Logrolling in the U.S. Congress.
Stratmann, Thomas ; Garrett, Daniel M.
I. INTRODUCTION
A long-standing question in political science is whether exchange
occurs in legislatures, as it is expected in any economy where the
intensity of demand varies. The issue was originally raised by Buchanan
and Tullock [1962] and expanded by Coleman [1966] and Mueller [1967].
The subsequent literature has produced numerous models of vote trading
(Haefele [1971], Riker and Brams [1973], Koford [1982a]). Much of the
work suggests that vote trading leads to chaotic results (see, for
example, Riker and Brams [1973], Kramer [1977], and McKelvey [1976]).
Currently, vote trading's quantitative importance and optimality
are unknown.
References to logrolling go back to the early literature in political
science. Bentley [1907] refers to it, and since then scholars such as
Mayhew [1966] and Ferejohn [1974] have provided primarily anecdotal
evidence for logrolling. The economic analysis of logrolling has mostly
been theoretical and little work has been done to assess the qualitative
and quantitative importance of vote trading in legislatures. However,
much might be learned from such analysis, given the apparent puzzle that
for most roll-calls votes on parts of bills only a minority of districts
stand to gain. Yet such proposals get passed.
Until recently vote trading has not been identified empirically.
Stratmann [1992] is the only paper that identifies vote trades
statistically, and it looks only at vote trades among agricultural
interests. However, it would be interesting to know whether logrolling
is prevalent in circumstances other than farm commodity programs. We
need to identify logrolling coalitions to assess how widespread
logrolling agreements are: we expect them to be common if the intensity
of demand for legislation varies.
Related to the issue of vote trading is the question of what factors
determine congressional voting behavior. Major elements in a
legislator's voting decision are constituency interests, ideology,
party, and (perhaps) vote trading. One segment of the literature on
congressional voting has focused on the role of political parties as an
important force determining a legislator's voting decision. Some
authors have argued that parties provide an organizational framework
within which logrolling will happen (see, for example, Fiorina [1974],
Koford [1987], Weingast and Marshall [1988], Johnson and Stratmann
[1992]). Alternatively, Lindsay and Maloney [1988] suggest that party
discipline forces a legislator to vote for or against a piece of
legislation. The latter view implies that on some issues party
affiliation forces the legislator to vote against constituency
interests.(1)
Whether party affiliation is a signal to constituencies of one's
overall propensity to vote on bills, or a means to build coalitions, or
whether both elements are important is an unresolved question. Voting
along party lines can be due to party loyalty or party pressure,
promoting the interests of one's constituency, or logrolling within
the party. To answer questions about voting along party lines and about
vote trading and coalitions within a quantitative framework, one has to
distinguish empirically between party loyalty and logrolling coalitions
that are organized within a party. Empirical studies have typically
included a party dummy variable in regression equations. However, if
logrolling coalitions are organized within a party, such a dummy
variable will measure both potential party loyalty or potential party
discipline and membership in a logrolling coalition. This paper uses a
different approach to separate the logrolling variable from the party
loyalty variable, and so distinguishes between voting for a proposal
because of membership in a log-rolling coalition organized by a party,
and because of potential party discipline.
This paper analyzes a broad range of votes where logrolling has been
reported. The analysis spans two Congresses (1959 to 1962) and examines
trades between interests favoring subsidies for city interests, labor
interests, and farm interests. These roll-call votes were analyzed by
Mayhew [1966] in his classic study of congressional behavior.
The first section presents the conceptual model underlying the
empirical analysis. The second section discusses the role of parties in
logrolling. The empirical model is presented in the third section, the
data are discussed in the fourth section, and results are presented in
the fifth section. The last section contains conclusions.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Legislators trade votes because intensities in preferences over
proposals differ and because proposals would not pass if every
legislator voted sincerely. In vote trading representative A will vote
in favor of a bill that she is mildly opposed to but that is strongly
favored by legislator B. In exchange, legislator B will support a bill
that he is mildly opposed to but that is strongly favored by A. Suppose
a third legislator is opposed to both proposals. In this case neither
proposal would pass in the absence of the vote-trading agreement but
both will pass if an agreement is made.(2)
Since Downs [1957] economists have modeled legislators as
representing their constituency. Constituency variables are expected to
predict and to explain the voting decisions of representatives. For
example, legislators from farm districts are predicted to vote for farm
subsidies. It is also in the constituency's interest that their
representative trades votes on some proposals that the constituency is
mildly opposed to, in exchange for votes on proposals the constituency
is intensely in favor of. For example, voters from a textile district
may prefer that their representative casts a vote in favor of steel
interests if this ensures that sufficient votes are cast for a tariff on
textiles.(3)
If logrolling is important, one expects logrolling agreements to add
to the explanation of the voting decision. One implication is that for
members of a logrolling coalition, a vote on one issue can explain the
vote on another issue. Thus the voting decision of a legislator can be
expressed as
(1) V=[[alpha].sub.1]+[[gamma].sub.1]W+[[delta].sub.1]S+
[[beta].sub.1][X.sub.v]+[[epsilon].sub.1]
where [X.sub.v] is a vector of constituency variables that influence
the vote on issue V, W and S are votes on other issues, and
[[epsilon].sub.1] is a random normally distributed error term with zero
mean and constant variance. For example, for an agreement between
interests for tariffs on textiles, on steel, and on sugar, V would
represent the vote on textiles, W a vote on steel, and S a vote on
sugar. Positive coefficients are predicted on W and S.
Differences in intensities of demand lead legislators to trade votes.
Demand among legislators varies because their constituents'
interests vary. To ensure that the estimated coefficients on the
right-hand-side votes reflect only logrolling and not other factors that
affect voting, W and S should not be the actual votes but the predicted
votes. Thus equation (1) can be rewritten as
(2) [Mathematical Expression Omitted]
where W and S are linear combinations of observed constituency
variables. A finding that [[gamma].sub.1] and [[delta].sub.1] are
positive and statistically different from zero is consistent with
logrolling. If the actual votes instead of the predicted votes were
employed in the regression equation, an omitted constituency
characteristic that drives the votes on V, W, and S could lead to the
erroneous conclusion that a vote trade occurred. The use of the
predicted votes ensures that vote trades are correctly identified.
Because the predicted votes are linear combinations of observed
constituency variables,(4) equations similar to equation (2) can be
written for the votes on sugar and on textiles:
(3) [Mathematical Expression Omitted]
(4) [Mathematical Expression Omitted]
The constituency variables [X.sub.w] and [X.sub.s] are variables
affecting the voting decision on W and S. Any omitted variables, such as
unobserved personal ideology, unobserved constituency interests,
logrolling agreements not captured by the right-hand-side variables, or
unmeasured party discipline, that affect all three votes will be
measured through the correlation between the error terms.
Bernholz [1973] has shown that legislative logrolling implies the
potential for cycles. Cycles may occur if vote-trading coalitions are
not stable because legislators have an incentive to renege on vote-trading agreements. No incentive exists to keep up the bargain once
their issue is voted on (see, for example, Mueller [1967], Riker and
Brams [19731). If logrolling coalitions are unstable, one would expect
to find, for example, that steel interests vote for textile interests
but that textile interests do not vote for steel interests. Instability
in legislatures may be a valid concern if an issue only comes up once,
but may not be relevant if issues are voted on repeatedly, as is the
case for the issues analyzed in this paper. Legislative vote trading
more closely resembles a prisoner's dilemma supergame, with
repeated dealing, than a game played only once, because issues are voted
on repeatedly (Mueller [1989, 931).(5)
A successful logroll implies an intense minority in favor of the deal
facing a relatively indifferent hostile majority. And we should see a
rather small majority in favor of the bills. The intense minority has no
incentive to buy more votes than required since only a majority of votes
is needed to pass a bill and vote trading is costly. If bills are passed
with unanimous support, vote trading is unlikely to have been the
motivating force in the passage of the bill. These concepts are used to
identify logrolls.
Legislators buy votes to ensure that a bill will win or lose. They
are not likely to be interested in trades unless they expect these
trades to lead to the desired outcome on the floor. Koford [1982b]
suggests logrolling may have occurred on votes where the intense
minority has won and the vote margin has been close. In the empirical
analysis, votes with a winning margin of less than about one hundred
votes are considered close.
Issues involving logrolling promise high benefits to a minority and
impose low costs on others and vice versa. The votes analyzed here have
this feature. These votes are on housing subsidies, farm subsidies, and
issues of interests to labor. Mayhew's [1966] analysis of these
votes shows that only a minority of all districts benefited from these
programs.
III. THE ROLE OF PARTY
Within the Downsian framework candidates' platforms converge at
the preferences of the median voter. If representatives deviate from the
preferences of their constituency because of party pressure to vote
along party lines, they risk defeat in the following general
election.(6) However, the convergence of platforms at the median ensures
that party affiliation does not matter. This brings into question the
purpose parties serve to constituencies and legislators. Peltzman [1984]
finds that the characteristics of each party's constituencies are
different. Alternatively, Johnson and Stratmann 11992] argue that
parties facilitate logrolling agreements among representatives from
similar constituencies.
Mayhew [1966] gives plenty of examples where members of Congress
voted on proposals along party lines even though the benefits of the
proposals accrued to only a minority of one party. He suggests that
between 1948 and 1962 the Democratic party was instrumental in
organizing vote-trading coalitions among its members. Mayhew reports
that a minority of all legislators were interested in farm issues, labor
issues, and city issues. If each legislator voted according to her true
preferences, a vote for subsidies for each special interest would have
failed. However, most of the farm, labor, and city districts were
represented by Democrats, and Mayhew claims the Democratic party was
instrumental in organizing a vote-trading coalition between these
interests that ensured benefits for the noted special interests. Others
have also argued that the Democratic party was an important force in
organizing logrolling coalitions in that time period (see, for example,
Froman [1967], Jackson [1974]).
It is easier for the majority party to organize successful vote
trades within the party; even if members of the minority party traded
votes among themselves, this would not assure the passage of the
proposals (Johnson and Stratmann [1992]). The Democrats were the
majority party in the House of Representatives during the 1950s and
1960s, and anecdotes exist about logrolling within the Democratic party
for the issues and the time periods analyzed in this paper. If these
trades were organized primarily between members of the Democratic party,
then we expect primarily Democratic representatives to have switched
their vote due to membership in a logrolling coalition and that
Democrats were the primary beneficiaries of bills that required vote
trades for their passage.
Previous studies have included a dummy variable for party affiliation
in regression equations and also have included an ideological rating by
interest groups as, for example, Americans for Democratic Action.
However, there is little theoretical justification for the inclusion of
these variables. The Downsian model predicts that legislators act
according to the interests of their constituency and that platforms of
parties converge at the preferences of the median voter. Thus personal
ideology and party affiliation should not matter. However, studies have
found statistically significant effects of these variables on
congressional voting (see, for example, Kau, Keenan, and Rubin [1982]).
It is unclear what the party dummy variable and ideological rating
measure. Existence of vote-trading coalitions can explain that
statistically significant effects are found on the aforementioned variables. Suppose parties organize logrolling coalitions, and
logrolling occurs primarily within the Democratic party, as has been
suggested for the 1950s and 1960s. In this case, a dummy variable for
Democrats is a variable measuring membership in logrolling coalitions.
Similar reasoning holds for ideological ratings since these ratings are
based on voting records. This suggests that the position that rating
variables measure logrolling agreements is at least as convincing as
arguing that rating variables reflect ideology. For example, a liberal
group favoring subsidies to lower income groups would rate a southern
farm representative high on the liberal scale, if this representative is
in a logrolling coalition with legislators favoring subsidies for public
housing and legislators favoring increases in the minimum wage. The
reason the legislator is ranked highly is not because of his or her
personal ideology or district interests but simply because of membership
in a logrolling coalition.
These considerations may be of secondary importance for studies that
are not focusing on logrolling and the role of parties in forming
logrolling coalitions. For example, in studies that analyze the effects
of campaign contributions on congressional voting, ideological ratings
may be useful as a proxy for logrolling coalitions. The goal of this
study is, however, to identify logrolling among certain interests within
a party; therefore a party dummy variable is not useful to analyze
logrolling between specific interests within one party. A party dummy
variable would simply confound the analysis of what kind of special
interest is trading with another special interest.
Thus ideology and party discipline may be important in a
legislator's voting decision, but inclusion of a party dummy
variable or an ideological rating in the regression equation is
problematic. Therefore, ideology and party discipline are accounted for
here via a correlation of the error terms in the system of regression
equations. If party discipline and unobserved ideology are important in
roll-call votes and work in the same direction, one expects a positive
correlation between the error terms.
This paper analyzes some of those votes where logrolling has been
reported within a rigorous statistical framework. It provides a
quantitative analysis as to whether a vote-trading agreement existed and
whether membership in a logrolling coalition motivated Democrats to vote
for special interests or whether party discipline and other factors were
the motivating forces. If it is found that the logrolling coefficients
are all zero, then it would seem that it was not logrolling that
motivated congressmen to vote along party lines. Highly and positively
correlated errors indicate that the same unobserved variables motivated
the voting decisions of Democrats and Republicans.
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
Since logrolling occurs over a series of votes, a simultaneous
three-equation probit model is specified. The model allows for a
correlation of the error terms and endogenizes the latent variables. It
draws on techniques suggested by Ashford and Sowden [1970], Amemiya
[1974], and Mallar [1977]. The model is estimated by full information
maximum likelihood.
Let [Y*.sub.1i], [Y*.sub.2i], and [Y*.sub.3i] be dichotomous variables indicating the voting decision of a legislator i on three
different votes, and let [chi.sub.1i], [chi.sub.2i], and [chi.sub.3i] be
vectors of observations on his or her constituency characteristics. A
three-equation model that allows for the simultaneous determination of
the voting decisions can be written as [Y*.sub.1i] =
[Y.sub.12][Y*.sub.2i] + [Y.sub.13][Y*.sub.3i] +
[[beta.sub.1][[chi].sub.1i] + [[epsilon].sub.1i] [Y*.sub.2i] =
[Y.sub.21][Y*.sub.1i] + [Y.sub.23][Y*.sub.3i] +
[[beta.sub.2][[chi].sub.2i] + [[epsilon].sub.2i] [Y*.sub.3i] =
[Y.sub.31][Y*.sub.1i] + [Y.sub.32][Y*.sub.2i] +
[[beta.sub.3][[chi].sub.3i] + [[epsilon].sub.3i]
(5) i = 1,...,n.
Since [Y.sub.1], [Y.sub.2], and [y.sub.3] are binary, we have
[Y.sub.ji] = 1 if [Y*.sub.ji]>0
[Y.sub.ji] = 0 if [Y*.sub.ji] [greater than or equal to] 0
(6) j = 1,...,3
where [Y*.sub.ji] is the net benefit a legislator receives from
voting on a piece of legislation. The disturbances capture unobserved
variables that influence a legislator's voting decision. The errors
[[epsilon][sub.ji] are distributed N(0,1) with E([[epsilon]sub.1i],
[[epsilon]sub.2i]) = [rho.sub.13], E([[epsilon].sub.1i],
[[epsilon].sub.3i],) = [rho.sub.13], and E([[epsilon]sub.2i],
[[epsilon]sub.3i]) = [rho.sub.23]. As suggested by Mallar [1979] the
votes on the right-hand side of (5) are estimated by
(7) [Y.sub.ji] = [beta.sub.j] [chi..sub.ji] + [[upsilon]sub.ji] j =
1,...,3.
Therefore, the right-hand-side vote variables are the predicted
indices when only constituency variables are used to explain the voting
behavior. This specification is consistent with the model represented in
equations 2, 3, and 4. Each coefficient in the system of equations in
(5) is identified since some constituency variables in one vote equation
do not appear in any of the remaining vote equations.(7)
If I used the observed dichotomous vote variables on the right-hand
side of equation 5, I would have no confidence that the estimated
coefficients measured logrolling. Besides logrolling, these coefficients
would also measure other unobserved variables, for example ideology,
that make the legislator favor or oppose all three issues considered.
Since predicted vote indexes are used in the estimation process, this
study is not subject to the criticism Jackson and Kingdon [1992] levy
against studies that use ideological ratings in vote regressions. The
estimated coefficients in equation 5 unambiguously reflect logrolling if
legislators' personal ideologies are orthogonal to constituency
interest in the equations used to estimate the predicted votes. In
particular, if personal ideology for government spending (measured by an
ADA residual, for example) were correlated with the explanatory variables in the equations used to estimate the predicted votes, then
the logrolling coefficients could be interpreted to reflect, in part,
ideological voting. The finding that the logrolling coefficients are not
statistically significant when no vote trades are predicted (on lopsided bills and bills where the intense minority lost) enhances our confidence
that the estimated vote trading coefficients reflect logrolling and not
unobserved ideology (Stratmann [1992]).
V. DATA AND ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION
Mayhew [1966] reports the presence of logrolling coalitions between
urban, farm, labor, and western interests for the time period he
analyzed. This study focuses on vote trading between the first three
interests.(8)
Anecdotal evidence for the presence of a logrolling coalition comes
from a statement on the House floor by the city representative Alfred
Santangelo of Manhattan: "I say you Members from the farm states
whom we have supported time and time again that this policy of
government aid is a two-way street. We want you to support us to the
same extent we supported you" (Mayhew [1966, p. 81]). Mayhew
states, "the Democratic party in these years (1947-1962) was
transcendently a party of 'inclusive' compromise...Some
congressmen wanted...area redevelopment funds, others wanted housing
projects, still others wanted farm subsidies. As a result, the House
Democratic leadership could serve as an instrument for mobilizing support among all Democrats for the programs of Democrats with
particular interests. 'Indifferent' Democratic congressmen
frequently backed such programs 'even against the debatable best
interests of the people of their own communities'" (Mayhew, p.
150). Though Mayhew suggests that logrolling may have occurred,
Democrats voting with other Democrats may also have been due to party
pressure or party loyalty as indicated by the title of his book
"Party Loyalty among Congressmen." This study investigates the
extent to which vote-trading agreements, purged of party loyalty or
party pressure, helped the passage of bills providing subsidies for
special interests.
I analyze two sets of roll-call votes from the 86th Congress
(1959-1960) and two sets of roll-call votes from the 87th Congress
(1961-1962). Each set of votes contains three roll-call votes each. The
selection of the votes was guided by Mayhew's [1966] study in which
he suggested the presence of logrolling coalitions for the passage of
these votes.
The farm vote in the first set of votes selected for the 86th
Congress curtailed the wheat price support program. This amendment was
defeated 224 to 141. The city vote cut authorization for the Housing Act
of 1959. This amendment was defeated 234 to 189. In the second set of
votes, the farm vote implemented the tobacco price support program
(250-149). The city vote allocated funds for public housing and urban
renewal (241-177). For both sets of votes the labor vote chosen is a
vote to authorize loans and grants to depressed areas (202-184).
Two sets of roll-call votes from the first session of the 87th
Congress were analyzed. The farm vote utilized in both sets of votes is
a vote on an amendment calling for a reduction in the appropriations for
the Department of Agriculture. This amendment was defeated 196 to 184.
In the first set of votes the city vote is on the passage of the Housing
Act of 1961 (235178). The labor vote is on the House version of the Area
Redevelopment Act (251167). In the second set of votes the labor matter
is on the adoption of the conference report of the Area Redevelopment
Act (224-193), and the city vote is on the authorization of $4.88
billion in housing programs (229-176). The numbers of these votes
corresponding to the numbers in various issues of the Congressional
Quarterly Almanac are given in the data appendix. In the statistical
analysis the vote was coded to equal one if the vote benefited farm,
city, or labor interests. If a legislator paired for (against), the vote
was counted as a yes (no) vote.
Mayhew's explanatory variables are used to identify constituency
interests of members of Congress. Farm votes are explained by number of
farms in a congressional district (FARMER), agricultural income by state
(AGING), this variable squared (AGINC2), and a dummy variable for
members of Congress coming from one of the eleven old confederate states
(SOUTH). On the first two variables a positive sign is expected and a
negative sign is expected on agricultural income squared. Mayhew argues
that southern states had a strong interest in agricultural legislation.
Thus, a positive sign on SOUTH is predicted. City votes, the term used
to describe votes on housing subsidies, are explained by the percent of
homes that are rented in a congressional district (RENT), the degree of
urbanization (URBAN), and SOUTH. The predicted sign on the first two
variables is positive. Mayhew reports that southern Representatives
voted for farm interests but often voted against other subsidies for
special interests. Thus, I expect a negative sign on SOUTH in city
votes. Labor votes are explained by the percent of blue collar workers
in a congressional district (BLUEC), and the rate of unionization by
state (UNION), this variable squared (UNION2), and SOUTH. The expected
signs on BLUEC and UNION are positive. The expected signs on UNION2 and
SOUTH are negative. The coefficients on the variables measuring
logrolling, as specified in the econometric model in the previous
sections, are positive. Means and standard deviations of the explanatory
variables are presented in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations
Variable Mean Units of Measurement
(Std. Dev.)
FARMER 0.8408 Number of farms in 10,000
(0.9128)
AGINC 1.9447 1959 income in agriculture by
(1.8308) state in 100 dollars
AGINC2 7.1260 AGINC squared
(17.1270)
URBAN 3.2156 Percent urbanization/10
(3.3759)
RENT 3.8386 Percent of nonowner-occupied
(1.5534) housing/10
BLUEC 4.9376 Percent of blue collar workers/10
(0.9583)
UNION 3.0460 Percent of unionization by state/10
(1.0473)
UNION2 10.3726 UNION squared
(6.0475)
SOUTH 0.2414 South=1, Non-South=0
(0.4284)
The votes analyzed were cast predominantly according to party lines.
For most votes, about 80 percent of the Democrats opposed about 80
percent of the Republicans. The constituency data reflect the
differences in the makeup of the typical Democratic legislator's
constituency and that of the typical Republican legislator.(9) For
example, from the 120-districts with the greatest number of farms,
renters (public housing interests), and blue collar workers (labor
interests), for these three categories, 25, 20, and 33 districts were
represented by a Republican. Therefore, most of the districts that
benefited primarily from farm, city, and labor legislation were
represented by Democrats.(10)
VI. RESULTS
The results from the 86th Congress's votes are presented in
Table 2. In the farm, city, and labor votes the constituency variables
have the predicted signs and are statistically significant. Legislators
are more likely to vote for farm interests the larger the number of
farms in a congressional district. State income in agriculture has the
predicted positive effect and the effect is declining at the margin.(11)
Representatives are more likely to vote for housing subsidies the more
urbanized their constituency and the larger the share of renters in
their congressional district. Legislators with a higher percentage of
blue collar workers in their constituency and legislators who come from
a state with a higher degree of unionization are more likely to vote in
favor of labor interests. Southern representatives are more likely to
vote for farm subsidies but less likely to vote for housing subsidies
and legislation favoring labor interests.
TABLE 2
Votes in 1959-60
First Set
Simultaneous Equations Model
Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors
FARM CITY LABOR
INTERCEPT -1.3700 -1.4700 -4.7900
(0.2300) (0.2900) (0.7600)
FARMER 0.4300
(0.1000)
AGINC 0.5700
(0.1300)
AGINC2 -0.0530
(0.0130)
URBAN 0.0600
(0.0220)
RENT 0.3500
(0.0700)
BLUEC 0.6000
(0.1000)
UNION 1.3000
(0.4000)
UNION2 -0.2000
(0.0600)
SOUTH 2.2700 -1.5500 -2.1200
(0.2900) (0.4500) (0.5200)
FARM 1.4800 1.4400
(0.3600) (0.3600)
CITY 0.4500 0.8800
(0.1500) (0.2200)
LABOR 0.8700 1.1100
(0.2100) (0.2400)
LOGLIKE pFC pFL pCL
-457.02 0.9700 0.9600 0.9500
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.700)
All of the six logrolling coefficients have the predicted positive
signs and are statistically significant. The estimates indicate a stable
coalition where logrolling contracts are honored. The findings suggest
that farm, city, and labor representatives have formed a logrolling
coalition that helped the passage of the bills each group was interested
in.
Seventy-one legislators switched votes because of membership in the
logrolling coalition in the farm vote.(12) In the city vote 135
legislators and in the labor vote 58 legislators switched their vote
because of membership in the logrolling coalition. Labor interests and
city interests would have lost the votes in the absence of logrolling.
In each vote the number of Democrats who switched their vote due to a
logrolling agreement outweighed the number of Republicans. For example,
in the farm vote, sixty-one of the seventy-one legislators who switched
their vote were Democrats.
The estimated correlation coefficients between the error terms of the
farm and labor equations (r) is 0.95. The other two estimated
correlation coefficients are of similar magnitude. The high and positive
correlations among the unobserved variables indicate that the same
unobserved factors influenced the votes of the representatives. Among
these factors are unobserved constituency variables, ideology, omitted
logrolling variables, and party discipline. Measured logrolling
agreements have an important effect on a legislator's voting
decision regardless of the nature of the unobserved variables. The high
positive correlation can be interpreted to mean that party loyalty is a
large part of what accounts for the high correlations. However, the high
positive correlations are consistent with the view that party is a brand
name under which like-minded candidates and voters gather and that,
therefore, the high positive correlations reflect unobserved
constituency interests (Peltzman [1984]). Also, the positive
correlations may reflect that Democratic western congressmen were part
of the logrolling. They gained water projects in exchange for votes for
farm, city, and labor interests.
The estimated coefficients on the constituency variables for the
second set of votes in the 86th Congress are very similar to the
previous estimates. Here, only the estimated logrolling correlation
coefficients, and standard errors are reported (Table III). Again, the
logrolling coefficients are statistically significant. Here, a pattern
of symmetry is apparent between city interests and labor interests and
between farm and city interests. The coefficients of the labor vote in
the city equation and the city vote in the labor equation are the
largest. The estimated correlation coefficients are smaller than in the
previous sets of votes, but still positive and relatively large.
TABLE III
Votes in 1959-60
Second Set
Parameter Estimates, Covariances, and Asymptotic Standard Errors
Equation
Right-hand variable FARM CITY LABOR
Logrolling Parameter Estimates
FARM -- 0.5900 0.8500
(0.1900)
(0.2000)
CITY 0.5800 -- 1.0000
(0.1700)
(0.2800)
LABOR 0.5500 1.1400 --
(0.2400) (0.2500)
Covariances
FARM 1.0 -- --
CITY 0.7800 1.0 --
(0.0800)
LABOR 0.8100 0.9400 1.0
(0.0600) (0.1700)
Table IV reports the results for the first set of votes in 1961. The
results confirm the presence of a logrolling coalition. The labor vote
in the farm equation is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level and all other votes are statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. Relative to the estimates for the previous Congress, the
correlation coefficients are lower between the farm and city equations
(0.44 versus 0.97) and the farm and labor equations (0.38 versus 0.96).
The logrolling and correlation coefficients for the second set of votes
for the 87th Congress are very similar to the first set (Table V). In
this vote, membership in the logrolling, coalition turned a no vote into
a yes vote for 21 legislators in the farm vote, 146 legislators in the
city vote, and 79 legislators in the labor vote. As in the previous
votes, the majority of legislators who switched their votes were
Democrats.
TABLE IV
Votes in 1961-62
First Set
Simultaneous Equations Model
Parameter Estimates and Asymptotic Standard Errors
FARM CITY LABOR
INTERCEPT -1.8700 -1.3600 -3.4100
(0.2600) (0.2800) (0.8400)
FARMER 0.9100
(0.1100)
AGINC 0.6700
(0.1400)
AGINC2 -0.0690
(0.0130)
URBAN 0.0850
(0.0270)
RENT 0.3000
(0.0700)
BLUEC 0.5600
(0.1200)
UNION 6.2000
(2.9000)
UNION2 -1.100
(0.4700)
SOUTH 1.2900 0.0200 -0.8100
(0.2700) (0.2400) (0.2900)
FARM 0.3500 0.3400
(0.1400) (0.1400)
CITY 0.3600 0.8700
(0.1400) (0.2100)
LABOR 0.4700 1.3100
(0.2700) (0.3000)
LOGLIKE [rho]FC [rho]FL [rho]CL
-533.33 0.4400 0.3800 0.9400
(0.1000) (0.1000) (0.1600)
TABLE V
Votes in 1961
Second Set
Parameter Estimates, Covariances, and Asymptotic Standard Errors
Equation
Right-hand variable FARM CITY LABOR
Logrolling Parameter Estimates
FARM -- 0.3600 0.3800
(0.1500)
(0.1400)
CITY 0.3500 -- 0.8000
(0.1300)
(0.2000)
LABOR 0.5500 1.4400 --
(0.3000) (0.3000)
Covariances
FARM 1.0 1.0
CITY 0.5300
(0.1000)
LABOR 0.3700 0.9800 1.0
(0.1000) (0.1700)
To some extent the size of the correlation coefficients reflects how
many votes are needed to get a majority. The correlations capture
unobserved vote-trading agreements that, for example, western
legislators made with city, farm, and labor interests. The more trades
required, and the more trades consequently made, the larger the
estimated correlation coefficients. The cause of the relatively low
correlations between farm votes and other issues, for example, in Table
V may be that only few extra votes (21) were needed for a majority.
If logrolling coalitions were organized within the Democratic party,
one expects that representatives who have the propensity to naturally
switch from a no vote to a yes vote are more likely to switch when they
are Democrats. I define a legislator who is likely to switch as someone
whose probability to vote for the measure in the absence of logrolling
is between 0.3 and 0.49. Table VI shows the results of this test. The
first column shows the number of Democrats (Republicans) whose estimated
probability to vote for the measure in the absence of logrolling is
between 0.3 and 0.49. Column 2 shows that, with two exceptions, more
Democrats than Republicans are predicted to switch their votes as a
result of vote trades. Of those who actually switched their votes,
Democrats did always outnumber Republicans. Further, the number of
Democrats (Republicans) who actually voted for the measure is always
larger (smaller) than the predicted switchers. This is consistent with
the view that other underlying variables, that are either unobserved or
omitted from the empirical model, motivate members from the two parties
to vote differently.
TABLE VI
Actual Changed Votes
No Actual
Logrolling Logrolling Votes Percent
Percent
(1) (22) (3) (2)/(1)
(3)/(1)
REPUBLICANS
First Set: 1961-62
FARM 18 2 5 0.11 0.28
CITY 98 47 15 0.48 0.15
LABOR 37 15 5 0.41 0.14
Second Set: 1961-62
FARM 20 6 5 0.30 0.25
CITY 55 33 7 0.60 0.13
LABOR 32 12 3 0.38 0.09
DEMOCRATS
First Set: 1961-62
FARM 9 1 6 0.11 0.67
CITY 96 48 77 0.50 0.80
LABOR 52 29 41 0.56 0.79
Second Set: 1961-62
FARM 14 8 10 0.57 0.71
CITY 100 70 80 0.70 0.80
LABOR 64 50 49 0.78 0.77
REPUBLICANS
First Set: 1959-60
FARM 26 4 1 0.15 0.04
CITY 81 43 10 0.53 0.12
LABOR 37 19 4 0.51 0.11
Second Set: 1959-60
FARM 25 2 1 0.08 0.04
CITY 91 55 10 0.60 0.11
LABOR 39 21 5 0.54 0.13
DEMOCRATS
First Set: 1959-60
FARM 38 27 33 0.71 0.87
CITY 82 57 78 0.70 0.95
LABOR 36 24 34 0.67 0.94
Second Set: 1959-60
FARM 33 21 23 0.64 0.70
CITY 116 80 101 0.69 0.87
LABOR 28 20 28 0.71 1.00
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Logrolling has been a dominant issue in the economic analysis of
legislatures and the political process. However, little has been known
about whether logrolling is quantitatively important for legislative
decision making. No empirical study has analyzed whether logrolling
occurs--not only within a narrowly defined area like agriculture, but
whether it also extends to differing policy areas.
This paper finds that logrolling plays an important role for diverse
policy areas of legislative decision making. The findings suggest that
logrolling agreements are widespread, and this conclusion is consistent
with economic theory which predicts that trades are made when the
intensity of demand varies.
The primary beneficiaries of the special-interest legislation on
farm, city, and labor issues were members of the Democratic party.
Vote-trading agreements were made within that party, and thus it served
as an instrument to facilitate logrolling between its members. This
paper isolated the effect of logrolling from that of party pressure.
Potential party pressure was accounted for via the correlation in the
error terms, and the logrolling variable was thereby purged of party
loyalty. The results suggest that many members of the Democratic party
supported their fellow legislators because of logrolling agreements.
APPENDIX
Data Sources
Roll-call votes: Data on roll-call votes were obtained from data
tapes. The numbers of the votes corresponding to various issues of the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac are for 1959, #22, #23, #36, #37, for
1960, #36, and for 1961, #18, #22, #35, #47, and #51.
FARMER: Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 87th
Congress, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Washington,
D.C., 1961. The Congressional District Data Book does not list the
number of farms for congressional districts that were not whole-county
districts. For the districts that were not listed, the number of farms
was computed using county-level data.
AGINC: Agricultural Statistics 1959, United States Department of
Agriculture.
URBAN: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 2, 1962.
RENT: Congressional District Data Book, Districts of the 87th
Congress, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington,
D.C., 1961.
BLUEC: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 20, 1956.
UNION: Troy, Leo, Distribution of Union Membership among the States:
1939 and 1953, Occasional Paper 56, New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research Inc., 1957.
(1.) The other reason legislators may vote against their
constituencies' interests is because of personal ideology See Kalt
and Zupan [1984].
(2.) See Bernholz [1973] for a more rigorous representation of vote
trading. Mueller [1989] provides a review of the literature on
logrolling.
(3.) See Olson [1965] for a general discussion of the influence of
small groups in the political process.
(4.) Kau and Rubin [1979] have attempted to examine logrolls on votes
on diverse issues. However, their method has the shortcoming that they
use a dummy variable for the vote on the right-hand side of the
regression equation instead of using the predicted vote.
(5.) Further, if parties are successful in enforcing vote trades,
stable coalitions are expected. See Koford [1987] and Weingast and
Marshall [1988].
(6.) Similarly, individual ideology plays no role in the voting
decision of a representative within the Downsian model. If a legislator
voted his own ideology, the model predicts that he would lose to the
challenger in the next election.
(7.) For the form of the likelihood function and for a model to
detect logrolling see Stratman [1992]. A GAUSS program to evaluate the
likelihood function is available from the author upon request.
(8.) According to Mayhew's definition, a vote is of western
interest whenever the vote is on a specific issue concerning a
particular western district, as, for example,
[Y.sub.ji] = 1 if [Y*.sub.ji]>0 the building of a dam. In this
study, western interests are not focused on because of lack of
availability of good constituency variables.
(9.) This finding is consistent with the arguments presented by
Peltzman [1984] and Johnson and Stratmann [19921.
(10.) Mayhew [1966] suggests that if every legislator voted in line
with narrowly defined constituency preferences, only a minority of
legislators would have voted for farm, city, or labor interests. He
identified 111 farm districts, 140 city districts, and 128 labor
districts.
(11.) A nonlinear form of the constituency variables that were
available by district were tried in the regression analysis. However,
the results suggested that these variables are linear and not nonlinear
in the voting decisions of legislators.
(12.) If the probability of voting for special interests was less
than 0.5 for a certain representative when the logrolling variables were
left out of the vote equation, and if for this legislator the
probability increased to above 0.5 when the logrolling variables were
included, then I counted the representative as a legislator who switched
his or her vote because of membership in a logrolling coalition.
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THOMAS STRATMANN, Associate Professor, Montana State University. I
thank Kenneth J. Koford for his suggestion to examine logrolling
coalitions based on Mayhew 11966]. Further, helpful comments from two
anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged.