]]) > [a.sub.2] ([bar.[zeta]],
[[delta].bar]) > [a.sub.2] ([[zeta].bar], [[delta].bar]) from Table
1. We find that [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as
predicted and significantly so (one-sided Wilcoxon test), but neither
[a.sub.2]([bar.[zeta]], [bar.[delta]]) > [a.sub.2]([[zeta].bar],
[bar.[delta]]) (as predicted) nor [a.sub.2]([[zeta].bar], [[delta].bar])
> [a.sub.2]([bar.[zeta]], [[delta].bar]) (not predicted) were
significant.
Now consider profits (see Appendix A for the group data).
Predictions are simple. Given the discount factor of the other player, a
high own discount factor implies a higher profit. Given the own discount
factor, a high discount factor of the other player implies a lower
profit. It turns out that this holds in the experimental data for all
possible ([zeta], [delta]) combinations (see Table 4). That is, though
high and low discount factor types can actually realize the same profit
in period t = 1, high discount factor types make larger profits because
of the trade shifted to period t = 2. Let [u.sub.S]([zeta], [delta]) and
[u.sub.B]([zeta], [delta]) indicate the average profits made in a
([zeta], [delta]) seller-buyer encounter. The average [u.sub.S]([zeta],
[delta]) was roughly 19, and the average [u.sub.B]([zeta], [delta]) was
about 21. The following inequalities are significant (with the
corresponding significance level of the one-sided Wilcoxon tests above
the inequality signs). We find that [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT
REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], and [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII] for the seller, and [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII] and [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] for the
buyer. Further, we find [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN
ASCII] and [MATHEMATICAL EXPRESSION NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] because
of the high rejection rates a ([bar.[zeta]], [bar.[delta]]) combination
implies.
Result 4: In line with the prediction, high discount factors of
either the seller or the buyer reduce the probability of a successful
trade in period t = 1. Participants realize higher average earnings if
their opponent has a low discount factor.
VI. CONCLUSION
The literature substantiating the intuition of Coase's (1972)
durable-goods monopolist has inspired much theory but only few
experiments. In this article, we have extended both lines of research.
We solve, for the first time, the simplest case where discount factors
are private information. Second, by conducting a laboratory experiment,
we provide a test of the theory.
Participants behaved rather reasonably to qualitative
predictions--possibly because we provided enough opportunity for
learning. There are few unprofitable purchases, and there are generally
lower prices in the second period, as predicted. Furthermore,
participants reacted adequately to changes in discount factors
(within-subject comparisons), and, as buyers, maintained higher
acceptance thresholds in the first than in the second period. Ceteris
paribus, a higher discount factor of at least one player shifts more
trade to the second period. Whenever the situation becomes rather
simple, as for instance in the second period, conditional rationality
can account for most of the decision data.
It has already been indicated in the introduction that we view
durable-goods monopolies as very intriguing. They challenge the
conventional wisdom that several competitors are needed to induce
competitive outcomes; they are also philosophically challenging by
claiming intrapersonal decision conflict. After all, it is due to
rational anticipation of own future behavior that the durable-goods
monopolist may earn so much less than a usual monopolist. It seems
remarkable that such insights seem to have been well understood by the
participants.
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS
The summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table A-1
at the matching group level. Notation is as in the main part of the
article except the new notation [a.sub.1] ([zeta], [[delta].bar]) and
[a.sub.1] ([zeta], [bar.[delta]]), which distinguishes acceptance rates
of buyers with low and high discount factors. The complete data set with
all individual decisions from the experiment, that is, all 1,440
negotiations, is available online at www.
wiwi.hu-berlin.de/~skroeger/dgm/.
APPENDIX B: INSTRUCTIONS
The experiment was conducted in German language, and the original
experimental instructions were also in German (available on request).
This is a slightly shortened translated version of the instructions.
Participants read the paper instructions before the computerized
experiment started. In the beginning of the instructions, subjects were
informed that the instructions are the same for every participant, that
they receive an initial endowment of DM 5, that wins and losses from all
periods would be added, that the exchange rate from ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit) to DM: 30 ECU = DM 1, that communication was not allowed
and questions would be answered privately, and that all decisions will
be treated anonymously. Then the main instructions started.
Two parties, a seller S and a buyer B, negotiate in each period
about the sale of a product. The buyer's product value v is 50 [is
less than or equal to] v [is less than or equal to] 150 (all in ECU).
The valuation is the payoff a buyer receives if be purchases the
product. In each period, there will be a new v drawn from this interval,
with all values being equally likely. The seller has production costs of
50 if he sells the good.
Whether you act as S or B is determined randomly at the beginning
of the experiment. You will keep your role for the whole experiment. You
will interact in total over 40 periods. Your bargaining partner will be
randomly determined every time at the beginning of each period.
Trade takes place according to the following rules:
1. S decides about the price [p.sub.1] with 0 [is less than or
equal to] [p.sub.1] [is less than or equal to] 200 within a first sales
opportunity.
2. B decides whether to buy and pay [p.sub.1] or not.
a. If B purchases the product, S receives [p.sub.1] 50. B receives
v and pays [p.sub.1], that is, his profit is v - [p.sub.1]. The period
is over.
b. If B does not purchase, there will be a second sales
opportunity. In this case, S decides about a second price [p.sub.2] with
0 [is less than or equal to] [p.sub.2] [is less than or equal to] 200. B
decides whether to buy and pay [p.sub.2] or not to buy at all.
i. If B purchases the product, S receives a discounted profit
[zeta]([p.sub.2] - 50). B receives v and pays [p.sub.2], that is, his
discounted profit is [delta](v - [p.sub.2]). (The discount factors
[zeta] and [delta] of the seller and the buyer, respectively, specify
with which factor the profit from the second sales opportunity is
multiplied.)
ii. If B does not purchase (i.e., does not to buy at all), both
parties receive zero profits. The period is over.
[At this point, the decision process is also graphically
illustrated]
There are only two values possible for both discount rates [zeta]
and [delta], namely, 0.3 and 0.7. Possible ([zeta], [delta])
constellations are therefore (0.3, 0.3), (0.3, 0.7), (0.7, 0.3), and
(0.7, 0.7). The likelihood for both discount factors values is the same,
and the values are randomly determined at the beginning of each period
independently for seller and buyer. All four constellations have the
same probability. Only S knows which of the two values [zeta] has been
selected. Correspondingly, only B knows his realized [delta] value.
At the beginning of each period, you are, according to your role,
informed about:
* As seller S: Your discount rate [zeta].
* As buyer B: Your discount rate [delta] and your valuation for the
product v.
At the end of each period, you will be informed about your profit
in each period and your total payoffs.
Thank you for participating!
TABLE 1
Experimental Parameters
v [member of] [0 ,1]
[bar.[zeta]] [[zeta].bar]
[p.sub.1] ([zeta]) 0.47 0.40
[p.sub.1] ([zeta]) 0.33 0.28
[v.bar] ([zeta]) 0.53 0.45
[bar.v] ([zeta]) 0.79 0.67
v [member of] [50, 150]
[bar.[zeta]] [[zeta].bar]
[p.sub.1] ([zeta]) 97 90
[p.sub.1] ([zeta]) 83 78
[v.bar] ([zeta]) 103 95
[bar.v] ([zeta]) 129 117
TABLE 2
Buyers' Accept/Reject Decisions
Period t = 1
[p.sub.1]
[less than or [bar.v.bar]
v < equal to] [less than or
[p.sub.1] v < [bar.v.bar] equal to] v All
Rejected 507 174 69 750
Accepted 4 32 654 690
All 511 206 723 1440
Period t = 2
[p.sub.2]
[less than or
v < [p.sub.2] equal to] v All
Rejected 335 68 403
Accepted 2 345 347
All 337 413 750
TABLE 3
Shares (%) of Accepted Offers for All
Discount Rate Combinations
Buyer
[[delta].bar] [bar.[delta]]
= 0.3 = 0.7
t = 1
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 60.4 41.7
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 49.8 31.9
t = 2
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 43.6 54.7
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 36.1 54.6
TABLE 4
Seller and Buyer Profits for All Discount
Rate Combinations
Buyer
[[delta].bar] = 0.3
All observations
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 [u.sub.s]:20 [u.sub.B]:22
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 [u.sub.s]:22 [u.sub.B]:19
Observations where a sale was made
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 [u.sub.S]:26 [u.sub.B]:29
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 [u.sub.S]:32 [u.sub.B]:28
Buyer
[bar.[delta]] = 0.7
All observations
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 [u.sub.S]:15 [u.sub.B]:24
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 [u.sub.S]:17 [u.sub.B]:20
Observations where a sale was made
Seller [[zeta].bar] = 0.3 [u.sub.S]:20 [u.sub.B]:33
[bar.[zeta]] = 0.7 [u.sub.S]:25 [u.sub.B]:29
TABLE A-1
Summary Statistics
[a.sub.1] [a.sub.1]
([zeta], ([zeta],
Group [p.sub.1] [p.sub.2] [[delta].bar]) [bar.[delta]])
1 83.87 75.46 0.85 0.62
2 84.54 77.13 0.89 0.66
3 90.73 83.15 0.88 0.70
4 100.73 85.49 0.87 0.46
5 87.53 81.27 0.81 0.48
6 83.71 74.98 0.81 0.69
7 91.08 80.12 0.79 0.70
8 87.91 97.87 0.93 0.56
9 88.56 77.35 0.81 0.50
10 83.58 76.67 0.84 0.52
11 85.12 73.32 0.82 0.48
12 80.27 73.16 0.74 0.69
A11 87.30 79.79 0.84 0.59
[u.sub.S] [U.sub.B] [DELTA] [DELTA]
([zeta], ([zeta], [p.sub.1] [p.sub.2]
Group [delta]) [delta]) ([zeta]) ([p.sub.1])
1 20.22 26.29 -9.52 -1.91
2 19.12 22.57 -8.84 -0.29
3 20.94 17.77 -2.65 1.87
4 19.19 14.71 7.34 -3.08
5 17.89 20.97 -5.86 1.43
6 17.06 21.23 -9.68 -0.93
7 22.89 20.13 -2.31 -1.12
8 18.98 21.70 -5.48 18.72
9 18.70 19.85 -4.83 -0.86
10 19.81 24.20 -9.81 0.84
11 16.74 22.59 -8.27 -4.21
12 15.41 22.78 -13.12 0.26
A11 18.91 21.23 -6.08 0.79
(1.) See Plato (1941) and Frank (1996) for a modern analysis.
(2.) For Homer's Ulysses, who binds himself to the ship's
mast, there is a way out of the dilemma. But usually such escape does
not exist.
(3.) A similar intrapersonal decision conflict arises in vertically
related markets. An upstream monopoly selling to multiple downstream
firms may significantly lose its market power (for experimental
evidence, see Martin et al. 2001).
(4.) There is the substantial myopia or short-terminism literature.
Takeover threats, career concerns, and risk considerations can induce
managers not to maximize the discounted value of the firm but to choose
projects with a high return early. Such factors are likely to differ
across managers. Thus, managers ultimately operate with different
discount factors. See, for example, Stein (1989) or Palley (1997) for
more references.
(5.) Only the assumption [delta] < 1 is actually necessary for
deriving a well-defined solution play. The boundary case [delta] = 1 can
only be analyzed via [delta] [??] 1 (see Guth and Ritzberger 1998). Note
that [delta] = 1 renders buying in period t = 1 or t = 2 as homogeneous trades in view of the buyer. The fact that [delta] = 1 cannot be solved
directly provides an example that price competition for homogeneous
products should be solved as the limiting case of such competition for
heterogeneous products when heterogeneity vanishes.
(6.) The general case of finitely many sales periods can be solved
via backward induction, and the infinite horizon via approximation by
letting the number of sales periods approach [infinity] (see Guth and
Ritzberger 1998).
(7.) Resulting from maximizing p(1 - p) where p is the unique sales
price and 1 - p the probability by which the seller expects his price p
to be accepted due to 1 - p = [[integral].sup.1.sub.p] dv.
(8.) Except for highly special games, for example, when all players
have unique undominated strategies, game-theoretic analysis requires
commonly known rules of the game.
(9.) A pooling equilibrium, based on the ex ante expected
impatience parameter [zeta] = (1 - w)[[zeta].bar] + w[bar.[zeta]], would
not satisfy sequential rationality because both seller types would like
to deviate from the common price [p.sub.1]([zeta]) as shown by our
derivation.
(10.) For the more patient seller, it does not pay to mimic the
price [p.sub.1] ([[zeta].bar]) because the additional revenue in period
t = 1 is overcompensated by the [bar.[zeta]]-weighted revenue loss in
period t = 2. For [zeta] - [[zeta].bar], the opposite is true. Note that
the period t = 2 solution price [p.sub.2] is optimal regardless of the
discount rate of the monopolist.
(11.) Participants were not informed that they were randomly
matched in a group of six only, which should have further discouraged repeated-game effects.
(12.) In the durable-goods experiment by Reynolds (2000), subjects
interacted in 12 durable-goods markets.
(13.) In two cases, buyers accepted a higher price than their
valuation in period t = 2. The average loss, -2.5, was quite small,
suggesting the possibility that a preference for efficiency might
explain these loss-making decisions; in particular, as they occurred in
later rounds (16, 38). By contrast, three of the four eases in which
buyers accepted a price higher than their valuation in first period
occurred early (rounds 1, 1, and 7). Here, the average loss was -27.
Rather than efficiency-seeking behavior, these cases can be seen as
mistakes.
(14.) This seller followed a pricing policy of [p.sub.1] = 75 and
[p.sub.2] = 200 in many rounds. With an expected value of v of 100, this
splits the expected surplus of 50 evenly in period t = 1. If this price
is not accepted, this seller refused to transact at all by offering a
price above the buyer's value ([p.sub.2] = 200 > 150 [greater
than or equal to] v). As a referee pointed out, this seller might have
tried to build up a reputation despite the random matching scheme (which
he or she may have misunderstood).
(15.) Four sellers followed this pricing policy four or more times,
explaining 27 out of 33 observations.
(16.) This suggests that inequity aversion (Bolton 1991) loses
influence in situations where at least some individual payments are
private information or difficult to guess.
(17.) The reported numbers are group averages. Individual averages
have the same means for [DELTA][p.sub.1]. As the number of trades that
continue in period t = 2 differs within groups, for individual
observations the mean also slightly differs: [DELTA][p.sub.2] = +0.79.
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WERNER GUTH, SABINE KROGER, AND HANS-THEO NORMANN *
* This article is part of the EU-TMR Research Network ENDEAR (FMRX-CT98-0238). Financial support from the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, through Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Humboldt
Universitat zu Berlin, and Max-Planck-Institute for Research into
Economic Systems is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Tim Grebe for
helping us running the experiments. We gratefully acknowledge the
constructive comments of a referee, Margrethe Aanesen, Pio Baake, and
Jan Potters.
Guth: Director, Max-Planck Institute for Research into Economic
Systems, Kahlaische Strasse, 07745 Jena, Germany. Phone: +49 3641
686-62, E-mail gueth@mpiew-jena.mpg.de
Kroger: PhD candidate, CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Phone: +31 13 4663066, E-mail:
S.Kroger@uvt.nl.
Normann: Professor, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway,
University of London, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, United Kingdom. Phone:
+44 1784 439534, E-mail hans.uormann@rhul.ac.uk