Employment and output effects of government spending: is government size important?
Karras, Georgios
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981 Barro proposed that temporary changes in government spending affect output more than permanent changes of the same size. He argued,
this is because temporary changes have no wealth effects, and so have a
larger impact on aggregate demand.(1) However, more recent research has
shown that in a life-cycle model with an endogenous labor-leisure choice
Barro's argument is reversed: permanent changes in government
spending have a greater impact on employment and output than transitory
changes of the same size, precisely because permanent changes are
associated with wealth effects that influence the optimal supply of
labor.(2)
The first objective in this paper is to examine possible differences
in the effects of permanent and transitory changes in government
spending. Government spending is decomposed for a number of countries
into permanent and transitory components and their relative impacts on
employment and output are examined.
My second objective is to investigate the relationship between public
sector spending and economic growth and the relationship of economic
growth to government size. Despite the importance of the subject, this
is an area where no consensus exists as yet. For example, Landau |1983~
concluded that "growth of government hurts growth," whereas
Kormendi and Meguire |1985~ found "no evidence that growth in the
ratio of government consumption to output adversely affects economic
growth," and Ram |1986~ reported that "government size has a
positive effect on economic performance and growth."(3) Recently
the above issue has become even more important because of the role
played in some of the "new" growth theory models by
externalities associated with the public sector. Barro |1990~ provides
an example of such a model where government sector productivity and the
size of government are important determinants of a country's growth
rate. In the present paper, I isolate the "productivity
effect" of government spending and then test its relationship to
government size.
The empirical results suggest that permanent changes in government
consumption generally have greater effects on output and employment than
do transitory changes of the same size. This result, robust across all
the different specifications examined, implies the existence of a
negative wealth effect associated with permanent increases in government
spending. It also reduces the potency of government spending as a
stabilization tool. In addition, the empirical findings also support a
negative relationship between the output effects of government spending
and government size, even though the statistical significance of this
relationship is sensitive to the choice of econometric methodology.
Using Barro's |1990~ theoretical conclusions, the estimated
equations imply that the optimal government size for the representative
country is approximately 20 percent of GDP.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the theoretical framework, and section III describes the econometric
methodology. Section IV reports the empirical results. Finally, section
V outlines the paper's main theoretical and policy implications.
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Following Barro |1981~ and Aschauer |1989~, assume that government
services are productive and let the aggregate production function take
the Cobb-Douglas form:
(1) |y.sub.t~ = |a.sub.n~|n.sub.t~ + |a.sub.k~|k.sub.t~ +
|a.sub.g~|g.sub.t~ + |u.sub.t~
with |u.sub.t~ = |Phi~ + |u.sub.t-1~ + |v.sub.t~, and where y is
output, n is labor, k is the capital stock, g is government consumption
(all variables in logarithms), and |Phi~ is the rate of technological
progress. Government consumption enters as an input because it includes
spending on the legal system, regulation, fire and police protection,
correction, and national defense. To the extent that it allows for a
more efficient allocation of property rights, g should have a positive
marginal product. We want to estimate (1) for as many countries as
possible, but because capital stock data exist only for a very small
number of countries, k will be eliminated from the production function
by using broadly accepted restrictions from economic theory. Under the
assumption that the steady state capital-output ratio is constant,
equation (1) becomes:(4)
(2) |Delta~|y.sub.t~ = (|Psi~ + |a.sub.n~|Delta~|n.sub.t~ +
|a.sub.g~|Delta~|g.sub.t~ + |v.sub.t~)/(1-|a.sub.k~)
where |Delta~ is the difference operator. This equation will be
estimated as
(3) |Delta~|y.sub.t~ = b + |b.sub.n~|Delta~|n.sub.t~ +
|b.sub.g~|Delta~|g.sub.t~ + ||Epsilon~.sub.t~,
and under the additional assumption of constant returns to scale in
capital and labor (|a.sub.n~ + |a.sub.k~ = 1), as(5)
(3|prime~) |Delta~|y.sub.t~ - |Delta~|n.sub.t~ = b +
|b.sub.g~|g.sub.t~ + ||Epsilon~.sub.t~.
All estimated equations will be specified in first differences
(growth rates) in order to avoid problems with nonstationarity and the
spurious regression problem first emphasized by Granger and Newbold
|1974~.
The production function implies that government spending affects
output in two ways: first directly as an input (the
"productivity" effect captured by |a.sub.g~ and |b.sub.g~),
but also indirectly through its impact on employment, n. Equation (3), a
structural equation, estimates the input effect. We can also estimate
the overall effect by obtaining the reduced forms for y and n as
functions of g.
Equation (2) and the assumption of profit maximization imply
(4) |Delta~|w.sub.t~ = ||Phi~ -
(1-|a.sub.k~-|a.sub.n~)|Delta~|n.sub.t~ + |a.sub.g~|Delta~|g.sub.t~ +
|v.sub.t~~/(1-|a.sub.k~)
where w is the logarithm of the real wage. Equation (4) is simply the
demand for labor written in terms of the wage. Next, write the labor
supply as
(5) |Mathematical Expression Omitted~
where |Mathematical Expression Omitted~ is the permanent component of
g. It is easy to show that in a life-cycle setting, labor supply is only
affected by changes in government spending that are (or are perceived to
be) permanent because only permanent changes in g have wealth
effects.(6) If permanent increases in g are associated with a wealth
loss, then |Zeta~ is positive.
At the labor market equilibrium, (4) and (5) can be combined to give
the reduced form for employment and output. These will be estimated as
(6) |Mathematical Expression Omitted~
and
(7) |Mathematical Expression Omitted~
where |Mathematical Expression Omitted~ is the transitory component
of g. The appendix derives both equations and also shows that if there
is a wealth loss (|Zeta~ |is greater than~ 0), permanent changes in g
will affect employment and output more than transitory changes
(|c.sub.1~|is greater than~|c.sub.2~ and |b.sub.1~|is greater
than~|b.sub.2~), and thus the Barro effect is reversed. The reasons for
this can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 that graphically examine the effects
of transitory and permanent increases in government spending,
respectively. In both figures, an increase in g shifts the demand for
labor to the right because of the increase in labor productivity. The
response of labor demand does not depend on whether the change is
permanent or transitory. This is not true for labor supply, however. In
Figure 1, where the increase in g is assumed to be temporary, there is
no wealth effect and thus labor supply is unaffected. In Figure 2, where
the increase in g is permanent and produces a wealth loss, labor supply
shifts to the right. It follows that employment, and therefore output,
will respond more to permanent than to transitory changes in government
spending.(7)
III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
Our main sample consists of thirty-seven countries (Group I) for
which data on output, the price level, and government consumption were
available for at least thirty years. The data are from the I.M.F.
International Financial Statistics. Employment data for sufficiently
long time periods (at least twenty years) were available for only
eighteen of the thirty-seven countries (Group II). The I.L.O. Yearbook
of Labor Statistics was the source for employment data. Table I presents
all the Group I countries along with a measure of government size and
its variance for each.
Equation (3) will be estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS)
because of the possible endogeneity of n. Then, the relationship of the
estimated |b.sub.g~'s to government size will be examined.
Equations (6) and (7), the reduced forms for employment and output, and
equation (3|prime~) can be consistently estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS).
The final issue that must be dealt with is the decomposition of
government consumption into permanent and transitory components. Because
every decomposition must be statistical, there are infinitely many ways
to carry it out.(8) The traditional method of linear detrending is
clearly not well-suited for our purposes because it generates a
deterministic permanent component. In addition, since the influential
work of Nelson and Plosser |1982~, it has been recognized that
stochastic trends are useful in the modelling of economic time series.
Guided by this, our first choice is the decomposition method first
proposed by Beveridge and Nelson |1981~, and later modified by
Cuddington and Winters |1987~, Miller |1988~, and Newbold |1990~. Watson
|1986~ has showed that the Beveridge-Nelson method belongs to a class of
optimal decompositions.
An alternative decomposition method, that will be employed in the
next section, was the one proposed by Hodrick and Prescott |1980~ and
used in the study of business cycles.(9) Kydland and Prescott |1990~
discuss this method, its selection criteria, and its uses. An additional
attractive feature of the Hodrick-Prescott filter is that it does not so
much rely on the "permanent vs transitory" nature of the
series, as on the "persistent vs cyclical" distinction. Put
differently, this approach, unlike the Beveridge-Nelson method, does not
depend on the existence of a unit root in the series and, as a result,
does not produce a trend component that is by construction a random
walk.(10) This property is desirable in our present application, because
it may not be permanence per se, but rather the persistence of
government consumption that in fact affects output and labor supply
decisions.
The next section presents the empirical results. All equations were
estimated using both the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) and the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) decompositions; the results obtained are in most cases
qualitatively similar. Because the Hodrick-Prescott technique has the
advantage discussed in the previous paragraph, and in order to preserve
space, I report only the Hodrick-Prescott results. In the single case
where the two methods provide different results, both are presented. All
results are available on request.
TABULAR DATA OMITTED
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table II reports the estimated reduced-form equations for employment
and output in terms of permanent and transitory government consumption.
All variables are in logarithms. The output equations are generally
estimated more successfully than the employment equations, which is not
surprising given that most of the latter have fewer degrees of freedom.
The coefficients usually have the expected sign (positive) and are often
statistically significant. Note that all coefficients with the wrong
sign are statistically insignificant. Our main interest at this point is
to examine whether the effects of permanent and transitory government
consumption are the same. In terms of equations (7) and (6), the null
hypotheses are |b.sub.1~ = |b.sub.2~ and |c.sub.1~ = |c.sub.2~. These
are tested by the F-statistic, whose significance level is reported in
Table II. Recall that if a permanent increase in g leads to a wealth
loss, the theory predicts that the permanent coefficients must be
generally larger. In Table II, this is clearly verified for output: for
seventeen countries, |c.sub.1~ = |c.sub.2~ can be rejected at the 10
percent level in favor of |c.sub.1~ |is greater than~ |c.sub.2~. In
addition, there is no country where the transitory effect has a
statistically significantly larger impact, and therefore no country
where the Barro hypothesis is verified. Thus it seems wealth effects do
exist, and permanent (or persistent) changes in government consumption
tend to raise output more than do transitory changes of the same size.
The evidence is less conclusive on employment, however. There are
only two countries (Australia and Japan) for which we can reject
|b.sub.1~ = |b.sub.2~ in favor of |b.sub.1~ |is greater than~ |b.sub.2~
at the 10 percent level, and there are two other countries (Italy and
Sweden) for which the inequality seems to hold in the opposite
direction. It seems plausible, however, that this is a result of the
limited number of observations we have for employment for most
countries. As shown below, the ambiguity disappears when the data are
pooled and the greater number of degrees of freedom allows for better
identification of the parameters.
Next, we estimate equations (3) and (3|prime~) for the eighteen Group
II countries. The method of estimation for equation (3) is two-stage
least squares in order to account for the possible endogeneity of
employment. The instruments include changes in the logarithm of
contemporaneous and lagged population, |Mathematical Expression
Omitted~, |Mathematical Expression Omitted~, |Delta~|n.sub.t-1~,
|Delta~|g.sub.t~, and |Delta~|g.sub.t-1~. Equation (3|prime~) can be
consistently estimated with OLS. The results are reported in Table III.
With the exception of the U.K., the estimates for |b.sub.g~ are positive
and often significant. Once more, the small number of degrees of freedom
may be preventing a tighter estimation of the |b.sub.g~ coefficient.
We also want to investigate the relationship between the output
elasticity of government consumption and government size, s. The index s
is defined as "average" government size, and it is calculated
over the relevant time periods (dictated by employment data
availability) as
|s.sub.i~ = |summation over t~|g.sub.it~ / |summation over
t~|y.sub.it~
Figures 3 and 4 plot the estimates of |b.sub.g~ against s for the
Hodrick-Prescott and Beveridge-Nelson decompositions, respectively.(11)
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the two variables are
(significance levels in parentheses):
|b.sub.g~ |b.sub.g~
Hodrick-Prescott Beveridge-Nelson
s -.232 -.517
(.355) (.028)
Both methods of decomposition imply a negative relationship between
the output elasticity of government consumption and government size,
even though only for the Beveridge-Nelson estimates does this
relationship appear to be statistically significant. There is evidence,
therefore, that government consumption is productive, but its output
elasticity falls with increases in government size.(12)
Evidence from Panel Data
A significant drawback of some of the regressions reported above is
that their degrees of freedom were limited. An obvious way to remedy
this within the present framework is to pool the data sets and conduct
time series-cross section regression.(13) Table IV contains the panel
regression results.
Panels A and B of Table IV estimate the reduced forms for output and
employment, respectively. All coefficients have the right sign and are
statistically significant, except for the coefficients of |Mathematical
Expression Omitted~ on employment, which are negative but statistically
not different from zero. The F-statistics test the hypothesis that the
coefficients of permanent and transitory changes in g are equal. As
expected given our previous results, this hypothesis can be rejected for
output in favor of the alternative that permanent effects are greater.
Interestingly, the null hypothesis is also rejected for employment,
again in favor of the alternative that permanent changes in g have a
greater impact. In addition, these findings are robust to different
models for the error term.
We next examine the importance of government size. Equation (3) can
be written as
(8) |Delta~|y.sub.it~ = |b.sub.0~ + |b.sub.n~|Delta~|n.sub.it~ +
|b.sub.g~|Delta~|g.sub.it~ + ||Epsilon~.sub.it~,
and |b.sub.g~ can be allowed to vary across countries as a function
of government size: |b.sub.gi~ = |Gamma~ + |Delta~|s.sub.i~. A negative
|Delta~ would imply a negative relationship between the output
elasticity of g and government size. Substituting the expression for
|b.sub.g~ into (8), the parameter |Delta~ can be estimated from
(9) |Delta~|y.sub.it~ = |b.sub.0~ + |b.sub.n~|Delta~|n.sub.it~ +
|Gamma~|Delta~|g.sub.it~ + |Delta~|s.sub.i~|Delta~|g.sub.it~ +
||Epsilon~.sub.it~.
Panels C and D of Table IV estimate several versions of equations (8)
and (9). Instrumental variables estimation with the usual list of
instruments is applied to the equations that include employment as an
explanatory variable. The first interesting result is that the
coefficients of |Delta~g are positive and statistically significant in
all specifications. This means that government consumption has a
positive marginal product. Equally interesting is that |Delta~ is
estimated to be negative by the interaction terms of Panel D, even
though it is statistically significant only in the last specification.
Note also, that the last specification is in terms of labor productivity
growth and estimated with OLS. This means that the decomposition method
is irrelevant in this case (since |Mathematical Expression Omitted~ is
only used as an instrument in some structural equations). TABULAR DATA
OMITTED TABULAR DATA OMITTED TABULAR DATA OMITTED These results seem to
suggest again, that while government consumption is productive, its
output elasticity depends negatively on government size.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first finding of this paper is that permanent changes in
government spending (like building more schools or enacting a new
bureaucracy) have a greater impact on employment and output than
transitory changes (like a commitment to send a man to Mars or a brief
military engagement). From Table IV, a 1 percent permanent increase in g
raises output in the representative country by 0.5 percent, whereas a 1
percent transitory increase raises output by only 0.1 percent.
Theoretically, this means that, unlike transitory increases, permanent
increases in g produce wealth losses that raise the optimal labor
supply.
This finding also has implications for stabilization policy. Since
permanent changes in government consumption have no cyclical effects, it
is only transitory changes in g that can be used for stabilization
purposes. Therefore, the paper's conclusion that the multipliers of
transitory changes in g are generally small reduces the attractiveness
of government consumption as a policy variable. In addition, the general
imprecision with which the responses of output to transitory changes are
estimated introduces significant uncertainty to the potency of g as a
policy variable and thus reduces its countercyclical value (see Brainard
|1967~).
The second finding of the paper is that government consumption is
generally productive and thus belongs in the production function. Using
the estimate of 0.281 for |b.sub.g~ from the second panel structural
equation, and a value of 0.30 for the capital share (Maddison |1990~,
Table 7), the output elasticity of government consumption for the
representative country in our sample is |a.sub.g~ =
|b.sub.g~(1-|a.sub.k~) = 0.20. This means that a 1 percent increase in
g, holding all other inputs constant, produces an average 0.2 percent
increase in output.
A third finding is that the output elasticity itself varies inversely
with government size. To illustrate, consider three countries with
different government sizes for the period examined. At the low end of
the spectrum, Japan has a government size of less than 10 percent of
GDP. At the other extreme, the government size in Sweden is 23 percent.
For Germany, in the middle, it is 18 percent. Maintaining the 0.30 value
for the capital share, and using |b.sub.g~ estimates from Table III, the
output elasticities of government consumption in these countries can be
calculated as follows: .32 in Japan, .22 in Germany (both statistically
significant), and .11 in Sweden (not statistically significant). These
numbers imply that a 1 percent increase in g, holding all other inputs
constant, will raise output by 0.32 percent in Japan, 0.22 percent in
Germany, and 0.11 percent in Sweden. In addition, these estimates have
implications about the optimal government size in each of these
countries. Using as a rule of thumb Barro's |1990~ conclusion that
the optimal government size, s, is equal to the output elasticity of g,
|a.sub.g~, one can conclude that the public sector is too small in
Japan, too large in Sweden, and has about the right size in Germany. We
can also go one step further. Writing |b.sub.g~ = |Gamma~ + |Beta~s,
Barro's rule of s = |a.sub.g~ becomes s = (|Gamma~ + |Delta~s)(1 -
|a.sub.k~) which gives
(10) s = (1-|a.sub.k~)|gamma~ / |1-|Delta~(1-|a.sub.k~)~
as the optimal government size for the representative country. Using
our estimates for |Gamma~ and |Delta~ from the last two panel
regressions, we obtain s = 0.19 (interestingly, both regressions imply
almost the same s despite different estimates for |Delta~ and |Gamma~).
Note also that this is almost identical to the 0.20 estimate for
|a.sub.g~, as estimated independently above.
Another way to illustrate this result is to write the marginal
product of government consumption as MPG = |a.sub.g~/s =
(1-|a.sub.k~)(|Delta~+|Gamma~/s). Using |Delta~ = -.876 and |Gamma~ =
.443 from Table IV, Figure 5 plots the marginal product of g against
government size for |a.sub.k~ = 0.3 and |a.sub.k~ = 0.4. Barro's
rule requires MPG = 1, and this is satisfied around s = 0.20 for both
plausible values for capital's share. We conclude that the optimal
government size for the representative country in our sample is
approximately 20 percent.
APPENDIX
From (1) the logarithm of the marginal product of capital is
(11) log(|MPK.sub.t~) = log(|a.sub.k~) + |y.sub.t~ - |k.sub.t~.
Using (11) we can write (1) as
(12) |y.sub.t~ = ||a.sub.n~|n.sub.t~ +
|a.sub.k~log(|a.sub.k~/|MPK.sub.t~) + |a.sub.g~|g.sub.t~ +
|u.sub.t~~/(1-|a.sub.k~).
We assume that at the steady state the marginal product of capital is
constant. From (11) this is equivalent to assuming that the steady state
capital-output ratio is constant. Equation (12) can be then written as
(2). We can also allow for deviations from the steady state by
specifying |(1-|a.sub.k~).sup.-1~/||u.sub.t~ +
|a.sub.k~log(|a.sub.k~/|MPK.sub.t~)~ as a random walk, in which case we
again obtain (2) and (3). The parameter |a.sub.g~ is not identified in
(2), but |b.sub.g~ is monotonically increasing in |a.sub.g~. Estimation
of |b.sub.g~ provides a measure of the input effect of government
spending on output. If the share of capital, |a.sub.k~, is not
dramatically different across countries (or more precisely, if
differences in |a.sub.k~ across countries do not depend on government
size, which is a weaker requirement), then any relationship between
|b.sub.g~ and government size would indicate the same relationship
between |a.sub.g~ and government size.
Profit maximization requires that the log of the real wage be
(13) |w.sub.t~ = log(|a.sub.n~) + |y.sub.t~ - |n.sub.t~,
which using (12) gives (4). Combining (4) and (5) gives
(14) |Mathematical Expression Omitted~
where
|Psi~ = ||1+|Xi~(1-|a.sub.n~-|a.sub.k~)|(1-|a.sub.k~).sup.-1~~.sup.-1~ |is greater than~ 0.
This is estimated as (6). Note that if |Zeta~ |is greater than~ 0,
(14) implies that |c.sub.1~ |is greater than~ |c.sub.2~. Finally, (6)
can be used to eliminate n from (3). The reduced form for output is thus
obtained:
(15) |Mathematical Expression Omitted~
which is estimated as (7). Again, if |Zeta~ |is greater than~ 0, (15)
implies |b.sub.1~ |is greater than~ |b.sub.2~.
1. Ahmed |1986~ also developed and estimated a similar model for the
United Kingdom.
2. See Christiano and Eichenbaum |1988~, Aiyagari, Christiano and
Eichenbaum |1990~, and Karras |1990~.
3. Reversing the causal relationship, Conte and Darrat |1988~ found a
feedback from real economic growth to the public sector size for
approximately ten OECD countries (half of their sample).
4. Most of the following equations are derived in the appendix.
5. Romer |1990~ gives a convincing argument why production functions
should exhibit constant returns to scale in rival factors of production.
6. It is plausible that in reality it may be persistence, rather than
permanence, of changes in government spending that matters for labor
supply decisions. In that case, the more persistent the government
spending process, the larger labor effects will be. This issue is
addressed by our choice of the Hodrick-Prescott filter as one of the
decomposition methods in the empirical section.
7. It also follows from this analysis that the wage will respond more
to transitory than to permanent changes in government spending. The only
reason why this is not tested by estimating a reduced form for the wage
is that wage data could not be obtained for a large number of countries.
Karras |1990~ finds that U.S. data are consistent with the wage
hypothesis.
8. See Christiano and Eichenbaum |1989~ for this and related issues.
Durlauf and Phillips |1988~ present a different and less agnostic point
of view.
9. The HP approach defines the trend component, |g.sup.P~, as the one
that minimizes
|Mathematical Expression Omitted~
For the purposes of this study, a number of different values for
|Lambda~ were tried, including |Lambda~ = 50, 100, 150, 200, and 500.
They all gave very similar results. Results reported are for |Lambda~ =
100, the value suggested by Kydland and Prescott |1989~.
10. It may be worth noting here, however, that the Beveridge-Nelson
identification assumption is not at all implausible, since stationarity
tests (not reported here but available on request) on the levels and
first differences of government consumption show convincingly that unit
roots on the levels do exist.
11. For an example of a similar methodology see Kormendi and Meguire
|1984~.
12. Note that this negative relationship is not simply one between
government size, s, and the marginal product of government spending.
From (1) it follows that the marginal product of government spending is
|a.sub.g~(Y/G) = |a.sub.g~|s.sup.-1~, and it is therefore by
construction negatively related to s. What the negative correlations of
Figures 1 and 2 (and also evidence from the next section) suggest is
that the parameter |a.sub.g~ itself varies inversely with government
size, which is a more interesting and novel finding.
13. The estimated equations become |z.sub.it~ = f(|v.sub.it~) +
|e.sub.it~, where z is the dependent variable, v is a vector of
explanatory variables, and e the error term. This can be estimated with
OLS if e is uncorrelated both across countries and time. It is likely,
however, that e will have fixed effects (|e.sub.it~ = |u.sub.i~ +
||Epsilon~.sub.it~ or |e.sub.it~ = |u.sub.i~ + |h.sub.t~ +
||Epsilon~.sub.it~) in which case GLS is required. If, in addition, some
of the right-hand-side variables are endogenous, then instrumental
variables must be used. In addition, ||Epsilon~.sub.it~ was allowed to
be autoregressive, ||Epsilon~.sub.it~ = |Rho~||Epsilon~.sub.it-1~, or
||Epsilon~.sub.it~ = ||Rho~.sub.i~||Epsilon~.sub.it-1~, but the
estimated |Rho~'s were statistically insignificant.
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